Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers‘ reliance on armcha... more Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers‘ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there‘s no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers‘ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with goo...
This document contains the appendices, which provides the stimulus materials, for the four studie... more This document contains the appendices, which provides the stimulus materials, for the four studies reported in: Gonnerman, Mortensen, & Robbins (forthcoming). KNOWING HOW as a philosophical hybrid. Synthese
In this article, we describe a project in which philosophy, in combination with methods drawn fro... more In this article, we describe a project in which philosophy, in combination with methods drawn from mental modeling, was used to structure dialogue among stakeholders in a region-scale climate adaptation process. The case study we discuss synthesizes the Toolbox dialogue method, a philosophically grounded approach to enhancing communication and collaboration in complex research and practice, with a mental modeling approach rooted in risk analysis, assessment, and communication to structure conversations among non-academic stakeholders who have a common interest in planning for a sustainable future. We begin by describing the background of this project, including details about climate resiliency efforts in West Michigan and the Toolbox dialogue method, which was extended in this project from academic research into community organization involving the West Michigan Climate Resiliency Framework Initiative. This extension involved application of several methods, which are the focus of the Methods section. We then present and discuss preliminary results that suggest the potential for philosophical dialogue to enhance mutual understanding in complex community initiatives that focus on sustainable responses to climate change. Overall, the article supplies a detailed, instructive example of how philosophy can support policy-relevant decision-making processes at the community level.
Abstract: Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance... more Abstract: Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there’s no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers ’ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide ...
We present three experiments that explore the robustness of the authentic-apparent effect—the fin... more We present three experiments that explore the robustness of the authentic-apparent effect—the finding that participants are less likely to attribute knowledge to the protagonist in apparent- than in authentic-evidence Gettier cases. The results go some way towards suggesting that the effect is robust to assessments of the justificatory status of the protagonist’s belief. However, not all of the results are consistent with an effect invariant across two demographic contexts: American and Indian nationalities.
Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists as... more Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists assume. We present four studies that go some way towards supporting our view—that the folk concept of knowledge-how is a philosophical hybrid, comprising both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. One upshot is, if we are going to award a presumptive status to philosophical theories of know-how that best accord with the folk concept, it ought to go to those that combine intellectualist and anti-intellectualist elements.
Some epistemologists appear to maintain that the folk can serve as a source of dialectical advant... more Some epistemologists appear to maintain that the folk can serve as a source of dialectical advantage in debates between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how. The common assumption seems to be that the philosophical account that best accords with the folk concept has a dialectical advantage over its competitors such that it ought to enjoy a strong (though defeasible) presumption in its favor. Work in experimental philosophy on the folk concept has thus far been rather conflicted, with some reporting results suggesting that the concept is intellectualist and others that it is anti-intellectualist. This chapter presents results in line with the claim that the folk concept is an epistemological hybrid, embodying both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist factors.
Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an imp... more Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an important role in underwriting ordinary practice in contemporary epistemology. But is it true? Here the authors present several studies that examine epistemic universalism by looking at the relationships between cultural background, folk knowledge attribution, and salience effects, whereby mention of an unrealized possibility of error undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge. These studies suggest that there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic intuitions, but that these parameters can vary in such a way that certain epistemic intuitions, in either their strength or propositional content, display patterns of genuine cross-cultural diversity.
Sackris and Beebe show that many people seem willing to attribute knowledge in the absence of jus... more Sackris and Beebe show that many people seem willing to attribute knowledge in the absence of justification. Their results provide some reason to claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not treat justification as necessary for its deployment. This chapter provides some support for this claim. It does so by addressing an alternative account of Sackris and Beebe’s results—the possibility that the observed knowledge attributions stemmed from protagonist projection, a linguistic phenomenon in which the speaker uses words that the relevant protagonist might use to describe her own situation and the listener interprets the speaker accordingly. That said, caution is recommended. There are alternative possibilities regarding what drives knowledge attributions in cases of unjustified true belief that must be ruled out before much confidence is given to the claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not take justification to be necessary for its use.
This article contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We ex... more This article contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We examine variability in the philosophical views of scientists. Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we analyze scientists’ responses to prompts on philosophical issues (methodology, confirmation, values, reality, reductionism, and motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social and behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which differences arose, with several more that look promising for future research. We then evaluate the difference between the natural and social sciences and the challenge of interdisciplinary integration across scientific branches.
Machery's case ag... more Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
Machery's case ag... more Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers‘ reliance on armcha... more Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers‘ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there‘s no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers‘ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with goo...
