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"The Contemporary Relevance of a Classic: Max Weber in the 21st Century"

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The results of the project "Between Political Theology and Expressive Symbolism: The Discursive Formations of the Late Modernity as a Challenge to the Social Order" carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2019, are presented in this work.

About the Journal

The *Russian Sociological Review* is an academic peer-reviewed journal of theoretical, empirical and historical research in social sciences.

The *Russian Sociological Review* publishes four issues per year. Each issue includes original research papers, review articles and translations of contemporary and classical works in sociology, political theory and social philosophy.

Aims

- To provide a forum for fundamental issues of social sciences.
- To foster developments in social sciences by enriching theoretical language and vocabulary of social science and encourage a cross-disciplinary dialogue.
- To provide educational materials for the university-based scholars in order to advance teaching in social sciences.

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- Theories of social order and social action
- Social methodology
- History of sociology
- Russian social theory
- Sociology of space
- Sociology of mobilities
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НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ «ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ»
ЦЕНТР ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЙ СОЦИОЛОГИИ

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В данной работе использованы результаты проекта «Между политической теологией и экспрессивным символизмом: дискурсивные формации позднего модерна как вызов социальному порядку», выполняемого в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2019 году.

О журнале

«Социологическое обозрение» — академический рецензируемый журнал теоретических, эмпирических и исторических исследований в социальных науках. Журнал выходит четыре раза в год. В каждом выпуске публикуются оригинальные исследовательские статьи, обзоры и рефераты, переводы современных и классических работ в социологии, политической теории и социальной философии.

Цели

- Поддерживать дискуссии по фундаментальным проблемам социальных наук.
- Способствовать развитию и обогащению теоретического словаря и языка социальных наук через междисциплинарный диалог.
- Формировать корпус образовательных материалов для развития преподавания социальных наук.

Область исследований

Журнал «Социологическое обозрение» приглашает социальных исследователей присылать статьи, в которых рассматриваются фундаментальные проблемы социальных наук с различных концептуальных и методологических перспектив. Нас интересуют статьи, затрагивающие такие проблемы как социальное действие, социальный порядок, время и пространство, мобильности, власть, нарративы, события и т. д.

В частности, журнал «Социологическое обозрение» публикует статьи по следующим темам:

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- Теории социального порядка и социального действия
- Методология социального исследования
- История социологии
- Русская социальная мысль
- Социология пространства
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- Нарративная теория и анализ
- Гуманитарная география и урбанистика

Наша аудитория

Журнал ориентирован на академическую и неакадемическую аудитории, заинтересованные в обсуждении фундаментальных проблем современного общества и социальных наук. Кроме того, публикуемые материалы (в частности, обзоры, рефераты и переводы) будут интересны студентам, преподавателям курсов по социальным наукам и другим ученым, участвующим в образовательном процессе.

Подписка

Журнал является электронным и распространяется бесплатно. Все статьи публикуются в открытом доступе на сайте: http://sociologica.hse.ru/.

Contents

BOOK REVIEWS

Содержание

РЕЦЕНЗИИ

Sociology of Max Weber in the 21st Century: From Reception to Actualization *

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This issue of the *Russian Sociological Review* is dedicated to Max Weber. It could be called an anniversary issue since one of Weber's famous works will celebrate its centenary immediately after the Review's publication. At the end of January, 1919, Weber delivered his famous speech *Politik als Beruf* (*Politics as a Vocation*), which was published in July of the same year. This is a remarkable coincidence, but still, no more than just a coincidence. In the many contributions to our issue (though not in all of them), Weber appears first as a political thinker and a political figure; meanwhile, we did not plan to celebrate the anniversary of any of his writings (yet some anniversary dates were indicated in the circulated call for papers). Scientists all over the world are reacting to this date and will continue to react to further dates. However, we should admit that these are the external causes to remember Weber and to return to his ideas. The social convention of encouraging the celebration of anniversaries marked by good round figures also holds in science. Weber's contemporary and great friend, Georg Simmel, would say that we are dealing with the aesthetics of numbers here,[1] which is more formal than a substantial approach. If there

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1. Although Simmel discussed only groupings of people, we can extend his ideas to other operations with numbers in the social life. Cf.: "Whether the division into numerically equal subgroups is rough and in practice continually modified . . . in either case it betrays most clearly and pitilessly the existence for its own sake of the law of formation for the group, in one case as a newly emerging tendency which is in perpetual conflict and compromise with other tendencies, in another case an absolutely thoroughgoing application" (1902: 28).

is a necessity to return to Weber, then, in fact, it does not matter whether it is the 99th or the 113th anniversary. However, although sociologists themselves are aware of the conventional nature of such conventions better than others, they are not inclined to violate the established rituals once again. We are really in the middle of our journey and still far from completing the series of Weberian anniversaries. In addition to the opportunity to remember him in the year of the anniversary of his death, we certainly will not miss the centenary of the first posthumous editions of his works, whether it be the first volume of *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (1920), or *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik* (1922). Yet, there is a question that is much more important, because anniversaries are celebrated only when there is no doubt in their subject.

To what extent does Weber indeed remain relevant today, while remaining a classic and while meaning more to living science than being a mere source for its self-identification? There is no doubt that Weber still retains his significance for sociology, since his recognition as an undisputed classic preserves the unity of discipline to some extent. However, does this mean that he remains an indispensable source in the practice of sociological research? On the one hand, it would be strange for sociologists to look for new reasons to deal with Weber at all. On the other hand, Weber's being taken for granted as a classic does not consistently remain the same. The recent times of the quiet confidence in the self-evident right of classics to attract our attention have passed. Our times have changed, and now we are not so confident to repeat that Weber remains "a source of endless fascination" (Adair-Toteff, 2014). Even the intense attempts of a few decades ago to question the status of the classics have ceased to play a significant role in recent discussions. Ambitious projects somehow related to what Jeffrey Alexander once called "the centrality of the classics" (1987) continue to evolve without the explicit, persistent application of their classical concepts to modernity.[2] In 2001, in the Introduction to the first issue of the *Journal of Classical Sociology*, we read that

> We take the view that in recent years the preference for "social theory" has in fact diluted the intellectual vitality and force of "sociological theory." One might take the charitable view that "social theory" is simply parallel to "political theory" … The promotion of social theory has often been a publishing strategy to situate theory books in a larger and more effective market strategy. However, this strategy may have little intellectual value for sociology. Social theory becomes a ragbag for almost any set of observations on modern society. There is no sense of an effective distinction between opinion and theory. (Turner, O'Neill, 2001: 9, 10)

2. A good example is the work of Richard Münch. His book *Theorie des Handelns* (1982) begins with the assertion that the classics of sociology must be treated with the same philological precision as the classics of philosophy. It was the spirit of the age. However, only a few years later, he published the English translation of selected chapters of this title (Münch, 2011 [1988]). Münch called it 'the next step' in comparison to an earlier book, and declared the development of the theory of modern society through the framework of classical sociology. Now, thirty years later, we could ask, "Who else is ready to deal with voluntaristic theory of action?" The author's latest publications (2016) show only a very limited use of Weber, as is the case with other classics.

We can interpret this diagnosis as a strong assertion. Sociology, it is said, is being decomposed into fragmented pieces. Although this has a negative impact on a discipline, we can overcome this state by turning to the ways in which sociological theory is produced. The word "fragmentation" may have turned out to be a very successful word in this essential text. One who is familiar with computers and the peculiarities of hard-drive disks will inevitably recall that the problems of fragmentation of a hard-drive can be solved by its defragmentation; after that, the system is expected to work much faster. However, the defragmentation of sociology has failed since it has not been possible to distinguish it from social theory and political philosophy. On the contrary, it is not the market considerations but rather the substantially scientific ones that are responsible for the increasing penetration of social (but not sociological!) theory and political philosophy into the field where sociology seemed to feel more confident. Today, it appears as much more fragmented, less efficient, and sometimes as more archaic than a science should be in the 21st century.

Probably, in this context, the return to the classics, first of all, to Weber and Durkheim, has a different meaning than a quarter of a century ago. It is not about showing the world the best of sociology, nor is it about simply using authoritative sources in the routine of current research. However pretentious it may sound, the point is to try to save sociology as a big project, a project, that despite its considerable background, emerged being exactly formulated in a very specific period of history, and a project that owes its greatest success to the astonishing results of a small circle of intellectuals including Max Weber.

There are some simple objections to the classics of sociology which seem to be difficult to refute, and are in line with the ideas about science which they implicitly assume. In general, they come down to the fact that social life is too fast-changing and that, over time, one certainly can go on having respect for the founding fathers of sociology but not benefit from their results. Even if science cannot offer anything better in terms of the quality of research, it still faces a completely different object of this research. Classical sociology has become obsolete not because science has moved forward, but because its object has changed.[3] There may be lengthy discussions here, but they are unlikely to work if we consider that science only deals with eternal objects to which it is becoming increasingly closer in the process of its evolution. Although this approach is incorrect in general, there is something very important and absolutely correct about it. Indeed, too much has changed since the creation of classical sociology. There emerged something that did not exist, but that which had existed has disappeared. Is it enough to state this fact to agree with such criticism, at least partially? It seems to us that this is not the case.

The historical context is not only changing, but sometimes the realities that seem to have faded away have come back. It happens so that we have to speak again about what was considered to be gone forever, and then, perhaps, not the historical diagnoses posed by the classics but the historical conditions of classical-concepts production become relevant. The State is the first to come to the mind among the issues which return. Since

3. This is the argument against sociology made, for example, in the context of phronetic social science (Flyvbjerg, 2001: Part One).

the 1990s, globalization seems to be the main distinctive feature of our age. The states' and territorial divisions inherited from the post-war era were gradually receding into the background. Meanwhile, the State was among the key insights of classical sociology. In the last years of his life, Weber considered the state to be one of the most important political formations, using the term *Verband* (an organization, as it would be interpreted even in the new translation of Weber's work: 2019: 128ff., 135ff.). It is *Verband*, according to Weber, that establishes the main patterns of human behavior within a given territory. The world is divided among states, and there are no unions which are more powerful over them, no cultural and social norms or norms of international law that have a universal significance for all states. Political Verband is therefore the ultimate reality for itself and for those living on the territories it can invade and occupy. We do not have the intention to portray Weber as a determined imperialist. We are only talking about what he thought was obvious when he was drafting the first chapter of *Economy and Society*, known to us as the *Soziologische Grundbegriffe*, at the close of his days after the end of the Great War. The last two notions that Weber talked about in this chapter were *Herrschaftsverband* (the ruling organization, according to the quite-misleading interpretation) and *hierokratischer Verband* (hierocratic organization). These are institutions that can coerce their members either through the legitimate use of physical force, or through their promise of salvation as a reward for good behavior. These are the most important rivals in the field of basic motivation; this is exactly what Weber himself saw, and this is what his readers saw.

The current return of the state, the return of its role, and the reduction of the role of international law and, possibly, of international organizations allows us to read Weber not in a new way, but anew, that is, as the one who had had a social experience which, in part, was similar to our own. In the same way, we now newly understand the role of hierocratic alliances vying with each other for huge salvation markets. After decades of secularization, the leading religious motivation as found by Weber begins to play an increasingly important role in economic and political life as well.

This is why we read Weber's thoughts on the possibilities and prospects of modernity. It is not on the need to complement political procedures with some charismatic leadership, and not as some scholarly truth, but as an old question stated anew. Perhaps the most important thing here is not so much an impressive return into politics or other spheres of social life of those elements that remind us in the most definite way of Europe after the First World War, but rather the return of that specific uncertainty or diversity of possibilities which seemed to be absent in the world after the "end of history." This is why we read Weber's texts with such hope for a better understanding of contemporary reality. This is why we have been expecting so much from this issue of the *Russian Sociological Review*. To a certain extent, our concerns and hypothesis have been proven — we received many submissions related to the contemporary relevance of Max Weber's theories to the political realm of our time. We hope that the papers included will contribute to the reconsideration of Weber's legacy and to classical sociology overall. In what follows, we provide an overview of the issue by highlighting the main ideas of the papers.

The issue is composed of several papers and a couple of book reviews. Some papers can be classified under the topic of "Weber and Russia," while others are more theo-

retically- and methodologically-oriented. The editors of the special issue decided not to group papers since many of them touch on interrelated aspects of the Weberian legacy.

The issue opens with a paper by William Outhwaite. In his contribution entitled "Max Weber's Conception of 'Rationalisation' and the 21st Century," he addresses the key concept of Weber's thought and explores the links between Weber's ideas and his own political orientation. As Outhwaite noted, Weber has been seen not only as a liberally-oriented scholar, but also as a nationalist. He shows that Weber's nationalism implied a certain tension between bureaucratic rationalization and politics. As described by Weber, the threats of the rationalization processes to the political leadership nowadays take a different form, i.e., a combination of nationalism with populist appeals. Outhwaite describes how Weber's framework can still be relevant to the recent European political crisis concerned with sovereignty (Brexit), and shows that his ideas are still fruitful.

Vadim Kvachev continues the discussion of Weberian notions in his review essay "From Weberian Bureaucracy to Networking Bureaucracy." He begins with the historical-sociological and theoretical analysis of the notion of bureaucracy, and places Weberian ideas in the context of post-modern philosophical thought of the second half of the 20th century (Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben). The second part of his paper is dedicated to the outline of contemporary tendencies (the development of ICT, and increasing rationalization and deregulation) that enable the transformation of Weberian bureaucracy as an intellectual tool into a networking bureaucracy.

The contemporary political relevance of Weber's methodological ideas is the key focus of Konstantin Gaaze's contribution, "Max Weber's Theory of Causality: Examination on Resistance to Post-Truth." Particularly, he relates the model of adequate causation as developed by Weber and the notion of post-truth, which has become quite popular these days. This intriguing comparison of the two ideas, one from the beginning 20th century while the other is from the 21st century, is carried out via the exploration of the theoretical context of Weber's studies (Gaaze provides an overview of von Kries' theory of objective possibility that was an important foundation for Weber's argument), and results in the critical examination of adequate and chance causation models.

The next paper continues the methodological discussion of Weber's legacy. This time, though, the contribution of "The Calling and Humility Scale: Extending the Weberian Approach to the Research of the Elective Affinity between Religion and the Economy" by Ivan Zabaev and Elena Prutskova is more concerned with the development of empirical tools in order to study the relations of economy and religion. As the authors suggest, calling is no longer the only ethics in economic and social relations, and there is a lack of reliable instruments to explore all the contemporary variety of ethical orientations as well. Zabaev and Prutskova present their considerations related to the construction of a scale to measure ethical orientations that will take into account the ethics of calling as well as humility.

A number of papers in the special issue are dedicated to Weber's writings on Russia. The first — "Max Weber on Russia: between Modern Freedom and Ethical Radicalism" by Camilla Emmenegger — examines Weber's oeuvre on Russian revolutions that

is mostly neglected and considered as less important than his writings on methodology or religion. The author shows how Weber's writings on Russia, being very relevant and occasional responding to the historical events of his times, are full of theoretical and political philosophical reflections on the nature and genealogy of modern freedom. Weber connected the emergence of freedom to radical puritanism.

Andrey Teslya chose a different focus within the broad topic of "Weber and Russia." His contribution is a study of how Weber's famous *Protestant Ethic* was received in Russia. At the time of its publication in Germany, the book did not cause any significant intellectual debates in Russia. However, Teslya focuses on two Russian philosophers of the beginning of the 20th century, Peter Struve and Sergei Bulgakov, who were the most attentive readers of Weber at that time. While Struve reflected on the nature of Christianity in the light of Weber's studies, Bulgakov attempted to apply Weber's general framework of the relation between religion and economy to the Russian context.

In his contribution of "Weber's and Sorokin's Analytical Treatment of the Russian Revolutions," Edward Ozhiganov compares two sociological views on the events of 1917–1918. In a critical way, Ozhiganov shows that both Weber and Sorokin failed to grasp the essence of the revolutionary events for various reasons. While Weber limited his analysis due to his concerns with the further participation of Russia in the Great War and did not follow his own research methodology, Sorokin constructed a positivistic framework that was not able to grasp the complexity of the events.

The next paper continues the exploration of the links between Weber's biography and his theoretical and political views. Nikolay Golovin argues that Weber's turn towards political essays during the Great War can be explained once his less-known letters are taken into account. For Golovin, Weber still followed his research ideals in these essays and letters; therefore, his political writings and essays can be seen as examples of applied historical sociology.

Another paper discusses Weber's thoughts on revolution. Timofey Dmitriev focuses on Weber's writings on the November revolution of 1918 in Germany. It is a review essay in which the author follows Weber's analysis of post-War times in Germany and shows its overall theoretical relevance. In this analysis, Weber once again addressed the issues of rationalization and bureaucratization and their threat to modern freedom. Dmitriev, along with Emmenegger, Kvachev, and other contributors, stresses the contemporary relevance of Weber's thought; it may seem that Weber's applied analysis may cause only historical interest but actually has many implications for today.

The last paper of the issue is a review by Mikhail Maslovskiy. Entitled "The Soviet Version of Modernity: Weberian and Post-Weberian Perspectives," it outlines a variety of approaches in historical sociology to Soviet society. He shows the limitations and controversies of these approaches once they are applied to the Soviet realm. Thus, as Soviet modernity was not a solid and homogenous entity, the approaches towards particular periods of its history should also differ and be more nuanced and empirically-oriented.

Two book reviews complete the special issue. Irina Trotsuk reviews Kieran Allen's *Weber: Sociologist of the Empire* in detail. In his book, Allen tries to go beyond the conven-

tional view of Weber as a founding father of sociology and show how this view emerged due to the Americanization of Weber, and what ideological foundations lie behind the "true" Weber. Oleg Kildyushov contributed to the issue with the review of *Max Weber und Siene Kreise: Essays*, a collection of essays on Weber by the recognized German scholar Mario Rainer Lepsius, who is now famous for his work on the complete edition of Weber's works titled *Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe*.

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Социология Макса Вебера в XXI веке: от рецепции к актуализации

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Max Weber's Conception of "Rationalization" and the 21st Century *

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Weber's concept of "rationalization" is rightly seen as the core of his mature thought. At the same time, there has been increasing attention to his "ambivalence" towards the rationalization of economic, administrative and political processes, and of the conduct of life altogether. The themes of his nationalism and the irrational tendencies of his complex personality have also become increasingly prominent. While nationalism may not be *per se* irrational, any nationalist is logically compelled (at least in principle) to recognize the legitimacy of other — possibly opposed — nationalisms. Weber attempted to avoid this paradox of nationalism by stressing the particular responsibility of larger states, albeit with the problematic concept of the "Herrenvolk." This article explores Weber's nationalism and current nationalist and populist tendencies, in the light of his conception of sovereignty, democracy and plebiscitary leadership (Führerdemokratie). "Sovereignty," I suggest, has become a shibboleth in the twenty-first century, notably in the US, Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Poland, and in the current debacle in the UK. Although Weber uses the word "sovereignty" very rarely, the concept is at the centre of his sociology of the state and also, I suggest, of his conception of rationalization. There is a parallel with his use of the term "nation."

Keywords: Max Weber, rationalization, nationalism, sovereignty, democracy, populism

> An epic struggle between globalization and a resurgent nationalism is changing political identities and conflicts across the world. (Crouch, 2019a: 1)[1]

Weber's concept of "rationalization" is rightly seen by many as *the* core of his thought (see, for example, Brubaker, 1984; Käsler, 1979: 215ff.). At the same time, there has been increasing attention to his "ambivalence" (Alexander, 1987) towards the rationalization of economic, administrative and political processes, and to the conduct of life altogether.[2] Whereas he had earlier been seen (with considerable reason) as a liberal by many North American and West German sociologists, the themes of his nationalism and the irrational tendencies of his complex personality became increasingly prominent.

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1. See also Outhwaite, 2020; Diamond, 2019 and, on "EUropean" cosmopolitanism, Outhwaite, 2006.

2. The paradigmatic instance is the rationalization of law as analyzed by Ihering and, following him, Weber. On this, see Turner and Factor (1994: 92). See also Frisby (1987) for the comparison with Simmel, who focused more on the culture of modernity.

While nationalism may not be *per se* irrational, one cannot escape the paradox that any nationalist is logically compelled (at least in principle) to recognize the legitimacy of other — possibly opposed — nationalisms.[3] (As Turner and Factor (1984: 56) note, "Weber adopted Treitschke's commitment to the glory of the nation as his own and insisted that this commitment is ultimately not rationally defensible.") He attempted however in part to avoid this paradox of nationalism by stressing particular responsibility of larger states, albeit with the problematic concept of the "Herrenvolk."

> Ein an Zahl »größeres«, machtstaatlich organisiertes Volk findet sich durch die bloße Tatsache, daß es nun einmal ein solches ist, vor gänzlich andere Aufgaben gestellt, als sie Völkern wie den Schweizern, Dänen, Holländern, Norwegern obliegen. Weltenfern liegt dabei natürlich die Ansicht: ein an Zahl und Macht »kleines« Volk sei deshalb weniger »wertvoll« oder vor dem Forum der Geschichte weniger »wichtig«. Es hat nur einfach als solches andere Pflichten und eben deshalb auch andere Kulturmöglichkeiten. <. . .> *Nur Herrenvölker haben den Beruf, in die Speichen der Weltentwicklung einzugreifen.* (Weber, 1988: 60, 259)

> Any numerically "large" nation organized as a *Machtstaat* finds that, thanks to these very characteristics, it is confronted by tasks of a quite different order from those devolving on other nations such as the Swiss, the Danes, the Dutch or the Norwegians. There is of course a world of difference between this assertion and the view that a people which is "small" in numbers and in terms of power is thereby less "valuable" or less "important" before the forum of history. It is simply that such nations, by their very nature, have different obligations and therefore other cultural possibilities. <. . .> *Only nations of masters are called upon to thrust their hands into the spokes of the world's development.* (Weber, 1994: 75, 269)

During or, as in this case, just after a world war, such nationalistic expressions are to be expected. (Durkheim, for example, wrote a polemic *L'Allemagne au-dessus de tout* (1915), in which he focused on Treitschke's concept of the state.) Weber, who had long criticized Treitschke's excesses (Weber, 1936: 174; see also Bendix and Roth (1971: 52)), had in 1911 somewhat self-critically referred to his own notorious lecture on the farmers east-of the Elbe:

> Ich habe schon in meiner Freiburger Antrittsrede, so unreif sie in vielem gewesen sein mag, die Souveränität nationaler Ideale auf dem Gebiete aller praktischen Politik, auch der sog. Sozialpolitik, in der rücksichtslosesten Weise vertreten . . . (Weber, 1950: 454)

> In my Freiburg inaugural address immature though it may have been in many respects, I most outspokenly supported the sovereignty of national ideals in the area of all practical policies, including the so-called social policy . . . (Weber, 1975: 411)

3. Separatist nationalisms are an exception, since they necessarily contest the nationalism of the state from which they aim to secede.

As Stephen Turner (2000: 17) writes, "Weber suggests that 'the fatherland' is . . . perhaps the only practical serious choice, because nationalism was the only plausible basis for a mass political party that could transcend the limitations of interest politics . . ." Guenther Roth wrote in similar terms that "Weber's was a nationalism embraced in good conscience at a time when Germany had not yet committed the crimes that would permanently disqualify her from making any cultural claims to political leadership" (1971: 28). Behind this responsible (verantwortungsethisch) nationalism however lay Weber's rather unreflective commitment to his "fatherland." In 1912, for example, Weber was invited by Russian students in Heidelberg to join in celebrating the 50th anniversary of their library (Weber, 1950: 509–510). Even on this festive occasion he apparently raised the possibility of a coming war and the fact that in such an event he and they would need to support the military activities of their respective states.

This affirmation of the "nation" was something self-evident for Weber, but for Germany and other major European powers there was the further element of "historical responsibility or, in US terms, "manifest destiny." This decisionist element of identification with his national state combined with what Troeltsch aptly called Weber's "science-free value position." This individualistic and in this sense modernist nationalism was shaped by what he came, in the second half of his active intellectual life, to conceptualize as the advance of rationalization and, in particular, bureaucratization:

> Wie ist es angesichts dieser Übermacht der Tendenz zur Bürokratisierung überhaupt noch möglich, irgendwelche Reste einer in irgendeinem Sinn »individualistischen« Bewegungsfreiheit zu retten? Denn schließlich ist es eine gröbliche Selbsttäuschung, zu glauben, ohne diese Errungenschaften aus der Zeit der »Menschenrechte« vermöchten wir heute (auch der konservativste unter uns) überhaupt zu leben. (Weber, 1988: 152)

> How is it *at all possible* to salvage any remnants of "individual" freedom of movement *in any sense*, given this all-powerful trend towards bureaucratization? It is, after all, a piece of crude self-deception to think that even the most conservative amongst us could carry on living at all today without these achievements from the age of the "Rights of Man." (Weber, 1994: 159)

In terms of practical politics,[4] this drove Weber's critique of the reactionary class ideology of the Junkers (Schluchter, 1980), despite what they had earlier done for the country (in both senses of the word "country"), and his (qualified) support for democracy as a possible source of responsible and conscientious political leadership.

> Die »Demokratisierung« im Sinne der Nivellierung der ständischen Gliederung durch den Beamtenstaat ist eine Tatsache. Man hat nur die Wahl: in einem bürokratischen Obrigkeitsstaat mit Scheinparlamentarismus die Masse der Staatsbürger rechtlos und unfrei zu lassen und wie eine Viehherde zu »verwalten«, — oder sie

4. See Giddens (1987: 187): "…it is difficult to resist the supposition that Weber's preoccupation with bureaucratic administration was . . . strongly influenced by the circumstances existing in Germany."

> als Mitherren des Staates in diesen einzugliedern. Ein Herrenvolk aber — und nur ein solches kann und darf überhaupt Weltpolitik treiben — hat in dieser Hinsicht keine Wahl. (Weber, 1988: 322)

> "Democratization" in the sense that the structure of social estates is being levelled by the *state run by officials*, is a fact. There are only two choices: either the mass of citizens is left without freedom or rights in a bureaucratic "authoritarian state" which has only the appearance of parliamentary rule, and in which the citizens are "administered" like a herd of cattle; or the citizens are integrated into the state by making them its *co-rulers*. A *nation of masters* (*Herrenvolk*) — and only such a nation can and may engage in "world politics" — has no choice in this matter. (Weber, 1994: 129)[5]

As Sven Eliason (2012: 148) wrote, "Weber understood that great political achievement ordinarily involved risky choices . . . perhaps Weber can be said to have miscalculated he risks of Caesarism. If so, the lesson is that politics as rational calculation may prematurely foreclose genuine and preferable possibilities . . ."[6]

For Weber rationalization meant, among other things, bureaucracy and the threat of what he called rule by officials (Beamtenherrschaft). In a much-cited passage he wrote:

> Das Entscheidende bliebe doch: daß diese »frei« schaffende Verwaltung (und eventuell: Rechtssprechung) nicht, wie wir das bei den vorbürokratischen Formen finden werden, ein Reich der freien Willkür und Gnade, der persönlich motivierten Gunst und Bewertung bilden würde. Sondern daß stets als Norm des Verhaltens die Herrschaft und rationale Abwägung »sachlicher« Zwecke und die Hingabe an sie besteht. Auf dem Gebiet der staatlichen Verwaltung speziell gilt . . . der . . . spezifisch moderne, streng »sachliche« Gedanke der »Staatsraison«. . . . Entscheidend ist für uns is nur: daß prinzipiell hinter jeder Tat echt bürokratischer Verwaltung ein System rational diskutabler »Gründe«, d.h. entweder: Subsumtion unter Normen, oder: Abwägung von Zwecken und Mitteln steht. (Weber, 1976: 564)

> Decisive is that this "freely" creative administration (and possibly judicature) would not constitute a realm of *free*, arbitrary action and discretion, of *personally* motivated favor and valuation, such as we shall find to be the case among pre-bureaucratic forms. The rule and the rational pursuit of "objective" purposes, as well as devotion to these, would always constitute the norm of conduct. Precisely those views which most strongly glorify the "creative discretion of the official accept, as the ultimate and highest lodestar for his behavior in public administration, the specifically modern and strictly "objective" idea of *raison d'état*...The only decisive point for us is that in principle a system of rationally debatable "reasons" stands behind every act of bureaucratic administration, namely, either subsumption under norms, or a weighing of ends and means. (Weber, 1968: 979)

Here too rationalization and raison d'état go together in Weber's analysis.[7]

5. See Lukács, 1962: 65; Schroeder, 1998.

6. See Palonen, 1998: 11.

7. In a little-known PhD thesis Maurice Weyembergh (1971) discussed the connection between rational-

The tension between bureaucratic rule and political leadership is a topos of the Weber-industry. Behind it is another tension: that between ethics and politics as a whole, confronting modern citizens with an existential choice. The Canadian theorist Richard Wellen writes of Weber:

> . . . contemporary philosophers have had to confront his view that Western culture has tied itself to a course of rationalization distinguished by the tension between ethics and the other spheres, and that out of this has emerged a dualism between the goods of individuality and those of power and organization. <. . .>
>
> Max Weber proposed that a certain kind of victory had been achieved by liberalism in the process of rationalization that has brought about the disenchantment of the world. At the same time he described this as a hollow victory, since liberalism has survived in a world in which its moral claims have become less salient than its (possible) functional advantages . . . a culturally successful liberal democracy could at most provide a context for a struggle between bureaucrats and leaders. (Wellen 1996: 57, 160)

Willen (Ibid.: 105) attempts, following Habermas, to develop a deeper legitimation basis for liberal democracy: ". . . it is important to see that communicative action, in Habermas's sense, must be appreciated for its potential to foster normative demands — irreducible to those of strategic action — upon the rational development of social institutions and procedures." It may indeed be possible to combine an active communicative public sphere with Weber's vision, even if Weber himself could hardly imagine it (Shils, 1987). There is a report in the Viennese "Neue Freie Presse" of a lecture in which Weber allegedly presented the possibility of a democratic variant of his ideal types of legitimacy.[8]

My focus here is however on another dimension of this issue: Weber's criticism of political "dilettantism" and his problematic concept of "leadership democracy" (Führerdemokratie). To put it briefly, the trend so far this century seems to be towards the combination of nationalism with plebiscitary and often populist appeals to the "will of the people" (Weale, 2018)[9], as expressed in often manipulated but semidemocratic elections (Isaac, 2017). This cult of the "mandate" is taken to legitimate attempts to sweep aside legal and/or parliamentary obstacles. There are prominent examples in postcommunist Hungary (changes to the constitution, subversion of the media) and Poland (attacks on judges) but also in the more established and until recently apparently stable democracies of the USA (Trump's obstruction of justice and declarations of states of emergency) and the UK (May's attempts to exclude parliament from the Article 50 notification, with the

ization and his political views, as expressed for example in his earlier writings such as his Freiburg inaugural lecture and his first article on the stock exchange (1894), in which he saw speculation as a necessary evil: "Une fois de plus, la science est mise au service de la politique, sans pour autant lui être subordonnée . . . La bourse constitue en quelque sorte un mal regrettable auquel il faut se résigner" (p. 115). See also Turner and Factor (1989).

8. Ein Vortrag Mar Webers über die Probleme der Staatssoziologie. *Neue Freie Presse*, 1917, no 19102, October 26, p. 10 (http://anno.onb.ac.at/pdfs/ONB_nfp_19171026.pdf).

9. On populism, see in particular Brubaker (2017).

judges who blocked this trick branded in the gutter press as "enemies of the people" and one of them suffering a homophobic verbal attack).

A relevant element in this context is the concept of "sovereignty."[10] Weber can serve again here as a guide:

> Nur ein politisch reifes Volk ist ein »Herrenvolk«: ein Volk heißt das, welches die Kontrolle der Verwaltung seiner Angelegenheiten in eigener Hand hält und durch seine gewählten Vertreter die Auslese seiner politischen Führer entscheidend mitbestimmt. (Weber, 1988: 259)

> *Only a politically mature people* is a "nation of masters" (*Herrenvolk*), which means a people controlling the administration of its affairs itself, and, through its elected representative, sharing decisively in the selection of its political leaders. (Weber, 1994: 269)

It is striking that Weber uses the word "sovereignty" very rarely, although the concept is at the center of his sociology of the state and also, I suggest, of his conception or rationalization. There is a parallel here, as Weichlein (2007: 105) notes, with his conception of the "nation," which is so self-evident for him that he rarely very rarely invokes it explicitly. One of his rare explicit remarks, made in an informal conference contribution, is the following: "The nation is an experienced community, whose adequate expression would be a state of its own, in other words it normally tends to engender such a state"[11] (Weber, 1988: 486; Weichlein, 2007: 104). Perry Anderson (1992: 205), drawing the contrast with Ernest Gellner, wrote that "Weber was so bewitched by the spell of nationalism that he was never able to theorize it . . ."

Sovereignty has become a contemporary shibboleth (Conti, Di Mauro, Memolo, 2018), for example in the Brexit slogan "take back control,"[12] in Trump's apotheosis of the already well-established US suspicion of multilateral obligations, and in the protests of the Polish, Hungarian, Russian and Chinese regimes against external criticism in relation to the rule of law and human rights.[13] The importance of the concept was brought home to me as I edited a book on Brexit in the autumn of 2016. The only contributor who saw possible advantages in Brexit was Stefan Auer (who graciously described himself as the "dissident"). In his contribution Auer stressed this aspect and the possibility of Britain escaping from what he and Nicole Scicluna (2017) described as the "sovereignty paradox": ". . . member states have ceded too much control to the supranational level to be able to set effective policies in important areas independently of each other and of the European

10. The Council of European Studies has chosen as its 2019 conference theme "Sovereignties in Contention: Nations, Regions and Citizens in Europe."

11. "Die Nation ist eine gefühlsmassige Gemeinschaft, deren adäquater Ausdruck ein eigener Staat wäre, die also normalerweise die Tendenz hat, einen solchen aus sich hervorzutreiben."

12. As I wrote this sentence (May 23, 2019), the latest Brexiteer minister to resign from Theresa May's doomed cabinet cited as her first reason for doing so: "I do not believe that we will be a truly sovereign United Kingdom through the deal that is now proposed."

13. On Russia, see, for example, Blakkisrud and Gasimov (2018).

institutions. Yet they retain enough initiative to resist compromise and thwart common solutions" (Auer 2017: 50).

Scicluna (2017: 113–114) illustrates this with the euro crisis:

> . . . national governments cannot succeed alone, yet they struggle to effectively cooperate…the failure to bring EMU fully within the constitutional paradigm in which laws are made following the community method . . . undermined the ECB's single monetary policy over a number of years, leading to the crisis. The crisis, in turn, has undermined the EU's constitutional balance, insofar as solutions have been sought outside the framework of EU treaty law (e.g. the Fiscal Compact which was adopted as an international treaty, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was established as an intergovernmental institution . . .

Other contributors took a more skeptical view. The sociologist of law Chris Thornhill (2017: 79), argued that "the classical doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has lost much of its plausibility." He and also Antje Wiener (2017: 145) stress that the Brexit controversy had opened up the contradiction in the unwritten British constitution between parliamentary and plebiscitary democracy. For Craig Calhoun (2017: 60) "[t]he Brexit campaign . . . played on an old idea of sovereignty, old English ideas about the difference between the island nation and the mainland of Europe, alarm over immigrants, and claims that the UK was somehow subsidising Europe."

The contemporary controversy over the relevance of sovereignty has a longer history. One of the first contributions to the British discussion is by Noel Malcolm (1991), currently one of the few academic supporters of Brexit.[14] It is interesting that a defender of state sovereignty, the jurist Dieter Grimm (2009) emphasizes the numerous limits put on it by the UN and WTO as well as the EU. For EU member states he sees Neil MacCormick's "post-sovereignty" as a possible future, but also the disappearance of sovereignty altogether (Grimm, 2015: 117). For the moment, however, "sovereignty protects democracy" (Ibid.: 128). Martti Koskenniemi (2010: 242) also ends his rather skeptical discussion on a positive note: ". . . sovereignty points to the possibility . . . that one is not just a pawn in someone else's game."

Arjun Appadurai (2017: 2–3) has deconstructed the myth of sovereignty:

> Economic sovereignty, as a basis for national sovereignty, was always a dubious principle. Today, it is increasingly irrelevant.
>
> In the absence of any national economy that modern states can protect and develop, it is no surprise that there has been a worldwide tendency in effective states and in many aspiring social movements to perform national sovereignty by turning towards cultural majoritarianism, ethno-nationalism and the stifling of internal intellectual and cultural dissent. In other words, the loss of economic sovereignty everywhere produces a shift towards emphasizing cultural sovereignty.

14. Malcolm, 2019; see also MacCormick, 1999; Held, 2002; Walker, 2003; Kalmo, Skinner, 2010.

Against this, Appadurai suggests, we need a "liberal multitude' as an answer to this "regressive multitude."[15] On the other hand, DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe Movement 2025) takes sovereignty seriously, as noted by Paul Blokker (2019: 345, 347): "Transnational populism lifts the struggle over popular sovereignty to the transnational level, where the action is . . . DiEM25 does not deny the national altogether, but rather calls for a democratic strengthening of sovereignty on both the national and transnational levels." Monnet's warning in 1943 however remains relevant:

> Il n'y aura pas de paix en Europe si les États se reconstituent sur une base de souveraineté nationale avec ce que cela entraîne de politique de prestige et de protection économique . . . Les pays d'Europe sont trop étroits pour assurer à leurs peuples la prospérité que les conditions modernes rendent possible et par conséquent nécessaire.[16]

> There will be no peace in Europe if the States are reconstituted on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that that entails in terms of prestige politics and economic protectionism . . . The countries of Europe are too small to guarantee their peoples the prosperity that modern conditions make possible and consequently necessary.

Richard Kuper (1996: 153–154) concludes: "The very desperation with which many nation states are clinging on to their "sovereignty" is, I believe, an indication of the extent to which it has already been eroded — from above and below as well as by the emergence of non-state forms of authority . . ."[17] Colin Crouch (2019b: 3) agrees: "Sovereign nationalism can play with flags and anthems, and spend the time hating immigrants, refugees and international organizations, leaving the global economy free." Richard Bellamy (2017: 228) aptly characterizes the way the Brexit government responded to Dani Rodrik's trilemma (the difficulty of combining globalization, national sovereignty and democracy): "They have delivered a formal facade of national sovereignty, symbolized by certain immigration controls...combined with a total openness to global economic processes over which they will have little or no democratic control."

Whether this delivery does in fact take place still remains uncertain. The reason for citing Brexit as an example is, I think, that it offers a particularly crass example of the contradiction between rationalization and an ethic of responsibility on the one hand and an ethic of conviction on the other. As in the (much more serious) case of climate change, manifest dangers are played down or simply denied. A century after his death, Weber's core concepts and preoccupations, though not his answers, remain highly relevant.

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15. See also Blühdorn and Butzlaff (2019).

16. Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet (Alger, 5 août 1943). Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/note_de_reflexion_de_jean_monnet_alger_5_aout_1943-fr-b61a8924-57bf-4890-9e4b-73bf4d882549.html (accessed 20 June 2019). See Isikzel, 2017: 140–141.

17. See also Negri, 2010; Isikzel, 2017: 140–141; Patberg, 2019.

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Концепция «Рационализации» Макса Вебера и XXI век

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Веберовская концепция «рационализации» по праву считается основой его зрелой мысли. В то же время все большее внимание уделяется его «двойственному» отношению к рационализации экономических, административных и политических процессов, как и жизненного поведения в целом. Проблематика национализма и иррациональных тенденций сложной фигуры Вебера также выступает все более заметно. Хотя национализм сам по себе не может быть иррациональным, любой националист логически вынужден (по крайней мере, в качестве принципа) признать законность других — возможно, противостоящих ему — национализмов. Вебер пытался избежать этого парадокса в рассмотрении национализма, подчеркивая особую ответственность крупных государств, тем не менее включая проблематичное понятие *Herrenvolk*. В данной статье рассматриваются национализм по Веберу и современные националистические и популистские движения в свете его концепции суверенитета, демократии и плебисцитарного лидерства (Führerdemokratie). Автор полагает, что в XXI веке «суверенитет» превратился в предрассудок — в особенности в таких странах, как США, Россия, Турция, Венгрия и Польша, а также Великобритания в условиях текущего краха. Хотя Вебер редко использует понятие суверенитета, оно является центральным в его социологии государства, а также, как полагает автор, в его концепции рационализации. В статье также проводится параллель с тем, как Вебер использует понятие «нация».

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, рационализация, национализм, суверенность демократия, популизм

From Weberian Bureaucracy to Networking Bureaucracy

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Max Weber viewed organizational bureaucracy as one of the inevitable premises for genesis of capitalism, and his concept of bureaucracy has been the authoritative instrument in the analysis of organizations for many years. The Fordist Modern social organization cannot be imagined without bureaucratic organization. Up to recent times, bureaucratic organization, existing as a general pattern of organizing social life, seemed to prove to be the ultimate efficiency as a means of organizing governmental bodies as well as big corporations. Today, Weberian bureaucracy as theory and practice come under criticism as rigid, obsolete, and ineffective. Under the conditions of late capitalism, modern organization is claimed to be more flexible and more adaptive to changes. It is my belief that the phenomenon of bureaucracy cannot be analyzed in isolation from other theories of social order. With its strict rules and regulations, Weberian bureaucracy is the embodiment of Foucauldian disciplinary power at the organizational level. Foucault's diagrams expressing power through systematic relations between humans, objects, and spaces could be the perfect study of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy changes with the transition from disciplinary power relations to postmodern power relations. The traditional disciplinary instruments (rules, codes, and regulations) give space for more flexible and even (at first sight) democratic inter-organizational relations. However, this supposed freed without freedom has its pricek. Deregulation paradoxically leads to even more regulation, which now appears as self-control and self-surveillance. Being microscopic (mostly due to novel technological opportunities) and de-regulative at the same time, this new networking bureaucracy restructures power relations in organizations in a way that produces behavior leading to atomization and individualization without a freedom.

Keywords: Max Weber, Michel Foucault, bureaucracy, networks, neoliberalism

Social sciences owe Max Weber so much that we could truly consider him as one of the founding fathers of sociology. The notions of Modernity, rationality, social action, and social stratification were first introduced or at least significantly developed by Weber.

Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy has been the authoritative instrument in the analysis of organizations for many years. Organizational bureaucracy was viewed by Max Weber as one of the inevitable premises for the genesis of capitalism. For Weber, the transition from the traditional to the Modern capitalist modes of governing is connected with a set of specific rules providing for the rationalization and systematization of institutions and social activities. The origins of these rules lay in Protestant ethics, and resulted in the disenchantment of the social space.

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Due to rationalization, society is no longer imagined as being established as the domain of eternal laws. Individuals who imagined themselves as being rational restructured the social space once driven by tradition hierarchies to intentionally-ordered structures known as bureaucracies.

Weberian bureaucratic organization (Weber 1978: 956–958) implies strict jurisdictional areas attached to the worker's position, identifying their functions and ability to act. It is constructed as a hierarchy of organizational positions from top to bottom levels, and it requires special training and focused specialization from the members of the organization. It consists of professionals whose lifelong vocation is bureaucratic work and thus, their working full-time. It is based on written documents, and it is regulated by general, objectified rules which do not depend on personal will.

The Fordist Modern social organization cannot be imagined without bureaucratic organization. The word "bureaucracy" obtained a negative connotation, although in fact the above-mentioned mode of organizational governing is rather typical than abnormal in the modern world. Up to recent times, the bureaucratic organization seemed to prove its ultimate efficiency as a means of organizing governmental bodies as well as big corporations; it existed as a general pattern of organizing social life.

Today, the Weberian bureaucracy as theory and practice come under criticism as rigid, obsolete, and ineffective. Modern organization under the conditions of late capitalism is claimed to be more flexible and adaptive to changes. The question is could the Weberian bureaucracy still be the key pillar in structuring organizations in the fast-changing, highly-competitive global world?

To see how Weberian bureaucracy has changed in the modern world, we should consider the evolution of its elements. It is very important to look at how Post-modernity has influenced classic organizational structures.

It is my belief that the phenomenon of bureaucracy cannot be analyzed in isolation from other theories of social order. Weberian bureaucracy with its strict rules and regulations is the embodiment of Foucauldian disciplinary power at the organizational level. Foucault's diagrams (Deleuze, 2006), expressing power through systematic relations between humans, objects, and spaces, could be an example of the perfect study of organizational systems. Is there a more colorful representation of classic Weberian bureaucracy than the diagram of the office space with strict rules, a dress-code, and a chain of command incarnating certain power relations aimed to discipline and organize obedient workers in an "objective" structured hierarchy? Moreover, there is also interesting parallel between Foucault's theory of power/knowledge and Weber's recognition of the role of information in the bureaucratic administration (Swedeberg, Agevall, 2005). I want to use the lenses of Foucauldian analysis to demonstrate the relevance of the Weberian bureaucratic concept in a Modern organizational structure analysis and its modification in the Post-modern era.

While defining bureaucracy, Weber writes that the idea of jurisdictional areas is essential for this notion. The bureaucracy is based on the rules, laws, or administrative regulations defining particular activities: "The regular activities required for the purpose of

the bureaucratically governed structure are assigned as official duties" (Weber, 1978: 956). In other words, the regular work done by the organization is recognized, systematized, and legalized. The jurisdictional area is exactly the legal provision of the actual work to be done by the organization. This requires the task of creating a system of knowledge that connects a particular set of work with its legal recognitions. We can assume power-knowledge relations where knowledge produces power, and power constitutes knowledge (Foucault, 1975: 27–28). According to Foucault, this process of the creation of power and knowledge structures is parallel, that is, the object becomes a subject of a power relation at the same time as systematic knowledge is collected. The system of knowledge becomes the discursive provision for the system of action intended by power. Weber himself spots this correlation between power and knowledge in establishing a bureaucratic structure: "Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through knowledge. This is the feature of it that makes it specifically rational. This consists on the one hand in technical knowledge which, by itself is sufficient to ensure it a position of extraordinary power. But, in addition to this, bureaucratic organizations, or the holders of power who make use of them, have the tendency to increase their power still further by the knowledge growing out of experience in the service" (Weber, 1925). Thus, Weber's concept of bureaucratic knowledge obtained through rational thinking and experience is very similar to the Foucauldian idea of power-knowledge. Knowledge constitutes rules, and rules determine authority, becoming its source and sine qua non at the same time.

The system of rules and regulation provides a system of the distribution of authority from top-level management to every element of the organization; integer authority is granulated into small pieces, each of which is attributed to every official. The jurisdictional areas delimitate these pieces of authority delegated from the entire authority of the organization as a whole: "The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdonal or otherwise, which may be displaced at the disposal of officials. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous fulfilment of these duties and for the exercise of the corresponding rights, only persons who qualify under general rules are employed" (Weber, 1978: 956). The position of the official in the bureaucracy is defined through rules and rational knowledge. Rational knowledge gained by professionals determines rules, rules determine duties, and duties determine activities and the work of the official. The system of empowerment in the bureaucracy exists through obtaining and imposing certain rational knowledge about what to do and how to do it. This is exactly what Weber called the "iron cage."

The Weberian bureaucratic organization is a representation of rational Modern industrial production in non-material sectors such as management, service, and information production. In this context, we should bear in mind that Weber conducted a detailed analysis of the genesis of capitalism. His analysis of bureaucracy is the extension of his research agenda devoted to exploring rationality in Modern society.

The triumph of rationality in industrial production was embodied in the Fordist factory with its detailed division of labor, task-specific workplaces, and the explicit system

of worker-efficiency regulation. Weberian bureaucracy was an incarnation of the same principles long before the exquisite Fordist factory saw the light of day. The principles of the constant rationalization of activities tested in the laboratory conditions of 19th century European continental bureaucracy were later implemented in highly-competitive American business.

