Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2016
The present work deals with the quality issue in social ontology: the fact that social entities n... more The present work deals with the quality issue in social ontology: the fact that social entities not only can exist or not exist, but can also be more or less achieved and be subject to degrees of existence, and the fact that social entities can be bearers of varieties of ways of existence, that is, there are several ways in which a social entity of a certain type can be realized. In accordance with phenomenological eidetics, I show that modifications of essential connections involve lacks or variations of essential parts of entities, which, respectively, imply degrees of existence and varieties of ways of existence which "enhance" the existence of social entities, and I argue that the modification issue hits the core of the quality of existence issue. Lastly, I focus on the essential connection of tendency as another case in which eidetics provides meaningful insights into the existential quality issue in social ontology.
Starting from Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy, I argue for an eidetics of empathy, ac... more Starting from Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy, I argue for an eidetics of empathy, according to which empathy is one type of acts that, as a whole, is subject to variations of its parts. Eidetics of empathy shows that a variety of acts of empathy, characterised by different degrees of fulfilment, is possible. Moreover, it allows to take into account adequately crucial issues in phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social ontology: in what sense empathy is the «direct perception» of others and their lived experiences? What is «negative empathy»? What are the essential features of sympathy and emotional sharing, as different from empathy?
In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint ... more In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment. Special attention is devoted to the importance of this notion both for human life in its social aspects (notably, the formation of group beliefs and the constituions of just joint commitments) and for social ontology (in particular, for the understanding of norm and institutions and of the intentionality of groups). Then, we briefly summarize the contents of the contributions collected in the issue.
I will argue for three principal claims that found the structure of the present issue of “Phenome... more I will argue for three principal claims that found the structure of the present issue of “Phenomenology and Mind” and represent three Leitmotive of the papers in it collected. A first claim on social world and everyday life world: (i) by making the social world, we make our everyday life world; A second and third claims on two essential features characterising social entities: (ii) social entities existentially depend on the intentionality of individuals, and precisely on heterotropic intentionality of individuals (collective intentionality, social intentionality and inter-subjective intentionality, or social cognition); (iii) social entities are essentially normative entities, i.e. social entities are bearers of a deontology.
I focus on empathy from an eidetic perspective, that provided by Edith Stein in her work On the P... more I focus on empathy from an eidetic perspective, that provided by Edith Stein in her work On the Problem of Empathy (1917) and which I call eidetics of empathy. I suggest that the eidetics of empathy allows us to inquire efficaciously into the structure of empathy, and therefore into the relation between empathy on the one hand, and embodied personal identity and intersubjectivity on the other. I argue that the eidetics of empathy sheds light on the complexity, heterogeneity and also fragility of the acts of empathy that we perform in our everyday life with respect to others, and provides us with the conceptual tools to address crucial questions such as: What is the specific and distinctive structure of empathy? What are the conditions of possibility of the performance of acts of empathy? Are there different fulfilment degrees of empathy? What role do living bodies play in the performance of acts of empathy? How is it possible to prevent and correct mistakes of empathy? I deal with t...
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, co... more I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very ...
In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I ... more In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of lega...
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2021
In this paper we investigate ways to comply with justice in a liberal democracy. In order to do t... more In this paper we investigate ways to comply with justice in a liberal democracy. In order to do that, we sketch Rawls’s account of moral-consensus stability and discuss the alternative idea of stab...
I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entitie... more I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the qu...
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2016
The present work deals with the quality issue in social ontology: the fact that social entities n... more The present work deals with the quality issue in social ontology: the fact that social entities not only can exist or not exist, but can also be more or less achieved and be subject to degrees of existence, and the fact that social entities can be bearers of varieties of ways of existence, that is, there are several ways in which a social entity of a certain type can be realized. In accordance with phenomenological eidetics, I show that modifications of essential connections involve lacks or variations of essential parts of entities, which, respectively, imply degrees of existence and varieties of ways of existence which "enhance" the existence of social entities, and I argue that the modification issue hits the core of the quality of existence issue. Lastly, I focus on the essential connection of tendency as another case in which eidetics provides meaningful insights into the existential quality issue in social ontology.
