PhD Candidate and Junior Lecturer in the John Stuart Mill College and Philosophy Department at VU Amsterdam.
My research focuses on discovering and evaluating the evidential principles foundational of belief in conspiracy theories. Supervisors: prof. dr. R. Van Woudenberg and prof. ir. dr. J. De Ridder
The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of "conspiracy the... more The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of "conspiracy theory" does not only stem from a conspiracy theory's being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory's being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of 'theory' in 'conspiracy theory'. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of 'conspiracy theory' are problematic for research open to the possibility of finding depolarization strategies. That is, because they preclude constructive engagement with the epistemic norms governing (the rationales foundational of) belief in conspiracy theories.
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2022
This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines ... more This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research.
Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimal... more Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories-i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies-should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of beliefi.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano's account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so should not be favored over the Minimalist Account. Furthermore, I propose that the Minimalist Account is the best conception of 'conspiracy theory' if we share Napolitano's goal of advancing the understanding of conspiracy theories.
The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of "conspiracy the... more The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of "conspiracy theory" does not only stem from a conspiracy theory's being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory's being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of 'theory' in 'conspiracy theory'. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of 'conspiracy theory' are problematic for research open to the possibility of finding depolarization strategies. That is, because they preclude constructive engagement with the epistemic norms governing (the rationales foundational of) belief in conspiracy theories.
Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2022
This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines ... more This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research.
Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimal... more Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories-i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies-should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of beliefi.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano's account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so should not be favored over the Minimalist Account. Furthermore, I propose that the Minimalist Account is the best conception of 'conspiracy theory' if we share Napolitano's goal of advancing the understanding of conspiracy theories.
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