Americans have a predilection for neat categories of activity and clear divisions of labor. One m... more Americans have a predilection for neat categories of activity and clear divisions of labor. One manifestation of this tendency is emphasis on a clear division between military and political realms and a related belief in a clean separation of military and civilian activities. But war is a complicated and messy human phenomenon that defies easy categorization. The fundamentally political core of war admits to few natural limits. The stakes of war are usually profound, and therefore the effective remedies can be no less intense. The deliberately contested allegiance of the local population pulls all aspects of societal functioning into the ambit of a counterinsurgency. Denying success to insurgents demands comprehensive solutions that cut across the political, economic, and cultural elements of the afflicted society. In stable, mature social systems, efficient arrangements develop to meet agreed needs. Insurgents use violence to deliberately target these neat and optimized arrangement...
: With the soldiers of the Army deployed to over 120 countries and executing a wide variety of mi... more : With the soldiers of the Army deployed to over 120 countries and executing a wide variety of missions, the Army as a profession is being stretched to its limits. Richard Lacquement takes note of these developments and calls for a clarification of what exactly the Army "profession" entails. His mapping of the profession's expert knowledge provides a framework to continue the debate on the jurisdictions of the Army profession. The recommendations he presents are radical and thought provoking. While there may not be a consensus on his conclusions, this monograph serves the important role of stimulating thought and debate on the Army profession.
: Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interes... more : Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc...
JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise a... more JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise and be able to relate this expertise to appropriate professional jurisdictions. This article attempts to do three things. First, it presents a way to think about the abstract professional knowledge that the Army requires as an institution. Second, it links this institutional imperative to suggestions for the contours of the expert knowledge required by individual professionals. Third, it describes a logical way to connect this expertise to the jurisdictions of professional practice. This approach seeks to move beyond broad concepts of full-spectrum dominance to a framework that permits clearer definitions, distinct priorities, and sharper boundaries to guide professional practice and professional development. Many recent studies about the future of the Army profession claim that there is significant tension about the future of the Army profession within the officer corps. (1) The dramatic...
For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven b... more For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven by the threat to national security posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the Soviet Union collapsed, analysts wondered what effect this dramatic change would have upon defense policy and the military capabilities designed to support it. Strangely enough, this development would ultimately have little effect on our defense policy. Over a decade later, American forces are a smaller, but similar version of their Cold War predecessors. The author argues that, despite many suggestions for significant change, the bureaucratic inertia of comfortable military elites has dominated the defense policy debate and preserved the status quo with only minor exceptions. This inertia raises the danger that American military capabilities will be inadequate for future warfare in the information age. In addition, such legacy forces are inefficient and inappropriately designed for the demands of frequent and important antiterrorist and peace operations. Lacquement offers extensive analysis concerning the defense policymaking process from 1989 to 2001, including in particular the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This important study also provides a set of targeted policy recommendations that can help solve the identified problems in preparing for future wars and in better training for peace operations.
JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise a... more JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise and be able to relate this expertise to appropriate professional jurisdictions. This article attempts to do three things. First, it presents a way to think about the abstract professional knowledge that the Army requires as an institution. Second, it links this institutional imperative to suggestions for the contours of the expert knowledge required by individual professionals. Third, it describes a logical way to connect this expertise to the jurisdictions of professional practice. This approach seeks to move beyond broad concepts of full-spectrum dominance to a framework that permits clearer definitions, distinct priorities, and sharper boundaries to guide professional practice and professional development. Many recent studies about the future of the Army profession claim that there is significant tension about the future of the Army profession within the officer corps. (1) The dramatic changes in the international environment and the changing aspects of warfare associated with new technology and new techniques related to force transformation drives this tension. One of the most critical tasks facing the Army's strategic leaders is to define and clarify the expert knowledge that constitutes the Army's professional jurisdictions. Although the final decisions belong to senior civilian and military leaders, integrating new concepts throughout the profession requires the informed engagement of all officers. Officers must understand this critical component of the Army profession and participate in shaping the profession's future. Full-spectrum dominance is a useful shorthand aspiration that glosses over the complexity of the varied demands the operational environment imposes on the Army as a whole and on individuals expected to operate along the entire spectrum of conflict with uniformly high competence. The spectrum of