The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account o... more The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, but interpreters have long struggled to determine what Kant means when he claims the faculties are in a state of free play. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the free play of the faculties in terms of the freedom of attention. By appealing to the different way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, we can explain how the faculties are free, even when the subject already possesses a concept of the object and is bound to the determinate form of the object in perception.
In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the ... more In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On this account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, the subject specifically attends to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding.
Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. D... more In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. Despite his restriction of genius to the domain of fine art, where he arguably subordinates it to taste, several recent interpreters have suggested that genius has a role to play in Kant’s account of cognition in general and scientific practice in particular. In this paper, I explore Kant’s reasons for excluding genius from science as well as the reasons that one might nevertheless be tempted to think that his account allows room for the scientific genius. I then argue that Kant’s concerns are not only epistemic, but also moral, and together, they give us good reason for resisting the veneration of genius.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2020
In this paper, I argue that although Kant's account of empirical schemata in the Critique of Pure... more In this paper, I argue that although Kant's account of empirical schemata in the Critique of Pure Reason is primarily used to explain the shared content of intuitions and empirical concepts, it is also informed by methodological problems in natural history. I argue that empirical schemata, which are rules for determining the spatio-temporal form of objects, not only serve to connect individual intuitions with concepts, but also concern the very features of objects on the basis of which they were connected and ordered in taxonomic systems based on similarity of form. I then suggest that Kant likely had scientific illustrations in mind in his discussion of empirical images in the Schematism chapter and that his account of schemata can help explain the epistemic function of these images in early modern science.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018
In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating th... more In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times – which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant’s primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160–1n – and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the ‘original’ synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselves – it is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts.
Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress, 2018
In a puzzling and oft-discussed footnote to section 26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant draw... more In a puzzling and oft-discussed footnote to section 26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant draws a distinction between forms of intuition, which merely give the manifold, and formal intuitions, which give “unity of representation.” According to Kant, formal intuitions require a synthesis “which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible” (B160n). Conceptualist interpreters maintain that this footnote shows that the unity of intuition depends on the understanding. Non-conceptualists, who are especially focused on the intuition of space, argue that the phenomenal space described in the Aesthetic is independent of the understanding. It is only the formal intuition of space, which they claim is the objective space studied in geometry, that depends on the understanding. In this paper, I explain the role of the understanding in generating the representation of space as an all-encompassing, actually infinite whole (which is presupposed by phenomenal space and geometric space) while at the same time explaining why Kant nevertheless claims that the unity of this representation belongs to sensibility, and not to any concept of the understanding.
The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account o... more The harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding is at the heart of Kant’s account of beauty in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, but interpreters have long struggled to determine what Kant means when he claims the faculties are in a state of free play. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the free play of the faculties in terms of the freedom of attention. By appealing to the different way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, we can explain how the faculties are free, even when the subject already possesses a concept of the object and is bound to the determinate form of the object in perception.
In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the ... more In this paper, I examine the role of attention in Kant’s aesthetic theory in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. While broadly Kantian aestheticians have defended the claim that there is a distinct way that we attend to objects in aesthetic experience, Kant himself is not usually acknowledged as offering an account of aesthetic attention. On the basis of Kant’s more general account of attention in other texts and his remarks on attention in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, I reconstruct Kant’s account of aesthetic attention. On this account, aesthetic attention is simultaneously directed at the form of an object and at the judging subject’s own mental states as she attends to the object. In the experience of beauty, the subject specifically attends to the harmonious relation between the faculties of imagination and understanding.
Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. D... more In the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that genius is a talent for art, but not for science. Despite his restriction of genius to the domain of fine art, where he arguably subordinates it to taste, several recent interpreters have suggested that genius has a role to play in Kant’s account of cognition in general and scientific practice in particular. In this paper, I explore Kant’s reasons for excluding genius from science as well as the reasons that one might nevertheless be tempted to think that his account allows room for the scientific genius. I then argue that Kant’s concerns are not only epistemic, but also moral, and together, they give us good reason for resisting the veneration of genius.
HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2020
In this paper, I argue that although Kant's account of empirical schemata in the Critique of Pure... more In this paper, I argue that although Kant's account of empirical schemata in the Critique of Pure Reason is primarily used to explain the shared content of intuitions and empirical concepts, it is also informed by methodological problems in natural history. I argue that empirical schemata, which are rules for determining the spatio-temporal form of objects, not only serve to connect individual intuitions with concepts, but also concern the very features of objects on the basis of which they were connected and ordered in taxonomic systems based on similarity of form. I then suggest that Kant likely had scientific illustrations in mind in his discussion of empirical images in the Schematism chapter and that his account of schemata can help explain the epistemic function of these images in early modern science.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018
In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating th... more In this paper, I propose a novel interpretation of the role of the understanding in generating the unity of space and time. On the account I propose, we must distinguish between the unity that belongs to determinate spaces and times – which is a result of category-guided synthesis and which is Kant’s primary focus in §26 of the B-Deduction, including the famous B160–1n – and the unity that belongs to space and time themselves as all-encompassing structures. Non-conceptualist readers of Kant have argued that this latter unity cannot be the product of categorial synthesis. While they are correct that this unity is not the product of any particular act of category-guided synthesis, I argue that conceptualists are right to nevertheless attribute this unity to the understanding. I argue that it is a result of what we can think of as the ‘original’ synthesis of understanding and sensibility themselves – it is a synthesis, moreover, in which the whole is logically prior to the parts.
Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress, 2018
In a puzzling and oft-discussed footnote to section 26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant draw... more In a puzzling and oft-discussed footnote to section 26 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant draws a distinction between forms of intuition, which merely give the manifold, and formal intuitions, which give “unity of representation.” According to Kant, formal intuitions require a synthesis “which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible” (B160n). Conceptualist interpreters maintain that this footnote shows that the unity of intuition depends on the understanding. Non-conceptualists, who are especially focused on the intuition of space, argue that the phenomenal space described in the Aesthetic is independent of the understanding. It is only the formal intuition of space, which they claim is the objective space studied in geometry, that depends on the understanding. In this paper, I explain the role of the understanding in generating the representation of space as an all-encompassing, actually infinite whole (which is presupposed by phenomenal space and geometric space) while at the same time explaining why Kant nevertheless claims that the unity of this representation belongs to sensibility, and not to any concept of the understanding.
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