Publications and forthcoming articles
R. Teichmann ed,. The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe (forthcoming)
A central idea in Anscombe's philosophy of action is that of practical knowledge, the formally di... more A central idea in Anscombe's philosophy of action is that of practical knowledge, the formally distinctive knowledge a person has of what she is intentionally doing. Anscombe also discusses 'practical truth', an idea she borrows from Aristotle, and which on her interpretation is a kind of truth whose bearer is not thought or language, but action. What is the relationship between practical knowledge and practical truth? What we might call the 'Simple View' of this relationship holds that practical knowledge is essentially knowledge of practical truth. But the Simple View isn't obviously available, since we have practical knowledge of all of our intentional actions, whereas an action manifests practical truth in Aristotle's sense only if it is a case of doing or living well. I suggest that we distinguish a thicker ethical version and a thinner action-theoretical version of each notion. This allows us to maintain a - complex - version of the Simple View, on which practical knowledge in the thick ethical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thick ethical sense, and practical knowledge in the thin action-theoretical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thin action-theoretical sense. Although Anscombe did not make these distinctions explicitly, I argue that she nevertheless commits herself to them in her discussion.
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020
Mental-state self-ascriptions – statements such as “My feet ache”; “I want to leave the party” – ... more Mental-state self-ascriptions – statements such as “My feet ache”; “I want to leave the party” – characteristically combine two distinctive features. They are first-person authoritative, in the sense that if we take a speaker issuing a self-ascription to be sincere, then we will also strongly presume that what they say is true; and they are epistemically asymmetrical with other forms of assertion, in that they appear epistemically ungrounded in reasons, evidence, or epistemic method. Expressivists about self-ascriptions try to accommodate self-ascriptions’ epistemic asymmetry by offering a *non-epistemic* account of their first-person authority. They reject or downplay the idea that self-ascriptions express self-*knowledge*, instead explaining their characteristic features in terms of the idea that they are avowals, statements which express the first-order states they self-ascribe. I do two things in this paper. First, I reject Expressivism and motivate an epistemic account of first-person authority. Second, I develop an account of self-knowledge and self-ascription which, rather than contrasting knowing one’s own states of mind and expressing them, explains self-knowledge in terms of the capacity for self-expression. This becomes possible given a general epistemological reorientation towards a ‘forward-looking’ conception of knowledge, as a certain kind of rational capacity to respond to a fact.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 2019
According to a widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action, intentions are propositional... more According to a widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action, intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view 'Propositionalism about Intention'. The key alternative holds that intentions acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I argue further that this burden has not been met in the literature.
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Philosophical Explorations, 2018
Matthew Boyle (2011) has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge he calls ‘Reflectivism’. ... more Matthew Boyle (2011) has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge he calls ‘Reflectivism’. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism, A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, and that these simply disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge along the lines of that defended by John Hyman (1999, 2015). I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, there is no explanatory role for (B) left to play.
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy
What is intentional action? In her (1957) 'Intention', Anscombe appeared to give not one, but two... more What is intentional action? In her (1957) 'Intention', Anscombe appeared to give not one, but two answers: first, intentional actions are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second, they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. It is implausible that she thinks of 'intentional action' as ambiguous, but she gives no explicit account of how these two characterisations converge on a single phenomenon. This sets up an interpretative puzzle which I solve by elucidating her two characterisations in concert with several other key concepts in 'Intention', including, 'practical reasons', the sui generis kind of explanation these provide, the distinction between 'practical' and 'speculative' knowledge, the formal features which mark this distinction, and Anscombe's characterisation of practical knowledge as knowledge 'in intention'.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2018
Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person's knowledge of her own intentional action – ... more Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person's knowledge of her own intentional action – displays formal differences to ordinary, or 'speculative' knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on thinking of practical knowledge as involving intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman's (1999, 2015) account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.
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Epistemological Pluralism project (Leverhulme ECF)
The abstract for my Leverhulme ECF project on "Epistemological Pluralism"
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An outline of my Leverhulme ECF Project on "Epistemological Pluralism"
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PhD: 'Action, Intention, and Knowledge'
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My PhD Thesis, in which I argue for 'Non-Propositional Intentionalism' about practical knowledge.... more My PhD Thesis, in which I argue for 'Non-Propositional Intentionalism' about practical knowledge. See the Thesis Summary for a more detailed abstract.
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Book reviews
Metapsychology Online 23(35), 2019
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Papers
Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 18, 2022
A central idea in Anscombe's philosophy of action is that of practical knowledge, the formall... more A central idea in Anscombe's philosophy of action is that of practical knowledge, the formally distinctive knowledge a person has of what she is intentionally doing. Anscombe also discusses 'practical truth', an idea she borrows from Aristotle, and which on her interpretation is a kind of truth whose bearer is not thought or language, but action. What is the relationship between practical knowledge and practical truth? What we might call the 'Simple View' of this relationship holds that practical knowledge is essentially knowledge of practical truth. But the Simple View isn't obviously available, since we have practical knowledge of all of our intentional actions, whereas an action manifests practical truth in Aristotle's sense only if it is a case of doing or living well. I suggest that we distinguish a thicker ethical version and a thinner action-theoretical version of each notion. This allows us to maintain a - complex - version of the Simple View, on which practical knowledge in the thick ethical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thick ethical sense, and practical knowledge in the thin action-theoretical sense is knowledge of practical truth in the thin action-theoretical sense. Although Anscombe did not make these distinctions explicitly, I argue that she nevertheless commits herself to them in her discussion
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2017
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Philosophical Explorations, 2018
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2018
Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doi... more Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional at... more A widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.
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