However, it is exactly the rationalized knowledge that was the grounding for both. In this case, Foucault uses the term of "analytical space" (1975: 143), the space of systematized knowledge distributed among individuals in the organization according to their place, status, functions, and other categories. The analytical space overlaps the systematized knowledge of individuals and objects in the organizational space, thus determining their status. It may be no accident that the typical representation of the repository of this type of knowledge is the file-cabinet (French *bureau*), as the bureaucracy starts with this systematized information. Furthermore, Weber put it this way: "The management of modern office is based upon written documents (the 'files') . . . and upon a staff and subaltern officials and scribes of all sorts. The body of officials working in an agency along with respective apparatus of material implements and the files makes up a bureau" (Weber, 1978: 957)

The bureaucratic analytical space is organized through the codification and description of knowledge in certain forms. This produces a huge amount of instructions, written orders, and other types of documents which are systematized in this *bureau*. Weber also outlines the need to create a specific class of officials providing the work of organization with the sustaining of this analytical space in order. In Foucauldian terms, they keep the analytical space, and are authorized to verify its reality with the knowledge from the analytical space (truth) producing knowledge/power. A bureaucracy divides its supreme authority into particles and uses the written documents verified according to analytical space by the authorized class of workers to redistribute it among its officials, attributing predefined jurisdictional areas to each of them. This distribution is settled as a system of general rules that is obligatory for every member of the bureaucratic organization: "The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise which the officials possess" (Weber, 1978: 958).

A bureaucracy is constituted from the analytical space provided by power/knowledge, resulting in general rules and jurisdictional areas of each individual in the organization, and manifests itself in creating a social superstructure called a hierarchy, that is, the systematization of these officials in a certain order: "The principles of office hierarchy and of channels of appeal stipulate a clearly established system of super- and sub-ordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of appealing in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office to the corresponding superior authority" (Weber, 1978: 957).

A hierarchy is an embodied analytical space that distributes individuals in social and organizational spaces. A hierarchy is important because it identifies who can wield influence on the analytical space in order to change it, and thus change regulations and

the authority distribution. The highest levels of bureaucratic officials exercise power on the basis of objectified rules, and could change these rules changing the analytical space (for example, by issuing orders or regulations). Officials at the middle and lower levels of hierarchy have to obey these rules, although they can resolve uncertain situations or situations beyond their jurisdictional area using "channels of appeal" to the highest levels.

At the level of the individual official, this results in the creation of detailed professional specializations and specified working positions: "When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that length of this obligatory working hours in the bureau may be limited" (Weber, 1978: 958). In other words, the specific workplace created in the organizational hierarchy of the bureaucracy requires training and specialization, and full-time work as a lifelong (or at least long-term) vocation.

As part of a bureaucracy, the specially trained and fully-employed individual alienates part of his life (the working hours) to the organization in which they work; in the same way, they alienate part of their personality in the form of their skills and abilities. The bureaucrat becomes a werewolf: an official worker of a bureaucracy in daylight and a private individual at night. This transformation take place in the arena of constantly changing purposes, focuses, and aims of personal activity. While being an official, the individual pursues the purposes of the organization in which they are employed; as a private person, they seek a salary for their work and to pursue their own needs and desires.

Inside the bureaucratic organization, the behavior of an individual falls under the controls of the analytical space. Foucault describes disciplinary control in terms of imposing time-tables (establishing rhythms, imposing particular occupations, or regulating the cycles of repetition), the measuring and elaborating of the working activity, and the correlation of body and gestures resulting in body-object articulation, relations that the body must have with the object that it manipulates (1975: 149). While the third instrument was actively used mostly in Fordist factories with its manual labor, the first two are the good examples of correlating the analytical space with the practical activity of bureaucratic workers.

The working life of the official is measured and evaluated according to the bureaucratic norms of working time, while the activities performed during this time are scrupulously described in special documents referred to their jurisdictional area. In other words, during any particular day, almost each work-step of a bureaucrat is classified and described in a set of special documents usually known as job instructions or duty regulations.

This is also relevant to job content, because bureaucratic work requires specific skills obtained through education: "Office management . . . usually presupposes thorough training in a field of specialization. This, too, holds increasingly for the modern executive and employee of a private enterprise, just as it does for the state of officials" (Weber, 1978: 958). In terms of training, the skills of a bureaucrat are also controlled and measured by means of the analytical space. To implement their duties, the official should prove to have certain qualities and skills themselves. The system of the evaluation of an official is also

established as part of the analytical space attaching certain qualifications characteristic to each job position, as well as the instruments to measure them.

Thus, the life of the bureaucratic worker is split in two parts, separating their social and professional life as an official subject, and their private life as a natural person. A bureaucracy pretends to rule the first one to be delimitated by working hours and working duties, while the second is a matter of self-management or household activities aimed at the reproduction of the individual's labor potential through the satisfaction of needs.

Let me put this in a way similar to the argument of Giorgio Agamben (1998) about the constituting of the state apparatus from the rejection of part of human life; the Weberian bureaucracy separates the individual from its naked life (biological needs and demands) and rejects the former. In the Weberian bureaucracy, the individual is official and nothing more since that is how this objectified inhumane structure works. To be a bureaucrat, one should do their best to isolate personality to become a part of what Foucault called a machine, meaning inexorable, rationalized systems of operating reality (1975: 163). To be an element of the machine, individuals should become an element that may be placed, moved, or articulated by others; to follow the various chronological series that discipline must combine to form a composite time of his work; and to be a subject of the precise system of command (Ibid.: 162–169). All of these qualities described are essential characteristics of the Weberian bureaucracy, which is a concrete representation of a social organizational machine.

In the tradition of the Foucauldian method, I should elaborate this theoretical model by conducting a diagrammatic analysis of bureaucracy. In other words, I should accomplish the analysis with diagrams, that is, technical and spatial conditions of the functioning of bureaucracy. The following description will be as general as possible because it should cover a general definition of the diagram in private corporations, as well as in public-sector bodies.

The typical diagram of Weberian bureaucracy is of course the office, a space in which the workplaces of bureaucratic workers are organized with a specific logic, and divided according to the principle of hierarchy by organizational departments. In the old-fashioned bureaucracy, each department has its own separate room while more modern organizations tend to have open spaces. In both cases, the highest levels of the administration usually have their own offices. The workplace of the bureaucratic worker usually consists of a table, a chair and a computer, but sometimes with office appliances. The daily responsibilities of a bureaucratic worker consist of working with files on the computer and communicating with colleagues, customers, or suppliers in person and through means of the telephone and the Internet. For the modern bureaucracy, it is typical to have its workers be present at the workplace for the entire day, except for officially-restricted work-breaks. Working duties are planned and described, and work-schedules and tasks are defined by the line managers. All violations of task deadlines and work routines are treated as inconsistent with the job.

The skills and abilities of bureaucratic workers are evaluated according to a predefined system of the human-resources management. This special evaluation is imposed to mea-

sure the efficiency and productivity of an office worker, and of required results for rewards or punishment.

What is it that makes a bureaucracy a perfect social machine? Based on the arguments listed above, I could outline two essential premises; the separation of the individual into two parts, professional and personal, with the rejection of the latter from the workspace, and the rationalization and structuring of social chaos into a solid organizational order subjugated to the aim of attaining efficiency and productivity. In the first case, bureaucracy generates a specific individual subject, a wholesome professional who has no room for private affection and thoughts in their mind; in the second case, it develops a wholesome organization which creates rules and borders to differentiate itself from the external chaos of the free market unifying professionals in pursuing collective goals. The bureaucracy thus is rather a specific mode of relation between the organization and the individual in this context than just a social institution (Maravelias, 2003: 551–552).

The theory of bureaucracy has influenced the social and economic theory of organization, and researchers have conducted many studies on the topic: R. K. Merton (1952), P. M. Blau (1956), E. Jacques (1986), W. A. Niskanen (2007), J. Q. Wilson (1991), P. Evans and J. E. Rauch (1999), and others. The concept of bureaucracy was found to be relevant in describing the social structure and consistent pattern of functioning of the organization. In 1937, in *The Nature of the Firm,* the famous economist Ronald Coase tried to formulate an economic explanation to the question of why firms are organized according to structural hierarchical principles which are different from free market patterns.

Nearly a century after Max Weber's death, the word "bureaucracy" has, at the same time, become a synonym for inefficiency, rigidity, the inability to adapt, and even for inhumanity. Several theoretical and practical attempts have been made to uncrown bureaucracy and promote different forms of organization. In the public sector, one of the most notable attempts resulted in the book called *Reinventing Government* (Osborne, Gaebler, 1992). The authors, D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, propose to deconstruct the bureaucracy in the public sector, and reorganizing it according to the principles of the private sector. According to D. Argyriades (2010), the Osbourne-Gaebler model of decentralization, deregulation, and the downsizing and outsourcing of the public bureaucracy has strongly influenced the patterns of managing structural changes in governmental organizations.

Private-sector companies began reshaping their organizational structures even earlier. The concepts of flexible, firm, VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity) and global network-centric organization and others were focused on possible reforms of the way organizations are managed. Critics of the Weberian bureaucracy argued that it is obsolete and belongs to the era of Modernity since we are living in Post-modern conditions where contracts are short-term, relationships require networking, and structures are flexible. This global and organizational evolution produced a whole variety of optimistic views representing de-regulative trends, including a shift to more personal freedom.

Indeed, the old-fashioned Weberian bureaucracy with its set of strict rules and restrictions imposed a professional control over the worker. The analytical space of the

workplace controls what should be done by each particular worker, as well as how and when. The lack of freedom under bureaucratic conditions appears obvious. This is the reason why Weberian bureaucracy as a concept was opposed by many for decades.

The opinion about the bureaucracy as a source of total control without any freedom nearly represents the Marxist idea of the contradiction between positive and negative freedom literally. Negative freedom destroys the obstacles and rules which prevent an individual of doing certain things, while positive freedom is the capacity of the individual to do certain things.

The negative freedom of a supposed de-bureaucratization has its price, which is, paradoxically, positive freedom. Deregulation in corporate and public-sector organizations means risk-shifting from the government and business to the employee who now becomes overburdened with the defense of social and labor rights that used to be public services (for example, this is obvious in the cases of healthcare and labor legislation). To be disciplined by bureaucratic governing also meant, in a way, to be protected by the same rules that controlled one's behavior and, for example, to be able to plan for the future, or to build a career according to unchanging rules.

Weberian bureaucracy revealed itself when exposed to critical changes in the global economy, namely the spreading of precarity, flexibility, and uncertainty. To adapt to these changes, organizations have to be flexible and transform rigid forms into more flexible forms. As it was stated a century and a half ago by Marx and Engels, "all what is solid melts into air." Bureaucratic structures melt into markets and networks while trying to adjust to these circumstances (Olsen, 2007).

These changes could be understood through the lenses of Foucauldian analysis in the same manner as I subjected the Weberian bureaucracy to. Foucault did not finish his work with the concept of disciplinary power. In his later works at the end of 1970s, he proposed the new concept of bio-power, or the "care of the self," which was further developed by Gilles Deleuze to become the concept of "control society." According to Foucault, the disciplinary power over actions and behavior *a posteriori* during the process of activity from the 18th century is being replaced by the preventive power over self-control and self-surveillance. Bio-power is internalized in the norms and representations of the subject, that is, the technologies of the self. The new individual is controlled by themselves and is not punished with rules and restrictions, but by the risks of being exposed to social risks of illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. In other words, the regulation is implemented in the subject who is now responsible for self-regulation and taking care of themselves.

Gille Deleuze elaborated Foucault's argument in the form of what he called the "control society" (1992). Unlike the disciplinary society, the society of control aspires to demolish old barriers and rules. Instead, it provides individuals with the freedom to do whatever they want. Workers are free from the enclosed workspace, strict rules, uniforms, etc. Instead, the control society establishes a constant monitoring and tracking of individual activities. You can do whatever you want, but everything will be monitored and recorded.

The process of de-bureaucratization starts with the blurring of the boundary that separated the professional life of an individual from their personal life. In what is usu-

ally called "post-bureaucracy" (Hakan Yuksel, 2016), or network-shaped entrepreneurial organizations, the individual's professional and personal lives melt into one perpetual lifestyle where personal abilities and skills are as important as technical skills, and one has to mix personal and business contacts to be successful. It is reflected in the widely-used concept of work-life balance which demonstrates the attempt to re-establish the boundaries missing between the personal and working lives.

The reason for this is the changing nature of labor. Labor becomes immaterial; in other words, it involves the manipulation of intangible objects, for example, information (Berardi, 2009). This type of labor does not require complex and expensive means of production, as most of it can be done by means of electronic devices such as a smartphone or a laptop. These circumstances change the conditions of the labor process, the alienation of labor, and management into more flexible ways.

Following these trends, modern organizations dismantle the traditional disciplinary instruments (rules, codes, and regulations), thereby giving room for more flexible and even (at first sight) democratic inter-organizational relations. Big corporations introduce flexible working hours, get rid of dress-codes, and detailed corporate rules and formality in communications.

The full working-time that existed in the Weberian bureaucracy as an imminent characteristic of the workplace was transformed to such an extent that it consumed personal time. To the same degree, one's personal life is consumed by professional purposes and career building, subordinating the life of an individual in the pursuit of promotions and larger salaries. The notion of soft skills (personal psychological characteristics) as a skill required in the workplace is essential in understanding how the post-bureaucracy devours private space. This labor "involves the investment of subjectivity" while "[t]he worker's personality and subjectivity have to be made susceptible to organization and command" (Lazzarato, 2012). Flexible working hours spread beyond the standard working time, and force a worker to work overtime, at home or during weekends.

The same thing is happening with the typical bureaucratic professional vocation. Instead of life-long professional individuals who had to adapt to a variety of small tasks and acquire situational competencies, workers come to be involved in a multitude of flexible employments, activities, and projects. The umbrella term for such a situation is 'precarious work', which reflects the instability and uncertainty in one's socio-professional status and employment (Bobkov, Kvachev, 2017). This, of course, implies that training should become more flexible and task-oriented; the classic scholastic education should be replaced by lifelong-learning oriented towards exclusively practical aims.

The jurisdictional areas in the post-bureaucratic organization became as fuzzy as working hours and professional status. The new project capitalism (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2017) operates outside the classic division of functions and responsibilities, creating a mixed space of multi-functional interactions and boundless project teams. The AGILE methodology teaches how to reshape organizations in order to increase efficiency through diffusing the hierarchical order of functions, that is, to do each project with

multiple teams, which is faster and results in projects being completed at an improved level at the same time.

In terms of hierarchy, teams are formed to work on each separate project. The post-bureaucracy tends to refuse the classic hierarchy structure of dividing the organization into departments. Instead, it tries to establish networks which allows for the creation of teams with members who are in line with the project's tasks.

Detailed techniques of regulating the behavior of the individual no longer exist. In the workplace, the worker is now relatively more "free" to do whatever they need to do to attain the desired results. The freedom provided in particular actions is subordinate to the organizational goal. Additionally, it releases the worker from some out-moded regulations such as a dress-code, or from the obligation to sit in front of a computer all day.

This all appears as freedom from old bureaucratic restrictions. At the same time, it is clearly only a negative freedom. The de-regulative lack of positive freedom paradoxically leads to even more regulations that only now appear as self-control and self-surveillance. This new networking bureaucracy, being very microscopic (mostly due to novel technological opportunities) and de-regulative at the same time, restructures the power relations in the organization in a way that produces behavior which leads to atomization and individualization without freedom. This phenomenon needs to be studied using the Weberian theoretical apparatus. Maravelias argues that the post-bureaucracy "continues and in certain respects intensifies the process of rationalization of human conduct that bureaucracy set underway" (2003: 551–552).

This rationalization reaches far beyond traditional professional competencies, but involves personality and individual qualities as well. The influential Harvard Business Review describes the process of managing network organization in writing that "in a connected age we need to instill passion and purpose around a shared mission" (Satell, 2015).

Instead of Fordist "docile bodies" (the Foucault formulization) in the networking bureaucracy, we have docile mindsets trained to be motivated and indoctrinated with the corporate culture. The bureaucracy exists not in the formal rules but in the attitudes and values of workers, manifesting itself as a specific structure of thinking. Instead of the Weberian "iron cage," the individual is trapped in the "iron net" which allows the individual to move freely, but each move entangles the individual more and more.

Network organization (or post-bureaucracy) through means of ICT creates systems of control which are exactly in line with the Deleuzian interpretation of Foucault. The worker is controlled by CCTV monitoring, a complicated system of PC-surveillance, or digital access badges designed to monitor the worker's presence at the work place, etc. Just like the control society in Deleuze's theoretical constructs, the post-bureaucracy acquires the shapes of the control organization. Giving freedoms in the framework of attaining organizational goals imposes massive and scrupulous supervision.

These are two major characteristics of the networking bureaucracy. The network, of course, has been developing since ICT technologies and the Internet provide the opportunities to develop networking communications and to restructure working activities through online-platforms and applications. In this case, the networking organization has

been characterized as "uberized," so-called after Uber, which was one of the first companies to introduce such technologies in the management and communication process. As a result, this process had been called "uberization."

It is important for the networking bureaucracy to be organized through the means of ICT. Some researchers argue that this implies not a de-bureaucratization, but a re-bureaucratization (Hodgson 2004), thus reviving principles of the Weberian bureaucracy in Post-modern conditions. Moreover, ideal types of bureaucracy and post-bureaucracy are hard to find in real life; for example, empirical study conducted in 2009 identifying characteristics of bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic workplaces showed that these features are usually mixed in one organization, or even in one job (Bolin, 2009).

Perhaps the final idea of reforming Weberian bureaucracy into a network is not personal freedom (at least, not positive freedom), but the process of increasing the efficiency of the bureaucratic means of control in the more flexible and fast-changing world. The famous philosopher Slavoj Žižek who wrote *The Puppet and the Dwarf* (2003) puts the problem this way; let us imagine two different fathers; one is the old-fashioned traditionalist who gives his children direct orders of what to do, while the other is a liberal postmodern father who, without direct orders, convinces the children that they should do something for their own sake. The latter, even if it is not authoritarian, is much more dangerous because he tries to manipulate and assure that what you have to do, you have to do *for your own good*. This is what is happening with networking bureaucracy; you do not have to obey strict rules, but, instead, you just have to be compliant to the conditions provided in the workplace. In the old-fashioned Weberian bureaucracy, the rules said that one should correspond to certain requirements; the networking bureaucracy provides one with *opportunities* and if one does not use them, it will lead to bad consequences for that individual only. In other words, the networking bureaucracy controls conditions instead of actions.

The concept of human capital (Becker, 1993) is used to transform the bureaucratic hierarchy and rules into the framework of conditions. According to this concept, each individual is a holder of their personal human capital, and have to do their best to use it to create personal income. The purpose of the organization is to provide conditions for each individual to develop their own capital and for income-generation. This will immediately lead to mutual benefits for the individual and the organization.

However, the creation of conditions implies that if one does not comply with this framework, it is the individual's fault, rather than the mismanagement of the organization or the state. Responsibility for personal actions and even well-being as a result of personal income shifts from the employer within labour relations to commercial-like networking relations, being as flexible and precarious as it is possible under modern legal and economic conditions.

Thus, the networking bureaucracy comprehends new, flexible, and innovative means of control and regulation through the creation of conditions and frameworks. The separation from formal Weberian principles did not mean de-bureaucratization, but a new form of the bureaucratization of networks. The complex study of these new forms is yet

to be done. Weber's legacy in this context might be important to understand these processes, and to reveal new forms of control and management.

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От веберовской бюрократии к сетевой бюрократии

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Теория бюрократии Макса Вебера мыслилась как одна из важнейших предпосылок для формирования современного капитализма. Вплоть до последних десятилетий предполагалось, что идеальный веберовский тип бюрократии проник во все сферы жизни и управления, в корпорации и государственное управления и даже является паттерном, организующим саму современную социальную жизнь. Сегодня веберовскую бюрократию как теорию и практику постоянно критикуют за жесткость, архаичность и неэффективность. Современные организации в условиях позднего капитализма претендуют на то, чтобы быть более гибкими и адаптирующимися к переменам. В настоящей статье обсуждается возможность концептуализации нового типа бюрократической организации — сетевой бюрократии. Автор комбинирует фукинианский и веберовский подход к анализу социальной организации, в частности, то, что Жиль Делёз называл «диаграммами Фуко», то есть диспозициями людей, вещей и пространств, выражающими отношения власти. Автор предлагает картину сетевой бюрократии, уходящей от укорененности в дисциплинарной власти к децентрализованным практикам эпохи позднего капитализма. Сетевая бюрократия предлагает гибкие инструменты контроля: гибкие рабочие часы, отсутствие жестких правил, устранение формализма в коммуникациях и рабочем процессе. Однако эта мнимая свобода дерегулирования оборачивается новой формой контроля. В отличие от классической веберовской бюрократии, контроль осуществляется посредством делегирования, создание системы самоконтроля индивидом своей собственной работы через совокупность мер скрытого паноптического наблюдения: видеокамеры, отслеживание действий сотрудника за компьютером, контроль времени пребывания на работе через электронные пропуска и т.п. Эти новые сетевые формы бюрократического контроля предполагают микроконтроль за действиями работника с помощью новых технологий и таким образом реструктурируют устаревшие отношения власти, еще сильнее уменьшая пространство личной свободы и усиливая атомизацию индивида.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, Мишель Фуко, бюрократия, сети, неолиберализм

Max Weber's Theory of Causality: An Examination on the Resistance to Post-Truth

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Post-truth as a form of epistemological democracy (Fuller, 2018) is a fight for authority between equal explanatory models with epistemological methods. What should a disciplinary reaction of sociology be to the dawn of post-truth? We are to re-investigate models of causal imputation within the domain of sociology in order to eliminate not any particular "bad" judgments of post-truth, but their logical forms. Max Weber spent at least five years developing a consistent theory of causation for sociology. To build his complex theoretical apparatus of causal imputation, Weber used the ideas of Johannes von Kries, a German psychologist and a philosopher of science. Because of logical vulnerabilities of von Kries's theory, both Weberian models of causal imputation can lead to the emergence of at least two forms of illegitimate judgments. However, Weber was not only mistaken but he also succeeded. The reading of his second model of causation, the "chance causation," can contribute to the debates over the notion of the subjective meaning in Weber's interpretative sociology.

Keywords: Max Weber, Johannes von Kries, causality, objective possibility, event, subjective meaning, post-truth

It looks like the more knowledge we bring to causal imputations in any area of life, the less we are able to verify them. Trials like the one of "Lucia de B," a Dutch nurse mistakenly accused of and convicted for multiple manslaughter of her patients (Derksen, Meijsing, 2009) on the basis of statistical calculations and conflicting toxicological reports, demonstrate that the complication of a causal chain of judicial proof dramatically increases the risk of a perversion of justice.

The economic epoch that started in 2008 is marked with a similar trait: we can no longer distinguish between scams, organized crime, and complex or risky businesses, even with a growing number of facts and digits at hand. We are still unable to figure out whether "Fannie May" and "Freddy Mac" were parts of an ineffective stimulus program (Mian, Sufi, Trebbi, 2010) or criminal fraud,[1] although both companies were nationalized eleven years ago. This means that whether you pursue criminal or unlawful goals or a legal business interest, the market, the state, or academia can only randomly tell the difference by building causal chains. Here, to make a clear distinction, we more likely need

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1. https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-267.htm

a sort of an epistemological miracle in a form of a leak or whistleblowing (Dyck, Morse, Zingales, 2007).

The decline of trust should be mentioned among the most dramatic social aspects of this evolution. The influential cultural and gossip magazine "New York" made a special web tag "#SummerofScams" in 2018, combining a considerable number of articles regarding high-profile frauds on one web page. These articles included college admission fraud, politicians' impersonations, McDonald's lottery winning chips fraud, and others, and proclaimed the beginning of the era of scams where "the scams are winning."

Since 2016, when Oxford Dictionaries named "post-truth" as the word of the year, this new era has an official name. Post-truth is a challenge of a bigger scale than just a deficit of rational political speech, or the proliferation of scams, or a decline of trust. Those are not only criminal and agnotological, but also epistemological phenomena (Block, 2019). Post-truth does not just change the way and the scale in which ignorance is spread, but also the way how we process this world, whether we understand it only as the social world or as the world as a whole. One can hardly find a better explanation when Fuller wrote that "I believe that a post-truth world is the inevitable outcome of greater epistemic democracy. In other words, once the instruments of knowledge production are made generally available — and they have been shown to work — they will end up working for anyone with access to them" (2018: 61).

The recently published "Mueller Report," also known as "Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election" and delivered by US Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, was a tremendous monument of epistemic democracy. Even after an explicitly intentional component was made public, misbehaviors and wrongdoings were still denied with causal imputation. At the same moment, this imputation was delegated to the public. Justice in a political sense has turned into a DIY kit for casus belli, impeachment, international tribunal, or re-election.

What should a disciplinary reaction of sociology be to the dawn of post-truth? The question may seem provocative or derisive since the first official biography of post-truth intimates that the sociology of science was one of the triggers of its dawn because it eroded the authority of science (McIntyre, 2018: 128–133). The sociology of science can be blamed for arousing post-truth, but we cannot "uncreate" the idea of the social construction of scientific facts; its ultimate and most known idea that all of the history of secular science itself is a history of "crafting of the concept of evidence" (Fuller, 2018: 37). However, the situation is so serious that even Bruno Latour states that "we are indeed at war" of "alternative facts" with science (de Vrieze, 2017), at least in the case of global warming.

Post-truth is a fight for authority between equal explanatory models since it is a democracy, but with epistemological methods. In terms of causal imputation, it requires both the ability to destroy causal chains of opponents and to build new ones. It is not just "Complete and Total EXONERATION," as the American president Donald Trump wrote on his Twitter account after the publication of the four-page summary of the Mueller report. Another popular Trump tweet is that it is also "A TOTAL Witch-hunt." It is not just "we are not there" about the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, but also a "CIA-

backed coup" about events in Kyiv in February, 2014. In general, what we can do is to investigate models of causal imputation within the domain of sociology and the domain of post-truth in order to eliminate not any particular "bad" judgments, but their logical forms. Here, we are again to "re-inspect the starting-block" (Outhwaite, 1987: 55).

We need to review not only working causal models but also the mistakes made along the way of building those models. We can find both in the legacy of Max Weber, who spent at least five years developing a consistent theory of causation for sociology. Causality actually is the most important epistemological topic of his methodological period. The so-called "adequate causation," one of his causation models developed in the short masterpiece "Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (1906), may be seen as similar to post-truth. Its logical form not only opens a door for "ethical arbitrariness using a new interpretation of causality to self-justification" (Davydov, 1997: 184), i.e., the instant re-writing of the past on the demand of the present, but also works as an example of illegitimate "retroactive causality" (von Wright, 1971: 81).

However, Weber was not only mistaken but he also succeeded. The reading of his second model of causation, the "chance causation," can contribute to the debates over the notion of the subjective meaning in *verstehende Soziologie* (interpretative sociology). Is it the sociologist who should be able to somehow reveal the subjective meaning of an action, or is it statistics that tells the truth about society? If the latter is true, then society itself is just an illegitimate retroactive phenomenon. Or, if society is oriented toward something that is penetrable only for both actor and observer, can statistics be meaningful or meaningless? Furthermore, if meaningful means penetrable, what is meaningful? We suggest that in "Critical Studies" and other methodological works, we can find some new answers.

Most of Weber's works written from 1902 to 1907 are not only "mentally strenuous essays" (Sica, 1990: 113), but also preliminary and, if one may say so, "internal" works not always intended for the public (Weber, 1975: 8–9). In the following sections, we will, in a respectful manner, (a) reveal their relevant theoretical context, (b) re-examine two models of causation developed by Weber, (c) explain their mistakes, and (d) formulate a few ideas concerning more "immune" models of causal imputation.

J. von Kries's Theory of Objective Possibility

To build his complex theoretical apparatus of causal imputation, Weber, as he himself put it, "plundered"[2] (2012b: 182) the ideas of Johannes von Kries, a German psychologist and a philosopher of science. We speak here about two interconnected theories, that is, two parts of the probabilistic logic of von Kries; his interpretation of non-numerical probabilities ("objective possibilities"), and the theory of causal imputation of an action (Tun) or an event. J. von Kries outlined the general principals of his theory in a 1886 treatise on

2. We do have at least one strong piece of evidence that Weber did not initially use this word. In the original version of "Kritische Studien" in the "Archiv" Weber wrote that he "organized" (*gegliedert*) von Kries's article (Treiber, 2015).

a logical investigation of the principles of probability. In this work, he presented the basic concept of objective possibility and explained the logical rules of its establishment, mentioning that they can be established not only logically. In 1888, von Kries published an article entitled "Über den Begriff der objectiven Möglichkeit und einige Anwendungen desselben," which was addressed to philosophers rather than to physicists or physiologists; this particular work drew the basis of the argument about the objective possibility for theorists, including Weber, among a wide range of disciplines.

How was von Kries's probabilistic theory positioned in the context of German-speaking epistemological ordeals of the early 20th century? First of all, it was Kantian. In von Kries's theory of probability, "objective randomness is integrated into a deterministic Kantian universe" (Stöltzner, 2011: 512). In his memoirs published in 1925, von Kries wrote that it was his "juvenile interest in Kant's epistemology" that led him to investigate both psychology and logic (Fioretti, 2001: 246). J. von Kries's theory was compatible with both Baden versions of the theory of knowledge, since one can treat such a theory as a tool of generalizing science, and the other as a fundament for ideographic causal logic. J. von Kries himself remained neutral on this question in a sense because his theory as an instrumental one was not supposed to be attached to only one domain.

Additionally, as Kantian, this theory was compatible with the natural scientific version of determinism,[3] on the terms that each event is causally necessary because of all previous circumstances (von Kries, 1888: 180–181). At the same time, however, it was a basis of the new "probabilistic-causal" physics which emerged with the statistical mechanics of Ludwig Boltzman who had quoted von Kries in his 1886 academy address on the probabilistic character of the second law of thermodynamics (Stöltzner, 1999: 96).

In the domain of statistics, von Kries's theory was a "mediating paradigm" (Heidelberger, 2010a: 261) between the successors of the "social physics" of Adolphe Quetelet, such as Wilhelm Lexis and the Younger German Historical School. J. von Kries's theory of probability offered tools for the statistical analysis and detection of disturbances in sequence, and it was suitable for the analysis of individual action through its legal part. Gustav Radbruch, a German philosopher of law, had reservations about the logical coherence of some methods of von Kries's logic. Radbruch found a serious contradiction between von Kries's methods and the *sine qua non* legal principle (Ibid.: 258–260), but the relevance of such debates and reservations was limited to the community of judges, since those arguments vanished into thin air outside the courtroom walls.

3. Ernst Cassirer believed that this version of determinism appeared in 1872 when Emil Du Bois-Reymond, in his lecture "Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens," repeated, after Laplace, that the only purpose of scientific knowledge is The Universe, taken as "a single fact, one great truth" (1872: 5). Not a single phenomenon, not a single event in this Universe is possible or probable from the point of view of its causality (Cassirer, 1956: 4). Ian Hacking supplements Cassirer's narrative alongside with a number of refinements. Determinism, in the sense Du Duis-Reymond postulated it, did not appear in 1872, but about 20 years earlier in the works of the philosophers and physicists Barre de Saint-Venant, Joseph Boussinesq, James Maxwell, and Charles Renouvier. The antithesis of Du Bois-Reymond's determinism was "pre-determinism," taken in the same sense as it was addressed and criticized by Kant, which implies that "our choices are predetermined by our motives, desires and beliefs" (Hacking, 1990: 152).

Edmund Husserl did not name von Kries as a "psychologist" in his *Logical Investigations* (1900), but made several suggestions on his theory of knowledge (Farber, 1943: 188–189) in order to distinguish logical laws as forms of reason from the laws of common sense. Also, von Kries was not mentioned in the list of scholars labelled with the title of "psychologist" by their colleagues, as presented by Martin Kusch (1995: 94–96).

Who were von Kries's opponents? One, Ernst Mach, can be named immediately. He shared von Kries's presumption that causality is a logical procedure, and only logical. However, Mach wanted to push this argument farther than von Kries. As one of Mach's followers formulated it, "constancy of dependences of relations determined by law, takes the place (in Mach's thought) of constant substances, of immutable things-in-themselves" (Becher, 1905: 545). Since our experience is a limit of our knowledge (in the Humian sense), causality can be grasped only as a relation that we can prove or empirically observe, and only as a function but not as a strict sequential chain (Mach, 1900; Heidelberger, 2010c). Ten years later, Bernard Russell gave a logical form to the functional understanding of causality (von Wright, 1974: 3). It had severe consequences for von Kries's version of psychology[4] and for his probabilistic logic. Since von Kries stated that not all probabilities are numerical (Fioretti, 2001; von Kries, 1888), those that are not have to either be represented numerically or leave the functionalist universe altogether. Statisticians, politicians, and courts have to operate with functional expressions, not with the apparatus of causal reasoning.

All in all, we have to say that the von Kries's theory was a true safe haven for Max Weber in political terms. It was a widely recognized meso-theory used by a number of applied sciences and disciplines, and had a small number of explicit opponents. Whether it was for Weber's academic instincts or for the true strengths of the theory, in a sense, it was indeed neutral to almost all philosophical and methodological debates splitting the German academia, at least around 1905. Equally important, the von Kries's theory was a meso-theory, not a school in the realm of philosophy of knowledge, and was thus open to considerable modifications.

To begin with a summary of von Kries's theory, we must characterize one crucial methodological match between the postulates of this theory and Weber's initial theoretical presumptions, outlined in "Roscher und Knies und die logischen Probleme der historischen Nationalökonomie" (1903), where von Kries's name was mentioned only once in a footnote. Boldly speaking, Weber wanted to discover individual causal laws similar to the law of gravity, but for individual social phenomena, as did his friend Georg Simmel, although clearly, they saw the nature of these phenomena very differently. But Weber did not believe that we can have access to an individual event as to a thing-in-itself. There is no ontological distinction between a natural event and a human action; the difference lies

4. J. von Kries argued that vitalistic (e.g., work of muscles or electricity chains) theories are unable to explain the grasping of external objects as things; his principle was "the physically similar corresponds to the psychically similar" (Ash, 1995: 96), and that the associative abilities of consciousness are responsible for recognizing objects in experience. Mach's followers, the neurophysiologists Erich Becher and Sigmund Exner, argued that cognition could be described in constants of functioning relations as found in the peripheral processes in the eye, brain, and in muscle reactions.

in the degree of interpretation available to the observer: "In other words: because, and to the extent that, it can be meaningfully interpreted, individual action is in principle in a specific sense less 'irrational' than the individual natural event. But only to the extent that it can be interpreted: beyond that limit, human action is no different from the fall of that boulder: 'incalculability,' in the sense of inaccessibility to interpretation, is, in other words, the principle [governing the actions] of the 'madman'" (Weber, 2012a: 43–44) and "The individual event, taken in isolation (the single throw of dice, the fragmentation of the falling boulder), remained completely irrational" (Ibid.: 44).

If only interpretation makes a difference, it is crucial to have valid laws of interpretation. This is why the interest in methodological problems of logic led Weber to von Kries. J. von Kries distinguished between a "particular event" (*individuelle Ereigniss*) and a "designated event" (*bezeichnetes Geschehn*) in a slightly different manner (1886: 87). To call something a "particular event," the observer must abandon any framework of classification. Regarding a "particular event," it is impossible to make a judgment on any concept or rule since the only empirical component available is what von Kries called "ontological knowledge," i.e., a "mass, a location at a time." We may say that both theorists treated isolated (or, in Weberian terms, "irrational") events as a sort of ontological prints. In belonging to the Kantian camp, both von Kries and Weber believed that it is only reason that connects events in a causal, i.e., a knowledgeable way. J. von Kries called such a specific faculty of reason "nomological knowledge."

All kinds of judgments that are derived from ontological knowledge are subjective in a sense. All probabilistic (*Wahrscheinlichkeit*) judgments are purely subjective; when one says that there is a certain probability "that under 10 throws [of dice] at least once six will fall," it means only that "we do not know whether it will occur or not" (von Kries, 1888: 180). However, some of the probabilistic, i.e., subjective expectations can be objectified, and they are "objective possibilities."

In a purely logical sense, possibilistic (*Möglichkeit*) judgments address directly the only objective item of any event, that is, the terms of its impossibility. Therefore, one can say that it is objectively possible that a dice will fall on six ten times in a row. Nothing can exclude the possibility of such a success with the legitimate necessity (Ibid.: 181). If one says that a dice will fall on a seven ten times in a row, it would be impossible because it is a contradiction, since dice only have six sides. To demarcate the scope of legitimate judgments of objective possibility, one needs *Spielraum,*[5] a specific logical construct that establishes "a range of objective possibilities of a hypothesis or event" (Treiber, 2015: 49; Heidelberger, 2001: 178).

Spielraum must meet three rules to keep all possibilities logically equal (von Kries, 1886: 66). The comparability rule requires dividing an event into a set of equal observing

5. Boltzmann's most significant innovation was his statistical model of entropy. Reaction was divided into three levels; the macro level, for which only temperature and pressure were known, the mid-level (*Zustand-everteilung*), where only the number of molecules was determined but not their properties, and the micro-level (*Komplexion*), where the energy and speed of each individual molecule were determined irrespective to their number (2015: 1973). In a sense, Boltzmann's thermodynamic model is close by construction to *Spielraum*.

units, i.e., molecules, households, knights, or species, as examples. The indifference rule requests to arrange possible outputs of an event into a set of "equal alternatives" (Heidelberger, 2001: 179). The originality rule means the non-derivability of one *Spielraum* from another, which is more fundamental (Ibid.), or precedes the former in time (Kamlah, 1983: 247).

However, *Spielraum* is not the only source of "objective possibilities." All simple games of chance are equal to *Spielraum* by their nature; the classical example is a game of dice which was described in the first text on probability theory by Christiaan Huygens (1714). Games of chance represent the very core of von Kries's theory, that is, the idea that the ontological cause of the event is almost always undetermined, and even "the infinitesimal variation of the initial conditions secures the periodical change of the outcome" (Heidelberger, 2010b: 180).

Besides *Spielraum* and games of chance, we do have some generally recognizable expectations; we expect that probabilities of getting either a one or a six on a dice are approximately equal. If someone starts getting a six many times in a row, we would be surprised at the very least. These conventions are merely commonsensical estimations of likelihood and unlikelihood of different events. They cannot be expressed in numerical values, but they are also "objective possibilities." Speaking about the conditions that establish a set of certain "objective possibilities," von Kries takes pneumonia and sepsis as examples. Pneumonia increases the risk of death, but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to precisely quantify this risk for each individual patient (1888: 191). Common sense will tell us, that for medical personnel, there is a greater "objective possibility" to catch an infectious disease than for peasants, but this cannot be properly quantified (Ibid.: 194).

There is a third group of "objective possibilities." When we discuss something concrete (*in concreto*), we approximate the likelihood of success of an undertaking. There are some "objective possibilities" rooted in the context of ontological data, but still one cannot quantify them. J. von Kries defines them as dependable on "the physical state of force or other power relations" (*physischen Kräftezustand oder sonstigen Machtverhältnissen*) (Ibid.: 191). These are the estimations of to what extent these particular circumstances can affect a prospected action or the one that has already taken place. Those objective possibilities could vary from the simplest form of the physical power of a fighter,[6] to a political situation and power dispositions.

The fate of von Kries's probability theory was not quite successful. Physics abandoned him in the early 1920s when a "full-blown" (Stöltzner, 2003: 10) version of Vienna Indeterminism opened a way to quantum physics. Twenty years after Weber published "Critical Studies," von Kries's name ceased to appear in logical and psychological treatises. A small part of von Kries's legacy remained in the economical theory of John Maynard Keynes. In 1936, Moritz Schlick, the organizer of Wiener Kreis and the last of logicians and theoreticians of science loyal to von Kries, was shot. Some of von Kries's ideas re-

6. Wittgenstein, another possible reader of von Kries's logic (Heidelberger, 2010b: 184; von Wright, 1982: 147), understood the discernibility of chance in a similar way; "Two people pointing out alternately certain features of the two competitors whose chances, as we should say, they are discussing" (Wittgenstein, 2007: 111).

mained in Ludwig Wittgenstein's works. At the end of the 1940s, right after the Second World War, two American readers of Weber, Peter Winch and Talcott Parsons, made an important theoretical and linguistic decision and translated the whole semantic line of the concepts of *Wahrscheinlichkeit*, *Möglichkeit,* and *Chance*[7] as "*probability*," with a regard to the strong statistical connotations of these concepts in Weber's works (Winch, 1990: 115; Weber, 1947: 100). In the English-speaking world of sociology, these important theoretical distinctions remained covered up for the next forty years.

Adequate Causation

The only methodological work where Weber addresses the logic of von Kries in detail is the second part of "Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik." Weber's models of causal imputation derive from the question of how to estimate the true causal value of an event or a specific factor, whether sustained or sporadic, in a causal chain. Almost the same question of how to distinguish between a disturbance and a normal course of events was asked by Wilhelm Lexis and his followers in the domain of statistics. While statisticians were searching for rules for detecting the causes of mass phenomena, Weber wanted to detect the bifurcation points of a sort, or points of no return in causal chains. He uses the Battle of Marathon, an example from the book of historian Eduard Meyer, of which he sharply criticized in the first part of the article. As a method, Weber uses the first model of causation proposed by von Kries, that of "adequate causation." He is weighing an "adequacy" of Meyer's conclusion that in case of losing the Battle of Marathon, Greece could become a Persian protectorate which would change the course of European and world history.

Weber did not include the concept of *Spielraum* in the list of the "the most elementary components" of von Kries's logic that can be useful for social science (2012b: 171). However, it is clear that Weber used and set the *Spielraum* of a logical type to determine the value of Battle of Marathon by estimating its "objective possibilities." Weber fulfilled only one logical rule of *Spielraum* out of the three, that is, the rule of "indifference," where the Greeks won, or the Persians won. The rule of "comparability" was ignored to eliminate the differences between the two armies. The rule of "originality" was intentionally broken.

Event Xo (the Battle of Marathon) becomes an element of the event of a larger scale X1 (the Persian Wars). In fact, Weber uses the *Spielraum* of a specific event as an integral element of another, which also has its own *Spielraum*. To access the *Spielraum* of the event of a bigger scale, one needs to choose a different logical possibility for the event of a smaller scale. By losing the Battle of Marathon, Greece could become a "Persian protectorate"

7. In his early works, Weber uses the words *Wahrscheinlichkeit* (probability) and *Möglichkeit* (possibility) to distinguish between two types of judgments (numerical and non-numerical respectively), so all "objective possibilities" in principle are unquantifiable but sometimes can be expressed in numbers. He uses the word *Zufall* to define an unexpected event, in the sense of Windelband's logic, an accident. He uses the word *Chance* (chance) to address preferable conditions or advantages. In the Russian language, there are rather strict equivalents for all the four words: *veroyatnost* (probability), *vozmozhnost* (possibility), *sluchai* (event), and *shans* (chance).

(Ibid.: 174), and this would change the outcomes of the third event, that is, the development of the European civilization, as well as of the fourth event — the development of the world civilization. The linear sequence of the throws of dice has been replaced here by "The Garden of Forking Paths," or by a tree of scenarios, or by a "nesting doll" type of event, when an event is "nested" within another one of a different scale.

Weber expressed the idea that "in order to grasp the real causal interconnections" we should "construct unreal ones" (2012b: 182), but instead, he changed the meaning of causation itself. He did not say that the Battle of Marathon was the reason for the "secularly oriented, the free Hellenic spiritual universe" to win in on a world scale (Ibid.: 174). Rather, the cause of the importance of the Battle of Marathon is the result of the preservation and flourishing of the Hellas secular democratic culture. As Weber bluntly puts it, the very fact that we still "register the consequences of certain decisions taken by Themistocles" is the reason for our interest in the investigation of "objective possibilities" of the decisions he made (Ibid.: 151).

For Weber, it is true that "the result is used . . . as a tool for constructing more and more new 'possibilities' that can be stretched back into the past and projected into the future" (Davydov, 1997: 179). Now we have a monstrous perspective on the necessary causes of past events contained in events that have not yet happened in the future. This is not just relativism, an "ethical arbitrariness using a new interpretation of causality to self-justification" (Ibid.: 184). If we already know the last event in the causal chain, then the "adequate causation" endows it with coercive force in regard to the events of the past. After each new future event in the causal chain has happened, the "adequate causation" will inherently rewrite all the previous events included in this chain. It looks as if the same rules of arithmetic change the "given" of a math problem depending on its solution. In a sense, it is a perfect example of exportation of negentropy (Brillouin, 1964: 8–9), but in a most peculiar way, that is, retroactively.

Another effect, probably an unexpected one, is the competition of future causes for past events as their possible effects. In John Stuart Mill's logic, this effect is called the "plurality of causes" (1964: 434). The "cause" of the Battle of Marathon can be both the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution; moreover, choosing one of these two causes with the help of inductive judgments would not be successful. The choice between competing causes of past events is a procedure of "reasoning, which may explain and verify them [only] deductively" (Ibid.: 436). Another implication is the competition of different logical orders for the events of the past. For a military historian, the success of the Greek phalanx would be an adequate "consequence" of the success of the Infantry Square in colonial wars. Why should we prefer the adequate causation as a chain of "secular culture — Battle of Marathon," and not as a chain of "European colonization — infantry square — phalanx?"

In his 1886 treatise on the theory of logical probability, von Kries clearly pointed out the disciplinary boundaries of the concept of "objective possibility," defining it as "objective or *physical* [emphasis added] possibility" (1886: 87). In his 1888 article, von Kries reminds us several times that when making judgments about possibilities, one must take

into account a "risk of losing yourself in questions or assertions that do not have a definite meaning," especially in the field of historical science (1888: 191).

Weber violated the rules of *Spielraum* when he fused two types of "objective possibilities" in one causal chain. In *Spielraum,* all such possibilities are objective because, according to von Kries, they are bound only by non-contradiction (180). Aristotle illustrated this by using an example of a triangle: "So will the definer prove if not what a triangle is? Yet then he will know by definition what it is and yet not know if it exists; and this is impossible" (Hintikka, 2004: 18). In Plato's *Protagoras*, Socrates proves, that if a number of things have one contrary, like all virtues and *aphrosyne*, they are the same (1996: 192). This is why, according to the rules of *Spielraum,* all sets of data from outputs, elements, as well as the settings themselves, have to be logically equal.

Weber used logical non-contradiction in the first step in his example where he says that the Greeks won, and the Persians won; if only one is true, it is non-contradictory. However, in the second step, he used the possibility of Greece becoming a Persian protectorate not in a logical sense, equal to not becoming, but in a sense of "objective possibilities" of the third type, that being of power relations. The position of power would give the Persians an advantage to impose their religious and political order over Greece. We choose this possibility in the *Spielraum* of a bigger scale — the fate of Hellas democracy and culture — not because it is logically equal, but because it was more likely. All "likelihoods" are more or less possible, not just "possible" and "impossible." When Meyer and then Weber claimed that Greece could become a theocracy because it happened in other Persian protectorates, they based this judgment on the causal chain that it was logically possible that the Greeks would lose the battle. However, it was not logically possible, but more likely that in that case Greece would become (a) a Persian protectorate, and (b) a theocracy.

Does it mean that the whole idea of modeling the possibilities to weight causes was a blunder from the very beginning? Let us retrace the sequence of steps Weber took. He wanted to define the principles of causal imputation for an individual, that is, individual causal laws. He employed von Kries's probabilistic logic and his concept of objective possibility. He tried to "weight" the Battle of Marathon, but in the end, it turned out that it was not a cause but an effect of a future cause. Weber mixed a logical understanding of possibility with nomological (if we use von Kries's terms, and can agree that objective possibilities of the second and third types of his theory can be called "nomological"). Was that mistake something shockingly new in Weber's times and in his intellectual surroundings?

