Drafts by Nicola Spinelli
Synthese, forthcoming
A common view is that self-identity is essential to objects if anything is. Itself a substantive ... more A common view is that self-identity is essential to objects if anything is. Itself a substantive metaphysical view, the position is of some import in wider debates, particularly (but not exclusively) in connection with such problems as physicalism and personal identity. In this paper I challenge the view. I distinguish between two accounts of essence – the modal and the definitional – and argue that self-identity is essential to objects on the modal but not on the definitional account. In the final part of the paper, I deal with a number of objections.
Argumenta, 2017
Can one hold both that universals exist in the strongest sense (i.e., neither
in language nor in ... more Can one hold both that universals exist in the strongest sense (i.e., neither
in language nor in thought, nor in their instances) and that they
exist contingently – and still make sense? Edmund Husserl thought
so. In this paper I present a version of his view regimented in terms
of modal logic cum possible-worlds semantics. Crucial to the picture
is the distinction between two accessibility relations with different
structural properties. These relations are cashed out in terms of two
Husserlian notions of imagination: world-bound and free.
After briefly presenting the Husserlian framework – his intentionalism,
idealism and how universals figure in them – I set up my modal
machinery, model the target view, and show that, depending on the
chosen accessibility relation, the necessary or the contingent existence
of universals can be derived. Importantly, since for Husserl both relations
are bona fide, both derivations are legitimate. In Husserl’s
philosophy, then, there is room for both necessary and contingent universals.
Some philosophers believe in universals and some dismiss them as
Organon F, 2018
Some philosophers believe that entities have essences. What are we to make of the view that essen... more Some philosophers believe that entities have essences. What are we to make of the view that essences are themselves entities? E.J. Lowe has put forward an infinite regress argument against it. In this paper I challenge that argument: first by identifying a general condition for the obtaining of a vicious infinite regress, and then by arguing that in Lowe's case the condition is not met. In making my case, I draw on Kit Fine's work on essence. I also discuss alternative lines of
defence and compare Lowe's regress with a similar but, I argue, not identical one to be found in Aristotle.
Disputatio, May 2016
According to a straightforward construal of intentionality, a mental state is intentional if ther... more According to a straightforward construal of intentionality, a mental state is intentional if there is something which it is about. There seem to be counterexamples to the construal, however: all those mental states which are about non-existents. For in those cases there seems to be nothing which the states are about. You may then want to either deny that the problematic cases are intentional (a bad idea, for a series of reasons) or construe intentionality in a non-straightforward way. Or you may try to accommodate the counterexamples within the original view. There are several strategies to do so. One of these turns on the idea that the claim that to be an intentional object is, in the first place, to be an entity (an existent) is false. There are several ways you can go about demonstrating this, too. I am interested in two, which I call Route 1 and Route 2, respectively. In his 2001 article "Intentional Objects", T. Crane implements both. In my paper, I argue that both Crane's implementations and the strategies themselves are unsuccessful, and had better be abandoned.
A property F is existence-entailing just in case for all x, necessar-
ily, if x has F then x exis... more A property F is existence-entailing just in case for all x, necessar-
ily, if x has F then x exists. Consider any existence-entailing property:
does its being existence-entailing admit of explanation? Suppose
it does. What is the explanation? A possible, and to some extent
promising, approach to providing one is the Non-Modal Essentialist
approach. In this paper I examine two Non-Modal Essentialist ac-
counts of existence-entailment and find them wanting, on the ground
that they entail necessitarianism: the view that what exists, exists
necessarily. In fact, I argue that the chief tenets of Non-Modal Es-
sentialism and the claim that there are existence-entailing properties
are incompatible. As a consequence, there can be no Non-Modal Essentialist account of existence-entailment.
Thesis Chapters by Nicola Spinelli
This is the front matter of my PhD thesis. It includes: title page, table of contents, acknowledg... more This is the front matter of my PhD thesis. It includes: title page, table of contents, acknowledgements, list of abbreviations, abstract, introduction.
Papers by Nicola Spinelli
Journal of Logic, Language and Information , 2024
This paper is about sentences of form "To be human is to be an animal", "To live is to fight", et... more This paper is about sentences of form "To be human is to be an animal", "To live is to fight", etc. I call them 'infinitive sentences'. I define an augmented propositional language able to express them and give a matrix-based semantics for it. I also give a tableau proof system, called IL for Infinitive Logic. I prove soundness, completeness and a few basic theorems.
