Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
skip to main content
10.1145/3289239.3289244acmotherconferencesArticle/Chapter ViewAbstractPublication PagesssprewConference Proceedingsconference-collections
research-article

gExtractor: Towards Automated Extraction of Malware Deception Parameters

Published: 03 December 2018 Publication History

Abstract

The lack of agility in cyber defense gives adversaries a significant advantage for discovering cyber targets and planning their attacks in stealthy and undetectable manner. While there has been significant research on detecting or predicting attacks, adversaries can always scan the network, learn about countermeasures, and develop new evasion techniques. Active Cyber Deception (ACD) has emerged as effective means to reverse this asymmetry in cyber warfare by dynamically orchestrating the cyber deception environment to mislead attackers and corrupting their decision-making process. However, developing an efficient active deception environment usually requires human intelligence and analysis to characterize the attackers' behaviors (e.g., malware actions). This manual process significantly limits the capability of cyber deception to actively respond to new attacks (malware) in a timely manner.
In this paper, we present a new analytic framework and an implemented prototype, called gExtractor, to analyze the malware behavior and automatically extract the deception parameters using symbolic execution in order to enable the automated creation of cyber deception schemes. The deception parameters are environmental variables on which attackers depend to discover the target system and reach their goals; Yet, they can be reconfigured and/or misrepresented by the defender in the cyber environment. Our gExtractor approach contributes to the scientific and system foundations of reasoning about autonomous cyber deception. Our prototype was developed based on customizing a symbolic execution engine for analyzing Microsoft Windows malware. Our case studies of recent malware instances show that gExtractor can be used to identify various critical parameters effective for cyber deception.