It appears that it was not. On May 1, 1894, Wilhelm Windelband gave an address on the occasion of his appointment as the rector of the Kaiser Wilhelm University in Strasburg. Discussing the perspectives of historical investigation, he originally drew a distinction between "nomothetic" and "idiographic" sciences that was almost similar to Heinrich Rickert's distinction of generalizing and individualizing sciences. Windelband lamented that logic, as a queen of methodology, always has an inclination toward nomothetic sciences, that it abandoned idiographic sciences, and that "it would be desirable — but there

are still very few treatments of the matter at hand — if logical reflection would do justice to the great historical reality which lies before us in historical thought itself at a level commensurate with how it has made comprehensible the forms of natural inquiry down to the finest details" (1998: 14). Thus, Windelband literally proposed to do what Weber did in 1906, while also expressing a hidden concern about what logic can bring in to history:

> That in 1780 Goethe commissioned the manufacture of a house clock and a door key, as well as, on 22 February, a ticket box, is documented by an entirely authentic bill of sale that has been handed down over the years. It is thus enormously true — it happened — and yet it is not an historical fact, either for the history of literature or for a biography. But this raises the question as to whether it is always possible to decide from the beginning whether or not the particular that is given to observation or handed down over the years warrants regard as a "fact." (Ibid.: 18)

We do not know what is going to be a historical fact from the next year or the next millennium. What kind of logical laws can grasp this ambiguity? We can say that such a question was probably asked by all of the major philosophers of the epoch, with Heinrich Rickert (a leader of neo-Kantians) and Edmund Husserl (the founder and one of the leaders of phenomenology) both agreeing that logic should not be mixed with history.

Rickert claimed that the idea of establishing a sequence of events determining each other is alien to the nature of history. A historian is only interested in causality dealing with "secondary historical individuals" (1986: 112). For example, the history of German literature has a modest deal of interest in the figure of Schiller's father as the parent of the great German poet. However, with regard to the "primary historical individual," Schiller, who can also be called "not divided (Individuendum)" (Ibid.: 101), Rickert stated that everything that history is doing is limited to "the peculiar character of the content of its manifold" (Ibid.: 112). No causation is possible or necessary here.

In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl appeals to the nature of logic itself rather than to the nature of history to build his argument. He referred to von Kries's theory of knowledge directly and proposed some modifications to it:

> Following a suggestion of J. von Kries, one could say, almost as characteristically, that these sciences are *nomological*, in so far as their unifying principle, as well as their essential aim of research, is a law. The name 'explanatory science' which we have used from time to time, will also do, provided it is used to stress the unity reached by explanation, rather than explanation itself. <. . .> There are, in the second place . . . *the ontological sciences*, such as geography, history, astronomy, natural history, anatomy etc. The truths of geography are united by their relation to the earth, the truths of meteorology concern, even more restrictedly, the weather-phenomena of the earth etc. (Ibid.: 147–148)

The foundation of this argument lies in Husserl's critique of two versions of psychologistic logic, that were formulated in the works of Christoph von Sigwart and John Stuart Mill and were the most discussed at the time. The word "psychologism" was indeed be-

ing used as a label (Kusch, 1995: 5–6), but Husserl did have a strict definition of it: "The psychologistic logicians ignore the fundamental, essential, never-to be-bridged gulf between ideal and real laws, between normative and causal regulation, between logical and real necessity, between logical and real grounds. No conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real" (Husserl, 2001: 50). It means that there cannot be such a thing as probabilistic logic or logical rules of causality. Logic is the science of formal laws, and causality is a method used by ontological sciences or simply a word to describe an intention of an individual. Husserl did not attack the idea that logic could help discover causal laws to explain the behavior of a historical individual, as did Rickert; he attacked the very idea that pure logical forms, such as non-contradiction, can give access to something beyond itself.

A number of authors believe that von Kries's probabilistic theory has its roots in Mill's logic. The Russian sociologist Bogdan Kistiakovsky noticed in 1902 that von Kries's understanding of causality is "quite adjacent to Mill's" (Kistiakovsky, 1998: 67). The same was stated by Hans Gross, the creator of criminology (Gross, 1918: 153–154). The mixed nature of knowledge in Mill's logic probably was not an issue for von Kries, since he himself did not believe, that logic and history could be connected consistently. Yet, Weber seems to have inherited that risk of confusing "a law as a term in causation with a law as the rule of causation" (Husserl, 2001: 49) from von Kries's theory, which in its turn led to the emergence of at least two forms of illegitimate historical judgments The first misinterpretation implies that logical possibility as a non-contradiction allows to link several cause-and-effect chains into one; the second one has to do with the effect of the "plurality of causes" that allows the researcher to edit the history over and over again.

Chance Causation

We know just one explicitly formulated logical model of retroactive causation. The Finnish philosopher Georg von Wright did not quote von Kries or Weber, but directly addressed Windelband's notion of the undetermined nature of "facts" in history, calling such a model of causation "retroactive causation."[8] Von Wright found it logically legitimate, but on very strict terms. Muscular efforts in the arrow of time precede results in "basic actions" (1971: 76) of me grabbing a coffee cup or pushing a button of the computer. In terms of causality, the action of grabbing a cup precedes the neural function that makes it happen: "The result of a basic action may have necessary, and also sufficient, conditions in antecedent neural events (processes) regulating muscular activity. These neural events I cannot "do" by simply making them happen. But I can nevertheless bring them about, viz. by performing the basic action in question. What I then bring about is, however, something, which takes place immediately before the action" (Ibid.). Basic action forms a pair, which von Wright called a "closed system." One needs an observer, an agent able to distinguish between the action of "grabbing," and a neural effort. Additionally, this type of

8. In economics, Clive Granger disproved of the idea of retroactive causation (Granger, 1969).

causality is of a "very short reach" (Ibid.: 81), because it is a cognitive loop but not a type of objective possibility. Therefore, it does not work for Weber and his sociology.

In the footnotes to "Critical Studies," Weber recognized the partial correctness of Kistiakovsky's counter-arguments regarding "adequate causation" (2012b: 183; Davydov, 1997: 186–187). In the last paragraph of the article, Weber intimated that he would give more detailed explanations regarding the matter, but never kept this promise. Of whether he saw his adequate causation as a mistake or not, we cannot be sure. Perhaps one of the most peculiar facts related to causal models developed by Weber on the basis of von Kries's theory of the "objective possibility" is that "causality does not in the later writings play a role analogous to the role it played in the earlier writings" (Turner, Factor, 1981: 21). After the creation of two working models of causation, Weber almost immediately abandoned them.

However, since we have distinguished between the logical and nomological possibilities, can we push this further and ask whether nomological knowledge is able to provide us with a working causal model? Let us set logic aside and investigate Weber's presumptions toward nomological knowledge. His own premise was that nomological, or "empirical"[9] knowledge makes history and society understandable because it is "derived from our own life experience and our knowledge of the behavior of others" (Weber, 2012b: 176). This knowledge is a hybrid. Roughly speaking, Weber understood "nomological knowledge" as opposite to Husserl's understanding, precisely as "the technical rules of a specifically human art of thought" — one could not give a better definition — and these combinations are imprints of society, and are to be investigated in comparison with ontological data.

In his second model of causation, "chance causation" (*zufälliger Verursachung*), Weber demonstrated how this knowledge works. Here, he weighted not logical possibility and impossibility, but the objective possibility of an action being "a 'fortuitous' . . . and not one with an 'adequate' cause" (2012b: 178):

> Suppose that a temperamental young mother is annoyed by some kind of unruly behavior on the part of her young child, and that she boxes his ears soundly . . . Suppose that the howling of the child awakens in the head of the family — who, as a male German, is convinced of his superior grasp of all matters, including the bringing up of children — the desire to remonstrate with "her" on "teleological" grounds. In that case, "she" may, for example, have the reflection, which she may offer as an excuse, that if, at that moment, she had not been "agitated" (let us suppose: by a quarrel with the cook), that disciplinary measure would not have been applied at all, or at least not "in that way"; and she will be inclined to admit to him that "he knows that otherwise, she is not like that." By saying this, she is referring to his "empirical knowledge" of her "constant motives," which would, under the vast majority of all possible constellations [of factors], have had another and less irratio-

9. Manuel DeLanda perfectly illustrates this unavoidable entanglement of pure logic and "technical rules" in Weberian sociology: "Successful solution of practical problems will involve consideration of relevant causal events, such as physical interactions with the means to achieve a goal, not just calculations in an actor's head" (2013:24).

> nal effect. In other words, she is claiming that the box on the ear was, on her part, a "fortuitous" reaction to the behavior of her child, and not one with an "adequate" cause . . . (Weber, 2012b: 177–178)

The narrative and analytical structure of this case can be outlined as follows; we need to compare the action of "boxed ears" to the young mother's "constant motives" (Ibid.: 177). The husband's experience is this nomological knowledge of her motives. Ontological knowledge is the action itself. Having had compared the former with the latter, the husband realized that it was an incident and not an expression of a pattern. The cause of the "box" was not irrational aggression, but an event unknown to him that triggered the disturbance. It is not retroactive causation since the cause of "boxed ears" precedes and not follows the result, as we know at the end. However, it is a loop in the same sense as in the example from von Wright because "ears" and "quarrel" form a closed system. Dispute resolved. According to von Kries's theory, the story can be explained in terms of "objective possibilities" of the second type. The husband (and we as observers) is weighing the two objective possibilities that his wife in general doesn't use physical force, and that small unresolved disputes might affect human actions. The husband's knowledge of his wife's constant motives explains both his tirade and his presumable acceptance of her causal imputation of "chance."

The second example that Weber employed as an illustration of "chance causation" demonstrates how this scheme does not work. If we presume that everything was almost ready for the March Revolution of 1848, then "two shots" in Berlin cannot be its "chance" cause since revolution was in the air. What does make a difference? When Gustav Radbruch criticized von Kries, one of his arguments was "that one could declare almost any condition as the adequate one (1902, 350 = 26; doubly paginated)" (Heidelberger, 2010a: 259). This is why Radbruch praised the *sine qua non* principle as superior, for one part of the cause cannot be named as more essential than the others. If the Revolution happened, then it happened, and the only admissible logical fuse is a requirement that we take everything for granted, including the "two shots" as the necessary cause.

When Weber said that a historian "can, with considerably better chances of success than (for instance) Bismarck himself, pose the question: what consequences could have been 'expected' if another decision had been taken?" (2012b: 170), we have almost the same composition as in the case with "two shots." The observer knows more than the actor. We do know that revolution was in the air, despite the fact that Frederick William IV might not have known it. As in the case of adequate causation, the case of "two shots" in Berlin does not work, for in the end, we know as much as we knew in the beginning.

One new form of asymmetry can be added. We already knew that retroactive causality is an extremely controversial procedure. Also, we knew that a logical operator (such as non-contradiction) can illegitimately connect causal chains that were not connected at the time of the event even by objective possibilities of the second and third type, i.e., by nomological knowledge. However, the presumption of an observer's privilege also provides some illegal causal connections if we presume that we must stay on the ground on

nomological knowledge in the meaning that Weber described above as "derived from our own life experience and our knowledge of the behavior of others." The observer's privilege, his "favorable chance," turns any causation into retroactive causation, since, as Radbruch noted, it is up to the observer to choose whether all causes were adequate or not.

There are two theoretical takeaways of Weber's *verstehende Soziologie* that are praised in almost all of the current schools of sociological thought. We can observe the "collective unintended consequence of intentional action, that is, as a kind of statistical result" and can understand it, for instance, in terms of "traditional reasons for action" (DeLanda, 2013: 24). Also, we can see what the emerged or imposed patterns of different choices that create such consequences are (MacIntire, 1962: 54–55). This begs the question: can we achieve a result which was meaningless for the actor but has a meaning for us?

Logic and statistics can show us something that the actor didn't see, such as Greece as a theocracy or the "spirit of capitalism" as a historical individual (Weber, 2001: 13), which is a commonly accepted reading of Weber's model of causality. While an actor thought that he was saving his soul or fighting for "ashes of his fathers, and the temples of his Gods" in Marathon, we can see something else. Using this model, "what sociologists do is . . . offer a hypothesis that claims to explain the pattern of action-orientation or motivation that lies behind the observed behavior" (Rex, 1977: 158). To push this further, if this kind of asymmetrical retroactive causation is legitimate, then society itself is retroactive phenomena (Rawls, 2009: 503; Stepantsov, 2013).

The privilege of an observer means that he will choose elements of a causal chain, whether the vehicle for connecting different causal chains will be logic or access to ontological knowledge inaccessible to the actor. Both "adequate causation" and "chance causation" offer a possibility for fabricating meaning with such instruments. Statistical devices are perfect examples of combining both formulas (as pure rules in terms of Husserl) and a huge amount of ontological data. In terms of both models of causation, such devices are legal in sociology as tools of asymmetrical retroactive causation and are open for all negative effects outlined at the end of Chapter II.

It must be noted that we have to also admit that "chance causation" used in the story of the German family gives access to a different understanding of meaning. We started with the presumption that Weber was fascinated with an idea of connectivity of more or less (in the degree of possible interpretation) "irrational" external events. He used von Kries's probabilistic logic to engage the roots of this connectivity. However, at the initial stage of his undertaking, he did not view von Kries's logic as a statistics reader-device. In a 1906 letter to the Polish economist Ladislaus von Bortkiewicz, Weber wrote that he "cannot understand how it came about: of course one cannot speak of the 'statistical theories' of Kries" (2012c: 385).

In a series of fragments written from 1911 to 1913, Weber tried to distinguish between social and non-social data of statistics:

> There are statistics of processes devoid of subjective meaning, such as death rates, phenomena of fatigue, the production rate of machines, the amount of rainfall, in

> exactly the same sense as there are statistics of meaningful phenomena. But only when the phenomena are meaningful do we speak of sociological statistics. Examples are such cases as crime rates, occupational distributions, price statistics, and statistics of crop acreage. Naturally there are many cases where both components are involved, as in crop statistics. (1978: 9)

As a weak thesis, we may admit that even after the end of his methodological period, Weber was in doubt and wanted to build a fuse into the "adequate causation" as a method of legitimate connection of events, addressing one of his most controversial concepts of "subjective meaning" of action. As a strong thesis, we may say that his methodological frame gives us such fuse. We cannot eliminate nomological knowledge of an actor from causal imputation; it is the only way to exclude the retroactive causation and minimize the degree of asymmetry of knowledge. Another option is to employ the *sine qua non* principle and exclude the idea of weighting different components of a cause of an event that has already happened.

In a small fragment of "Roscher und Knies," Weber demonstrates how causal imputation that preserves the nomological knowledge of an actor as part of the equation works. Weber comes to a paradoxical conclusion for his times when he wrote: "To explain [why we find those 'miscalculations'] in, say, the Peruzzi account books, we can put forward all sorts of reason – except one: that the multiplication table was not yet 'correct' at that time" (2012a: 39). If such a disturbance was not a sign of anything for merchants, maybe it was not a disturbance at their time?[10]

Conclusion: Causality and Post-Truth

In my reading, Weber's models of causation sometimes are alarmingly close to post-truth. Substitution of likelihood with logical possibility can be one of the vehicles of post-truth because it connects causal chains in an illegitimate manner: one logical jump, common sense, jumps again, and so on. Any conspiracy theory uses such a trick. It is logically possible that the chief officials of Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign were pedophiles because nothing can logically exclude such a possibility. However, such logical possibility can not be used for modeling causal chains with "likelihoods," as it happened in the so-called "Pizzagate conspiracy theory" (McIntyre, 2018: 109).

The idea of retroactive causation leaves us unprotected before the "plurality of causes." When the Christchurch murderer wrote the names of old battles on his gun together with the names of white fascist terrorists of recent times (Elliot, 2019), he probably also made

10. Weber relied on the interpretation made by Werner Sombart who believed that "medieval bookkeepers were grossly inefficient and inept at simple arithmetic" (De Roover, 1958: 33). It is true only to certain extent. Roman numbers and the lack of the decimal system, "which may have existed in embryo as early as the early thirteenth century, but lacked a useful notation system for another three hundred years" led to mistakes and "quicksand of fractions like 33453121/4320864" (Crosby, 1997: 118). However, in the case of the Peruzzi books, "the computations were remarkably accurate; in all of the surviving Peruzzi documents, Sapori was able to detect only a few minor errors" (Hunt, 1994: 112).

a sort of a claim for "adequate causation" on the ground of the re-writing of the causal chain, connecting his crime and crime of other terrorists with the history of "Christian civilization." The idea that the nomological knowledge of an actor can be removed from the perspective of legitimate causal imputation denies the right of historical actors for meaningful action; we can "animate" actors within any frame of reference, from statistics to psychoanalysis. It is the worst implication of post-truth for humanitarian knowledge because it is the worst thinkable case of exploitation.

What we can do, besides investigating the landscapes of nomological knowledge and objective possibilities, is to be vigilant about the techniques of causal imputation mentioned above. In the field of political discourse, we must stay conscious about any type of judgments where different events are mixed with pure logical instruments without regard to common sense. In the field of sociology, when causal imputation is being applied, a strong methodological reading of meaning requires mandatory intersection between the planes of nomological knowledge of the observer and the actor. Therefore, the applicability of historicist models of thinking in sociology should be re-examined. One of the possible avenues leads to the idea of overcoming of the "circle of correlationism" (Meilliassoux, 2008: 123) in sociological explanation.

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Теория причинности Макса Вебера: испытание на устойчивость к постправде

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Постправда, будучи формой эпистемической демократии (Fuller, 2018), представляет собой борьбу разных объяснительных моделей за власть и признание. Какой может быть реакция социологии как дисциплины на расцвет постправды? Чтобы не отвечать на каждое ошибочное суждение, мы можем изучить имеющиеся в социологии модели установления причинно-следственных связей и указать на ошибочные логические формы этих суждений. Макс Вебер потратил пять лет на разработку нескольких моделей установления причинно-следственных связей. Чтобы построить свои модели, Вебер воспользовался теоретическим аппаратом немецкого физиолога и философа науки Иоганна фон Криса. Унаследовав

логическую уязвимость теории фон Криса, модели каузальности Вебера приводят к производству нелегитимных логических суждений, как минимум, двух типов. Однако Вебер также и преуспел. Предлагаемое прочтение одной из моделей, «случайной» причинной обусловленности, добавляет новые аргументы в полемику относительно субъективно полагаемого смысла в понимающей социологии Вебера.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, Иоганн фон Крис, каузальность, событие, объективная возможность, субъективный смысл, постправда

The Calling and Humility Scale: Extending the Weberian Approach to the Research of the Elective Affinity between Religion and the Economy *

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Weber's famous work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has been widely applied in sociological research. Weber formulated the question of the relationship between religion and the economy in the sense that certain types of Protestant denominations fostered the development of capitalism. One of the main factors which Weber paid attention to was the "Protestant ethic" concept of calling/vocation. The authors of this research have integrated these findings and extended the original Weberian approach in which ethics plays the central role in the analysis of the elective affinity between religion and the economy. It can be shown that humility is the second component of the ethical variable used by Weber in his sociology of religion. This approach makes the concept of economic ethics relevant for studying all major Christian denominations, that is, not only Catholic and Protestant, but also Orthodox. The aim of the current article is to develop an empirical research method based on this theoretical approach. We propose a scale measuring the ethics of calling and humility which can be assessed in quantitative surveys. The scale was pre-tested in October-November 2017 in four countries (233 respondents in Russia, Switzerland, Georgia, and Romania). After corrections based on the pre-test results, the scale was applied in a survey of parishioners of four Christian denominations in Russia (1262 respondents), those of the Orthodox, Catholic, "traditional" Protestant (Lutheran, Baptist, etc.), and the "new" Protestant (Pentecostal) denominations, in 2017–2018.

Keywords: economic ethics, humility scale, calling scale, M. Weber, F. Nietzsche, M. Scheler, Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, Orthodox Christianity

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Introduction

Weber's famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (2011), has been widely applied in sociological research (Eisenstadt, 1968; Kalberg, 2011; Lehmann, Roth, 1995; Marshall, 1982; Schluchter, Graf, 2005; Swatos, Kaelber, 2016). Weber formulated the question of the relationship between religion and the economy in the sense that certain types of Protestant denominations fostered the development of capitalism. One of the main factors which Weber paid attention to was the "Protestant ethic" concept of calling/vocation. The connection between theology and economic ethics has also been studied in other settings, such as the religious roots of Indian (Kapp, 1963; Singer, 1956), Jewish (Tamari, 1987), or Japanese societies (Bellah, 1985), the role of Pentecostalism in Latin America (Martin, 1993), as well as Islam and Buddhism in Asia (Means, 1969; Sarkisyanz, 1965), and the different branches of Christianity (Eisenstadt, 1968; Fanfani, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, 2003; Porta, Lopez-de-Silane, Shleifer, Vishny, 1996). Weber's ideas have also been applied to the analysis of contemporary Russian Orthodox Christianity (Buss, 1989, 2003; Dinello, 1998; Makrides, 2005; Marsh, 2008; Knorre, 2011; Fedotova, Kross, 2006; Kharkhordin, 2002). In a study of economic ethics in communities formed around monasteries, it has been found that humility and obedience are the main ethical concepts that shape monastic Russian Orthodox economic thought (Zabaev, 2015).

The authors of this research have integrated these findings and extended the original Weberian approach in which ethics plays the central role in the analysis of the elective affinity between religion and the economy. This tradition has a certain deficiency in that it lacks generality. Researchers have been looking for the ethics of vocation/calling in different settings, while there are denominations with other ethical tenets. Weber himself noted the distinction between the "humility" of Lutherans and the "vocation" of Calvinists. Later, this distinction was transformed into the "asceticism-mysticism" dichotomy. These other ethical tenets may have other potential economic and social effects. Since these other ethical tenets are not analyzed, these possible effects remain underestimated. In line with the critics of modernity and the role the ethics of calling played in it, these effects may turn out to be not only negative. It can be shown that humility is the second component of the ethical variable used by Weber in his sociology of religion (Zabaev, 2018b). This approach makes the concept of economic ethics relevant for studying all of the major Christian denominations, not only Catholic and Protestant, but also Orthodox. The aim of the current article is to develop an empirical research method based on this theoretical approach. We revise the existing scales of calling and humility, and try to construct our own scale. In contrast to the existing scales, it is more related to religion. We take three consequent steps to solve this problem. First, we shortly introduce the ethical variable which has two main components, those of calling and humility. It has a basis in the *The Protestant Ethic*, and later in Weber's *Sociology of Religion*. After this, we review the existing attempts to measure calling and humility in empirical research, and propose our own operationalization of these concepts. Finally, we describe the results of testing this scale in a survey of parishioners of four Christian denominations in Russia. We con-

clude that the ethical views of contemporary religious people can be analyzed using the approach suggested by Weber. The respondents perceive reality in accordance with the principles that Weber anticipated.

We propose a scale measuring the ethics of calling and humility, which can be assessed in quantitative surveys. This scale was designed in the course of a joint Russian-Swiss research project titled "Religion and patterns of social and economic organization: elective affinity between religion and economy in Christian denominations in Switzerland and Russia." The scale was pre-tested in October-November 2017 in four countries (233 respondents in Russia, Switzerland, Georgia, and Romania). Although the sample was not representative, it allowed for evaluating the structure and psychometric properties of this scale. After corrections based on the pre-test results, the scale was applied in a survey of parishioners of four Christian denominations in Russia (1262 respondents), from the Orthodox, Catholic, "traditional" Protestant (Lutheran, Baptist, etc.), and "new" Protestant (Pentecostal) denominations, in 2017–2018. It was conducted in different Russian regions among participants at religious services in several parishes of each of the four Christian denominations.[1]

There are several distinct features which contribute to the scientific novelty of our approach. First, there are many scales which evaluate the Protestant ethic of calling/vocation (Miller, Woehr, Hudspeth, 2002), and many scales of humility (McElroy, 2017; Worthington, Davis, Hook, 2017), but our scale is the first in which these two concepts are evaluated against each other within a common theoretical framework. Second, our scale includes two additional concepts which allow for differentiating humility and calling from relatively-close empirically, but quite-distant-theoretically concepts like ressentiment and careerism (Scheler, 1972). Third, our conceptualization of humility is based on a theological and philosophical rather than only a psychological approach (applied in most of the existing scales), which makes our scale more relevant for studying religious ethics in particular. In addition, the word "humility" is not used in the scale items, and the respondents are not directly asked to assess how humble they are.

The "Asceticism–Mysticism" Dichotomy and its Corresponding Central Categories

The Weberian tradition began as the analysis of how the ethics of vocation/calling (*Beruf*) contributed to the formation of capitalism. For more than a century, Weber's thesis has been a subject of criticism and clarification. In particular, a number of authors showed that there was no connection between capitalism and Protestantism (Barro, McCleary, 2003; Becker, Woessmann, 2009; Blum, Dudley, 2001; Cantoni, 2013; Delacroix, Nielsen, 2001; Grier, 1997). In this regard, it might seem pointless to continue working in line with the Weberian approach. However, we propose to bring ethics, not religiosity, to the

1. Similar surveys of four Christian denominations were also conducted in Switzerland, so a cross-country comparison will be possible in further research. The current analysis is based on only the Russian dataset.

forefront of the analysis. The point is that calling is an ethical category, although it has a religious background. We think that this approach is closer to the original Weberian idea. This idea was that the (Protestant) ethics had some (perhaps causal) relation to a number of elements of the spirit of capitalism, rather than that Protestantism was the cause of capitalism.

The Weberian tradition does not constitute a single stream of research. Rather, there are various sub-traditions. One of these is the development of "work ethic" scales to measure the ethics of calling. Researchers have made significant progress in this direction.

Our scale of practical religious ethoses has also been elaborated according to Weber's ideas described in both *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and later works. An analysis of Orthodox Christianity in the framework of the Weberian tradition meets with a number of difficulties. In the *The Protestant Ethic*, Weber introduces the opposition between asceticism and mysticism, describing Orthodox Christianity as being closer to mysticism.

Humility is the key concept for mysticism in the same way that calling is the key concept for asceticism (Zabaev, 2018a). Thus, a scale of "humility" is needed in order to analyze the influence of ethics cultivated in Orthodox Christianity with the same logic. The situation becomes even more complicated if we also take into account that the *The Protestant Ethic* contains explicit and implicit references to F. Nietzsche's texts. As a result of a reconstruction of the discussion between M. Scheler and Nietzsche, the ethical variable acquires the form of a "square," where the opposition of asceticism and mysticism according to Weber intersects with the distinction of "noble" and "common" types of people according to Scheler. This results in four components of ethics, those of (1) calling, (2) humility, (3) careerism, and (4) ressentiment (Zabaev, 2018b).

Nietzsche differentiates between the "noble" and "slave" valuation mode when he writes that

> The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the *ressentiment* of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and *this* No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye — this need to direct one's view outward instead of back to oneself — is of the essence of *ressentiment*: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world . . . (2011: 37–38; emphasis in the original)

Nietzsche linkes the emergence of ressentiment with the Judeo-Christian religion. Scheler believes that Christianity could not be the source of the ethical changes that Nietzsche attributes to it. The two key components of humility, according to Scheler, are: (1) "letting go" of our ego, "losing" or even "abandoning" ourselves without fear, emancipation from the ideas of dignity, merits, rights, self-worthiness, self-respect and instead of it; (2) perceiving everything as being given to us as a gift (2005: 24). Scheler differenti-

ates between the "noble" and "common" type of person. He writes: "The noble man experiences value *prior* to any comparison, the common man *in* and *through* a comparison" (Scheler, 1972: 37; emphasis in the original). The latter can also be of two types: "The energetic variety of the 'common' man becomes an *arriviste*, the weak variety becomes the *man of ressentiment*" (Ibid.: 38; emphasis in the original).

In line with this theoretical argument, a scale of practical religious ethoses based on the four components (calling vs. careerism, and humility vs. ressentiment) has been elaborated and tested in quantitative empirical surveys of parishioners of four Christian denominations.

In developing this scale, we tried not to ignore the humility problem that Weber inherited from Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, humility was a symbol of the negative character traits that Christianity fostered in people. For him, humility was almost a vivid expression of ressentiment. Weber introduces his typology of asceticism and mysticism (with the corresponding ethical categories of "calling" and "humility"), in connection with the Nietzschean idea of ressentiment (Tyrell, 2014). Weber demonstrates two fundamentally different ways to achieve salvation, correlated with two ways of coping with ressentiment in Nietzschean theory. Each of them presupposes its own way of life (*die Lebensführung*). Contemporary psychological approaches to humility often abandon this problem, treating humility as some supplement aimed at making a person of vocation (with his activity, self-realization, achievement of goals, etc.) a little bit more human in not always forgetting about others. A Weberian thesis would have been that these two ethical perspectives might not co-exist so easily in one person.

Conceptualization and Operationalization of Calling

Calling/vocation (*Beruf*) is the key category describing asceticism in the Weberian typology of rational salvation techniques. Calling is often defined as finding deep meaning in one's work (Wrzesniewski et al., 1997), or a commitment to the value and importance of hard work (Miller et al., 2002). It is often connected with the cultivation of some activity, skill, or virtue. In the classical text of R. Baxter used by Weber in his analysis of Protestant ethics, the following idea is given: "A man without a calling thus lacks the systematic, methodical character which is, as we have seen, demanded by worldly asceticism" (Weber, 2011). The Protestant value of asceticism, that is, hard work together with the rejection of luxury and this-worldly pleasures, was one of the factors which led to the development of the attitude towards life which Weber called "the spirit of capitalism." Weber's thesis has been widely discussed and criticized, as little empirical evidence has been found for the association between belonging to a particular religion and the work ethic. The "Protestant" work ethic has been found among Catholics and Muslims (Inglehart, Norris, 2004; Shirokanova, 2015).

There are two main versions of the Calling conceptualization. In the framework of the first approach, a calling is described as the ability to derive a sense of purpose or meaningfulness from one's role in life, and holding other-oriented values and goals as

primary sources of motivation (Dik et al., 2012; Duffy, Dik, 2013). An example of this approach is the distinction between seeing one's work as "either a Job (focus on financial rewards and necessity rather than pleasure or fulfillment; not a major positive part of life), a Career (focus on advancement), or a Calling (focus on enjoyment of fulfilling, socially useful work)" (Wrzesniewski et al., 1997: 21). Our theoretical approach goes in line with the second tradition where calling is conceptualized as a component of the work ethic, as done by Weber and his followers and/or critics. An example of this approach is a variety of multidimensional work ethic scales that are more-or-less detailed. For instance, Miller et al. proposed the following dimensions; importance of hard work, self-reliance, leisure avoidance, centrality of work, morality/ethics, delay of gratification, and avoidance of wasted time (2002). Modrack proposed to shorten the list to four core components of "hard work, no leisure, asceticism, independence/self-reliance" (2008: 6). Our operationalization of calling was inspired by the approach proposed by Miller et al. (2002), although their original scale has been revised.

Calling should be differentiated from Careerism. Careerism is not just a pursuit of power and money, but a pursuit of power, money, or being more highly esteemed than others, etc., *without thinking of one's work in terms of its intrinsic value* (Scheler, 1972).

Conceptualization and Operationalization of Humility

Humility is the key category in describing mysticism in the Weberian typology of rational salvation techniques. On the one hand, the Weberian definition of a mystic emphasizes passivity vs. activity, and acceptance vs. struggle:

> The contemplative mystic minimizes his activity by resigning himself to the order of the world as it is . . . He is constantly striving to escape from activity in the world back to the quietness and inwardness of his god. Conversely, the ascetic, whenever he acts in conformity with his type, is certain to become god's instrument. . . . Therefore the success of the ascetic's action is a success of the god himself, who has contributed to the action's success, or at the very least the success is a special sign of divine blessing upon the ascetic and his activity. But for the genuine mystic, no success which may crown his activity within the world can have any significance with respect to salvation. For him, his maintenance of true humility within the world is his sole warranty for the conclusion that his soul has not fallen prey to the snares of the world. (Weber, 1965: 174)

On the other hand, the traditional Christian connotations linking "acceptance" with the "other" are present: "There lives in the Orthodox Church a specific mysticism based on the East's unforgettable belief that *brotherly love and charity* . . . form a way not only to some social effects that are entirely incidental, but to a knowledge of the meaning of the world, to a mystical relationship to God" (Toennies et al., 1973: 144–145; emphasis added).

This vision can be conceptualized in different ways. In its simplest form, it leads to distinguishing three components: (1) passivity of the perceiving subject, or a willingness

to accept, a perspective which Scheler designated as *the world as a gift*, as opposed to perception of the world as given to us by right in accordance with our dignity; (2) *openness to a different perspective*, which is the ability to take a different view, to look at what is happening from a different angle, or to admit one's mistakes; and (3) *the lack of attention to oneself and high other-focus*, which is accepting others in all the concreteness of their existence and in being able to feel their needs and helping them.

In contemporary psychology, researchers often try to escape from the negative connotations of humility by using J. P. Tangney's definition and explaining it with the beautiful metaphor of R. Warren: "Humility is not thinking less of yourself; it is thinking of yourself less" (Tangney, 2002: 148). According to Tangney, the key components of humility are:

> accurate assessment of one's abilities and achievements (*not* low self-esteem, self-deprecation); ability to acknowledge one's mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations (often vis-à-vis a "higher power"); openness to new ideas, contradictory information, and advice; keeping of one's abilities and accomplishments — one's place in the world — in perspective (e.g., seeing oneself as just one person in the larger scheme of things); relatively low self-focus, a "forgetting of the self," while recognizing that one is but one part of the larger universe; appreciation of the value of all things, as well as the many different ways that people and things can contribute to our world. (Tangney, 2000: 73–74)

Tangney's view of humility seems somewhat one-sided as compared to the articles even in theological encyclopedias (Adnès, 1969; Dihle, 1957). Tangney portrays humility as "a rich, multifaceted construct, in sharp contrast to dictionary definitions that emphasize a sense of unworthiness and low self-regard" (2000: 73). While acknowledging the psychological approach to the conceptualization of humility, we, at the same time, try not to abandon the passivity and self-abasement aspects of humility that are present in the position of "old" Christianity, where it is written that "Obedience is absolute renunciation of our own life . . . Obedience is the tomb of the will and the resurrection of humility. A corpse does not argue or reason as to what is good or what seems to be bad" (Climacus, St. John, 2012: Step 4).

Without both rejecting these connotations in advance and putting additional emphasis on them, we take into account the initial Weberian approach, largely inspired by Nietzsche's moral philosophy. It is important to preserve the distinction of humility and ressentiment in the research inventory. A reference is made to both the initial equating of humility and ressentiment made by Nietzsche (2011) and the protection of the Christian virtue of humility and differentiation of these perspectives carried out by Scheler (1972, 2005). Ressentiment is a hidden desire for revenge, a modality of human existence in which people prefer to suffer and wait for a chance of revenge, (at least in their imagination), than actively resisting something.

The currently existing scales of humility can be divided into direct and indirect scales. Direct scales use the word "humility" and cognate words. Respondents are asked to directly assess their degree of being humble. (There are two types of indirect measures,

those of self-report and other-report scales. For a detailed review of the psychological scales of humility, see Hill et al., 2017; McElroy, 2017; Zabaev, 2018a.) For this study, the most influential is the approach by J. C. Wright et al., who suggest measuring humility as a sum of the two components of "low self-focus" and "high other-focus" (2017).

Researchers of humility are faced with the paradox of how to rely on a person's self-report for evaluation of a characteristic which presupposes low attention (or even self-neglect) to oneself. D. E. Davis et al. propose a concept of relational humility which can be measured as an observer's judgment of whether the target person is humble or not (2011). R. E. Landrum proposes to measure "dispositional humility," which assumes that humble people like other humble people. He suggests that instead of asking direct questions like "Are you humble?," a different wording of "Do you like people who are...?" can be used (2011). We also attempted to overcome this difficulty in the current study. The key components of this attempt were (1) opposing humility as a virtue to another virtue, that of calling, (2) the introduction of negative components (ressentiment and careerism) which additionally enhance the distinctiveness of the scale, and (3) using question wording which suggests a certain shift in the respondents' attention from themselves.

Results

The Calling and Humility Scale consists of 31 statements describing different people[2]. The respondents are asked to evaluate to what extent these people are like them on a six-point scale ("very much like me," "like me," "moderately like me," "a little like me," "not like me," "not at all like me," or "hard to answer"). Where possible, the scale items were formulated in gender-neutral language. In items where this was difficult, gender-specific formulations (he/she) were used. The model was evaluated via Confirmatory factor analysis using the M-Plus 7.3 software package (Muthén, Muthén, 2017). Some of the scale items were omitted at different stages of analysis[3], and the final model included 23 statements. The factor loadings are presented in Table 1[4]. The measurement model of Humility consists of three latent factors, those of *High Other-Focus*, the *World as a Gift*, and *Openness to a Different Perspective*. The model of Calling includes five latent factors, those of *Achievement, Self-Worthiness, Centrality of Work, Productivity*, and *Independence*. Two additional concepts are represented by *Careerism* and the *Ressentiment* factor.

2. The full list of the scale items is provided in Appendix I.

3. Item 28 was dropped from the model because the respondents did not understand it well, and often chose the "hard to answer" option. Item 13 was dropped from the analysis because it loaded on the wrong factor. Several items were deleted because of significant cross-loadings. Our aim was to construct the most parsimonious scale with a minimal amount of indicators, which provided the best model fit. For this reason, the remainder of the omitted descriptions of people were dropped from the model because there were enough items which loaded on a particular factor.

4. The model was constructed in several stages. Only the main resulting versions of the models are described in the text.

Table 1. Factor Loadings (Standardized)*

	M1. Calling	M2. Humility	M3. Final total model	M4. An alternative total model with several cross-loadings
HIGH OTHER-FOCUS				
5 This person is concerned if other people are in trouble		0.569	0.567	0.567
19 This person feels the needs of other people		0.726	0.700	0.699
25 This person likes to help other people		0.601	0.635	0.637
THE WORLD AS A GIFT — PASSIVITY				
6 If this person is treated unfairly, he/she tries to be patient and not to think about it		0.400		
12 This person tries to follow the natural course of events, not actively oppose it		0.523	0.533	0.559
24 If bad things happen to him/her, this person does not fight actively against it		0.502	0.523	0.511
31 This person always wants to be a winner				–0.306
OPENNESS TO A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE				
11 This person easily admits his/her mistakes		0.480	0.491	0.535
17 This person considers advice from others carefully		0.521	0.509	0.700
ACHIEVEMENT				
21 This person is proud of his/her achievements	0.565		0.564	0.600
31 This person always wants to be a winner	0.635		0.639	0.581
SELF-WORTHINESS				
4 This person tries to defend his/her interests under all circumstances	0.710		0.703	0.698
16 This person does not allow others to act unfairly upon him/her	0.575		0.598	0.599

22 This person tries to defend his/her point of view to the end	0.658	0.648	0.649
11 This person easily admits his/her mistakes			–0.186
CENTRALITY OF WORK			
14 Even if this person was financially able, he/she would not stop working	0.709	0.707	0.706
30 Life without work would be very boring for this person	0.729	0.721	0.732
9 Career growth is much more important for this person than the opportunity to follow his/her vocation		-0.330	–0.264
PRODUCTIVITY			
23 This person schedules the day in advance to avoid wasting time	0.707	0.681	0.686
26 This person tries to use his/her time productively	0.766	0.797	0.789
9 Career growth is much more important for this person than the opportunity to follow his/her vocation			-0.160
INDEPENDENCE			
18 This person tries to do everything by himself/herself	0.618	0.663	0.672
20 This person doesn't like having to depend on other people	0.621	0.580	0.574
17 This person considers advice from others carefully			–0.394
CAREERISM			
9 Career growth is much more important for this person than the opportunity to follow his/her vocation		0.751	0.763
15 This person strives strongly to earn as much money as possible		0.719	0.714
27 This person invests most of his/her time and resources in his/her career		0.743	0.749

RESSENTIMENT		
10 If this person is treated unfairly, he/she feels hurt, and hopes that bad, unjust acts will be retributed	0.877	0.895
29 This person is convinced that in the long run all bad people will get what they deserve	0.598	0.586

*All factor loadings are significant at the $p \leq 0.001$ level. Cross-loadings are marked in grey.

Calling

The analysis was conducted in several stages. First of all, the Calling measurement model was constructed (M1). The goodness-of-fit measures indicate that our model fits the data well ($\chi^2(34) = 71.03$, $p = 0.0002$; RMSEA = 0.03; CFI = 0.98; TLI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.02). Only the significant χ^2 indicates that this five-factor model lacks an exact fit to the data. However, it has been shown in the literature that the use of χ^2 as a measure of model fit is over-restrictive because of its sensitivity to sample size. It has been proven to be almost unrealistic to find a well-fitting model with insignificant χ^2 in empirical research if the sample size is large (Byrne, 2012: 66–68), which is true in our case. Several more realistic fit indices have been proposed to overcome the problematic nature of χ^2. We report four of them.[5] Values close to 0 (0.05 or less) for the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), as well as values close to 1 (more than 0.90 or 0.95) for the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), indicate a well-fitting model (Ibid.: 69–77).

The first factor in the Calling measurement model is *Achievement*, which is measured by two statements: "This person is proud of his/her achievements" and "This person always wants to be a winner." This factor emphasizes the importance of this-worldly success. The doctrine of predestination played a central role in Weber's thesis, as illustrated when he writes "the question of eternal salvation constituted people's primary life concern during the Reformation epoch" (2011: 119). People were searching for signs of being among the faithful blessed by God. Calvinists believed that such signs of being predestinated for salvation were manifested "in this life, also in a material sense" (Ibid.: 165). That was the reason why success and achievement were very important to them.

In the Puritans' view, the elect who acquired their state of grace serve to increase God's glory. Thus, God's grace is manifested in human life. The idea of grace is somewhat different in Catholicism. The principle of Human Dignity is central to Catholic social teaching. It emphasizes that, as humans were created after the image and likeness of God, each human life is sacred and every person has inherent worth and dignity. The grace and dignity aspect of calling is expressed in the *Self-worthiness* latent factor which includes the three statements of "This person tries to defend his/her interests under all

5. More detailed information on fit measures is reported in Appendix II.

circumstances," "This person does not allow others to act unfairly upon him/her," and "This person tries to defend his/her point of view to the end."

Christians believe that God has given every human being some unique talents and skills. It is a person's duty to develop this gift from God. People fulfill their personal vocation through the development of their talents, and persistent work in their profession. One of the outcomes of the predestination doctrine was strong religious anxiety which could be released only through hard work: "*Work without rest in a vocational calling* was recommended as the best possible means to *acquire* the self-confidence that one belonged among the elect" (Weber, 2011: 125, emphasis in the original). Work should be central to a Christian's life, and the "unwillingness to work is a sign that one is not among the saved" (Ibid.: 161). The *Centrality of work* dimension of calling accounts for the importance of work in one's life. It includes the two statements of "Even if this person was financially able, he/she would not stop working," and "Life without work would be very boring for this person."

The avoidance of wasting time is another important feature of the Protestant ethics of calling emphasized by Weber. He wrote that "According to the will of God, which has been clearly revealed, *only activity*, not idleness and enjoyment, serves to increase His glory. Hence, of all the sins, *the wasting of time* constitutes the first and, in principle, the most serious" (Ibid.: 160; emphasis in the original). The time given to each human being is limited, so one should use it carefully. This aspect constitutes the next factor of *Productivity*, measured by the two statements of "This person schedules the day in advance to avoid wasting time," and "This person tries to use his/her time productively."

Weber stressed that the doctrine of predestination resulted in the spiritual isolation and loneliness of a solitary individual. People "were directed to pursue their life's journey in solitude . . . And no one could help them" (Ibid.: 119). Puritan literature often warned against friendship and trust in others (Ibid.: 121). Accordingly, self-reliance is one of the key features of the ethics of calling. This aspect is reflected in the factor of *Independence* in our model. There are two statements on this factor, those of "This person tries to do everything by himself/herself" and "This person doesn't like having to depend on other people."

We tried to check if a second-order factor of Calling which manifests in the five latent factors described above exists, but the model quality decreased substantially after adding this global factor. This is rather predictable based on previous studies which showed that the Protestant work ethic is constituted of a list of independent factors. We propose that a more general Calling work ethic factor should be constructed in the formative logic. Every factor in the model accounts for an important constitutive feature of this phenomenon. The latent factors of Calling are complementary, not interchangeable. They cannot replace each other because the phenomenon in question would be substantially different.

Humility

The measurement model of Humility (M2) was constructed in the second stage of analysis. The fit indices for this model are excellent ($\chi^2(17) = 25.47$, $p = 0.085$; RMSEA = 0.02; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.98; SRMR = 0.03), and even the χ^2 statistic is insignificant.

The first component of the Humility model is the *World as a gift* factor. The factor is measured by three statements: "If this person is treated unfairly, he/she tries to be patient and not to think about it," "This person tries to follow the natural course of events, not actively oppose it," and "If bad things happen to him/her, this person doesn't fight actively against it." This factor represents the attitude of accepting all that comes (even unpleasant things) with thankfulness, as opposed to acquiring or gaining something in accordance with one's rights, dignity, or merits. M. Scheler expressed it as follows:

> The genuine "letting go" of our ego and its value, daring to adventure upon the fearful emptiness that gapes beyond what is related to the ego consciously and semi-consciously — that is just what matters! Dare to be amazed and thankful before the fact that thou art not nothing, that anything at all is — and not rather Nothingness! Dare to dispense with all thy presumed inward "rights," thy "worthiness," thy "merits," all the respect of men — especially, however, with your "self-respect" — with any and all claim to be "worthy" of any kind of good fortune and to look instead upon it as a gift: Then only art thou humble! (2005: 24).

This factor reveals that humility is closer to passivity and contemplation, as opposed to activity and breaking through obstacles.

The second component of humility is the factor of *Openness to a different perspective* with two statements: "This person easily admits his/her mistakes" and "This person considers advice from others carefully." The ability to accept a different point of view, to look at what is happening from a different angle, and to admit one's mistakes are manifestations of low self-focus. Not prioritizing oneself opens space for being more attentive to the existence of different views, which might enrich one's own vision of the situation. As Wright et al. put it, "humility is a corrective to our natural tendency to treat our 'selves' as 'special,' to strongly prioritize or privilege our own mental states (e.g. our beliefs, values, etc.) and capacities (e.g. skills, abilities, etc.) . . . and have undue attachment to them simply because they are ours" (2017: 5). This aspect of humility is different from just low self-esteem. It accentuates an openness to new, challenging ideas and information which comes from sources other than ourselves. This aspect of humility is emphasized today in business literature. Collins's study shows that companies which made the biggest breakthrough "from good to great" were led by managers who were humble (2001). In contrast to the first component which is not social, here the other person appears as a horizon, as a potential opportunity, or as one towards whom people realize themselves in the world.

The third latent factor in the model of Humility is *High other-focus*. Three items load on this factor: "This person is concerned, if other people are in trouble," "This person feels the needs of other people," and "This person likes to help other people." In this factor, sociality reaches its peak. It could be assumed that the third factor is very similar to the second, that is, high other-focus is another side of low self-focus. In our sample, these

components are highly related to each other (the Pearson correlation between the latent factors is 0.8). However, they are theoretically distinct. Helping and caring about others does not necessarily follow from being able to accept other people's advice or to admit one's mistakes. It can be hypothesized that in some societies these two components can be merged, but in others, separated. This can be one of the tasks for further cross-cultural research on the scale measurement invariance.

The Total Model

The final model (M3) includes Calling and Humility specified on the previous stages of analysis, as well as two additional latent factors, those of *Ressentiment* and *Careerism*. The model quality is quite satisfactory, since all fit indices (except the significant χ^2) are within the proposed cut-off points ($\chi^2(184) = 509.7$, $p < 0.001$; RMSEA = 0.04; CFI = 0.93; TLI = 0.90; SRMR = 0.04).

Psychological literature today gives many positive connotations to humility and puts it somewhere near modesty. Nevertheless, a number of ambivalent phenomena are often thought of as humility or in close connection with it. One of them is ressentiment, which should be differentiated from humility. The idea of ressentiment, i.e., a sense of hostility towards external "evil" which causes one's own failures coupled with a hidden desire for revenge, is articulated in Nietzsche's philosophy and also discussed by Scheller in connection with the Christian ideal of humility (1972). In Nietzsche's words, "the man of *ressentiment* is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself. His soul *squints*; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and back doors, everything covert entices him as *his* world, *his* security, *his* refreshment; he understands how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble" (2011: 38; emphasis in the original).

