Yordan K. Kutiyski is an MSc graduate of political science from the VU University Amsterdam and holds a MA degree in Latin American studies from the Centre of Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA) at the University of Amsterdam. He is currently the academic research coordinator of Kieskompas (Election Compass). His research interests include electoral behavior, European and Latin American politics. Address: Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, Netherlands
In spite of competing in different political contexts and responding to a variety of ideological ... more In spite of competing in different political contexts and responding to a variety of ideological challenges, social demo cratic parties share a homogeneous ideological orientation, at least when their aggregate positions are considered. Although relevant differences emerge if we look at party stances on individual issues, there is largely an ideological overlap when it comes to the parties’ aggregate positions.
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social f... more The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behavior change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behavior, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of individual differences and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; pe...
The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked mu... more The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of ‘Brexiters’. In this article, we challenge the popularized view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our e...
Supplementary_A for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative... more Supplementary_A for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official part... more Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official party positions on salient political issues are compared with the positions of core voter groups on the same issues: 1) Corbynism (Left-wing economic polarisation); 2) Macronism (pro-market economic polarisation coupled with culturally progressive/libertarian stances); 3) Progressive-libertarian distancing (the adoption of moderate economic stances with culturally progressive policies) and 4) Catch-all (traditional social democratic centrism). The results from the European countries included in the study show that, with regard to the relative positioning of social democratic parties visa-vis their core voter groups, the most beneficial strategies, in terms of electoral appeal, are the traditional social-democratic catch-all strategy of moderation along both the economic and cultural dimensions, as well as the Corbynist strategy of polarisation along the economic dimension.
Supplementary_C for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative... more Supplementary_C for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
The likely 2016 election candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offer voters very distinct ... more The likely 2016 election candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offer voters very distinct visions of how the US should be governed. Using data from the Election Compass USA 2016 voter advice application, Andre Krouwel, Yordan Kutiyski and Pat Beck II look at the extent to which the candidates’ supporters agree with the candidates’ policy positions on issues such as law and order, immigration, education, moral values, economy, national security and healthcare. They write that given the policy preferences of their supporters, Donald Trump would govern the US in a diametrically opposed manner to Hillary Clinton, and vice versa.
Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallizati... more Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallization of opposition towards the EU, Euroscepticism has become a transnational phenomenon. The term Euroscepticism has become common political language in all EU member states and with the advent of the Eurozone crisis increasingly 'embedded' within European nation states. Bringing together a collection of essays by established and up-and-coming authors in the field, this handbook paints a fuller, more holistic picture of the extent to which the Eurosceptic debate has influenced the EU and its member states. Crucially, it also focuses on what the consequences of this development are likely to be for the future direction of the European project. By adopting a broad-based, thematic approach, the volume will centre on theory and conceptualisation, political parties, public opinion, non-party groups, the role of referenda - and the media - and of scepticism within the EU institutions. Containing a full range of thematic contributions from eminent scholars in the field and contributions from EU practitioners closely involved in the current debate about the future of the EU, the handbook is a definitive, frame of reference for academics, practitioners and those with an interest in the debate about the EU. The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism is an essential reference for scholars, researchers and practitioners working and researching in the EU and European field and more broadly of key interest to students of European Studies, EU and European Politics.
Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclu... more Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclusive. Some suggest that populist parties’ success is due to their candidates’ appeal, others see as explanatory factors a general dissatisfaction with representative democracy or the agreement with populist policy proposals. Most studies– particularly those based on national elections studies– suffer from the problem that too few populist voters are identifiable and too little is known about their opinion structure to simultaneously test all these explanations. Through online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) in The Netherlands and France we have compiled unique datasets including tens of thousands populist parties’ supporters with responses on a large number of issues, leadership evaluations and societal perceptions. By comparing the 2012 French and Dutch elections in which Marine Le Pen’s(Front National) and Geert Wilder’s PVV run, this study finds that despite the broadening political agenda of right-‐wing populist parties (RPPs), leadership evaluation and agreement on cultural issues remain the dominant drive of RPPs’ vote intention.
