Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities and U.S. Policy. By Uri Ra'a... more Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities and U.S. Policy. By Uri Ra'anan et al. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's (for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), 1985. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86. Edited by John W. Sewell et al. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1985. By Mark N. Katz Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe. By Gregory F. Treverton. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate. By Michael Nacht. Washington, D.C.: Brookigs Institution, 1985. By Derek Leebaert Latin Migration North: The Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy. By Michael S. Teitelbaum. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1985. By Sol Sanders Nation Against Nation. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. By Stanley J. Michalak, Jr.
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1991
... America's purpose in the new world will be different from that of its previous great glo... more ... America's purpose in the new world will be different from that of its previous great global mission. ... (3) Why do Europeans persist in nurturing the illusion of an ... blood relations with Europe, and Americans share with Europeans the same badges and appurtenances of daily life. ...
Review of Faith & International Affairs, Jun 1, 2012
The tenets of American exceptionalism—defined as its civil religion—have shifted over time, and e... more The tenets of American exceptionalism—defined as its civil religion—have shifted over time, and exceptionalism's most recent iteration has alarming ramifications, demonstrated through US counterterrorism policy. In crucial respects, the American project can be compared to ancient Rome: in its civil universalism; its sense of exceptional destiny; its use of sacred symbols; and its militarization. Global terrorism today threatens America's sense of divine blessing, its civil-religious identity. The mindset undergirding current US counterterrorism, especially the extensive use of drone attacks, should be normatively criticized as a sharp deviation from the traditional ethos of exceptionalism. The new ethos is one of ruthlessly purging the world of alleged threats rather than redeeming/transforming the world.
THE PLACE: The River Frigidus, in a country we now call Bosnia. The time: autumn, 394. Two Roman ... more THE PLACE: The River Frigidus, in a country we now call Bosnia. The time: autumn, 394. Two Roman emperors. Theodosius I and Eugenius, are at war, with the world in the balance. A deciding factor: Alaric's Gothic tribal militia. His shock troops storm the laager where Eugenius's soldiers shelter, defeating them and reuniting the empire under Theodosius. But reveling in their strength, the Goths soon take on the imperial state itself. Rome contains them only when the emperor's sister. Galla Placidia. weds the Gothic leader and Visigoths are made Roman in Aquitaine. (1) Nine centuries later. A wholly extravagant man, Roger de Flor. seals a deal with Andronicus II, basileus of a much-shrunken Romaioi. Roger's soldier-company--7,000 Catalans. women and children, too--sets out against the Turks. Nothing can stop this skirmishing, ferocious light infantry. But there is not enough gold in the Byzantine treasury to pay them. Catalan anger against an empty-pocket state (that betrays them!) starts an empire-wide, seven-year rampage that comes close to bringing down Constantinople itself. (2) Two snapshots in history: two "'non-state actors" seizing the greatest states of their day by the throat--and taking what they want. For all of its unpalatable irony, this is our world today. We Americans, 21st-century Romans, find ourselves ineffective against the barbarians we call non-state actors. The non-state fighters are like Melville's Moby Dick: they "heap" us, they task us. Yet we can achieve nothing against them. Something is happening here, and we need to take it onboard. But doing so means throwing off our narcissism and certainty of entitlement. It is a heavy burden to shrug off. But shrug it we must. The "American Way of War" enshrines triumph through military "transformations." (3) They are divine tokens of our superiority. Even better, "like-us" challenges from others are met by all-out U.S. out-performance. German combined arms innovation between the world wars led to "Patton beats Rommel." Ditto Japanese carrier aviation. Ditto Soviet atomic rockets. Ditto too the Soviets' vaunted "military-technical revolution." How we outdid them! But our paradigm of military "revolution" is steadfastly both technology-driven and self-focused. The American way of war is all about "like-us" or "kin-enemies" also doing like us. We always win out in the end, and win big. Today's transformation, however, has nothing to do with us, except perhaps in how the new innovators take on our technologies--and target our vulnerabilities. The innovators here are emerging societies and alternative communities--not "kin-enemies" but aliens, "stranger-enemies." They drive this transformation of war. History's Legacy Since classical antiquity there have been two eras in which non-state actors dominated war. One was the time of antiquity's end, from the 5th to the 7th centuries. The second was at the end of the Middle Ages and the very beginning of modernity, in the 13th and 14th centuries. These were tumultuous times, of course, but also periods in which identity was shifting and migrating. Specifically, these eras track the morphing identity of the Greco-Roman world and the late-medieval transformation of the Mediterranean world (the emergence of the Ottomans as successors to both the Byzantine and Sunni Arab commonwealths). These were transition periods, between-times, bridging old establishments to new. Consider what was happening: * International relationships were marked by migrations of peoples, economic big changes, and "outside" shocks like grand pandemics and abrupt climate change. * Societies were shaken by new ideas and new movements, leading to new collective consciousnesses and thus new identities. * The very nature of ruling authority was shifting in people's minds, moving rapidly from established forms to new claims. If we look at late antiquity and early modernity, we see two very different, but also two very change-oriented times. …
Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities and U.S. Policy. By Uri Ra'a... more Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Strengths, Vulnerabilities and U.S. Policy. By Uri Ra'anan et al. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's (for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), 1985. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1985-86. Edited by John W. Sewell et al. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books (for the Overseas Development Council), 1985. By Mark N. Katz Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe. By Gregory F. Treverton. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate. By Michael Nacht. Washington, D.C.: Brookigs Institution, 1985. By Derek Leebaert Latin Migration North: The Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy. By Michael S. Teitelbaum. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1985. By Sol Sanders Nation Against Nation. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. By Stanley J. Michalak, Jr.