conflict and range of military operations is vast. Society might well require the Army to participate in all kinds of missions. The difficulty is that the Army, as well as its individual members, is not infinitely capable. There are limits on the capacity of the required choices. Limits include time, manpower, materiel, and a host of other factors. We must be careful not to become jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none. Everyone trying to do everything might lead to everyone doing nothing well. We already acknowledge that fighting and winning the Nation's wars is the highest priority. Taking the nonnegotiable contract from the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1.04 series as the start point, we can identify other priorities at the nexus of expert knowledge and jurisdictions of practice. (2) We should be forthright in debating and negotiating these priorities. We owe society and the members of the profession this improved clarity as a step toward greater effectiveness. The Army's Expert Knowledge One of the first and most far-reaching tasks we must undertake is to clarify the nature of the profession's expert knowledge. Professionals are experts in an abstract body of human knowledge. (3) The quintessential characteristic of a profession is the exercise of judgment. A common description of military professional expertise is the management of violence. (4) I submit that this is no longer a useful phrase with which to describe military expertise. The term suggests management as the critical central expertise and obscures the more important role of leadership and the centrality of the human dimension of the profession. Leadership, not management, is the true core of the Army profession. A better definition would be, "The core expertise of American military officers is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession whose primary expertise is the organized application of coercive force on behalf of the American people." In abbreviated form, "Expertise is leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force. …
: What is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How do... more : What is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American national security objectives? The first question is easy to answer: There is no intrinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success. Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important national causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted conventional wisdom. The second question is more difficult to answer. Avoidance of casualties is an unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argument that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, potentially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices. The persistence of the myth also causes adversari...
Americans have a predilection for neat categories of activity and clear divisions of labor. One m... more Americans have a predilection for neat categories of activity and clear divisions of labor. One manifestation of this tendency is emphasis on a clear division between military and political realms and a related belief in a clean separation of military and civilian activities. But war is a complicated and messy human phenomenon that defies easy categorization. The fundamentally political core of war admits to few natural limits. The stakes of war are usually profound, and therefore the effective remedies can be no less intense. The deliberately contested allegiance of the local population pulls all aspects of societal functioning into the ambit of a counterinsurgency. Denying success to insurgents demands comprehensive solutions that cut across the political, economic, and cultural elements of the afflicted society. In stable, mature social systems, efficient arrangements develop to meet agreed needs. Insurgents use violence to deliberately target these neat and optimized arrangement...
: With the soldiers of the Army deployed to over 120 countries and executing a wide variety of mi... more : With the soldiers of the Army deployed to over 120 countries and executing a wide variety of missions, the Army as a profession is being stretched to its limits. Richard Lacquement takes note of these developments and calls for a clarification of what exactly the Army "profession" entails. His mapping of the profession's expert knowledge provides a framework to continue the debate on the jurisdictions of the Army profession. The recommendations he presents are radical and thought provoking. While there may not be a consensus on his conclusions, this monograph serves the important role of stimulating thought and debate on the Army profession.
: Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interes... more : Current operations, demands of persistent conflict, and enduring U.S. national security interests underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve U.S. Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout U.S. history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize, and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within the Department of Defense (DoD) to create a comprehensive approach to improve U.S. SFA. At the heart of the recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to institutionalize SFA activities effectively and to facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc...
JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise a... more JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise and be able to relate this expertise to appropriate professional jurisdictions. This article attempts to do three things. First, it presents a way to think about the abstract professional knowledge that the Army requires as an institution. Second, it links this institutional imperative to suggestions for the contours of the expert knowledge required by individual professionals. Third, it describes a logical way to connect this expertise to the jurisdictions of professional practice. This approach seeks to move beyond broad concepts of full-spectrum dominance to a framework that permits clearer definitions, distinct priorities, and sharper boundaries to guide professional practice and professional development. Many recent studies about the future of the Army profession claim that there is significant tension about the future of the Army profession within the officer corps. (1) The dramatic...
