

In Defence of Direct Realism

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In her careful consideration of my book, *The Problem of Perception* (henceforth, *PP*), Susanna Siegel highlights what she takes to be a number of shortcomings in the work. First, she suggests that a sense-datum theorist has two options—what she calls the “complex sense-data option” and the “two-factor option”—that survive the argument of my book unscathed. I consider these two options in the first two sections of this reply. Secondly, she criticizes my suggestion that there are three and only three basic and independent sources of perceptual consciousness: an issue I take up in my third section. Thirdly, she expresses reservations about my response to the argument from hallucination. In particular, she argues that the phenomenological considerations on which I put so much weight cannot settle the fundamental issue here. I address this criticism in the fourth section of this reply. Finally, she spends a certain amount of time discussing the notion of a “veridicality-relevant property”, a topic to which I devote the concluding section of this reply.

The Complex-Sense Data Option

Siegel complains that I do not allow the sense-datum theorist sufficient latitude in how sense-data may be characterized. In particular, in the case of visual sense-data I suppose that they must be presented to the subject merely two-dimensionally. Only so can my appeal to the perceptual constancies count as an argument against the sense-datum theory. If, however, sense-data can be presented three-dimensionally, they could themselves exhibit the perceptual constancies, and my argument would collapse.

In reading this criticism of my argument one would naturally take it that I had attempted to refute the sense-datum theory in my book.¹ In fact, I attempted no such thing. What I attempted to do was to defend direct realism against arguments derived from the nature of perception. More precisely, I focused on two arguments—from illusion and from hallucination (since I believe these to be the only ones meriting serious consideration). So my pur-

¹ It is significant in this connection that Siegel reconstrues my position as one that consists of objections “to the sense-datum theory, rather than to the sense-datum premise” (p. 383).

pose was to show that neither of these arguments refutes direct realism, or shows it to be less worthy of credence than any rival theory of perception. In order to do that I did not need to show that the sense-datum theory is false, only that it is not, given the facts of illusion and hallucination, demonstrably, or even probably, true. (The objection from Siegel that we are presently considering concerns only the argument from illusion.)

The penultimate section of Chapter One of my book (*PP*, 54-61) is significant in this regard. It is there that I argue that the only thing that the argument from illusion demonstrates is that the same sensory qualities are present in a veridical perception and a perfectly matching illusion in precisely the same way. I also claim, however, that this fact can be accommodated without embracing the sense-datum theory. For we can do justice to this fact by saying that in the two situations in question the subject experiences the same perceptual *sensations*. An analysis of sensory consciousness in terms of sensations is an alternative to an *act-object* analysis of such consciousness. The latter analysis would, I suggested, immediately deliver us into the hands of a sense-datum theory; but perhaps the former analysis can be made compatible with a direct realist account of perception. Indeed, perhaps it can be shown that such an analysis is *incompatible* with a sense-datum account of perception. For perhaps it can be shown—the rest of Part One of my book is an attempt to show—that sensations are not objects of awareness in perceptual consciousness; whereas a sense-datum, as I understand the term, is essentially an object of awareness. I signalled this important move in the overall argumentative strategy of Part One of the book as follows: “Since this is our task, I shall no longer refer to sensory qualities as sense-data, or as the qualities of sense-data. That would, in effect, be to capitulate to the Argument [*sc.* from illusion] . . . In order to underline the fact that we need, at least, to reject the novel act-object analysis of sense-experience if Direct Realism is to be vindicated, I shall revert to the traditional term ‘sensation’” (*PP*, 61). From this point of the book on, throughout Part One, I explore the possibility of sensation being incorporated into a direct realist account of perception—one that is not excluded, or rendered unlikely, by the possibility of illusion since the analysis of sensory consciousness in terms of sensations, on which it is based, is no less plausible than an act-object analysis of such consciousness.² Hence it is *only* theories that employ the notion of perceptual sensation that are considered in the rest of Part One. So the sense-

² In the section of my book here in question I do, in fact, suggest that an analysis of sensory consciousness in terms of sensation is *more* plausible than an act-object analysis. That discussion would, however, need to be further developed to constitute a *refutation* of that option. As this section of my book makes clear, I do not equate a sense-datum theory with an act-object analysis of sensory consciousness. But as far as I can see, Siegel’s complex sense-data option does require such an act-object analysis, for reasons indicated in the following paragraph.

datum theory, as it features in the rest of Part One, is a *particular form* of sense-datum theory—one that is closely related to what Siegel characterizes as my “restrictive notion of indirect realism” (§5). Such a sense-datum theory holds that in all perceptual situations we are immediately aware of sensations as objects of awareness. This theory will, as it were, be the fall-back position if it cannot be shown that perceptual sensations, though featuring in perceptual consciousness, are not objects of awareness.