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 1991
... America's purpose in the new world will be different from that of its previous great glo... more ... America's purpose in the new world will be different from that of its previous great global mission. ... (3) Why do Europeans persist in nurturing the illusion of an ... blood relations with Europe, and Americans share with Europeans the same badges and appurtenances of daily life. ...
Review of Faith & International Affairs, Jun 1, 2012
The tenets of American exceptionalism—defined as its civil religion—have shifted over time, and e... more The tenets of American exceptionalism—defined as its civil religion—have shifted over time, and exceptionalism's most recent iteration has alarming ramifications, demonstrated through US counterterrorism policy. In crucial respects, the American project can be compared to ancient Rome: in its civil universalism; its sense of exceptional destiny; its use of sacred symbols; and its militarization. Global terrorism today threatens America's sense of divine blessing, its civil-religious identity. The mindset undergirding current US counterterrorism, especially the extensive use of drone attacks, should be normatively criticized as a sharp deviation from the traditional ethos of exceptionalism. The new ethos is one of ruthlessly purging the world of alleged threats rather than redeeming/transforming the world.
THE PLACE: The River Frigidus, in a country we now call Bosnia. The time: autumn, 394. Two Roman ... more THE PLACE: The River Frigidus, in a country we now call Bosnia. The time: autumn, 394. Two Roman emperors. Theodosius I and Eugenius, are at war, with the world in the balance. A deciding factor: Alaric's Gothic tribal militia. His shock troops storm the laager where Eugenius's soldiers shelter, defeating them and reuniting the empire under Theodosius. But reveling in their strength, the Goths soon take on the imperial state itself. Rome contains them only when the emperor's sister. Galla Placidia. weds the Gothic leader and Visigoths are made Roman in Aquitaine. (1) Nine centuries later. A wholly extravagant man, Roger de Flor. seals a deal with Andronicus II, basileus of a much-shrunken Romaioi. Roger's soldier-company--7,000 Catalans. women and children, too--sets out against the Turks. Nothing can stop this skirmishing, ferocious light infantry. But there is not enough gold in the Byzantine treasury to pay them. Catalan anger against an empty-pocket state (that betrays them!) starts an empire-wide, seven-year rampage that comes close to bringing down Constantinople itself. (2) Two snapshots in history: two "'non-state actors" seizing the greatest states of their day by the throat--and taking what they want. For all of its unpalatable irony, this is our world today. We Americans, 21st-century Romans, find ourselves ineffective against the barbarians we call non-state actors. The non-state fighters are like Melville's Moby Dick: they "heap" us, they task us. Yet we can achieve nothing against them. Something is happening here, and we need to take it onboard. But doing so means throwing off our narcissism and certainty of entitlement. It is a heavy burden to shrug off. But shrug it we must. The "American Way of War" enshrines triumph through military "transformations." (3) They are divine tokens of our superiority. Even better, "like-us" challenges from others are met by all-out U.S. out-performance. German combined arms innovation between the world wars led to "Patton beats Rommel." Ditto Japanese carrier aviation. Ditto Soviet atomic rockets. Ditto too the Soviets' vaunted "military-technical revolution." How we outdid them! But our paradigm of military "revolution" is steadfastly both technology-driven and self-focused. The American way of war is all about "like-us" or "kin-enemies" also doing like us. We always win out in the end, and win big. Today's transformation, however, has nothing to do with us, except perhaps in how the new innovators take on our technologies--and target our vulnerabilities. The innovators here are emerging societies and alternative communities--not "kin-enemies" but aliens, "stranger-enemies." They drive this transformation of war. History's Legacy Since classical antiquity there have been two eras in which non-state actors dominated war. One was the time of antiquity's end, from the 5th to the 7th centuries. The second was at the end of the Middle Ages and the very beginning of modernity, in the 13th and 14th centuries. These were tumultuous times, of course, but also periods in which identity was shifting and migrating. Specifically, these eras track the morphing identity of the Greco-Roman world and the late-medieval transformation of the Mediterranean world (the emergence of the Ottomans as successors to both the Byzantine and Sunni Arab commonwealths). These were transition periods, between-times, bridging old establishments to new. Consider what was happening: * International relationships were marked by migrations of peoples, economic big changes, and "outside" shocks like grand pandemics and abrupt climate change. * Societies were shaken by new ideas and new movements, leading to new collective consciousnesses and thus new identities. * The very nature of ruling authority was shifting in people's minds, moving rapidly from established forms to new claims. If we look at late antiquity and early modernity, we see two very different, but also two very change-oriented times. …
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