OUP pre-publication draft, now published in Iakovos Vasiliou, ed., Moral Motivation (OUP 2016), a... more OUP pre-publication draft, now published in Iakovos Vasiliou, ed., Moral Motivation (OUP 2016), a volume in the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series.
Moral Motivation is a new book edited by Iakavos Vasiliou. It is part of the Oxford Philosophica... more Moral Motivation is a new book edited by Iakavos Vasiliou. It is part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts Series.
I discuss three issues: first, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women phil... more I discuss three issues: first, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women philosophers at nearly all stages of their careers as well as the phenomenon of stereotype that can lead women to underperform intellectually; second, the value of mentoring and sponsorship for strategically positioning women to eventually assume leadership roles in philosophy; and third, what women philosophers can do in leadership roles, in particular, including other women and helping to advance their careers.
I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treat... more I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treatise and Enquiry . In the former work, a redirected sympathy naturally extends our concern, and subsequently our moral approval or blame, to all those included within the scope of the rules of justice. In the Enquiry , we find this same progress of sentiments, but Hume’s introduction of the sentiment of humanity allows him to make a stronger case for the importance of those virtues that are useful, particularly the virtues of justice. The command of our esteem and our moral approval of justice secure a place for justice at the heart of Hume’s ethics. This does not entail, however, that other useful virtues are not also essential. Benevolence and the care of children, friendship, and gratitude not only help to sustain sociability, but they are essential for living a properly human life.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019
The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignit... more The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignity. I situate the argument in the context of Martha Nussbaum's recent work against anger and resentment. Drawing on Enlightenment thinkers, I show the importance of resentment in deterring injury, in creating greater solidarity and humanity, and in preserving human dignity. The paper also offers a preliminary analysis of the norms that help to ensure appropriately expressed resentment.
<jats:p>In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that since good and evil are naturally re... more <jats:p>In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that since good and evil are naturally relative to each individual's private appetites, and man's nature is predominantly selfish, then morality must be grounded in human conventions. His views provoked strong reactions among British moral philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moral sense theories comprise one set of responses. A moral sense theory gives a central role to the affections and sentiments in moral perception, in the appraisal of conduct and character, and in deliberation and motivation. Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson argued that we have a unique faculty of moral perception, the moral sense. David Hume and Adam Smith held that we cultivate a moral sensibility when we appropriately regulate our sympathy by an experience-informed reason and reflection.</jats:p>
In his introduction to the Green and Grose edition of Hume's Treatise (first appearing in 187... more In his introduction to the Green and Grose edition of Hume's Treatise (first appearing in 1874, with several subsequent editions), T. H. Green characterized the aim of history as that of distilling "from the chaos of events a connected series of ruling actions and beliefs—the achievements of great men and great epochs"; history is thus properly concerned with a "reach of the hopes and institutions which make history a progress instead of a cycle. " Similarly, the history of philosophy properly done shows that metaphysical enquiry "is really progressive and has a real history, but it is history represented by a few great names," one of them that of David Hume.1 Green's critical introduction is an example of that genre of the history of philosophy that Richard Rorty called "Geistesgeschichte."2 This genre allows the historian to reconstruct the past according to the story he wishes to tell. Green himself emphasizes that the history of p...