How is this relevant to Siegel’s objection? That objection takes two forms: one being directed against my appeal to the perceptual constancies, and one being directed against my account of the *Anstoss*. In relation to the former the objection essentially consists in suggesting that sense-data should be regarded as being phenomenally three-dimensional in character and thereby subject to the perceptual constancies. Now, although this may, perhaps, be said in relation to some possible form of sense-datum theory, it cannot, I continue to hold, be said of the only form of sense-datum theory that is relevant to the main argument of Part One of my book: one that identifies sense-data with perceptual sensations. The reason for this is that when, to consider just one type of perceptual constancy, a physical object looks to be getting nearer to you, something expands in the field of sensation. This expansion must be attributed to sensation. For what else, given that we are accepting sensations as part of a possibly true perceptual theory, could it be attributed to? The direct object of awareness in this situation, however, neither expands nor seems to. The direct object of awareness is therefore not sensation.

This same line of thought also suffices to answer the complex-sense data option as it applies to the *Anstoss*. For here this option consists in denying the following claim: “If tactile perception in cases of *Anstoss* involves direct perception of sense-data, then these sense-data *must be those associated with bodily sensations*” (p. 389, my emphasis). This cannot, however, be denied, given that the only sort of sense-datum theory that is pertinent to the working out of the position defended in Part One of my book is one that identifies sense-data with sensations.

The Two-Factor Option

Unlike the complex sense-data option, the two-factor option accepts that the two features that I focus on in order to defend direct realism—perceptual constancy and the *Anstoss*—are not features of sense-data, and so are not features of the objects of which we are directly aware. Rather, this option holds that there is something involved in perceptual consciousness over and above sense-data, something that gives us an *indirect* awareness of features of perceptual objects that fall outside what Siegel terms the “sensory core”—such as, I suggested, perceptual constancy and the *Anstoss*. This second line of criticism may seem to remain intact even given my rebuttal of the preceding

objection. For this option is, as far as my own argument is concerned, equivalent to taking sense-data to be perceptual sensations. So the objection would be that I have not even excluded this limited form of sense-datum theory: something that it may seem I need to do, since such a theory may seem but the index of a failure to show that sensations are not objects of awareness in perception. In fact, however, I do not, in terms of the essentially defensive task I set myself in my book, strictly need even to do this. Once again, all I need to do is to give a plausible account of a way in which sensations can fail to be objects of awareness: to offer an unrefuted and at least equally plausible alternative account to the sense-datum theory. In fact, however, I think that what I have written on the subject does constitute a refutation of this particular option. For one thing, I have offered what I take to be a *convincing* account of how sensation does actually function in perceptual situations: one that is considerably *more* plausible than its sense-datum rival. To the extent that my account is found convincing, to that extent the two-factor option is discredited, since they are *rival* accounts of how sensation functions in perception. Moreover, my book contains two direct criticisms of the two-factor option, though one, I now see, is perhaps somewhat difficult to discern. Let me take this latter one first.

At one point Siegel writes that her two-factor option “differs from what Smith calls ‘two-component theories’ in his chapter 3. The latter divide experience into a component that essentially involves concepts (or perhaps their ‘application’), and a component that does not. No commitments at all about concepts are made by the two-factor option” (p. 391 n6). Now, it is true that I did, in Chapter Four of my book, criticize the dual component theory (among others) for claiming that conceptualization is an essential element in perception as such.³ It was, however, in Chapter Three of my book that I singled out the dual component theory and subjected it to a series of criticisms, none of which concerned the fact that concepts are given an essential role to play in its analysis of perception. The criticisms concerned, rather, the nature of the separation between the two functions in perception that the theory postulates, and, thereby, the denial that the senses themselves are competent to give us perceptual consciousness. It is true that I did define a dual component theory as one that involves conceptualization; and it is a fault that I did not make it clearer that the arguments I specifically aim at the theory have a wider scope than just a conceptualist version of it. They do, however, have a wider scope; and as far as I can see, what Siegel has in mind

