My primary research interests lie at the intersection of metaphysics and science. At the metaphysical end of this junction I work on issues of causation, powers, emergence and the laws of nature. At the physical end, I work on the nature of space and time, with a particular interest in the arrow of time. My wider interests include the philosophy of biology (especially evolutionary biology), epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.
The world is a complex place, and this complexity is an obstacle to our attempts to explain, pred... more The world is a complex place, and this complexity is an obstacle to our attempts to explain, predict, and control it. In Power and Influence, Richard Corry investigates the assumptions that are built into the reductive method of explanation—the method whereby we deal with complexity by studying the components of a complex system in relative isolation and use the information so gained to explain or predict the behaviour of the complex whole. He investigates the metaphysical presuppositions built into the reductive method, seeking to ascertain what the world must be like in order that the method could work. Corry argues that the method assumes the existence of causal powers that manifest causal influence—a relatively unrecognised ontological category, of which forces are a paradigm example. The success of the reductive method, therefore, is an argument for the existence of such causal influences. The book goes on to show that adding causal influence to our ontology gives us the resources to solve some traditional problems in the metaphysics of causal powers, laws of nature, causation, emergence, and possibly even normative ethics. What results, then, is not just an understanding of the reductive method, but an integrated metaphysical worldview that is grounded in an ontology of power and influence.
Two kinds of philosophical questions are raised by the current public debate about climate change... more Two kinds of philosophical questions are raised by the current public debate about climate change; epistemic questions (Whom should I believe? Is climate science a genuine science?), and ethical questions (Who should bear the burden? Must I sacrifice if others do not?). Although the former have been central to this debate, professional philosophers have dealt almost exclusively with the latter. This book is the first to address both the epistemic and ethical questions raised by the climate change debate and examine the relationship between them.
The difference between cause and effect seems obvious and crucial in ordinary life, yet missing f... more The difference between cause and effect seems obvious and crucial in ordinary life, yet missing from modern physics. Almost a century ago, Bertrand Russell called the law of causality 'a relic of a bygone age'. In this important collection 13 leading scholars revisit Russell's revolutionary conclusion, discussing one of the most significant and puzzling issues in contemporary thought.
The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the kind of information that is available ... more The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the kind of information that is available to us through empirical observation of the world. Apart from the appeal that such an investigation has in itself, the investigation is motivated by the difficulties that are encountered in the interpretation of modern physics. It is my belief that we can only reach an adequate understanding of empirical theories, and the relation between mathematics and the world in general, if we first come to an adequate understanding of the kind of information upon which such theories are based. I begin
my investigation with the assumption that there is an external world that is distinct from the experiences of observers. I then assume, with a little argument, a causal theory of perception according to which the fundamental relation between the world
and experience is a causal relation. From this starting point I argue for the following claims:
(1) Perception can provide knowledge about the causal-dispositional nature of the world. In particular, I argue, we need not be too worried by sceptical arguments involving such devices as evil demons, dreams, and illusions.
(2) In a sense, our knowledge of the world does not go beyond the causal structure of the world.
(3) Knowledge of causal structure alone is enough to account for the rich, precise, and accurate theories of the world that are exempli fied in modern science.
In defence of this last claim, I provide an explicit interpretation of Spatial Geometry, Special Relativity, and Classical electromagnetism in terms of causal structure alone."
This book investigates the metaphysical presuppositions of a common—and very successful—reductive... more This book investigates the metaphysical presuppositions of a common—and very successful—reductive approach to dealing with the complexity of the world. The reductive approach in question is one in which we study the components of a complex system in relative isolation, and use the information so gained to explain or predict the behaviour of the complex whole. So, for example, ecologists explain shifts in species population in terms of interactions between individuals, geneticists explain traits of an organism in terms of interactions between genes, and physicists explain the properties of a gas in terms of collisions between the particles that make up the gas. It is argued that this reductive method makes substantive metaphysical assumptions about the world. In particular, the method assumes the existence of causal powers that manifest ‘causal influence’—a relatively unrecognized ontological category of which forces are a paradigm example. The success of the reductive method, therefore, is an argument for the existence of such causal influence. The book goes on to show that adding causal influence to our ontology gives us the resources to solve some traditional problems in the metaphysics of powers, causation, emergence, laws of nature, and possibly even normative ethics. What results, then, is not just an understanding of the reductive method, but an integrated metaphysical world view that is grounded in a novel ontology of power and influence.
