How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed... more How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influencednot only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party’s overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany’s compensatory mixed-member system, Japan’s parallel system (combined with a “best loser ” or “zombie ” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR. In all democratic legislatures elected representa-tives must cooperate, organize themselves, andcreate institutions to achieve their individual and collective goals. Despite the universal nature of the challenge of legislative organization, the scholarship on the topic has been dominated by studies of the con-temporary U.S. Congress (Gamm and Huber 2002).
This chapter explains methodological choices. It offers greater detail about how the dependent va... more This chapter explains methodological choices. It offers greater detail about how the dependent variable is coded. Because of the three-outcome variable (high policy, public goods, or distributive committee type), the discrete choice method of multinomial logistic (MNL) regression is used. It permits assessing the extent to which parties make tradeoffs across both committee types and models of party personnel (expertise and electoral–constituency). The chapter explains the reasons why MNL is preferable to binomial logistic regression by a comparison of results on one of the book’s party cases (the German Christian Democratic Union) under either regression format and calculates predicted probabilities for Bundestag committee placement using some of our independent variables. It also explains that some parties (those in Israel and Japan) do not make tradeoffs across committee types to the same degree as parties in our others cases, and are therefore analyzed with binomial logistic regr...
In Britain’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system—an exclusively single-seat-district system—every m... more In Britain’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system—an exclusively single-seat-district system—every member of the House of Commons is elected in a unique geographically defined single-seat district. The FPTP system thus maximizes the importance of the geographic location of votes to party seat maximization. Yet as a single-tier system with no intraparty competition, it also promotes reliance on the expertise model, as the party seeks to emphasize its national policy reputation. Given the crucial role of districting in such a system, a party is expected to trade off reliance on the expertise model in order to deploy its personnel to Select Committees as a means to maximize the party’s chances of holding marginal (swing) districts. The findings show that the expertise model holds more strongly for the Conservative Party, and more weakly for the Labour Party, with the reverse pattern holding for the electoral–constituency model. Both parties show a high tendency toward issue ownership.
This chapter tests the book’s premises on a case of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP... more This chapter tests the book’s premises on a case of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) representation, using the case of legislative committees in the Bundestag of Germany. Its results cover the two largest parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party. German parties should have a strong tendency to use the expertise model, because the MMP system means that votes cast anywhere in the country are of approximately equal value in maximizing seats. Thus, parties are able to emphasize their national reputation for policy, for which matching the expertise of their personnel to committee function is valuable. The MMP system also creates local single-seat districts in which nearly half of members are elected. Thus, aspects of the electoral–constituency model also should apply, as parties seek to develop connections to constituencies through local and personal vote of their legislators. The results offer strong support for the premises of the theory.
This chapter develops the electoral–constituency model of party personnel. Under this model, part... more This chapter develops the electoral–constituency model of party personnel. Under this model, parties deploy their personnel according to their ability to draw votes within specific electoral districts or to specific competing candidates of the party. The chapter derives testable premises, grounded in a two-dimensional characterization of electoral systems: (1) the extent to which they shape a party’s seat maximization through dependence on the geographical location of votes; and (2) the extent of a party’s dependence on “personal votes” of individual candidates. Nationwide proportional representation (PR) versus systems with many electoral districts define the first dimension, while the second dimension is characterized by differences between systems with closed party lists and those employing a single nontransferable vote (SNTV). The chapter discusses how different single-tier and mixed-member systems generate different tradeoffs between parties’ use of the expertise and electoral–...
This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members ... more This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members of the 120-seat Knesset are elected in a single nationwide district under closed party lists. Due to this electoral system design, the geographic location of votes does not matter for a party’s overall seat total, and candidates have almost no incentive to develop a personal vote. The chapter finds strong support for the expertise model in how the Labor Party assigns members to legislative committees, but relatively little support in the Likud Party. Both parties exhibit strong issue ownership tendencies.
This chapter focuses on the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, which changed from first-p... more This chapter focuses on the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, which changed from first-past-the post (FPTP) to mixed-member proportional (MMP). The chapter analyzes the National and Labour parties under both electoral systems. As expected, the expertise model becomes more important to parties’ allocation of legislators to House of Representatives committees after the electoral reform to MMP, due to the move to a system in which votes cast anywhere count toward seat maximization. Parties also change how they assign members under the electoral–constituency model, as the system moves from one in which winning districts is the exclusive way in which a party maximizes seats to one in which legislators representing districts may be leveraged to help the party win more votes from the party list. Both parties show strong issue ownership tendencies before and after electoral reform.