The *Ressentiment* factor is measured by the two statements: "If this person is treated unfairly, he/she feels hurt, and hopes that bad, unjust acts will be retributed" and "This person is convinced that in the long run all bad people will get what they deserve." As can be seen from the correlations (Table 2), Ressentiment is actually to a large extent independent of the three humility factors. The only significant correlation with the World as a gift factor is very low in magnitude ($r = 0.23$).

Calling should be differentiated from careerism. In Scheler's words, a careerist (*der Streber*)[6] "is not someone who energetically and potently pursues power, property, honor, and other values. He does not deserve this name as long as he still thinks in terms of the intrinsic value of something which he actively furthers and represents by profession or calling. The ultimate goal of the arriviste's aspirations is not to acquire a thing of value, but to be more highly esteemed than others" (1972: 11). A careerist tries to get at the top, and to achieve success at any cost. Careerism is a pursuit of career and income for the sake of career and income only, without caring for the work content and meaning. In our model, the *Careerism* factor is measured by three statements; "Career growth is much more important for this person than opportunity to follow his/her vocation," "This per-

6. Translated into English as "an arriviste."

son strives strongly to earn as much money as possible," and "This person invests most of his/her time and resources in his/her career."

After adding the Careerism factor, we decided to introduce a cross-loading for one of its items based on a high Modification index (MI=45.6), that is, "Career growth is much more important for this person than the opportunity to follow his/her vocation" on the *Centrality of work* factor. The cross-loading was negative (–0.33), significant, and (most important) very meaningful. It allows for intensifying the opposition between *Careerism* as orientation towards career only, and *Centrality of work* as orientation towards career as a reflection of mastering one's vocation.

To be consistent, we also report results of an alternative total model (M4) with several other interpretable cross-loadings added one-by-one based on Modification indices. They seem logical; however, they are not very strong and increase the complexity of the model. We would propose to treat these additional cross-loadings with caution. They should be retested on different samples. Although the fit indices for this model are better ($\chi^2(180) = 432.76$, $p < 0.001$; RMSEA = 0.04; CFI = 0.95; TLI = 0.92; SRMR = 0.03), at this stage of research we consider the more parsimonious model with one cross-loading (M3) to be the final model.

Another modification to the final model which we introduced using exploratory logic after revision of the results was omitting the item "If this person is treated unfairly, he/she tries to be patient and not to think about it." This indicator was specified to load on the *World as a gift* factor, but modification indices suggested that actually it has salient loadings on three other factors, those of *Achivement* (negative), *Self-worthiness* (negative), and *Ressentiment* (positive). These cross-loadings are meaningful, but their existence makes the statement unable to differentiate well among the factors of our interest. For this reason, we decided to drop the item from the final model.

In addition to the possibility of testing specific hypotheses about the structure of latent factors, confirmatory factor analysis allows for estimating the correlations between these factors.

One of our main hypotheses was that Humility and Calling are not independent, and can be counterposed against each other in some sense. Calling presupposes cultivation of some activity and self-focus while humility is associated with passivity, acceptance, and other-focus. However, they cannot be represented as complete opposites or poles of a singular scale since they are contrasted not on one common basis, but rather like activity and state, or doing and being. Our results demonstrate that the calling and humility components can be differentiated as separate factors, but they are not completely independent. Moreover, different aspects of humility are correlated with particular aspects of calling in opposite directions (Table 2).

The *Achievement* and *Self-worthiness* factors are negatively related to the *World as a gift* factor (in both cases, the Pearson correlation coefficient $r = -0.35$, $p \leq 0.001$), which is consistent with theoretical expectations. At the same time, the *Centrality of work* and *Productivity* factors are positively associated with *High other-focus* ($r = 0.26$ and 0.36, respectively, $p \leq 0.001$), as well as with *Openness to a different perspective* ($r = 0.34$ and 0.43, respectively, $p \leq 0.001$).

Table 2. Latent Factor Correlations (Total Model — M3)

	WORLD AS A GIFT — PASSIVITY	OPENNESS TO A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE	ACHIVEMENT	SELF-WORTHINESS	CENTRALITY OF WORK	PRODUCTIVITY	INDEPENDENCE	CAREERISM	RESSENTIMENT
HIGH OTHER-FOCUS	0.12	0.81***	-0.12*	0.03	0.26***	0.36***	0.27***	-0.08	–0.06
WORLD AS A GIFT — PASSIVITY		0.25**	–0.35***	-0.35***	0.00	-0.06	0.08	-0.08	0.23***
OPENNESS TO A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE			–0.04	0.04	0.34***	0.43***	0.19**	0.13*	0.01
ACHIVEMENT				0.84***	0.54***	0.28***	0.38***	0.89***	0.29***
SELF-WORTHINESS					0.34***	0.19***	0.41***	0.62***	0.33***
CENTRALITY OF WORK						0.37***	0.34***	0.56***	0.18***
PRODUCTIVITY							0.25***	0.28***	0.00
INDEPENDENCE								0.32***	0.11*
CAREERISM									0.30***

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Conclusion

Weber's *The Protestant Ethics* laid the foundation for the analysis of the contribution of religion (religious ethics) to the formation of personality and modern society. In the 20th and early 21st centuries, Weber's interpreters analyzed the contribution of ethics of calling to the formation of the most productive economic attitudes (in relation to the modern society). Such research was conducted in the framework of modernization theory and cross-cultural studies. The ethics of calling turned out to be one of the components of the triumphant culture-society-economy bond, denoting a positive goal and purpose of human history alongside such components as, for example, economic growth, free market, and democracy (Shcherbak, 2018). Parallel to this, however, there developed an alternative perception of the world, as well as scientific approaches connected with it where this bond was criticized. To a large extent, this criticism was associated with the emergence of fascism (as well as World War II or the Holocaust, as examples) in the center of the civilized world. It was clear to the authors who developed such ideas that the successful development of Western societies either could not prevent the emergence of fascism, or even became its cause (Arendt, 1973; Fromm, 1994; Polanyi, 2001). Later, the criticism of neoliberalism and the distribution of power in modern society emerged, as the social stratification and inequality associated with it was revealed.

Apart from the grand-criticism of modern society, literature on management and organizational leadership started to emphasize the importance of such forms of leadership that were not similar to the business captains of the heroic era of capitalism[7] like the "servant leader" (Greenleaf, 1998), or the "humble leaders of the fifth level" (Collins, 2001). Thus today, calling is no longer the one and only positive version of the practical ethos or the anthropological human type associated with it.

In this regard, it seems appropriate to revise the original Weberian ethical typology and transform it into an empirical method for the analysis of the contribution of various religions to the formation of the character of their adherents. This seems even more justified since Weber himself showed that the ethics of calling was spread in a relatively small number of faiths and denominations. Recognition of the ethics of calling as the key factor to the formation of a proper and productive people of modernity directed the search for the effects of religious ethics in this direction. A large number of researchers were looking for analogs of the ethics of calling in other religions and cultures.

It seems that today we can proceed to a more comprehensive analysis of the ethical[8] contribution of religions to the formation of the economy and social relations. In this article, we attempted to develop a scale for conducting such an analysis, a scale that takes into account not only the ethics of calling, but also its main opponent, that of the ethics

7. For reviews, see Avolio, Walumbwa, Weber, 2008; Morris, Brotheridge, Urbanski, 2005; Nielsen, Marrone, 2018; Owens, Johnson, Mitchell, 2013; Parris, Peachey, 2013.

8. We deliberately speak about the effect of ethics since the influence of religion on the economy and human activity in other areas can also pass through other channels, such as through institutions, including the construction of a particular ecclesiological model, economic, or other doctrines, through the direct participation of churches and religious organizations in the economy and social life.

of humility. In addition, we are trying to consider some other ethical components that were important to Weber at the time when he was developing his "asceticism-mysticism" dichotomy (primarily, we mean the ethics of ressentiment).

Unlike previous attempts where only the calling scale was constructed (often as equivalent to the work ethic), here an attempt was made to solve a larger problem by taking into account Weber's opposition of "asceticism" ("calling" as the key category) and "mysticism" ("humility" as the key category), and crossing this opposition with the distinction between the "noble" and "common" types according to Scheler. This has made it possible to distinguish "positive" humility and calling from their "negative" counterparts, those of careerism and ressentiment.

Additional tasks addressed by the project were to construct a scale of humility that does not ignore its "dark" side, meets the requirements of the psychological measurement quality (high reliability), and overcomes the "humble cannot call themselves humble" paradox. The scale can be applied in surveys of both religious and non-religious people as well as in different countries and denominations.

The results of this analysis show that the structure of the ethical variable assumed by Weberian theory is consistent with the structure of the perception of reality by the parishioners of four Christian denominations in Russia who participated in our survey. The scale can be used for the measurement of practical religious ethoses. The formal scale quality indicators appear to be quite satisfactory and the structure is in line with theoretical considerations, although additional analysis would be necessary to gain more information on the scale reliability, validity, and measurement invariance.

Appendix I. The Humility and Calling Scale — Initial Operationalization with 31 Items

General instructions

English version	Russian version
Below are descriptions of different people. To what extent are these people like you? Are they "very much like you," "like you," "moderately like you," "a little like you," "not like you," "not at all like you"?	Далее приведены описания разных людей. Насколько описанные люди похожи на Вас? Они «очень похожи на Вас», «похожи на Вас», «умеренно похожи на Вас», «мало похожи на Вас», «не похожи на Вас» или «совсем не похожи на Вас»?

Answer options

No.	English version	Russian version
1	very much like me	очень похож на меня
2	like me	похож на меня
3	moderately like me	умеренно похож на меня
4	a little like me	мало похож на меня
5	not like me	не похож на меня
6	not at all like me	совсем не похож на меня
99	hard to answer	затрудняюсь ответить

Descriptions

No.	English version	Russian version	Concept
1	Income is much more important for this person than usefulness of his/her job for people	Доход для этого человека намного важнее, чем польза, которую его работа приносит людям	Careerism
2	This person likes to overcome obstacles, to go against fate	Этот человек любит преодолевать препятствия, идти наперекор судьбе	Calling
3	Work takes a lot of this person's time, leaving little time to relax	Работа занимает у этого человека много времени, оставляя мало времени, чтобы расслабиться	Calling
4	This person tries to defend his/her interests under all circumstances	Этот человек старается защищать свои интересы при любых обстоятельствах	Calling
5	This person is concerned if other people are in trouble	Этот человек переживает, когда у других неприятности	Humility
6	If this person is treated unfairly, he/she tries to be patient and not to think about it	Если с этим человеком поступают несправедливо, он(а) старается терпеть и не думать об этом	Humility
7	This person tries to be simple and modest	Этот человек старается быть простым и скромным	Humility
8	Having done something good, this person would not want other people to know about it	Сделав что-то хорошее, этот человек не хотел бы, чтобы об этом узнали другие люди	Humility

9	Career growth is much more important for this person than the opportunity to follow his/her vocation	Карьерный рост для этого человека намного важнее, чем возможность следовать своему призванию	Careerism
10	If this person is treated unfairly, he/she feels hurt, and hopes that bad, unjust acts will be retributed	Если с этим человеком поступают несправедливо, он(а) чувствует обиду и надеется, что за плохие, несправедливые поступки людям воздастся	Ressentiment
11	This person easily admits his/her mistakes	Этот человек легко признаёт свои ошибки	Humility
12	This person tries to follow the natural course of events, not actively oppose it	Этот человек старается следовать естественному ходу событий, активно не противодействовать ему	Humility
13	This person usually asks other people for advice when making decisions	Принимая решения, этот человек обычно спрашивает совета у других людей	Humility
14	Even if this person was financially able, he/she would not stop working	Даже если бы материальное положение позволяло, этот человек не перестал бы работать	Calling
15	This person strives strongly to earn as much money as possible	Этот человек прилагает все усилия, чтобы заработать как можно больше денег	Careerism
16	This person does not allow others to act unfairly upon him/her	Этот человек не позволяет другим поступать с собой несправедливо	Calling
17	This person considers advice from others carefully	Этот человек внимательно прислушивается к советам	Humility
18	This person tries to do everything by himself/herself	Этот человек старается делать всё самостоятельно	Calling
19	This person feels the needs of other people	Этот человек чувствует нужды других людей	Humility
20	This person doesn't like having to depend on other people	Этот человек не любит зависеть от других людей	Calling
21	This person is proud of his/her achievements	Этот человек гордится своими достижениями	Calling

22	This person tries to defend his/her point of view to the end	Этот человек старается до конца отстаивать свою точку зрения	Calling
23	This person schedules the day in advance to avoid wasting time	Этот человек заранее планирует свой день, чтобы избежать потери времени	Calling
24	If bad things happen to him/her, this person doesn't fight actively against it	Если с этим человеком случается что-то плохое, он(а) не оказывает активного сопротивления	Humility
25	This person likes to help other people	Этому человеку нравится помогать другим людям	Humility
26	This person tries to use his/her time productively	Этот человек старается использовать свое время продуктивно	Calling
27	This person invests most of his/her time and resources on his/her career	Этот человек вкладывает большую часть своего времени и ресурсов в свою карьеру	Careerism
28	Good things which the person hasn't deserved often happen in his/her life	В жизни этого человека часто случаются хорошие вещи, которых он(а) не заслужил(а)	Humility
29	This person is convinced that in the long run all bad people will get what they deserve	Этот человек убеждён, что со временем все плохие люди получат по заслугам	Ressentiment
30	Life without work would be very boring for this person	Жизнь без работы была бы для этого человека очень скучной	Calling
31	This person always wants to be a winner	Этот человек всегда хочет быть победителем	Calling

Appendix II. Model Fit Information

	M1. Calling	M2. Humility	M3. Total model with one cross-loading	M4. Alternative Total model — with several cross-loadings	Cut-off values for a well-fitting model
AIC	32613.667	21210.254	65401.250	65332.312	The lower — the better
BIC	32826.097	21343.719	65970.041	65920.888	The lower — the better
Sample-Size Adjusted BIC	32689.524	21257.963	65604.786	65542.928	The lower — the better

Chi-Square — Estimate	71.031	25.471	509.695	432.757	The lower — the better
Degrees of Freedom	34	17	184	180	
P-Value	0.0002	0.0847	0.0000	0.0000	A well-fitting model should have an insignificant Chi-Square, but this is almost unrealistic with large samples
RMSEA — Estimate	0.032	0.022	0.041	0.037	0.6 (some authors propose 0.8) or lower — acceptable; 0.5 or lower — good
90 Percent C.I. for RMSEA	0.022 0.043	0.000 0.039	0.037 0.046	0.032 0.041	The Confidence Interval should stay below 0.05
Probability RMSEA ≤ .05	0.997	0.999	1.000	1.000	0.95 or higher
CFI	0.981	0.990	0.930	0.945	0.9 or higher — acceptable; 0.95 or higher — good
TLI	0.969	0.983	0.903	0.923	0.9 or higher — acceptable; 0.95 or higher — good
SRMR	0.022	0.026	0.035	0.031	0.6 (some authors propose 0.8) or lower — acceptable; 0.5 or lower — good

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Шкала призвания и смирения: развивая веберовский подход к исследованию избирательного сродства между религией и экономикой

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Авторы настоящей статьи развивают веберовский подход, в котором этика играет центральную роль в анализе избирательного сродства между религией и экономикой. Работа М. Вебера «Протестантская этика и дух капитализма» является одним из классических социологических исследований. В ней Вебер сформулировал вопрос о соотношении религии и экономики в том смысле, что определенные типы протестантских деноминаций способствовали развитию рационального капитализма. Одним из главных факторов, на который обратил внимание Вебер, была сформулированная в этике протестантов концепция призвания. Авторы данной статьи показывают, что вторым значением этической переменной, используемой Вебером в его социологии религии, является «смирение». Такой подход делает веберовскую теорию хозяйственной этики актуальной для изучения всех основных христианских конфессий — не только католицизма и протестантизма, но и, например, православия. Целью настоящей статьи является разработка методики эмпирического исследования, основанной на данной теории. В статье разрабатывается шкала измерения этики призвания и смирения, которая может быть использована в количественных опросах. Шкала была предварительно протестирована в октябре — ноябре 2017 года в четырех странах (233 респондента в России, Швейцарии, Грузии и Румынии). После корректировки по результатам предварительного тестирования шкала была применена в опросе прихожан четырех христианских конфессий в России (1262 респондента) в 2017–2018 гг.: православных, католиков, «традиционных» протестантов (лютеран, баптистов и др.) и «новых» протестантов (пятидесятников).

Ключевые слова: хозяйственная этика, шкала смирения, шкала призвания, ресентимент, Макс Вебер, Фридрих Ницше, Макс Шелер, католичество, протестантизм, православие

Max Weber on Russia: Between Modern Freedom and Ethical Radicalism

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The Weberian writings on the Russian Revolutions have been mostly overlooked by scholars, and treated as secondary within the large corpus of Max Weber's sociological and political texts. Nonetheless, they deal with a central question in Weber's work: the destiny of freedom in late modernity. While questioning the chances of success of the liberal struggle in Russia, Weber turns back to the moment in which modern freedom emerged in history, singling out the specific conditions that made it possible. Among these, a very central (although also very neglected) role is played by what Weber calls "a particular religious viewpoint." Instead of being a result of economic development (Weber refuses the thesis according to which capitalism is necessarily emancipatory and bounded to democracy), or of an idea of tolerance grounded on indifference (as a certain interpretation of liberalism would suggest), modern freedom has its central birthplace in religious radicalism, in particular in the puritan one. Weber seems to suggest that modern (that is, negative) freedom is born in a position of ethical intransigence, when religious *virtuosi* refuse to obey to political (i.e. worldly) authority in order to follow their own conscience, that is God's voice. In order to better comprehend this peculiar link, the article investigates the Weberian conception of modern freedom as it emerges from his writings on Russia, seeking to deepen the relationship between modern freedom and ethical radicalism.

Keywords: Max Weber, Russian Revolution, liberalism, religion, ethical radicalism, modern freedom

The Burning Question

Written at the end of 1905, in the summer of 1906, and in 1917, the three main writings Max Weber dedicated to Russia offer a sharp report of the revolutionary events that shook the Russian empire.[1] As his wife Marianne Weber related, he followed the developments "in breathless excitement" (Marianne Weber, 1989: 342): he suspended his work on Rudolf Stammler (Mommsen, 1989a: 5) and in a few weeks learned enough Russian to enable him to read Russian papers by himself. The result of this involvement is two long, dense essays, full of details and references, in which he tried to assess the chances of a

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1. Weber dedicated to Russia two more minor writings, "On Germany and Free Russia," published in Russkija Vedomosti in March 1909, and "The Russian Revolution and the Peace," which appeared in the Berliner Tageblatt in May 1917, as well as a speech for the 50th anniversary of Heidelberger Russische Lesehalle in December 1912.

liberal change in Russian society: "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," written at the end of 1905, in the middle of the revolutionary crisis, and "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Constitutionalism," finished in the summer of 1906, after the dissolution of the first Duma by the Tsar. They were followed some ten years later by another, shorter text on the revolutionary events of February 1917, "Russia's Transition to Pseudo-democracy."

Despite their historical relevance, Weber's writings on the Russian revolutions seemed to be condemned to oblivion. They received scarce attention in Germany at the time of their publication (in Weber's words, they found "no consideration"),[2] and they have continued to be overlooked by scholars since, and treated as secondary within the large corpus of Weber's sociological and political texts. As Wolfgang Mommsen noted in his *Preface* to the tenth volume of *Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe* (MWG), they remain "in the shade" [*Schattendasein*] (Mommsen, 1989b: VII).[3] More recently Dittmar Dahlmann, co-editor with Mommsen of the tenth volume of MWG, lamented the lack of a thorough analysis of Weber and Russia (Dahlmann, 2014: 82).

The marginality of Weber's writings on the Russian revolutionary events within the huge secondary bibliography on Weber's work is partly due to fact that they are largely considered occasional writings, being related to very particular circumstances and therefore lacking scientific value. Actually, Weber himself tended to underestimate his own writings, calling them mere "chronicles" (Mommsen 1989b: VII).[4] Nevertheless, starting from Beetham book *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics* (1974), the publication of the texts in two of the volumes of MWG in 1989 and their partial English translation in 1995, these writings have begun to emerge — at least partially — from oblivion. Both Beetham and the co-editors of the German and English editions have sought to highlight the theoretical and political meaning of these texts beyond their everyday political character: "His examination of Russian conditions is far more than a simple narrative

2. Letter to Friedrich Naumann, 17 May 1907 (Weber, 1990: 304).

3. Ignored for a long time by the Weberian *Forschung*, they gained a little attention mostly thanks to the Richard Pipes's 1955 article and to the second edition of the *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* edited by Johannes Winckelmann in 1958. However, the attention was mostly negative. They have been criticized as affected by "obviously wrong judgements" (Mommsen, 2004: 276), since Weber would have looked at the Russian events through the lenses of his interest in German politics (Pipes, 1955: 373). Furthermore, Weber has been accused of being unable to comprehend what was really at stake during the Russian revolutions or even to foresee the relevance of the Bolshevik turn (Aron, 1965: 120). Even the sociology of revolution has widely ignored Weber's writings on Russia, as it is the general view that his political sociology lacks a theory of revolution. See, for example, Peter Blau (1963: 309) or Theda Skocpol's work on revolution, in which, although she cites Weber for his perspective on political change (1979: 304), she ignores his writings on the Russian revolution (see Wells, Baehr, 1995: 22). For a different opinion, see Chazel (1995), Collins (2001). For a thorough overview of the current state of research, see Dahlmann (2014).

4. As he writes to Sombart, "they are not 'scientific works'" (Weber, 1990: 143). Weber conceived the first of these writings, "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," as a "few remarks" to the review, written by Zivago for the "Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik," of the constitutional draft for the Russian Empire that was developed by the liberal Union of Liberation (Sojuz Osvobodežnjia) and published some months earlier in Russian and French. The "few remarks" became something more, as Weber himself states that he wants to investigate the "bearers of the liberal and democratic movement" (Weber, 1995a: 41).

account; Weber seeks to uncover what is 'significant' about the 'general situation'" (Wells, Baher, 1995: 3).

Weber's intent was to examine the chances of the success of the liberal movement in Russia and the possibility of the instauration of liberal democracy; yet, as a very acute commentator of his work notes, Weber saw "much more than the Russian present in these texts" (Scaff, 1996: 532). The Russian events have a "universal-historical significance" (Mommsen, 1997: 2) for Weber, representing one of "the 'last' opportunities for the construction of 'free' cultures 'from scratch'" (Weber, 1995a: 111). Russia, together with the USA, appears to offer favorable conditions for the establishment of a liberal order, in contrast to Western and Central Europe, whose countries have already reached an advanced level of bureaucratization, economic development and social *Sättigung*.[5] Russia might in fact possess "the preconditions for a dynamic and potentially vast development, both economically and socially" (Mommsen, 1997: 2).

Among the detailed information on and references to the Russian situation, it is possible to find in Weber's texts the traces of an essential question, through which Weber looked at Russia and which shaped his own view: as Mommsen put it, "whether and to what extent it is still possible in late capitalism to affirm the principles of individual freedom and democratic government" (Mommsen, 1989a: 4). As Beetham has shown, the destiny of freedom[6] in late modernity "in the face of the increasing rationalization of life, and the bureaucratization of economic and political structures" (Beetham, 1974: 44) was a constant preoccupation for Weber, as it occurs "in most of his writings and speeches in the years 1904–1910" (Ibid.). As is well known, Weber saw in this increasing rationalization and bureaucratization the fundamental process of modernity which leads to a progressive reduction of individual freedom — well depicted in the image of the "iron cage" in the famous passage at the end of *The Protestant Ethic*. This is why, despite allegedly being mere "chronicles," Weber's writings on the Russian revolutions are filled with a mixture of pessimism and emotional involvement (Weber, 1995b: 232; Wells, Baehr, 1995: 2). They are "imbued with passionate participation" (Mommsen, 1989a: 14), since they deal with the question of the possibility of freedom "under the condition of developed capitalism and modern bureaucracy" (Dahlmann, 2014: 83).

Starting with the "burning question" (Mommsen, 1989a: 4), which scholars have already brought to light, this paper aims to push forward the ongoing examination of Weber's concern for freedom in his texts on Russia. In particular, I show how Weber addresses the question of freedom and the chances of liberal struggle in Russia from two

5. For a detailed analysis of this concept in Max Weber's work, see Alagna (2011).

6. Weber never gave a concise exposition of his conception of freedom [*Freiheit*]: the concept has no univocal definition in his work, entailing as it does multiple semantic dimensions (Beetham, 1974: 47–48). For the aims of this essay, I will concentrate on Weber's conception of modern freedom, whose key feature is that it entails a negative dimension (accordingly to Isaiah Berlin's dichotomy: see Berlin 1969), that is, a limit to politics. It is "freedom from compulsion, especially from the power of the state. In this sense the concept was as unknown into Antiquity and the Middle Ages" (Weber, 1978: 1209). This understanding of freedom brings Weber near the liberal tradition (Beetham, 1989). For a systematic exposition of Weber's concept of freedom, see Palonen (1999).

different — but not mutually exclusive — perspectives. First, I briefly touch on the manner in which Weber, from a realistic point of view, analyzes the social and material factors that could foster or impede the development of liberalism in Russian society. Then, I focus on the way he looks at the ideal factors underlying the liberal movement. In order to further our understanding of this level of Weber's argument, I focus on the first of his texts, "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," where his reflections on idealism emerge more explicitly. In particular, I show how, through genealogical reasoning, Weber turns from Russian contemporaneity to Puritan early modernity, tracing the conditions of modern freedom back to the moment of its genesis. Also referring to other writings of Weber's where the question of liberalism and modern freedom is dealt with, in particular his *Sociology of Religion*, a *Nachlass* of *Economy and Society* called "Political and Hierocratic Domination" and his most famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, I deal with Weber's argument on the peculiar link between Puritanism and liberalism. Finally, turning back to his writings on Russia, I argue that Weber binds the question of freedom to the possibility of ethical radicalism in late modernity.[7]

"The Tide of Material Constellations"

At the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber affirmed that a correct sociological analysis of historical and political change must refuse a mono-causal interpretation of reality, and must interlace material and ideal conditions: "It is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the preparation, but as the conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of historical truth" (Weber, 2001a: 125). From this perspective, Weber's writings on Russia have been considered the "empirical counterpoint" (Wells, Baehr, 1995: 16) to this methodological statement, since they show "the materialist side" of Weber's understanding of historical development, to which the "spiritualist" one of *The Protestant Ethic* can be juxtaposed (Scaff ,1996: 527). They help, therefore, to "erode further what remains of Weber's reputation as a writer biased towards 'idealist' explanations of social life" (Wells, Baehr, 1995: 22). In contrast to *The Protestant Ethic*, in the texts on Russia an analysis of material factors and in particular of class interests is prevalent. At the first level Weber judges the chances of a liberal movement from the point of view of the material interests of different classes and social actors in Russian society, looking for the factors that could promote the cause of freedom.

The main supporters of a liberal change of the autocratic state in Russia were the urban intelligentsia and the liberal landowners, who, in the years preceding the revolution,

7. I will not delve extensively into the distinction between *Verantwortungsethik* and *Gesinnungsethik* because they are later expressions in Weber's work (appearing for the first time the latter in the first edition of *Zwischenbetrachtung* in 1915, the former only in the last version of *Politics as Vocation*). At any rate, the expression "ethical radicalism" belongs to the field of the ethics of conviction, in that it refuses to make compromises with the world in the name of the rightness of its ideals: it implies an ethical intransigence in the face of the world. As we will see, in an important letter on this topic Weber uses a similar expression, "radical idealism."

had their core in the *zemstvos*, the organs of local government, "the most vital institution in Russian public life" (Weber, 1995a: 47). The *zemstvo* represented for Weber evidence of the falsity of the theories affirming that Russia was too immature for self-government.[8] But at the time of the revolution in 1905, the *zemstvos* were already very weak, since, starting from the last decade of the 19th century, their sphere of influence had been eroded by bureaucracy, and had become mere "passive associations" (Ibid.: 48).

Lacking an institutional basis — since the *zemstvo* were by that time too weak — the liberal movement also lacked a material basis. According to Weber, the bourgeoisie supporting the liberal movement was bourgeois in terms of their ideas and life-style, but not in terms of their economic interests: "From the economic point of view, the *zemstvo* liberals were in general 'non-interested' parties, representing a political and social idealism" (Ibid.: 45).

The liberal movement had even less support in the other social classes. The rising industrial bourgeoisie was explicitly reactionary, as it was only interested in maintaining order, and was able to achieve its own aims only by influencing the state bureaucracy. As for the urban proletariat, they could have supported the liberal movement provisionally but, apart from the fact that it was still very small, they were strongly influenced by social democracy, which was clearly contrary to the ideals of liberalism and individualism (Ibid.: 110).

Weber turns lastly to the peasants, regarding them as "most crucial to the [Russian] future political democracy" (Beetham, 1974: 186). Their importance is evident from the fact that agrarian reform was included in all the liberal reform programs. In particular, the liberals were convinced that, once their economic demands were satisfied, the peasants would give their support to the political part of the reform, that is, to a liberal transformation of society. Weber spends many pages contesting this assumption, showing how the peasants were far removed from both individualistic principles and an individualistic agrarian program. On the contrary, the demand for agrarian reform was not shaped in an individualistic form, but by the principle of "the equal right of all to a livelihood from the land" (Ibid.: 187), which founds its roots in agrarian communism and in the institution of *obščina*, the peasant village communities.

As Weber notes in his second essay, in which he analyses the tsarist regime and the tsar's response to the revolution, the liberal movement had not succeeded in obtaining substantial change: the Tsar had allowed only "the outward appearance of 'constitutional' guarantees" (Weber, 1995b: 153), giving nothing at the level of real power. The result was a "profoundly false" (Ibid.: 184) pseudo-constitutionalism: "The Tsar himself never sincerely intended the transformation of Russia into a constitutional state [Rechtsstaat], with what the October Manifesto rather naively termed 'real' guarantees of personal rights; for the Tsar there were only police interests" (Ibid.: 152–153).

The victory was, in the end, one for bureaucracy, since the only significant change was the reorganization of the Council of Ministry, which sanctioned the end of classic autoc-

8. A popular thesis in Germany: according to Mommsen, the aim of Weber's writings was exactly to contrast this opinion in Germany and to stimulate a greater opinion support (see Mommsen, 1989a: 45).

racy and the definitive stabilization of centralized control typical of modern bureaucracy: "Anyone can see at once what has here been created: the definitive bureaucratic rationalization of autocracy over the whole area of domestic policy, which today really calls for the expert, and that means, given the deficiencies of local government: exclusively the bureaucrat" (Ibid.: 177–178). Weber ascribes the weakness of the liberal movement in Russia above all to a lack of material interests on the part of the social classes involved. The liberal movement fails because no social class has a real, economically grounded, interest in it: "The forces of liberalism failed, Weber shows, because they lacked potent bearers (institution, social strata) to carry forward, and resources to sustain, the liberal idea" (Wells, Baehr, 1995: 23).[9]

Analyzing the various social actors and their material interests and their relationship to the cause of liberal struggle, Weber has to admit that we cannot expect that liberalism will be defended by economic interests: "If it were *only* a question of the 'material' conditions and the complex of interests directly or indirectly 'created' by them, any sober observer would have to say that all *economic* indicators point in the direction of growing 'unfreedom'" (Weber, 1995a: 109).

In this sense, Weber refutes the idea of an essential link between liberalism and capitalism: Weber argues that "the introduction of advanced capitalism could not be expected to bring liberal democracy to Russia" (Wells, Baehr, 1995: 27). Whereas at the time of early capitalism the economic and social structures showed an affinity with liberal values (although this affinity does not imply a causal relationship), at the present time advanced capitalism had "little in common either with individualism or democracy" (Mommsen, 1997: 3). Indeed, late modernity shows how advanced capitalism jeopardizes freedom. As he writes in "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," "It is absolutely ridiculous to attribute to the high capitalism which is today being imported into Russia and already exists in America — this "inevitable" economic development — any elective affinity with "democracy" let alone with "liberty" (in *any* sense of the word). The question should be: how can these things exist at all for any length of time under the domination of capitalism?" (Weber, 1995a: 109)

The Genesis of Modern Freedom

Weber's pessimism about the liberal struggle is grounded on his political realism (Davydov, 1995: 82–85); on the finding that "all economic indicators" were pointing in the opposite direction. Yet, in particular in "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia," Weber carries his reflection on freedom in late modernity to another level of abstraction, pertaining to the idealistic side of this process; that is, with the ethical resources that underpin the struggle for freedom and which are necessary for contrasting the stiffening and rationalization of life.

9. Weber maintains the same disillusion also in face of the revolution of 1917, of which he declares: "So far, there has been no 'revolution' but merely 'the removal' of an incompetent monarch" (Weber, 1995c: 252).

The last paragraphs of "Bourgeois Democracy" are drenched with a striking enthusiasm for the liberal struggle, and in particular for the "uncompromising idealism, the relentless energy, the ups and downs of tempestuous hope and agonizing disappointment experienced by those in the thick of the fight" (Weber, 1995b: 231). This idealism, stresses Weber, is "of the [same] kind" as the "political 'individualism' of West European 'human rights'" (Weber, 1995a: 65–66): in describing and applauding the radical idealism that fuels the Russian liberal struggle, Weber has in mind the "ideal factors" that have been at the origin of modern freedom in Western society. In this sense, Weber turns back to the moment in which modern freedom emerged in history, singling out the specific conditions that made it possible: "Modern 'liberty' arose from a unique, never to be repeated set of circumstances" (Ibid.: 109).

Weber maintains that four factors created the circumstances that led to the birth of modern freedom. Three of them are, according to Weber, material: the unexpected discovery of immense spaces in the New World, the economic structure of early capitalism, and the rationalization of life through science. The fourth is an ideal condition, which emerged from a "religious thought world" [*religiösen Gedankenwelt*] (Ibid.: 271): "Finally, there are certain ideal values, which, emerging from the concrete historical peculiarity of a certain religious thought world, have, together with numerous particular political constellations and in collaboration with those (aforementioned) material conditions, gone to make up the particular 'ethical' character and the cultural values of modern man" (Ibid.: 109). Here Weber is not so explicit, saying nothing about what type of religious thought world or what types of ideal values he means. Yet, shortly before in the essay, referring to the conditions of the "political 'individualism' of West European 'human rights'," he had already spoken of "religious convictions which rejected unconditionally all subjection to human authorities as atheistic worship of the creature" (Ibid.: 65–66).

To better understand what Weber means when he speaks of this "religious convictions," it is useful to consider that when he began to take interest in the Russian events he had just finished writing *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Scaff is thus right when he notes that the categories Weber used in his essays on Russia were precisely those categories he had elaborated shortly before in *The Protestant Ethic* (Scaff, 1996: 527). The proximity between this book and the essays on Russia, thus, concerns not only, as mentioned, their methodological approaches, but also their theoretical content. As Beyer-Thoma has stressed, "Weber employs his individualistic model, rooted in the spirit of political and economic liberalism, to Russia as well" (Beyer-Thoma, 2003: 285). However, while Beyer-Thoma focuses his attention on the main thesis of *The Protestant Ethic*, which concerns the link between a religious ethic — the Protestant one — and a specific economical behavior — the capitalistic one,[10] the more useful reference here is to another line of reasoning, whose traces can be found in the footnotes of the second part of the

10. Beyer-Thoma looks for protestant asceticism in Russia and reflects on a possible link between the Old Believers and modern enterprise. Although he affirms that Weber had not considered the Old Believers in his writings on Russia (Beyer-Thoma, 2003: 286), Weber dedicated a note to them, saying that "there are profound differences in their understanding of 'worldly asceticism'" (Weber, 1995a: 130).

book, where Weber tackles the link between a religious ethic — always Protestant, and Puritan in particular — and another sphere of life, the political. The question to which Weber refers has to do with the effects of the Puritan ethic on politics.

It is exactly here that one can find the "religious thought world" of which Weber spoke in the first essay on Russia: Protestant asceticism, and specifically his Puritan and Baptist version, built a specific relationship with politics in which political, that is, worldly, authority is refused. Puritanism is for Weber essentially anti-authoritarian and as such constitutes the ideal birthplace of modern freedom. As he writes in a footnote of the first edition of *The Protestant Ethic*: "The *religious* foundation of the principle of the rejection of all *human* authorities as 'idolatry' and a devaluation of the *absolute* subjection of the will which is due to *God alone* and his law . . . — this *positive* religious motivation for 'hostility to authority' was the historically decisive 'psychological' basis for 'liberty' in the puritan countries" (Weber, 2002a: 157).

For the thesis of the particular link between Puritanism and political liberalism Weber was influenced by the work of Georg Jellinek (1927), who had shown the effect of Puritanism on the idea of human rights11. As Riesebrodt argues, "Weber was particularly taken by Jellinek's claims that the declaration of human rights had a religious and not a political origin, and that the principles of the French revolution were actually the principles of the American Revolution" (2004: 38–39).[12] The idea was already present among Whig historians, who traced political liberalism back to Puritanism and whose works were well known to Weber. As Roth observed, "one of Weber's sources was the great historian Samuel Rawson Gardiner, who propagated the notion . . . of a 'Puritan Revolution'" (Roth, 1993a: 85). According to Roth, Weber was greatly interested in this thesis partly due to the "antagonism to France in Imperial Germany and the increasing hostility to the legacies of the Enlightenment in German culture" (Roth, 1993b: 22), as well as to the (related) "Anglophilia" among German liberals (Roth, 1993a).

In any case, for Weber, the relationship between Puritanism and liberalism is not linear at all, being more a *Wahlverwandtschaft* than a simple causal relation as asserted by Whig historians.[13] Weber's observations on the anti-authoritarian effects of Puritanism is part of a wider reflection on the relationship between religion and politics, and, even more widely, between religion and various spheres of life (Schluchter, 1979). This is the main topic of the "Zwischenbetrachtung," the short but fundamental essay in the middle of his *Sociology of Religions*.

11. According to Roth, "if Weber was provoked by Kiirnberger to misread some of Franklin's writings, he wrote *The Protestant Ethic* also under the sway of Georg Jellinek's *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens*" (Roth, 1993b: 20)

12. For this interpretation, Riesebrodt refers here also to Roth (1993b: 21–22).

13. As Walzer notes, for the Whig historians "the purely individualistic relationship of the saint to his God, the emphasis upon voluntary association and mutual consent . . . the extraordinary reliance upon the printed word, with each man his own interpreter — all this, we have been told, trained and prepared the liberal mind," while "Max Weber credited Puritanism with a rather different character" (1963: 61).

For Puritanism, and in particular the Puritan and Baptist sects,[14] its relationship to politics depends on a mixture of different elements. The first element is the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh, since the only one to whom our love must be directed is God (Weber, 2001a: 94, 182). This repudiation brings the Puritan believer to reject every homage to human authorities. An opposition between outer-worldly and inner-worldly (that is, political) authority is then introduced, according to the principle that "one should obey God rather than man" (Weber, 1953: 337).

A second element is the principle that God speaks to the individual conscience, without any worldly mediation. The certainty of salvation [*certitudo salutis*] "occurred through individual revelation, by the working of the Divine Spirit in the individual, and only in that way" (Weber, 2001a: 93). Obeying God means, therefore, obeying one's own conscience. Consequently, the principle to obey God instead of human authority entails the unconditional refusal of all state orders that contradict personal conscience, which is — if well interpreted — God's voice. Since every state interference in issues where only individual conscience should decide is considered illegitimate, "freedom of conscience [is demanded] as an absolute right of the individual against the state" (Weber, 2002b: 211).

A third element is ethical intransigence, since there is no adiaphora (Weber, 2001a: 248), that is, no ethically neutral sphere or action; every single act of every single day must be ethically irreproachable, since "every single sin would destroy every . . . merit" (Ibid.: 195). Therefore, the spheres on which worldly authority can legislate without being potentially in contrast with religious duties are drastically reduced[15]: demanding "the non-intervention of the political power" (Weber, 1978: 1208), Puritanism defines areas of social and personal life in which politics must not intervene.

The fourth element is an attitude of indifference towards others. The theory of predestination brings solitude and the individualism of the believer to their extreme, as the destiny of other people has been decided forever, and there is nothing one can do to change one's destiny. There is, therefore, no reason for coercing others to change their way of living in order to save their eternal life: "The consistent Quaker applies the principle of the freedom of conscience not only to himself but also to others, and rejects any attempt to compel those who are not Quakers or Baptists to act as if they belonged to his group" (Ibid.: 1209). Furthermore, the idea present in Calvinism that the glory of God requires the subjugation of the damned was "gradually superseded by the other idea . . . that it was an insult to His glory to partake of the Communion with one rejected by God" (Weber, 2002a: 206).[16] This makes coercion not only useless, but also dangerous for those who

14. For the peculiarity of the sect in contrast to the Church and its affinity to anti-authoritarianism see D'Andrea (2017). For its importance for the development of American civil society see Kim (2004).

15. The main field in which this contrast emerges is of course the war, the first political activity the believer refuses in the name of his own conscience (Weber, 1953: 337). It is however not the only one: see Weber (2001a: 111–112).

16. For the difference between Calvinism and Puritan sects see Benedict (2003: 246). The indifference towards others and the fear of contamination are the two elements at the origin of the sect, in contrast to the Church: while the latter is universalistic and intolerant, the sects are characterized by voluntarism and particularism (or exclusivity): see Alexander (1989: 112), Kim (2000: 207).

exert it. The Puritan believer, therefore, refuses political power not only to the extent that he or she is an object of it, refusing to submit himself to political power, but also to the extent that he or she is a subject of it, namely, he also refuses to exert political coercion on others (D'Andrea, 2017).

Here are the religious roots of modern freedom, whose peculiarity it is to entail a negative dimension, a freedom from power. This arises primarily as religious freedom, as freedom of conscience: "it is the most basic Right of Man because it comprises all ethically conditioned action and guarantees freedom from compulsion, especially from the power of the state. . . . The other Rights of Man or civil rights were joined to this basic right" (Weber, 1978: 1209).

Modern freedom is therefore born from a specific religious intransigence, an ethically grounded unavailability to political power; when religious *virtuosi* refuse to obey political (i.e. worldly) authority in order to follow their own conscience, that is God's voice. It entails a mixture of the devaluation of political authority, individualism, ethical intransigence and indifference towards others. These are the "religious convictions" to which Weber refers in "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" to explain the genesis of modern freedom. As he writes in a letter to Adolf Harnack: "Concerning American freedom I have a *completely* different opinion. […] We shouldn't forget that we owe to the sects things that today *we all* perceive as essential: freedom of conscience and most basic human rights. . . . *Only radical* idealism could produce that."[17]

Weber gives a very specific interpretation of the genesis of liberalism and modern freedom, one in which ethical intransigence plays a key role. This, however, has been partly overlooked by scholars. In descriptions of the Puritan personality as "based on a complex form of rational conduct, a form which combined purposive rational action with adherence to values" (Alexander, 1989: 107) (and was therefore at the origin of modern freedom and liberal democracy), the intransigent, fanatical, character of this adherence as a necessary element for affirming freedom is partly overshadowed in favor of a greater attention to other elements, such as the horizontality and voluntarism of social relationships.[18] Those scholars, such as Michael Walzer (1963), who insist instead on Puritan fanaticism, refuse to see in Puritanism the cradle of liberalism, opposing liberal tolerance and Puritan fanaticism.[19]

But it is precisely on this singular link between religious fanaticism and tolerance that Weber grounds the *Wahlverwandtschaft* between Puritanism and liberalism: here we can see an example of a Weberian "heterogony of ends" (Erizi, 2014), where actions aiming at specific goals produce unintended consequences. The most famous is the capitalist economy, born from actions of men not at all interested in making profit, but only in their

17. Letter to Adolf Harnack, 12 January 1905, Heidelberg; see Weber (2015: 422).

18. Among many authors who refer to Weber's thesis on a *Wahlverwandtschaft* between Puritan sects and liberal democracy see Alexander (1989), Kalberg (1997), Benedict (2003), Maley (2011: 121–145), Kim (2000, 2004). In the article of 2000 Kim focuses on the "ethical rigorism" of puritans, recognizing it as a fundamental element of Weber's conception of personality (2000: 210).

19. On the contrary, Walzer contends that Puritanism leads to self-control, repression, suspicion, in short, to a society characterized by terror, not by freedom (1963: 88; for a similar thesis see Zafirovksy, 2010).

other-worldly salvation. In the same way, liberalism was born from religious fanaticism: from people who strongly believed in one faith and acted rigorously to find proof of their eternal salvation, and who developed "a paradoxical attitude that seeks with fanatical zeal to renounce and, moreover, to transform this world for the sake of the other world" (Kim, 2000: 202). In this way, Weber rejects the idea that modern freedom — which means, as we have seen, negative freedom — is anchored in indifferentism or relativism: from a perspective that affirms the equivalence of different opinions — their indifference for political power — one that asserts, for example, religious freedom because religion is not an important matter. On the contrary, for Weber "it is not a vague tolerance but a fierce commitment to the individual which . . . makes freedom possible" (Alexander, 1989: 112). Religious freedom is asserted precisely because it is the most important matter in an individual's life, one about which the individual does not accept any compromise. "The autonomy of the individual became anchored, not in indifference, but in religious standpoints, and the struggle against all kinds of "authoritarian" arbitrariness assumed the proportion of a religious duty" (Weber, 2002b: 212).

Freedom and Ethical Radicalism in Late Modernity

Neither economic development nor religious relativism, but religious-ethical radicalism: this is the thesis of the genesis of modern freedom that Weber bears in mind when he analyses the chances for a liberal movement in Russia. Turning from an analysis of the genesis of modern freedom in early modernity to the fights for freedom in his contemporaneity Weber was looking for a similar, ethically grounded, radical idealism: "In fact [democracy and liberty] are *only possible* where they are backed up by the determined *will* of a nation not to be ruled like a flock of sheep. We 'individualists' and supporters of 'democratic' institutions must swim 'against the tide' of material constellations (Weber 1995a: 109; first emphasis added)."[20]

As Davydov points out, "Weber is not looking for chances for freedom in Russia where the so-called 'Realpolitiker' were looking for them (and of course didn't find them)" (1995: 81). It is neither in economic necessity, nor in material interests (Ibid.: 79), but in the *will* of a nation that the necessary condition to affirm and defend liberty lies.

In this sense, in contrast to the 'Realpolitiker', "the type of 'complacent' German who cannot bear not to be 'on the side of the victors', [and] can only look with pity on such a movement" (Weber, 1995a: 101–102), Weber affirms the greatness of the idealism of Russian liberals and applauds "the evident idealism and willingness to make sacrifices shown by these men, [something that] is one of the most ethically pleasing and estimable things that today Russia has to offer" (Ibid.: 45). In fact, he sees in the liberal struggle a radical idealism, a "desperate tenacity reminiscent of the age of Charles I" (Weber 1995b: 158).

Yet the longer the events went on, the more Weber must admit that the idealism of Russian liberals is not strong enough, and not rooted in radical convictions. For the Puri-

20. It is noteworthy that here Weber affirms his belonging to liberal individualism — the first-person plural clearly expresses it.

tan believer what was at stake in his claim for freedom of conscience and in his rejection of political authority was eternal life: by fighting for negative freedom, he was fighting for eternal salvation. In "a time in which the beyond meant everything" (Weber, 2001a: 102), this gave him the necessary strength.[21] Liberalism no longer has this strength because, having lost its religious motivational pull, it has lost its propulsive force: "This *positive* religious motivation for 'hostility to authority' was the historically decisive 'psychological' basis for 'liberty' in the puritan countries. However highly one may rate the historical significance of the 'Enlightenment,' its ideals of liberty lacked that foundation in those *positive* motive forces which were necessary to secure their continued existence" (Weber, 2002a: 157).

