Why did a clique of Mauritanian officers risk their lives to overthrow the autocrat they had serv... more Why did a clique of Mauritanian officers risk their lives to overthrow the autocrat they had served for twenty years, only to cede power to an elected civilian? And having won acclaim for their commitment to a process of democratic transition, why did most of these officers join a year later to overthrow the newly elected president? Had the international community been fooled by a military junta—or was it complicit in creating an elaborate pseudo-democratic facade?
Drawing on numerous interviews and field research in an Islamic republic wracked by ethnic tensions, terrorism, dire poverty, and the living legacy of slavery, Noel Foster addresses these questions to reveal the complex forces at work in Mauritania’s long struggle for better governance.
The International Journal of African Historical Studies, May 1, 2011
Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and... more Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers/ First Forum Press, 2011. Pp. viii, 315; bibliography, index, glossary. $72.50. By the middle of 2011, Mauritania seemed largely immune to the currents of unrest and change sweeping much of North Africa and the Middle East. Aside from a single case of self-immolation in the center of the capital, Nouakchott, in February 2011 and protests in eastern Mauritania at about the same time, the country was strangely quiescent. This, however, could not disguise the fact that many, if not most, Mauritanian citizens harbored the same frustrations, grievances, and aspirations as their Tunisian, Egyptian, or Syrian counterparts. This is brought home forcefully by Noel Foster's book-length analysis of modern Mauritania focusing mainly on the 2003-2009 period. It was during this period that the young state was rocked by a violent attempted coup against the long-serving president, Maaouiya OuId Sid' Ahmed Taya; the peaceful overthrow of OuId Taya by his own military establishment two years later; an interim army regime that delivered on its promise to bring at least a measure of civilian democracy (from February 2007 to August 2008); followed once more by a military coup against the head of state. Then, in contentious circumstances, the leader of the 2008 coup, General Mohamed OuId Abdelaziz, was elected president in 2009. Foster's work is one of the very few books on Mauritania in English, and reflects extensive research and fieldwork. After a general introduction to the history and the divided social character of the country, the author begins his treatment by describing the parlous state of affairs by 2003 under President OuId Taya, whose rule had become increasingly iron-fisted, corrupt, and impervious to change. This formerly apolitical and honest officer had transformed himself into a stubborn remnant of the mass repression of the late 1980s, and distributed economic favors to his tribal kinsmen to an extent never before seen. It came as little surprise, then, that on June 8-9, 2003, a small group of disaffected army officers attempted- and very nearly succeeded- to unseat OuId Taya and possibly install of government of mixed Islamist-Arab Nationalist proclivities. In the early hours of the uprising, there was an astonishingly (or not) minimal response from most military and paramilitary units around Nouakchott, forcing OuId Taya to personally lead a counterattack with the help of the Presidential Security Battalion (known by its French acronym as BASEP), saving his regime in the nick of time. The unpopularity of his rale now abundantly demonstrated, President OuId Taya had a clear opportunity to change his stripes, but he did not. On the contrary, he clung ever more fiercely to the levers of power, holding what amounted to show trials of alleged coup plotters and other dissidents, continuing his corrupt ways, holding blatantly rigged elections later in 2003, and sending his army on what amounted to a wild goose chase across Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to pursue the guerrillas of AI-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had attacked a Mauritanian garrison in June 2005. This was the last straw for the army, and OuId Taya was bloodlessly overthrown in August 3, 2005, when he was out of the country. A transitional military junta was put into place, promising genuine democracy. In a country in which, as Foster persuasively argues, there is no dominant ideology either in the army or the population at large and in which there was absolutely no tradition of real pluralism, it might have been extremely difficult for any transitional regime, no matter how well intentioned, to bring about this sort of change. Did the Military Committee for Justice and Democracy (CMJD) succeed? Noel Foster argues they mostly did not. He builds a strong case. In the first place, the coup was solely an "old guard" affair originated and carried out at the highest levels of the officer corps. …
The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, 2021
How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and auth... more How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and authority, and turn such crises in their favour? This chapter draws on the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent “COVID diplomacy” to show how authoritarian powers, when confronted with unexpected crises, adapt. Beijing’s initial reaction to the emergence of COVID-19 arguably favoured its spread, while Moscow initially responded to the novel Coronavirus outbreak by minimizing its significance in state media while mismanaging the outbreak, even to the detriment of top leadership. However, both powers adapted and turned to “COVID-19 diplomacy” to serve pre-existing messaging objectives with domestic and foreign audiences, using targeted messaging in support of medical aid and outreach. Moscow used COVID diplomacy to reassure domestic audiences and win favour with select foreign audiences, while China gained favour with a broader audience. COVID diplomacy also reveals a longst...
