Prominent political philosophers have recently argued that nation-states can be held morally acco... more Prominent political philosophers have recently argued that nation-states can be held morally accountable because they qualify as group agents Much of the ensuing debate has focused on the existence of collective agency or its consequences for individual responsibility. Critics deny that groups of people possess the self-awareness, motivation, or biological material to qualify as agents. Others question what such claims tell us about the answerability of discrete actors such as citizens in democratic states. Overlooked in these discussions is the fact that claims about national responsibility contain not only a theory of group agency, but also a theory of states-of what such entities are and what they are like. It is merely assumed that if groups can be held accountable then nation-states bear moral responsibility. My aim here is to challenge this presumption. Political institutions, I argue, predictably lack the unity and control that accounts of group agency contend moral accountability requires.
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (forthcoming)
Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do n... more Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do not ignore an important value, are wrongfully complicit in injustice, and undermine the foundations of democracy. Others argue that given the insignificance of individual ballots, voting is too costly to be rational, much less obligatory. Here I develop an alternative approach to civic ethics, one that situates voting as just one instance of a wide class of civic obligations that collectively citizens must fulfill. Since it is impossible for each individual citizen to do them all, they necessarily must be apportioned out. Rather than having a duty to vote, or floating free of obligation, I argue that each person is responsible for doing her share of civic work. Many can do this without going to the polls; however, some cannot. As I show, this way of understanding the moral status of voting allows us to unify disparate account of civic ethics, speaks to the moral status of the poor and marginalized, and avoids controversial claims about causation and rationality.
Ignorance of current events is typically treated as a moral failing. In this article, I argue tha... more Ignorance of current events is typically treated as a moral failing. In this article, I argue that the outrage directed at the unengaged is largely misplaced. Neither a concern for bettering the world, nor duties of beneficence, or self-improvement, or worries about arrogance or complicity justify a standing obligation to pay attention to the news. Nonetheless, I contend that citizens do have moral reason to remain informed—they ought not be indifferent to the lives of others. What follows is unexpected—contra popular sentiment most of us have the strongest reason to attend to news about distant people whose circumstances we cannot change.
Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal a... more Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal an inappropriate attitude to the good or to associated individuals, and that this provides a weighty reason against having or participating in such markets. This style of argument has recently come under withering attack from Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski (2015a, 2015b). They point out that the significance of any market exchange is explained by a contingent semiotic norm. Given the tremendous value that could be realised by markets in, for instance, bone marrow, or kidneys, deferring to such norms across the board would have very significant opportunity costs. In the absence of any rationale for these norms, they should be ignored completely. We provide one important rationale. Unlike many semiotic objections to markets, we provide a broadly consequentialist semiotic argument. We argue that a range of behaviours play important signalling roles in interpersonal social practices; in particular, in practices involving caring, esteem, and testimony. Markets in these behaviours would distort these signals. Moreover, many of the productive advantages yielded by markets rely in turn on positive market norms that also inhibit the signalling behaviours associated with these non-market behaviours. We conclude that there will inevitably be trade-offs between the distributive advantages of new markets and these interpersonal social practices.
Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in poli... more Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit.
Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in poli... more Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit.
Semiotic objections to market exchange of goods or services maintain that such markets signal an ... more Semiotic objections to market exchange of goods or services maintain that such markets signal an inappropriate attitude to the goods or to associated individuals, and that this provides a weighty reason against having or participating in such markets. Such objections are to be distinguished from more familiar worries, for instance that markets in particular goods lead to exploitation (e.g. markets in prostitution or child labor), promote harmful behavior (e.g. markets in chemical weapons), or violate people’s rights (e.g. markets in slaves). Semiotic objections focus on the meaning, signal, or expressive significance of an exchange. According to Michael Walzer, for example, “... when medieval Christians condemned the sin of simony, they were claiming that the meaning of a particular social good, ecclesiastical office, excluded its sale and purchase.”1 Elizabeth Anderson has said that “prostitution is the classic example of how commodification debases a gift value and its giver.” Sim...
Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The ... more Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice) Since you have been born and brought up and educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and our slave from the beginning. . .? (Plato, Crito) Fred owns an auto dealership. He is kind to children, bakes brownies for neighbors, and feeds stray cats. He also does not pay his taxes. Fred lives in a well-functioning democracy that respects human rights. His refusal is not an act of protest. He simply wants the money. One of the most common explanations for why Fred's behavior is wrong is that disobedience violates duties of reciprocity. 1 As H.L.A. Hart writes, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those For immensely helpful encouragement and discussion I would like to thank Ya'ir Aizenman,
Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The ... more Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice) Since you have been born and brought up and educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and our slave from the beginning. . .? (Plato, Crito) Fred owns an auto dealership. He is kind to children, bakes brownies for neighbors, and feeds stray cats. He also does not pay his taxes. Fred lives in a well-functioning democracy that respects human rights. His refusal is not an act of protest. He simply wants the money. One of the most common explanations for why Fred's behavior is wrong is that disobedience violates duties of reciprocity. 1 As H.L.A. Hart writes, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those For immensely helpful encouragement and discussion I would like to thank Ya'ir Aizenman,
Prominent political philosophers have recently argued that nation-states can be held morally acco... more Prominent political philosophers have recently argued that nation-states can be held morally accountable because they qualify as group agents Much of the ensuing debate has focused on the existence of collective agency or its consequences for individual responsibility. Critics deny that groups of people possess the self-awareness, motivation, or biological material to qualify as agents. Others question what such claims tell us about the answerability of discrete actors such as citizens in democratic states. Overlooked in these discussions is the fact that claims about national responsibility contain not only a theory of group agency, but also a theory of states-of what such entities are and what they are like. It is merely assumed that if groups can be held accountable then nation-states bear moral responsibility. My aim here is to challenge this presumption. Political institutions, I argue, predictably lack the unity and control that accounts of group agency contend moral accountability requires.
Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (forthcoming)
Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do n... more Many political philosophers contend that citizens have a moral obligation to vote. Those who do not ignore an important value, are wrongfully complicit in injustice, and undermine the foundations of democracy. Others argue that given the insignificance of individual ballots, voting is too costly to be rational, much less obligatory. Here I develop an alternative approach to civic ethics, one that situates voting as just one instance of a wide class of civic obligations that collectively citizens must fulfill. Since it is impossible for each individual citizen to do them all, they necessarily must be apportioned out. Rather than having a duty to vote, or floating free of obligation, I argue that each person is responsible for doing her share of civic work. Many can do this without going to the polls; however, some cannot. As I show, this way of understanding the moral status of voting allows us to unify disparate account of civic ethics, speaks to the moral status of the poor and marginalized, and avoids controversial claims about causation and rationality.
Ignorance of current events is typically treated as a moral failing. In this article, I argue tha... more Ignorance of current events is typically treated as a moral failing. In this article, I argue that the outrage directed at the unengaged is largely misplaced. Neither a concern for bettering the world, nor duties of beneficence, or self-improvement, or worries about arrogance or complicity justify a standing obligation to pay attention to the news. Nonetheless, I contend that citizens do have moral reason to remain informed—they ought not be indifferent to the lives of others. What follows is unexpected—contra popular sentiment most of us have the strongest reason to attend to news about distant people whose circumstances we cannot change.
Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal a... more Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal an inappropriate attitude to the good or to associated individuals, and that this provides a weighty reason against having or participating in such markets. This style of argument has recently come under withering attack from Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski (2015a, 2015b). They point out that the significance of any market exchange is explained by a contingent semiotic norm. Given the tremendous value that could be realised by markets in, for instance, bone marrow, or kidneys, deferring to such norms across the board would have very significant opportunity costs. In the absence of any rationale for these norms, they should be ignored completely. We provide one important rationale. Unlike many semiotic objections to markets, we provide a broadly consequentialist semiotic argument. We argue that a range of behaviours play important signalling roles in interpersonal social practices; in particular, in practices involving caring, esteem, and testimony. Markets in these behaviours would distort these signals. Moreover, many of the productive advantages yielded by markets rely in turn on positive market norms that also inhibit the signalling behaviours associated with these non-market behaviours. We conclude that there will inevitably be trade-offs between the distributive advantages of new markets and these interpersonal social practices.
Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in poli... more Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit.
Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in poli... more Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit.
Semiotic objections to market exchange of goods or services maintain that such markets signal an ... more Semiotic objections to market exchange of goods or services maintain that such markets signal an inappropriate attitude to the goods or to associated individuals, and that this provides a weighty reason against having or participating in such markets. Such objections are to be distinguished from more familiar worries, for instance that markets in particular goods lead to exploitation (e.g. markets in prostitution or child labor), promote harmful behavior (e.g. markets in chemical weapons), or violate people’s rights (e.g. markets in slaves). Semiotic objections focus on the meaning, signal, or expressive significance of an exchange. According to Michael Walzer, for example, “... when medieval Christians condemned the sin of simony, they were claiming that the meaning of a particular social good, ecclesiastical office, excluded its sale and purchase.”1 Elizabeth Anderson has said that “prostitution is the classic example of how commodification debases a gift value and its giver.” Sim...
Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The ... more Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice) Since you have been born and brought up and educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and our slave from the beginning. . .? (Plato, Crito) Fred owns an auto dealership. He is kind to children, bakes brownies for neighbors, and feeds stray cats. He also does not pay his taxes. Fred lives in a well-functioning democracy that respects human rights. His refusal is not an act of protest. He simply wants the money. One of the most common explanations for why Fred's behavior is wrong is that disobedience violates duties of reciprocity. 1 As H.L.A. Hart writes, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those For immensely helpful encouragement and discussion I would like to thank Ya'ir Aizenman,
Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The ... more Any decent mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than paying taxes. (David Schmidtz, The Elements of Justice) Since you have been born and brought up and educated, could you say that you were not our offspring and our slave from the beginning. . .? (Plato, Crito) Fred owns an auto dealership. He is kind to children, bakes brownies for neighbors, and feeds stray cats. He also does not pay his taxes. Fred lives in a well-functioning democracy that respects human rights. His refusal is not an act of protest. He simply wants the money. One of the most common explanations for why Fred's behavior is wrong is that disobedience violates duties of reciprocity. 1 As H.L.A. Hart writes, "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those For immensely helpful encouragement and discussion I would like to thank Ya'ir Aizenman,
Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in poli... more Standard accounts of reciprocal citizenship hold that citizens have a duty to participate in politics. Against this, several business ethicists and philosophers have recently argued that people can satisfy their obligations of civic reciprocity non-politically, by owning, managing, or working in for-profit businesses. In this article, I reject both the standard and the market accounts of reciprocal citizenship. Against the market view, I show that the ordinary work of profit maximization cannot take the place of traditional political activity. Yet contra the standard political account, I show that a special class of the actions we perform in our work as employers and employees in for-profit companies can fulfill our obligations of reciprocity. Business ethicists must therefore develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between for-profit business endeavors and the debts we owe fellow citizens who undertake burdensome political work to our benefit.
Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal a... more Semiotic objections to market exchange of a good or service maintain that such exchanges signal an inappropriate attitude to the good or to associated individuals, and that this provides a weighty reason against having or participating in such markets. This style of argument has recently come under withering attack from Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski (2015a, 2015b). They point out that the significance of any market exchange is explained by a contingent semiotic norm. Given the tremendous value that could be realized by markets in, for instance, bone marrow, or kidneys, deferring to such norms across the board would have very significant opportunity costs. In the absence of any rationale for these norms, they should be ignored completely. We provide one important rationale. Unlike many semiotic objections to markets, we provide a broadly consequentialist semiotic argument. We argue that a range of behaviors play important signaling roles in interpersonal social practices; in particular, in practices involving caring, esteem, and testimony. Markets in these behaviors would distort these signals. Moreover, many of the productive advantages yielded by markets rely in turn on positive market norms that also inhibit the signaling behaviors associated with these non-market behaviors. We conclude that there will inevitably be trade-offs between the distributive advantages of new markets and these interpersonal social practices.
This article advances a novel account of civic reciprocity. Traditionally, the contention that ci... more This article advances a novel account of civic reciprocity. Traditionally, the contention that citizens have duties of reciprocity to co-nationals who obey the law has been thought to entail citizens must themselves obey. In recent years, a number of scholars have suggested it is enough that citizens contribute to the common good. I show both of these claims are wrong . While citizens need not obey, it is not enough to add general value. Instead, reciprocity requires each citizen undertake her share of civic work, burdensome acts that advance her community’s plan for the production of pubic goods. The class of actions that qualify is much more expansive than classic accounts of civic reciprocity recognize, but more limited than recent critics acknowledge.
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Drafts by Brookes Brown
citizens do have moral reason to remain informed—they ought not be indifferent to the lives of others. What follows is unexpected—contra popular sentiment most of us have the strongest reason to attend to news about distant people whose circumstances we cannot change.
Papers by Brookes Brown
citizens do have moral reason to remain informed—they ought not be indifferent to the lives of others. What follows is unexpected—contra popular sentiment most of us have the strongest reason to attend to news about distant people whose circumstances we cannot change.