I was born forty-six years ago, I am married and have three children. I teach Theory of Knowledge at BA Philosophy (undergraduate) and for some time I have been dealing with phenomenological epistemology. I studied the connection, sometimes controversial, between Neo-kantianism and Phenomenology, in the belief that it was a case study about thesame philosophy and its use of reflection. I have an ancient and never dormant interest in the notions of space and measure, which I have studiedlooking not only at geometry and physics, but also at architecture and law. I hope, in the short term, to be able to give a more organic form to a phenomenological logic, by comparing Husserl and contemporary literature,especially on syntax, existential sentences, theory of concepts, modal semantics and the theory of truth.The proof of the pudding is in the eating!
The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a p... more The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a pivotal position in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory, with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of phenomenological accessibility.
In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschi... more In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschieden an Bedeutung gewonnen.Dieser Bereich ist disziplinenübergreifend, denn er beinhaltet Diskussionen der Logik (über die Definition von Begriffen), der Philosophie des Geistes (über die Analyse von Begriffsbildungsprozessen) und der Erkenntnistheorie (über die Untersuchung der Bildung und Veränderung von Begriffssystemen. Nicht zuletzt aus diesen Gründen stammen die besten Analysen des Begriffs ‚Beispiel‘ aus diesem Foschungsbereich. Aus der Perspektive der von Goodman inspirierten Definition des Beispiels scheinen allerdings die Theorien, die in diesem Bereich aufgestellt wurden, insofern mangelhaft, als sie Beispiele weder als Instanziierung von Eigenschaften noch als Referenten verstehen.
Masi, Melisi, Seller (eds.), Tra Experientia ed experimentum. Medioevo e modernità a contronto, pp. 173-193, 2022
What distinguishes an experience from an experiment? And in what
does the transition from one to ... more What distinguishes an experience from an experiment? And in what does the transition from one to the other consist of? Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation. The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations, testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify what kind of empiricism phenomenology is. That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954). What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a p... more The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a pivotal position in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory, with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of phenomenological accessibility.
In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschi... more In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschieden an Bedeutung gewonnen.Dieser Bereich ist disziplinenübergreifend, denn er beinhaltet Diskussionen der Logik (über die Definition von Begriffen), der Philosophie des Geistes (über die Analyse von Begriffsbildungsprozessen) und der Erkenntnistheorie (über die Untersuchung der Bildung und Veränderung von Begriffssystemen. Nicht zuletzt aus diesen Gründen stammen die besten Analysen des Begriffs ‚Beispiel‘ aus diesem Foschungsbereich. Aus der Perspektive der von Goodman inspirierten Definition des Beispiels scheinen allerdings die Theorien, die in diesem Bereich aufgestellt wurden, insofern mangelhaft, als sie Beispiele weder als Instanziierung von Eigenschaften noch als Referenten verstehen.
Temporality represents the most important and difficult question of
phenomenology: decisive for i... more Temporality represents the most important and difficult question of phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that... more Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that the VI Logical Investigation has introduced perception in the “space of reasons”? Can we share what Husserl himself wrote on the VI Logical Investigation, or that it constituted a first step towards a phenomenological theory of reason?
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
Il verso della dissoluzione e quello della caduta Notizie sull'orientamento architettonico tra Th... more Il verso della dissoluzione e quello della caduta Notizie sull'orientamento architettonico tra Th. Lipps e H. van der Laan Felice Masi 1. Pretesto: dal di sotto e dal di lato «Gli ingegneri quando fanno un ponte... poi, dopo che è fatto, e si regge da sé solo... al
Realismo, pragmatismo, naturalismo. Le trasformazioni della fenomenologia in Nord America, 2020
The essay aims to examine some contributions of A. Schutz to general
epistemological questions, ... more The essay aims to examine some contributions of A. Schutz to general
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.
Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that... more Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that the VI Logical Investigation has introduced perception in the “space of reasons”? Can we share what Husserl wrote on the VI Logical Investigation, that is, that it constituted a first step towards a phenomenological theory of reason? These two questions are mirror-like, even though he first one concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism and the second with respect to later developments of Husserlian thought, i. e. phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology. After a first part dedicated to some operational definitions, the essay deals with six study-cases, on the basis of which the conclusion is that the VI Logical Investigation achieves an intersection between theory of provability and reflexive empiricism.
The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a p... more The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a pivotal position in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory, with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of phenomenological accessibility.