Appendix_B for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative stud... more Appendix_B for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
Vergleicht man die offiziellen Positionen sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu zentralen politischen ... more Vergleicht man die offiziellen Positionen sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu zentralen politischen Themen mit den Positionen ihrer wichtigsten Wahlergruppen zu diesen Themen, so lassen sich vier sozialdemokratische Kernstrategien unterscheiden: 1) Corbynismus (linksokonomische Polarisierung); 2) Macronismus (marktfreundliche okonomische Polarisierung kombiniert mit progressiven/libertaren Positionen in kulturellen Fragen); 3) progressiv-libertare Distanzierung (moderate okonomische Positionen verbunden mit progressiver Politik auf der kulturellen Achse) und 4) catch all (traditioneller sozialdemokratischer Zentrismus). In den hier analysierten europaischen Landern haben sich mit Blick auf die relative Positionierung sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu ihren wichtigsten Wahlergruppen zwei Strategien als am geeignetsten erwiesen, um Wahlerstimmen zu maximieren: die traditionelle Catch-all-Strategie, die entlang der okonomischen sowie der kulturellen Achse auf gemasigte Positionen setzt, so...
A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical politic... more A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical political ideology, both left- and right-wing, tend to share similar underlying psychological patterns. By utilizing data collected through a voting advice application in Sweden, this study aims to assess whether extreme leftists and rightists share similarities in the psychological and political understanding of how society functions. We propose three hypotheses to test this pattern: Extreme left and right individuals are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories than moderates; they are more likely to have negative economic evaluations; and they are less politically and interpersonally trustful. By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, we find a similar linkage between ideology and economic evaluations. However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideolog...
Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de kenmerken en beweegredenen van k... more Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de kenmerken en beweegredenen van kiezers die wel eens een verkiezing overslaan. Dit onderzoek verschilt scherp van eerder onderzoek naar niet-stemmen, doordat mensen niet het stempel ‘stemmer’ of ‘niet-stemmer' krijgen. Lang niet alle Nederlanders die stemgerechtigd zijn, nemen ook daadwerkelijk deel aan alle verkiezingen. Vooral bij zogenaamde verkiezingen van de ‘tweede orde’, voor de gemeenteraad, Provinciale Staten, de waterschappen en voor het Europees parlement, blijven veel kiezers thuis. Bijna twee-derde van de stemgerechtigden slaat weleens een verkiezing over. Tussen diegenen die echt altijd gaan stemmen (trouwe kiezers) en structurele afhakers – burgers die nooit (meer) stemmen- zit een grote variantie aan typen situationele (niet-)stemmers. Niet iedere situationele niet stemmer is hetzelfde en het patroon van wegblijven bij verkiezingen verschilt eveneens.
Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclu... more Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclusive. Some suggest that populist parties’ success is due to their candidates’ appeal, others see as explanatory factors a general dissatisfaction with representative democracy or the agreement with populist policy proposals. Most studies– particularly those based on national elections studies– suffer from the problem that too few populist voters are identifiable and too little is known about their opinion structure to simultaneously test all these explanations. Through online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) in The Netherlands and France we have compiled unique datasets including tens of thousands populist parties’ supporters with responses on a large number of issues, leadership evaluations and societal perceptions. By comparing the 2012 French and Dutch elections in which Marine Le Pen’s(Front National) and Geert Wilder’s PVV run, this study finds that despite the broadening political...
Dok se na agregatnoj razini ne cini da je doslo do velike promjene snaga u Europskoj uniji, na ra... more Dok se na agregatnoj razini ne cini da je doslo do velike promjene snaga u Europskoj uniji, na razini pojedinacnih zemalja doslo je znacajnih zaokreta koji bi mogli imati dalekosežne posljedice za buduci politicki smjer EU-a
In spite of competing in different political contexts and responding to a variety of ideological ... more In spite of competing in different political contexts and responding to a variety of ideological challenges, social demo cratic parties share a homogeneous ideological orientation, at least when their aggregate positions are considered. Although relevant differences emerge if we look at party stances on individual issues, there is largely an ideological overlap when it comes to the parties’ aggregate positions.
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social f... more The COVID-19 pandemic has affected all domains of human life, including the economic and social fabric of societies. One of the central strategies for managing public health throughout the pandemic has been through persuasive messaging and collective behavior change. To help scholars better understand the social and moral psychology behind public health behavior, we present a dataset comprising of 51,404 individuals from 69 countries. This dataset was collected for the International Collaboration on Social Moral Psychology of COVID-19 project (ICSMP COVID-19). This social science survey invited participants around the world to complete a series of individual differences and public health attitudes about COVID-19 during an early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic (between April and June 2020). The survey included seven broad categories of questions: COVID-19 beliefs and compliance behaviours; identity and social attitudes; ideology; health and well-being; moral beliefs and motivation; pe...