Weber, therefore, is forced to acknowledge that Russian liberalism is only an opinion movement, lacking a worldview that can provide the radicalism necessary to oppose tsarist autocracy. As he noted in the essay of 1917, after the defeat of the liberal revolution in 1905–1906, the urban intelligentsia abandoned the project of a liberal reform of the state, taking shelter in a romantic nationalism of Greater Russia, whose task was "the 'liberation' of every imaginable nation" (Weber, 1995c: 243). In the face of the failure of their movement, they just changed ideals and values to foster and defend.

In the circumstances of the Russian revolutions, there was another worldview, alternative to religion but playing a similar function and bearing likewise a strong idealism: socialism. Socialism is for Weber a surrogate [*Ersatz*] for religion (Erizi, 2011), in that it postulates a future of (inner-worldly) redemption, thus giving people the necessary radical idealism to fight against the world.[22] But instead of fostering individual freedom *against* the "tide of material constellations," socialists believe they are "borne along by 'material development' to inevitable victory" (Weber, 1995a: 110), being in this sense unable to put up resistance to historical necessities and accustoming themselves instead to "the unquestioning acceptance of dogmas." Indeed, it "drills the masses in the intellectual parade-ground step and, instead of directing them to an other-worldly paradise, which, in Puritanism, could *also* claim some notable achievements in the service of this-worldly 'liberty,' refers them to a paradise in this world, making of it a kind of inoculation against change for those with an interest in preserving the status quo" (Weber. 1995a: 110).

It is from the same perspective that Weber addresses the Orthodox religion: he wanted to see if the Russian religious tradition could constitute an anchor to idealism sufficiently strong to "swim 'against the tide' of material constellations."[23] In order to examine what kind of relationship Russian religiosity has with the world, Weber considers the

21. According to Weber the religious ethic has been the most powerful force against the "world as it is": it can be one of the most transformative factors in the world, because it gives enough strength, in the form of subjective motives, to act ethically in the world, which means to act against the world (Weber, 1953).

22. This ethical intransigence is Weber's target in *Politics as Vocation*: like every ethic of conviction, it is indifferent towards the consequences of its action and therefore inadequate to politics. Weber used this judgment to contest socialist revolutionaries during the 1918 revolutionary events in Germany. Nonetheless, even in *Politics as Vocation*, Weber recognizes the necessity for a good politician to interlace *Verantwortungsethik* and *Gessinunngsethik* (Weber, 1946: 127).

23. For Weber's analysis of the Orthodox church, see Di Giorgi (1996: 176–179).

Orthodox church and its relationship with tsarist autocracy.[24] Despite the absence of a consideration of the Orthodox religion in Weber's whole *Sociology of Religion*, in the *Nachlass* of *Economy and Society* Weber classifies the Orthodox church as a type of Caesaropapism, which consists of "the complete subordination of priestly to secular power" (Weber, 1978: 1161). Accordingly, in a paragraph of "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" Weber shows how, in contrast to Catholicism (in which the papacy constitutes a power able to counterbalance the secular one) and to the anti-authoritarianism of Puritanism, the Orthodox church works as "the religious foundation of autocracy" (Weber, 1995a: 64).[25]

In this sense, Weber does not see any ethical source capable of giving people the ethical radicalism necessary to take the fight against the tsarist autocracy in a liberal direction. Taken from this perspective, the Russian liberal struggle plays a fundamental role in Weber's view, as a warning to his contemporaries and posterity: the future of liberty does not lie in material conditions, nor will it be defended by economic interests; rather, freedom needs a strong, ethically grounded, radical idealism. This is something that Weber does not locate in the subjectivity of late modernity: rather, as he affirms in his *Science as Vocation*, disenchantment with the world and the end of transcendence seem to bring about a growing tendency for adaptation, the vanishing of the world's ethical tension, an "inertia of modern man, who fails to take principled moral action" (Kim 2000: 210).

However, because of this trend towards the depletion of ethical resources in late modernity, Russian liberal idealism has for Weber an important significance, regardless of its failure.[26] As Schluchter has pointed out, Weber's reflection on radical idealism in Russian writings will later flow into the category of *Gesinnungsethik* (Schluchter, 1988: 187). Although the word itself is not present, Weber speaks of "pan-moralism" (Weber, 1995a: 52) in order to describe the behavior of political idealism: that of those who "take the view '*fiat justitia, pereat mundus*' [and who say that] even if the masses reject all cultural advance or destroy it, we can only ask what is just, and we have done our duty" (Ibid.: 51–52). As Weber's later reflection on this category makes clear, a *Gesinnungsethiker* judges an action by its intrinsic value and not by its instrumental value. The "absolute rejection of the 'success ethic' here means, in the political sphere, that only the unconditional ethical imperative is valid as the guiding star of positive action" (Ibid.: 52). A just action has for the *Gesinnungsethiker* a value regardless of its consequences or its success. It may be

24. More generally, Weber was convinced that Russian religiosity had mostly developed into a mystical version of Christianity. "Mystic" implies that the refusal of the world that religious ethic produces takes the form of an escape from the world, an apolitical retreat from it, which understands the search of salvation in the form of contemplation and non-action (Weber 2001b, 323-324) — that is, something that does not bring about a transformation of the political order. According to Schluchter, Weber's interest in mysticism was prompted initially by his work on the Russian revolution of 1905 (1989: 129; see also Adair-Toteff, 2002).

25. Weber also refers to some radical tendencies of the low Orthodox clergy, which had shown an active reformism, clamoring for the end of autocracy and a program of social reforms (Weber, 1995a: 127). Weber shows how these tendencies unfortunately produce the opposite effect, since they reinforce the organic relationship between ecclesiastic hierarchy and state power. Indeed, the Orthodox church does not have an "Archimedean point external to the state": in front of the choice between "either depending on believers from below through elections or on above, hierarchy won't have doubts about this last choice" (Weber, 1989: 355).

26. For a similar interpretation, see Davydov (1995).

shown to him, argues Weber, that his action is useless or even counterproductive, but "for him — if he is really faithful to his convictions — this proves nothing" (Weber, 1949: 23).

This is the same attitude which Weber sees — at least in part[27] — in the Russian liberals, and it is the same argument that he uses to defend them against accusations of having failed: the type of "sated" German *Realpolitiker* may complain that the main ability of the Russian liberals is "to miss opportunities" (Weber, 1995a: 106). But this realistic observation does not prove anything, or at least not everything (Davydov, 1995: 86): "whatever may be the ultimate success of their work" (Weber, 1995a: 41), they have fulfilled their mission (Ibid.: 107). Judged from a realistic perspective, the liberals have failed. Weber is obviously well aware of this and does not abandon the realistic perspective at all. However, he recognizes that, from a *gesinnungsethisch* perspective, they can be "right" (Weber, 1949: 23). They have still succeeded in asserting through their actions the value of freedom, regardless of the consequences and success, despite and against the tide of material constellations. And, according to Weber, only in this way "can 'ideological' liberalism remain, within its ideal sphere, a 'force' unassailable by outward violence" (Weber, 1995a: 107).

This praise of ethical radicalism may sound paradoxical for an author who strongly criticized the radicalism of revolutionaries such as the socialists, highlighting their disruptive nature and their unsuitability to politics (Weber, 1946). Weber was of course well aware that ethical radicalism could lead either to fanaticism — Puritan believers, after all, did likewise — or to a "holy renunciation," as he writes in "Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" (Weber, 1995a: 52). Yet it is, at the same time, *conditio sine qua non* for the affirmation of freedom. As Weber himself writes at the end of *Politics as Vocation*, it is this ethical radicalism that gives subjects the strength not to "crumble when the world from [their] point of view is too stupid or too base for what [they] want to offer" and to say "in the face of all this . . . 'In spite of all!'" (Weber, 1946: 128).

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27. Besides these "extreme ideologues" (Weber, 1995a: 52), Weber refers to others Russian democrats, who support liberal individualism on the basis of a reasoning closer to the ethic of responsibility: they affirm liberalism by virtue of its consequences, claiming that it has an "educational" effect (Ibid.) on the people. Yet, even in this case, Weber must admit the failure of this perspective: the hopes of these democrats are grounded in an "optimistic belief on natural harmony of interests of free individuals, a belief which has now been finally destroyed by capitalism" (Ibid.: 66).

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Вебер о России: между современной свободой и этическим радикализмом

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Сочинения Макса Вебера о русских революциях в значительной степени недооценены в академическом сообществе и рассматриваются как вторичные в общем массиве веберовских социологических и политических текстов. Однако Вебер в них обращается к ключевому для него вопросу: судьбе свободы в эпоху позднего модерна. Критически оценивая шансы на успех русских либералов, Вебер возвращается к тому моменту, когда возникла современная свобода, и вычленяет особые условия, благодаря которым ее появление стало возможным. Ключевую роль сыграло то, что Вебер называет «специфически религиозной ориентацией». Свобода не является результатом экономического развития (Вебер отрицал представление, согласно которому капитализм ведет к эмансипации и связан с демократией) или же производным от идеи толерантности, основанной на индифферентности (как предполагалось в некоторых интерпретациях либерализма). Основным истоком современной свободы является религиозный радикализм (в частности, пуританский). Вебер предполагает, что современная (т. е. негативная) свобода возникает из позиции этической непреклонности, когда религиозный *виртуоз* отказывается подчиняться политическому (т.е. мирскому) авторитету, чтобы следовать своей вере, то есть голосу Бога. В данной статье исследуется веберовская концепция современной свободы, выстраиваемая в его работах о русских революциях в попытке углубить взаимосвязь между концепцией современной свободы и этическим радикализмом.

Ключевые слова: Вебер, Русская революция, либерализм, свобода, религия, этический радикализм, современная свобода

The Protestant Ethic in the Russian Context: Peter Struve and Sergey Bulgakov Read Max Weber (1907–1909) *

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The paper focuses on two Russian interpretations of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, the first written by Peter Struve, whose reaction on Weber's research was among the first in Russia, and the second by Sergey Bulgakov, who attempted a reinterpretation of Weber's concepts with their subsequent application to the conditions of Imperial Russia. It is widely known that Max Weber had a number of well-educated readers in Russia. The first was Bogdan Kistiakowsky who was directly connected with Weber's academic circle through his teacher, the prominent German jurist Georg Jellinek. Yet, this paper addresses the reflections of other intellectuals who belonged to the generation born in 1870s, including Peter Struve and Sergei Bulgakov and their younger fellows such as Semyon Frank who joined this intellectual circle through his older friend and supporter, Peter Struve. Despite the fact that Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* did not cause intense intellectual debates in Russia during 1906–1910, Struve and Bulgakov were those who responded to the main arguments, providing two views on this classic book. Peter Struve proceeds from the premise of the loss by modern Christianity (both Western and Eastern) of an effective, real faith in the Resurrection, and the consequent impossibility of true religious community. As a result, Christianity turns out to be an asceticism exercised outside this world. Bulgakov's analysis interprets the Weberian concept as a general model of the "deep idealistic enthusiasm" influence on economic life, and translates this reasoning into a pragmatic plane, that is, into the possibility of economic "pedagogics" and the rise of a "spirit" of a new economy as an alternative to capitalism.

Keywords: Max Weber, the New Middle Ages, sociology of religion, secularization, ethics of economy

Compared with other outstanding figures of the German academy, Max Weber attracted relatively little attention from the Russian public at the beginning of the 20th century. Neither of the two articles by Weber that were published in the German version of jour-

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Исследование выполнено в рамках гранта РНФ (№ 18-18-00442) «Механизмы смыслообразования и текстуализации в социальных нарративных и перформативных дискурсах и практиках» и поддержано из средств субсидии, выделенной на реализацию Программы повышения конкурентоспособности БФУ им. И. Канта.

nal *Logos* appeared in its Russian edition.[1] On one hand, this situation can easily be explained by the circumstances of that era, especially the forthcoming World War. However, Weber's name was seldomly mentioned in Russian discussions during the previous years as well since the most important figures of German social science for the Russian public at that time were Sombart, Simmel, Brentano, and Gumplowicz. Their texts were not just discussed, but actively translated, as was the case with the Russian edition of Sombart's *Modern Capitalism* which was twice translated and published with detailed prefaces. In part, Weber's poor representation in Russian publications could be explained by the deep immersion of his texts in the dense context of German theoretical debates since this circumstance made their reading and translation a difficult task. The huge interest in Weber would arise after his death as a reflection of the German interest in Weber's works, and following a series of Russian translations of his works in the 1920s.[2] Weber was known in late 1800s Russia to only a limited circle of intellectuals who were directly or quite closely associated with German intellectual life.

The immediate reaction to *The Protestant Ethic* (1904) within the Russian context was connected with the details of the domestic intellectual situation of the day and the issues that were then at the center of discussion. It has already been mentioned that we are talking about a rather small group of intellectuals, namely Peter Struve and Sergei Bulgakov, in whose texts both hidden and obvious responses to the Max Weber text in the first years after its publication can be found.

Both Struve and Bulgakov were among the most prominent and influential Russian intellectuals of the 1900s and the 1910s, especially Peter Struve (1870–1944). In the 1890s, Struve was among the founding fathers of Russian social democracy. He played a decisive role in the formation of a broad liberal political consensus in the early 1900s, and he sought to form a national-liberal policy in Russia in the second half of the 1900s. At the same time his importance, as well as that of Bulgakov who had been Struve's colleague in much of his undertakings, was not so much in the role of a political leader (here both Struve and Bulgakov were unsuccessful in real terms) as in the formation of an intellectual agenda, including the introduction of new subjects and ideas from Western European debates due to his active journalistic and publishing activities. It should be mentioned that for many years, from 1906 to 1918, Struve was the editor-in-chief for one of the most influential "thick" literary journals called *Russian Thought* (*Russkaya mysl'*). He also organized the publication of a number of prominent collections of intellectual essays, from *Problems of Idealism* (*Problemy Idealizma*, 1902) to *Out of the Depths* (*Iz glubiny*, 1918). Each of these collections became an outstanding "landmark" in Russian intellectual history, and significantly modified its public agenda.

If the intellectual evolution of both Struve and Bulgakov could be defined as a progress from Marxism to Idealism (and, later on, to the church; see the title of the work by

1. "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology" (1913, no 3), and "The Meaning of 'Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and Economics" (1917–1918, no 7).

2. See the works by mediaevalists Evgeny Kosminsky and Alexander Neusykhin, especially Neusykhin's translation of Weber's *The City*).

Kolerov, 2017), then their original interest of the problem of capitalism's formation and the role of religion in this process seems self-evident in this respect. It should be noted though, that their own progress in the above-mentioned direction was not a unified process; moreover, oppositions inherent in it were lined up not in accordance with the logic of the contradictions drawn later by historians of this line of thought.

There were several key texts that could be regarded as landmarks and, at the same time, as individual variants of this progress in the eyes of its participants as well as their contemporaries. First of all, it is a Preface written by Struve to Nikolay Berdyaev's book *Subjectivism and Individualism in Social Philosophy* (*Sub'ektivizm i individualizm v obshchestvennoj filosofii*), first published in 1901. Berdyaev's own book is deeply immersed in previous disputes with the popular ideology of "narodniks," and is a kind of continuation of Struve's *Critical Notes on the Economic Development of Russia* (1894), which ends with a scandalous call "to recognize our low level of civilization and go to the training for capitalism" (Struve, 1894: 288). In a comprehensive preface, which could easily have been published as an independent brochure, Struve formulates the general outline of his own philosophy of "idealism" which, he thinks, forms a more solid and thus better foundation for social ideals and the social movement more effectively than Marxism (1999a).

It is this striving that will find its form in the next two prominent publications. The first, in the collection called *Problems of Idealism* ("Problemy idealizma," 1902), will bring two groups of authors, the representatives of the academic community seeking opportunities and foundations for a new social movement, and recently-Marxist young intellectuals seeking to find a new theoretical base for their public commitments together (see Kolerov, 1996; Kolerov, 2002). The second landmark publication was a collection of essays by Sergey Bulgakov which was published in 1903 and titled *From Marxism to Idealism* ("Ot Marxizma k idealizmu"). It was designed not only to express the views that the author himself regarded as correct at the time of publication, but also to show the logic of the progress from Marxist positions to "Idealism," from attempts to protect Marxist theory from criticism through modifying it, and to the affirmation of the desire to reveal a truly solid foundation for the ideal of social change in these new views, which was expressed by Marxism, but could not find its own solid philosophical basis in Marxism (Bulgakov, 1997: 4).

At the same time, the political paths taken by Struve and Bulgakov differed significantly. If the former was progressing towards national-liberalism,[3] the latter preserved the socialist character of his views which were initially justified by idealistic reasons, then by the considerations of "general Christianity," and then receiving an Orthodox foundation in the proper sense of the term after 1909.[4] In the period before the Revolution, though, Bulgakov consistently attempted at the same time to distance himself from liberalism (both political and economic). These attempts differed only by a degree of their

3. On Struve's views from 1905 to 1908, see Kolerov, 2017a. On the concepts of "nation" and "nationalism" in the texts of Struve in the 1890s — 1910s, see Teslya, 2018b.

4. On Bulgakov's understanding of nationalism (in relation to Struve's views of 1908–1909), see Teslya, 2018a.

radicalism. One of the key differences relating to how the two intellectuals read Weber's writings concerned the idea of personality. For Struve, it is "a formal basis and a fundamental condition of morals developed slowly but steadily in humankind" (1999: 23) and therefore it gives freedom and autonomy; according to Bulgakov, the individualistic aspect of personality should be overcome.

The differences between Struve and Bulgakov's approaches will also lead to fundamentally different readings and applications of Weber's work to the Russian context. In Struve's views, the attention to religious issues since 1901 has been explicitly linked to the formation of modern nationalism, liberalism, and the logic of political rights and liberties. As early as Struve's first public political statement in the leaflet of 1892, he focuses on "freedom of the press, speech and assembly" as a "guarantee of civic independence" (2000: 26). In his article "What is the true nationalism?" Struve asserts, firstly, close links "between internal freedom, freedom of belief and external freedom, freedom of action" (1999: 23) and, secondly, the connection of "the idea of inalienable human rights" "with the great religious and cultural movement of the 16th and 17th centuries" (Ibid.: 24).

Relying on this perspective, Struve addressed *The Protestant Ethic*, after having waged a polemic on the lecture entitled "On the sweetest Jesus and the bitter fruits of this world" ("O sladchajshem Iisuse i gor'kih plodah mira") delivered by Vasiliy Rozanov at the meeting of the Religious-Philosophical Society on November 21, 1907, in Saint Petersburg. The central topic of the lecture was the relationship between Christianity and the secular world. In arguing with Dmitry Merezhkovsky and his doctrine of "religious community," Rozanov contests the latter's assertion "that the Gospel is compatible with sweet devotion to the muses, that it is possible both to listen to Father Matthew's sermons and to read Gogol's *The Government Inspector* or *Dead Souls*. . . . The message of Dmitry . . . consisted in the idea that the Gospel was compatible with everything that humans had loved so much in their culture for thousands of years" (Kolerov, 2009: 139). Rozanov, as is commonly known, metaphysically interprets "Christianity" as something radically opposed to the "secular world," incompatible with it (Ibid.: 149), and reconcilable only either through inconsistency or through the reduction of Christianity to a moral teaching (Ibid.: 147).

In making his case, contrary to the previous speakers, Struve joined Rozanov's understanding of Christianity. Having contrasted two types of asceticism, the one "practiced inside this world along with its recognition, and the one — practiced outside this world" (Ibid.), Struve went on in writing that "Calvinism has become the basis of the capitalist system. It happened so precisely because it began to exercise asceticism within this world. Through the natural psychological development of all the consequences of asceticism, practiced in such a way, it finally came to the well-known cult of economic activity and possessive individualism" (Ibid.: 163).

Here Struve, in spite of the previous remarks made by the Rev. Constantine Aggeev and the philosopher Sergei Askoldov, supporting Rozanov in claiming that Christian asceticism is a practice, "which was exercised outside this world, which turned its eyes away from this world" (Ibid.), continues by saying: "But the resurrection of the dead did

not happen, and mankind ceased to believe it. This is terrible, but it is a fact and a very important fact. The historical feat of Protestantism as a worldview is that it summed it up. He approved the fact that mankind ceased to believe in the resurrection of the dead" (Ibid.: 163–164).

In 1907–1909 Struve's political views had changed. The theme of "Great Russia" as a mighty foreign-policy power, feasible only if based on national unity and the highest development of its economic potential, attains the greatest significance for him. Therefore, one of the constant topics of his 1908-1909 articles later included in the collection entitled "Patriotica" (1997), becomes the problem of individual economic behavior. In the article entitled "Intelligentsia and National Economy" (first published in Saint-Petersburg's newspaper "Slovo" ('The Word'), No 622, November 16, 1908), Struve, for example, writes that "any economic progress is based on the replacement of less productive social and economic systems with more productive ones" (1999: 81). He goes on to insist that "this truth" "should not be understood "in a materialist way," as does scholarly Marxism. A more productive system is not something dead, devoid of spiritual dimension. Greater *economic performance* is always based on higher personal *suitability*. Whereas personal suitability is a set of certain spiritual properties: self-possession, self-control, prudence. A progressive society can be built only on the idea of personal suitability as the basis and measure of all social relations. If within the idea of freedom and individuality resides an eternal idealistic moment of liberalism, in the idea of personal suitability we have an eternal realistic moment of liberal worldview" (Ibid.).

The reasoning thus focuses on the combination of the economic order and the corresponding types of personal behavior. Struve asserts the interrelation of politics, the economy, and culture, strongly refusing to consider the latter as a byproduct of economic development while at the same time referring to some religious experience hidden under rather broad notions of "idealistic" and "spiritual." Developing this idea, Struve, who already has the forthcoming publication of *Landmarks* ("Vekhi") in mind, insists that intellectuals

> must understand that the productive process is not some "predatory" activity, but the process of creation of the very basics of human civilization.
>
> At the same time, the pragmatic, economically responsible actors of this process, those who occupy a "dominant" position within it, cannot think of themselves simply as representatives of group or class interests. *The interest is justified and its defense might be a cause of civilization only insofar as in its basis lies the idea of serving for the sake of public good*, understood as the realization of a well-known function which has a creative significance for the whole of society. (Ibid.: 84–85; italics are mine)

In his article "Religion and socialism" ("Religiya i socializm"), published in the eighth volume of "Russian Thought" ("Russkaya mysl'") in 1909, Struve addresses his understanding of the social role of religion and its prospects, noting that "ethics is essentially close to religion and serves as the intermediary link between the latter and politics" (Ibid.: 94). He continues to explain his credo when he writes that

> I think that current religious crisis is being replaced by a new truly religious worldview, in which old incentives of religious, Christian-born liberalism will rise again: ideas of personal heroism and responsibility complicated by a new motive, the motive of personal freedom understood as *creative* autonomy. It is no coincidence that within this old religious liberalism the ideas of divine predestination and divine grace were so strong. This liberalism has concentrated in God all the power of creative will. Contemporary religious consciousness cannot be reconciled with this understanding of God, man and their relationship.
>
> *Man as a cosmic bearer of personal creative heroism is the central idea that will peacefully or stormily, slowly or quickly capture the imagination of mankind, capture it in religious terms, and pour new powers into mortified private and public life.*
>
> That is my faith. (Ibid: 97; italics are mine)

The problem that arises within Struve's logic and which he tries to bypass is the conjuncture of "national economy" and "personality," since the ethics of economy, on the one hand, is based on religion, and, on the other hand, religion itself, not only in times contemporary to Struve, but also in the long run, is understood by him as a "private affair." So, for example, at the end 1909, he writes: "*Human is of course the main actor and decisive force in economic life*. The capital gains its power only if it is connected with the human. But if the Russian man had already developed the economic properties that the rich West is so strong with, the very question of increased attraction of capital investments to our national economy from outside would not be raised at all. The question of Russia's economic revival is, first of all, the question as how to create *a new economic man*" (Ibid.: 96; italics are mine).[5] He reacted to the publication of Russian novelist Alexander Ertel's personal correspondence twice, finding important material highlighting the links between religious consciousness and economy within the Russian modernity in these letters. Struve would write: "The main positive idea to be put against the 'ideology' of intelligentsia is the idea of a religion as life-constructing and life-consecrating element" (Ibid.: 245).

At the same time, during the debate on the above-mentioned Rozanov report, he stated that "mankind ceased believing" in the resurrection of the dead "and the entire Western world undoubtedly does not believe it. Maybe a part of the Orthodox world still remains with this faith. But another part of the Orthodox world has definitely lost it. Christianity has fallen away from this material faith in the victory over death, and attempts to revive it are attempts to revive something inanimate" (Kolerov, 2009: 164). He was admitting the possibility of such a revival, "but at the moment it is absent as a living potentiality within human life" (Ibid.). Hence his statement of impossibility of the "religious community," most directly formulated in 1914 in the article entitled "Religion and community," and his deep conviction that "pure religious consciousness should insist that

5. "Economic Programs and 'Unnatural Regime'" from the Moscow Weekly, No 50, December 19, 1909 (the article was included in the collection entitled "Patriotica"). Struve uses the phrase "new economic man" which is connected with the concept of "new men," which has been the key concept for the Russian intelligentsia since the 1860s, and was put in the subtitle of *What is to be Done?* by Nikolai Chernyshevsky. The problem of a "new man" formation included labor issues as well (see Paperno, 1996; Vdovin, 2017: 168–174, 240–245).

all social and public affairs in their significant part are indifferent with regard to religion" (Rozanov, 1999: 120), and that "the early Christians felt themselves as if they were living through the end of times. *This feeling cannot be normal in contemporary Christianity. For contemporary Christians and, I will say, for the whole of modern religious consciousness, religious aversion to the world is a turn inside oneself*" (Ibid.: 121; italics are mine).

The same set of questions but from another angle was treated by Sergey Bulgakov. He followed Struve[6] in his interest of Weber and addressed *The Protestant Ethic* no later than 1909, that is, more than a year after his colleague (Bulgakov, 1991, 2008a; Davydov, 1997, 1998: 121–149; Plotnikov, Kolerov, 1999: 103–107). Bulgakov immediately devoted his paper called "The national economy and the religious personality" to the problems raised in Weber's famous book. This paper originally existed as a lecture which he delivered on March 8, 1909, to the Vladimir Solovyov Religious-Philosophical Society in Moscow. Later in the same year it was published as an article in "The Moscow Weekly" (Moskovskiy ezhenedel'nik, 1909, no 23-24), a magazine edited by Prince Evgeniy Troubetzkoy and sponsored by the famous Russian philanthropist Margarita Morozova. The paper was structured in four parts:

In the first part, Bulgakov offers a critical consideration of a political economy's methods and epistemology. First of all, he scrutinizes the concept of "economic man" who scratches out "the living psychological personality" and converts society "into a sack of atoms" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 177; 2008b: 158). Following Struve, he puts forth as his initial thesis that "human personality is an independent economic factor . . . In a word, the *economy of the household is led by its housekeeper*" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 177; 2008b: 161; translation is modified).

The second part deals with the influence of religion on economy "because it is a factor in the formation of human personality" and should be "introduced in the realm of economic life study" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 177). Hence the subject matter of the research is asceticism (the work is understood to be its special case), since in "its practical meaning asceticism is an attitude toward the world, related to recognition of supreme, above-the-world, transcendental values . . . However, exactly as if due to its abnegation of the world, asceticism may — and with certain tension it inevitably does — win upon the world, as it is the case, by the way, with every profound idealistic aspiration" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 178–179; 2008b: 162). Note that Bulgakov in this last reservation removes the specificity

6. So, for example, in his paper which is of key significance for our analysis, "The national economy and the religious personality," included in the author's collection of *Two Cities* with the subtitle of "An inquiry into the nature of social ideals," Bulgakov wrote "Benthamism (the original one, and its later variety, *Marxism*) (Bulgakov, 2008a: 194; 2008b: 177). Such a judgment can surprise the reader all the more that in the first two articles, opening the book and having a principal significance — "Ludwig Feuerbach's religion of godmanhood" and "Karl Marx as a religious type" — Bulgakov asserts that Marxism does not have its own philosophy, and is entirely based on Feuerbach's "religion of godmanhood." In the said paper, "The national economy and the religious personality," this genealogy is not only forgotten, but a new one dating back to "Benthamism" is introduced without any explanation. The explanation can be found in the program article "The meaning of life," written by Struve in 1908 and devoted to Leo Tolstoy's 80th anniversary (Russian Thought, 1908, Book VIII). Here he interprets Bentham as "a true philosophical father of socialism" and gives detailed arguments in favor of this position (Bulgakov, 1999: 111–112).

of the religious "factor," regarding it to be the special case of every "profound idealistic aspiration" while the provision of "as if due to its abnegation of the world" is directed against Rozanov and his interpretation of Christianity.[7]

After a series of historical cases of Christian attitude to economics given in the second part, the third one focuses on "modern capitalism." After referring to Sombart's definition of "a key feature of this capitalist spirit" as "economic rationalism, methodical adjustment of means to ends" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 182; 2008b: 166), it turns to Weber's *The Protestant Ethic* with the story about "the intrinsic, historically established, link between Calvinism and capitalism" (Ibid.: 167).

The fourth and final part outlines the current state of affairs both in Russia and in the rest of the world asking about their future prospects.

Actually, this last part is of special interest for us since it allows us to see Bulgakov's logic in handling some of Weber's concepts. First of all, "the dominance of utilitarianism and the decline of personality" are interpreted as threatening "to cut back economic development" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 193; 2008b: 176). Particularly threatening this situation is seen for Russia, whose immediate task is an economic education of its people: "Benthamism . . . becomes, in pure economic sense, a factor of decomposition and harm, as long as it has an impact on the attitude of a person toward personal duties, as long as it destroys the moral discipline that constitutes a foundation for every professional labor; mere awareness of interests is insufficient ground for individual discipline" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 194; 2008b: 177).

Consequently, "Benthamism," which Bulgakov actually identifies with "economic rationalism" in Sombart's interpretation, is conceived as destructive for both capitalism and socialism: "Socialism, if it aspires to become a genuine, superior form of economy without losing what has been already accomplished, and to be capable of furthering productive forces, should be even more in disagreement with Benthamism. On the contrary, this form requires such a level of personal responsibility and self-discipline that it cannot be attained in the name of just personal interests but presupposes superior ethical culture" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 195; 2008b: 178).

Thus, the problem of economic pedagogics is at the heart of the problem, the urgent need for it is motivated, in particular, by the ongoing "slow but firm and inevitable (if all remains unchanged) economic invasion of Russia by foreigners" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 196; 2008b: 178).

Bulgakov closes his article with the following statement: "while pushing the goal of Russia's economic invigoration and renewal, one must not forget the spiritual prerequisites, namely, about the elaboration of economic psychology, which may emerge only through social self-education" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 197; 2008b: 179). It is rather telling that, although Bulgakov in his paper refers to the issue of "economic potentials of Orthodox

7. According to Rozanov's logic, Christianity, unlike other religions, is an abnegation of the world (see: Teslya, 2018). Struve, in his speech devoted to Rozanov, said that asceticism is actually inherent in any religion, having divided asceticism into two types (see above); in this case Bulgakov dismisses this distinction of Struve, claiming that any asceticism exists "as if due to its abnegation of the world."

Christianity," he boils it down to a brief remark: "Being radically different from Puritanism and Protestantism in general, in the aspect of the discipline of docility and "walking under God" (as well as dogmatically the same *Starobriadnichestvo* ["Adherers-to-the-Old-rite"]) it poses powerful means of nurturing and educating a sense of personal responsibility and duty that is so essential to economic activity as well as for all other types of service to society" (Bulgakov, 2008a: 191; 2008b: 174).

The most remarkable in the final part is the pragmatic argumentation that *de facto* refers to the very logic of "Benthamism," that is, "self-education" turns out to be necessary for utilitarian purposes as the goals of economic development justify the significance of the religious factor.

However, for Bulgakov himself, the contradiction may not have been as rigid as it appears in the eyes of an outside observer, due to the following sets of circumstances:

First, in these years and until his personal turn of 1922–1924, he will live in the perspective of a close, immediate, and yet-to-come already in the time of his own life radical religious renewal/revelation (Teslya, 2017), something that Bulgakov will later define in terms of the "New Middle Ages," which should replace the "Modern Age" (Bulgakov, 1989: 402).

Second, relying on *The Protestant Ethic,* Bulgakov tries to outline the logic of the new economic system, an alternative to capitalism, which should be formed as a consequence of a different religious ethics, thus "reenchanting" the world again. His own position, in contrast to the position of Weber and Struve, appears as the position of both an observer and a creator of this new reality.

Following this logic, Bulgakov, in his *Philosophy of Economy,* seeks to outline the framework of this new understanding, which he sees as an alternative to the "materialist" philosophy of economics that he identifies with Marxism understood as the most consistent expression of the political economy's worldview (1990: Ch. IX). The second volume of this work should have been devoted to the outlining of this new "ethics of economy," but it was not finished. Some elements of Bulgakov's view of this topic were given in his *magnum opus* titled *Unfading Light* (1917), which pretends to be the general outline of the whole of his philosophical system. From Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 3 of the Third book that are devoted to the problems of the economy, it becomes quite clear why the issue of development of the independent "ethics of economy" is removed by Bulgakov from the list of his priorities. He says that "economy does not have in itself any eschatological tasks that go beyond the bounds of mortal life of this age" (Bulgakov, 2017: 586; 2012: 380), and "Economy is only permitted by it [the Gospel] — it is reconciled with it as the burden of life of this age but nothing more" (Bulgakov, 2017: 587; 2012: 381). However, one point in this text is of particular interest: "economism," whose collapse Bulgakov sees in the Great War and declares to be "the magical kingdom from this world" (Bulgakov, 2017: 588; 2012: 382). This is the theoretical move which can be regarded as an attempt to turn over the famous Weber's logic of "disenchantment of the world": "Modern history has not succeeded, but precisely through this failure, through a deepened experience of good and evil, a general crisis of history and the universe is being prepared. And the failure of all

world history is also its greatest success, for its goal is not in but beyond its limits; there the historical element calls and compels" (Bulgakov, 2017: 588; 2012: 382).

Thus, we can see two types of Russian interpretations of *The Protestant Ethics*. On one hand, in his texts, Peter Struve captured the major problems of Weber's work, among them being the question of how is it possible to produce a sustainable economic ethics while at the same time remaining within the framework of modern religious consciousness complicated by an advancing secularization. For Struve, the answer lies in shifting the center of gravity to individual, personal models of economic behavior (and that is the reason of his interest in Alexander Ertel's letters). On the other hand, with regard to the Russian situation, this changing religious consciousness turns out to be a tool for personal development, drawing on the inter-related trio of religion, ethics, and law.

On the contrary, Sergey Bulgakov will read Weber's text in a more "expansive" mode, that is, not in terms of the emergence of the "spirit of capitalism" suited for Russian economic development, but rather as a general model of the birth of the "spirit" of a certain economic order arising out of religious ethics. Drawing upon his desire to build a "Christian socialism," he will raise the question of the possibility and necessity of producing a new economic ethic, combining pragmatic arguments and prophetic aspirations that are so typical of him.

No less significant is the fact that Struve did not find any actual resources for the formulation of some general ethics for the new capitalist economy. It seems quite natural, therefore, that he skipped this issue and moved towards the task of individual work on himself, that is, to the development of an individual worldview. This fact was also captured by Sergey Bulgakov, although in a curious way; contrary to his own initial formulation of the issue, he motivates the task of building an economic ethic in purely pragmatic terms with actual economic needs. In other words, as theorists, both Struve and Bulgakov demonstrate the impossibility of "repeating" the model of economic ethic whose genesis has been explored by Weber. Out of the bare necessity for such a model, even if it is accompanied by the general (however correct) understanding of the necessity to form such an ethic, it does not follow the possibility of its simple reproduction through the historical sequence of stages.

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«Протестантская этика» в русском контексте: П. Б. Струве и С. Н. Булгаков читают М. Вебера (1907–1909)

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Известно, что в России у Вебера было некоторое число хорошо подготовленных читателей — в первую очередь Б. Кистяковский, непосредственно связанный с веберовским академическим кругом через своего учителя Г. Еллинека, но также и целый ряд других интеллектуалов поколения 1870-х гг. и их младших товарищей — таких как П. Струве, С. Булгаков, С. Франк (входящий в этот интеллектуальный круг через своего старшего друга и покровителя П. Струве). В дальнейшем они образуют основной состав редакции «Русской Мысли», в отличие от русского «Логоса», где будет собираться следующее поколение, ориентированное на другие группы немецкого академического мира. Вместе с тем непосредственных откликов на «Протестантскую этику…» в России практически не было, она не оказалась в явном центре интеллектуальных дебатов 1906–1910 гг. В данной статье внимание сосредоточено на двух развернутых реакциях и интерпретациях «Протестантской этики» — со стороны П. Струве, который первым в России достаточно развернуто отреагировал на концепцию Вебера, и С. Булгакова, предпринявшего опыт переинтерпретации веберовской концепции и приложения ее к российским условиям. Струве исходит из утраты современным христианством (как западным, так и восточным) реальной веры в воскресение — и невозможности религиозной общественности, в связи с чем христианство оказывается действующим как аскетизм вне мира. Оптика Булгакова проинтерпретирует веберовскую концепцию в общую модель влияния «глубокого идеалистического воодушевления» на хозяйственную жизнь — и переводит рассуждение в прагматическую плоскость, возможность хозяйственной «педагогики» и образования «духа» нового хозяйства, альтернативного по отношению к капитализму.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, новое средневековье, социология религии, секуляризация, хозяйственная этика

Weber's and Sorokin's Analytical Treatment of the Russian Revolutions

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The roots and dynamics of the Russian collapse of 1917–1918 provide an occasion for considering the question of the lessons that modern sociology can draw from the "sociology of revolution" of Max Weber and Pitirim Sorokin. This paper reviews the relevance of the approaches demonstrated by Weber's "understanding sociology" and Sorokin's "sociology of factors" on the testing ground of the emergency and confrontation of various forces of the Russian political scene in 1917–1918. Neither Weber nor Sorokin set forth methodological guidelines for their analysis of the Russian revolutions and this paper does not intend to reconstruct their views on the basis of the comparative taxonomies of their categories and concepts. This paper identifies the reasons for the opposing assessments which Weber and Sorokin gave for the causes of the Russian Disorder of 1917–1918 and the consequences they have for their claims to comprehend the revolutionary situation. The paper highlights the circumstances that prompted them to free themselves from obligations to their own theories and to use the authority of science to promote plans for Westernization, i.e. the proposed reconstruction of the political and state institutions of Russia on the model of the leading Entente states. The paper shows that the limits of the Weberian analytical vision of the Russian political scene were due to his consideration of the events in Russia mainly through the question of Russia's further participation in the World War I and its consequences for imperial Germany, while Sorokin's views were constrained by the fact that he represented Russian political positivism and Russian political masonry.

Keywords: Russian Disorder, the sociology of the revolution, political ideology, political positivism, political masonry, pseudo-democracy, Bolshevism, political predictions.

Introduction

The centennial of the Russian political collapse of 1917–1918 provides modern sociologists with the opportunity to once again turn to the analysis of revolutionary utopias and the dynamics of leadership and bureaucracy. On this anniversary, it may seem strange (or indicative) that the "sociologies of revolution" of Max Weber and Pitirim Sorokin are weakly positioned on the pages of sociological and political science journals and publications.

In modern Russia, an appeal to Weber's "sociology of revolution" is latent or explicitly motivated by the question: is the threat of a new revolution in Russia real? According to Golovin, the main conclusion of "Weberian Russian studies" is that "Russian society has

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not yet completed its historical choice. It took Germany more than half a century to do this, from the transition to a political system of the Western type in 1918 and ending with the country's unification in 1990. How long Russia will need is an open question" (Golovin, 2017: 70–88). In the same context, Maslovsky analyzes the "post-Weberian sociology of revolution" and "Soviet modern" in the works of a number of Western sociologists (Breuer, Arnason, David-Fox among others) (Maslovsky, 2017: 1–5).

The appeal to Sorokin's "sociology of revolution" is motivated in the same way: "Is it possible, and how it is possible, that a new revolutionary tide is in our country?" (Kovalev, 2017: 55). The shades of this treatment range from premonition to "whether the Russian government finally pupates in the shell of mercenary interests and is unable to answer the questions that Russian society poses" (Chernysh, 2017: 94) to the announcement, although with reservations, of the arrival of a revolutionary situation in today's Russia (Ivanov, 2017).

Interest in Weber's "sociology of revolution" occurs against the backdrop of the "international reinterpretation industry of Max Weber" (Kaesler, 2015). The essence of this extremely active and persistent "Weber revisionism" Scaff defines as a "part of the struggle for the mastery of Weber, a struggle that is important since Weber is thought to occupy the central terrain in the social sciences. Whoever controls the interpretation of Weber can entertain hopes of also governing scientific activity" (Scaff, 1984: 191).

Without dwelling on the endless discussion of "Weber Studies" about the "correct" and "incorrect" variants of the compositional design of Weber's texts, we assume that his essay "On Some Categories of Understanding Sociology" is a methodological compendium that contains the original guides for all thematic sections of both the initial (1910–1914) and the revised version (1918–1920) of *Economy and Society*. His program essay, published in 1913 in the fourth issue of the international journal of philosophy of culture *Logos* (Weber, 1913: 253–294), was an explication of the title conceptual section of the prepared volume *Economy and Society* for the fundamental publication *Essays on the Social Economy*.

This essay, which has the character of a manifesto, contains the first systematic exposition of the categories of Weber's interpretative approach, regarding sociology as an analysis of structures based on domination. Following the path of scientific sociology, Weber was far from imposing a new classification of concepts: in the words of Kant, he put forward "a guide for creating this science itself." Edited and signed by Weber for publication, the text which became the first chapter of *Economy and Society* — "Basic Concepts of Sociology," is a reworking of, and addition to, the essay "On Some Categories of Understanding Sociology" in the context of its proposed publication of his *magnum opus*. We can only assume that the need for change was motivated by the prospects for the institutionalization of sociology in Germany, and in this article we will not dwell on the circumstances that prompted him to make such a decision. Weber himself noted that "compared to the essay in the fourth edition of *Logos* the terminology was simplified as much as possible and changed several times to be as clear as possible. Of course, the need for unconditional popularization would not always be compatible with the need for

maximum clarity of this terminology, and should, if necessary, yield to it" (Weber, 1913: 253). Here, Weber made it very clear that changes in terminology is the price that has to be paid for fulfilling the requirements of popularization, while potentially such requirements may be detrimental to categorical clarity.

The formula of the invariance of domination is given by Weber in the final part of the essay "On Some Categories of Understanding Sociology":

> The rational rules of an association, be it compulsory or voluntary association, are thus imposed or "suggested" by the one group for specific purposes (again perhaps very differently conceived among themselves). By the second group, namely the staff of the association, the rules are — though not necessarily with awareness of those purposes of their creation — more or less evenhandedly subjectively interpreted and actively carried out. A third group subjectively knows the usual application of the rules in varying degrees as far as is absolutely necessary for their private purposes, and the rules become the means of orienting their action (legal or illegal), because the rules give rise to specific expectations about the behavior of others (of the staff as well as of the members). By the fourth group, however, and that is the "mass," an action approximately conforming to the average understood meaning is "traditionally" practiced and usually observed without any knowledge of the purpose and meaning or even of the existence of the rules. (Weber, 1913: 293)

This formula defines the fundamental thesis of the sociology of Weber: "Only one thing is beyond doubt: evaluating any human relationships, regardless of their nature and structure, they should be considered from the point of view which type of people they give in the process of external or internal selection chances for domination" (Weber, 1922b: 479).

Kaesler, reviewing the publication of volume I/22-4 of the canonical collected works of Weber, entitled *Domination* (Weber, 2005), writes the following:

> Thus, he without hesitation proceeds from the ancient civilizations to the world of the states of his time, from tribal cultures, which were not yet studied, to the organizational history of remote monastic communities. For his comprehensive search for forms of domination, there are no boundaries, eras, countries, or cultures. It is in these texts that we meet not the "sociological expert" Max Weber, but the almost frightening gestalt of the early 20th century, as editor Hanke formulated in her preface to publication: "Max Weber meets us here as a universally educated scientist which, with systematic interest, confidently proceeds through world history, exploring the central phenomenon of human coexistence: domination. (Kaesler, 2015)

Weber himself used the concept of domination selectively and inconsistently, which raises the problems of whether Weber's analysis should be considered in the context of the German liberal political tradition and what connection between scientific views and political affiliation should be kept in mind. How realistic, for example, was Weber's position during the period when the question was raised about the principles of the political reconstruction of Germany? Turning to his works such as "Parliament and Government in Reordered Germany" (Weber, 1921b: 126–260) and "The Future State Form of Ger-

many" (Weber, 1921c: 341–376), it is difficult to understand whether Weber has in mind the principles that should be, from his point of view, most acceptable for the construction of the post-war state order of Germany, or the facts of political reality, more or less demonstrable and predictable.

"The Sorokin revival" is also marked by a certain dominance — Sorokin is represented as the champion of the "Russian sociological tradition," which, by definition of Sandstrom, "offers a half-way point between either accepting sociological evolutionism as a law-like generalization describing human social change or as a universal ideology that relies on the excesses of scientism to define our imaginative place in the cosmos" (Sandstrom, 2008: 613). According to Nichols, "the Russian stylistic elements" of Sorokin's manner of doing sociology includes "four stylistic features, namely, encyclopedism, polemics, a prophetic posture and a popular or public genre" (Nichols, 2012: 378).

Sorokin himself attributed his main works of the Russian period — *The System of Sociology* and *The Sociology of Revolution* — to behaviorism (Sorokin, 1926). The guiding principles of the Sorokin's variant of behavioral sociology were as follows: sociology can and should be structured as the natural sciences, every normativism should be banished from sociology, it should be an experienced, objective discipline (Sorokin, 1920: IX–XI).

Due to the emphasis on the relationship between stimuli and reactions and on observed behavior, behaviorism was particularly suitable for the various classifications of social interaction offered by Sorokin, giving them the appearance of an exact, objective science. However, such classification systems do not directly explain anything, mainly because they cannot be used to provide problem-oriented explanations in specific areas of sociological analysis. Therefore, it is difficult to detect traces of Sorokin's classification of forms of social behavior in his *Notes of the Sociologist* and *Sociology of the Revolution*.

In Sorokin's explanation of the driving forces of revolution is a whole taxonomy of the psychological features of the actors of the revolutionary process, mainly of a negative nature. In a certain sense, Sorokin's behavioral psychologism resembles the psychological reductionism of Michels, who considered human nature as an organic source of the natural propensities of the masses: the need for leadership, gratitude to leaders, etc. (Michels, 1925: 33).

Sorokin and Michels also proceeded from the ethical formulation of the problem of "ideal democracy," therefore Weber's criticism of Michels's position on this problem may well be attributed to Sorokin. According to Weber, ideal democracy is a historical fiction, and the alleged desire to eliminate the domination of man over man is an intellectual fallacy (Weber, 1908). As Weber wrote to Michels, "the concept of domination [Herrschaft] does not become clear in your work. Your analysis of [this] is too simple" (Weber, 1911). Thus, we can see significant disagreements about the central issues of political sociology: if for Michels it was "democracy," then for Weber it was "domination."

Later, in his autobiography, Sorokin wrote: "Already World War I had made some fissures in the positivistic, "scientific," and humanistic Weltanschauung I had held before the War. The Revolution of 1917 enormously enlarged these fissures and eventually shattered this world-outlook with its positivistic philosophy and sociology, its utilitarian sys-

tem of values, and its conception of historical process as a progressive evolution toward an ever better man, society, and culture" (Sorokin, 1963: 204).

Here the question inevitably arises, which Kovalev asks:

> To what extent can one be guided by Sorokin's practical and scientific experience here? Sorokin, as you know, in his approach to the revolution adhered to the behavioral interpretation: "Revolution is first of all a certain change in the behavior of members of society, on the one hand, and their psyche and ideology, beliefs and beliefs, morality and assessments on the other." But revolutions have such a feature: in hindsight, they appear to be completely inevitable. But in the current reality they always happen unexpectedly for contemporaries. That is, most often the revolutionary events were not predicted Sorokin. (Kovalev, 2017: 54–76)

The answer to the question of how much one can be guided by Sorokin's "practical and scientific experience" lies on a different plane: despite the well-known differences between "scientific" forecasting and "practical" foresight, in both cases the utility of political predictions does not depend in principle on their reliability. In other words, they are united by the fact that a political forecast or foresight can be arbitrarily false, but at the same time very effective in terms of the goals of political actions.