This chapter introduces the typology of committee types: high policy, public goods, and distribut... more This chapter introduces the typology of committee types: high policy, public goods, and distributive. It develops the theory of party personnel strategy, consisting of two models political parties may use: the expertise model and the electoral–constituency model. The chapter derives testable premises for the expertise model, which states that parties assign legislators according to individual attributes (e.g., occupation, gender, and local electoral experience) that signal a background relevant to the type of committee on which they serve. The chapter argues that parties of the left and right will tend to differ in which committee types they emphasize, even in the same electoral system, according to their issue ownership. It summarizes the thirteen parties on their tendencies to have legislators with each of the key individual attributes.
This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation syst... more This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation system of elections to the Assembly of the Republic. The closed party lists imply that individual candidates have little to benefit from cultivating a personal vote. Parties control the order in which their members are elected and can be expected to be relatively free to deploy their personnel in a manner that enhances the collective reputation of the party. On the other hand, Portugal’s electoral system is one in which geographic location of votes matters to seat maximization, because instead of nationwide proportional representation, the country has several regional districts of varying, population density, and district magnitude. The results show some tendency of the major parties to use both the expertise and electoral–constituency models in assigning members to legislative committees, although stronger in the Socialist Party than in the Social Democratic Party.
This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current m... more This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system and its former single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. The chapter tests for impacts of electoral system change in the Liberal Democratic Party’s assignment of members to committees in the House of Representative of the Diet. It finds that the some aspects of the expertise model apply more strongly under MMM than under SNTV, but that the party follows the logic of the electoral–constituency model more than the expertise model, even under MMM. Both findings conform to theoretical expectations. The chapter also analyzes the main alternative parties in each electoral system era: the Japan Socialist Party (under SNTV) and the Democratic Party of Japan (under MMM). For these two left-leaning parties, we find considerable evidence that a party’s issue ownership matters to party personnel practices.
The book develops the notion of “party personnel strategies”, which are the ways in which politic... more The book develops the notion of “party personnel strategies”, which are the ways in which political parties assign their elected members—their “personnel”—to serve collective organizational goals. Key party goals are to advance a policy brand and maximize seats in the legislature. We offer a theory of how assignments of members to specialized legislative committees contribute to these goals. Individual members vary in their personal attributes, such as prior occupation, gender, and local experience. Parties seek to harness the attributes of their members by assigning them to committees where members’ expertise is relevant; doing so may enhance the party’s policy brand. Under some electoral systems, parties may need to trade off the harnessing of expertise against the pursuit of seats, instead matching legislators according to electoral situation (e.g., marginality of seat) or characteristics of their constituency (e.g., population density). The book offers analysis of the extent to ...
Abe’s political brilliance won a smashing 2014 victory for an unpopular party with unpopular poli... more Abe’s political brilliance won a smashing 2014 victory for an unpopular party with unpopular policies. Abe won because he succeeded in defining the alternatives – framing the election as a referendum on Abenomics, pursuing a consistent communications strategy, blurring policy differences on other issues – and timing the election brilliantly. The focus on Abenomics in the election has not prevented Abe from claiming a mandate on a broad range of policies, many of which are not popular with voters, and pursuing a bold, proactive agenda. This leads us to provide the election with its sobriquet, Japan’s “bait-and-switch” election. This is not the first time a politician earning ambiguous support at the polls has enacted a sweeping agenda (we have in mind Margaret Thatcher in 1983, but readers may think of others). Despite their apathy in the campaign, Japanese voters might find that they have re-elected a prime minister who will transform their country. A striking feature of the 2014 House of Representatives campaign was the lack of clear choices offered to voters. Indeed, it was an election with only one realistic option for voters. In large numbers of districts, the LDP offered the only viable candidate. At the national level, the opposition remained in disarray, thus making the LDP the only plausible government option. Moreover, this disarray left the opposition unable to challenge the LDP on policy grounds. As a result, when the LDP centered its policy campaign on Abenomics, no party offered a serious and coherent alternative, and no party took the LDP to task for ignoring other significant policy issues in the campaign. In this way, the LDP and its candidates could campaign as the only choice for those who held in contempt the DPJ’s incompetent experience in government, as the only party with a plausible chance of victory, and as the only alternative to present coherent policy proposals. Because the LDP could present itself
How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed... more How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influencednot only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party’s overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany’s compensatory mixed-member system, Japan’s parallel system (combined with a “best loser ” or “zombie ” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR. In all democratic legislatures elected representa-tives must cooperate, organize themselves, andcreate institutions to achieve their individual and collective goals. Despite the universal nature of the challenge of legislative organization, the scholarship on the topic has been dominated by studies of the con-temporary U.S. Congress (Gamm and Huber 2002).