moment of visibility in the history of ‘sex talk’ to show how ideas about Arab sexuality became s... more moment of visibility in the history of ‘sex talk’ to show how ideas about Arab sexuality became symbolically key to the struggle to define decolonised France. Its use of testimonials, fiction and audiovisual sources bring a useful multidisciplinary perspective for writing Maghrebi male voices and perspectives into the history of French decolonisation. Its format, topic, and resonance with current issues will likely make it an accessible and enjoyable book for undergraduate students, while its incisive analysis, use of innovative sources, and historiographical framing make it an important addition to graduate student reading lists. This study brings a laser-sharp focus to liminal spaces and identities in a way that illuminates broad transformations in both the history of sex, and the role of sex in history. In its rewriting of the connection between sexual revolution and the Algerian revolution, it constitutes a landmark book for the study of French identity and politics, colonialism and decolonisation, and the history of sex and gender.
The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, 2021
How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and auth... more How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and authority, and turn such crises in their favour? This chapter draws on the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent “COVID diplomacy” to show how authoritarian powers, when confronted with unexpected crises, adapt. Beijing’s initial reaction to the emergence of COVID-19 arguably favoured its spread, while Moscow initially responded to the novel Coronavirus outbreak by minimizing its significance in state media while mismanaging the outbreak, even to the detriment of top leadership. However, both powers adapted and turned to “COVID-19 diplomacy” to serve pre-existing messaging objectives with domestic and foreign audiences, using targeted messaging in support of medical aid and outreach. Moscow used COVID diplomacy to reassure domestic audiences and win favour with select foreign audiences, while China gained favour with a broader audience. COVID diplomacy also reveals a longst...
Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and... more Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers/ First Forum Press, 2011. Pp. viii, 315; bibliography, index, glossary. $72.50. By the middle of 2011, Mauritania seemed largely immune to the currents of unrest and change sweeping much of North Africa and the Middle East. Aside from a single case of self-immolation in the center of the capital, Nouakchott, in February 2011 and protests in eastern Mauritania at about the same time, the country was strangely quiescent. This, however, could not disguise the fact that many, if not most, Mauritanian citizens harbored the same frustrations, grievances, and aspirations as their Tunisian, Egyptian, or Syrian counterparts. This is brought home forcefully by Noel Foster's book-length analysis of modern Mauritania focusing mainly on the 2003-2009 period. It was during this period that the young state was rocked by a violent attempted coup against the long-serving president, Maaouiya OuId Sid' Ahmed Taya; the peaceful overthrow of OuId Taya by his own military establishment two years later; an interim army regime that delivered on its promise to bring at least a measure of civilian democracy (from February 2007 to August 2008); followed once more by a military coup against the head of state. Then, in contentious circumstances, the leader of the 2008 coup, General Mohamed OuId Abdelaziz, was elected president in 2009. Foster's work is one of the very few books on Mauritania in English, and reflects extensive research and fieldwork. After a general introduction to the history and the divided social character of the country, the author begins his treatment by describing the parlous state of affairs by 2003 under President OuId Taya, whose rule had become increasingly iron-fisted, corrupt, and impervious to change. This formerly apolitical and honest officer had transformed himself into a stubborn remnant of the mass repression of the late 1980s, and distributed economic favors to his tribal kinsmen to an extent never before seen. It came as little surprise, then, that on June 8-9, 2003, a small group of disaffected army officers attempted- and very nearly succeeded- to unseat OuId Taya and possibly install of government of mixed Islamist-Arab Nationalist proclivities. In the early hours of the uprising, there was an astonishingly (or not) minimal response from most military and paramilitary units around Nouakchott, forcing OuId Taya to personally lead a counterattack with the help of the Presidential Security Battalion (known by its French acronym as BASEP), saving his regime in the nick of time. The unpopularity