³ “Dual component theories” is the term I used for what Siegel terms “two-component theories”. I retain my original terminology only to minimize possible confusion with the “two factor” option.

as her two-factor option is open to all but one of the criticisms I levelled against the dual component theory in Chapter Three of my book.⁴

Siegel suggests that my own account of perception is actually a version of the two-factor option (pp. 395-96). Now, in a very broad sense it is perhaps not inappropriate to characterize my own theory as a two-factor one, in so far as I think that there is more to perceptual consciousness than sensation. On my account, however, the two “factors” are unified in a way that they are not on either the dual component theory (whether conceptualistically construed or not), or Siegel’s own two-factor option. For both these latter theories regard sensory states themselves as being wholly non-intentional, so that some distinctively cognitive process has to be introduced that has the autonomous function of securing an object of awareness; and, moreover, this cognitive process is so introduced that the relation between it and sensation is at best causal. On my view, however, the non-sensory features of perceptual consciousness are not cognitive in their own right at all, but (apart from the *Anstoss*, which I give special treatment, and which I shall address shortly) have no other function than to *structure the sensory field itself*. Sensory states themselves, thereby, possess intentionality. It is because Siegel’s the two-factor option, in common with the dual component theory, lacks this crucial feature that it succumbs to the criticisms I directed against any form of the dual component theory.

Unlike the dual component theory, Siegel’s two-factor option is presented *as a form of indirect realism*. It is because of this that it is open to a second criticism to be found in my book—and this time quite explicitly. In fact, however, Siegel not only suggests that my own account of perception is a two-factor theory, which in some sense is correct, but that it is one that is compatible with indirect realism (pp. 395-96). This I regard as definitely false. Indeed, my own theory is the background against which I explicitly criticize indirect theories—in such a way as to include the two-factor option.

Siegel correctly identifies, as a central concern of mine, an attempt to explain how sensations can be in consciousness without being objects for consciousness. She then says that there seem to be two options here: “One is that the subject perceives the sensations . . . Another option is that the subject does not *perceive* the sensations, but stands in some other relation to them” (pp. 395-96). The former, but not the latter, would be a version of indirect realism; and Siegel charges that nothing I say rules out the first option. In fact, I regard the first option as analytically false, since for something to be *perceived* is for it precisely to be an *object* for consciousness, and not something that is merely “in” consciousness. So

⁴ One of my criticisms was that the dual component theory does not sustain direct realism. This does not, of course, count as a criticism of Siegel’s proposal, since it is intended as a form of indirect realism.

these two options are not options concerning how to spell out the distinction between being an object for consciousness and being merely in consciousness. Rather, one is an option that recognizes this distinction, and the other fails to. Chapter Six of my book is devoted to making sense of and defending the distinction.

I have indicated how my own theory differs from the dual component theory (the issue of conceptualization aside). It differs even more radically, however, from Siegel's two-factor option, since this is a version of the sense-datum theory. For the two-factor option holds that only sensations are "perceptually basic" or objects of "immediate" awareness, in the sense that only sensations are objects of which we are aware not in virtue of being aware of anything else as an object. On my view, however, not only are we immediately aware of features—such as the perceptual constancies and the *Anstoss*—that are not, and cannot be, features of sensation, we are *never* aware of sensations as objects (immediately or otherwise) when we enjoy perceptual consciousness, since the objects of which we are immediately aware *do* have these features that sensations cannot have.