This document contains the appendices, which provides the stimulus materials, for the four studie... more This document contains the appendices, which provides the stimulus materials, for the four studies reported in: Gonnerman, Mortensen, & Robbins (forthcoming). KNOWING HOW as a philosophical hybrid. Synthese
In this article, we describe a project in which philosophy, in combination with methods drawn fro... more In this article, we describe a project in which philosophy, in combination with methods drawn from mental modeling, was used to structure dialogue among stakeholders in a region-scale climate adaptation process. The case study we discuss synthesizes the Toolbox dialogue method, a philosophically grounded approach to enhancing communication and collaboration in complex research and practice, with a mental modeling approach rooted in risk analysis, assessment, and communication to structure conversations among non-academic stakeholders who have a common interest in planning for a sustainable future. We begin by describing the background of this project, including details about climate resiliency efforts in West Michigan and the Toolbox dialogue method, which was extended in this project from academic research into community organization involving the West Michigan Climate Resiliency Framework Initiative. This extension involved application of several methods, which are the focus of the Methods section. We then present and discuss preliminary results that suggest the potential for philosophical dialogue to enhance mutual understanding in complex community initiatives that focus on sustainable responses to climate change. Overall, the article supplies a detailed, instructive example of how philosophy can support policy-relevant decision-making processes at the community level.
Abstract: Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance... more Abstract: Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there’s no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers ’ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide ...
We present three experiments that explore the robustness of the authentic-apparent effect—the fin... more We present three experiments that explore the robustness of the authentic-apparent effect—the finding that participants are less likely to attribute knowledge to the protagonist in apparent- than in authentic-evidence Gettier cases. The results go some way towards suggesting that the effect is robust to assessments of the justificatory status of the protagonist’s belief. However, not all of the results are consistent with an effect invariant across two demographic contexts: American and Indian nationalities.
Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists as... more Our view is that the folk concept of knowing how is more complicated than many epistemologists assume. We present four studies that go some way towards supporting our view—that the folk concept of knowledge-how is a philosophical hybrid, comprising both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. One upshot is, if we are going to award a presumptive status to philosophical theories of know-how that best accord with the folk concept, it ought to go to those that combine intellectualist and anti-intellectualist elements.
Some epistemologists appear to maintain that the folk can serve as a source of dialectical advant... more Some epistemologists appear to maintain that the folk can serve as a source of dialectical advantage in debates between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how. The common assumption seems to be that the philosophical account that best accords with the folk concept has a dialectical advantage over its competitors such that it ought to enjoy a strong (though defeasible) presumption in its favor. Work in experimental philosophy on the folk concept has thus far been rather conflicted, with some reporting results suggesting that the concept is intellectualist and others that it is anti-intellectualist. This chapter presents results in line with the claim that the folk concept is an epistemological hybrid, embodying both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist factors.
Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an imp... more Epistemic universalism, the view that epistemic intuitions are culturally universal, plays an important role in underwriting ordinary practice in contemporary epistemology. But is it true? Here the authors present several studies that examine epistemic universalism by looking at the relationships between cultural background, folk knowledge attribution, and salience effects, whereby mention of an unrealized possibility of error undermines our willingness to attribute knowledge. These studies suggest that there may be structural universals, universal epistemic parameters that influence epistemic intuitions, but that these parameters can vary in such a way that certain epistemic intuitions, in either their strength or propositional content, display patterns of genuine cross-cultural diversity.
Sackris and Beebe show that many people seem willing to attribute knowledge in the absence of jus... more Sackris and Beebe show that many people seem willing to attribute knowledge in the absence of justification. Their results provide some reason to claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not treat justification as necessary for its deployment. This chapter provides some support for this claim. It does so by addressing an alternative account of Sackris and Beebe’s results—the possibility that the observed knowledge attributions stemmed from protagonist projection, a linguistic phenomenon in which the speaker uses words that the relevant protagonist might use to describe her own situation and the listener interprets the speaker accordingly. That said, caution is recommended. There are alternative possibilities regarding what drives knowledge attributions in cases of unjustified true belief that must be ruled out before much confidence is given to the claim that the folk concept of knowledge does not take justification to be necessary for its use.
This article contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We ex... more This article contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We examine variability in the philosophical views of scientists. Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we analyze scientists’ responses to prompts on philosophical issues (methodology, confirmation, values, reality, reductionism, and motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social and behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which differences arose, with several more that look promising for future research. We then evaluate the difference between the natural and social sciences and the challenge of interdisciplinary integration across scientific branches.
Machery's case ag... more Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
Machery's case ag... more Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
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