Abstract: One of the most powerful tools in science is the method of reductive explanation, where... more Abstract: One of the most powerful tools in science is the method of reductive explanation, where we explain the behaviour of a complex system in terms of the behaviour of the parts from which it is composed. In order to employ this method we observe the behaviour of the parts in isolation and use this information to tell us how the parts will contribute the behaviour of the whole. Clearly then, the method assumes that something in what we learn when we observe the parts in isolation remains true when the parts are part of a larger ...
Bob is a good and thoughtful person. He is concerned with the welfare of others, he gives to char... more Bob is a good and thoughtful person. He is concerned with the welfare of others, he gives to charity, and he takes an interest in local politics. Bob also enjoys a good steak. One day, while Bob is savouring a particularly good steak at a barbeque, he is approached by his old friend Pete. Now Pete is a vegetarian: one of the annoying, proselytising kind.
This chapter investigates the relation between an ontology of power and influence and the metaphy... more This chapter investigates the relation between an ontology of power and influence and the metaphysics of causation. A traditional approach to this task might involve an attempt to provide a conceptual analysis of causation in terms of power and influence, but that is not the approach taken here, for it is argued that there is no single concept of causation. Rather, following Ned Hall, the various concepts of causation are divided into two main camps, causation as production and causation as dependence. In both camps, it is shown, the characteristic features of causation can be generated by the existence of appropriate powers and influences, and questions about whether causation has occurred can be answered, in part, by looking at the arrangement of relevant powers and influences. Thus, it is argued that causation is grounded in structures of causal influence.
One of the more cruel characteristics of climate change is that its pernicious effects are borne ... more One of the more cruel characteristics of climate change is that its pernicious effects are borne disproportionately — unevenly — by a few, and most often by those whose lives enjoy little margin for error. This includes, of course, those in low-lying, equatorial regions, those living in already arid conditions, and those living on small island nations. But over the last four years at least, farmers across Australia have found themselves particularly exposed to worsening drought conditions. It has now become something of a national ritual to see senior federal politicians don their Akubras (or baseball caps, as the case may be) and embark on a 'listening' tour through the worst of the drought-affected regions. This is most often accompanied by expressions of sympathy — or even calls for prayer. But are such expressions of sympathy little more than forms of self-exculpation, of empty sentiment, in the face of more than a decade of government inaction on climate change? What ab...
This chapter investigates the ontology of causal power and causal influence that was suggested by... more This chapter investigates the ontology of causal power and causal influence that was suggested by the discussion of reductive explanation in the previous two chapters. In particular, it is suggested that we should understand causal powers to be dispositions to manifest causal influence. Such powers, it is shown, can be given a conditional analysis that is less susceptible to counterexamples than conditional analyses of dispositions more generally. It is further argued that the conditional analysis can be extended to cover multi-track powers by using functions, rather than conditionals, to describe powers. Functional descriptions of powers connect nicely to the descriptions of force fields that one finds in physics, suggesting that we can interpret forces as influences in the sense described here.
<p>This chapter argues that the reductive method of explanation assumes an ontology of caus... more <p>This chapter argues that the reductive method of explanation assumes an ontology of causal powers that manifest invariant causal influence. The reductive method takes what we know about how systems behave in one situation (typically a situation of relative isolation), and apply that knowledge to explain or predict the behaviour of the system in another situation (such as when it is a part of a more complex system). If this method is to work, then there must be something that remains constant from one situation to another in a way that supports the method. It is shown that standard ontologies do not contain anything that can fulfil this role. It is then shown that a relatively novel kind of entity, dubbed 'causal influence', can do the job.</p>
This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesti... more This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesting that the concept of causal influence may be helpful in the field of normative ethics. In particular, it is argued that the ontology of causal influence opens up the possibility of a novel category of normative ethical theory called influentialism. Influentialism stands in contrast to the traditional categories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The aim is not to argue that influentialism is preferable to these traditional categories, but simply to put the theory on the table for consideration. However, it is argued that influentialism has some promising features that make it worthy of consideration. In particular, influentialism seems to occupy a middle ground between consequentialism and deontology and is able to combine seemingly incompatible intuitions from these two categories.