For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven b... more For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven by the threat to national security posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the Soviet Union collapsed, analysts wondered what effect this dramatic change would have upon defense policy and the military capabilities designed to support it. Strangely enough, this development would ultimately have little effect on our defense policy. Over a decade later, American forces are a smaller, but similar version of their Cold War predecessors. The author argues that, despite many suggestions for significant change, the bureaucratic inertia of comfortable military elites has dominated the defense policy debate and preserved the status quo with only minor exceptions. This inertia raises the danger that American military capabilities will be inadequate for future warfare in the information age. In addition, such legacy forces are inefficient and inappropriately designed for the demands of frequent and important antiterrorist and peace operations. Lacquement offers extensive analysis concerning the defense policymaking process from 1989 to 2001, including in particular the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This important study also provides a set of targeted policy recommendations that can help solve the identified problems in preparing for future wars and in better training for peace operations.
JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise a... more JUNIOR LEADERS of the Army profession must understand the nature of Army professional expertise and be able to relate this expertise to appropriate professional jurisdictions. This article attempts to do three things. First, it presents a way to think about the abstract professional knowledge that the Army requires as an institution. Second, it links this institutional imperative to suggestions for the contours of the expert knowledge required by individual professionals. Third, it describes a logical way to connect this expertise to the jurisdictions of professional practice. This approach seeks to move beyond broad concepts of full-spectrum dominance to a framework that permits clearer definitions, distinct priorities, and sharper boundaries to guide professional practice and professional development. Many recent studies about the future of the Army profession claim that there is significant tension about the future of the Army profession within the officer corps. (1) The dramatic changes in the international environment and the changing aspects of warfare associated with new technology and new techniques related to force transformation drives this tension. One of the most critical tasks facing the Army's strategic leaders is to define and clarify the expert knowledge that constitutes the Army's professional jurisdictions. Although the final decisions belong to senior civilian and military leaders, integrating new concepts throughout the profession requires the informed engagement of all officers. Officers must understand this critical component of the Army profession and participate in shaping the profession's future. Full-spectrum dominance is a useful shorthand aspiration that glosses over the complexity of the varied demands the operational environment imposes on the Army as a whole and on individuals expected to operate along the entire spectrum of conflict with uniformly high competence. The spectrum of conflict and range of military operations is vast. Society might well require the Army to participate in all kinds of missions. The difficulty is that the Army, as well as its individual members, is not infinitely capable. There are limits on the capacity of the required choices. Limits include time, manpower, materiel, and a host of other factors. We must be careful not to become jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none. Everyone trying to do everything might lead to everyone doing nothing well. We already acknowledge that fighting and winning the Nation's wars is the highest priority. Taking the nonnegotiable contract from the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 1.04 series as the start point, we can identify other priorities at the nexus of expert knowledge and jurisdictions of practice. (2) We should be forthright in debating and negotiating these priorities. We owe society and the members of the profession this improved clarity as a step toward greater effectiveness. The Army's Expert Knowledge One of the first and most far-reaching tasks we must undertake is to clarify the nature of the profession's expert knowledge. Professionals are experts in an abstract body of human knowledge. (3) The quintessential characteristic of a profession is the exercise of judgment. A common description of military professional expertise is the management of violence. (4) I submit that this is no longer a useful phrase with which to describe military expertise. The term suggests management as the critical central expertise and obscures the more important role of leadership and the centrality of the human dimension of the profession. Leadership, not management, is the true core of the Army profession. A better definition would be, "The core expertise of American military officers is the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization, a profession whose primary expertise is the organized application of coercive force on behalf of the American people." In abbreviated form, "Expertise is leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force. …
: What is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How do... more : What is the nature of the American public's sensitivity to U.S. military casualties? How does casualty sensitivity affect the pursuit of American national security objectives? The first question is easy to answer: There is no intrinsic, uncritical casualty aversion among the American public that limits the use of U.S. armed forces. There is a wide range of policy objectives on behalf of which the public is prepared to accept American casualties as a cost of success. Squeamishness about even a few casualties for all but the most important national causes is a myth. Nonetheless, it is a myth that persists as widely accepted conventional wisdom. The second question is more difficult to answer. Avoidance of casualties is an unassailably desirable objective. It is precisely the natural nobility of the argument that makes it susceptible to misuse in the policy-making process, potentially leading to ineffective or inefficient choices. The persistence of the myth also causes adversari...
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