I have a PhD in Philosophy from University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil. My research interests are mostly in Philosophy of Language. I'm currently working on the following subjects: word meaning, polysemy, semantic minimalism, reference, Frege's Puzzle and singular thought. Supervisors: Marco Ruffino
In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference ar... more In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.
Neste artigo, primeiramente apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conheci... more Neste artigo, primeiramente apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conhecimento de verdades contingentes a priori e a crítica de Keith Donnellan a essa tese. Depois, exploro a distinção que Donnellan faz entre (a) saber que uma sentença é verdadeira e (b) conhecer a verdade que essa sentença expressa. Argumento que essa distinção não é relevante apenas no contexto de sua crítica ao contingente a priori, mas sim para nossa prática com nomes próprios de modo geral. Tento mostrar que conhecer o significado de nomes próprios não se resume à nossa competência linguística com eles, mas depende de termos acquaintance com seus portadores. Se isso é verdadeiro, então a tese do contingente a priori, tal como formulada por Kripke, não pode estar correta.
Kaplan’s (1989a) solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of... more Kaplan’s (1989a) solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philosophers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch how some solutions to the name version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of character would look like, and argue that all of them are flawed in some way: they are either semantically implausible or unable to account for cognitive value successfully.
In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspecti... more In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspectival contents. Peter Ludlow's most recent book is a systematic defense and exploration of what he calls interperspectival contents. Such contents are a sui generis kind of content expressed in language by tense and indexical expressions. They are essentially perspectival, and they cannot be eliminated or reduced to non-perspectival contents. Moreover, the 'inter' in 'interperspectival' means they are not subjective, private Thanks to Peter Ludlow for very useful discussion and clarifications.
In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as bri... more In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.
In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct r... more In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential semantics to all subject-phrases. I offer a brief overview of its four chapters and point out some of their virtues and shortcomings.
Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an asp... more Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an aspect of meaning? Frege himself assumed an affirmative answer to those questions, and so did many direct reference theorists, such as David Kaplan and John Perry. Even though they defend a theory that is anti-Fregean by nature, they share the view that it is semantics’ business to account for Frege’s Puzzle and cognitive value. There are two traditional ways to do so in referentialist semantics. One is via character and the other via reflexive content. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that both fail. To do that, I first examine what exactly Frege’s Puzzle is, and if what traditionally goes under the name of “Frege’s Puzzle” really corresponds to the puzzle that Frege himself formulated. I then examine how the solutions to the puzzle in terms of character and reflexive content are supposed to work for indexicals, where they are most appealing, and for proper names. I argue that there is no version of these solutions that is able to account for all the relevant phenomena. I conclude that, if this is the case, then we have serious reasons to suspect that Frege’s Puzzle should not be explained by semantics, and that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning as it is often supposed.
In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference ar... more In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.
Neste artigo, primeiramente apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conheci... more Neste artigo, primeiramente apresento tese de Kripke sobre a possibilidade de se adquirir conhecimento de verdades contingentes a priori e a crítica de Keith Donnellan a essa tese. Depois, exploro a distinção que Donnellan faz entre (a) saber que uma sentença é verdadeira e (b) conhecer a verdade que essa sentença expressa. Argumento que essa distinção não é relevante apenas no contexto de sua crítica ao contingente a priori, mas sim para nossa prática com nomes próprios de modo geral. Tento mostrar que conhecer o significado de nomes próprios não se resume à nossa competência linguística com eles, mas depende de termos acquaintance com seus portadores. Se isso é verdadeiro, então a tese do contingente a priori, tal como formulada por Kripke, não pode estar correta.
Kaplan’s (1989a) solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of... more Kaplan’s (1989a) solution to the indexical version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of the character of linguistic expressions has been greatly influential and much discussed. Many philosophers regard it as being correct, or at least as being on the right track. However, little has been said about how character is supposed to apply to proper names, and how it could account for the name version of the Puzzle. In this paper I want to fill this gap. I sketch how some solutions to the name version of Frege’s Puzzle in terms of character would look like, and argue that all of them are flawed in some way: they are either semantically implausible or unable to account for cognitive value successfully.
In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspecti... more In this review, I present and discuss the main aspects of Peter Ludlow's theory of interperspectival contents. Peter Ludlow's most recent book is a systematic defense and exploration of what he calls interperspectival contents. Such contents are a sui generis kind of content expressed in language by tense and indexical expressions. They are essentially perspectival, and they cannot be eliminated or reduced to non-perspectival contents. Moreover, the 'inter' in 'interperspectival' means they are not subjective, private Thanks to Peter Ludlow for very useful discussion and clarifications.
In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as bri... more In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.
In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct r... more In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential semantics to all subject-phrases. I offer a brief overview of its four chapters and point out some of their virtues and shortcomings.
Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an asp... more Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an aspect of meaning? Frege himself assumed an affirmative answer to those questions, and so did many direct reference theorists, such as David Kaplan and John Perry. Even though they defend a theory that is anti-Fregean by nature, they share the view that it is semantics’ business to account for Frege’s Puzzle and cognitive value. There are two traditional ways to do so in referentialist semantics. One is via character and the other via reflexive content. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that both fail. To do that, I first examine what exactly Frege’s Puzzle is, and if what traditionally goes under the name of “Frege’s Puzzle” really corresponds to the puzzle that Frege himself formulated. I then examine how the solutions to the puzzle in terms of character and reflexive content are supposed to work for indexicals, where they are most appealing, and for proper names. I argue that there is no version of these solutions that is able to account for all the relevant phenomena. I conclude that, if this is the case, then we have serious reasons to suspect that Frege’s Puzzle should not be explained by semantics, and that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning as it is often supposed.
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