This chapter shows how causal powers and causal influences can be composed, both synchronically a... more This chapter shows how causal powers and causal influences can be composed, both synchronically and asynchronically, to form composite powers and composite influences, which are a common feature of reductive explanation. Indeed, outside fundamental physics it is likely that many, if not all, the powers and influences mentioned will be composite rather than fundamental. A major part of this chapter involves defending the idea that composite influences can be composed of more basic component influences. In particular, it defends the idea from objections against the existence of composite and component forces. Since forces are paradigmatic examples of causal influence, these arguments will also be objections to the concept of composite influences more generally. Finally, having defended an account of the relation between composite and component powers, it show that this account defuses an argument recently advanced by Alexander Bird, who concludes that there are few, if any, true macro...
This chapter develops a characterization of the kind of reductive explanation that is the topic o... more This chapter develops a characterization of the kind of reductive explanation that is the topic of the book. In particular, the book is concerned with substantive causal reductions rather than Nagel-style theory reductions. The characterization of reductive explanation that is developed here is based on Marie Kaiser’s account of explanatory reduction in biology, and, like Kaiser’s account, it highlights the importance of the fact that reductive explanations treat component systems as if they were parts in isolation. That is, in a reductive explanation it is assumed that our knowledge of how an element behaves in isolation can be useful in understanding the role that part plays when it is part of a complex system.
This chapter brings together the discussions of the previous chapters in order to develop a model... more This chapter brings together the discussions of the previous chapters in order to develop a model of reductive explanation that clarifies the role of causal powers and causal influences, and identifies a number of metaphysical assumptions made by the method of reductive explanation. These assumptions are metaphysical in the sense that they bear on issues of traditional concern to metaphysicians. In so far as the model presented here is an accurate account of how reductive explanation works, the great success of the reductive approach will be evidence for the truth of these presuppositions, and so will give us an empirical handle on various metaphysical questions. The presuppositions unearthed in this chapter will inform the metaphysical picture that is developed in subsequent chapters.
This chapter explores the different ways in which the reductive method of explanation might fail,... more This chapter explores the different ways in which the reductive method of explanation might fail, and asks what such failures might tell us about the world. In particular, the chapter investigates possible situations in which one or more of the assumptions identified in previous chapters fails. It is argued that the failure of one of these assumptions will give rise to something that is recognizable in the traditional notion of ‘ontological’ or ‘strong’ emergence. This understanding is then used to defend the conceptual possibility of such ontological emergence against the influential arguments of Jaegwon Kim. It is further argued that the failure of a different assumption gives rise to a relatively unrecognized form of ontological emergence related to the way that causal influences combine. Thus, an understanding of the reductive method gives us a way to grasp the notoriously slippery metaphysical concept of emergence.
In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logica... more In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logically possible for anything to satisfy this concept. If ESP is not logically possible, then it would be pointless to conduct experiments trying to discover whether it exists. If, on the other hand, it is logically possible, then its existence or otherwise is an empirical question, a question that can be decided only by looking at the empirical evidence for and against. Questions concerning the logical possibility of ESP are most pressing in the case of precognition. Thus the latter part of this chapter will focus on precognition in particular. What’s more, because worries about precognition often revolve around the possibility of ‘backwards causation’—situations in which an effect comes before its cause—I will pay particular attention to the role that causation plays in the concept of ESP.
The world is a complex place, and this complexity is an obstacle to our attempts to explain, pred... more The world is a complex place, and this complexity is an obstacle to our attempts to explain, predict, and control it. In Power and Influence, Richard Corry investigates the assumptions that are built into the reductive method of explanation—the method whereby we deal with complexity by studying the components of a complex system in relative isolation and use the information so gained to explain or predict the behaviour of the complex whole. He investigates the metaphysical presuppositions built into the reductive method, seeking to ascertain what the world must be like in order that the method could work. Corry argues that the method assumes the existence of causal powers that manifest causal influence—a relatively unrecognised ontological category, of which forces are a paradigm example. The success of the reductive method, therefore, is an argument for the existence of such causal influences. The book goes on to show that adding causal influence to our ontology gives us the resources to solve some traditional problems in the metaphysics of causal powers, laws of nature, causation, emergence, and possibly even normative ethics. What results, then, is not just an understanding of the reductive method, but an integrated metaphysical worldview that is grounded in an ontology of power and influence.