It is this insistence of mine that the *immediate* objects of awareness in perception are characterized by phenomenal three-dimensionality and the perceptual constancies that constitutes the second criticism of the two-factor option. For this theory holds that we are but *indirectly* aware of such features when we perceive. But I regard the suggestion that when, for example, you look at this page, you are any less directly aware of its appearing at some distance from you than you are of its appearing black and white, and that its apparent distance is any jot less an intrinsic feature of it than its colour, as straightforwardly phenomenologically false. So this second argument against the two-factor option is not so much an argument as a phenomenological observation (or, you might say, brute assertion). I dwell on this point at some length in my book (*PP*, 178-85). Such assertion is, however, supported in two ways. First, I point out that we are very poor at getting the non-constant features in perceptual constancy right (*PP*, 181-82). This would be strange if these are the features we are directly aware of. Secondly, I refer the reader to a paper of mine where I discuss this question of whether we are but indirectly aware of three-dimensionality at some length.⁵

Finally, let us consider the two-factor option as it relates to the *Anstoss*. In this connection the two-factor option holds that "it is by directly perceiving these bodily sense-data [*sc.* pressure and muscular sensations] that one can perceive a public, impinging object, making the latter perception indirect" (p. 390). I think this suggestion misses the unique character of the *Anstoss*. For the *Anstoss* essentially involves *activity* on the part of the subject, since it is

⁵ "Space and Sight," *Mind* 109 (2000), 481-518. The material in this article was originally intended to be included in my book, but had to be excised for reasons of length.

experienced only as a check to one's active movement.⁶ Muscular and pressure sensations, however, are essentially *passive*; and I think it is a mistake in principle to try and account for a sense of agency in terms of what is but passively experienced. If such sensations cannot account for a sense of agency, then neither can they account for the *Anstoss*, which essentially involves such agency.⁷

Perceptual Consciousness

In my book I suggested that there are three (and only three) fundamental conditions that individually suffice to render a sensory state phenomenologically perceptual in character: phenomenal three-dimensionality, what I termed "kinetic structure" (and Siegel terms the "perspectival condition"), and the *Anstoss*. Siegel seems to accept the last, but is unconvinced by the first, and finds the second not only unclear and in need of "more theorizing" (p. 400), but also ambiguous as between what she calls the *disposition condition* and the *representation-of-disposition condition* (p. 401).

I continue to believe that phenomenal three-dimensionality suffices for perceptual consciousness, and I do not know what more to do to convince a reader of this than what I said in my book. Actually, the claim seems more or less self-evident to me. I think all I can do here is address the counter-example that Siegel proposes. She points out that the elements in what I call the "inner light-show" (i.e., in effect, any phenomenally two-dimensional visual field) are experienced as being (immediately) *in front of one*, and not, for example, at the back of one's head. Since one's head is a three-dimensional volume, these elements are phenomenally located in three-dimensional space. It will not do to reply to this point to say that physical surfaces are located in three-dimensional space while yet being two-dimensional. For my three-dimensionality condition for perceptual consciousness is that an object be phenomenally presented as at a distance from an organ of perception, not that the object itself be phenomenally presented as a three-dimensional volume.⁸

In fact, however, Siegel's point about the inner light-show's being phenomenally "in front" does not show that the phenomenon counts as phe-

⁶ It is not, however, true, as Siegel says at one point, that "the experience of activity is one and the same as the experience of feeling an alien body impinge on you" (p. 388). For not only can one be aware of actively moving one's body without experiencing any check to its progress, even when there is such a check this latter is clearly not identical to the movement that is checked.

⁷ In fact, I think that the unique character of the *Anstoss* also rules out the former complex sense-data option in this particular area. Appeal to that option essentially consists in charging that I unreasonably restrict the characterizations of sense-data that are in fact available to a sense-datum theorist. But however one characterizes them, sense-data are surely going to be passively experienced; and so none can be identified with the *Anstoss*.

⁸ At one point (p. 399) Siegel wonders if I might have meant to include such "volumetric" three-dimensionality in my first condition for perceptual consciousness. I did not.

nomenally three-dimensional in the precise sense that I meant it. For as I spelled out this notion on its initial appearance in my book, I specified that if an object is visually presented three-dimensionally, it must make phenomenological sense to suppose that another visual object should interpose itself between oneself and the original object (*PP*, 137). Moreover—something I take to be implied by this—one must, in principle, be able to imagine that the original object should appear nearer or further away from one. None of this is true, it seems to me, for elements in the inner light-show. Although it is arrayed, in some sense, “in front”, I cannot imagine it getting any closer, or, indeed, further away; nor can I make sense of interposition. Siegel’s point does not, as far as I can see, raise any issue of principle that is not already raised by the perhaps even more obvious phenomenal three-dimensionality of bodily sensations, which, in my initial discussion of this first condition, I dismissed for failing to meet this first condition for perceptual consciousness (*PP*, 137).