In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschi... more In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschieden an Bedeutung gewonnen.Dieser Bereich ist disziplinenübergreifend, denn er beinhaltet Diskussionen der Logik (über die Definition von Begriffen), der Philosophie des Geistes (über die Analyse von Begriffsbildungsprozessen) und der Erkenntnistheorie (über die Untersuchung der Bildung und Veränderung von Begriffssystemen. Nicht zuletzt aus diesen Gründen stammen die besten Analysen des Begriffs ‚Beispiel‘ aus diesem Foschungsbereich. Aus der Perspektive der von Goodman inspirierten Definition des Beispiels scheinen allerdings die Theorien, die in diesem Bereich aufgestellt wurden, insofern mangelhaft, als sie Beispiele weder als Instanziierung von Eigenschaften noch als Referenten verstehen.
Masi, Melisi, Seller (eds.), Tra Experientia ed experimentum. Medioevo e modernità a contronto, pp. 173-193, 2022
What distinguishes an experience from an experiment? And in what
does the transition from one to ... more What distinguishes an experience from an experiment? And in what does the transition from one to the other consist of? Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation. The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations, testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify what kind of empiricism phenomenology is. That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954). What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a p... more The suppositional view of the conditionals, and the modal language which derives from it, has a pivotal position in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory, with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of phenomenological accessibility.
In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschi... more In den letzten dreißig Jahren hat die Erforschung von Begriffen, Konzeptionen und deren Unterschieden an Bedeutung gewonnen.Dieser Bereich ist disziplinenübergreifend, denn er beinhaltet Diskussionen der Logik (über die Definition von Begriffen), der Philosophie des Geistes (über die Analyse von Begriffsbildungsprozessen) und der Erkenntnistheorie (über die Untersuchung der Bildung und Veränderung von Begriffssystemen. Nicht zuletzt aus diesen Gründen stammen die besten Analysen des Begriffs ‚Beispiel‘ aus diesem Foschungsbereich. Aus der Perspektive der von Goodman inspirierten Definition des Beispiels scheinen allerdings die Theorien, die in diesem Bereich aufgestellt wurden, insofern mangelhaft, als sie Beispiele weder als Instanziierung von Eigenschaften noch als Referenten verstehen.
Temporality represents the most important and difficult question of
phenomenology: decisive for i... more Temporality represents the most important and difficult question of phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that... more Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that the VI Logical Investigation has introduced perception in the “space of reasons”? Can we share what Husserl himself wrote on the VI Logical Investigation, or that it constituted a first step towards a phenomenological theory of reason?
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
Il verso della dissoluzione e quello della caduta Notizie sull'orientamento architettonico tra Th... more Il verso della dissoluzione e quello della caduta Notizie sull'orientamento architettonico tra Th. Lipps e H. van der Laan Felice Masi 1. Pretesto: dal di sotto e dal di lato «Gli ingegneri quando fanno un ponte... poi, dopo che è fatto, e si regge da sé solo... al
Realismo, pragmatismo, naturalismo. Le trasformazioni della fenomenologia in Nord America, 2020
The essay aims to examine some contributions of A. Schutz to general
epistemological questions, ... more The essay aims to examine some contributions of A. Schutz to general
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.
Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that... more Can we say that the epistemology of the first phenomenology is a form of verificationism and that the VI Logical Investigation has introduced perception in the “space of reasons”? Can we share what Husserl wrote on the VI Logical Investigation, that is, that it constituted a first step towards a phenomenological theory of reason? These two questions are mirror-like, even though he first one concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism and the second with respect to later developments of Husserlian thought, i. e. phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology. After a first part dedicated to some operational definitions, the essay deals with six study-cases, on the basis of which the conclusion is that the VI Logical Investigation achieves an intersection between theory of provability and reflexive empiricism.
Chiunque abbia aperto un libro di Husserl sarà stato entusiasta o sorpreso per il frequente ricor... more Chiunque abbia aperto un libro di Husserl sarà stato entusiasta o sorpreso per il frequente ricorso a esempi da cui partire o con cui illustrare lunghe catene di argomenti. Questo è però il sintomo di una visione più ampia, meritevole di approfondimento, dei rapporti tra realtà e astrazione, esperienza e concetti, linguaggio e logica. In gioco è un’intera visione del mondo fatta di innumerevoli dettagli; delinearla è l’obiettivo di questo volume. La fenomenologia dal punto di vista empirico è, alla lettera, una prospettiva in cui praticare la fenomenologia. E se è vero che l’empirismo fenomenologico corre il duplice pericolo del riduzionismo e del deduttivismo, la fenomenologia dal punto di vista empirico prova a fugarli entrambi con una teoria della coscienza colta nella sua vita quotidiana, un’analisi dell’apparenza condotta con serio buon umore e un amore modesto per la verità.
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does the transition from one to the other consist of?
Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism
from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation.
The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the
connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations,
testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of
phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify
what kind of empiricism phenomenology is.