Two kinds of philosophical questions are raised by the current public debate about climate change... more Two kinds of philosophical questions are raised by the current public debate about climate change; epistemic questions (Whom should I believe? Is climate science a genuine science?), and ethical questions (Who should bear the burden? Must I sacrifice if others do not?). Although the former have been central to this debate, professional philosophers have dealt almost exclusively with the latter. This book is the first to address both the epistemic and ethical questions raised by the climate change debate and examine the relationship between them.
The difference between cause and effect seems obvious and crucial in ordinary life, yet missing f... more The difference between cause and effect seems obvious and crucial in ordinary life, yet missing from modern physics. Almost a century ago, Bertrand Russell called the law of causality 'a relic of a bygone age'. In this important collection 13 leading scholars revisit Russell's revolutionary conclusion, discussing one of the most significant and puzzling issues in contemporary thought.
The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the kind of information that is available ... more The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the kind of information that is available to us through empirical observation of the world. Apart from the appeal that such an investigation has in itself, the investigation is motivated by the difficulties that are encountered in the interpretation of modern physics. It is my belief that we can only reach an adequate understanding of empirical theories, and the relation between mathematics and the world in general, if we first come to an adequate understanding of the kind of information upon which such theories are based. I begin
my investigation with the assumption that there is an external world that is distinct from the experiences of observers. I then assume, with a little argument, a causal theory of perception according to which the fundamental relation between the world
and experience is a causal relation. From this starting point I argue for the following claims:
(1) Perception can provide knowledge about the causal-dispositional nature of the world. In particular, I argue, we need not be too worried by sceptical arguments involving such devices as evil demons, dreams, and illusions.
(2) In a sense, our knowledge of the world does not go beyond the causal structure of the world.
(3) Knowledge of causal structure alone is enough to account for the rich, precise, and accurate theories of the world that are exempli fied in modern science.
In defence of this last claim, I provide an explicit interpretation of Spatial Geometry, Special Relativity, and Classical electromagnetism in terms of causal structure alone."
This book investigates the metaphysical presuppositions of a common—and very successful—reductive... more This book investigates the metaphysical presuppositions of a common—and very successful—reductive approach to dealing with the complexity of the world. The reductive approach in question is one in which we study the components of a complex system in relative isolation, and use the information so gained to explain or predict the behaviour of the complex whole. So, for example, ecologists explain shifts in species population in terms of interactions between individuals, geneticists explain traits of an organism in terms of interactions between genes, and physicists explain the properties of a gas in terms of collisions between the particles that make up the gas. It is argued that this reductive method makes substantive metaphysical assumptions about the world. In particular, the method assumes the existence of causal powers that manifest ‘causal influence’—a relatively unrecognized ontological category of which forces are a paradigm example. The success of the reductive method, therefore, is an argument for the existence of such causal influence. The book goes on to show that adding causal influence to our ontology gives us the resources to solve some traditional problems in the metaphysics of powers, causation, emergence, laws of nature, and possibly even normative ethics. What results, then, is not just an understanding of the reductive method, but an integrated metaphysical world view that is grounded in a novel ontology of power and influence.
Abstract: One of the most powerful tools in science is the method of reductive explanation, where... more Abstract: One of the most powerful tools in science is the method of reductive explanation, where we explain the behaviour of a complex system in terms of the behaviour of the parts from which it is composed. In order to employ this method we observe the behaviour of the parts in isolation and use this information to tell us how the parts will contribute the behaviour of the whole. Clearly then, the method assumes that something in what we learn when we observe the parts in isolation remains true when the parts are part of a larger ...
Bob is a good and thoughtful person. He is concerned with the welfare of others, he gives to char... more Bob is a good and thoughtful person. He is concerned with the welfare of others, he gives to charity, and he takes an interest in local politics. Bob also enjoys a good steak. One day, while Bob is savouring a particularly good steak at a barbeque, he is approached by his old friend Pete. Now Pete is a vegetarian: one of the annoying, proselytising kind.