Indeed, that there must be something wrong with Siegel’s suggestion becomes clear, I think, when we bear in mind that she accepts that to be aware of the inner light-show is not to enjoy perceptual consciousness. For if such a show is, as she supposes, phenomenally three-dimensional, why is it not phenomenologically perceptual in character? How could it then lack the ostensible over-againstness and independence that surely suffices for perceptual consciousness in contrast to the mere awareness of sensations? Her further elaboration of the objection, which consists, in part, in emphasising that the objects in question would appear blurred, would move with one’s gaze, and would not allow of having different perspectives on them, perhaps suggests that these, at least jointly, are incompatible with the experience being phenomenologically perceptual in character. But I cannot see that they are. A visual experience with such a character would indeed be strange. But if phenomenal three-dimensionality is present, the experience would surely be perceptual in character. We should be seeing a blurred object that inexplicably stayed fixed in our visual field as we moved our eyes. Strange, as I say; but not *ipso facto* non-perceptual. Indeed, on my view, *ipso facto* perceptual.

Siegel’s objection here may perhaps be tied up with a more general concern she has with my reference to a notion of *independence* that I take to be an essential aspect of perceptual consciousness. At one point she charges me with glossing over the distinction between something existing independently of one’s body and existing independently of one’s mind (p. 398 n11). If she thinks that I am confused over this matter, or at least if she thinks that I suppose that being dependent on one’s body is incompatible with being the object of perceptual consciousness, or if she thinks this herself, this may explain her assessment of the inner light-show. For she does write, in this connection, that “[i]t seems possible to distinguish *distance* from the sense-

organ, from *independence* from the sense-organ” (p. 399). If, as she supposes, distance from the sense-organ is present in the case of the inner light-show, perhaps she discounts it as a case of perceptual consciousness because the “show”, or at least the (lateral) position of the show, is dependent on the eye. As she goes on to say, the elements in the inner light-show do not look “to exist independently of the eye”. However this may be, when I first discuss the issue of objectivity in my book, I do, in fact, implicitly distinguish between the independence of an object from one’s body and its independence from one’s mind, or at least one aspect of the mind: “[O]bjects of perception have an existence that is not dependent, causally, conceptually, or in any other way, on perceptions of those objects” (*PP*, 66-67). I intentionally restricted the sort of dependency that must be excluded to dependency on *perceptions*. Ruling out dependency on one’s body would not be a good idea, since, for example, one’s shadow is dependent on one’s body but clearly can be an object of perception. And even ruling out the dependence of an object of perception on the particular organ that is involved in the perception would also not be a good idea: just consider seeing one’s own eyes in a mirror. Since I was never tempted by the thought that causal dependence on one’s body is incompatible with being the object of perceptual consciousness, I would not deny that elements in the inner light-show are objects of perceptual consciousness *because* their position is dependent upon the position of one’s eyes. I deny perceptual consciousness in their case, rather, because they are not presented three-dimensionally (and also lack the other two conditions for perceptual consciousness). If elements in an inner light-show *were* presented three-dimensionally, then I *would* regard them as objects of perceptual consciousness, despite the dependence in question. After all, it is my claim that *each* of my three conditions *suffices* for perceptual consciousness.

As to the more general issue of dependence and objectivity, in the footnote from which I have recently quoted Siegel raises the question whether a sort of dependence on the mind other than a dependence on perception itself should be excluded from objects possessing objectivity: namely, dependence on the *will* of the subject. She imagines a subject (e.g., a certain sort of witch) who can, by a sheer act of will, create and sustain physical objects in existence while yet being able to perceive them by touching them. In fact, I now think that the whole issue of *causal* dependence is irrelevant to the objectivity that pertains to perceptual consciousness as such. I certainly see no reason to deny that such a witch could indeed perceive the objects she is ontologically sustaining.⁹ This case is not, of course, excluded by my own original discussion