self-knowledge, intersubjectivity, sociability, illusion, self-deception, and hypocrisy—despite t... more self-knowledge, intersubjectivity, sociability, illusion, self-deception, and hypocrisy—despite taking often strikingly different positions on these questions and topics. This review cannot do justice to the intricate conversation Griswold stages between these two figures on these topics. In each of the five chapters, Griswold focuses on a strand in the complex of questions about the self, moving between the writings of Rousseau and Smith, and then concluding the chapter with a dialectical exchange that often moves beyond the published writings. The goal is not to answer a question or resolve a dispute, and there is no declared winner in the exchange. The goal is rather to deepen, explore, and complicate the question at hand. This lack of resolution may be unsatisfying to some readers, but it is both truer to the questions Griswold is examining, and more germane to a broader goal of the book. This broader goal, which begins to appear as the dialectic advances into further complexity, seems to be to provide a case study in how and why conflict and disagreement occur and continue. As Griswold reveals, Rousseau and Smith are not just in disagreement about substantive philosophical questions; they also disagree in large-scale metaphilosophical ways. Rousseau tends to think in “starkly binary terms”—seeing any opacity as utter impenetrability, and any artifice as total fabrication (254), whereas Smith tends to think in terms of spectra and degrees—looking for practical, commonsense, “good enough” solutions to real problems. But it is not clear how much more can be said to sharpen these metaphilosophical differences. Indeed, if Hume were asked to comment on these differences, he might say that Griswold has uncovered a temperamental and sentimental difference in the philosophies of Rousseau and Smith, where the differences in their respective views on “human life and . . . happiness” are best explained by the different sentiments of the sect to which each belongs (Hume, “The Epicurean,” n. 1). What we might say, following Griswold’s own comments in the final paragraph of this book, is that this staged encounter between Rousseau and Smith reminds us that disagreement and conflict occur not only because people have different beliefs and values, and potentially incommensurate lists of priorities, but also because they have different worldviews and different temperaments. Recognizing this may not help to resolve our differences, but it will help us to understand them. Like Griswold’s other work, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith will be a valuable resource for scholars of Rousseau, Smith, and Enlightenment philosophy more generally. Griswold deepens and extends the already extensive scholarship on Rousseau on the “question of the self,” and, for scholars of Smith, he opens up promising new lines of research and inquiry on these topics. L a u r e n K o p a j t i c Fordham University
In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing a... more In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing a... more In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
OUP pre-publication draft, now published in Iakovos Vasiliou, ed., Moral Motivation (OUP 2016), a... more OUP pre-publication draft, now published in Iakovos Vasiliou, ed., Moral Motivation (OUP 2016), a volume in the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series.
Moral Motivation is a new book edited by Iakavos Vasiliou. It is part of the Oxford Philosophica... more Moral Motivation is a new book edited by Iakavos Vasiliou. It is part of the Oxford Philosophical Concepts Series.
I discuss three issues: first, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women phil... more I discuss three issues: first, a main problem: the implicit biases that disadvantage women philosophers at nearly all stages of their careers as well as the phenomenon of stereotype that can lead women to underperform intellectually; second, the value of mentoring and sponsorship for strategically positioning women to eventually assume leadership roles in philosophy; and third, what women philosophers can do in leadership roles, in particular, including other women and helping to advance their careers.
I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treat... more I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treatise and Enquiry . In the former work, a redirected sympathy naturally extends our concern, and subsequently our moral approval or blame, to all those included within the scope of the rules of justice. In the Enquiry , we find this same progress of sentiments, but Hume’s introduction of the sentiment of humanity allows him to make a stronger case for the importance of those virtues that are useful, particularly the virtues of justice. The command of our esteem and our moral approval of justice secure a place for justice at the heart of Hume’s ethics. This does not entail, however, that other useful virtues are not also essential. Benevolence and the care of children, friendship, and gratitude not only help to sustain sociability, but they are essential for living a properly human life.
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019
The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignit... more The paper offers an account of justified resentment and its importance in preserving human dignity. I situate the argument in the context of Martha Nussbaum's recent work against anger and resentment. Drawing on Enlightenment thinkers, I show the importance of resentment in deterring injury, in creating greater solidarity and humanity, and in preserving human dignity. The paper also offers a preliminary analysis of the norms that help to ensure appropriately expressed resentment.
<jats:p>In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that since good and evil are naturally re... more <jats:p>In Leviathan (1651), Thomas Hobbes argued that since good and evil are naturally relative to each individual's private appetites, and man's nature is predominantly selfish, then morality must be grounded in human conventions. His views provoked strong reactions among British moral philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moral sense theories comprise one set of responses. A moral sense theory gives a central role to the affections and sentiments in moral perception, in the appraisal of conduct and character, and in deliberation and motivation. Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson argued that we have a unique faculty of moral perception, the moral sense. David Hume and Adam Smith held that we cultivate a moral sensibility when we appropriately regulate our sympathy by an experience-informed reason and reflection.</jats:p>
In his introduction to the Green and Grose edition of Hume's Treatise (first appearing in 187... more In his introduction to the Green and Grose edition of Hume's Treatise (first appearing in 1874, with several subsequent editions), T. H. Green characterized the aim of history as that of distilling "from the chaos of events a connected series of ruling actions and beliefs—the achievements of great men and great epochs"; history is thus properly concerned with a "reach of the hopes and institutions which make history a progress instead of a cycle. " Similarly, the history of philosophy properly done shows that metaphysical enquiry "is really progressive and has a real history, but it is history represented by a few great names," one of them that of David Hume.1 Green's critical introduction is an example of that genre of the history of philosophy that Richard Rorty called "Geistesgeschichte."2 This genre allows the historian to reconstruct the past according to the story he wishes to tell. Green himself emphasizes that the history of p...