This chapter investigates the relation between an ontology of power and influence and the metaphy... more This chapter investigates the relation between an ontology of power and influence and the metaphysics of causation. A traditional approach to this task might involve an attempt to provide a conceptual analysis of causation in terms of power and influence, but that is not the approach taken here, for it is argued that there is no single concept of causation. Rather, following Ned Hall, the various concepts of causation are divided into two main camps, causation as production and causation as dependence. In both camps, it is shown, the characteristic features of causation can be generated by the existence of appropriate powers and influences, and questions about whether causation has occurred can be answered, in part, by looking at the arrangement of relevant powers and influences. Thus, it is argued that causation is grounded in structures of causal influence.
One of the more cruel characteristics of climate change is that its pernicious effects are borne ... more One of the more cruel characteristics of climate change is that its pernicious effects are borne disproportionately — unevenly — by a few, and most often by those whose lives enjoy little margin for error. This includes, of course, those in low-lying, equatorial regions, those living in already arid conditions, and those living on small island nations. But over the last four years at least, farmers across Australia have found themselves particularly exposed to worsening drought conditions. It has now become something of a national ritual to see senior federal politicians don their Akubras (or baseball caps, as the case may be) and embark on a 'listening' tour through the worst of the drought-affected regions. This is most often accompanied by expressions of sympathy — or even calls for prayer. But are such expressions of sympathy little more than forms of self-exculpation, of empty sentiment, in the face of more than a decade of government inaction on climate change? What ab...
This chapter investigates the ontology of causal power and causal influence that was suggested by... more This chapter investigates the ontology of causal power and causal influence that was suggested by the discussion of reductive explanation in the previous two chapters. In particular, it is suggested that we should understand causal powers to be dispositions to manifest causal influence. Such powers, it is shown, can be given a conditional analysis that is less susceptible to counterexamples than conditional analyses of dispositions more generally. It is further argued that the conditional analysis can be extended to cover multi-track powers by using functions, rather than conditionals, to describe powers. Functional descriptions of powers connect nicely to the descriptions of force fields that one finds in physics, suggesting that we can interpret forces as influences in the sense described here.
<p>This chapter argues that the reductive method of explanation assumes an ontology of caus... more <p>This chapter argues that the reductive method of explanation assumes an ontology of causal powers that manifest invariant causal influence. The reductive method takes what we know about how systems behave in one situation (typically a situation of relative isolation), and apply that knowledge to explain or predict the behaviour of the system in another situation (such as when it is a part of a more complex system). If this method is to work, then there must be something that remains constant from one situation to another in a way that supports the method. It is shown that standard ontologies do not contain anything that can fulfil this role. It is then shown that a relatively novel kind of entity, dubbed 'causal influence', can do the job.</p>
This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesti... more This final chapter puts the ontology of power and influence to use beyond metaphysics by suggesting that the concept of causal influence may be helpful in the field of normative ethics. In particular, it is argued that the ontology of causal influence opens up the possibility of a novel category of normative ethical theory called influentialism. Influentialism stands in contrast to the traditional categories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. The aim is not to argue that influentialism is preferable to these traditional categories, but simply to put the theory on the table for consideration. However, it is argued that influentialism has some promising features that make it worthy of consideration. In particular, influentialism seems to occupy a middle ground between consequentialism and deontology and is able to combine seemingly incompatible intuitions from these two categories.
This chapter shows how causal powers and causal influences can be composed, both synchronically a... more This chapter shows how causal powers and causal influences can be composed, both synchronically and asynchronically, to form composite powers and composite influences, which are a common feature of reductive explanation. Indeed, outside fundamental physics it is likely that many, if not all, the powers and influences mentioned will be composite rather than fundamental. A major part of this chapter involves defending the idea that composite influences can be composed of more basic component influences. In particular, it defends the idea from objections against the existence of composite and component forces. Since forces are paradigmatic examples of causal influence, these arguments will also be objections to the concept of composite influences more generally. Finally, having defended an account of the relation between composite and component powers, it show that this account defuses an argument recently advanced by Alexander Bird, who concludes that there are few, if any, true macro...