The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked mu... more The result of the referendum in the United Kingdom in 2016 to leave the European Union sparked much interest on the socio-economic characteristics of ‘Brexiters’. In this article, we challenge the popularized view of the Leave voter as an outsider and find that individuals from an intermediate class, whose malaise is due to a declining financial position, represent an important segment of the Brexit vote. We use individual-level data from a post-Brexit survey based on the British Election Study. Our analysis tests three predictive models. First, although our analysis confirms the negative association between education and Leave vote, we find that voting Leave is associated more with intermediate levels of education than with low or absent education, in particular in the presence of a perceived declining economic position. Secondly, we find that Brexiters hold distinct psycho-social features of malaise due to declining economic conditions, rather than anxiety or anger. Thirdly, our e...
Supplementary_A for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative... more Supplementary_A for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official part... more Four main strategies of social democratic competition can be distinguished when the official party positions on salient political issues are compared with the positions of core voter groups on the same issues: 1) Corbynism (Left-wing economic polarisation); 2) Macronism (pro-market economic polarisation coupled with culturally progressive/libertarian stances); 3) Progressive-libertarian distancing (the adoption of moderate economic stances with culturally progressive policies) and 4) Catch-all (traditional social democratic centrism). The results from the European countries included in the study show that, with regard to the relative positioning of social democratic parties visa-vis their core voter groups, the most beneficial strategies, in terms of electoral appeal, are the traditional social-democratic catch-all strategy of moderation along both the economic and cultural dimensions, as well as the Corbynist strategy of polarisation along the economic dimension.
Supplementary_C for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative... more Supplementary_C for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
The likely 2016 election candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offer voters very distinct ... more The likely 2016 election candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offer voters very distinct visions of how the US should be governed. Using data from the Election Compass USA 2016 voter advice application, Andre Krouwel, Yordan Kutiyski and Pat Beck II look at the extent to which the candidates’ supporters agree with the candidates’ policy positions on issues such as law and order, immigration, education, moral values, economy, national security and healthcare. They write that given the policy preferences of their supporters, Donald Trump would govern the US in a diametrically opposed manner to Hillary Clinton, and vice versa.
Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallizati... more Since the advent of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a key turning point in terms of the crystallization of opposition towards the EU, Euroscepticism has become a transnational phenomenon. The term Euroscepticism has become common political language in all EU member states and with the advent of the Eurozone crisis increasingly 'embedded' within European nation states. Bringing together a collection of essays by established and up-and-coming authors in the field, this handbook paints a fuller, more holistic picture of the extent to which the Eurosceptic debate has influenced the EU and its member states. Crucially, it also focuses on what the consequences of this development are likely to be for the future direction of the European project. By adopting a broad-based, thematic approach, the volume will centre on theory and conceptualisation, political parties, public opinion, non-party groups, the role of referenda - and the media - and of scepticism within the EU institutions. Containing a full range of thematic contributions from eminent scholars in the field and contributions from EU practitioners closely involved in the current debate about the future of the EU, the handbook is a definitive, frame of reference for academics, practitioners and those with an interest in the debate about the EU. The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism is an essential reference for scholars, researchers and practitioners working and researching in the EU and European field and more broadly of key interest to students of European Studies, EU and European Politics.
Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclu... more Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclusive. Some suggest that populist parties’ success is due to their candidates’ appeal, others see as explanatory factors a general dissatisfaction with representative democracy or the agreement with populist policy proposals. Most studies– particularly those based on national elections studies– suffer from the problem that too few populist voters are identifiable and too little is known about their opinion structure to simultaneously test all these explanations. Through online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) in The Netherlands and France we have compiled unique datasets including tens of thousands populist parties’ supporters with responses on a large number of issues, leadership evaluations and societal perceptions. By comparing the 2012 French and Dutch elections in which Marine Le Pen’s(Front National) and Geert Wilder’s PVV run, this study finds that despite the broadening political agenda of right-‐wing populist parties (RPPs), leadership evaluation and agreement on cultural issues remain the dominant drive of RPPs’ vote intention.