This chapter explains methodological choices. It offers greater detail about how the dependent va... more This chapter explains methodological choices. It offers greater detail about how the dependent variable is coded. Because of the three-outcome variable (high policy, public goods, or distributive committee type), the discrete choice method of multinomial logistic (MNL) regression is used. It permits assessing the extent to which parties make tradeoffs across both committee types and models of party personnel (expertise and electoral–constituency). The chapter explains the reasons why MNL is preferable to binomial logistic regression by a comparison of results on one of the book’s party cases (the German Christian Democratic Union) under either regression format and calculates predicted probabilities for Bundestag committee placement using some of our independent variables. It also explains that some parties (those in Israel and Japan) do not make tradeoffs across committee types to the same degree as parties in our others cases, and are therefore analyzed with binomial logistic regr...
In Britain’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system—an exclusively single-seat-district system—every m... more In Britain’s first-past-the-post (FPTP) system—an exclusively single-seat-district system—every member of the House of Commons is elected in a unique geographically defined single-seat district. The FPTP system thus maximizes the importance of the geographic location of votes to party seat maximization. Yet as a single-tier system with no intraparty competition, it also promotes reliance on the expertise model, as the party seeks to emphasize its national policy reputation. Given the crucial role of districting in such a system, a party is expected to trade off reliance on the expertise model in order to deploy its personnel to Select Committees as a means to maximize the party’s chances of holding marginal (swing) districts. The findings show that the expertise model holds more strongly for the Conservative Party, and more weakly for the Labour Party, with the reverse pattern holding for the electoral–constituency model. Both parties show a high tendency toward issue ownership.
This chapter tests the book’s premises on a case of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP... more This chapter tests the book’s premises on a case of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) representation, using the case of legislative committees in the Bundestag of Germany. Its results cover the two largest parties, the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party. German parties should have a strong tendency to use the expertise model, because the MMP system means that votes cast anywhere in the country are of approximately equal value in maximizing seats. Thus, parties are able to emphasize their national reputation for policy, for which matching the expertise of their personnel to committee function is valuable. The MMP system also creates local single-seat districts in which nearly half of members are elected. Thus, aspects of the electoral–constituency model also should apply, as parties seek to develop connections to constituencies through local and personal vote of their legislators. The results offer strong support for the premises of the theory.
This chapter develops the electoral–constituency model of party personnel. Under this model, part... more This chapter develops the electoral–constituency model of party personnel. Under this model, parties deploy their personnel according to their ability to draw votes within specific electoral districts or to specific competing candidates of the party. The chapter derives testable premises, grounded in a two-dimensional characterization of electoral systems: (1) the extent to which they shape a party’s seat maximization through dependence on the geographical location of votes; and (2) the extent of a party’s dependence on “personal votes” of individual candidates. Nationwide proportional representation (PR) versus systems with many electoral districts define the first dimension, while the second dimension is characterized by differences between systems with closed party lists and those employing a single nontransferable vote (SNTV). The chapter discusses how different single-tier and mixed-member systems generate different tradeoffs between parties’ use of the expertise and electoral–...
This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members ... more This chapter focuses on a case of nationwide proportional representation. In Israel, all members of the 120-seat Knesset are elected in a single nationwide district under closed party lists. Due to this electoral system design, the geographic location of votes does not matter for a party’s overall seat total, and candidates have almost no incentive to develop a personal vote. The chapter finds strong support for the expertise model in how the Labor Party assigns members to legislative committees, but relatively little support in the Likud Party. Both parties exhibit strong issue ownership tendencies.
This chapter focuses on the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, which changed from first-p... more This chapter focuses on the impact of electoral reform in New Zealand, which changed from first-past-the post (FPTP) to mixed-member proportional (MMP). The chapter analyzes the National and Labour parties under both electoral systems. As expected, the expertise model becomes more important to parties’ allocation of legislators to House of Representatives committees after the electoral reform to MMP, due to the move to a system in which votes cast anywhere count toward seat maximization. Parties also change how they assign members under the electoral–constituency model, as the system moves from one in which winning districts is the exclusive way in which a party maximizes seats to one in which legislators representing districts may be leveraged to help the party win more votes from the party list. Both parties show strong issue ownership tendencies before and after electoral reform.
