The traditional view of the Corinthian War suggests that Athens, despite having bold imperial amb... more The traditional view of the Corinthian War suggests that Athens, despite having bold imperial ambitions, struggled to fund its military campaigns. Its concern for its military finances was ‘haphazard and improvisatory’. Its decisions on war funding were chaotic and desperate, depending on Persian gold, excessive eisphorai (‘wealth taxes’) and arbitrary rejections of peace.
This paper re-examines the financial decisions made by the dēmos in response to the events of the Corinthian War. It concludes that this traditional view must be modified. Athens, far from mismanaging its military finances, held tight control over them. This paper argues that it was Athens’ concept of military security, and its desire to restore sōteria (‘safety’) and dunamis (‘military might’) to the state, which drove Athenian decision-making during the war. In particular, it will show that Athens deliberately and systematically built up its cash reserves in order to rebuild its fleet and fund its naval campaigns. It will argue that Athens rejected Andocides’ peace plan with some justification. The paper uses all available literary and epigraphical evidence to reconstruct the financial situation at Athens during the period. This reconstruction allows the wisdom of Athenian decision-making regarding military finances to be assessed. Despite failing to reach its objective, Athens came dangerously close to defeating Sparta and re-establishing itself as a maritime empire within fifteen years of the Peloponnesian War. It did this through careful and deliberate financial planning and the rigorous pursuit of military security.
The traditional view of the Corinthian War suggests that Athens, despite having bold imperial amb... more The traditional view of the Corinthian War suggests that Athens, despite having bold imperial ambitions, struggled to fund its military campaigns. Its concern for its military finances was ‘haphazard and improvisatory’. Its decisions on war funding were chaotic and desperate, depending on Persian gold, excessive eisphorai (‘wealth taxes’) and arbitrary rejections of peace.
This paper re-examines the financial decisions made by the dēmos in response to the events of the Corinthian War. It concludes that this traditional view must be modified. Athens, far from mismanaging its military finances, held tight control over them. This paper argues that it was Athens’ concept of military security, and its desire to restore sōteria (‘safety’) and dunamis (‘military might’) to the state, which drove Athenian decision-making during the war. In particular, it will show that Athens deliberately and systematically built up its cash reserves in order to rebuild its fleet and fund its naval campaigns. It will argue that Athens rejected Andocides’ peace plan with some justification. The paper uses all available literary and epigraphical evidence to reconstruct the financial situation at Athens during the period. This reconstruction allows the wisdom of Athenian decision-making regarding military finances to be assessed. Despite failing to reach its objective, Athens came dangerously close to defeating Sparta and re-establishing itself as a maritime empire within fifteen years of the Peloponnesian War. It did this through careful and deliberate financial planning and the rigorous pursuit of military security.
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This paper re-examines the financial decisions made by the dēmos in response to the events of the Corinthian War. It concludes that this traditional view must be modified. Athens, far from mismanaging its military finances, held tight control over them. This paper argues that it was Athens’ concept of military security, and its desire to restore sōteria (‘safety’) and dunamis (‘military might’) to the state, which drove Athenian decision-making during the war. In particular, it will show that Athens deliberately and systematically built up its cash reserves in order to rebuild its fleet and fund its naval campaigns. It will argue that Athens rejected Andocides’ peace plan with some justification. The paper uses all available literary and epigraphical evidence to reconstruct the financial situation at Athens during the period. This reconstruction allows the wisdom of Athenian decision-making regarding military finances to be assessed. Despite failing to reach its objective, Athens came dangerously close to defeating Sparta and re-establishing itself as a maritime empire within fifteen years of the Peloponnesian War. It did this through careful and deliberate financial planning and the rigorous pursuit of military security.
This paper re-examines the financial decisions made by the dēmos in response to the events of the Corinthian War. It concludes that this traditional view must be modified. Athens, far from mismanaging its military finances, held tight control over them. This paper argues that it was Athens’ concept of military security, and its desire to restore sōteria (‘safety’) and dunamis (‘military might’) to the state, which drove Athenian decision-making during the war. In particular, it will show that Athens deliberately and systematically built up its cash reserves in order to rebuild its fleet and fund its naval campaigns. It will argue that Athens rejected Andocides’ peace plan with some justification. The paper uses all available literary and epigraphical evidence to reconstruct the financial situation at Athens during the period. This reconstruction allows the wisdom of Athenian decision-making regarding military finances to be assessed. Despite failing to reach its objective, Athens came dangerously close to defeating Sparta and re-establishing itself as a maritime empire within fifteen years of the Peloponnesian War. It did this through careful and deliberate financial planning and the rigorous pursuit of military security.