References

[1]
Ehab Al-Shaer and Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman. 2015. Attribution, Temptation, and Expectation: A Formal Framework for Defense-by-Deception in Cyberwarfare. In Cyber Warfare. Springer, 57--80.
[2]
Spyros Antonatos, Periklis Akritidis, Evangelos P Markatos, and Kostas G Anagnostakis. 2007. Defending against hitlist worms using network address space randomization. Computer Networks 51, 12 (2007), 3471--3490.
[3]
Frederico Araujo, Kevin W. Hamlen, Sebastian Biedermann, and Stefan Katzenbeisser. 2014. From Patches to Honey-Patches: Lightweight Attacker Misdirection, Deception, and Disinformation. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 942--953.
[4]
D. Balzarotti, M. Cova, C. Karlberger, C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, and G. Vigna. 2010. Efficient Detection of Split Personalities in Malware. In Proc of NDSS '10.
[5]
D. Brumley, C. Hartwig, Z. Liang, J. Newsome, P. Poosankam, D. Song, and H. Yin. 2008. Automatically Identifying Trigger-based Behavior in Malware. In Botnet Analysis and Defense, W. Lee, C. Wang, and D. Dagon (Eds.). Vol. 36. Springer, 65--88.
[6]
P. Royal C. Song and W. Lee. 2012. Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. In Proc. of HotSec'12.
[7]
Vitaly Chipounov, Volodymyr Kuznetsov, and George Candea. 2012. The S2E platform: Design, implementation, and applications. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS) 30, 1 (2012), 2.
[8]
Mihai Christodorescu, Somesh Jha, and Christopher Kruegel. 2007. Mining Specifications of Malicious Behavior. In Proceedings of the the 6th Joint Meeting of the European Software Engineering Conference and the ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on The Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC-FSE '07). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 5--14.
[9]
P. M. Comparetti, G. Salvaneschi, E. Kirda, C. Kolbitsch, C. Krugel, and S. Zanero. 2010. Identifying Dormant Functionality in Malware Programs. In Proc. of S&P '10.
[10]
Leonardo De Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner. 2008. Z3: An efficient SMT solver. In International conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems. Springer, 337--340.
[11]
Nicolas Falliere. 2007. Windows Anti-Debug Reference. https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/windows-anti-debug-reference. (2007). {Online; accessed 04-February-2018}.
[12]
Syed Fida Hussain Gillani, Ehab Al-Shaer, Samantha Lo ?, Qi Duan, and Mostafa Ammar ?and Ellen Zegura. 2015. Agile Virtualized Infrastructure to Proactively Defend Against Cyber Attacks. In Infocom.
[13]
Harriet Goldman, Rosalie McQuaid, and Jeffrey Picciotto. 2011. Cyber resilience for mission assurance. In Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2011 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 236--241.
[14]
Kristin E Heckman, Frank J Stech, Roshan K Thomas, Ben Schmoker, and Alexander W Tsow. 2015. Cyber denial, deception and counter deception. Springer.
[15]
Todd Jackson, Babak Salamat, Andrei Homescu, Karthikeyan Manivannan, Gregor Wagner, Andreas Gal, Stefan Brunthaler, Christian Wimmer, and Michael Franz. 2011. Compiler-generated software diversity. In Moving Target Defense. Springer, 77--98.
[16]
Haadi Jafarian, Qi Duan, and Ehab Al-Shaer. 2016. Effective Address Mutation Approach for Disrupting Reconnaissance Attacks. To appear in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (2016).
[17]
J. H. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan. 2015. An Effective Address Mutation Approach for Disrupting Reconnaissance Attacks. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 10, 12 (Dec 2015), 2562--2577.
[18]
Sushil Jajodia, Anup K. Ghosh, V.S Subrahmanian, Vipin Swarup, Cliff Wang, and Xiaoyang Sean Wang (Eds.). 2013. Moving Target Defense II - Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling. Advances in Information Security, Vol. 100. Springer.
[19]
Min Gyung Kang, Stephen McCamant, Pongsin Poosankam, and Dawn Song. 2011. Dta++: dynamic taint analysis with targeted control-flow propagation. In NDSS.
[20]
Amanjot Kaur. 2013. Dynamic Honeypot Construction. (2013).
[21]
C. Kolbitsch, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel. 2011. The Power of Procrastination: Detection and Mitigation of Execution-Stalling Malicious Code. In Proc. of CCS' 11.
[22]
C. Kolbitsch, B. Livshits, B. Zorn, and C. Seifert. 2012. Rozzle: De-Cloaking Internet Malware. In Proc. of S&P' 12.
[23]
Sukwha Kyung, Wonkyu Han, Naveen Tiwari, Vaibhav Hemant Dixit, Lakshmi Srinivas, Ziming Zhao, Adam Doupé, and Gail-Joon Ahn. 2017. HONEYPROXY: Design and Implementation of Next-Generation Honeynet via SDN. In IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS).
[24]
Martina L, Clemens K., and M.Paolo. 2011. Detecting Environment-Sensitive Malware. In Proc. of RAID'11.
[25]
Kaspersky Lab. 2017. Kaspersky Security Bulletin. Overall statistics for 2017. https://securelist.com/ksb-overall-statistics-2017/83453/. (2017).
[26]
A. Moser, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. 2007. Exploring Multiple Execution Paths for Malware Analysis. In Proc. of S&P' 07.
[27]
Fei Peng, Zhui Deng, Xiangyu Zhang, Dongyan Xu, Zhiqiang Lin, and Zhendong Su. 2014. X-Force: Force-Executing Binary Programs for Security Applications. In Proceedings of the 2014 USENIX Security Symposium. San Diego, CA.
[28]
Georgios Portokalidis and Angelos D Keromytis. 2011. Global ISR: Toward a comprehensive defense against unauthorized code execution. In Moving Target Defense. Springer, 49--76.
[29]
Yong Qiao, Yuexiang Yang, Jie He, Chuan Tang, and Zhixue Liu. 2014. CBM: Free, Automatic Malware Analysis Framework Using API Call Sequences. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 225--236.
[30]
Prateek Saxena, Pongsin Poosankam, Stephen McCamant, and Dawn Song. 2009. Loop-extended symbolic execution on binary programs. In Proceedings of the eighteenth international symposium on Software testing and analysis. ACM, 225--236.
[31]
Madhu K. Shankarapani, Subbu Ramamoorthy, Ram S. Movva, and Srinivas Mukkamala. 2011. Malware Detection Using Assembly and API Call Sequences. J. Comput. Virol. 7, 2 (May 2011), 107--119.
[32]
Verizon Enterprise Solutions. 2017. 2017 Data Breach Investigations Report. http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2017/. (2017).
[33]
Nathaniel Soule, Borislava Simidchieva, Fusun Yaman, Ronald Watro, Joseph Loyall, Michael Atighetchi, Marco Carvalho, David Last, David Myers, and Capt Bridget Flatley. 2015. Quantifying & Minimizing Attack Surfaces Containing Moving Target Defenses. (2015).
[34]
Jianhua Sun, Kun Sun, and Qi Li. 2017. CyberMoat: Camouflaging critical server infrastructures with large scale decoy farms. In Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2017 IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 1--9.
[35]
PaX Team. 2015. PaX address space layout randomization (ASLR). http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/aslr.txt. (2015). {Online; accessed 10-Feburary-2017}.
[36]
Slush Pool Team. 2017. Stratum Mining Protocol Official Documentation. https://slushpool.com/help/manual/stratum-protocol/. (2017).
[37]
J. Wilhelm and T. Chiueh. 2007. A forced sampled execution approach to kernel rootkit identification. In Proc. of RAID'07.
[38]
Jun Xu, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer. 2003. Transparent runtime randomization for security. In 22nd International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 2003. Proceedings. 260--269.
[39]
Z. Xu, L. Chen, G. Gu, and C. Kruegel. 2012. PeerPress: Utilizing Enemies' P2P Strength against Them. In Proc.of CCS' 12.
[40]
Zhaoyan Xu, Jialong Zhang, Guofei Gu, and Zhiqiang Lin. 2014. Golden Eye: Efficiently and Effectively Unveiling Malware's Targeted Environment. In Proceedings of the 17th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID' 14).
[41]
Yulong Zhang, Min Li, Kun Bai, Meng Yu, and Wanyu Zang. 2012. Incentive Compatible Moving Target Defense against VM-Colocation Attacks in Clouds. In Information Security and Privacy Research, Dimitris Gritzalis, Steven Furnell, and Marianthi Theoharidou (Eds.). IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, Vol. 376. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 388--399.
[42]
Quanyan Zhu and Tamer Başar. 2013. Game-theoretic approach to feedback-driven multi-stage moving target defense. In Decision and Game Theory for Security. Springer, 246--263.