⁹ Siegel’s case should be distinguished from Kant’s notion of an *intellectual intuition*, which he ascribes to God. God, on this view, is aware of things *in virtue* of creating and sustaining them in existence. He does not create them *and then* (passively) perceive them. I

of independency, since I ruled out only causal dependence of objects on *perceptions* of them. But I now see no reason why even this latter sort of dependency should not be allowed. For consider a physicalist view according to which perceptual experiences are certain processes in the brain. Why should not those processes, in so far as they are physical, give rise to something (say, an image on a screen) that the subject can perceive?¹⁰ The only independence that I should have concerned myself with is phenomenological independence: a sense of an object's being distinct from one's experience of it. Any relations of causal dependence that are not embodied in perceptual experience itself are irrelevant to what I was really concerned with: the *sense* of objectivity that essentially attaches to perceptual consciousness. Hence, I was also wrong to write that "objects of perception can . . . exist unperceived". All that is relevant to phenomenology is that one have a sense that they could. I of course deny that this holds of elements of the inner light-show.

Turning now to my second condition for perceptual consciousness—what Siegel calls the "perspectival condition"—she finds exactly what I have in mind unclear. What I mean is, quite simply, *position-constancy*. I think Siegel may have somewhat misconstrued my view here, since she says that in my book I introduced this second condition in connection with olfactory experiences. In fact I did not: I introduced the notion in connection with the visual experiences of cataract patients, who can perceive light, though not three-dimensionally. In my view olfactory experience typically *lacks* position constancy. My discussion of olfaction was a discussion of how this sense has something merely analogous to the second condition for perceptual consciousness. The three conditions that I lay down are conditions for *original* perceptual consciousness. Olfaction, in my view, is but *derivatively* perceptual.

Despite this, Siegel has noticed something that was, I subsequently came to see, unclear in my book. "[F]or all Smith's phenomenological distinction says, there could be perceptions that nonetheless lack perceptual phenomenology," she writes (p. 397). That is true, and I do actually admit such a possibility, though it is far from clear in my book that I do.¹¹ This unclarity is a fully adequate reason for Siegel's uncertainty over whether I regard what she calls the *disposition condition* as sufficient for perceptual consciousness, or

regard an element of passivity as essential to any sensory form of perceptual consciousness, the *Anstoss* included.

¹⁰ I am no physicalist; but I do not think that physicalism can be ruled out of court because of the sense of objectivity that attaches to perceptual consciousness.

¹¹ I have subsequently addressed this issue, in passing, in a paper arising out of a lecture delivered at a conference on *Distinguishing the Senses* at the University of Glasgow in 2004. The proceedings of that conference are due to be published in a volume edited by Fiona Macpherson and Matthew Nudds.

only the stronger *representation-of-disposition condition*. My actual view is that, when position-constancy is not actually in play as a result of moving a sense organ, the representation-of-disposition condition is required for *phenomenologically* perceptual consciousness.¹² However, the simple disposition condition suffices in such a situation, given a suitable connection with the environment, for a sensory state to be an actual *perception* of a normal physical object. Consider a young cataract sufferer who, with unmoving eyes, perceives light *for the first time*. This is a genuine perception of physical light, in my view. However, since this is the subject's first visual perception, he or she will have no appreciation that position-constancy is operative for the visual system, and so the representation-of-disposition condition will not be met. Here we have a case of perception without "perceptual consciousness" in the phenomenological sense. This does not mean that phenomenology is irrelevant to an analysis of perception, since this subject's sensory state counts as a perception only because position constancy, though not actually in play, characterizes, or is "operative for", the subject's visual system; and such constancy is only relevant because, when it is actually in play, it issues in phenomenologically perceptual consciousness. That is what I should have said clearly in the book.

