This thesis compares how Christian thinkers John Chrysostom (349-407 CE) and Philip Melanchthon (... more This thesis compares how Christian thinkers John Chrysostom (349-407 CE) and Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560 CE) understood the theological concept of justification as found in Paul’s epistle to the Romans, and how their respective intellectual environments influenced their understandings of justification. Through detailed analysis of how Chrysostom and Melanchthon defined the theological concepts underlying their views of justification, it is demonstrated that, while their descriptions of justification often seem amicable, these apparent similarities are superficial. Their primary disagreement rests in their understandings of righteousness, which, for Chrysostom, was the outcome of a synergistic process wherein the faithful Christian gradually became, in actuality, more righteous by cooperating with the will and grace of God. Furthermore,
Chrysostom viewed righteousness as a distinct stages in one’s struggle for salvation that followed one’s justification. Melanchthon rejected the notion that human beings themselves could become righteous, instead positing that faithful Christians are justified and simultaneously declared righteous by God based solely on their trust in the saving power of Christ’s atoning death.
Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government presents a teleological justification for the ... more Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government presents a teleological justification for the appropriation of resources, which he bases upon the good of self-preservation realized by these resources. I show that this argument is similar to the case for use presented in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. Initially, Locke places limitations upon ownership, such as taking only as much as one can use before spoilage, and not frivolously destroying resources. These limitations act to regulate the amount of resources an individual may appropriate and ensures there is enough for others also to meet their needs. However, with the introduction of durable forms of money that are not subject to spoilage, Locke claims that constraint of spoilage is no longer salient, and an individual may appropriate resources without limit or concern for the original purpose or end of an object. Locke argues that spoilage is not immoral in and of itself, but becomes so when taking more than may be used before spoilage prevents others from meeting their needs. I argue that Locke’s initial justification for use and appropriation, being self-preservation, is in tension with his claim that durable forms of money are not subject to the initial limitations associated with first argument from self-preservation. What is strongest in Locke’s argument for use are those elements similar to those of Aquinas’ argument for use, and by abandoning this initial method of justification, his later argument for property is undermined.
This thesis compares how Christian thinkers John Chrysostom (349-407 CE) and Philip Melanchthon (... more This thesis compares how Christian thinkers John Chrysostom (349-407 CE) and Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560 CE) understood the theological concept of justification as found in Paul’s epistle to the Romans, and how their respective intellectual environments influenced their understandings of justification. Through detailed analysis of how Chrysostom and Melanchthon defined the theological concepts underlying their views of justification, it is demonstrated that, while their descriptions of justification often seem amicable, these apparent similarities are superficial. Their primary disagreement rests in their understandings of righteousness, which, for Chrysostom, was the outcome of a synergistic process wherein the faithful Christian gradually became, in actuality, more righteous by cooperating with the will and grace of God. Furthermore,
Chrysostom viewed righteousness as a distinct stages in one’s struggle for salvation that followed one’s justification. Melanchthon rejected the notion that human beings themselves could become righteous, instead positing that faithful Christians are justified and simultaneously declared righteous by God based solely on their trust in the saving power of Christ’s atoning death.
Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government presents a teleological justification for the ... more Chapter 5 of Locke’s Second Treatise of Government presents a teleological justification for the appropriation of resources, which he bases upon the good of self-preservation realized by these resources. I show that this argument is similar to the case for use presented in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. Initially, Locke places limitations upon ownership, such as taking only as much as one can use before spoilage, and not frivolously destroying resources. These limitations act to regulate the amount of resources an individual may appropriate and ensures there is enough for others also to meet their needs. However, with the introduction of durable forms of money that are not subject to spoilage, Locke claims that constraint of spoilage is no longer salient, and an individual may appropriate resources without limit or concern for the original purpose or end of an object. Locke argues that spoilage is not immoral in and of itself, but becomes so when taking more than may be used before spoilage prevents others from meeting their needs. I argue that Locke’s initial justification for use and appropriation, being self-preservation, is in tension with his claim that durable forms of money are not subject to the initial limitations associated with first argument from self-preservation. What is strongest in Locke’s argument for use are those elements similar to those of Aquinas’ argument for use, and by abandoning this initial method of justification, his later argument for property is undermined.
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Chrysostom viewed righteousness as a distinct stages in one’s struggle for salvation that followed one’s justification. Melanchthon rejected the notion that human beings themselves could become righteous, instead positing that faithful Christians are justified and simultaneously declared righteous by God based solely on their trust in the saving power of Christ’s atoning death.
However, with the introduction of durable forms of money that are not subject to spoilage, Locke claims that constraint of spoilage is no longer salient, and an individual may appropriate resources without limit or concern for the original purpose or end of an object. Locke argues that spoilage is not immoral in and of itself, but becomes so when taking more than may be used before spoilage prevents others from meeting their needs. I argue that Locke’s initial justification for use and appropriation, being self-preservation, is in tension with his claim that durable forms of money are not subject to the initial limitations associated with first argument from self-preservation. What is strongest in Locke’s argument for use are those elements similar to those of Aquinas’ argument for use, and by abandoning this initial method of justification, his later argument for property is undermined.
Chrysostom viewed righteousness as a distinct stages in one’s struggle for salvation that followed one’s justification. Melanchthon rejected the notion that human beings themselves could become righteous, instead positing that faithful Christians are justified and simultaneously declared righteous by God based solely on their trust in the saving power of Christ’s atoning death.
However, with the introduction of durable forms of money that are not subject to spoilage, Locke claims that constraint of spoilage is no longer salient, and an individual may appropriate resources without limit or concern for the original purpose or end of an object. Locke argues that spoilage is not immoral in and of itself, but becomes so when taking more than may be used before spoilage prevents others from meeting their needs. I argue that Locke’s initial justification for use and appropriation, being self-preservation, is in tension with his claim that durable forms of money are not subject to the initial limitations associated with first argument from self-preservation. What is strongest in Locke’s argument for use are those elements similar to those of Aquinas’ argument for use, and by abandoning this initial method of justification, his later argument for property is undermined.