Manuela Moschella
Manuela Moschella is professor of political science in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the University of Bologna. She is one of the editors of the Review of International Political Economy. She has served as Associate Fellow at the Europe Programme at Chatham House and as Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovations (CIGI). Her research focuses on the politics of economic policymaking, the relationship between technocracy and politics, and the features of European political economy.
Moschella’s latest book is titled Unexpected Revolutionaries. How Central banks Made and Unmade Economic Orthodoxy (2024, Cornell University Press). The book traces and explains the institutional transformation of central banks from the 1970s to the Covid crisis by drawing attention to the patterns of political support for central banks over time.
She is also one of the co-editors of European Political Economy: Theoretical Approaches and Policy Issues (Oxford University Press, 2023)
Address: https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/manuela.moschella
@ManuMoschella | https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rG6Cj8QAAAAJ&hl=en
Moschella’s latest book is titled Unexpected Revolutionaries. How Central banks Made and Unmade Economic Orthodoxy (2024, Cornell University Press). The book traces and explains the institutional transformation of central banks from the 1970s to the Covid crisis by drawing attention to the patterns of political support for central banks over time.
She is also one of the co-editors of European Political Economy: Theoretical Approaches and Policy Issues (Oxford University Press, 2023)
Address: https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/manuela.moschella
@ManuMoschella | https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=rG6Cj8QAAAAJ&hl=en
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Books by Manuela Moschella
Moschella argues that the political nature of central banks lies at the heart of these transformations. While formally independent, central banks need political support to justify their policies and powers, and to obtain it, they carefully manage their reputation among their audienceselected officials, market actors, and citizens. Challenged by reputational threats brought about by twenty-first-century recessionary and deflationary forces, central banks such as the Federal Reserve System and the European Central Bank strategically deviated from orthodox monetary policies to preempt or manage political backlash and to regain public trust. Central banks thus evolved into a new role only in coordination with fiscal authorities and on the back of public contestation.
Papers by Manuela Moschella
Moschella argues that the political nature of central banks lies at the heart of these transformations. While formally independent, central banks need political support to justify their policies and powers, and to obtain it, they carefully manage their reputation among their audienceselected officials, market actors, and citizens. Challenged by reputational threats brought about by twenty-first-century recessionary and deflationary forces, central banks such as the Federal Reserve System and the European Central Bank strategically deviated from orthodox monetary policies to preempt or manage political backlash and to regain public trust. Central banks thus evolved into a new role only in coordination with fiscal authorities and on the back of public contestation.