This chapter develops a characterization of the kind of reductive explanation that is the topic o... more This chapter develops a characterization of the kind of reductive explanation that is the topic of the book. In particular, the book is concerned with substantive causal reductions rather than Nagel-style theory reductions. The characterization of reductive explanation that is developed here is based on Marie Kaiser’s account of explanatory reduction in biology, and, like Kaiser’s account, it highlights the importance of the fact that reductive explanations treat component systems as if they were parts in isolation. That is, in a reductive explanation it is assumed that our knowledge of how an element behaves in isolation can be useful in understanding the role that part plays when it is part of a complex system.
This chapter brings together the discussions of the previous chapters in order to develop a model... more This chapter brings together the discussions of the previous chapters in order to develop a model of reductive explanation that clarifies the role of causal powers and causal influences, and identifies a number of metaphysical assumptions made by the method of reductive explanation. These assumptions are metaphysical in the sense that they bear on issues of traditional concern to metaphysicians. In so far as the model presented here is an accurate account of how reductive explanation works, the great success of the reductive approach will be evidence for the truth of these presuppositions, and so will give us an empirical handle on various metaphysical questions. The presuppositions unearthed in this chapter will inform the metaphysical picture that is developed in subsequent chapters.
This chapter explores the different ways in which the reductive method of explanation might fail,... more This chapter explores the different ways in which the reductive method of explanation might fail, and asks what such failures might tell us about the world. In particular, the chapter investigates possible situations in which one or more of the assumptions identified in previous chapters fails. It is argued that the failure of one of these assumptions will give rise to something that is recognizable in the traditional notion of ‘ontological’ or ‘strong’ emergence. This understanding is then used to defend the conceptual possibility of such ontological emergence against the influential arguments of Jaegwon Kim. It is further argued that the failure of a different assumption gives rise to a relatively unrecognized form of ontological emergence related to the way that causal influences combine. Thus, an understanding of the reductive method gives us a way to grasp the notoriously slippery metaphysical concept of emergence.
In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logica... more In this chapter, I aim to clarify the concept of ESP so that we can ask whether it is even logically possible for anything to satisfy this concept. If ESP is not logically possible, then it would be pointless to conduct experiments trying to discover whether it exists. If, on the other hand, it is logically possible, then its existence or otherwise is an empirical question, a question that can be decided only by looking at the empirical evidence for and against. Questions concerning the logical possibility of ESP are most pressing in the case of precognition. Thus the latter part of this chapter will focus on precognition in particular. What’s more, because worries about precognition often revolve around the possibility of ‘backwards causation’—situations in which an effect comes before its cause—I will pay particular attention to the role that causation plays in the concept of ESP.
In 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, swept through South... more In 2013 Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded, swept through Southeast Asia killing over 6,000 people, leaving tens of thousands more homeless, and causing billions of dollars' worth of damage. Four days later at the UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, the chief Filipino delegate, Yeb Sano, made an impassioned plea for action on climate change:Mr President, I speak for my delegation, but I speak for the countless people who will no longer be able to speak for themselves after perishing from the storm... We can take drastic action now to ensure that we prevent a future where super typhoons become a way of life. (ABC News 2013)If Haiyan and other extreme weather events such as heat waves, droughts, or wildfires are caused by climate change, then this would provide us with compelling and immediate motivation to mitigate our effects on the climate. However, the message from climate scientists regarding the causal link between climate change and individual extreme weather events is somewhat confusing (see Chapter 10, Experts in the Climate Change Debate). On the one hand, they tell us that many types of extreme weather event are likely to occur more often as a result of climate change, but on the other, they are reluctant to draw direct links between climate change and particular events. Indeed (until recently, at least) it has been the orthodoxy among climate scientists that despite having good reason to believe that climate change increases the probability of certain extreme events, it is impossible to attribute any single weather event, no matter how extreme, to human-induced climate change (see for example, Karoly 2009: 35; Rahmstorf et al. 2005; Sobel in Campbell 2013: Stott, Stone, and Allen 2004: 610). This attitude is nicely summarized in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which states that "While individual extreme events cannot be attributed to external influences, a change in the probability of such events might be attributable to external influences" (Hegerl