Cynthia Stark is professor of philosophy at the University of Utah specializing in feminist, political and moral philosophy. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of North Carolina in 1993. She also holds a Master's Degree in Political Science (specializing in political theory) from the University of Pittsburgh. Her articles are published in the Journal of Philosophy, Hypatia, Nous, and the Journal of Political Philosophy, among others. She has been a co-editor of the Feminist Philosophy Quarterly since 2023 and is the recipient of the David Eccles School of Business Daniels Fund Leadership in Ethics Education Teaching Award.
Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for 1) condoning some cases of oppression and 2) condemni... more Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for 1) condoning some cases of oppression and 2) condemning others for the wrong reason, namely that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, simply because it violates universal moral equality. I argue that luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two responses address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.
In Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, Watson and Hartley dispute the claim that Rawls’s doctri... more In Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, Watson and Hartley dispute the claim that Rawls’s doctrine of political liberalism must tolerate gender hierarchy because it counts conservative and orthodox religions as reasonable comprehensive doctrines. I argue that their defense in fact contains two arguments, both of which fail. The first, which I call the “Deliberative Equality Argument”, fails because it does not establish conclusively that political liberalism’s demand for equal citizenship forbids social practices of domination, as the authors contend. The second, which I call the “Equal Liberties Argument”, fails because it supports a particular version of political liberalism and not the doctrine itself.
In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also... more In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional 'reach' or currency. It has the first when it applies to only social (and not natural) phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced (and not naturally occurring) goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan's view contains two fatal ambiguities and, second, that, to be sound, it requires an institutional currency. This second argument implies that virtually all extant luck egalitarian currencies are incompatible with his approach. I argue, third, that the alleged absurd implications often have little to do with the extent of luck egalitarianism's reach.
This paper develops a notion of manipulative gaslighting, which is designed to capture something ... more This paper develops a notion of manipulative gaslighting, which is designed to capture something not captured by epistemic gaslighting, namely the intent to undermine women by denying their testimony about harms done to them by men. Manipulative gaslighting, I propose, consists in getting someone to doubt her testimony by challenging its credibility using two tactics: “sidestepping” (dodging evidence that supports her testimony) and “displacing” (attributing to her cognitive or characterological defects). I explain how manipulative gaslighting is distinct from (mere) reasonable disagreement, with which it is sometimes confused. I also argue for three further claims: that manipulative gaslighting is a method of enacting misogyny, that it is often a collective phenomenon, and, as collective, qualifies as a mode of psychological oppression.
Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for 1) condoning some cases of oppression and 2) condemni... more Luck egalitarianism has been criticized for 1) condoning some cases of oppression and 2) condemning others for the wrong reason, namely that the victims were not responsible for their oppression. Oppression is unjust, however, the criticism says, simply because it violates universal moral equality. I argue that luck egalitarian responses to this critique are inadequate. Two responses address only the first part of the objection and do so in a way that risks making luck egalitarianism inconsistent. A third severely dilutes the luck egalitarian doctrine. A fourth manages to denounce some instances of oppression for the right reason, but at the same time permits other instances and condemns yet others for the wrong reason.
In Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, Watson and Hartley dispute the claim that Rawls’s doctri... more In Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, Watson and Hartley dispute the claim that Rawls’s doctrine of political liberalism must tolerate gender hierarchy because it counts conservative and orthodox religions as reasonable comprehensive doctrines. I argue that their defense in fact contains two arguments, both of which fail. The first, which I call the “Deliberative Equality Argument”, fails because it does not establish conclusively that political liberalism’s demand for equal citizenship forbids social practices of domination, as the authors contend. The second, which I call the “Equal Liberties Argument”, fails because it supports a particular version of political liberalism and not the doctrine itself.
In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also... more In addition to having an institutional site or scope, a theory of distributive justice might also have an institutional 'reach' or currency. It has the first when it applies to only social (and not natural) phenomena. It has the second when it distributes only socially produced (and not naturally occurring) goods. One objection to luck egalitarianism is that it has absurd implications. In response, Tan has defended a luck egalitarian account that has a strictly institutional reach. I argue, first, that Tan's view contains two fatal ambiguities and, second, that, to be sound, it requires an institutional currency. This second argument implies that virtually all extant luck egalitarian currencies are incompatible with his approach. I argue, third, that the alleged absurd implications often have little to do with the extent of luck egalitarianism's reach.
This paper develops a notion of manipulative gaslighting, which is designed to capture something ... more This paper develops a notion of manipulative gaslighting, which is designed to capture something not captured by epistemic gaslighting, namely the intent to undermine women by denying their testimony about harms done to them by men. Manipulative gaslighting, I propose, consists in getting someone to doubt her testimony by challenging its credibility using two tactics: “sidestepping” (dodging evidence that supports her testimony) and “displacing” (attributing to her cognitive or characterological defects). I explain how manipulative gaslighting is distinct from (mere) reasonable disagreement, with which it is sometimes confused. I also argue for three further claims: that manipulative gaslighting is a method of enacting misogyny, that it is often a collective phenomenon, and, as collective, qualifies as a mode of psychological oppression.
Page 1. CYNTHIA A. STARK THE WORDS WE LOVE TO HATE1 Kent Greenawalt's most recent book i... more Page 1. CYNTHIA A. STARK THE WORDS WE LOVE TO HATE1 Kent Greenawalt's most recent book is a compilation and expansion of four lectures on freedom of speech he delivered in the early 1990s. His stated aim in this work is most ambitious. ...
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