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Research Challenges in Internet Ad Markets: Vignettes on Complex Environments

Published: 08 October 2024 Publication History

Abstract

Internet ad markets have been a great source of motivation and challenging problems for the Economics and Computation community. The practical design of these ad markets has also greatly benefited from advances in the Economics and Computation community. Through a series of vignettes, we aim to highlight interesting challenges in modern internet ad markets, born out of a Google perspective. In this first article, we focus on a few particular auction design and optimization questions motivated by the Sponsored Search and Display Ads markets. We hope these articles spur further progress in the research community and in industry.

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 20, Issue 2
December 2022
88 pages
EISSN:1551-9031
DOI:10.1145/3699804
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 08 October 2024
Published in SIGECOM Volume 20, Issue 2

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Author Tags

  1. Ad auctions
  2. first-price
  3. intermediaries
  4. sponsored-search

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