The Argument From Hallucination

In her discussion of my response to the argument from hallucination Siegel focuses on my attempt to introduce unreal intentional objects in an ontologically non-committing way: a way that I call "ontologically reductive". She offers two possible readings of such an attempt. On the first—the "neutral" reading—talk of unreal intentional objects implies nothing about the structure of hallucinatory experience itself. Siegel has no difficulty in showing that such an approach gets us nowhere. This is not the reading that captures my own view. The second reading—the "negative" reading—does not regard the intentional object account of hallucination as ontologically neutral, but as ontologically *negative*, in that it denies that hallucinatory experience has a certain structure: specifically, that it involves awareness of an entity as object. This is indeed my view. In relation to this second reading Siegel's charge is that I have not proved my case—and, more generally, that purely phenomenological considerations could not prove such a case (since it concerns a matter of ontology, albeit in a negative way). I think I can be brief here, since the issue is essentially the same as the one discussed in the first section of this reply: Siegel is taking me to be trying to prove something stronger than what I actually attempted to prove. To repeat: all I attempted to show in my book is that direct realism is, as far as facts concerning percep-

¹² Such perceptual consciousness will, however, be of the *acquired* variety. I mention acquired perception at three points in *The Problem of Perception*: pp. 144, 158 and 174.

tion are concerned, no less plausible than its alternatives. In the present connection I attempted to show that a direct realist account of perception is *fully compatible* with the facts of (possible) hallucination, so that, therefore, the argument from hallucination does not refute direct realism nor render it implausible.¹³ Once again, however, I do think that I have shown that *certain* forms of sense-datum theory can be ruled out: namely, those that identify sense-data with perceptual sensations. In the section of my book dealing with hallucination I refer back to my response to the argument from illusion and re-affirm my contention that the *Anstoss* and the perceptual constancies are, phenomenologically, incompatible with *such* sense-datum theories. This finding of Part One of my book is relevant to Part Two, since hallucinations, being phenomenologically perceptual in character, must have at least one of the necessary conditions for perceptual consciousness discussed in Part One.

“Veridicality-Relevant” Properties

Employing materials from my book, Siegel defines a *veridicality-relevant property* as “a property F such that if an object looks F, and one is perceiving veridically, then the object really is F” (p. 392).¹⁴ She then writes that I appear to hold that being a directly perceivable property and being a veridicality-relevant property are co-extensive (p. 392). I think I must plead guilty to appearing to hold this view, since I did not bring out and clarify all the distinctions that are needed in this area. In fact, however, I do not hold this view. I certainly do hold that all veridicality-relevant features are directly perceivable.¹⁵ I am not, however, committed to the converse of this. It may be that some directly perceivable features are not veridicality-relevant.

It should be noted, first, that in the passage from my book on which Siegel is basing her notion of veridicality-relevance, I was not discussing the issue of directness and indirectness, but rather the issue of what it is to be a “sensible quality”. The relationship between this notion and the issue of directness is not straightforward. It is clear, I think, that all sensible qualities are directly perceivable; but, once again, the converse of this is not so clear. Part of the reason why I may appear to endorse co-extensiveness in this section of my book is that I do think that a *sense-datum theorist* should hold these notions to be co-extensive; and in the section in question I was discuss-

¹³ Strangely, given her criticisms, when Siegel initially summarizes my treatment of the argument from hallucination, she presents my approach accurately when she writes that “Smith’s strategy is to argue that there is such an alternative [sc. to the sense-datum theory]” (p. 404). To show that something is an alternative to X is not, *ipso facto*, to refute X.

¹⁴ The “if...then” expresses entailment—or at least it was meant to in the passage from my book on which Siegel is basing herself (*PP*, 49). Also, in case it needs saying, “looks” should be read as meaning “perceptually looks”.

¹⁵ I therefore accept the argument that Siegel offers on my behalf against her two-factor option (pp. 392-93).

ing sense-datum theories. Sense-datum theorists ought to accept co-extensiveness here because they hold that that all and only sense-data and their features are objects of direct perception, and because such theorists should hold, I in effect argued, that all and only sensible qualities are features of sense-data. Since I defined a sensible quality in such a way that they and only they are veridicality-relevant, we have co-extensiveness for a sense-datum theorist. It is, however, another question how someone who is not a sense-datum theorist, such as myself, should stand on this issue.