Appendix_B for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative stud... more Appendix_B for Mapping parties in a multidimensional European political space: A comparative study of the EUvox and euandi party position data sets by Andres Reiljan, Yordan Kutiyski, and André Krouwel in Party Politics
Vergleicht man die offiziellen Positionen sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu zentralen politischen ... more Vergleicht man die offiziellen Positionen sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu zentralen politischen Themen mit den Positionen ihrer wichtigsten Wahlergruppen zu diesen Themen, so lassen sich vier sozialdemokratische Kernstrategien unterscheiden: 1) Corbynismus (linksokonomische Polarisierung); 2) Macronismus (marktfreundliche okonomische Polarisierung kombiniert mit progressiven/libertaren Positionen in kulturellen Fragen); 3) progressiv-libertare Distanzierung (moderate okonomische Positionen verbunden mit progressiver Politik auf der kulturellen Achse) und 4) catch all (traditioneller sozialdemokratischer Zentrismus). In den hier analysierten europaischen Landern haben sich mit Blick auf die relative Positionierung sozialdemokratischer Parteien zu ihren wichtigsten Wahlergruppen zwei Strategien als am geeignetsten erwiesen, um Wahlerstimmen zu maximieren: die traditionelle Catch-all-Strategie, die entlang der okonomischen sowie der kulturellen Achse auf gemasigte Positionen setzt, so...
A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical politic... more A large volume of academic research has demonstrated that individuals who profess radical political ideology, both left- and right-wing, tend to share similar underlying psychological patterns. By utilizing data collected through a voting advice application in Sweden, this study aims to assess whether extreme leftists and rightists share similarities in the psychological and political understanding of how society functions. We propose three hypotheses to test this pattern: Extreme left and right individuals are more inclined to believe in conspiracy theories than moderates; they are more likely to have negative economic evaluations; and they are less politically and interpersonally trustful. By means of hierarchical regression analyses, we reveal a quadratic relationship between extreme political ideology and conspiracy beliefs. Moreover, we find a similar linkage between ideology and economic evaluations. However, the empirical analyses fail to provide evidence that extreme ideolog...
Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de kenmerken en beweegredenen van k... more Dit onderzoek heeft als doel om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de kenmerken en beweegredenen van kiezers die wel eens een verkiezing overslaan. Dit onderzoek verschilt scherp van eerder onderzoek naar niet-stemmen, doordat mensen niet het stempel ‘stemmer’ of ‘niet-stemmer' krijgen. Lang niet alle Nederlanders die stemgerechtigd zijn, nemen ook daadwerkelijk deel aan alle verkiezingen. Vooral bij zogenaamde verkiezingen van de ‘tweede orde’, voor de gemeenteraad, Provinciale Staten, de waterschappen en voor het Europees parlement, blijven veel kiezers thuis. Bijna twee-derde van de stemgerechtigden slaat weleens een verkiezing over. Tussen diegenen die echt altijd gaan stemmen (trouwe kiezers) en structurele afhakers – burgers die nooit (meer) stemmen- zit een grote variantie aan typen situationele (niet-)stemmers. Niet iedere situationele niet stemmer is hetzelfde en het patroon van wegblijven bij verkiezingen verschilt eveneens.
Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclu... more Hypotheses on why people vote for populist parties are abound, yet academic findings are inconclusive. Some suggest that populist parties’ success is due to their candidates’ appeal, others see as explanatory factors a general dissatisfaction with representative democracy or the agreement with populist policy proposals. Most studies– particularly those based on national elections studies– suffer from the problem that too few populist voters are identifiable and too little is known about their opinion structure to simultaneously test all these explanations. Through online Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) in The Netherlands and France we have compiled unique datasets including tens of thousands populist parties’ supporters with responses on a large number of issues, leadership evaluations and societal perceptions. By comparing the 2012 French and Dutch elections in which Marine Le Pen’s(Front National) and Geert Wilder’s PVV run, this study finds that despite the broadening political...
Dok se na agregatnoj razini ne cini da je doslo do velike promjene snaga u Europskoj uniji, na ra... more Dok se na agregatnoj razini ne cini da je doslo do velike promjene snaga u Europskoj uniji, na razini pojedinacnih zemalja doslo je znacajnih zaokreta koji bi mogli imati dalekosežne posljedice za buduci politicki smjer EU-a
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