The free will/determinism problem is usually presented as a problem about the compatibility of la... more The free will/determinism problem is usually presented as a problem about the compatibility of laws of a certain kind – deterministic – with a special property of human beings: free will. And many people think, sometimes on the basis of argument, sometimes because it just seems obvious to them, that determinism is incompatible with free will. Some say that determinism rules out not just free will but also moral responsibility. Others disagree, claiming that we might be morally responsible eve..
For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew argume... more For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew arguments in contemporary philosophy have had more influence than Harry Frankfurt's ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsiblity.’ In that famous paper Frankfurt noted that all parties to the traditional debate about the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with determinism had subscribed to a common assumption. They had assumed the truth of something Frankfurt called ‘the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,’ which he expressed as follows:(PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.In the traditional debate incompatibilists argued that if determinism is true, then no one can ever do otherwise, while compatibilists argued that there is a morally relevant sense in which even a deterministic agent can do otherwise. Frankfurt proposed to show that PAPis false, thereby undercutting the traditional debate.
I have argued that even if time travel is metaphysically possible, there are some things a time t... more I have argued that even if time travel is metaphysically possible, there are some things a time traveler would not be able to do. I reply here to critics who have argued that my account entails fatalism about the past or entails that the time traveler is unfree or that she is bound by “strange shackles.” My argument does not entail any sort of fatalism. The time traveler is able to do many of the things that everyone else can do and is as free as any non-time-traveler. The time traveler is constrained only as we all are by the laws of nature. My argument shows only how strangely those constraints must operate if those laws permit time travel.
Van Inwagen offers a formal reconstruction of this argument, one which closely resembles an argum... more Van Inwagen offers a formal reconstruction of this argument, one which closely resembles an argument which Carl Ginet has used in defence of incompatibilism.2 The power of this argument derives from the fact that its premises are defended by claims that the compatibilist must accept that we cannot change either the laws or the past. Although the argument does not rest on any obvious fallacy, I will argue that it is not valid. But first, a few remarks on what the argument is about. Incompatibilism is normally understood as the thesis that freedom is not compatible with determinism, but the Ginet/van Inwagen argument doesn't say anything about freedom. The conclusion of the argument is that if determinism is true, then no agent can ever falsify any true proposition. The propositions in question have the form 'Agent S does x time t'. The argument is supposed to show that if determinism is true, no agent can ever falsify any true proposition about what she does at a given time. In plain English, the claim is that no causally determined agent can ever do otherwise. What does being able to do otherwise have to do with freedom? It is usually taken for granted that being able to do otherwise is at least a
The free will/determinism problem is usually presented as a problem about the compatibility of la... more The free will/determinism problem is usually presented as a problem about the compatibility of laws of a certain kind – deterministic – with a special property of human beings: free will. And many people think, sometimes on the basis of argument, sometimes because it just seems obvious to them, that determinism is incompatible with free will. Some say that determinism rules out not just free will but also moral responsibility. Others disagree, claiming that we might be morally responsible eve..
For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew argume... more For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.T.S. Eliot, Four QuartetsFew arguments in contemporary philosophy have had more influence than Harry Frankfurt's ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsiblity.’ In that famous paper Frankfurt noted that all parties to the traditional debate about the compatibility of free will and moral responsibility with determinism had subscribed to a common assumption. They had assumed the truth of something Frankfurt called ‘the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,’ which he expressed as follows:(PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.In the traditional debate incompatibilists argued that if determinism is true, then no one can ever do otherwise, while compatibilists argued that there is a morally relevant sense in which even a deterministic agent can do otherwise. Frankfurt proposed to show that PAPis false, thereby undercutting the traditional debate.
I have argued that even if time travel is metaphysically possible, there are some things a time t... more I have argued that even if time travel is metaphysically possible, there are some things a time traveler would not be able to do. I reply here to critics who have argued that my account entails fatalism about the past or entails that the time traveler is unfree or that she is bound by “strange shackles.” My argument does not entail any sort of fatalism. The time traveler is able to do many of the things that everyone else can do and is as free as any non-time-traveler. The time traveler is constrained only as we all are by the laws of nature. My argument shows only how strangely those constraints must operate if those laws permit time travel.
Van Inwagen offers a formal reconstruction of this argument, one which closely resembles an argum... more Van Inwagen offers a formal reconstruction of this argument, one which closely resembles an argument which Carl Ginet has used in defence of incompatibilism.2 The power of this argument derives from the fact that its premises are defended by claims that the compatibilist must accept that we cannot change either the laws or the past. Although the argument does not rest on any obvious fallacy, I will argue that it is not valid. But first, a few remarks on what the argument is about. Incompatibilism is normally understood as the thesis that freedom is not compatible with determinism, but the Ginet/van Inwagen argument doesn't say anything about freedom. The conclusion of the argument is that if determinism is true, then no agent can ever falsify any true proposition. The propositions in question have the form 'Agent S does x time t'. The argument is supposed to show that if determinism is true, no agent can ever falsify any true proposition about what she does at a given time. In plain English, the claim is that no causally determined agent can ever do otherwise. What does being able to do otherwise have to do with freedom? It is usually taken for granted that being able to do otherwise is at least a
Uploads