This chapter introduces the typology of committee types: high policy, public goods, and distribut... more This chapter introduces the typology of committee types: high policy, public goods, and distributive. It develops the theory of party personnel strategy, consisting of two models political parties may use: the expertise model and the electoral–constituency model. The chapter derives testable premises for the expertise model, which states that parties assign legislators according to individual attributes (e.g., occupation, gender, and local electoral experience) that signal a background relevant to the type of committee on which they serve. The chapter argues that parties of the left and right will tend to differ in which committee types they emphasize, even in the same electoral system, according to their issue ownership. It summarizes the thirteen parties on their tendencies to have legislators with each of the key individual attributes.
This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation syst... more This chapter focuses on Portugal and its districted, closed-list proportional representation system of elections to the Assembly of the Republic. The closed party lists imply that individual candidates have little to benefit from cultivating a personal vote. Parties control the order in which their members are elected and can be expected to be relatively free to deploy their personnel in a manner that enhances the collective reputation of the party. On the other hand, Portugal’s electoral system is one in which geographic location of votes matters to seat maximization, because instead of nationwide proportional representation, the country has several regional districts of varying, population density, and district magnitude. The results show some tendency of the major parties to use both the expertise and electoral–constituency models in assigning members to legislative committees, although stronger in the Socialist Party than in the Social Democratic Party.
This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current m... more This chapter focuses on the case of Japan, and its electoral reform, analyzing both the current mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system and its former single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. The chapter tests for impacts of electoral system change in the Liberal Democratic Party’s assignment of members to committees in the House of Representative of the Diet. It finds that the some aspects of the expertise model apply more strongly under MMM than under SNTV, but that the party follows the logic of the electoral–constituency model more than the expertise model, even under MMM. Both findings conform to theoretical expectations. The chapter also analyzes the main alternative parties in each electoral system era: the Japan Socialist Party (under SNTV) and the Democratic Party of Japan (under MMM). For these two left-leaning parties, we find considerable evidence that a party’s issue ownership matters to party personnel practices.
The book develops the notion of “party personnel strategies”, which are the ways in which politic... more The book develops the notion of “party personnel strategies”, which are the ways in which political parties assign their elected members—their “personnel”—to serve collective organizational goals. Key party goals are to advance a policy brand and maximize seats in the legislature. We offer a theory of how assignments of members to specialized legislative committees contribute to these goals. Individual members vary in their personal attributes, such as prior occupation, gender, and local experience. Parties seek to harness the attributes of their members by assigning them to committees where members’ expertise is relevant; doing so may enhance the party’s policy brand. Under some electoral systems, parties may need to trade off the harnessing of expertise against the pursuit of seats, instead matching legislators according to electoral situation (e.g., marginality of seat) or characteristics of their constituency (e.g., population density). The book offers analysis of the extent to ...
Abe’s political brilliance won a smashing 2014 victory for an unpopular party with unpopular poli... more Abe’s political brilliance won a smashing 2014 victory for an unpopular party with unpopular policies. Abe won because he succeeded in defining the alternatives – framing the election as a referendum on Abenomics, pursuing a consistent communications strategy, blurring policy differences on other issues – and timing the election brilliantly. The focus on Abenomics in the election has not prevented Abe from claiming a mandate on a broad range of policies, many of which are not popular with voters, and pursuing a bold, proactive agenda. This leads us to provide the election with its sobriquet, Japan’s “bait-and-switch” election. This is not the first time a politician earning ambiguous support at the polls has enacted a sweeping agenda (we have in mind Margaret Thatcher in 1983, but readers may think of others). Despite their apathy in the campaign, Japanese voters might find that they have re-elected a prime minister who will transform their country. A striking feature of the 2014 House of Representatives campaign was the lack of clear choices offered to voters. Indeed, it was an election with only one realistic option for voters. In large numbers of districts, the LDP offered the only viable candidate. At the national level, the opposition remained in disarray, thus making the LDP the only plausible government option. Moreover, this disarray left the opposition unable to challenge the LDP on policy grounds. As a result, when the LDP centered its policy campaign on Abenomics, no party offered a serious and coherent alternative, and no party took the LDP to task for ignoring other significant policy issues in the campaign. In this way, the LDP and its candidates could campaign as the only choice for those who held in contempt the DPJ’s incompetent experience in government, as the only party with a plausible chance of victory, and as the only alternative to present coherent policy proposals. Because the LDP could present itself
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Papers by Robert J. Pekkanen