Although Sorokin's efforts to comprehend the laws of Russia's political development and to make predictions, the prospects of "revolution" were unsuitable from a scientific and prognostic point of view; they may have played an instrumental role, fueling the mood of revenge among Russian immigrants. As such attitudes faded away, the attention to his "sociology of revolution" gradually disappeared.

It should be taken into account that in journalistic and scientific works about the life and activities of Sorokin of the Russian period, information is often unreliable. As Glotov writes in his article, which was the best publication of the journal *Sociological Studies* in 2012, "inconsistencies and discrepancies in the presentation of the biography of the Russian period of Sorokin's life indicate that in the history of Russian sociology not enough attention is paid to documentary and archival materials. Unfortunately, despite the increased interest in the scientific activity of Sorokin, there are no special works devoted to a reliable description of his biography and a critical analysis of sources" (2012: 138–144).

In this regard, one of the critically important but unexplored aspects of Sorokin's role in creating the Russian collapse of 1917–1918 is his work in the secretariat of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, although little is known about his real influence on decision-making by the Provisional Government at various stages of its transformation. Researchers made great efforts to uncover the details of Sorokin's life, but if they mention this aspect of his political activity, then it is only to dismiss it as an unfortunate episode and to be content with very superficial, and sometimes simply unintelligible, explanations as "secretary of science," "personal secretary," etc. (Johnston, 1998: 7; Finkel, 2005: 158; Lomonosova, 2006: 56; Kovalev, 2017: 58; Sapov, 2017: 19).

The Political Worldview of Weber and Sorokin and the Limits of Their Analytical Vision of the Russian Disorder 1917–1918

Anyone who studies the sociological works of Weber, from the very beginning, is faced with the methodological problem mentioned above: should they be considered in the context of the German liberal political tradition, and what connection between scientific views and political affiliation should be kept in mind? German liberalism had its own special destiny, due to the defeat in 1848, the surrender to Bismarck in the 1850s, the emergence of "national liberalism" in the 1870s, and the location between the hammer and the anvil of the imperial political scene — the Marxist social democracy and politically dominant Junkers until the collapse of the empire in 1918. This fate, undoubtedly influenced the character of Weber's liberalism and determined the boundaries within which the transformation of his political outlook into sociological concepts took place.

Throughout 1916–1917, despite all attempts by Weber to find his place in German politics, he remained an outsider, although he did not dramatize his "political inapplicability" (Weber, 1984: 580–581). In a report at the meeting of the Progressive People's Party (*Fortschrittliche Volkspartei*) in Munich in 1916, Weber referred to his membership of the nationalist Pan-German League (*Alldeutscher Verband*), but only in order to say ironically that he was not involved in the activities of this political organization (Weber, 1988c: 158). "I have always considered politics only from a national point of view," declared Weber, "not only external, but also any policy in general" (Ibid.).

Weber belonged to the class of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie, which created the world capitalist economy of the 19th century. On both sides his family were the well-known Anglo-German clans of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which conducted import-export and transport operations throughout the world (Roth, 2002: 509–520).

Since his inaugural professorial speech at the University of Freiburg (1895), Weber professed the conviction that the national long-term interests of Germany are threatened by three main dangers: the preservation of political domination in the hands of the economically dying class of Junkers, the fatal political immaturity of the German bourgeoisie and the strengthening of Russia (Weber, 1988b: 24–26). In 1916, this belief was actualized in the form of a geopolitical theory, according to which "the threat from Russia is the only one that is directed against our existence as a national power (*nationaler Machtstaat*) as such, not only in economic and political, but also in the cultural area" (Weber, 1988c: 168–169).

For Weber, the February coup d'état in Russia was a complete surprise: "Even those who are better informed on the situation than I am had serious doubts as to whether the Tsar would be overthrown during the war" (Weber, 1988f: 197). Considering the hopeless, from the point of view of the overthrow of the tsarist regime, balance of anti-regime and conservative forces in Russia, Weber declared: "For all that, revolution appeared extremely improbable. The fact that revolution has come after all is due, as well as to success of our army, to the purely personal conduct of the Tsar" (Ibid.: 201).

Considering the stakes of the geopolitical game in which Germany and Russia were drawn, one could expect a more consistent analysis from a theorist such as Weber. He relied, in many respects, on biased sources of information and his intuition, while continuing to dream of an alliance with Great Britain based on the "common spiritual interests" (Weber, 1988a: 585–586).

According to Paddock, "in spite of attempts to be "objective," many of his views reflected vague "Orientalist" prejudices about Russia" (Paddock, 2010: 77). Paddock means the group of historians and publicists of the second wave of Baltic-German immigration (Rohrbach, Schiemann, Haller and others), influential in German society and the ruling circles of Germany, who in their numerous Russophobic works justified the need to weaken or destroy the Russian empire, which allegedly threatened European civilization. According to their theory, Russia was not a historically established single state, but was an unnatural conglomerate of peoples held together by "Tatar" despotism. Only the dismemberment of Russia into its "natural," historical and ethnographic components could permanently save Germany from the Russian menace (Andreeva, 2015: 101–105). Their recommendations are embodied in the politics of the "revolutionizing" of Russia pursued by the German political and military leadership during the First World War on the basis of the support of social and ethnic opposition forces in order to destroy the Russian political regime.

Like most "orientalists," Weber did not considered Russia to be part of Europe or even to have participated in the historical development of Western civilization. A comparison of Weber and Baltic German agitators would be fruitful, because their writings display interesting similarities regarding the cliché of "the Russian menace." Although this paper's space does not permit further analysis of this, it is necessary to dwell on the controversial Hoetzsch-Haller case (Hellmann, 1975: 442–457) which reveals Weber's way of selecting political information.

Hoetzsch, who belonged to the most significant and influential specialists in Russian affairs of the period of the late German empire and Weimar republic, demanded the recognition of Russia as a historical-political individuality, which had developed according to its own laws and the needs of its idea of state and its people's nature. But worst of all for the Baltic German "orientalists" was that Hoetzsch professed an unshakable conviction that pitting German world politics against Russia was dangerous mistake and that the German Reich needed Russia's support against their Anglo-Saxon rival (Liszkowski, 1986: 215–239).

Haller, who was an ignorant dilettante in matters of Russian history and had never before done any scientific research on Russia, published a passionate political pamphlet accusing Hoetzsch of helping the enemy and calling him "the Russian danger in the German home." The statements of Haller were supported by Baltic German professors and publicists, but also met Weber's approval even though Hoetzsch "dismissed Haller's ignorance of Russian historical literature and numerous errors, exaggerations, distortions and misjudgments, and had 'executed his opponent with thoughtful thoroughness'" (Ibid.: 236).

As Weber wrote, "the work is an attack on the book by and also on the activities of Prof. Hötzsch for the Kreuzzeitung. It is indeed astonishing that a man who has frequently been to Russia, and whose book makes considerable claims for itself, should demonstrate such a complete ignorance of decisive political party groupings as in fact is the case in this book, which is shallow in every respect, and cannot be taken seriously as a source of political information" (Weber, 1921a: 110).

This episode clearly showed that the point was not the absence of reliable information about Russian affairs, as Weber has repeatedly said, but its filtering based on political preferences. In 1917–1918, tectonic changes in the geopolitical landscape of Europe showed how much he was mistaken in this existential question for Germany and Russia.

Partly because of his informational selectivity and partly because of the unavailability of documentary evidence of the intervention of Anglo-American financial and political elites in Russian politics with the conscious intent to create a political regime, which they could then set up as a tool for their world geopolitical interests, Weber erroneously assessed the alignment of political forces on the Russian and world political scene.

This is to say that although the Anglo-American financial and political elites did not create or bring about the two revolutions in Russia, they nonetheless created the conditions under which their two-step scenario could appear. Without such planned support on the part of the Anglo-American elites, along with finance from Imperial Germany, there would have been no Kerensky and no Lenin or Trotsky. The political dynamism of the Bolshevism owed its success to a general state of instability in Russia, which was engineered by the Anglo-American elites.

Whether there were two consecutive scenarios of the Russian collapse here, or the February and October coups of 1917 in Russia were not internally interconnected — the answer to this question illuminates both the ideological and theoretical roots of the "sociology of the revolution" of Weber and Sorokin.

Just like Weber, Sorokin also did not pay the slightest attention to those geopolitical actors who determined the place of Russia and Germany in the "new world order," although for other reasons. The limits of his political analysis were predetermined by the fact that he represented both Russian political positivism and Russian operational political masonry. The theoretical background of Sorokin in 1917–1918 was a creative mix of the theories of his teachers and mentors Kovalevsky (the theory of factors), de Roberti (biosocial theory) and Petrazhitsky (psychological theory), who were the father-founders and leaders of Russian speculative masonry in 1906–1916.

Political positivism provided the ideological component of Russian political masonry. Sorokin took an active part in the development of the program documents of political masonry, being attracted to this activity by Kerensky, the Secretary General of the masonic "Supreme Council of the Peoples of Russia," long before the February coup (Norton, 1983: 257). The nomenclature of "pseudo-democracy," its institutions in various sectors of government and legislation were formed by the shadow organization of Russian political masonry of 1917, whose creditworthiness depended on the decisions of the financiers of the United Kingdom and the United States. The ideology of "democratization," advocated

by Sorokin, was closely connected with plans for "westernization," i.e. the alleged formation of political and state institutions in Russia on the model of the leading Entente countries.

Sorokin was more knowledgeable than Weber about the nature of the democratic interlude, since he himself was one of its key actors. Therefore, he did not hesitate to stop his behaviorist sociology from being a "precise and experienced" science as soon as it came to the forces and actors in the unprecedented diplomatic, military and financial campaign of the Anglo-American establishment in Russia.

As noted earlier, for Weber the February coup d'état was a complete surprise. It is unlikely that Weber realized that the British coordinated the preparation and implementation of the coup d'etat in Russia by a shadow military-industrial clique and had information on its specific time. Unlike his previous studies on the fate of Russian democracy, this time Weber considered the events in Russia mainly through the prism of the question of Russia's further participation in World War I and its consequences for Germany. As soon as the Provisional Government (11 of its 12 members were political masons) published on March 27 (April 9) 1917 an "Appeal to Citizens" on the objectives of foreign policy, followed by the so-called note by Foreign Minister Milyukov expressing confidence in the victorious end of the present war, Weber suspected fraud in the Russian pseudo-democracy. Since Weber considered the parliamentarization and federalization of the political system to be the key tasks of building democracy, he analyzed from this point of view the entire spectrum of Russian political forces. The methodological basis of this analysis was the well-known scheme of his theoretical sociology: "classes," "status," and "parties" are phenomena of the distribution of power within a community (Weber, 1980: 531).

After discussing the prospects of Russian "democratization," *pro et contra*, Weber wrote: "As long as the situation remains as it is, the Social Democrats and Socialist-Revolutionaries can only play the role of 'driven' and in this quality they are tolerated because they mislead the masses about the 'revolutionary' nature of the government" (Weber, 1988f: 116). This characteristic — "can only play the role of 'driven'" — is key: this type of political regime can be kept in the saddle if the relevant performers are found and financial channels for ensuring their activities are created (Weber, 1988f: 120).

Weber, who assessed the "financial channels" for the ensuring political activities in the light of ideas about the investment feasibility based on a sample of the 19th century, was mistaken about the goals of international financial capital at the beginning of the 20th century. He believed that "any well-trained bourgeois organizer, even with a completely empty wallet, will receive credit — and, probably, being a well-paid agent of American capitalists, will inevitably receive it easier than a socialist (i.e, bureaucratic) apparatus" (Weber, 1921c: 351).

The goals of the geopolitical struggle for the "new world order" were shown by his American counterpart Thorstein Veblen, with whose works he was well acquainted. It can be assumed that the main reasons for this originated not only in the philosophical and epistemological foundations of the social theories of Weber and Veblen, but also in their understanding of the causes and consequences of crises between 1914 and 1920, which

was the peak of their intellectual and public activity. It is possible that the work "Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution" (Veblen, 1915) had a negative effect: he argued that the modern German economy in a mature form was imported from England and installed in the German quasi-feudal "dynastic" state system. In this symbiosis of industrial technology and dynastic rule, Veblen saw a particular threat to democracy.

Veblen believed, with grounds, that one should fear this explosive mixture of the German feudal hierarchical order and the highest level of technological development, primarily because the development needs of industrial technologies and industrial production inevitably conflict with the institutional foundations of this system, awakening an aberrant-type worldview, threatening to transform the entire social body of Germany beyond recognition.

The works of Veblen reflected the events of the initial period of the creation of the Anglo-American financial oligarchies of a "new world order" with the use of the routine strategy of identifying and supporting indigenous radical movements, which in the conditions of directed economic collapse are brought to power and using various methods are pushed along the path of internal conflict and military aggression.

The script for the strategists of the Anglo-American establishment for Russia was that when the Provisional Government, under the pretext and with the policy of "democratic modernization," would plunge Russia into chaos, it would be time to play the Bolshevik card and draw the country into a civil war that would forever bury the fantasy of the Russian plutocracy of "sovereign Russia." Kerensky, having successfully fulfilled his mission as the "grave-digger of young Russian freedom" (Weber, 1988e: 333), left Russia with the help of British intelligence. Lenin and his clique of "professional revolutionaries" were called onto the political stage as the main performers.

The "political program" of the Provisional Government, the creation of which Sorokin took an active part in, launched the processes of degradation and chaos in all sectors of the economy, public administration, the military sphere and Russia's foreign policy. The masonic political plan worked with extraordinary destructive force. As the military commissar of the Provisional Government in May-September 1917, Stankevich testified, first of all that the power had fallen apart: "It has disintegrated already a long time ago, right after revolution" (Stankevich, 1920: 115).

The liberal democratic interlude, which ended in the Disorder of 1917–1918, was a reflection of the failed attempts of political masonry to unite the interests of various groups of the large industrial-commercial and financial bourgeoisie, the petty urban and rural bourgeoisie, and the *raznochinstvo* on the ruins of the socio-political system of imperial Russia. The task, risky enough from any point of view, was to cause chaos in the country to prepare the ground for the cultivation of the dictatorship, which the puppet clique of Kerensky tried to undertake in several stages. The fact that the policy of the Provisional Government, or more precisely of the triumvirate of the leaders of Russian political masonry — Kerensky, Nekrasov and Tereshchenko, crashed, and made a steep transition to surrender to the Bolsheviks (Milyukov, 1991: 473), was an obvious fact, regardless of post factum explanations.

Weber's assessment of the accession of Bolshevism in Russia depended entirely on his vision of the prospects for concluding peace "with the one who offers a guarantee of loyal fulfillment of its conditions, by whomsoever he was" (Weber, 1988d: 292). The problem, he believed, was that since Bolshevism would not last more than a few months in power, peace with it gives weak guarantees for the future government of Germany. Weber gave such a prediction because he considered the Bolshevik's rule as "the dictatorship of an insignificant minority relying on an army tired of war, which inevitably is a purely military dictatorship, only a dictatorship not of generals, but corporals" (Weber, 1988d: 292). Contrary to Weber's considerations, the shock force of the Bolsheviks was not a "war-tired army," but the decaying reserve garrisons located in all the major cities of Russia, who first of all secured guarantees not to be sent to the front.

According to Weber, it did not matter which ideology the St. Petersburg leaders of the soldier proletariat (even sincerely) were guided by: "They wait and require only one — salaries and booty" (Weber, 1988d: 292). It is amazing how a theorist of such a high rank as Weber could be satisfied with such superficial and popular explanations, having in his theoretical arsenal such first-class concepts as domination, charismatic leadership, political sect, legitimacy, economic and social order.

Unlike Weber, who was an outsider in relation to the institutions of power, Sorokin was the leader of the right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and a member of the secretariat of the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, in which, apparently, he was in charge of ideology and domestic politics. On the basis of available documents, it is difficult to judge whether Sorokin really played the role of the "second person in Kerensky's short-lived government," as Johnston defined him (Johnston, 1999: 14), but his influence on the course of the Provisional Government in some areas was significant, especially on the question of the continuation of the war.

The style and terminology of the approach of Sorokin to the explanation of political events in Russia 1917–1918 was attributed to his characteristic mixture of scientific logic and fiction, while simultaneously combining schemes of positivism and the speculative history of politics. Sorokin himself insisted that "if party sociology exists, this is only due to the fact that sociology as a science is still poorly developed, it is not established, and therefore each party has to create its own sociology, suggesting that it is at the same time also scientific sociology, i.e. universally binding for all" (Sorokin, 2000: 9). Of all these "sociologies," the "theory of factors" was the most correct for him, serving as a tool to work out the party line of the group of right-wing socialists-revolutionaries close to Kerensky.

The behaviorist theory of the factors of "social life" in the action of Sorokin is one of the clones of the positivist metaphysics of history. Intended to give "genuine keys to mastering the complex mechanics of social phenomena" (Sorokin, 2000: 12), it proved to be unsuitable for forecasting political processes because of its speculative nature and because of its role as an ideology of democratization. In the field of political theory, following his teacher Petrazhitsky, he believed that "the secret of power is in the human psyche" (Sorokin, 2000: 32), and, in accordance with this premise, considered "psychological fac-

tors" as sufficient. On this basis, Sorokin made far-reaching assessments and conclusions, which over and over did not work.

Sorokin's program of political positivism was the "democratic modernization" of Russia on the basis of the "strictly scientific" construction of the institutions of the rule of law and individual rights. This program had gray areas that Sorokin preferred not to talk about, but which were obvious even from the point of view of his own methodological guidelines of positivist sociology on "fact-finding," "objectivity" and "de-ideologization." He did not calculate the possible consequences of the destruction of state, public, cultural, religious structures and the "mechanical" solidarity of the traditional society at the peak of a world war. This was justified by the fact that "the revolutionary government has to hack at once where normal power would solve issues for a number of years. And this courage to cut and cut from the revolutionary government should be found" (Sorokin, 2000: 78–79).

Such "courage to cut" is the first sign of the desire for disorder, and therefore most important here was the analysis of the origin of political and economic interests that Kerensky's revolutionary government actually implemented. There are no attempts at such an analysis in Sorokin's practical and scientific experience. "We supported and support the coalition Provisional Government," Sorokin wrote. "We recognize that, in general, our revolutionary power stands on top" (Sorokin, 2000: 76). At the same time, the economist, Zagorsky, head of the department of the Ministry of Labor of the Provisional Government, stated that "most of the measures taken by the Russian government have never been put into practice. The disorganization of all administrative and economic mechanisms was so great that the very subject of public administration and control disappeared" (Zagorsky, 1928: 269).

In assessing the Bolshevik coup, Sorokin did not go beyond Weber, treating it as "a special case of the phenomenon of praetorian rear, widely spread throughout Russia" (Sorokin, 2000: 173). Such an assessment was both erroneous and inept, as was the conclusion that followed from it: "Even if the Bolsheviks manage to seize power completely, they will not be able to retain it. Their social base is too narrow. It is all exhausted by a handful of Bolshevik fanatics" (Sorokin, 2000: 173). Meanwhile, the political dynamism of Bolshevism was successful thanks to political and economic instability in Russia, planned and executed by the westernizers themselves in accordance with the canonical strategy of the new world order. Taken as a whole, the sociological journalism of Sorokin was the ideological accompaniment of the steady drift of Kerensky's clique in the direction of the Disorder.

Why did the idea of freedom, a theorist and proponent of which Sorokin considered himself, quickly degrade to a degree of primitive chaos? Sorokin could not answer this question clearly, not only because of his ideological beliefs, which reduce the scientific value of his "sociological notes" to zero. His "sociology of revolution" was built on historical parallels and generalizations which were explicated with the help of the so-called collective categories as the "substances" of history. This helped him, with his outstanding eloquence, to select the necessary cases for his theory and to present narrative material

in the necessary light to promote "democratization." All this looked like an "explanation," but only until reality finally made its own amendments.

The significance of the bureaucracy, including the military, that mutated from a professional class to a political class remained outside the scope of Sorokin. The small urban and rural bourgeoisie, to which Sorokin unsuccessfully appealed, could not play an independent role here because of their heterogeneity and different interests. The work of Sorokin *The Current State of Russia*, published in Prague in Russian shortly after his expulsion from Russia (1922), is interesting precisely because it continued with all the same ways of explaining and predicting the events that he used in his sociological publicism in the period of the Disorder 1917–1918.

The ultimatum of history, as Sorokin believed, was that the regime of "communism-statism" had to settle for capitalism and the bourgeois legal system unconditionally for 2–3 years or to forcibly disappear from the historical arena (Sorokin, 1922: 47). The basis for this confidence was a long list of economic, social and political deprivations, supplemented by crime and deviant behavior statistics. According to his prediction, the government was to move to a moderate democratic party expressing the interests of peasant proprietors (Ibid.: 56–57). In his extensive monograph *Sociology of the Revolution* (447 pages), which was published in English in the USA in 1925 (Sorokin, 1925), the list of deprivations was supplemented and illustrated with the help of historical examples selected for the occasion. Terminologically, it differs quite significantly from the Russian-language version (the manuscript of 1923 was republished in Russia in 2004), which gives the impression of two parallel methodologies of the "sociology of revolution" — Russian and American.

The basic principle of analysis of sociological theories can be viewed in the light of key idea of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge that "there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured" (Mannheim, 1954: 2). As Mannheim wrote, "the so-called pre-scientific inexact mode of thought, however (which, paradoxically, the logicians and philosophers also use when they have to make practical decisions), is not to be understood solely by the use of logical analysis. It constitutes a complex which cannot be readily detached either from the psychological roots of the emotional and vital impulses which underlie it or from the situation in which it arises and which it seeks to solve" (Mannheim, 1954: 1–2). We can find a lot of evidence for this idea in the works by Weber and Sorokin devoted to the analysis of the causes of the Russian collapse 1917–1918.

The question of whether the "scientific objectivity" proclaimed by both writers was a latent manifestation of the "vital impulses" or, due to specific political circumstances and whether they neglected the requirement to base assessments and conclusions only on those hypotheses that can be verified, serves as a reason for understanding the limits of the likelihood that sociology can provide political analysis and forecasting.

Conclusion

Our study of Weber's and Sorokin's approaches to the analysis of the Great Russian Disorder 1917–1918 shows a connection between their political affiliations and scientific views which has determined the boundaries in which their political worldview was transformed into sociological concepts.

The Weberian treatment of "method" should also be borne in mind: Weber considered it a "methodological pestilence" and "plague of frogs" (Adair-Toteff, 2014: 245–268). For Weber, social science methodology "is always only an awareness of the means that have justified themselves in practice" (Weber, 1922a: 217). Accordingly, this paper relies on the belief that formal methodological discussions would not only lead essentially away from substantive problems but also create a dangerous illusion that with its help an understanding of the object of analysis may be achieved.

Weber's concept of the invariance of domination set a certain trend in the studies of Russian revolutions, within the boundaries of which the selection and interpretation of information was carried out. This concept is a very effective research tool, however, in the case of Russian Disorder 1917–1918 Weber used the concept inconsistently and contrary to his own attitudes.

Sorokin's "sociology of revolution" adhered to behavioral psychological reductionism, presented by Sorokin in his main theoretical work of the Russian period — *The System of Sociology*, a kind of positivist analogue of Weber's *Economy and Society*. His conception of revolutions was deficient both in its theoretical structure and in its practical consequences. Ways of explaining and predicting the events in the *Notes of the Sociologist*, a sociological journalism of 1917, were continued in his work *The Current State of Russia* (1922) and in his *magnum opus* of this period, *The Sociology of Revolution* (1925).

Claims to comprehend the revolution's roots and causes lead sociologists into a risky zone of the competition of a set of outcomes or "scenarios," the reliability of which can be confirmed or refuted only by the course of events. Political processes are complex networks of interaction between a multitude of actors and circumstances for which there are no generalizing theories and which cannot be interpreted on the basis of an isolated classification of any groups of factors.

This paper shows that contrary to their insistent demands for scientific objectivity and rigor, Weber and Sorokin failed to account for the goals and actions of key actors on the Russian and world political scene which engineered Russian collapse 1917–1918. As a result, the accuracy of their approaches is in doubt.

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Аналитика русских революций у М. Вебера и П. Сорокина

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Макс Вебер и Питирим Сорокин дали противоположные оценки причин российской смуты 1917–1918 гг., но оба ошиблись в прогнозировании ее последствий. Сравнивая их подходы, важно понять, где лежат истоки этих расхождений. Настоящая статья раскрывает значение «демократической» интерлюдии, которая проложила путь к господству большевизма в стране. Независимо от того, были ли Февральский и Октябрьский перевороты 1917 года в России внутренне не связаны между собой, или представляли два последовательных сценария российского коллапса — ответ на этот вопрос освещает как идеологические, так и теоретические корни видения российской смуты М. Вебером и П. Сорокиным. И дело здесь не только в дистанции наблюдения, но и в различиях в методологии подходов и даже в стиле политического мышления. «Социология революции» П. Сорокина была методически основана на исторических параллелях и обобщениях, которые были выражены с помощью так называемых коллективных понятий как действующих «сущностей» истории. М. Вебер, напротив, сделал невозможным даже гипотетическое предположение о действии в истории каких-либо «объективных» закономерностей, тем самым блокировав путь к эволюционным, стадийным и формационным теориям. Оба социолога принимали активное участие в политической реконструкции своих стран, однако если политическая карьера М. Вебера детально изучена, мало что известно о реальной роли П. Сорокина в механизме власти Временного правительства на разных этапах его трансформации. М. Вебер рассматривал события в России главным образом сквозь призму вопроса о дальнейшем участии России в войне и ее последствиях для Германии, находясь в сфере иллюзий о союзе с Великобританией на основе «общности духовных интересов». Пределы аналитического видения П. Сорокиным российской политической сцены были ограничены тем, что он представлял в своем лице российский политический позитивизм и российское политическое масонство.

Ключевые слова: российская смута, социология революции, политическая идеология, политический позитивизм, политическое масонство, псевдодемократия, большевизм, политические прогнозы

Max Weber and the Great War: Personal Opinions and Essays as Historical Sociology *

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The influence of the Great War on the personality, sociology, political activity, and views of Max Weber has not yet been sufficiently researched. The second complete edition of works by Max Weber presents us with new opportunities to conduct a historical and sociological analysis of these issues. His personal letters and essays written during the Great War provide us with highly informative materials for such research. These materials, some of which are not widely known, are studied in the article from the perspective of historical sociology, whose co-founder was Weber himself. At the very beginning of the Great War, Max Weber underwent an emotional experience. He gave up lecturing for two years of army service in the hospital commission. After his service, he would make the shift to political speeches, declarations, and opinion essays. His previous understanding of the essence of war had been critically re-evaluated from the national and patriotic to the insight that Germany during and after the war would face a difficult choice between the trajectory of individual historical development and the Western path to political freedom. The article analyzes and sums up Weber's criticism of the politics of the German High Command which had obtained virtual governmental power in Germany. In particular, the article studies Weber's criticism of the total submarine warfare started by the German military in 1917–1918 and its political consequences. This political prevarication used by the commanders at the end of the Great War resulted in the tight connection between democracy and military defeat in German public opinion. Some of Weber's political forecasts are summed up and critically evaluated.

Keywords: Max Weber, history of sociology, historical sociology, sociology of war

Max Weber was actively involved in the politics of his age, an involvement which would have a great influence on his work. This fact became particularly evident during the Great War. Weber's political essays written during the war years are rather well known; their importance is not disputed, but the significance of wartime events for his scientific work is still insufficiently studied. Even rarer, newer publications lack clarity and consistency. It is important to keep in mind that Weber's circle of scientific communication narrowed sharply during the war. He was much more focused on his German scientific milieu, and considerably less so on the international one. German scientists were determined

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and belligerent. For example, Emil Lederer, a prominent economist, wrote in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, the famous journal co-edited by Weber, that the coming war would require a total effort to be exerted by all sides in a battle leading to their complete final exhaustion, for the loser and the winner alike (Lederer, 1915: 347–384). We dare to admit that this view was shared by many German academics, including Weber himself. Weber, however, preserved his scientific principles along with the capacity for a sociological analysis of German politics, which, among other things, allowed him to make critical evaluations of the German High Command's strategy during the Great War. This combination of ardent political temperament and clear analytical mind is unique for the history of sociology. Hinnerk Bruhns, in his recent publication, suggests that the point can be "clarified by itself due to the various perspectives on the topic itself" (Bruhns, 2017: 201); however, no particular clarity "by itself" has been created for the readers.

Weber's Criticism of the Military Politics of the German High Command

The sudden outbreak of the Great War provoked the rise of patriotic sentiments. In August, 1914, the vast majority of warring European nations regarded the war to be defensive and just. Remembering the short-period military campaigns of 1866 and 1871, no one expected the war to be long or exhausting. The military of all ranks in the armies involved believed that the outcome of the war would be clear after several decisive battles at its beginning, and that they would all return home before the next Christmas.

The elite of European intellectuals, Henri Bergson, Anatole France, Sigmund Freud, Stefan George, Thomas Hardy, Thomas Mann, Marcel Proust, Rainer Maria Rilke, Herbert Wells, Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Émile Durkheim. and many others embraced the military euphoria. Weber often called the war "great and wonderful," and "a 'splendid' expenditure of heroic power and loving preparedness for sacrifice" (Weber, 1926: 530; Schneider, 1970: 90).

The war made him remarkably enthusiastic. Surprisingly, "he completely recovered" (Weber, 1926: 525) from the nervous illness that had been the reason for his leaving Heidelberg University for an indefinite period in the 1900s and refusing to participate in politics. He had been treated at health resorts, but the rehabilitation was slow-going. Weber continued to be involved in sociology, accepting the post of editor-in-chief of *Archiv*, and was in touch with his colleagues.

In the context of his above-mentioned reaction to the Great War, we should be reminded that the defensive military doctrine in Germany had been changed to the strategic offensive plan drawn up by Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913, Chief of the Imperial German General Staff in 1891–1905), or the so-called Schlieffen Plan devised in 1905–1906. The plan was to avoid the two-front war which primarily required a quick defeat of France in the West in combination with the German military forces' projection to the East with the consequent defeat of Russia (Pantenius, 2016). Considering the fact that the war was officially declared only on Russia, the implementation of the plan began in Bel-

gium and France which were attacked without any declarations or claims. The European community was heavily impressed by this act of German aggressiveness. The war was known to have started in the Balkans, and France had nothing to do with that event. The Schlieffen Plan was already ruined in 1914 by the quick military mobilization in Russia, and the need for Germany to fight a two-front war.

The war continued, but military euphoria did not last for long. In Germany, societal disturbance and alarm were growing because of the unclear prospects of the war, and the destiny of the state. On March 11,1916, Weber told his wife that he "is atop of the volcano" (2008: 332). On September 4, 1916, in a letter to Bernhard Guttmann (1869-1959), a journalist and writer, he strategically defined further war development as follows: "If one of you, Gentlemen, . . . asks: 'So, what are we supposed to fight for?' I'll answer: 'For our very existence as a nation with its own policy and self-orientation'" (Weber, 2008: 525). His situational analysis appeared to be historically correct.

The war seemed to be endless. Obviously, it was exhausting for the opponents. The war had changed the life-style of the Webers (along with other German citizens). It hurt his relatives and friends. The husband of his younger sister was killed in action at the Eastern theatre of war near Tannenberg in August, 1914. On August 22, 1915, his brother Karl was killed, as well as his friend, Emil Lask, in the same year (Weber, 1926: 537).

Since the beginning of war, the Reichstag proclaimed the "civil peace," and refused to control the German military by parliamentary methods as was done in the UK and France. In 1914, after the glorious victory of the battle of Tannenberg, the authority and influence of Oberste Heeresleitung (hereinafter referred as OHL, the High Military Command) had grown enormously. As the OHL's authority was so great because of the reinforcement by the high martial qualities of the Imperial German Army (Reichsheer), political power was moving gradually to the German Military. However, according to Bismarck's imperial constitution of Germany, the OHL was formally responsible to the Kaiser. The political power of the Kaiser became so limited that he withdrew into the shadows and preferred to follow the instructions of the OHL. Meanwhile, the continuing war aggravated the critical attitude towards the monarchy; the Kaiser was seen as responsible for the poverty, hunger, and the introduction of food rationing (Plenkov, 2011: 178–179). However, it did not mean that the OHL leaders were as good as longsighted professional politicians, according to Weber's own understanding of their important role.

Weber turned out to be one of the most authoritative critics of the OHL military policy, and his criticism was absolutely correct. Even his scrutiny of the four most important military and political decisions made by the OHL and the results of these decisions allows for an evaluation of the scientific depth and historical importance of Weber's analysis of historical alternatives. Among them were total submarine warfare, a separate peace with Russia, a fear that the transition from the imperial political institutions to democratic ones would be connected in public opinion with the hard and humiliating peace treaty conditions, and, finally, the issue of responsibility. for the war. The German military held that the sinking of British navy ships and civil vessels without any respect for the norms of international law would interrupt the British food and materiel supply lines would lift

the naval blockade of Germany, and therefore would bring them victory within the second half of the year. (Naval surface attacks would have certainly been a losing proposition since the German navy was not comparable to the British navy's in terms of its fighting powers.)

Long before the beginning of total submarine warfare, Weber, along with outstanding political figures, contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March, 1916, with a memorandum called "Increasing U-boat warfare" (Die verschärfte U-Boot-Krieg) (Weber, 1984: 99–125). In this paper, he warned that war against civil vessels sailing to the UK with women and children on board would break the international law. Moreover, it would provoke the USA to join the war, which would be a disaster for Germany. Weber's address had its intended and far-reaching effect: the initiator of U-boat warfare, the German Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, was dismissed on March 15, 1916. Nevertheless, unrestricted submarine warfare started on February 1, 1917. German submarines ruined enemy vessels with a gross tonnage of 1 million tons, sixteen percent of which were British. The UK was on the brink of military defeat, but, as a result of the quick development of ASW (anti-submarine weapons), Germany suffered heavy losses which could not have been replenished in 1917 (in contrast to the Entente members with their superior resources). On April 6, 1917, as Weber had warned, the USA declared war on Germany in response to the total submarine warfare, and joined the Entente, making its economic and military potential even greater. Thus, Weber had not only predicted the defeat for Germany, but he also foresaw the rise of the United States whose financial support "would tie up the bankrupt European countries." Indeed, in the post-War period, the USA and the UK started to define the political governance in European countries, including Germany.

In his letters to the historian Hermann Oncken (1869–1945), Weber forecast that the Central European Empires (Germany and Austria-Hungary) "would be tied up to the American, financial system after the war, since we could not help them" (Weber, 2008: 842). Such a precise forecast about the changes of the world order and the composition of its political forces was constantly repeated by Weber. This fact proves the efficiency of his historical sociology. Thus, he connected American participation in the war across the Atlantic with the further rise of the United States as a superpower. Since 1915, the German High Command had been looking for a separate peace with Russia, although unsuccessfully. After the February 1917 Revolution in Russia, Weber considered a peace treaty with Russians to be a good option. He approved the statement released by the Russian Provisional Government on May 4, 1917 (April 17, OS), which proclaimed that "Russia along with its decisive victory will refrain from territory acquisition and extension of its power at the expense of other states" (Ibid.: 632). In a May 8, 1917, letter to the authoritative politician Friedrich Naumann, Weber advised his addressee to publicly announce that "we should immediately take the Russian position: no restitutions or reparations, granting of mutual guarantees eliminating warfare threats to the other party, a peace treaty conclusion," the refusal of claims against Western powers, irrespective of their "support . . . of military goals inconsistent with the demands of the Russian government" (Ibid.: 632–633).

In 1918, the German Military launched a total offensive in the Eastern theatre of the war. On March 3,1918, Soviet Russia was forced to sign the "extortionate" Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, losing 1 million square kilometers of their territory populated by 56 million people. Weber criticized the pressure exerted by the German Command on the Soviet delegation at the peace negotiations. He wrote to his wife that "present events in Brest-Litovsk do not make good impressions" (Weber, 1989: 53).

Weber held that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk would last only for the period of Russia's weakness. He turned out to be correct. On November 11, 1918, the new German revolutionary government withdrew from the Treaty, and on November 13, 1918, Soviet Russia cancelled it as well. Thus, the Treaty, despite the OHL's plans, gave Germany neither food nor any other resources to continue the war. The Allies got a sufficient impression of German's "extortionate" behavior, having been pointed out by Weber in his public speeches and private correspondence.

At the end of the Great War, Weber, being an experienced and responsible politician, noted that fear would arise as the transition from imperial political institutions to democratic ones would be linked in German public opinion with the difficult and humiliating peace treaty conditions formalizing Germany's military defeat. On July 15, 1917, he wrote to Otto Thomas, a leader of the labor movement: "It might have been unwise to heavily underline the link between domestic democratization and the peace treaty, given that this link exists and appears to be true . . . Anyway, democracy is essential for national reasons and the Germans deserve it irrespective of peace" (Weber, 2008: 695–696). Obviously, Weber comprehended that democracy as dictated by the Allies could be perceived negatively by Germans. In this respect, he appeared to be a prophet; in the autumn of 1918, the OHL, hoping to save the army, agreed to a truce that avoided a military disaster. Then, the OHL performed the maneuver Weber had been warning about. On October 28, 1918, a few days before the Empire's end, at the Command's insistence, the government was made accountable to Parliament, and a new government was formed. In doing so, Germany made the transition to the Western political system, since the Chancellor became responsible to the Reichstag and not to the Kaiser.

A skillful maneuver of the military was to shift the responsibility for the defeat upon the democratic government and the Parliament who sanctioned the signing of a severe peace treaty. General Erich Ludendorff, the Chief of the General Staff would say: "Gentlemen, Social Democrats have to conclude a peace treaty which must be signed right now. They have to put the mess right. The mess they had created for us!" The maneuver was rather successful: in German public opinion, democracy and the military defeat have become synonyms for decades. Soon the Nazis would make huge political capital out of the struggle with democracy, destroying it and bringing German history to a deadlock. Here, Weber turned out to be a true political forecaster.

Weber held that blaming Germany for the outbreak of war was unbearably unfair, and this thought completely coincided with German public opinion. He studied the findings of the Allies on this issue and came to a conclusion about Russia's fault in the outbreak of war, pointing out its geopolitical interests in the Balkans and the Turkish Straits (Weber,

1984: 343). The said ambitions in relation to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus (also known as Bosporus) actually existed in Russian society, although these ambitions turned out to be unsound and unrealizable.

Along with other German politicians and journalists, Weber started an active struggle against the idea of blaming Germany for the war. On February 3 or 4 in 1919, he and his colleagues founded the "The Heidelberger Society for Legal Policy" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Politik des Rechts, Heidelberger Vereinigung). He presented a worked-out "united" position of the Society during the Versailles negotiations held from May 15–28, 1919. He violently opposed the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles with its enormously tough and humiliating conditions for Germany. In fact, the reparation sums were so huge that the country stopped paying interest on them, taking into account all further financial settlements. It would only be in 2010, ninety-two years after the war ended, that the debt would be settled, having been paid by the work of three post-war generations. All of this could hardly be called a fair deal. The issue of responsibility for the Great War is a problem even today. Historians have failed to identify a unified reason for this. A majority of modern experts held that it was exactly this issue that led to the outbreak of WWII (Plenkov, 2014: 176). Despite the fact that these results have been obtained by the efforts of several generations of historians, Weber, who has pointed out the unfairness of the Versailles Treaty, was the first among its shrewdest critics.

Weber's criticism of the German High Command's politics, including total submarine warfare, the pressure excised on Russia to conclude the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the predatory annexations, and war indemnities turned out to be historically true. He precisely evaluated the outcomes of these politics for Germany and for the world. As one of only a few, he managed to foresee the OHL's anti-democratic maneuvers linking democracy and the humiliating Treaty of Versailles in German public opinion. His understanding of the hopeless, exhausting war for Germany was much deeper than the OHL's strategic plans which aimed to crush one enemy after another at any cost, according to the thoughts of Field Marshal Schlieffen. It is not really necessary to be a sophisticated military strategist to have a deep understanding of the reality of war in the 20th century. It was enough to be a sociologist sensible to the reality of a new mass society which declared itself with the beginning of the World War.

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, the main case of this article is to prove the point that Weber's choice in favor of writing political essays during the Great War is only at first glance the decision applicable to his own dilemma of science versus politics. As the analysis has shown, Weber's essays and public speeches addressed to the German public and his signing of collective appeals are all correlative with thoughts from his letters, and could not be derived from his historical sociology as it is. Weber's sociology and political essays set out and solved some methodological and historical questions on the public choice between the historical alternatives of further development. They give certain answers that explain why and how

did the world of modern politics find itself in this particular situation. If we only take into account the present research perspective of historical sociology, there is a possibility to explain the objectiveness and independence of Weber's evaluations given to the military and historical reality, and contrast them with other opinions and assessments that exist in the academic world and with the unavoidable German High Command propaganda. Our significant conclusion is that, on one hand, we should agree with a well-known evaluation given by the historian W. Mommsen (1930–2004) that "in his [Weber's] political system of values the main roles were given to the nation, power and culture" (Mommsen, 1974: 90–96, 132–133). Weber's value system, as it can be traced from our analysis, was dominated by those scientific values where conclusiveness always overpowers any other value, including national ideas or political passions. Thus, the objective character of his values is explained and, moreover, proven by the very history of modernity.

The present research of Weber's active engagement in the events of the Great War shows that his political essays and public speeches represent not only his participation in politics through their method, analytical depth, and historical authenticity of their results, but also demonstrates an essential contribution to applied historical sociology.

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Макс Вебер и Великая война: личное мнение и публицистика как историческая социология

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Влияние Первой мировой войны на личность, социологию, политическую деятельность и взгляды Макса Вебера изучено недостаточно. Завершающееся издание полного собрания его сочинений, содержащее личную переписку и публицистику военных лет, открывает новые возможности исследования названных вопросов. Некоторые из этих материалов, в том числе малоизвестные, исследуются в данной статье в аспекте веберовской исторической социологии. В начале Великой войны он пережил эмоциональный подъем и в 50-летем возрасте добился назначения военным членом лазаретной комиссии, на два года оставив почти все иные занятия. По мере затягивания войны он включился в политику в качестве публициста и общественного деятеля. В ходе войны его национально-патриотическая позиция эволюционировала от вопроса о месте Германии среди мировых держав к внутриполитическим вопросам, прежде всего необходимости скорейшего перехода к политической системе западного типа. В статье доказано, что в годы Великой войны Вебер лишь на первый взгляд сменил науку на политику в силу исторических обстоятельств. Обращения Вебера-публициста к общегерманской аудитории, его публичные выступления, подписание коллективных воззваний, его личная переписка, проникнуты теоретическими положениями его исторической социологии.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, история социологии, историческая социология, социология войны

Max Weber and the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany; or, Why Bolshevism Had No Chance in the West

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Among the canonic genres of the modern social-philosophical and social-scientific thought, in German sociology and social theory of the 20th century, there is a special type of research called "the diagnosis of the era" (*Zeitdiagnose*), i.e. the analysis of a specific historical situation. Max Weber's articles, publications and speeches in the last years of the war and first post-war years are an excellent example of such an application of the social-theoretical knowledge for the diagnosis of the modernity. The article considers Weber's political and social diagnosis of the time in his articles of 1917–1919 on the post-war reorganization of Germany on democratic principles. The author focuses on Weber's assessment of the ways of the political and social development of Germany after the defeat in the World War I and the November Revolution of 1918. The article also analyzes Weber's proposals on the reform of the political and electoral system of the German Empire and considers Weber's views on the prospects for a socialist revolution in Central Europe after the end of World War I on the model of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. The final part of the article provides a generalized assessment of the theoretical scheme that Weber applied in the analysis of the events and processes of the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, and identifies its significance for understanding the historical fate of the modern world.

Keywords: Max Weber, diagnosis of the era, German Empire, November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, modern mass democracy, individualism, freedom, Bolshevism, rationalization, bureaucratization, modernity

Among the canonic genres of modern social-philosophical and social-scientific thought in German sociology and social theory of the 20th century, there is a special type of research called "the diagnosis of the era" (*Zeitdiagnose*), i.e., the analysis of a specific historical situation. As the development of social-scientific thought in the 20th century proved, this genre is an absolutely indispensable way of understanding modern societies and the current trends of their development. This genre is a practical application of social-theoretical and empirical-analytical conclusions and generalizations of the social sciences. It contributes not only to a better understanding of the social events and processes but also to the practical orientation of political and social action (Joas, Knöbl, 2004: 37–38).

As a rule, this genre becomes especially important under the large-scale crises and social upheavals that destroy the old social order and sends traditional norms and guide-

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lines of action into oblivion, which in turn determines an urgent need to understand the future course of events. Max Weber's articles, publications, and speeches in the last years of World War I and the first post-war years are an excellent example of such an application of social-theoretical knowledge for the diagnosis and forecast of current trends of modern development. Weber's immaculate knowledge of the conceptual apparatus of the modern social-scientific thought, of which he made a significant contribution to its development, and his perfect understanding of the social nature of modern societies allowed him to present a clear and devoid-of-sentiment picture of the current trends in the development of Germany and the West after the "Great War."

Weber objected to those romantic intellectuals and prophets who insisted that Germany and the West would inevitably reach the verge of either socialist revolution or decline after the war. In his articles and speeches of 1917–1919, he unequivocally showed the groundlessness of such forecasts. At the same time, he argued tirelessly that the fragile modernity of the West in its resistance to the attacks of the right-wing and left-wing radicals and to the tendencies of decline and collapse could not rely only on the current constellations of "material interests." Such a resistance demanded careful and responsible political action aimed at protecting liberal institutions, practices, and values; without such action, it would be impossible to protect individual freedoms, personal autonomy, and the private initiative of the modern individual.

In his reflections on the Russian Revolution of 1905, Weber had already drawn his readers' attention to the historical originality of Western liberal, political, and economic institutions, and to their extreme vulnerability and fragility in the face of the dominant economic and social trends in the development of modernity. The same tonality is typical for his articles and speeches about the German Revolution of 1918. In 1906, when warning Russian liberals of the groundless belief in the inevitable triumph of the political and cultural ideals of liberalism in Russia with the establishment and development of capitalism, Weber emphasized that "'democracy' and 'individualism' would stand little chance today if we were to rely for their 'development' on the 'automatic' effect of material interests. This is due to the fact that to the very extent possible material interests obviously lead society in the opposite direction" (1995 [1906]: 108).[1]

According to Weber, rational industrial capitalism, and the practices and ideals of autonomous personality and the rational culture of modernity determined by it constitute a unique historical constellation due to the confluence of a number of unique historical factors. The intersecting of these factors, such as the maritime expansion of the West, the peculiar economic structure of the early capitalism, the conquest of nature with rational science and technology, and, last but not least, the development of a system of values based on the religious complex of Protestantism, resulted in the rationalization of the individual's everyday behavior on the basis of *the methodical conduct of life* (*Lebensführung*), which is closely related to the ethical ideal of an autonomous person. However, Weber argues that the development of modern capitalism leads to an undermining rather

1. MWG, I/10: 269.

than a strengthening of the civilizational foundations of the modern world. Therefore, the fundamental question of modernity should be completely different: "How can these things exist at all for any length of time under the domination of capitalism? In fact, they are only possible where they are backed up by the determined *will* of a nation not to be ruled like a flock of sheep" (Ibid.).[2]

After presenting such an understanding of the historical destinies of the modern world in a series of articles on the first Russian Revolution (MWG, I/10: 86–279), Weber included his reflections on the post-war destinies of Germany and the West in his further studies. The article focuses on Weber's political and social diagnosis of the era in his articles and speeches of 1917–1919, as well as paying particular attention to his assessment of the developmental paths of Germany after the November Revolution of 1918, and his prospects for a socialist revolution in Western and Central Europe based on the model of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The article also outlines and analyzes the social and political agenda of the time, which, according to Weber, could allow the German people to overcome the trials of the era and to create a new democratic state that was capable in terms of world politics with honor. Finally, the article briefly describes the general theoretical scheme applied by Weber in the analysis of the events and processes of the German Revolution of 1918, and shows its significance for understanding the historical destinies of the modern world.

