One of the most controversial aspects in the current debate over intuitions in analytic philosoph... more One of the most controversial aspects in the current debate over intuitions in analytic philosophy is the issue of their evidential role. On the one hand the “classical view” proposes that intuitions provide self-sustaining, rock-bottom evidence that can be taken as an a priori source of knowledge for philosophical theory-building. In contrast Hermann Cappelen argues that intuitions do not play any evidential role in philosophy.
Based on an overview on these paradigmatic standpoints I present an intermediate position on the evidential role of intuitions. Intuitions have evidential value and they are relevant for philosophical inquiry. I argue for their reliability with the help of an analogy with perception and the phenomenological notion of “Being in the World”. Just like perception intuitions are rooted in our direct, engaged involvement with the world. When we are ready to accept “perceptual dogmatism” (at least for pragmatic reasons) “intuitive dogmatism” can be employed as well. Some authors in the field seem to have sympathies for this perspective (Chudnoff 2010; Kornblith 2007; Nagel 2012; Sosa 2007b).
Intuitions cannot be understood without taking their fallibility into account. Intuitions are not meant to be used as unquestioned, a priori sources of knowledge. They provide defeasible evidence, just like many other kinds of evidence. Hence they can be used as starting points in philosophical discussion. Finally I introduce some criteria to examine the trustworthiness of specific intuitions. They can be seen as first steps in a theory of error regarding intuitions.
Starting from the epistemological controversy between reductionism and holism this paper investig... more Starting from the epistemological controversy between reductionism and holism this paper investigates a case in the social sciences: Social network analysis claims a position in the “middle” of these two poles (thesis 1). In this paper I provide two main arguments drawn from the philosophy of science which suggest to identify a “reductionist tilt” of the research trend under discussion. Its mathematical-formalistic methodology and its economic-instrumentalist approach challenge the epistemological claim (thesis 2). However, recent developments around the network theorist Harrison C. White seem to provide for a way of thinking that does not only bring the epistemological “middle” into reach again but can also be understood as part of a “new” philosophy including contemporary philosophers like Jacques Derrida and Niklas Luhmann: This thinking could be characterized by its decidedly interdisciplinary approach, its consideration of reciprocity and non-linear causality as well as the assumption of a difference as a metaphysical origin (thesis 3).
One of the most controversial aspects in the current debate over intuitions in analytic philosoph... more One of the most controversial aspects in the current debate over intuitions in analytic philosophy is the issue of their evidential role. On the one hand the “classical view” proposes that intuitions provide self-sustaining, rock-bottom evidence that can be taken as an a priori source of knowledge for philosophical theory-building. In contrast Hermann Cappelen argues that intuitions do not play any evidential role in philosophy.
Based on an overview on these paradigmatic standpoints I present an intermediate position on the evidential role of intuitions. Intuitions have evidential value and they are relevant for philosophical inquiry. I argue for their reliability with the help of an analogy with perception and the phenomenological notion of “Being in the World”. Just like perception intuitions are rooted in our direct, engaged involvement with the world. When we are ready to accept “perceptual dogmatism” (at least for pragmatic reasons) “intuitive dogmatism” can be employed as well. Some authors in the field seem to have sympathies for this perspective (Chudnoff 2010; Kornblith 2007; Nagel 2012; Sosa 2007b).
Intuitions cannot be understood without taking their fallibility into account. Intuitions are not meant to be used as unquestioned, a priori sources of knowledge. They provide defeasible evidence, just like many other kinds of evidence. Hence they can be used as starting points in philosophical discussion. Finally I introduce some criteria to examine the trustworthiness of specific intuitions. They can be seen as first steps in a theory of error regarding intuitions.
Starting from the epistemological controversy between reductionism and holism this paper investig... more Starting from the epistemological controversy between reductionism and holism this paper investigates a case in the social sciences: Social network analysis claims a position in the “middle” of these two poles (thesis 1). In this paper I provide two main arguments drawn from the philosophy of science which suggest to identify a “reductionist tilt” of the research trend under discussion. Its mathematical-formalistic methodology and its economic-instrumentalist approach challenge the epistemological claim (thesis 2). However, recent developments around the network theorist Harrison C. White seem to provide for a way of thinking that does not only bring the epistemological “middle” into reach again but can also be understood as part of a “new” philosophy including contemporary philosophers like Jacques Derrida and Niklas Luhmann: This thinking could be characterized by its decidedly interdisciplinary approach, its consideration of reciprocity and non-linear causality as well as the assumption of a difference as a metaphysical origin (thesis 3).
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Papers by Gerhard Kreuch
Based on an overview on these paradigmatic standpoints I present an intermediate position on the evidential role of intuitions. Intuitions have evidential value and they are relevant for philosophical inquiry. I argue for their reliability with the help of an analogy with perception and the phenomenological notion of “Being in the World”. Just like perception intuitions are rooted in our direct, engaged involvement with the world. When we are ready to accept “perceptual dogmatism” (at least for pragmatic reasons) “intuitive dogmatism” can be employed as well. Some authors in the field seem to have sympathies for this perspective (Chudnoff 2010; Kornblith 2007; Nagel 2012; Sosa 2007b).
Intuitions cannot be understood without taking their fallibility into account. Intuitions are not meant to be used as unquestioned, a priori sources of knowledge. They provide defeasible evidence, just like many other kinds of evidence. Hence they can be used as starting points in philosophical discussion. Finally I introduce some criteria to examine the trustworthiness of specific intuitions. They can be seen as first steps in a theory of error regarding intuitions.
Other by Gerhard Kreuch
Based on an overview on these paradigmatic standpoints I present an intermediate position on the evidential role of intuitions. Intuitions have evidential value and they are relevant for philosophical inquiry. I argue for their reliability with the help of an analogy with perception and the phenomenological notion of “Being in the World”. Just like perception intuitions are rooted in our direct, engaged involvement with the world. When we are ready to accept “perceptual dogmatism” (at least for pragmatic reasons) “intuitive dogmatism” can be employed as well. Some authors in the field seem to have sympathies for this perspective (Chudnoff 2010; Kornblith 2007; Nagel 2012; Sosa 2007b).
Intuitions cannot be understood without taking their fallibility into account. Intuitions are not meant to be used as unquestioned, a priori sources of knowledge. They provide defeasible evidence, just like many other kinds of evidence. Hence they can be used as starting points in philosophical discussion. Finally I introduce some criteria to examine the trustworthiness of specific intuitions. They can be seen as first steps in a theory of error regarding intuitions.