self-knowledge, intersubjectivity, sociability, illusion, self-deception, and hypocrisy—despite t... more self-knowledge, intersubjectivity, sociability, illusion, self-deception, and hypocrisy—despite taking often strikingly different positions on these questions and topics. This review cannot do justice to the intricate conversation Griswold stages between these two figures on these topics. In each of the five chapters, Griswold focuses on a strand in the complex of questions about the self, moving between the writings of Rousseau and Smith, and then concluding the chapter with a dialectical exchange that often moves beyond the published writings. The goal is not to answer a question or resolve a dispute, and there is no declared winner in the exchange. The goal is rather to deepen, explore, and complicate the question at hand. This lack of resolution may be unsatisfying to some readers, but it is both truer to the questions Griswold is examining, and more germane to a broader goal of the book. This broader goal, which begins to appear as the dialectic advances into further complexity, seems to be to provide a case study in how and why conflict and disagreement occur and continue. As Griswold reveals, Rousseau and Smith are not just in disagreement about substantive philosophical questions; they also disagree in large-scale metaphilosophical ways. Rousseau tends to think in “starkly binary terms”—seeing any opacity as utter impenetrability, and any artifice as total fabrication (254), whereas Smith tends to think in terms of spectra and degrees—looking for practical, commonsense, “good enough” solutions to real problems. But it is not clear how much more can be said to sharpen these metaphilosophical differences. Indeed, if Hume were asked to comment on these differences, he might say that Griswold has uncovered a temperamental and sentimental difference in the philosophies of Rousseau and Smith, where the differences in their respective views on “human life and . . . happiness” are best explained by the different sentiments of the sect to which each belongs (Hume, “The Epicurean,” n. 1). What we might say, following Griswold’s own comments in the final paragraph of this book, is that this staged encounter between Rousseau and Smith reminds us that disagreement and conflict occur not only because people have different beliefs and values, and potentially incommensurate lists of priorities, but also because they have different worldviews and different temperaments. Recognizing this may not help to resolve our differences, but it will help us to understand them. Like Griswold’s other work, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith will be a valuable resource for scholars of Rousseau, Smith, and Enlightenment philosophy more generally. Griswold deepens and extends the already extensive scholarship on Rousseau on the “question of the self,” and, for scholars of Smith, he opens up promising new lines of research and inquiry on these topics. L a u r e n K o p a j t i c Fordham University
In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing a... more In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing a... more In the Treatise, Hume focuses on pride as an “indirect passion,” one indicative of self-valuing and moral virtue and contributing positively to our sense of who we are and, in particular, to our moral identity. This essay examines those features of pride that make Hume’s account of the indirect passions so distinctive, beginning with an examination of his application of the experimental method to explain the origin of the indirect passions and the double relation of ideas and impressions as the efficient causes of these passions. Also examined is the relationship Hume draws between the principle of sympathy, pride, and the causes of pride; the relations among pride in virtuous character, moral confidence and, competence; and Hume’s account of pride in the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. Finally, the author considers the view of Humean moral agency as heteronomous in nature.
Hume insists that character is the proper object of moral evaluation. We may sometimes consider a... more Hume insists that character is the proper object of moral evaluation. We may sometimes consider actions independently of motive and character, looking instead, for example, at the consequences of a certain course of conduct. But Hume argues that what really makes a difference for us ...
I focus on the importance of moral approval, admiration, and pride as crucial sources of moral id... more I focus on the importance of moral approval, admiration, and pride as crucial sources of moral identity and agency. Our capacities to admire and value one another for our moral dispositions play a key role in helping to create empathic persons.
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