That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted
from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and
empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to
psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954).
What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the
choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its
its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a
contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the
resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a
verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from
the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of
hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to
determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory,
with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly
foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of
phenomenological accessibility.
phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus
about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.
does the transition from one to the other consist of?
Questions such as these accompany the entire history of empiricism
from Hume onwards. They are questions which, if properly understood, prevent us from getting away with one of the typical shortcuts: the difference between quality and quantity, or between qualia and things, or between description in the first or third person (or perhaps even second person), or between subjectivity and objectivity, or between the influence or ininfluence of observation.
The answer I would like to propose is that the difference, and thus also the
connection, between experience and experiment passes through the example, its choice and the work that is done with it. And this is the main answer that can be derived - at least this is my opinion - from a careful reading of Husserl. The centrality of the example in phenomenology, and especially in its long (perhaps too long) epistemological preparations,
testifies among other things, and once again, to the belonging of
phenomenology to a certain empiricist tradition and helps to clarify
what kind of empiricism phenomenology is.
That phenomenology has a passion not only for differences also for examples is a well-known fact; it is what for some makes it tedious, wasteful. It is so well known that it has more than once been interpreted
from the function it reserves for examples, both when an exemplaristic metaphysics an exemplarist metaphysics (De Muralt 1958), or when, examining its theory of concepts, the link between formalisation and
empirical-exemplary basis (Benoist 2009; cf. Lobo 2000), or when its use has been appreciated, in its narrower application to
psychopathology (Lanteri-Laura 1954).
What is less well known, however, is that, knowing how difficult the
choice of an example, Husserl had devised an instrument to regulate its
its formation and operation. The instrument of which I speak is the a
contingent a priori.I thought I would organise my report like this. First I will give a brief introduction and some initial clarification of terms. Then I will try to explain what I mean by example. Finally, I will line up some definitions of contingent a priori, taken mainly from Husserl.
in the current debate on probability. In order to clarify better many of the topics under discussion could be useful the
resumption of the reflections that Husserl dedicated to probability between 1902 and 1911. Against the background of a
verificationist epistemology of quasi-intuitive empirical statements, Husserl elaborates a logic of probability, distinct from
the pure logic, which applies to a specific class of empirical statements, suppositions. To this end, he defines different forms of
hypotheses and logical modalities; then he elaborates a peculiar concept of a fundamental field, in which it is possible to
determine the changes in the modalities of the statements based on motivations, probabilistically measurable. This theory,
with its oscillations and uncertainties, will be abandoned, starting from 1913, to make room for a more markedly
foundational position with the demonstration of presentability, which stresses, in a transcendental sense, the principle of
phenomenological accessibility.
phenomenology: decisive for its idea of phenomenon and consciousness. What means that time is the appearing itself, so not a time of consciousness but the consciousness itself: this is the phenomenological question about the origin of time. Composed in three decades approximately—from 1904 to 1934—Husserlian contributions phenomenology of temporality constitutes the most extensive corpus
about this matter in the canon of occidental philosophy. They lead in three main directions and correspond to the same number of periods of their development: the mathesis of intentional manifolds (1904–1911), the metaphysics of individuality (1917–1918), the theory of temporal self-constitution (1929–1934). After the description of the phases, the sources and the internal articulations, the paper makes room for a brief and essential glossary of phenomenology of temporality, made up of some of the most considerable and aporetic notions: the retention, and its bond with protention, individuality and its elusive essence, the flow and the stream. Lastly, the paper inspects and examines some of the most remarkable critics to phenomenology of temporality, from Heidegger to Derrida, from Bergmann to Lévinas, in order to demonstrate how leading was its role in the whole philosophy of the twentieth century.
These two questions are mirror-like; although the first concerns the demarcation of phenomenology with respect to the tradition of classical empiricism (of which, somehow, also included Brentano, but also the Carnap’s testability and Popper’s falsificationism) and the other with respect to subsequent developments of husserlian thought, that is to say with respect to phenomenological philosophy or transcendental phenomenology, however only if the phenomenological epistemology of VI Logical Investigation is part of a theory of reason (in a theory of give the reason of cognitive statements and ultimately also of oneself, as a theory) , then it can also be a particular case of verificationism.
epistemological questions, starting from his idea of the scientific theories and concepts formation, of type and model, of relevance, of proof and degree of belief. Great attention is paid to the resumption of the Carneades’ mechanism, in which each operation of confirmation is linked to a level of credibility. The focus on these issues allows not only to understand Schutz’s context (North American phenomenology, logical neo-empiricism, pragmatism and his peculiar relationship with F. Kaufmann), but also to establish a comparison with Chisholm’s reading of Carneades.