Numerous faculties of the humanities have been introduced within universities over the last few d... more Numerous faculties of the humanities have been introduced within universities over the last few decades. These new institutional enterprises are in need of historical legitimisation and historical substance, a canonical identity that is. Rens Bod’s daring book "A New History of the Humanities" (which has originally been published in Dutch as "De Vergeten Wetenschappen") answers such calls with a study of stunning scope. How such historical canons can answer recurrent needs for what is called origin myths is marvellously explained by Ed Jonker in his book "De Geesteswetenschappelijke Carrousel" (which translates as the carousel of the humanities). My essay critically examines Bod’s A New History of the Humanities with the help of Jonker’s criteria.
I will defend that Bod’s all-pervasive science-like talk of “patterns and principles” systematically excludes several disciplines that are less bound up with “proof”, “rigorous tests” and “experiment”. When describing something in terms derived from something else, i.e. when describing the humanities in terms of scientific methodology, it is not very surprising that all kinds of similarities pop up. The leniency toward “the scientific method” eventually reduces the autonomy and intrinsic value of the humanities. Instead of striving for plurality, the book turns out to be a monolithic form of unreflective remembrance, a form of ethnocentrism that Jonker calls “public history” or “social memory”. With such an approach, problems of ethnocentrism and exclusion are inevitable.
As an example of a discipline that does not fit into Bod’s methodological framework, I wish to discuss its relation with the discipline of philosophy with the aid of some case studies. That at present philosophy flourishes in the faculties of the humanities can in the light of "A New History of the Humanities" only appear as a true miracle. Even if one entertains the cliché on the nature of philosophy of and history quoted above, there exist no strong arguments to exclude philosophy from the history of the humanities. It is worthwhile to realise that “the rise of the humanities” is a contingent process, being still very much open ended today. Striving for a plurality of different cultures and practices is therefore indispensable. Looking for ways to incorporate notions of argumentative structure and critical reflection—or even to dispense the method of “principles and patterns” for a moment—might preserve at least some of the original heterogeneity and incompleteness.
In the 1930s, Ernst Cassirer’s Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937) wa... more In the 1930s, Ernst Cassirer’s Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937) was one of the very few defences of a neo-Kantian philosophy of science. As its main representative, Cassirer received enthusiastic responses from leading physicists. Moreover, three important physicists reviewed his daring book. With the development of quantum mechanics the philosophical concepts of causality and determinism faced a serious trial. QM harmed the possibility of a precise and complete prediction and only assigned probabilities to multiple possible measurement outcomes. But against announcements of the bankruptcy of causality and determinism, Cassirer argued that they were advanced to more sophisticated forms. Firstly, Cassirer understood causality as the general postulate that our nature displays an intelligible orderliness according to law. Secondly, he argued that the sometimes celebrated title of indeterminism led to either scepticism or metaphysics. Cassirer argued that QM did not attack the “determinateness of law” at all, for the laws of the theory are necessary and always apply. However, all commentators found that Cassirer’s causality came across as too general. Also, it was asked whether his formulations could protect physics against the “indeterminateness” of individual (atomic) processes and their apparent “Willkürlichkeit”. I will explore the aims of Cassirer’s philosophy and compare them with the critique of his commentators and conclude that Cassirer nevertheless met what C. F. von Weizsäcker called the “needs of the physicists”.
Numerous faculties of the humanities have been introduced within universities over the last few d... more Numerous faculties of the humanities have been introduced within universities over the last few decades. These new institutional enterprises are in need of historical legitimisation and historical substance, a canonical identity that is. Rens Bod’s daring book "A New History of the Humanities" (which has originally been published in Dutch as "De Vergeten Wetenschappen") answers such calls with a study of stunning scope. How such historical canons can answer recurrent needs for what is called origin myths is marvellously explained by Ed Jonker in his book "De Geesteswetenschappelijke Carrousel" (which translates as the carousel of the humanities). My essay critically examines Bod’s A New History of the Humanities with the help of Jonker’s criteria.
I will defend that Bod’s all-pervasive science-like talk of “patterns and principles” systematically excludes several disciplines that are less bound up with “proof”, “rigorous tests” and “experiment”. When describing something in terms derived from something else, i.e. when describing the humanities in terms of scientific methodology, it is not very surprising that all kinds of similarities pop up. The leniency toward “the scientific method” eventually reduces the autonomy and intrinsic value of the humanities. Instead of striving for plurality, the book turns out to be a monolithic form of unreflective remembrance, a form of ethnocentrism that Jonker calls “public history” or “social memory”. With such an approach, problems of ethnocentrism and exclusion are inevitable.
As an example of a discipline that does not fit into Bod’s methodological framework, I wish to discuss its relation with the discipline of philosophy with the aid of some case studies. That at present philosophy flourishes in the faculties of the humanities can in the light of "A New History of the Humanities" only appear as a true miracle. Even if one entertains the cliché on the nature of philosophy of and history quoted above, there exist no strong arguments to exclude philosophy from the history of the humanities. It is worthwhile to realise that “the rise of the humanities” is a contingent process, being still very much open ended today. Striving for a plurality of different cultures and practices is therefore indispensable. Looking for ways to incorporate notions of argumentative structure and critical reflection—or even to dispense the method of “principles and patterns” for a moment—might preserve at least some of the original heterogeneity and incompleteness.