From October 1917 to November 1918: Would Germany Repeat the Fate of Russia?

Weber harshly criticized the Bolshevik coup of October 1917 in Petrograd.[3] He believed that the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks' seizure of power with the support of a part of the workers and declassed soldiers was only a transient episode in the Russian tragedy. Weber did not really believe in the Bolsheviks' ability to retain power, and gave them no more than a few months before the right-wing dictatorship of the propertied classes would replace them under the slogan of restoring the bourgeois order. He considered the Bolshevik government of February 1918 as "a government of an insignificant minority. It relies on the army being tired of the war. Under the given circumstances (and completely regardless of their beliefs' sincerity) they are doomed to a purely *military dictatorship*, and not of generals but of *corporals*" (MWG, I/15: 404–405). Such an assessment of the Bolshevik regime eventually proved unrealistic, but Weber refused to change his assessment for quite some time. In his speech at a rally in Munich on November 4, 1918, he insisted that "bolshevism is the military dictatorship, therefore, like any other dictatorship, it is destined to collapse" (MWG, I/16: 365).[4]

2. MWG, I/10: 270.

3. Weber's assessments of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Bolshevism, and the reasons for their unrealistic character can be found in: Dmitriev 2017: 305–328. An instructive analysis of Weber's views on the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Bolshevism can be found in: Breuer 1992: 267–290; Breuer 1994: 84–109; Dahlmann 1998: 380–408; Dahlmann 2014: 81–102; Mommsen 1984: 267–282; Mommsen 1997: 1–17; Müller 2014: 32–40.

4. Deutschlands politische Neuordnung (Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, November 5, 1918).

However, in less than a year, the revolution knocked authoritatively at the doors not only of Russia, but also of the German Fatherland. In the fall of 1918, Germany was on the verge of military defeat. In October 1918, unrest began on the German Navy ships in Kiel, when the crews refused to sail for the last decisive battle with the English "Royal Navy," thus refusing to go to a certain death. In early November, the uprising first spread to the naval bases in Hamburg and Lübeck, and then gradually to the entire North of Germany, and then throughout the country. Following the example of the Russian Revolution, soviets of workers and soldiers' deputies were created everywhere to perform the functions of local authorities and demobilize military units. On November 10 in Berlin, the leader of the Majority Social Democrats, Philipp Scheidemann, proclaimed the German Democratic Republic from the Reichstag window, which was two hours before the leader of the German left-wing radicals, Karl Liebknecht, proclaimed the "Socialist Republic" from the balcony of the Imperial Palace. In the evening, the Council of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies of Berlin approved the composition of the new revolutionary government, the Council of People's Delegates (CPD) (*Rat der Volksbeaufragten*), with the representatives of the two factions of the German social democracy movement, those of the GSPD (the German Social Democratic Party, also called the Majority Social Democrats) and the USPD (the Independent Social Democratic Party, also called the Independent Social Democrats). This opened a new page in the history of Germany. Now it was not a question of whether the Bolsheviks would hold power in Russia, but of whether their followers would come to power in Germany, and of whether the Bolshevik revolutionary virus would spread throughout Germany and further to the West.

Initially, Weber fiercely criticized the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany. He described it as a "bloody carnival not deserving the honest name of the revolution" (Weber, 1984 [1926]: 642). He blamed the chaos in the country mainly on the system of the workers' and soldiers' soviets created one after another in different localities as the revolutionary events unfolded. Weber was especially critical of the attempts of the left-wing radicals from the Spartacus League pushing the revolution of the Russian way of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and to the republic of soviets,[5] which explains his angry philippics against "Liebknecht's mad gang."[6] In the first weeks of the revolution, Weber noted the "confusion of the amateurish government" of Prince Max von Baden, and made the sad conclusion that "only intoxication with 'revolution' serves people as a kind of drug until the trouble came."[7] However, as Weber added, the socialist faith of the masses and their leaders, no matter how sincere it is, "cannot improve the ruined financial system and restore the lack of capital; therefore, a new disappointment, unbearable after all already experienced, can lead many, namely the most faithful believers, to the internal bankruptcy."[8]

5. In January 1919, the Spartacus League was transformed into the German Communist Party (GCP), and would become the main conductor of Bolshevik ideas in Germany.

6. Letter to Helene Weber of November 19, 1918 (MWG, II/10-1: 310).

7. Letter to Helene Weber of November 19, 1918 (MWG, II/10-1: 310).

8. Letter to Else Jaffé-Richthofen of November 15, 1918 (MWG, II/10-1: 304).

As well as criticizing the German followers of the Bolsheviks, and the members of the Spartacus League and their leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, Weber sharply criticized the policies of the Independent Social Democrats in the revolutionary *Rat der Volksbeaufragten* for their incorrigible doctrinairism and political romanticism that paved the road to hell with good intentions. It was the presence of the Independent Social Democrats in the revolutionary government that explained Weber's refusal to cooperate with it. In a private letter written shortly after the revolution broke out, he wrote: "Participation in *this* government, or even working for it, would be well-nigh impossible. *These people*, i.e., Herr Haase and his comrades, in contrast to the trade union officials and to Ebert — *only* require lackeys, just as the monarchy did."[9] Weber considered the plans of the Independent Social Democrats to nationalize the German economy as complete nonsense under the auspices of losing the war and economic chaos. Moreover, when the country was to pay huge reparations, the transfer of main industries to the state would play into the hands of the allies making it easier for them to get reparation supplies. "Politically and economically," said Weber, "we are under foreign domination. Particularly, in economic terms, we are bound to depend on the foreign powers for decades to come. We need foreign loans for the maintaining of our supply lines and for the recovering of our economy as well. The proletarian government, however, cannot even hope to have credit assistance from abroad. The socialist economy is also out of the question; we can even say that in German economic history entrepreneurial activity has never been so urgent. If the current economic breakdown continues for some months ahead, not only will there be nothing left of our military earnings, but the most part of our industrial equities are going be lost. In that case our industrialists will become mere servants to Americans" (MWG, I/16: 400).

Weber believed that the plans of the Independent Social Democrats to nationalize the economy were not related to the fundamental problems that the new democratic authorities had to solve, that is, the democratization and parliamentarization of the German political system, the adoption of a new constitution, and signing a peace treaty with the allies. Hence, Weber made an extremely important conclusion for his sociology of revolution: "From the point of view of socialist hopes for the future, the prospects for a wartime revolution are now the worst imaginable, even if it were to succeed. Under the most favorable circumstances, it could only mean that *political* arrangements would approach the form desired by democracy, this, however, would pull it away from socialism because of the *economically* reactionary consequences it would be bound to have. No fair-minded socialist may deny that either" (1994d [1918]: 301).[10]

Meanwhile, events went from bad to worse. In the late autumn of 1918, Weber, like many contemporaries, had a keen sense of the impending civil war. In his attempts to find the means to prevent a war, he added the considerations on domestic policy to the analysis of the international situation. In those critical moments for the new democratic authorities, Weber argued that foreign intervention was acceptable to block the path to

9. Letter to Lili Schäfer, around November 29 — December 4, 1918 (MWG, II/10-1: 331).
10. MWG, I/15: 632.

power for the left-wing radicals. He wrote that "If the situation worsens, we will have to let the Americans to put things in order whether we like it or not. Let us hope we will avoid the shame of allowing our enemies to act."[11] Such an extremely undesirable turn of events would ensure the defeat of the left-wing extremists by a foreign force, and the nation would get another chance to unite to repel the foreign invaders.

However, Weber gradually realized that in order to prevent the left or right radicalization of the revolution, the moderate Majority Social Democrats had to cooperate with the forces of the bourgeois order. Certainly, such an understanding was determined by Weber's participation in the work of the Heidelberg Council of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies when he had the opportunity to see "the responsibility and honesty of the right-wing socialists, who tried to prevent the revolution they did not want but the Bolsheviks strived for" (Weber, 1984 [1926]: 644). It was at the request of the right-wing socialists that Weber became a member of the Heidelberg Council of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, hoping to help the new authorities with his knowledge.[12]

Under the collapse of the monarchy and the widespread formation of workers' and soldiers' councils, Weber saw the shortest way to the normalization of social-political life in convening a democratically-elected National Constituent Assembly. He understood perfectly well that the convocation of the Assembly would not serve as a panacea for civil war,[13] but he had great hopes for it since the Assembly was to adopt a new constitution which would lay the foundations of the new republican-democratic system. In the fall of 1918, in referring to the collapse of all previous German dynasties, Weber wrote that "'historical' legitimacy is over. And now the only way back from the violent domination of soldiers' councils to the civilian system, which is left to the specific 'middle class parties,' is *revolution* and natural-law legitimacy of the *constituent assembly* based on people's sovereignty" (MWG, I/16: 103).[14] Although for Weber, as a political thinker, it was not a republic but a constitutional parliamentary monarchy that was a more suitable form of government for Germany.[15] However, in November 1918, he welcomed the republic as a

11. Letter to Helene Weber of November 19, 1918 (MWG, II/10-1: 310–311).

12. As acknowledged by Weber himself, the only thing that made him happy in those tragic days for Germany was "the unpretentious efficiency of ordinary people in trade unions and many soldiers, for example, in the local council of 'workers and soldiers' deputies', in which I am a member. I have to admit that they did their job perfectly, without any idle talk" (Letter to Helene Weber of November 19, 1918 [MWG, II/10-1: 310]).

13. Weber stressed in the fall of 1918 that "the fact that the Constituent Assembly is a *reliable* means to resolutely prevent a civil war, is not at all necessary" (MWG, I/16: 105).

14. To explain Weber's idea, Jan-Werner Müller wrote: "Weber was convinced that traditional legitimacy — based on precedent and prescription — was disappearing, and that Europeans had entered the democratic age for good. The charisma of monarchs — not so much as personal quality as what Weber called 'the charisma of blood' passed down from one generation to the next, but also attached to the institution itself — had been dispelled by the disasters of the war during which monarchs had generally revealed themselves as incompetent" (2014: 9).

15. According to Weber, "modern mass society, which was becoming increasingly 'legalistic' and value-neutral as a result of bureaucratization, should retain a monarchy as the surviving link to the source of charismatic legitimacy. Weber argued in this way because he believed that the legitimization of domination based upon a belief in legality was much weaker than one based upon charismatic or traditional forms of legitimacy, even though he viewed them both to be formally equivalent. Fundamentally, he held only the charismatic form to be a source of genuine legitimacy" (Mommsen, 1984: 290–291).

politically inevitable step under the given circumstances, and expressed the hope that the collapse of the old dynastic orders would finally allow "to put the bourgeoisie politically *on its own feet*" (MWG, I/16: 107).[16]

In the late autumn of 1918, under extreme political uncertainty, the perception of the new government by the bourgeois circles became crucial. The main political question determining the very future of Germany was "whether the bourgeoisie in its mass will acquire a new *political spirit*, more prepared for responsibility and with a greater self-consciousness" (MWG, I/16: 106). By December 1918, Weber had already called on the progressively-minded bourgeois circles of the German society to form an alliance with the moderate Majority Social Democrats to stop the revolution from slipping to the left and to chaos and anarchy. At the same time, Weber made a number of conciliatory gestures to the new authorities and even praised the plans of 'socialization' of the economy developed by the leaders of social democracy and of the social-democratic trade unions. When speaking at a rally in Frankfurt on December 1, 1918, Weber even said that his views were "very close to, if not identical with, those of many academically trained members of the Social Democratic Party" (MWG, I/16: 379).[17]

In the winter of 1918–1919, Weber took an active part in the creation of the new, liberal German Democratic Party. He considered it as a non-class organization capable of playing the role of mediator between the progressive bourgeois strata and the moderate working-class majority.[18] Beginning at the end of November 1918, he gave speeches to support the new party in Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Berlin, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, and Fürth. He reproached the revolutionary government for inaction, and called on it to put an end to the danger threatening the revolution from the left. "Here he argued again and again that the German Democratic Party, and indeed all progressive sections of the bourgeois classes alike, ought to cooperate with the Majority Social Democrats in a joint effort to establish a stable democratic order" (Mommsen, 1989: 85). Weber believed that, under the given circumstances, a true alliance with the Majority Social Democrats was the only justified political strategy for both liberals and the middle strata.[19] In those days, he used to say that "for decades, the paths of honest, absolutely peaceful and absolutely radical bourgeois and socialist democracies could be the same, and they could follow these paths shoulder to shoulder so that once to choose different paths" (MWG, I/16: 382–383).

16. However, it should be noted that, as a consistent German nationalist, Weber was convinced that "the interests and tasks of the nation are above . . . all questions of the political form" (MWG, I/16: 99–100).

17. Das neue Deutschland (Frankfurter Zeitung, December 1, 1918). Commenting on this issue, David Beetham wrote, that "in fact what Weber said was that his position was indistinguishable from many of 'many academically trained members of the Social Democratic Party' — that is, those who recognized the necessity of capitalism! — and in fact he went on in his speech to explain why he could not be a Social Democrat" (Beetham 1985 [1974]: 173).

18. "This organization sought to consist of representatives of all classes as an intermediate authority between the social-democratic and bourgeois parties, just like the National Social Party of Naumann once used to be. It was joined by many representatives of the spiritually leading strata who, just as resolutely as the socialist workers, supported the genuine democracy, but unlike them rejected experiments with the economic system and put the *national* idea above the international one" (Weber, 1984 [1926]: 653).

19. Das neue Deutschland: Speech in Frankfurt, December 1, 1918 (MWG, I/16: 379–383).

The political situation in Germany began to gradually improve in January, 1919, when the Independent Social Democrats left the revolutionary government. This determined the outcome of the German communists' attempt of a Bolshevik coup in Berlin, which was severely suppressed by the social-democratic government with the support of the army. The leaders of the unsuccessful uprising of the German Bolsheviks, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were killed by reactionary-minded officers. Despite the fact that Weber did not approve of such a method of eliminating the "red threat,"[20] the suppression of the Bolshevik coup in Berlin by the forces of the bourgeois order objectively contributed to the stabilization of the social-political situation in the country on the eve of the elections to the National Constituent Assembly.[21] For the first time, there was a hope of creating a broad political coalition of the progressively-minded groups of the German bourgeoisie and the moderate Majority Social Democrats, a coalition which could repel left-wing and right-wing extremist attacks and lay the constitutional foundations of a new democratic Germany.

At that time, the political situation in Germany was so critical that Weber considered the economically-meaningless partial nationalization of the means of production by the state as the lesser evil, provided it could satisfy the socialist aspirations of the masses, thereby preventing the radicalization of their mood. However, in the spring of 1920, this did not prevent Weber from rejecting the proposal of the leadership of the Democratic Party to become its representative in the Commission on Socialization formed by the marxist-minded Social Democrats headed by Karl Kautsky. Although Weber officially explained his refusal due to poor health, he wrote more frankly about the reasons not to participate in the commission's activities and to leave the party in a letter to his sister Clara. "Since the Democratic party . . . has dared me to concern myself with 'socialization' and I believe that this is 'insanity' at this time, I have to withdraw. Politicians *have* to compromise . . . — a scholar *cannot* justify this."[22] Weber's decision to leave the National Democratic Party marked the end of his career as a politician, and his return to academic studies.

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20. In those days, Weber used to say that "the dictatorship of the street has come to such an end that I did not want. Liebknecht was certainly an honest man. *He called the street to fight* and *the street killed him*!" (MWG, I/16: 461). According to Weber, "*the workers and soldiers' councils* were honest too. Burghers should not forget what they owe to their honest and fair work. But their *central body* in Berlin was politically below any criticism and was engaged in the worst possible amateurish activities" (Heidelberger Zeitung, January 18, 1919 [MWG, I/16: 462]).

21. When assessing the decision of the leaders of the Council of People's Delegates to resort to the help of the military to suppress the armed uprising of the German extreme 'leftists', the historian of Weimar Germany claimed that the official leaders of the German revolution simply did not have any other choice under the given circumstances. Horst Möller wrote: "One should admit both the need to criticize the government units' cruelty in suppressing the uprising in those days, and the need to use the military to save a chance to create a democratic republic and to really bring the matter to the National Constituent Assembly. Certainly, the 'Spartacus men' and their radical supporters aimed at preventing on the street what could not be prevented in the revolutionary bodies. They were not ready to accept democratic rules of the game — neither in their deputies' councils nor in the Congress. In this sense, Ebert and the leadership of the GSPD had no choice" (Möller, 2004: 53).

22. Letter to Clara Mommsen of April 20, 1920 (MWG, II/10-2: 983).

"Democratization" as an Imperative of the Era

When reflecting on Germany's post-war development, Weber pinned great hopes on the democratization of its political system. According to Weber, such a democratization would not only beneficially affect domestic policy by making the German society more politically and socially united, but also strengthen Germany's position in the international arena. The first step on this path was to be the reform of the Prussian three-class system of suffrage, which aimed to provide the masses with broader institutional guarantees for their participation in determining the destinies of the country. The idea of constitutional reform of Prussia, the largest of the German states, was not a new idea. The famous German scientists Ernst Troeltsch and Friedrich Meinecke had previously suggested the idea of the reform in 1914. This issue had become particularly acute at the final stage of the war when both the liberal opposition and the authorities had become concerned about how to enlist the support of the society tired of war.

Weber was a strong supporter of the reform of the outdated electoral system that gave clear preference to voters from the privileged classes (the bourgeoisie and the land aristocracy) over workers when casting votes. He hoped that the electoral reform would not only increase the chances of the working class and their political representatives, the German Social Democrats, to participate in public administration, but also would demonstrate the goodwill of the government to cooperate with the constructively- and patriotically-minded Majority Social Democrats.

Moreover, Weber considered the democratization of the Prussian electoral system, which was to be only the first step to the democratization of the German political system as a whole, as an imperative not only of the political moment but of the era as well. World War I turned unusually quickly from an old war of the dynastic type into a mass war of nations where only the nations' active participation would lead to victory. However, the flip side of such "nationalization" of the masses by their engagement in military actions was their "politicization," as the masses desired to determine their historical destiny at least partially. Ralf Dahrendorf commented on this issue, that "the wars of the 20th century were not fought by small groups of direct participants but demanded participation of almost the entire population. As a result, the ruling circles came to the conclusion that something had be done for those who risked their lives but did not have any official social-political rights. They were to get civil rights, as Winston Churchill said at the end of the war" (Dahrendorf, 1992: 73).

Weber shared this opinion on the masses' participation in the 'total' war and on the dialectics of the extension of civil rights. While waiting for the return of millions of soldiers from the front, one could talk about their integration into the social-political order of post-war Germany only by providing them with the same civil rights with those who had remained in the rear during the war. In the modern nation-state with the armed forces based on universal conscription, the demand to risk one's life and even sacrifice it on the battlefield for the future of one's nation implies the right to participate in the political will that determines the most important issues of the nation-state existence. Weber wrote that

> the *legal* introduction of equal suffrage in Prussia is, however, a demand of the *Reich* in the interests of national politics, for the *Reich* must be able to call on its citizens to fight for their own existence and honor again in the future, should this prove necessary. It is not sufficient for this purpose to have supplies of munitions and other materials and the necessary official bodies; what is also needed is the nation's *inner readiness* to defend this state as *its* state . . . This is the crucial political reason why the *Reich* must ensure that equal suffrage is implemented everywhere, by coercion if necessary. (1994b [1917]: 125–126)[23]

Despite the fact that politics, according to Weber, "is not an ethical matter," he considered the extension of suffrage after the war a "matter of political decency" for the soldiers who fought at the front to defend their German Fatherland. In other words, Weber saw the meaning of the urgent reform of the Prussian three-class system of suffrage primarily in that "the warriors who fought in the battles would get a decisive vote on the new arrangement of the homeland after the war."[24]

However, for Weber, the reform of the electoral system of Prussia and of the political system of Germany did not only have an internal political significance. He argued that the rapid restoration of Germany's position on the world stage after the war was only possible provided political unity and social consolidation within the country were achieved, which required both the extension of civil rights of the broad masses and the democratization of the political system. According to Weber, that was the only way to establish the plenipotentiary parliamentary government and responsible political leadership. He defined this problem as a clear alternative when he wrote: "There are only two choices: either the mass of citizens is left without freedom or rights in a bureaucratic 'authoritarian state' which has only the appearance of parliamentary rule, and in which the citizens are 'administered' like a herd of cattle; or the citizens are integrated into the state by making them its *co-rulers*" (Weber, 1994b [1917]: 129).[25] However, as Weber acknowledged, formulating this alternative in such a sharp, antithetic form was by and large imaginary, because Germany, which was one of the few industrially developed countries of the West at that time, could not but play the role of a 'great power' on the world stage. Therefore, in a certain sense, Germany was doomed to either create such a viable national state that would meet the aspirations of both ruling elites and broad masses, or to lose the status of world power.[26]

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23. MWG, I/15: 392–393.

24. Frankfurter Zeitung, March 28, 1917 (MWG, I/15: 221).

25. MWG, I/15: 396.

26. Ibid. Earlier in 1916, Weber, when asked why Germans condemned themselves to being a nation with a great power and to playing an important role in world politics, answered: "*Why* did we doomed ourselves to this political fate and surrendered to the spell of history? Not due to vanity, but due to *the responsibility to history*. Not from the Swiss, Danes, Dutch or Norwegians the descendants will demand an answer for the form of culture on the Earth. It is us not them that the descendants will rightfully scold, if in the Western hemisphere of our planet there will be nothing except for Anglo-Saxon conventions and the Russian bureaucracy . . . The nation of seventy million people living between such world conquerors must be a powerful state . . . The honor of our people demands this. The German war — and we will never forget this — is *a matter of honor*, not a question of changes on the map or economic benefits" (MWG, I/15: 192).

To solve the tasks of the nation and the country, Weber proposed to supplement the democratization of the suffrage and the political system with the parliamentarization of the empire. In January 1918, Weber emphasized that "we wish *the democratization of the suffrage* and *the extension of the rights of parliament*."[27] He considered these two lines of the political reform to be closely related. When speaking about the "parliamentarization" of the empire, Weber did not mean the simple existence of an institution, called a 'parliament' by modern political science, or its wider powers. He defined parliamentarization as a reform of the political system of Germany, which would give the parliament the actual means of political control over the state bureaucracy. However, to perform this task successfully, a democratically-elected parliament needed serious political authority. Such authority was available only for the people's representation elected on the basis of universal, equal, and secret suffrage. The introduction of such a non-class universal suffrage would provide millions of Germans with an opportunity to take part in the most important political decisions.

Weber sharply objected to those German right-wing and left-wing intellectuals who opposed the country's parliamentarization in claiming that the "Great War" allegedly proved the advantages of *the direct military-dictatorial rule*. According to Weber, such judgments and assessments were reckless and short-sighted. Like the military socialism in the economy, the direct military dictatorship in politics was a product of extreme conditions typical for the wartime, regardless of its hidden monarchical or parliamentary forms; after the war, the direct military dictatorship would inevitably go into the past. Weber would write that

> enthusiasm for "democracy without parliamentary rule" was nourished during the war, of course, by the fact that as in any serious war — in all countries without exception, in England, France, Russia and Germany — a political-military *dictatorship* of the most comprehensive kind actually replaced the normal form of government, whether this was called a "monarchy" or a "parliamentary republic" and this will undoubtedly cast its shadow far into peacetime. This type of rule operates everywhere with a specific kind of mass demagogy and shuts down all normal valves and controls, including control by parliament. (1994b [1917]: 127–128)[28]

Weber's conclusions based on the analysis of the "Great War" were opposite to the conclusions of the supporters of "Prussian socialism" in Germany, such as Oswald Spengler, and the Bolsheviks in Russia. While Spengler considered the experience of war as the advantage of 'individual's serving the whole' in the old-Prussian spirit and as a justification of the dictatorship of strong personalities in politics,[29] the Bolshevik leaders

27. Berliner Tageblatt, January 17, 1918 (MWG, I/15: 744).

28. MWG, I/15: 394–395.

29. In 1920, Spengler wrote in the pamphlet "Preussentum und Sozialismus": "The German, or more precisely Prussian, instinct is that power belongs to the whole. An individual *serves* it. The whole is sovereign. The king is only the first person of the state (Frederick the Great). Everyone takes his place. He is given orders and obeys orders. From the 18th century this is the authoritarian socialism, not liberal and anti-democratic in its essence for we speak of the British liberalism and French democracy" (Spengler, 1920: 15).

considered Prussian "military socialism" as the first, necessary step towards a socialist planned economy. On the contrary, Weber believed that those political and social-economic forms, born in an emergency situation, were to die off or be dismantled in the course of the return of social, political, and economic life in Western countries to a peaceful norm. "Just as the war economy cannot serve as a model for a normal peacetime economy . . . wartime political arrangements cannot be the pattern for a peacetime political structure" (Weber, 1994b [1917]: 128).[30]

Weber's 1917 articles and speeches on the reform of the constitutional order of Prussia prove that he saw the future of Germany not in the right-wing or left-wing dictatorship, but in strengthening the foundations of parliamentarism. Weber stated that "one of the most powerful arguments *for* the creation of orderly *responsible* political leadership by *parliamentary* leaders is that such an arrangement weakens, as far as this is possible, the impact of purely emotional influences both from 'above' and 'below'" (1994b [1917]: 125).[31]

Just before the overthrow of the monarchy, Weber agreed that "where the system of Caesarism (in the wider sense of the word) operates, which is to say the direct, popular election of the head of state or a city, as in the United States, . . . democracy can exist *without* a parliamentary system — which does not mean entirely *without* parliamentary power" (1994b [1917]: 126–127).[32] Weber argued that such a model was not suitable for Germany with its monarchic rule, because it did not solve two fundamental problems: (1) it did not block the dilettantism of the monarch, who — due to the exclusion from the current political struggle — did not need to weigh his words or bear personal responsibility for his actions in politics, especially in foreign affairs, and (2) it did not have the effective means to control the activities of the bureaucratic management apparatus. Therefore, Weber concluded that

> the full power of parliament is indispensable wherever *hereditary* organs of state — monarchs — are the (formal) heads of officialdom. Inevitably, the modern monarch is always just as much of an *amateur* as any member of parliament and therefore quite incapable of controlling an administration. But there is this difference: a member of parliament can learn to weigh the *power of words* in party *conflict*, whereas the monarch is required to remain *outside* this struggle; furthermore, provided it has the right to hold *enquiries*, parliament is in a position to acquire the relevant facts on a subject (by cross-examining experts and witnesses under oath) and thus to control the actions of officials. (1994b [1917]: 127)[33]

Weber defined the functional advantage of the democratically elected parliament (as opposed to the unlimited monarchic rule and the system of soviets not recognizing the separation of powers), as the body that controls the bureaucracy while at the same time serves as an ideal platform for selecting political leaders.

30. MWG, I/15: 395.
31. MWG, I/15: 392.
32. MWG, I/15: 394.
33. MWG, I/15: 394.

Weber never shared the faith of orthodox Marxists that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" could serve as a means of salvation capable of putting an end to the "exploitation of man by man"; he considered such hopes as naive. Moreover, as a scholar and politician, Weber was well aware that "the system of political councils, despite the so-called elements of direct democracy, had nothing to do with democracy due to the class restrictions of suffrage" (Möller, 2004: 37–38).

The idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in its Leninist-Bolshevik interpretation was contrary to the hopes that Weber and other liberal German academics and intellectuals pinned on the democratization of the electoral system and political regime in Germany. The reforms for democratizing the German political system introduced universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage for all men and women who were citizens of the *Reich* and having reached the age of 20 (Article 22 of the Weimar Constitution, adopted on August 11, 1919). On the contrary, the Constitution of Soviet Russia (RSFSR) which was adopted in 1918 "explicitly did not give equal rights: members of the old exploiting classes were deprived of the right to vote in soviet elections, and urban workers' votes were heavily weighted as against peasants' votes. Associated with this was an elaborate structure of class-discriminatory laws and regulations designed to put workers in a privileged position and to disadvantage the bourgeoisie that had been in place since the Revolution" (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 155).

Finally, the idea of the self-governing 'state-commune' suggested by V. Lenin in *State and Revolution* (1917) did not solve the problem of the effective administrative control in mass industrial societies. Like the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!," the idea was good as a pretentious phrase capable of mobilizing workers and soldiers to break the bourgeois social order, but it turned out to be completely incapable of administering a large multinational country. Self-government as a form of direct political participation of individuals in public administration — Weber called such a method "management without domination" (*Herrschaftsfremde Verbandsverwaltung*) — was feasible only in small communities (MWG, I/23: 574). Concerning the control in large mass industrial societies, Weber identified two alternatives, those of either the amateur management by representatives of the old respected "nobility" (*Honoratioren*), which was leaving the social-political stage everywhere in the West in the early 20th century, or management by the specially-trained, professional bureaucracy. There was no third way. Weber emphasized that "democracy has only the choice of being run cheaply by the rich who hold honorary office, or of being run expensively by paid professional officials. The latter alternative, the development of professional officialdom, has become the fate of all modern democracies in which honorary office was inadequate to the task, that is, in the great mass states" (1994d [1918]: 276).[34]

The widespread use of old specialists in the Bolshevik government bodies and in the Red Army, as much as the November Revolution of 1918 in Germany, when the old bureaucratic apparatus of the empire transferred over to the new power without any exceptions and reductions, convinced Weber that the modern bureaucracy is nothing more

34. MWG, I/15: 603.

than a "living machine" of rational management based on formal rules, and is ready to indiscriminately serve whoever is interested in its services and ready to pay the officials their salary and ensure their proper social status. In November 1918, Weber wrote that "it turned out that a bureaucratic machine — by the nature of its ideal and material driving forces, and due to the nature of modern economic life, which, if it failed in this machine, would be in a catastrophic state — without hesitation is ready to serve *anyone* who physically possesses the means of violence and guarantees the preservation of bureaucratic posts" (MWG, I/16: 103).

Thus, speaking of the need to create a democratic political system in Germany after the fall of the monarchy in November 1918, Weber did not at all mean such a political structure would imply the democratic self-government of the masses. A year earlier, he wrote that "the system of the so-called direct democracy is technically possible only in a small state (canton). In all mass states, democracy leads to bureaucratic administration and, without parliamentarization, to *pure* rule by officials" (Weber, 1994b [1917]: 126–127).[35] Therefore, according to Weber, the conflict between the real alternatives of the German political system reform of the democratic type did not go along the lines of "direct democracy" versus the "rule of bureaucracy." In a mass industrial society, which Germany was by that time, the former was technically impossible, while the latter was technically necessary and inevitable. In fact, the question of German political system reform was whether the unlimited dominance of officials in a new democratic Germany would remain, or would this dominance be directed by elected and responsible political leaders and placed under the control of the democratically-elected parliament on the basis of universal, equal, and secret suffrage. At the same time, the democratization of the German political system was to put an end to the pressure of street radicals and both left-wing and right-wing political businessmen. Before the fall of the monarchy, Weber noted in December 1917 that "*only* the orderly *leadership* of the masses by responsible politicians is at all capable of breaking *unregulated* rule by the street and *leadership* by chance demagogues" (1994b [1917]: 125).[36] Weber's ideas on the political system of Germany after the November Revolution of 1918 and the collapse of the monarchy were presented in 1918–1919 in his theory of *mass plebiscitary democracy*.[37]

Germany in 1918: An Unfinished Revolution?

Why wasn't there a socialist revolution based on the Russian model in 1918 Germany? If we ignore the nuances of the political and geopolitical situation, then the general interpretation schemes that Weber used to analyze the revolutionary processes in Russia and in the West, including Germany, are very similar.[38] The normal capitalist development

35. MWG, I/15: 393–394.

36. MWG, I/15: 392.

37. On the significance of mass plebiscitary democracy for Weber's political theory, see: Beetham, 1985: 226–249; Loewenstein, 1966: 63–90; Mommsen, 1974: 72–94; Mommsen, 1984: 390–414; Müller, 2014: 40–48.

38. This general theoretical scheme of Weber's analysis of the revolutionary processes in Russia in 1905 and 1917 and in Germany in 1918–1919 will be discussed in the final part of the article.

of the economy and normalization of the conditions of everyday life were not possible in Russia or in Germany without private entrepreneurs managing the capital and being capable of getting the necessary loans for economic recovery from banks and foreign investors, and without an adjusted control apparatus that met the needs of the everyday administrative management.[39] As Weber emphasized in his public speeches of 1918–1919, a purely proletarian government did not inspire confidence in foreign countries and creditors. "Only a *bourgeois* government will get loans for *recovery*" (MWG, I/16: 113). Therefore, Weber considered all of the measures which were demanded by the doctrinal-minded circles of social democracy for the socialization of the economy as untimely and disastrous for the economic recovery of Germany. From his point of view, such measures had to be decisively rejected. In 1919, in his famous speech "Politics as a vocation," Weber emphasized that "where there is nothing, not only the Kaiser but also the proletarian has lost his rights" (1946 [1919]: 128). Certainly, when reflecting on the prospects for Germany's economic recovery after the war, Weber did not deny the possibility that Germany would use the methods of government intervention to overcome the catastrophic situation in the economy in the short term. However, he was convinced that the economic order based on state-controlled syndicates and state enterprises would lead to economic stagnation and to the exacerbation of social conflicts in the long run (Münkler, 1995: 46).

The same was true of political radicals and extremists from both the left and the right. All extreme political movements whose demands and actions were contrary to the needs of social-political stabilization and economic recovery, had to be marginalized and pushed out of politics. Under the economic chaos and post-war depression, the stabilization of the political and social-economic life was possible only if the bourgeois and business circles that sought to democratize the political system agreed with the moderate circles of social democracy and the trade union movement.[40] If such an alliance failed, an extreme reaction would push the bourgeois strata to the right. This would force the moderate strata of the middle class and even some workers to support the dictatorship of the wealthy classes (perhaps, together with foreign intervention) in order to restore the foundations of the bourgeois order. Weber argued that, without the normalization of the social-political life and without creating the prerequisites for a peaceful economic recovery and the peace treaty, "the socialist faith of the masses will be broken, and then the nation will 'ripen' for long periods of submission to the *new authoritarian authorities*, anyway how" (MWG, I/16: 380–381). Such a statement was determined by Weber's firm

39. On the social-political stabilization in the leading countries of Western Europe after the World War I and on the restart of the economic development as two imperatives of the post-military recovery in the 1920s, see the detailed study in Maier, 2015. See also a very informative essay by the same author on the two post-war periods in the restoration of Western Europe in the 1920s and 1950s: Maier, 1981: 327–352.

40. It was not without reason that Weber considered the agreement between the organizations of the German business community (initiated by the largest German industrialist Hugo Stinnes) and the Majority Social Democrats unions (the agreement was signed by Carl Legien) as one of the main real achievements of the November Revolution of 1918. This agreement, called the Stinnes-Legien Pact, laid the foundations for the social partnership of labor and capital, established an eight-hour working day, and excluded the so-called "yellow trade unions" from the negotiations of entrepreneurs and representatives of the organized labor movement (MWG, I/16: 399).

belief that it was simply impossible to manage the modern mass industrial society in the normal non-emergency conditions by any other means than rational-bureaucratic and market-capitalist. As Weber mentioned in his Viennese lecture on socialism in 1918, "the modern economy cannot be managed in any other way" (1994d [1918]: 279).[41]

In other words, Weber considered all lower-classes revolutions which aimed at overthrowing the existing social order and property order as reactionary in essence and unrealizable in principle, as evidenced by his analysis of Russian Bolshevism. Even before World War I, Weber wrote that the modern rational bureaucratic "apparatus makes 'revolutions' in the sense of the forceful creations of entirely new formations of authority, more and more impossible — technically, because of its control over the modern means of communications (telegraph, etc.) and also because of its increasingly rationalized inner structure" (1978/2: 989).[42] His works and speeches of 1917–1919 prove that neither the 1917 Russian Revolution nor the 1918 German Revolution made him change his views.

The question is why Weber's arguments failed to explain the process of revolution in Russia 1917, but were extremely accurate for the analysis of the revolutionary process in Germany and in the West in general. The answer to this question can be found in the peculiarities of the social-political situation in Russia and Germany, in the balance of social-class forces, and in the political and cultural-national traditions of the two countries.

When the Bolshevik coup took place in Russia in the fall of 1917, the war continued and the Russian army was in a state of advanced disintegration. There was no trace of the previous order and discipline. The authority of the officer corps was unusually low, which determined a sharp deterioration in the relationship between soldiers and officers. The soldiers' and sailors' councils controlled the situation at the front and in the rear units, and not a single order of the military command was executed without their approval, so that "Russian desertions, already rising as peasant soldiers responded to news of the land seizures, grew to epidemic proportions" (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 57). After the October coup, the declassed soldiers initially supported the new revolutionary government that had promised to end the war and give land to the peasants.

In Germany, the situation was quite different. Unlike the October 1917 in Russia, the peak of the revolutionary events in Germany was in the winter of 1918–1919, when the truce with the Entente powers was already signed, the fighting had stopped and the German soldiers, unlike the Russian soldiers, did not need to demand peace. In the internal political struggle of 1918–1919, both soldiers and war veterans played an important role, but they did not stand in a united front on the side of any particular political force. Many soldiers, especially war veterans, adhered to radical views, but again, unlike Russia, these were rather right-wing than left-wing views. By the summer of 1919, the number of *Freikorps*, the German right-wing paramilitaries consisting of former soldiers and officers, consisted of 442 thousand people (Weissbecker, 1990: 27). It was these paramilitary forces that played a decisive role in suppressing the putsch of the German Communists in Janu-

41. MWG, I/15: 607.
42. MWG, I/22-4: 210.

ary 1919 in Berlin, and in the defeat of the Soviet republics in a number of German lands in 1918–1919.

The fast demobilization of the army, accompanied by the provision of war veterans, soldiers, and officers with a number of social guarantees and payments, allowed the revolutionary-minded units to disband and neutralize the soldiers' councils that practically ceased to exist by the summer of 1919. The skillful demobilization policy of the military authorities and the lack of mass unemployment contributed to the fact that demobilization did not worsen the situation in the country.

The peace treaty with the Entente powers was a matter of life and death for Germany and the German nation, but the leaders of the Entente countries refused to negotiate peace with anyone except the authorized representatives of the National Constituent Assembly. This greatly undermined the position of the radical leftists because they could not count on the Entente powers to sit down with them at the negotiating table, and raised the chances of the bourgeois center and right-wing social-democratic center of holding power. The readiness of the leaders of the right-wing social democracy to form an alliance with the parties of the bourgeois center and even with the militarized right-wing groups in order to suppress the left-wing extremists and to protect the foundations of social order made the socialist revolution in Germany based on the Russian model almost impossible. The aspirations of the organized workers, especially the members of trade unions, also had very little in common with the intentions of the left-wing radicals from the Spartacus League. The aspirations of the middle strata and of a large part of workers were limited to the peace treaty and a democratic system based on liberal-bourgeois principles, which resulted in demands for the early convocation of the democratically-elected National Constituent Assembly so that it would adopt a new constitution, and sign a peace treaty with the allies on terms acceptable to Germany.

Finally, in 1918–1919 Germany, the problem that played a fatal role in the Russian Revolution of 1917, that is, *the agrarian question*, did not exist. In Russia, the peasant masses were united by the radical agenda. They demanded the gratuitous alienation of the landlord and private land and its equal redistribution among the members of the rural community. In Germany, on the contrary, the strong peasants-landowners prevailed in the village and made good money during the war on food and raw materials supplies. Their interests were closer to those of the large landowners than to those of the rural poor and farm laborers. Therefore, the peasants-landowners became a powerful stronghold and a stabilizer of the social order which the German urban bourgeoisie and the old imperial bureaucracy could fully rely upon. It should also be noted that such a strong commitment of German farmers to the principles of the inviolability of private property and social order affected the attitudes of the army in which many peasants served. Thus, the majority of peasant-landowners supported the bourgeois 'forces of order' in Germany, unlike in Russia. The bourgeois classes in the cities also did not intend to surrender their social-class positions and their newly acquired power without a fight.

In other words, despite the trials and hardships of the masses during the war, the configuration of the social-class forces in post-war Germany did not favor a socialist

revolution of the Bolshevik type. It was this peculiar balance of social-class forces that Weber meant when he spoke contemptuously about the attempts of the radical leftists to organize a communist coup in Germany, and establish a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' following the example of Soviet Russia. Weber stressed that both the urban and rural bourgeoisies of Germany would give a decisive armed rebuff to such adventures. When speaking to Austrian reserve officers in Vienna in the summer of 1918, Weber mentioned the hopes of the Bolshevik leaders to unleash the socialist revolution in Germany, and in particular of Leon Trotsky who led the Soviet delegation at the negotiations with the powers of the Fourth Union in Brest-Litovsk, calling these hopes completely baseless: "Trotsky hoped, by means of wars of words and the misuse of such words as 'peace' and 'self-determination,' to unleash civil war in Germany. He was, however, so ill-informed as to be ignorant of the fact that at least two-thirds of the German army is recruited from the countryside: and a further one-sixth from the petite bourgeoisie, for whom it would be a genuine pleasure to slap down the workers, or anyone else who wanted to start any such revolution" (1994d [1918]: 300).[43]

When analyzing the trends of the political-social development of Germany after the November Revolution of 1918, Weber had to take not only the balance of social-political and social-economic forces in the country but also the geopolitical situation into account. The latter clearly did not favor a stable republican democratic system in Germany.

The fact that the democratic republic was established in Germany in the most unfavorable political and international conditions repeatedly affected its historical fate negatively. The democratic republic was established under the armed defeat and the collapse of the old political order; it had had every chance of becoming a "republic without republicans" and a new political form alien to both the old ruling elites and the broad masses. Weber saw the difficulties that the authorities of new democratic Germany had to face from the very beginning perfectly.

In the fall of 1918, Weber wrote that "it is very bad for the development of the sense of national dignity that democracy did not come to us in the same way as to Holland, England, America or France — due to the successful battles, or as we sought: it became the result of the defeat and not of the honorable peace. Moreover, there is also the shameful liquidation of the bankrupt old regime, which was a burden to our democracy and now darkens politically its future. At first our democracy can promise the nation only sad days. The republic sends us rays of hope, but today we do not know if they all will come true" (MWG, I/16: 107).

The international context of the establishment of the first German democracy did not remove the question of the viability of the political forces that took the leading positions in the new political order.[44] The fate of the revolution in Germany crucially depended on

43. Weber's passage is even more harsh in German (MWG, I/15: 630).

44. The second German democracy — the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) — was established in 1949 also due to the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, but this military defeat was accompanied by the complete and unconditional surrender, occupation by the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition and subsequent division of the country into the Western and Soviet zones of influence. Paradoxically, it was in 1945-1949 that all of Weber's painful fears of 1918–1919 came true. "In the East," wrote Raymond Aron, commenting on

the political position of the social democracy that split into three rival factions during the war. "Under the strain of responding to the war effort, the GSPD finally split in 1917. The more radical wing formed the so-called Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), while the majority remained with the more moderate GSPD, sometimes known as the Majority Social Democratic Party. A loose, more radical grouping further to the left of the Social Democrats was the Spartacus League, whose leading lights were Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It was in this complex domestic configuration that the new republic was born" (Fulbrook, 2015: 21). The majority of the organized workers remained loyal to the former right-wing leadership of the GSPD headed by Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, who became the leaders of the Majority Social Democrats.

In his articles and public speeches in the winter of 1918–1919, Weber expressed doubts that the leaders of the German social democracy would be able to solve their political tasks. In his 1894 speech when he took the position of professor in Freiburg, Weber had already expressed doubts that German social democracy was mature enough in terms of its political experience and ability of its political leaders to decide Germany's political fate. Weber blamed not only the political legacy of Bismarck, whose authoritarian course did not develop equal civil partnership with various forces of the German society, but also the internal vices of the social-democratic movement.

Weber said then "what is *threatening* about our situation is the fact that the bourgeois classes seem to be wilting as the bearers of the *power*-interests of the nation, while there is still no sign that the workers are beginning to become mature enough to take their place" (1994a [1894]: 26). According to Weber, "if we were indeed successful in creating an 'aristocracy of labor' to be the bearer of the political sense of purpose (*Sinn*) which today's labor movement, in our view, lacks, could the spear of leadership, which the arm of the bourgeoisie is still too weak to bear, be transferred to the broader shoulders of the workers. But that moment still seems a long way off" (Ibid.: 27).

Thus, Weber had every reason to fear that the Majority Social Democrats in November 1918 could not cope with the overwhelming burden of administering the new state under economic chaos and military defeat. The success of the political system reform and social-political stabilization depended on the decisions of the new authorities that had replaced the collapsed monarchy to a great extent. In November 1918, the Council of People's Delegates, consisting of the leaders of the moderate factions of the German social democracy, became the new power. For decades, German social democracy had demanded the socialist restructuring of society; therefore, most of the members of were law-abiding, right-wing reformists. For them, just like for the representatives of other

the results of World War II in Europe, "the outcome of World War II was the same as it would have been for World War I if the Tsarist regime had survived. As soon as Germany was eliminated, the contested areas of Eastern Europe fell under Russian domination. They were occupied by Soviet troops and turned into popular democracies. In the twentieth century, armies are accompanied by regimes and ideologies" (Aron, 2002 [1957]: 59). Nevertheless, the second democracy in Germany was much more successful than the first. The second democracy escaped the fate of the Weimar Republic. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, it managed not only to integrate into the military-political structures of the Western world but also to become the engine of the economic development and unification of Western Europe.

groups of German society, the revolution that many experts had predicted for so long was still a complete surprise. Having been taken to the top of power by the revolutionary whirlwind, they very soon found themselves in the forced and unusual role of the defenders of the bourgeois order from the attacks of left-wing radicals. In its turn, the new socialist government managed to hold power because it accepted the help of the army command and right-wing paramilitary units consisting of former front-line soldiers from the very beginning. The alliance with the army command allowed the right-wing social democracy to avoid the mistakes of the moderate Russian socialists from the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries parties. The fact that there was no "German October" can be also explained by the united opposition of the reformist moderate Majority Social Democrats and forces of the bourgeois order to the "red threat."

The stabilizing political role of social democracy at the moment of crisis in the history of Germany had its historical background. Unlike the Bolshevik Party in Russia, the German Social Democrats became a powerful national political force during the war that led a large part of the organized labor movement. Before the war, German social democracy perceived the national political system and especially the monarchy with a certain distrust and even hostility; after the war began, social democracy and its faction in the *Reichstag* took the social-patriotic position. There was a dynamic *nationalization* of the party, which the "iron chancellor" Bismarck once called, together with German Catholics and their political organizations, the main internal enemies of the new German Empire. According to Weber, the evolution of the German Social Democratic Party during the war was an important lesson for anyone interested in politics in the modern world. He described this evolution as follows: "Precisely the experience of this war (including what is now happening in Russia) has demonstrated a point we have emphasized already, namely that *no* party, whatever its program, can assume the *effective* direction of the state *without becoming national*" (Weber, 1994b [1917]: 106–107).[45]

In the pre-war period, Weber had already advocated for the real participation of the moderate social democracy in public administration (Mommsen, 1984: 101–123). He believed that such participation in the national parliament as well as in public administration was the best way to ensure the social unity of the nation and progressive social policy. Moreover, such participation would provide the leaders and activists of social democracy with an indispensable experience of state administration which could be of a worthy use. Weber explained this position using the fact that "democratic parties which *share in government* are bearers of nationalism everywhere" (1994b [1917]: 82).[46]

The change in Weber's attitude towards the German socialists was determined by both the vote of the social-democratic faction in the *Reichstag* for military credits and the Majority Social Democrats' support for the military efforts of the German Empire in World War I. During the war, the right-wing Majority Social Democrats became the key participant of the intra-German political coalition that aimed at keeping the civil peace (*Burgfrieden*). When commenting on the position of German social democracy during

45. MWG, I/15: 373.
46. MWG, I/15: 349.

the war, Weber noted that "even the truly modest measure of actual and precarious participation conceded to the representatives of radical democracy in Germany during the war was sufficient to persuade them to place themselves at the service of objective (*sachlich*) *national* politics" (1994b [1917]: 82).[47]

The position of the party's leadership and of the majority of its members during the war inevitably affected the political choice made by the moderate social democracy after the defeat of Germany and the fall of the monarchy. This was the choice of concluding a peace treaty, democratizing the political system, and implementing progressive social reforms within the capitalist system, and not the choice of the complete destruction of the old bourgeois order under socialist slogans. If the moderate social democracy welcomed a revolution, it was only the revolution that did not threaten the foundations of the traditional bourgeois order. The late autumn of 1918 position of the Majority Social Democrats and their leaders of democratic reforms to prevent the revolution determined their readiness to make an alliance with the bourgeois forces to preserve the foundations of social order. In July, soon before the eve of the November Revolution of 1918, the leader of the Majority Social Democrats and the future first president of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert, unequivocally expressed the position of the party leadership: "Anyone who witnessed the events in Russia, in the interests of the proletariat cannot wish for the same development of affairs in our country" (Ebert, 1918: 586). For the same reason, the right-wing social democracy condemned the October coup of 1917 and the civil war in Russia, and called the "dictatorship of the proletariat" established by the Bolsheviks a version of the "Asian despotism" (Zarusky, 1998).