of his rale now abundantly demonstrated, President OuId Taya had a clear opportunity to change his stripes, but he did not. On the contrary, he clung ever more fiercely to the levers of power, holding what amounted to show trials of alleged coup plotters and other dissidents, continuing his corrupt ways, holding blatantly rigged elections later in 2003, and sending his army on what amounted to a wild goose chase across Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to pursue the guerrillas of AI-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had attacked a Mauritanian garrison in June 2005. This was the last straw for the army, and OuId Taya was bloodlessly overthrown in August 3, 2005, when he was out of the country. A transitional military junta was put into place, promising genuine democracy. In a country in which, as Foster persuasively argues, there is no dominant ideology either in the army or the population at large and in which there was absolutely no tradition of real pluralism, it might have been extremely difficult for any transitional regime, no matter how well intentioned, to bring about this sort of change. Did the Military Committee for Justice and Democracy (CMJD) succeed? Noel Foster argues they mostly did not. He builds a strong case. In the first place, the coup was solely an "old guard" affair originated and carried out at the highest levels of the officer corps. …
Why did a clique of Mauritanian officers risk their lives to overthrow the autocrat they had serv... more Why did a clique of Mauritanian officers risk their lives to overthrow the autocrat they had served for twenty years, only to cede power to an elected civilian? And having won acclaim for their commitment to a process of democratic transition, why did most of these officers join a year later to overthrow the newly elected president? Had the international community been fooled by a military junta—or was it complicit in creating an elaborate pseudo-democratic facade?
Drawing on numerous interviews and field research in an Islamic republic wracked by ethnic tensions, terrorism, dire poverty, and the living legacy of slavery, Noel Foster addresses these questions to reveal the complex forces at work in Mauritania’s long struggle for better governance.
The International Journal of African Historical Studies, May 1, 2011
Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and... more Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers/ First Forum Press, 2011. Pp. viii, 315; bibliography, index, glossary. $72.50. By the middle of 2011, Mauritania seemed largely immune to the currents of unrest and change sweeping much of North Africa and the Middle East. Aside from a single case of self-immolation in the center of the capital, Nouakchott, in February 2011 and protests in eastern Mauritania at about the same time, the country was strangely quiescent. This, however, could not disguise the fact that many, if not most, Mauritanian citizens harbored the same frustrations, grievances, and aspirations as their Tunisian, Egyptian, or Syrian counterparts. This is brought home forcefully by Noel Foster's book-length analysis of modern Mauritania focusing mainly on the 2003-2009 period. It was during this period that the young state was rocked by a violent attempted coup against the long-serving president, Maaouiya OuId Sid' Ahmed Taya; the peaceful overthrow of OuId Taya by his own military establishment two years later; an interim army regime that delivered on its promise to bring at least a measure of civilian democracy (from February 2007 to August 2008); followed once more by a military coup against the head of state. Then, in contentious circumstances, the leader of the 2008 coup, General Mohamed OuId Abdelaziz, was elected president in 2009. Foster's work is one of the very few books on Mauritania in English, and reflects extensive research and fieldwork. After a general introduction to the history and the divided social character of the country, the author begins his treatment by describing the parlous state of affairs by 2003 under President OuId Taya, whose rule had become increasingly iron-fisted, corrupt, and impervious to change. This formerly apolitical and honest officer had transformed himself into a stubborn remnant of the mass repression of the late 1980s, and distributed economic favors to his tribal kinsmen to an extent never before seen. It came as little surprise, then, that on June 8-9, 2003, a small group of disaffected army officers attempted- and very nearly succeeded- to unseat OuId Taya and possibly install of government of mixed Islamist-Arab Nationalist proclivities. In the early hours of the uprising, there was an astonishingly (or not) minimal response from most military and paramilitary units around Nouakchott, forcing OuId Taya to personally lead a counterattack with the help of the Presidential Security Battalion (known by its French acronym as BASEP), saving his regime in the nick of time. The unpopularity of his rale now abundantly demonstrated, President OuId Taya had a clear opportunity to change his stripes, but he did not. On the contrary, he clung ever more fiercely to the levers of power, holding what amounted to show trials of alleged coup plotters and other dissidents, continuing his corrupt ways, holding blatantly rigged elections later in 2003, and sending his army on what amounted to a wild goose chase across Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to pursue the guerrillas of AI-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had attacked a Mauritanian garrison in June 2005. This was the last straw for the army, and OuId Taya was bloodlessly overthrown in August 3, 2005, when he was out of the country. A transitional military junta was put into place, promising genuine democracy. In a country in which, as Foster persuasively argues, there is no dominant ideology either in the army or the population at large and in which there was absolutely no tradition of real pluralism, it might have been extremely difficult for any transitional regime, no matter how well intentioned, to bring about this sort of change. Did the Military Committee for Justice and Democracy (CMJD) succeed? Noel Foster argues they mostly did not. He builds a strong case. In the first place, the coup was solely an "old guard" affair originated and carried out at the highest levels of the officer corps. …
The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, 2021
How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and auth... more How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and authority, and turn such crises in their favour? This chapter draws on the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent “COVID diplomacy” to show how authoritarian powers, when confronted with unexpected crises, adapt. Beijing’s initial reaction to the emergence of COVID-19 arguably favoured its spread, while Moscow initially responded to the novel Coronavirus outbreak by minimizing its significance in state media while mismanaging the outbreak, even to the detriment of top leadership. However, both powers adapted and turned to “COVID-19 diplomacy” to serve pre-existing messaging objectives with domestic and foreign audiences, using targeted messaging in support of medical aid and outreach. Moscow used COVID diplomacy to reassure domestic audiences and win favour with select foreign audiences, while China gained favour with a broader audience. COVID diplomacy also reveals a longst...
moment of visibility in the history of ‘sex talk’ to show how ideas about Arab sexuality became s... more moment of visibility in the history of ‘sex talk’ to show how ideas about Arab sexuality became symbolically key to the struggle to define decolonised France. Its use of testimonials, fiction and audiovisual sources bring a useful multidisciplinary perspective for writing Maghrebi male voices and perspectives into the history of French decolonisation. Its format, topic, and resonance with current issues will likely make it an accessible and enjoyable book for undergraduate students, while its incisive analysis, use of innovative sources, and historiographical framing make it an important addition to graduate student reading lists. This study brings a laser-sharp focus to liminal spaces and identities in a way that illuminates broad transformations in both the history of sex, and the role of sex in history. In its rewriting of the connection between sexual revolution and the Algerian revolution, it constitutes a landmark book for the study of French identity and politics, colonialism and decolonisation, and the history of sex and gender.
The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare, 2021
How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and auth... more How do authoritarian powers adapt to unexpected crises that challenge their capabilities and authority, and turn such crises in their favour? This chapter draws on the exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent “COVID diplomacy” to show how authoritarian powers, when confronted with unexpected crises, adapt. Beijing’s initial reaction to the emergence of COVID-19 arguably favoured its spread, while Moscow initially responded to the novel Coronavirus outbreak by minimizing its significance in state media while mismanaging the outbreak, even to the detriment of top leadership. However, both powers adapted and turned to “COVID-19 diplomacy” to serve pre-existing messaging objectives with domestic and foreign audiences, using targeted messaging in support of medical aid and outreach. Moscow used COVID diplomacy to reassure domestic audiences and win favour with select foreign audiences, while China gained favour with a broader audience. COVID diplomacy also reveals a longst...
Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and... more Mauritania: The Struggle for Democracy. By Noel Foster. Studies on North Africa. Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers/ First Forum Press, 2011. Pp. viii, 315; bibliography, index, glossary. $72.50. By the middle of 2011, Mauritania seemed largely immune to the currents of unrest and change sweeping much of North Africa and the Middle East. Aside from a single case of self-immolation in the center of the capital, Nouakchott, in February 2011 and protests in eastern Mauritania at about the same time, the country was strangely quiescent. This, however, could not disguise the fact that many, if not most, Mauritanian citizens harbored the same frustrations, grievances, and aspirations as their Tunisian, Egyptian, or Syrian counterparts. This is brought home forcefully by Noel Foster's book-length analysis of modern Mauritania focusing mainly on the 2003-2009 period. It was during this period that the young state was rocked by a violent attempted coup against the long-serving president, Maaouiya OuId Sid' Ahmed Taya; the peaceful overthrow of OuId Taya by his own military establishment two years later; an interim army regime that delivered on its promise to bring at least a measure of civilian democracy (from February 2007 to August 2008); followed once more by a military coup against the head of state. Then, in contentious circumstances, the leader of the 2008 coup, General Mohamed OuId Abdelaziz, was elected president in 2009. Foster's work is one of the very few books on Mauritania in English, and reflects extensive research and fieldwork. After a general introduction to the history and the divided social character of the country, the author begins his treatment by describing the parlous state of affairs by 2003 under President OuId Taya, whose rule had become increasingly iron-fisted, corrupt, and impervious to change. This formerly apolitical and honest officer had transformed himself into a stubborn remnant of the mass repression of the late 1980s, and distributed economic favors to his tribal kinsmen to an extent never before seen. It came as little surprise, then, that on June 8-9, 2003, a small group of disaffected army officers attempted- and very nearly succeeded- to unseat OuId Taya and possibly install of government of mixed Islamist-Arab Nationalist proclivities. In the early hours of the uprising, there was an astonishingly (or not) minimal response from most military and paramilitary units around Nouakchott, forcing OuId Taya to personally lead a counterattack with the help of the Presidential Security Battalion (known by its French acronym as BASEP), saving his regime in the nick of time. The unpopularity of his rale now abundantly demonstrated, President OuId Taya had a clear opportunity to change his stripes, but he did not. On the contrary, he clung ever more fiercely to the levers of power, holding what amounted to show trials of alleged coup plotters and other dissidents, continuing his corrupt ways, holding blatantly rigged elections later in 2003, and sending his army on what amounted to a wild goose chase across Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to pursue the guerrillas of AI-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had attacked a Mauritanian garrison in June 2005. This was the last straw for the army, and OuId Taya was bloodlessly overthrown in August 3, 2005, when he was out of the country. A transitional military junta was put into place, promising genuine democracy. In a country in which, as Foster persuasively argues, there is no dominant ideology either in the army or the population at large and in which there was absolutely no tradition of real pluralism, it might have been extremely difficult for any transitional regime, no matter how well intentioned, to bring about this sort of change. Did the Military Committee for Justice and Democracy (CMJD) succeed? Noel Foster argues they mostly did not. He builds a strong case. In the first place, the coup was solely an "old guard" affair originated and carried out at the highest levels of the officer corps. …
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Drawing on numerous interviews and field research in an Islamic republic wracked by ethnic tensions, terrorism, dire poverty, and the living legacy of slavery, Noel Foster addresses these questions to reveal the complex forces at work in Mauritania’s long struggle for better governance.
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Papers by Noel Foster
Drawing on numerous interviews and field research in an Islamic republic wracked by ethnic tensions, terrorism, dire poverty, and the living legacy of slavery, Noel Foster addresses these questions to reveal the complex forces at work in Mauritania’s long struggle for better governance.