Husserl Studies, 2021
Husserl’s official account of essence is modal. It is also, I submit, incompatible with the role ... more Husserl’s official account of essence is modal. It is also, I submit, incompatible with the role that essence is supposed to play, especially relative to necessity, in his overall philosophy. In the Husserlian framework, essence should rather be treated as a non-modal notion. The point, while not generally acknowledged, has been made before (by Kevin Mulligan for one); yet the arguments given for it, though perhaps sound, are not Husserlian. In this paper I present a thoroughly Husserlian argument
for that claim, as well as a Husserlian essentialist account of necessity. I also discuss the role of grounding within the account.
Book Reviews by Nicola Spinelli
Phenomenological Reviews, 2018
Phenomenological Reviews, 2017
This is a good book – and, on the Italian market, a much-needed one. Simone Aurora’s declared aim... more This is a good book – and, on the Italian market, a much-needed one. Simone Aurora’s declared aim is to show that Husserl’s Logical Investigations belong to the history and conceptual horizon of structuralism, and in a prominent position at that.
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Drafts by Nicola Spinelli
in language nor in thought, nor in their instances) and that they
exist contingently – and still make sense? Edmund Husserl thought
so. In this paper I present a version of his view regimented in terms
of modal logic cum possible-worlds semantics. Crucial to the picture
is the distinction between two accessibility relations with different
structural properties. These relations are cashed out in terms of two
Husserlian notions of imagination: world-bound and free.
After briefly presenting the Husserlian framework – his intentionalism,
idealism and how universals figure in them – I set up my modal
machinery, model the target view, and show that, depending on the
chosen accessibility relation, the necessary or the contingent existence
of universals can be derived. Importantly, since for Husserl both relations
are bona fide, both derivations are legitimate. In Husserl’s
philosophy, then, there is room for both necessary and contingent universals.
Some philosophers believe in universals and some dismiss them as
defence and compare Lowe's regress with a similar but, I argue, not identical one to be found in Aristotle.
ily, if x has F then x exists. Consider any existence-entailing property:
does its being existence-entailing admit of explanation? Suppose
it does. What is the explanation? A possible, and to some extent
promising, approach to providing one is the Non-Modal Essentialist
approach. In this paper I examine two Non-Modal Essentialist ac-
counts of existence-entailment and find them wanting, on the ground
that they entail necessitarianism: the view that what exists, exists
necessarily. In fact, I argue that the chief tenets of Non-Modal Es-
sentialism and the claim that there are existence-entailing properties
are incompatible. As a consequence, there can be no Non-Modal Essentialist account of existence-entailment.
Thesis Chapters by Nicola Spinelli
Papers by Nicola Spinelli
for that claim, as well as a Husserlian essentialist account of necessity. I also discuss the role of grounding within the account.
Book Reviews by Nicola Spinelli
in language nor in thought, nor in their instances) and that they
exist contingently – and still make sense? Edmund Husserl thought
so. In this paper I present a version of his view regimented in terms
of modal logic cum possible-worlds semantics. Crucial to the picture
is the distinction between two accessibility relations with different
structural properties. These relations are cashed out in terms of two
Husserlian notions of imagination: world-bound and free.
After briefly presenting the Husserlian framework – his intentionalism,
idealism and how universals figure in them – I set up my modal
machinery, model the target view, and show that, depending on the
chosen accessibility relation, the necessary or the contingent existence
of universals can be derived. Importantly, since for Husserl both relations
are bona fide, both derivations are legitimate. In Husserl’s
philosophy, then, there is room for both necessary and contingent universals.
Some philosophers believe in universals and some dismiss them as
defence and compare Lowe's regress with a similar but, I argue, not identical one to be found in Aristotle.
ily, if x has F then x exists. Consider any existence-entailing property:
does its being existence-entailing admit of explanation? Suppose
it does. What is the explanation? A possible, and to some extent
promising, approach to providing one is the Non-Modal Essentialist
approach. In this paper I examine two Non-Modal Essentialist ac-
counts of existence-entailment and find them wanting, on the ground
that they entail necessitarianism: the view that what exists, exists
necessarily. In fact, I argue that the chief tenets of Non-Modal Es-
sentialism and the claim that there are existence-entailing properties
are incompatible. As a consequence, there can be no Non-Modal Essentialist account of existence-entailment.
for that claim, as well as a Husserlian essentialist account of necessity. I also discuss the role of grounding within the account.