In the 1930s, Ernst Cassirer’s Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937) wa... more In the 1930s, Ernst Cassirer’s Determinismus und Indeterminismus in der modernen Physik (1937) was one of the very few defences of a neo-Kantian philosophy of science. As its main representative, Cassirer received enthusiastic responses from leading physicists. Moreover, three important physicists reviewed his daring book. With the development of quantum mechanics the philosophical concepts of causality and determinism faced a serious trial. QM harmed the possibility of a precise and complete prediction and only assigned probabilities to multiple possible measurement outcomes. But against announcements of the bankruptcy of causality and determinism, Cassirer argued that they were advanced to more sophisticated forms. Firstly, Cassirer understood causality as the general postulate that our nature displays an intelligible orderliness according to law. Secondly, he argued that the sometimes celebrated title of indeterminism led to either scepticism or metaphysics. Cassirer argued that QM did not attack the “determinateness of law” at all, for the laws of the theory are necessary and always apply. However, all commentators found that Cassirer’s causality came across as too general. Also, it was asked whether his formulations could protect physics against the “indeterminateness” of individual (atomic) processes and their apparent “Willkürlichkeit”. I will explore the aims of Cassirer’s philosophy and compare them with the critique of his commentators and conclude that Cassirer nevertheless met what C. F. von Weizsäcker called the “needs of the physicists”.
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Papers by Pim Van Der Heijden
I will defend that Bod’s all-pervasive science-like talk of “patterns and principles” systematically excludes several disciplines that are less bound up with “proof”, “rigorous tests” and “experiment”. When describing something in terms derived from something else, i.e. when describing the humanities in terms of scientific methodology, it is not very surprising that all kinds of similarities pop up. The leniency toward “the scientific method” eventually reduces the autonomy and intrinsic value of the humanities. Instead of striving for plurality, the book turns out to be a monolithic form of unreflective remembrance, a form of ethnocentrism that Jonker calls “public history” or “social memory”. With such an approach, problems of ethnocentrism and exclusion are inevitable.
As an example of a discipline that does not fit into Bod’s methodological framework, I wish to discuss its relation with the discipline of philosophy with the aid of some case studies. That at present philosophy flourishes in the faculties of the humanities can in the light of "A New History of the Humanities" only appear as a true miracle. Even if one entertains the cliché on the nature of philosophy of and history quoted above, there exist no strong arguments to exclude philosophy from the history of the humanities. It is worthwhile to realise that “the rise of the humanities” is a contingent process, being still very much open ended today. Striving for a plurality of different cultures and practices is therefore indispensable. Looking for ways to incorporate notions of argumentative structure and critical reflection—or even to dispense the method of “principles and patterns” for a moment—might preserve at least some of the original heterogeneity and incompleteness.
With the development of quantum mechanics the philosophical concepts of causality and determinism faced a serious trial. QM harmed the possibility of a precise and complete prediction and only assigned probabilities to multiple possible measurement outcomes. But against announcements of the bankruptcy of causality and determinism, Cassirer argued that they were advanced to more sophisticated forms. Firstly, Cassirer understood causality as the general postulate that our nature displays an intelligible orderliness according to law. Secondly, he argued that the sometimes celebrated title of indeterminism led to either scepticism or metaphysics. Cassirer argued that QM did not attack the “determinateness of law” at all, for the laws of the theory are necessary and always apply. However, all commentators found that Cassirer’s causality came across as too general. Also, it was asked whether his formulations could protect physics against the “indeterminateness” of individual (atomic) processes and their apparent “Willkürlichkeit”.
I will explore the aims of Cassirer’s philosophy and compare them with the critique of his commentators and conclude that Cassirer nevertheless met what C. F. von Weizsäcker called the “needs of the physicists”.
I will defend that Bod’s all-pervasive science-like talk of “patterns and principles” systematically excludes several disciplines that are less bound up with “proof”, “rigorous tests” and “experiment”. When describing something in terms derived from something else, i.e. when describing the humanities in terms of scientific methodology, it is not very surprising that all kinds of similarities pop up. The leniency toward “the scientific method” eventually reduces the autonomy and intrinsic value of the humanities. Instead of striving for plurality, the book turns out to be a monolithic form of unreflective remembrance, a form of ethnocentrism that Jonker calls “public history” or “social memory”. With such an approach, problems of ethnocentrism and exclusion are inevitable.
As an example of a discipline that does not fit into Bod’s methodological framework, I wish to discuss its relation with the discipline of philosophy with the aid of some case studies. That at present philosophy flourishes in the faculties of the humanities can in the light of "A New History of the Humanities" only appear as a true miracle. Even if one entertains the cliché on the nature of philosophy of and history quoted above, there exist no strong arguments to exclude philosophy from the history of the humanities. It is worthwhile to realise that “the rise of the humanities” is a contingent process, being still very much open ended today. Striving for a plurality of different cultures and practices is therefore indispensable. Looking for ways to incorporate notions of argumentative structure and critical reflection—or even to dispense the method of “principles and patterns” for a moment—might preserve at least some of the original heterogeneity and incompleteness.
With the development of quantum mechanics the philosophical concepts of causality and determinism faced a serious trial. QM harmed the possibility of a precise and complete prediction and only assigned probabilities to multiple possible measurement outcomes. But against announcements of the bankruptcy of causality and determinism, Cassirer argued that they were advanced to more sophisticated forms. Firstly, Cassirer understood causality as the general postulate that our nature displays an intelligible orderliness according to law. Secondly, he argued that the sometimes celebrated title of indeterminism led to either scepticism or metaphysics. Cassirer argued that QM did not attack the “determinateness of law” at all, for the laws of the theory are necessary and always apply. However, all commentators found that Cassirer’s causality came across as too general. Also, it was asked whether his formulations could protect physics against the “indeterminateness” of individual (atomic) processes and their apparent “Willkürlichkeit”.
I will explore the aims of Cassirer’s philosophy and compare them with the critique of his commentators and conclude that Cassirer nevertheless met what C. F. von Weizsäcker called the “needs of the physicists”.