et al. 2007: sec. 9.4.3.3).This reluctance to draw causal conclusions has political consequences. The UK's former environment secretary, Owen Paterson, for example, has refused to endorse claims by his prime minister, David Cameron, that severe storms which afflicted the UK in January 2014 were linked to climate change. Critics have charged that Paterson's refusal to acknowledge such links has led to under-preparation for severe floods (Johnston 2014; Swinford 2014). In Australia, after devastating and unseasonable wildfires in October 2013, the prime minister, Tony Abbott, dismissed any suggestion of a link between these fires and climate change as ''complete hogwash'' (Bolt 2013). Although many criticized Abbott for this claim, these criticisms focused on the link between climate change and wildfires in general. No prominent climate scientist seemed willing to contradict Abbott by drawing a direct link between climate change and those particular fires. This lack of direct contradiction made it easier for Abbott to push ahead with plans to water down legislation for action on climate change.I believe that there is some confusion in this debate as a result of insufficient attention being paid to the concepts of "causation" at play. In this chapter I will be turning a philosophical eye on the issue, asking what concept (or concepts) of causation are being employed by scientists and asking which concept or causation is most appropriate. I will show that scientists, politicians, and journalists have made a number of mistakes in their thinking about the causal links between individual events and climate change and will also argue that the confusion about how to think about causation here has led scientists to be more hesitant than they should be when it comes to attributing individual extreme events to climate change.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2015
Abstract This paper takes up Huw Price׳s challenge to develop a retrocausal toy model of the Bell... more Abstract This paper takes up Huw Price׳s challenge to develop a retrocausal toy model of the Bell-EPR experiment. I develop three such models which show that a consistent, local, hidden-variables interpretation of the EPR experiment is indeed possible, and which give a feel for the kind of retrocausation involved. The first of the models also makes clear a problematic feature of retrocausation: it seems that we cannot interpret the hidden elements of reality in a retrocausal model as possessing determinate dispositions to affect the outcome of experiments. This is a feature which Price has embraced, but Gordon Belot has argued that this feature renders retrocausal interpretations “unsuitable for formal development”, and the lack of such determinate dispositions threatens to undermine the motivation for hidden-variables interpretations in the first place. But Price and Belot are both too quick in their assessment. I show that determinate dispositions are indeed consistent with retrocausation. What is more, I show that the ontological economy allowed by retrocausation holds out the promise of a classical understanding of spin and polarization.
We argue that the climate change debate has been plagued with confusions resulting from the fact ... more We argue that the climate change debate has been plagued with confusions resulting from the fact that the word “skepticism” has been given positive connotations. Many people, including a number of professional philosophers and scientists, regard skepticism as an intellectual virtue, and as a particularly scientific virtue at that. We will consider various ways of understanding the word “skepticism” and argue that skepticism is not a virtue, and that there is nothing scientific about it.
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Books by Richard Corry
my investigation with the assumption that there is an external world that is distinct from the experiences of observers. I then assume, with a little argument, a causal theory of perception according to which the fundamental relation between the world
and experience is a causal relation. From this starting point I argue for the following claims:
(1) Perception can provide knowledge about the causal-dispositional nature of the world. In particular, I argue, we need not be too worried by sceptical arguments involving such devices as evil demons, dreams, and illusions.
(2) In a sense, our knowledge of the world does not go beyond the causal structure of the world.
(3) Knowledge of causal structure alone is enough to account for the rich, precise, and accurate theories of the world that are exempli fied in modern science.
In defence of this last claim, I provide an explicit interpretation of Spatial Geometry, Special Relativity, and Classical electromagnetism in terms of causal structure alone."
Papers by Richard Corry
my investigation with the assumption that there is an external world that is distinct from the experiences of observers. I then assume, with a little argument, a causal theory of perception according to which the fundamental relation between the world
and experience is a causal relation. From this starting point I argue for the following claims:
(1) Perception can provide knowledge about the causal-dispositional nature of the world. In particular, I argue, we need not be too worried by sceptical arguments involving such devices as evil demons, dreams, and illusions.
(2) In a sense, our knowledge of the world does not go beyond the causal structure of the world.
(3) Knowledge of causal structure alone is enough to account for the rich, precise, and accurate theories of the world that are exempli fied in modern science.
In defence of this last claim, I provide an explicit interpretation of Spatial Geometry, Special Relativity, and Classical electromagnetism in terms of causal structure alone."