Another reason why I may appear to endorse such co-extensiveness is that I explain what it is to be a sensible quality in part by employing the “in virtue of” relation; and I also employ this relation to define the distinction between direct and indirect awareness. We are indirectly aware of an object, I claimed, if and only if we are aware of it in virtue of being aware of some object distinct from it; and I distinguish between distinctness and non-identity (*PP*, 6 including n12). However, as can be seen from this specification, I define the distinction between direct and indirect awareness only for objects, not for their properties; and, indeed, throughout the book I apply the distinction only to objects, and not their properties. Moreover, the extension of the distinction to properties is not straightforward, since the difference between distinctness and non-identity is not perhaps wholly clear in relation to properties. Moreover, when I employ the “in virtue of” relation to define a sensible quality—hence when I am explicitly concerned with properties of objects—I do not mention either distinctness or non-identity. What I wrote was the following: “[W]henver something is veridically perceived to be *F*, we can always ask whether it is so perceived in virtue of our veridically perceiving features of that object that do not entail that the object is *F*” (*PP*, 49). Only if the answer is No are we dealing with a sensible quality. Now, if an object’s possessing some feature *G* does not entail that that object possesses feature *F*, then, I take it, *F* and *G* are not identical; but, in so far as we can make sense of this notion in relation to properties, perhaps, despite this lack of entailment, *F* and *G* are not *distinct*. When you look at a stationary ball, you see it, in a single view, in virtue of seeing about half of it. You do not, thereby, see the ball only indirectly, because the ball’s facing half, though not identical to the ball, is not distinct from it. Now consider the property of being-at-least-half-a-sphere, which you can veridically perceive the ball to have. That something possesses this property does not entail that it is a complete sphere. So being a complete sphere is not, in this situation, a sensible quality. Does this mean that you are perceiving the sphericity of the ball indirectly? This is not entailed by what I have said. Indeed, if the property of being-at-least-half-a-sphere and being-a-sphere are not “distinct”, analogy with my definition of indirect perception would give a negative answer to the question. Moreover, even if the affirmative answer is the right

one, the notion of indirectness that is in play here is significantly different from that which I employ when discussing *objects* of perception, rather than their features.

Being-at-least-half-a-sphere is a somewhat contrived property, though it serves to make the point. A less contrived example concerns wetness. If I held the co-extensiveness view that Siegel attributes to me, I would have to say that we cannot directly perceive wetness (for the reasons given at *PP*, 50). I am not at all inclined to say this, and my position does not commit me to it. Sense-datum theorists are, I argued, committed to saying this, and I offered them a property that has no name as what they should say a person who perceives wetness is directly aware of (*PP*, 50). If, however, this unnamed property is not distinct from the property of wetness, my account can allow us direct perception of wetness (and similar properties).

As to the issue of veridicality-relevance itself, Siegel makes some of my judgements on which properties are veridicality-relevant and which are not sound somewhat more enigmatic than they actually are. She suggests that I hold sphericity to be veridicality-relevant, but also that I deny that any three-dimensional volumetric property is veridicality-relevant. She suggests that by including sphericity among the veridicality-relevant properties I must mean something other than a property that relates to three-dimensional volumes (p. 392). In fact I do not know what non-three-dimensional sphericity would be.¹⁶ The same, single property of sphericity occurs both in a list of veridicality-relevant properties and in a list of properties that are not veridicality-relevant. This is possible because veridicality-relevance is relative to a perceptual situation, and in particular to how much of the object one is allowed to explore perceptually. As I write at one point, "If we allow our subject a more extended, coherent hallucination, in which he attains more 'views' of the object, we can allow our characterizations of the hallucinated object to expand" (*PP*, 265). Since I restrict acceptable characterisations of hallucinated objects to veridicality-relevant properties, this statement shows the relativity of the latter notion to a perceptual situation. Hence, in the passage in which sphericity is treated by me as veridicality-relevant I explicitly say that it counts as such "if the object is small enough to be felt at one moment in its entirety" (*PP*, 267). On the other hand, the passages where sphericity is treated as not veridicality-relevant concern perceptual situations in which the subject is limited to a partial view or feel of an object.

¹⁶ On the other hand, "dagger-shaped" (the other example that Siegel refers to in this connection) is—not, as she suggests, simply a non-volumetric notion, but—*ambiguous* as between a two-dimensional and a three-dimensional sense, as I tried to make clear: "If, by 'dagger-shaped' we mean . . ." (*PP*, 265).