Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Ma... more Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Mach as his chief philosophical mentor, Mach himself publicly rejected relativity in the preface to Die Prinzipien der physikalischen Optik. This work was first published by Mach's son Ludwig in 1921, five years after Mach's death, but the preface is dated "July 1913", when Einstein was working on general relativity and believing not only that he had Mach's "friendly interest" and support, but also that his project was the working-out of some of Mach's suggestions. To Einstein, whose sympathy for Mach's overall philosophy of science had already begun to wane by 1921, the posthumous appearance of the preface seemed to underscore the inconsistency between Machian positivism and his own program to construct an abstract and geometrical physics; this interpretation appears in important modem analyses like Blackmore (1972), Holton (1988), and Zahar (1989),...
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2012
William Demopoulos identified a particular kind of “conceptual analysis” as a central achievement... more William Demopoulos identified a particular kind of “conceptual analysis” as a central achievement of the analytic tradition in philosophy, with far-reaching implications for the philosophy of mathematics and the mathematical sciences. I present an overview of this notion of conceptual analysis, the part that it has played in the construction and interpretation of physical theory, and its implications for some general questions about the relation between formal theories and experience.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2014
One of the enduring challenges for the interpreter of Poincare is to understand the connections b... more One of the enduring challenges for the interpreter of Poincare is to understand the connections between his analysis of the geometry of space and his view of the development of the theory of space-time. On the one hand, he saw that the invariance group of electrodynamics determines a four-dimensional space with a peculiar metrical structure. On the other hand, he resisted Einstein’s special theory of relativity, and continued to regard the Newtonian space-time structure as a sufficient foundation for the laws of physics. I propose to approach this question by considering the privileged position that space plays, according to Poincare, in our conception of the physical world, and particularly in the construction of the fundamental concepts by which physical processes submit to objective measurement. Poincare’s position results from granting the concept of space an epistemological priority that, in the face of modern physics, it was unable to sustain.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2011
The philosophy of space and time did not begin with Newton and Leibniz, but there are perfectly g... more The philosophy of space and time did not begin with Newton and Leibniz, but there are perfectly good reasons why contemporary discussions see their origin in the controversy between those two. On the one hand, the issues explicitly raised between them—especially, and most obviously, the epistemological and methodological questions surrounding Newton’s theory of absolute space and motion—have never lost their relevance to the continuing evolution of physics. On the other hand, in different but equally unprecedented ways, they saw the question of the nature of space and time as part of a larger set of deeply interconnected questions, not only in the foundations of physics, but also in metaphysics, epistemology, and the foundations of mathematics.
This essay considers the nature of conceptual frameworks in science, and suggests a reconsiderati... more This essay considers the nature of conceptual frameworks in science, and suggests a reconsideration of the role played by philosophy in radical conceptual change. On Kuhn's view of conceptual conflict, the scientist's appeal to philosophical principles is an obvious symptom of incommensurability; philosophical preferences are merely “subjective factors” that play a part in the “necessarily circular” arguments that scientists offer for their own conceptual commitments. Recent work by Friedman has persuasively challenged this view, revealing the roles that philosophical concerns have played in preparing the way for conceptual change, creating an enlarged conceptual space in which alternatives to the prevailing framework become intelligible and can be rationally discussed. If we shift our focus from philosophical themes or preferences to the process of philosophical analysis, however, we can see philosophy in a different and much more significant historic role: not merely as an...
Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Ma... more Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Mach as his chief philosophical mentor, Mach himself publicly rejected relativity in the preface to Die Prinzipien der physikalischen Optik. This work was first published by Mach's son Ludwig in 1921, five years after Mach's death, but the preface is dated "July 1913", when Einstein was working on general relativity and believing not only that he had Mach's "friendly interest" and support, but also that his project was the working-out of some of Mach's suggestions. To Einstein, whose sympathy for Mach's overall philosophy of science had already begun to wane by 1921, the posthumous appearance of the preface seemed to underscore the inconsistency between Machian positivism and his own program to construct an abstract and geometrical physics; this interpretation appears in important modem analyses like Blackmore (1972), Holton (1988), and Zahar (1989),...
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2012
William Demopoulos identified a particular kind of “conceptual analysis” as a central achievement... more William Demopoulos identified a particular kind of “conceptual analysis” as a central achievement of the analytic tradition in philosophy, with far-reaching implications for the philosophy of mathematics and the mathematical sciences. I present an overview of this notion of conceptual analysis, the part that it has played in the construction and interpretation of physical theory, and its implications for some general questions about the relation between formal theories and experience.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2014
One of the enduring challenges for the interpreter of Poincare is to understand the connections b... more One of the enduring challenges for the interpreter of Poincare is to understand the connections between his analysis of the geometry of space and his view of the development of the theory of space-time. On the one hand, he saw that the invariance group of electrodynamics determines a four-dimensional space with a peculiar metrical structure. On the other hand, he resisted Einstein’s special theory of relativity, and continued to regard the Newtonian space-time structure as a sufficient foundation for the laws of physics. I propose to approach this question by considering the privileged position that space plays, according to Poincare, in our conception of the physical world, and particularly in the construction of the fundamental concepts by which physical processes submit to objective measurement. Poincare’s position results from granting the concept of space an epistemological priority that, in the face of modern physics, it was unable to sustain.
The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 2011
The philosophy of space and time did not begin with Newton and Leibniz, but there are perfectly g... more The philosophy of space and time did not begin with Newton and Leibniz, but there are perfectly good reasons why contemporary discussions see their origin in the controversy between those two. On the one hand, the issues explicitly raised between them—especially, and most obviously, the epistemological and methodological questions surrounding Newton’s theory of absolute space and motion—have never lost their relevance to the continuing evolution of physics. On the other hand, in different but equally unprecedented ways, they saw the question of the nature of space and time as part of a larger set of deeply interconnected questions, not only in the foundations of physics, but also in metaphysics, epistemology, and the foundations of mathematics.
This essay considers the nature of conceptual frameworks in science, and suggests a reconsiderati... more This essay considers the nature of conceptual frameworks in science, and suggests a reconsideration of the role played by philosophy in radical conceptual change. On Kuhn's view of conceptual conflict, the scientist's appeal to philosophical principles is an obvious symptom of incommensurability; philosophical preferences are merely “subjective factors” that play a part in the “necessarily circular” arguments that scientists offer for their own conceptual commitments. Recent work by Friedman has persuasively challenged this view, revealing the roles that philosophical concerns have played in preparing the way for conceptual change, creating an enlarged conceptual space in which alternatives to the prevailing framework become intelligible and can be rationally discussed. If we shift our focus from philosophical themes or preferences to the process of philosophical analysis, however, we can see philosophy in a different and much more significant historic role: not merely as an...
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