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Application Layer Cyber Deception Without Developer Interaction2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)10.1109/EuroSPW61312.2024.00053(416-429)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
  • (2023)SCAHunter: Scalable Threat Hunting Through Decentralized Hierarchical Monitoring Agent ArchitectureIntelligent Computing10.1007/978-3-031-37963-5_88(1282-1307)Online publication date: 20-Aug-2023
  • (2022)Forced continuation of malware execution beyond exceptionsJournal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques10.1007/s11416-022-00457-819:4(483-501)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2022

Recommendations

Comments

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Other conferences
SSPREW-8: Proceedings of the 8th Software Security, Protection, and Reverse Engineering Workshop
December 2018
69 pages
ISBN:9781450360968
DOI:10.1145/3289239
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 03 December 2018

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Qualifiers

  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed limited

Conference

SSPREW-8

Acceptance Rates

Overall Acceptance Rate 6 of 13 submissions, 46%

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)16
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)4
Reflects downloads up to 01 Sep 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Application Layer Cyber Deception Without Developer Interaction2024 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW)10.1109/EuroSPW61312.2024.00053(416-429)Online publication date: 8-Jul-2024
  • (2023)SCAHunter: Scalable Threat Hunting Through Decentralized Hierarchical Monitoring Agent ArchitectureIntelligent Computing10.1007/978-3-031-37963-5_88(1282-1307)Online publication date: 20-Aug-2023
  • (2022)Forced continuation of malware execution beyond exceptionsJournal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques10.1007/s11416-022-00457-819:4(483-501)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2022
  • (2021)SODA: A System for Cyber Deception Orchestration and AutomationProceedings of the 37th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference10.1145/3485832.3485918(675-689)Online publication date: 6-Dec-2021

View Options

Get Access

Login options

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media