Analysis of China's domestic legal efforts to generate new maritime rights to match growing marit... more Analysis of China's domestic legal efforts to generate new maritime rights to match growing maritime interests
Discusses how international law, especially the UNCLOS III treaty, influences Chinese maritime po... more Discusses how international law, especially the UNCLOS III treaty, influences Chinese maritime policy decision-making
This conference paper will be published by the Center for Naval Analyses in a forthcoming volume.... more This conference paper will be published by the Center for Naval Analyses in a forthcoming volume. It examines China's pursuit of "maritime power" through domestic legal and administrative efforts, demonstrating how China systematically expands the scope and content of the maritime rights prescribed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to advance political and strategic goals.
Recent reports alleging Chinese military activity in Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir call r... more Recent reports alleging Chinese military activity in Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir call renewed attention to the extraordinary relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Such activities fuel concerns – especially in Washington and New Delhi – that China enjoys unique privileges and exercises inordinate influence in Pakistan. Despite this perception, however, instances of direct Chinese involvement in Pakistani political and security affairs are rare. Even as Chinese economic interests in Pakistan multiply, Beijing has shown little inclination to actively involve itself in shaping Pakistani behavior, taking cautious and minimal steps to protect its narrowly defined interests and repeatedly snubbing the democratically-elected civilian regime of Asif Ali Zardari. This hands-off approach thus also supports a different conclusion, namely that China’s privileged relationship with Pakistan may be “more apparent than real,” better characterized as periodic episodes of converging interests than a consistent pattern of real cooperation. Pakistan’s serial provocations of India, hot-and-cold relationship with the United States and seeming inability to “keep the Korans out of Xinjiang” – that is, to prevent Islamist militants and madrassas from supporting Muslim separatists in China’s troubled western region – are all headline indications that Pakistani behavior does not always conform to Chinese preferences.
A reconsideration of traditionally skeptical attitudes about military transparency appears to be ... more A reconsideration of traditionally skeptical attitudes about military transparency appears to be underway in China. Whereas Beijing formerly rejected Western calls for greater military transparency—arguing that transparency benefits the strong at the expense of the weak—a new calculus seems to be emerging that reflects China’s greater confidence in its own strength. As Chinese military capabilities have improved in both relative and absolute terms, the same logic that justified wariness of military transparency now recommends it as a useful tactic. Recent comments by Chinese officials and experts, along with some adjustments to military practice, suggest that greater transparency is now seen as an instrument capable of serving useful political and deterrent functions.
China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
This memo outlines strategies that the Philippine and U.S. governments can adopt to help the gove... more This memo outlines strategies that the Philippine and U.S. governments can adopt to help the government of Taiwan achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. Among the many different and often competing Taiwanese goals, we selected maintenance of the status quo as our focus, a malleable idea that has manifested itself as the common denominator on both ends of the political spectrum. Although the memo refers to the Philippine and U.S. governments as main actors, the strategies presented are not limited to actions undertaken by government officers or through formal mechanisms – they also provide space for multi-track processes (such as Track-Two diplomacy) and other activities initiated by private actors, such as local Chambers of Commerce, and non-government organizations. The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China. We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.
Analysis of China's domestic legal efforts to generate new maritime rights to match growing marit... more Analysis of China's domestic legal efforts to generate new maritime rights to match growing maritime interests
Discusses how international law, especially the UNCLOS III treaty, influences Chinese maritime po... more Discusses how international law, especially the UNCLOS III treaty, influences Chinese maritime policy decision-making
This conference paper will be published by the Center for Naval Analyses in a forthcoming volume.... more This conference paper will be published by the Center for Naval Analyses in a forthcoming volume. It examines China's pursuit of "maritime power" through domestic legal and administrative efforts, demonstrating how China systematically expands the scope and content of the maritime rights prescribed by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to advance political and strategic goals.
Recent reports alleging Chinese military activity in Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir call r... more Recent reports alleging Chinese military activity in Pakistani-controlled areas of Kashmir call renewed attention to the extraordinary relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Such activities fuel concerns – especially in Washington and New Delhi – that China enjoys unique privileges and exercises inordinate influence in Pakistan. Despite this perception, however, instances of direct Chinese involvement in Pakistani political and security affairs are rare. Even as Chinese economic interests in Pakistan multiply, Beijing has shown little inclination to actively involve itself in shaping Pakistani behavior, taking cautious and minimal steps to protect its narrowly defined interests and repeatedly snubbing the democratically-elected civilian regime of Asif Ali Zardari. This hands-off approach thus also supports a different conclusion, namely that China’s privileged relationship with Pakistan may be “more apparent than real,” better characterized as periodic episodes of converging interests than a consistent pattern of real cooperation. Pakistan’s serial provocations of India, hot-and-cold relationship with the United States and seeming inability to “keep the Korans out of Xinjiang” – that is, to prevent Islamist militants and madrassas from supporting Muslim separatists in China’s troubled western region – are all headline indications that Pakistani behavior does not always conform to Chinese preferences.
A reconsideration of traditionally skeptical attitudes about military transparency appears to be ... more A reconsideration of traditionally skeptical attitudes about military transparency appears to be underway in China. Whereas Beijing formerly rejected Western calls for greater military transparency—arguing that transparency benefits the strong at the expense of the weak—a new calculus seems to be emerging that reflects China’s greater confidence in its own strength. As Chinese military capabilities have improved in both relative and absolute terms, the same logic that justified wariness of military transparency now recommends it as a useful tactic. Recent comments by Chinese officials and experts, along with some adjustments to military practice, suggest that greater transparency is now seen as an instrument capable of serving useful political and deterrent functions.
China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
This memo outlines strategies that the Philippine and U.S. governments can adopt to help the gove... more This memo outlines strategies that the Philippine and U.S. governments can adopt to help the government of Taiwan achieve its foreign and security policy objectives. Among the many different and often competing Taiwanese goals, we selected maintenance of the status quo as our focus, a malleable idea that has manifested itself as the common denominator on both ends of the political spectrum. Although the memo refers to the Philippine and U.S. governments as main actors, the strategies presented are not limited to actions undertaken by government officers or through formal mechanisms – they also provide space for multi-track processes (such as Track-Two diplomacy) and other activities initiated by private actors, such as local Chambers of Commerce, and non-government organizations. The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China. We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.
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Papers by Isaac B. Kardon
China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China.
We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.
China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China.
We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.