Starting from Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy, I argue for an eidetics of empathy, ac... more Starting from Stein’s phenomenological account of empathy, I argue for an eidetics of empathy, according to which empathy is one type of acts that, as a whole, is subject to variations of its parts. Eidetics of empathy shows that a variety of acts of empathy, characterised by different degrees of fulfilment, is possible. Moreover, it allows to take into account adequately crucial issues in phenomenology of intersubjectivity and social ontology: in what sense empathy is the «direct perception» of others and their lived experiences? What is «negative empathy»? What are the essential features of sympathy and emotional sharing, as different from empathy?
In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint ... more In this introductory chapter, we recall some of the crucial aspects of Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment. Special attention is devoted to the importance of this notion both for human life in its social aspects (notably, the formation of group beliefs and the constituions of just joint commitments) and for social ontology (in particular, for the understanding of norm and institutions and of the intentionality of groups). Then, we briefly summarize the contents of the contributions collected in the issue.
I will argue for three principal claims that found the structure of the present issue of “Phenome... more I will argue for three principal claims that found the structure of the present issue of “Phenomenology and Mind” and represent three Leitmotive of the papers in it collected. A first claim on social world and everyday life world: (i) by making the social world, we make our everyday life world; A second and third claims on two essential features characterising social entities: (ii) social entities existentially depend on the intentionality of individuals, and precisely on heterotropic intentionality of individuals (collective intentionality, social intentionality and inter-subjective intentionality, or social cognition); (iii) social entities are essentially normative entities, i.e. social entities are bearers of a deontology.
I focus on empathy from an eidetic perspective, that provided by Edith Stein in her work On the P... more I focus on empathy from an eidetic perspective, that provided by Edith Stein in her work On the Problem of Empathy (1917) and which I call eidetics of empathy. I suggest that the eidetics of empathy allows us to inquire efficaciously into the structure of empathy, and therefore into the relation between empathy on the one hand, and embodied personal identity and intersubjectivity on the other. I argue that the eidetics of empathy sheds light on the complexity, heterogeneity and also fragility of the acts of empathy that we perform in our everyday life with respect to others, and provides us with the conceptual tools to address crucial questions such as: What is the specific and distinctive structure of empathy? What are the conditions of possibility of the performance of acts of empathy? Are there different fulfilment degrees of empathy? What role do living bodies play in the performance of acts of empathy? How is it possible to prevent and correct mistakes of empathy? I deal with t...
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, co... more I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very ...
In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I ... more In my paper I introduce the phenomenological concept of “eidetics” and its application to law. I show that, according to this approach grounded in the works of Reinach (1913/1989) and Stein (1925), the problem of the existence and validity of the law can be fruitfully analysed in terms of parts-wholes which constitute law-making acts as wholes, both as performed and fulfilled acts. I argue that the parts of law-making acts can be subject to varying degrees of constraint – necessary, possible or contingent parts – and that it is the possible part of law-making acts that makes the difference between the existence of law-making acts and their validity: between their mere existence as performed acts, and their full existence as fulfilled and valid acts. I show this in focusing on Stein’s suggestion of filling the inter-personal gap between legislator and citizens in legal provisions by introducing “integrative acts”, which facilitate the uptake and, consequently, the enforcement of lega...
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2021
In this paper we investigate ways to comply with justice in a liberal democracy. In order to do t... more In this paper we investigate ways to comply with justice in a liberal democracy. In order to do that, we sketch Rawls’s account of moral-consensus stability and discuss the alternative idea of stab...
I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entitie... more I address the issue of the unity of social ontology despite the extreme variety of social entities: groups, money, promises, governments, laws, etc. Then, I focus on Gilbert’s account of social ontology as an ontology specifically dealing with groups as plural subjects, and face with Gilbert’s concept of shared values as values of plural subjects created by joint commitment. I argue that Gilbert’s account of shared values is a cognitivist and extrinsic one: it neglects the specific role of values for the constitution of plural subjects and considers values neither as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for social unity. I suggest that, unlike Gilbert and the main trend in the contemporary social ontological debate, phenomenology provides an axiology that can allow to account adequately for values and to understand values’ crucial role for social unity. I discuss Scheler’s dividing vs. sharing values thesis and mention Schapp’s collective values thesis. Finally I address the qu...
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