One of the features of the German Revolution of 1918 was that the main struggle was not between right-wing and left-wing forces, but between the moderate leftists and the left-wing radicals which created the German Communist Party (GCP) in the winter of 1918–1919. German communists openly focused on Russian Bolshevism, and demanded the dictatorship of the proletariat in Germany. On the contrary, after the military defeat and the collapse of the monarchy, the right-wing forces were so demoralized that they could not play an independent political role. On the evening of November 10, 1918, the new chief of staff of the Western front army, General Groener, called Ebert and offered his troops to fight the Bolshevik danger. In the next few months, the Ebert-Groener agreement allowed for the suppression of the actions of the left-wing radicals, thus preventing a full-scale civil war of the Russian type.

The idea of an early peace with the countries of the Entente and the demands for democratizing the political system were very popular among all groups of German society, while the left-wing radicals' demands for establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat and for the social restructuring on the basis of Marxist socialism were not widely accepted. The most important condition for the victory of the right-wing Majority Social Democrats was their unification of all the powers of the propertied bourgeois Germany

47. Ibid.

under the slogans of convening the National Constituent Assembly and preserving the foundations of the bourgeois social order.

An important stabilizing role in the development of the German Revolution was the fact that the main demands of the masses for the democratization of the political system and the implementation of progressive social reforms were met by the Council of People's Delegates in the very first months of the revolution, which eliminated the grounds for the radicalization of revolutionary slogans at the first stages of the revolutionary process. The Council of People's Delegates approved an eight-hour working day and unemployment benefits, guaranteed the mandatory re-instatement of demobilized soldiers to their previously-held jobs, and proclaimed universal and equal suffrage for men and women from the age of 20, together with all political rights and freedoms. The Commission on Socialization of a number of industries was created and led by the famous Marxist theorists Karl Kautsky and Rudolph Gilferding. Thus, the German Revolution ended before it had even managed to begin.

The attempt of the left-wing radicals to use the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" to direct the revolutionary process in Germany on the Russian path completely failed. At the Berlin All-German Congress of Soviets from December 16-20, 1918, only 10 delegates out of 489 voted for the transfer of power to the soviets, while the overwhelming majority voted for elections to the National Constituent Assembly in January, 1919. The struggle of the radical leftists against the revolutionary government of the right-wing Majority Social Democrats, which reached its peak in the winter of 1918–1919, ended by the complete defeat of the radical leftists and the deaths of their most prepared and prominent leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. This ensured the conditions for the stabilization of the social-political situation and for democratic elections to the National Constituent Assembly. The Assembly's deputies, meeting in Weimar in February, 1919, elected the social democrat Friedrich Ebert as the first president of the republic, and adopted the constitution of the new democratic Germany. Therefore, the 'party of businessmen' (an expression of the Russian philosopher Fedor Stepun, who studied in Germany on the eve of World War I and knew the social-political situation in the country quite well), consisting of moderate social democrats and centrist bourgeois circles, quickly won over both the left-wing and right-wing radicals.

Conclusion

Despite the fact that Weber's 1917–1919 articles and speeches on the political system reform in Prussia and the German Empire and on the development of the institutions of new democratic Germany were topical and their content was determined mainly by the rapidly changing social-political context, their value is far beyond a situational political analysis.[48] Moreover, Weber's conclusions and proposals for the new political structure

48. David Beetham was among the first to note this in his study of Weber's theory of modern politics. Despite the fact that Weber's works on Germany and on Russia during revolutions of 1905 and 1917 primarily "commented on some specific issues of politics . . . such issues could only be made intelligible in terms of

of Germany are determined by a coherent theoretical system based on several theses. The conclusion of the article focuses on the key features of this theoretical scheme and its significance for the social-philosophical and social-scientific study of the historical destiny of modernity.

As Weber stressed in the series of articles "Parliament and Government in Germany under a new Political Order," the world of modernity as developed in the West in Modern Times could have become the winner in all of the disasters of the era by only providing worthy answers to the three main questions that determined the historical fate of the West in the early 20th century. Weber carefully studied these in a series of articles on the future political structure of democratic Germany.

Designed to describe the main features and development trends of modernity, Weber starts his theoretical scheme with rationalization and bureaucratization, along with their global significance. In 1918, Weber asked the question of "how is it *at all possible* to salvage any remnants of 'individual' freedom of movement *in any sense*, given this all-powerful trend towards bureaucratization?" (1994c [1918]: 159).[49] This question clearly echoes the question raised by Weber in 1906 in the articles on the revolution in Russia of the civilizational prerequisites and historical destinies of the modern world. Weber's concern about the fate of modern individualism and liberalism of the Western type was determined by his understanding that the economic development trends of the early 20th century did not contribute to the consolidation of these cultural-political values and corresponding forms of behavior, but, on the contrary, led to their destruction and decline. Weber had already noted in 1906 that "if it were *only* a question of the 'material' conditions and the complex of interests directly or indirectly 'created' by them, any sober observer would have to say that *all* economic indicators point in the direction of growing 'unfreedom'. It is absolutely ridiculous to attribute to the high capitalism which is today being imported into Russia and already exists in America — this 'inevitable' economic development — any elective affinity with 'democracy' let alone with 'liberty'" (1995a [1906]: 108–109).[50] In other words, Weber linked the tendencies towards rationalization and bureaucratization, typical for mature Western capitalism, with the tendencies to economic stagnation and political non-freedom, thus trying to find such forces that would constitute a counterbalance to these negative trends.

In the political domain, the question of the historical fate of modernity takes on a different form. Here Weber asks: "In view of the growing indispensability and hence increasing power of state officialdom, which is our concern here, how can there be any guarantee that forces exist which can impose limits on the enormous crushing power of this constantly growing stratum of society and control it effectively? How is democracy even in this restricted sense to be *at all possible*?" (1994c [1918]: 159).[51] Under the auspices

a wider analysis of the social and political forces involved. It is possible to build up a remarkably consistent picture of these from the different periods of Weber's writing" (Weber, 1985 [1974]: 151).

49. MWG, I/15: 465–466.

50. MWG, I/10: 270.

51. MWG, I/15: 466.

of the 1918 Revolution in Germany, Weber tried to answer this second, political question on the historical fate of modernity by creating a theory of mass plebiscitary democracy designed to solve the three main problems of modern politics in the mass industrial society, those of (1) political leadership, (2) effective administrative management, and (3) the political participation of the masses in making the most important state decisions. Thus, the Weberian interpretation of the essence of modern politics is the search for an effective balance of three main actors of the mass politics of the 20th century, those of political leaders, the bureaucratic apparatus of domination and control, and the political role of the masses.

It is well known that Weber rejected the natural-law and radical-democratic approaches for the justification of modern democracy. He preferred a more prosaic and businesslike approach, for he simply did not see any other serious alternative to democracy in the modern world. According to Weber, mass democracy was necessary as a form of mass public legitimation and justification for political rule and institutions in the West in the twentieth century. Concerning Germany, he was also convinced that the dissemination of democratic institutions and management techniques was the only means of overcoming authoritarian rule and of limiting the uncontrolled power of government officials with effective forms of public control. As the modern mass democracy has no alternative except for public administration by specially-trained officials, the control over the bureaucratic apparatus of domination becomes of paramount importance. Moreover, the primary task of modern politics is to learn how to take advantage of the professional officials' competencies and skills while putting them under reliable democratic control at the same time. Therefore, when officials-functionaries and the masses become the main actors in modern mass states, responsible leadership becomes the main challenge for Weber who considered it as a source for solutions to the problems of political control over the bureaucracy and of the political leadership of the masses.

Finally, in the domain of social-historical anthropology, the question of the fragility of the modern world and its possibilities for survival takes on the following form: "Which human and social types are historically in demand to preserve individualistic freedoms, economic dynamism and political democracy inherent in the world of modernity?." Weber formulates this third and "the most important of all questions" (1994c [1918]: 159) on the current trends in the development of the modern world by focusing on the professional bureaucracy when he writes that "it is clear that its effectiveness has strict internal limits, both in the management of public, political affairs and in the private economic sphere. The *leading spirit*, the 'entrepreneur' in the one case, the 'politician' in the other, is something different from an 'official'. Not necessarily in form, but certainly in substance" (Ibid.).[52]

What distinguishes a politician and an entrepreneur from a professional official? Weber stressed that "the difference lies rather in the kind of *responsibility* borne by each of them, and this is largely what determines the demands made on their particular abilities"

52. MWG, I/15: 466.

(1994c [1918]: 160).[53] He adds that "the official should stand 'above the parties', which in truth means that he must remain outside the *struggle* for power of his own. The struggle for personal power and the acceptance of full *personal responsibility for one's cause* (*Sache*) which is the consequence of such power — this is the very element in which the politician and the entrepreneur live and breathe" (Ibid.: 161).[54]

Just as the entrepreneur represents the main source of dynamism and innovations in the market-capitalist economy and prevents it from making no headway by his innovations, the leadership in politics requires a great insight and responsibility from those politicians who should be fundamentally different from the officials-executors' social-psychological type in order to effectively perform their tasks.[55] It can be seen here that the figures of a dynamic entrepreneur and a responsible politician are put forward in the center of Weber's analysis of modernity. Lacking their assistance, the institutional order of modern society is doomed to lose its own dynamic character both in economics and politics. Moreover, Weber draws a far-reaching analogy between a private entrepreneur and an independent politician. He regards these figures as the carriers of the private initiative and personal autonomy which allow them to be the most important counterbalance to the far-gone proceedings of rationalization and bureaucratization in the world of modernity.

Thus, in his articles and speeches during the German Revolution of 1918, Weber-the-scholar and Weber-the-politician used a coherent social-theoretical system to study the historical fate of the modern world in the West. This theoretical scheme, originally used by Weber to analyze the 1905 Revolution in Russia and then refined in his analysis of the historical material of the 1918 Revolution in Germany, is still valid for interpreting the problems of contemporary political and public life, provided the new historical experience of the 20th century is taken into account along with integrating the theoretical potential of Weber's scheme into present-day social-scientific work.

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53. MWG, I/15: 467.

54. MWG, I/15: 468.

55. Weber wrote in 1917: "However — and people often forget this — even the most outstanding civil servant is not necessarily a good politician, and vice versa" (MWG, I/15: 244; Weber, 1995b [1917]: 245).

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Макс Вебер и Ноябрьская революция 1918 года в Германии, или Почему у большевизма не было шансов на Западе

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К числу канонических жанров современной социально-философской и социально-научной мысли относится особый тип исследования, который в немецкой социологии и социальной теории XX века было принято называть «диагнозом эпохи» (Zeitdiagnose), т.е. анализом конкретной исторической ситуации. Первоклассный пример такого применения социально-теоретического знания для диагноза и прогноза актуальных тенденций развития современности дают статьи, публикации и выступления Макса Вебера последних военных и первых послевоенных лет. Статья посвящена политическому и социальному диагнозу эпохи, данному Вебером в его статьях 1917–1919 годов, связанных с обсуждением проблем послевоенного переустройства Германии на демократических началах. Особое внимание уделяется оценке Вебером путей политического и социального развития Германии после поражения в мировой войне и Ноябрьской революции 1918 года. Отдельно рассматриваются взгляды Вебера на перспективы социалистической революции в странах Центральной Европы после окончания мировой войны по образцу большевистской революции в России 1917 года. Подробно освящаются и анализируются также предложения Вебера по реформе политической и избирательной системы Германской империи. В заключительной части статьи дается обобщенная характеристика той теоретической схемы, которой Вебер руководствовался при своем анализе событий и процессов революции 1918 года в Германии и раскрывается ее значение для понимания исторических судеб мира модерна.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, диагноз эпохи, Германская империя, ноябрьская революция 1918 года в Германии, современная массовая демократия, индивидуализм, свобода, большевизм, рационализация, бюрократизация, современный мир

The Soviet Version of Modernity: Weberian and Post-Weberian Perspectives

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The article discusses several approaches to the study of Soviet society drawing on Max Weber's theoretical models or following a broadly-understood Weberian tradition in historical sociology. Weberian perspectives have been used for the analysis of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The early Bolshevik Party has been characterized as a community of "ideological *virtuosi*" while its further development has been described either as "incomplete rationalization" or as a re-traditionalization. In the article, it is argued that employing the post-Weberian multiple modernities approach allows us to overcome some of the difficulties that have emerged in this case. In particular, the article focuses on Johann Arnason's analysis of the Soviet model of modernity. For Arnason, the Soviet model incorporated both the legacy of imperial transformation from above and the revolutionary vision of a new society. He claims that communism represented a distinctive version of modernity rather than a deviation from the modernizing mainstream. In recent historical studies of the Soviet period, two approaches have been formed stressing the modernity of the Soviet regime or its neo-traditionalist aspects. The distinction between these approaches has been discussed by Michael David-Fox. The article considers the parallels between the new historical studies of Soviet society, on the one hand, and both Weberian and post-Weberian sociological perspectives, on the other.

Keywords: Max Weber, historical sociology, Johann Arnason, communism, modernity, Soviet society

Introduction

The international Weber renascence and a new wave of historical sociology represented important developments in world sociology since the 1970s. It has been argued that Weber's works can be examined "in a manner that clarifies their present-day utility to comparative-historical sociologists" (Kalberg, 1994: 3). Two main research strategies have been used in Weberian historical sociology. On the one hand, Weber's own concepts were employed, though these concepts could be systematized and modified. On the other hand, new theoretical approaches were used that followed a broadly understood Weberian tradition in historical sociology. In the latter case, concepts borrowed from other theoretical traditions could be employed, and new ideal types could be constructed. However, it should be noted that there were no attempts of a comprehensive analysis of

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Soviet communism from a Weberian perspective that could be compared to Weber's own studies of the economic ethic of world religions. At the same time some aspects of the development of Soviet society were considered by historical sociologists who drew on Weberian theory in their research.

The first part of the article discusses the approaches to the study of the Soviet system based on the concepts of Weber's sociology. In particular, the first part evaluates the works of Stefan Breuer and Klaus-Georg Riegel, both offering Weberian analyses of Soviet communism. The second part considers the post-Weberian multiple modernities approach to Soviet-type societies as elaborated by Johann Arnason. It is argued that this approach allows us to overcome some contradictions connected with the use of Weberian perspectives. Finally, the third part presents an account of recent debates on modernity and neo-traditionalism in Soviet society in the works of historians. It is emphasized that common points can be found in sociological and historical studies of the Soviet version of modernity.

Weberian Approaches to Communism

The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the early Soviet system have been discussed from a Weberian theoretical perspective by Stefan Breuer, who demonstrates the relevance of Weber's analysis of communism for understanding the revolution and its consequences. Weber distinguished three basic types of communism; the household communism of a traditional family, military communism, and finally, the communism of a religious group (1978: 153). These forms belonged mostly to pre-modern societies, but examples could also be found in modern times. Thus, in his articles on the Russian Revolution of 1905, Weber referred to the Russian peasant commune as the last remnant of communism in Europe. He described the clash between the institutions and values of modern capitalism and the archaic communism of the Russian peasantry (Weber, 1995).

Drawing on Weber's concepts, Breuer analyzes not only this type of agrarian communism but also the communism of the revolutionary army and the communism of the Russian intelligentsia. According to Breuer, all three forms played an important role in the Russian Revolution of 1917. At the same time, he tends to diminish the significance of peasant communism in favor of the other two forms. For Breuer, "the comradeship communism of the rebellious army" played a smaller part in the revolutionary events than Weber had believed since "the charismatic bands of followers of the Revolution's initial period were quickly transformed into a well-disciplined mass army" (1992: 270–271). The third form of communism discussed by Weber was represented by the utopian communism of the intelligentsia. However, in Breuer's view, Weber underestimated the role of this form in the Russian Revolution; his attitude to the Bolsheviks was based on the conviction that history "had never produced a single instance where intellectuals had actually brought down a state and then reconstructed it according to their own ideas" (Ibid.: 272).

Unlike Weber, Breuer regards the Soviet political regime as a form of legitimate domination. Breuer believes that the concept of charismatic domination is relevant in this case, although he singles out not the personal qualities of the revolutionary leaders but rather the impersonal charisma of the Bolshevik party as a community of "ideological *virtuosi*." This concept that draws on the Weberian notion of religious *virtuosi* was originally used by Roth (1984) for the analysis of countercultural movements of the 1960s. In addition, Breuer refers to the concept of charisma of reason which was applied by Weber to the 1789 French Revolution. For Weber, the charismatic glorification of reason by Robespierre represented "the last form that charisma has adopted in its fateful historical course" (1978: 1209). However, in Breuer's view, this form of charisma distinguished not only the French Jacobinism, but other revolutionary movements including Bolshevism. While he acknowledges the differences between these movements, Breuer also finds common features of Jacobinism and Bolshevism, such as the belief that society could only be changed by revolutionary means, preference for centralized and statist organizational forms, and the fetishization of revolutionary ideology (1992: 279).

Some parallels can be found between Breuer's analysis and Eisenstadt's approach to Jacobin ideology. For Eisenstadt, Jacobinism set the paradigm for revolutionary transformations of modernity. The essence of the Jacobin program was the belief in the transformation of society through political action: "The pristine Jacobin orientations and movements have been characterized by a strong predisposition to develop not only a totalistic world-view, but also over-arching totalitarian all-encompassing ideologies, which emphasize a total reconstitution of the social and political order" (Eisenstadt, 1999: 73). According to Eisenstadt, the Jacobin component could be found in different political forms but they developed first in "leftist" revolutionary movements "which often conflated the primacy of politics with the implementation of a technologic or moralistic vision of progress and reason" (Ibid.).

Breuer argues that the Bolshevik regime that tried to reconstruct the whole society according to a rational plan could be considered as the embodiment of charisma of reason. He emphasizes the rational features in the Soviet system although, as he acknowledges, the Bolshevik type of rationalization "remains strangely incomplete" (1992: 284). Breuer analyzes the early Bolshevik government and provides a general account of the Soviet system as a whole. He does not discuss the character of the Stalinist regime in the USSR in detail. This seems to be paradoxical since most researchers representing different schools in Soviet studies regarded Stalin's "revolution from above" as the decisive moment in formation of the Soviet system (Tucker, 1992; Fitzpatrick, 1999). This decisive moment has been practically ignored in Breuer's analysis. Apparently, the Stalinist dictatorship hardly fits into his theoretical scheme.

On the other hand, Breuer tries to explain the reasons for an incomplete Soviet rationalization in the post-Stalinist period. He refers to Weber's analysis of the tendency towards bureaucratic autonomization. As Breuer points out, bureaucracies which escape from political control and pursue their own interests "treat offices as sinecures, monopolize the leading positions for functionary advancement, develop a pronounced 'guild'

mentality, and allow other factors besides purely technical qualifications to enter into appointment decisions" (1992: 284). Thus, Breuer takes some unintended consequences of the Bolshevik project into consideration. Nevertheless, his main focus is on the early stage of implementation of the project. Apparently, Breuer's analysis should be supplemented with other approaches to the Soviet system.

A Weberian account of the evolution of the Bolshevik party has also been offered by Klaus-Georg Riegel. It is characteristic that, like Breuer, he starts with the notion of "ideological *virtuosi*" but he makes some conclusions that are altogether different. Riegel focuses on a comparative analysis of religious communities and revolutionary organizations. He claims that the evolution of religious communities and particularly monastic orders offers a possibility of a comparison between secular communities of *virtuosi* and their religious predecessors (Riegel, 2002: 112). For Riegel, in spite of the obvious differences in the purposes of their activities, religious and secular communities of *virtuosi* possess some similar structural characteristics.

Riegel devotes special attention to the "confession rituals" in the revolutionary parties. In his micro-sociological analysis of such rituals in the Bolshevik party, this scholar draws not only on Weberian theoretical models but also on some ideas of Durkheim and Foucault. He discusses the transition of the Bolshevik party as a community of "ideological *virtuosi*" into a "hierocracy" under Stalin, drawing a parallel with Weber's account of the rise of professional priesthood. For Weber, the emergence of a church is accompanied by the rationalization of dogma and rituals. Accordingly, the Holy Scriptures are provided with commentaries and then turned into objects of systematic education. At the same time, the personal charisma of the *virtuosi* is substituted with the charisma of office while the administrative apparatus with disciplined functionaries is formed (Ibid.: 117).

Riegel considers Marxism-Leninism as a kind of political religion. As he argues, the Leninist cult, which was already established during his lifetime, "laid the foundations for a political and sacral tradition which could be selectively used by the Stalinist hierocratic power" (Riegel, 2005: 109). For Riegel, the formation of Stalin's "hierocracy" included a selective reformulation of the Leninist legacy. Riegel claims that the new "sacral tradition" was invented by "ideological experts" of Stalinist orthodoxy. He writes: "The most important tenet of faith in this invented sacral tradition of Marxism-Leninism was that Stalin alone qualified as the only true disciple of Lenin; the consequence thus being his monopoly of infallible interpretation of his holy scriptures" (Ibid.: 110).

In Riegel's view, the traits of "hierocracy" were particularly conspicuous in the party purges of the late 1930s, but it should be taken into account that only an analogy between the Bolshevik regime and the system of hierocratic domination can be discussed. This analogy can be really convincing, as Riegel's analysis of Stalinist "criticism and self-criticism" demonstrates. Nevertheless, crucial differences exist between political and hierocratic domination. Overall, Riegel's analysis can be seen as complementary to other Weberian approaches, but it does not allow us to provide a detailed account of the Soviet political regime.

It seems that the concept of artificially-produced charisma could also be relevant for such an account. According to Weber, charisma can be "a gift that inheres in an object or person simply by virtue of natural endowment" but charisma may also "be produced artificially in an object or person" (1978: 400). While genuine charisma was characteristic of religious prophets and founders of empires, charisma is manufactured with the use of the mass media in modern political life. The concept of manufactured charisma has been applied to fascist regimes. Thus, the rise of Mussolini and Hitler "whose biography prior to their entry into politics is rather pale and below average" was due to artificially produced charisma (Breuer, 2008: 22). Apparently, this also applies to Stalin.

In the Soviet case, one could speak of a clash between the impersonal charisma of reason of the "old Bolsheviks" and the largely manufactured Stalin's personal charisma in the second half of the 1920s. By the middle of the 1930s, the emphasis was shifted from the manufacturing of personal charisma to the invention of the new tradition (Maslovskiy, 2016: 27). This culminated in the 1938 publication of the Stalinist "holy scripture," *The Short Course of History of the All-Union Communist Party*. This book, published at the end of the Great Purge, "gave the charismatic leadership a traditional basis through a mythical account of party history" (Arnason, 1993: 111).

At first sight, the approaches elaborated by Breuer and Riegel seem to be incompatible. While Breuer emphasizes the modernizing and rationalizing features of Bolshevism, Riegel focuses on its largely non-modern structural and ideological traits. Nevertheless, both approaches reflect some essential characteristics of the Soviet political regime, particularly of the 1920s and 1930s. It can be argued that they consider different aspects of the Bolshevik project and some unintended consequences of its transformation. Apparently, the gap between these approaches can be bridged on the bases of the multiple modernities perspective in contemporary historical sociology.

The Soviet Model from the Multiple Modernities Perspective

The multiple modernities perspective in sociological theory was originally developed by Shmuel Eisenstadt and elaborated by Johann Arnason, Peter Wagner, and other scholars. While Eisenstadt's contribution first of all consists of the analysis of Axial Age civilizations, his discussion of multiple modernities is particularly relevant for contemporary sociology (Eisenstadt, 2001). His multiple modernities theory has been characterized by Spohn as "a crucial alternative to the revived mainstream (neo)-modernization paradigm, the predominant modes of globalization analysis as well as the socio-philosophical discourse on modernity and postmodernity" (2001: 499–500). At the same time, as Peter Wagner claims, Eisenstadt's approach "has failed to make the innovative impact that one could have expected" (2010: 54). According to Wagner, Eisenstadt's strong idea of "cultural programme" can be applied to "classical" civilizations, but not so much to contemporary versions of modernity.

Johann Arnason's multiple modernities perspective partly draws on Eisenstadt's theory and employs other sources, particularly Cornelius Castoriadis" theory of "social

imaginaries." Arnason's works of the 1990s and 2000s have been characterized as "a mix of Weber and Castoriadis" (Blokker, Delanty, 2011: 120). According to Arnason, civilizational analysis in historical sociology as represented by Benjamin Nelson and Shmuel Eisenstadt can be regarded as "post-Weberian" (2003b: 228). This term can also be applied to Arnason's approach. In his works, Arnason focuses on social creativity and considers both the cultural and political aspects of the dynamics of civilizations and different types of modernity. It has been pointed out that Arnason's work represents "one of the most elaborate contributions to the contemporary revival of civilizational theory, methodology and analysis" (Spohn, 2011: 24). He has offered a theoretical model of civilizational analysis that includes various components which range from cultural premises to geographical contexts of civilizational patterns (Arnason, 2001).

Overall, the perspective of civilizational analysis proposed by Eisenstadt and elaborated by Arnason "begins with the recognition of the pluralistic nature of civilizations without any presupposition of a single model or the superiority of European civilization, which is seen as one of many" (Delanty, 2016: 24). In comparison with Eisenstadt, Arnason makes a stronger emphasis on interaction of civilizational patterns. For Arnason, civilizations should not be seen as "self-contained or self-generating" but are shaped by their interactions with other civilizations (Ibid.: 24–25). Arnason has been regarded as the main representative of the "relational" perspective within contemporary civilizational analysis (Smith, 2017: 29).

The theory of multiple modernities which developed within the paradigm of civilizational analysis presupposes that the concept of modernization as the transition from tradition to modernity is not sufficient for an understanding of the social and cultural dynamics of contemporary societies. From this perspective, "tradition" and "modernity" should not be regarded as mutually-exclusive concepts. At the same time, the variety of cultural and institutional forms of today's societies cannot be explained with only references to traditions. On the one hand, traditions provide cultural resources that influence the working out and realization of different projects of modernity. On the other hand, traditions themselves are being transformed and can be invented in the conditions of modernity. Unlike the more conventional theoretical approaches, Arnason's version of civilizational analysis emphasizes the heterogeneous, ambivalent, and antinomian character of civilizational patterns. The distinctive characteristic of this perspective is a focus on civilizational transformations and intercivilizational encounters (Braslavskiy, Maslovskiy, 2014: 48–49).

It is significant that Arnason has devoted considerable attention to the analysis of the Soviet "alternative" version of modernity. Arnason points out that there was a tendency to regard communist societies as "pre-, anti- or pseudo-modern" after the collapse of the Soviet system. However, he argues that these societies represented "a distinctive but ultimately self-destructive version of modernity rather than a sustained deviation from the modernizing mainstream" (Arnason, 2002: 61). First of all, Arnason focuses on the character of imperial modernization in Russia. In his view, the origins and the later transformation of the totalitarian project could only be understood with reference to

that background (Arnason, 1993: 21). For Arnason, the Soviet model incorporated both the legacy of imperial transformation from above and the revolutionary vision of a new society. Their synthesis led to a "reunified and rearticulated tradition" which served "to structure a specific version of modernity" (Arnason, 2002: 87).

According to Arnason, both classical and contemporary approaches to modernization tended to underestimate the significance of imperial formations. Max Weber did not offer a detailed comparative analysis of imperial traditions, and, in subsequent literature, most of the attention was devoted to the contrast between traditional and modern states, while the specific characteristics of imperial states were not taken into account. However, Eisenstadt's study of the social and political structures of empires (Eisenstadt, 1993) demonstrated that "the mobilizing capacity of the imperial centre with regard to social forces and resources sets it apart from more traditional states" (Arnason, 1993: 19). Following Eisenstadt, Arnason claims that empires could be the vehicles of changes that pre-figure more radical trends of the modernization process.

In his comparative analysis of the origins of Soviet and Chinese communism, Arnason employs the concept of imperial revolution. He claims that the revolutions in the two collapsing empires ultimately led to the restoration of imperial structures on new foundations. As he notes, it is paradoxical that a revolutionary ideology borrowed from the West "served to rationalize and legitimize the innovative restoration of the two most powerful non-Western empires" (Arnason, 2003a: 309). Arnason focuses on the interaction and entanglements of imperial legacies and revolutionary processes in these two cases. He demonstrates some similarities between the two imperial revolutions. However, on the eve of the revolution, the Russian empire was a more active participant in "global rivalries" and had advanced much further along the path of reforms in comparison with its Chinese counterpart (Ibid.: 310).

Arnason also considers the difference between short-term and long-term perspectives of the Russian Revolution. As he points out, the culmination of the Bolshevik takeover was the end of the Civil War in 1921, while Stalin's "second revolution" that began at the end of the 1920s "was the final twist to the Bolshevik project" (Arnason, 2016: 29). The end of that "second revolution" can be seen in "the termination of the Great Purge in 1938 which "marks the self-destruction of the Bolsheviks and the final consolidation of a totalitarian regime" (Ibid.). Overall, Arnason believes that the comparative histories of revolutions should not emphasize either ideologies or power structures, but rather should employ an "interactive view." From this perspective, "intertwinings of culture and power should be seen as a fundamental feature of the social-historical world" (Ibid.: 41). At the same time, Arnason recognizes that a distinction should be made between historical situations "where acute power struggles predominate over everything else and others where concentrated expressions of ideological visions have the upper hand" (Ibid.). For Arnason, the first type is exemplified by the Russian Civil War, while the second type is represented by the Stalinist transformation from the end of the 1920s.

In his earlier study of the Soviet model, Arnason discusses the particular communist project of modernity which was rooted in Marxist theory and its more-marginal Bolshe-

vik version connected to the Russian tradition. Like Riegel, Arnason regards Marxism-Leninism as a political religion and claims that there was "a partial functional equivalence" between this ideology and traditional theological systems (1993: 116). Arnason emphasizes that the Soviet ideology continued both the scientific trend and "redemptive visions" in Marxism: "In the Bolshevik context, the result was simultaneous scientization and sacralization of the revolutionary project as well as of the vanguard to which it was entrusted, and both aspects were reinforced by the Russian background" (Ibid.: 117). Thus, Arnason overcomes the exclusive focus on either rationalizing or traditionalizing aspects of the Bolshevik regime represented respectively by Breuer's and Riegel's works.

In his analysis of the Soviet model of modernity, Arnason uses the concepts of Weberian political theory. For Arnason, Weber's typology of domination is the most convenient frame of reference for the study of the Soviet model, but it should not be regarded as an exhaustive inventory. Arnason makes a conclusion that while the Soviet mode of legitimization included elements of all three Weberian ideal types, it represented a new and original phenomenon nevertheless. Arnason distinguishes between two types of communist regimes; the charismatic variant leading to autocracy, and a more rationalized oligarchic one. He believes that "both charisma and rationality acquired specific meanings in the context of the Soviet model; their common denominator was a claim to authoritative knowledge and a mandate to program society on that basis" (Arnason, 2002: 74). While Arnason does not discuss this specific meaning of charisma and rationality in detail, there is a clear parallel between his approach and Breuer's more Weber-oriented analysis of "charisma of reason" and its transformation under Soviet communism.

According to Arnason, the Stalinist revolution from above realigned the Bolshevik project with older patterns of imperial modernization. At the same time, the slogan of "socialism in one country" justified the aims of the regime in the language of the world communist movement, while the idea of Leninism as the Marxism of a new epoch "gave the regime an ideological foundation for its claim to represent a new civilization with a global mission" (Arnason, 1995: 44). However, there were significant differences between "the pre-war and the post-war constellation." As Arnason points out, "the autocratic regime and the enlarged empire seemed to reinforce each other: Stalin's rule was re-legitimized by victory and expansion, and his charismatic leadership served to contain centrifugal trends within the bloc" (Ibid.: 46). On the other hand, the imperial legacy re-emerged as a more independent factor after the "downgrading" of the totalitarian project. During the stage of "oligarchic stabilization," the Soviet system turned to global expansionism instead of internal mobilization (Arnason, 1993: 202). At this stage, "the global presence and prestige of the Soviet regime were clearly of major importance to its legitimizing effort at home" (Arnason, 2002: 79).

In his discussion of the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, Arnason distinguishes between two main trends in the dynamics of the Soviet regime; the internal one of re-traditionalization and the external one of globalization. While Arnason has referred to re-traditionalization as connected with the reactivation of the imperial legacy by the Stalinist regime, he also discusses it "in a more conventional and comprehensive

sense, and with the connotations of a process rather than a strategy" during the Brezhnev period (1993: 213). In his view, this trend was evident in the attempts to present the "Soviet way of life" as a specific tradition. But, according to Arnason, the trend towards re-traditionalization did not lead to a sustainable civilizational pattern.

As Arnason notes, it has become a commonplace understanding that the Soviet model was a failure on all levels. Soviet economic institutions proved incapable of meeting the standards imposed by the capitalist states, while the political structure in the USSR was unable "to sustain a global contest with a more resourceful rival" and at the same time the inability to resist the appeal of Western popular culture and consumerism was "a fatal weakness" (Arnason, 1995: 45). However, he believes that the crisis in the end of the 1980s was not the result of "all-round and unmitigated failure," but rather a "peculiar combination of limited success and long-term failure" (Ibid.: 46). It should be noted that the relevance of the multiple modernities perspective for understanding the causes of Soviet collapse has been considered by Richard Sakwa, who stresses that the Soviet experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative modernity, but "failed to sustain itself as a coherent social order" (2013: 74). As he puts it, the Soviet system was "not anti-modern, but mismodernized" (Ibid.: 75).

New Historical Accounts of Soviet Modernity

In recent historical studies of the Soviet system and particularly of the Stalinist period, two approaches have been identified which stress the modernity of the Soviet regime or its neo-traditionalist aspects. On the one hand, the modernity approach focuses on such phenomena as "planning, scientific organization principles, welfare-statism, and techniques of popular surveillance" (Fitzpatrick, 2000: 11). On the other hand, the neo-traditionalist approach concentrates on the "archaicizing" phenomena: "petitioning, patron-client networks, the ubiquity of other kinds of personalistic ties like *blat*, ascribed status categories, "court" politics in the Kremlin, the mystification of power" (Ibid.).

The distinction between "modernist" and "neo-traditionalist" approaches to Soviet history has been discussed by Michael David-Fox. He argues that different trends can be found within each of them, but the "modernists" tendency to stress projects and programs has left an opening for the "neo-traditionalists" to look for results rather than intentions and to emphasize unexpected consequences in the guise of Stalin-era retreats" (David-Fox, 2006: 539). At the same time, the American historians who followed the "modernist" approach were "implicitly" moving towards the sociological multiple modernities perspective represented in particular by Eisenstadt's works (Ibid.: 538).

David-Fox singles out the first generation of Soviet modernity scholarship of 1990s and 2000s. As he argues, this generation "tended to focus on transformational agendas and processes, especially the interventionist state, programs articulated by elites, and the shift in historical attitudes that animated them" (2015: 23). However, one of the shortcomings of this scholarship, according to David-Fox, was a lack of development of the comparative perspective on Soviet modernity. When this perspective was present, comparisons

were made mostly with the Western states. An exception was Stephen Kotkin's analysis of illiberal modernities of the inter-war period that included Japan (Kotkin, 2001).

The neo-traditionalist interpretation of the Soviet social order emerged partly as a reaction to the modernity approach. One of the main points of the "neo-traditional" critique was that "Bolshevik projects met Russian reality to produce unexpected reincarnations of traditional societies" (David-Fox, 2015: 27). In this connection, David-Fox considers Terry Martin's "oft-quoted" statement: "Modernization is the theory of Soviet intentions; neo-traditionalism, the theory of their unintended consequences" (Martin, 2000: 175). Nevertheless, as David-Fox stresses, representatives of that camp equated modernity with western societies and did not accept the possibility of illiberal or non-western modernity. At the same time "defining tradition remains one of the most pressing issues for any conception of neo-traditionalism" (David-Fox, 2015: 27). It can be argued, however, that unlike the two above-mentioned historical approaches, the multiple modernities perspective in historical sociology provides the theoretical analysis of both "Soviet intentions" and unintended consequences of the Bolshevik project.

David-Fox refers to Getty (2013) as an example of difficulties with application of the concept of tradition in historical studies of the Soviet political regime. In his book, Getty describes a thousand-year-old political culture that "drove the practices of boyars and commissars alike" (David-Fox, 2016: 27). From this perspective, events from Russia's distant past are seen as directly analogous to those of the Soviet period. For David-Fox, Getty's work is exemplary among those who do not see modern traits in Russian history while conceiving a binary dichotomy between the modern and the traditional. As David-Fox notes, this "black-and-white division" is based on "a reading of Weber's ideal types, astonishing in its literal-mindedness, as if everything modern in governance could be seen as 'rational-bureaucratic' and as if everything before that was personalistic, traditional, and patrimonial" (Ibid.: 28). Evidently, Getty ignores the contributions of today's Weberian sociology, let alone the multiple modernities perspective. Moreover, his approach represents a step back in comparison with historians from the "neo-traditionalist" camp who do not reject the concept of modernity altogether.

It is noteworthy that David-Fox discusses some overlaps and convergences between the modernist and neo-traditionalist perspectives on Soviet history; he writes that "both agreed that the Soviet order to some extent mixed modern features with others, whether those were seen as traditional or distinctive, peculiarly Russian, specifically Soviet, or illiberal. Neither side completely denied either particularistic traits or comparative commonalities" (David-Fox, 2015: 38). In his view, the debate between the modernist and neo-traditionalist camps illuminates the need to go beyond conceptual frameworks that segregate "intentions and consequences, ideas and circumstances, political programs and social reality, above and below. Only the study of their interrelationships can lead out of the impasse created in the post-Soviet debate" (Ibid.: 45). It should also be noted that the distinction between modernist and neo-traditionalist interpretations of Soviet history reminds a discussion in Weberian sociology of the two possible ways of routinization of

charisma: rationalization and traditionalization. However, historians of the Soviet period are mostly unaware of this discussion.

David-Fox considers some sociological approaches to the problem of Russian/Soviet modernity. As he argues, Peter Wagner's book *Sociology of Modernity: Liberty and Discipline* has been "unjustly ignored in the Russian field," like many other works on multiple modernities (David-Fox, 2015: 29). At the same time, David-Fox does not discuss Wagner's later works devoted to modernity as "experience and interpretation" (Wagner, 2008). While the American historian refers to Johann Arnason's thesis that Marxist-Leninist ideology limited the role of reflexivity in social life (David-Fox, 2015: 31), he does not take other aspects of Arnason's analysis of Soviet modernity into consideration.

Overall, David-Fox distinguishes between four perspectives on Russian/Soviet modernity that could be found mostly in English-language historical works of the last fifteen years. First, there is a trend to reject the concept of modernity in discussing Russian history, particularly the period from the 1850s until the 1950s. The second perspective is a tendency to regard modernity as a unified phenomenon, and to concentrate on what Russia and the USSR had in common with other modern states. The third perspective draws on the works of Eisenstadt and his colleagues who argued that Soviet communism represented an alternative version of modernity. Finally, the fourth position, which also presupposes multiplicity of modernities, emphasizes their entanglement and interaction (David-Fox, 2016: 21).

David-Fox stresses the relevance of the concepts of "alternative" and "entangled" modernities for the field of Russian/Soviet studies. In his discussion of alternative modernity, he draws on Eisenstadt's theory and historical works dealing with Nazi Germany, Imperial Russia, and the USSR. As David-Fox argues, if one accepts "the possibility that there have been many differing forms of modernity — *many* rather than none, one, or two — then it follows that there has been a specific historical path in the Russian and Soviet case that is at once particular *and* connected to other modern forms" (Ibid.: 34). He believes that this perspective allows researchers to build on a legacy of historiographical tradition delineating the peculiar traits of imperial Russia in a broader European context. Thus David-Fox refers to Martin Malia's use of the plural form of the German term *Sonderwege* (special paths) which, in his view, anticipated the concept of multiple modernities (Ibid.: 35).

According to David-Fox, the notion of "alternative" Soviet modernity which is sometimes used in historical studies is compatible with the sociological theory of multiple modernities (2016: 36). He also considers the concept of "failed modernity" which is connected to conceiving the Soviet system as an alternative modern form. In this connection, he poses the following question; "does regime change mean that an entire system, an alternative modernity, failed? Or could it be that other strands of a broader Russian/Soviet modernity that straddled 1917 also survived 1991?" (Ibid.: 37).

In his discussion of "entangled modernities," David-Fox refers to the works of Therborn (2003) and Arnason (2003a). He emphasizes that from this perspective, modernity is not seen as a single systemic whole, but it is rather "broken up into its component ele-

ments and conceived in terms of the interactions of those elements across space and time" (2016: 39). In his view, this approach allows one to draw a more differentiated picture of differing paces of change and cross-border entanglements in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. The American historian believes that combining the concepts of "alternative" and "entangled" modernities could be a promising avenue of research. Overall, though, David-Fox focuses mostly on the debate on modernity and neo-traditionalism in the works of historians. While he follows this debate very closely up to the present day, he does not consider some of the latest developments in sociological discussion of multiple modernities. It can be assumed that a more detailed analysis of recent trends, not only in historical but also in sociological literature, would contribute to a better understanding of the peculiarities of the Soviet version of modernity.

Conclusion

Weberian perspectives on Soviet modernity tended to emphasize either the rational character of the Bolshevik project or re-traditionalizing trends as unintended consequences of that project. While the original Bolshevik project and the early Soviet regime have been discussed by Breuer as a specific case of rationalization, the Stalinist system apparently demonstrated traditionalist features, as highlighted by Riegel. At the same time, the routinization of "charisma of reason" in a neo-traditionalist direction is hard to explain within the framework of Weberian sociological theory. It seems that, in this case, Weber's theoretical models should be supplemented with elements of other theoretical approaches. It has been argued in the article that drawing on the "post-Weberian" multiple modernities perspective in historical sociology allows us to overcome some of the difficulties with the application of Weber's concepts to Soviet history.

Arnason's analysis of the Soviet model takes the interactions and entanglements of several traditions, both inherited from the pre-revolutionary past and invented ones, into consideration. As Arnason argues, the Bolsheviks followed a strategy of revolutionary transformation from above which included elements of the older project of imperial modernization. At the same time, the civilizational component of Soviet modernity was defined by Marxism-Leninism as a world political religion. Finally, the trend to re-traditionalization during the last decades of the Soviet period was connected with the emergence of the "Soviet way of life" on the level of everyday behaviour. All of these (neo) traditional elements are discussed in their relationship with the strategies of the political elite. Cultural encounters with the West are also seen as increasingly important. Overall, Arnason's analysis is more nuanced and complex than references in the works of historians from the "neo-traditionalist" camp to Soviet "reincarnations" of traditional society as opposite to western-style modernity.

Apparently, there are some common points between the "modernist" approach to Soviet history and the theory of multiple modernities. As David-Fox demonstrates, representatives of this approach were "implicitly" moving towards the sociological multiple modernities perspective. However, what is needed is the transcending of the disciplinary

boundaries between history and sociology. On the one hand, historians generally do not use the conceptual tools of historical sociology. On the other hand, historical sociologists often employ abstract theorizing without sufficient attention to empirical data. The field of Soviet studies could benefit from working out middle-range sociological theories that would be more empirically-oriented than the current multiple modernities perspective. Overall, combining Weberian and post-Weberian sociological perspectives and new historical approaches may result in a more comprehensive analysis of the Soviet system as a specific type of modern society.

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Советская версия модерна: веберианские и постверберианские подходы

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В статье рассмотрены различные подходы к изучению советского общества, которые опираются на теоретические модели, разработанные Максом Вебером, либо следуют более широкой веберовской традиции в исторической социологии. Веберианские подходы применялись в том числе и для анализа Русской революции 1917 года и ее последствий. В частности, ранняя большевистская партия характеризовалась как сообщество «идеологических виртуозов», тогда как ее дальнейшее развитие описывалось как «незавершенная рационализация» либо ретрадиционализация. В статье подчеркивается, что использование постверберианской концепции множественных модернов позволяет преодолеть некоторые сложности, возникающие в данном случае. Особое внимание уделяется в статье анализу советской модели модерна в работах Й. Арнасона. С точки зрения этого социолога, советская модель включала в себя как наследие имперской трансформации сверху, так и революционное видение нового общества. Как указывает Арнасон, коммунизм представлял собой особую версию модерна, а не отклонение от универсального пути модернизации. В то же время в исторических исследованиях советского периода сложились два подхода, выделяющие модернистский характер советского режима либо его неотрадиционалистские аспекты. Различия между этими двумя направлениями обсуждались в работах М. Дэвид-Фокса. В статье прослеживаются параллели между новыми историческими исследованиями советского общества и (пост)веберианскими социологическими подходами.

Ключевые слова: Макс Вебер, историческая социология, Йохан Арнасон, коммунизм, модерн, советское общество

Too Many Webers for Small Sociology; or, How Critically Sociologists Should Consider Their Canon *

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It is always a challenge to reflect on a book which is definitely beyond your "institutional" field of competence. I am not sure the situation is the same in all "national" sociologies[1], but being a Russian sociologist means having a distinct field of competence — acquired or ascribed by the "significant others" of the sociological community. There have been many debates on the relevance of any sociologists' typology, however strange the very idea of such a typology is. For example, in the Russian sociological tradition, such typologies vary from the bitter-ironic one introduced by Gennady Batygin to the generally acknowledged one presented in the collection of essays *Debate on Methods* (Voronkov et al., 2004). The former proposed a distinction between "service" sociologists (striving for administrative power), "hunting" sociologists (searching for new knowledge) and "decorative" sociologists (creating communicative networks) (Batygin, 2002) based on some more "traditional" typologies, such as developed by Vickery and Vickery (1987).[2] *Debate*

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* The results of the project "Between Political Theology and Expressive Symbolism: The Discursive Formations of the Late Modernity as a Challenge to the Social Order" carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2019, are presented in this work.

В данной работе использованы результаты проекта «Между политической теологией и экспрессивным символизмом: дискурсивные формации позднего модерна как вызов социальному порядку», выполняемого в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2019 году.

1. Certainly, there are such schools despite all globalization trends. I will miss all other debates — on the relevance of the very term 'sociology," on the distinction of sociology and social sciences, and many others that do exist and are worth mentioning but not focusing at in the review.

2. There are many more typologies, one of the most famous is presented in Berger's *Invitation to Sociology* (1963), but there is no point in further focusing on the details to the detriment of the very idea of typology.

on Methods was intended to reveal the senselessness and futility of the division between "quantitative" and "qualitative" sociology/methodology/studies but turned into a discussion about the epistemological grounds and heuristic potential of sociology in the spirit of Thévenot and Boltanski's (1983) idea of scientific interpretations as inevitably determined by social representations. *Debate on Methods* identified sociologists as theorists, methodologists and empiricists, and argued that the works of Weber were absolutely essential for theorists and methodologists of the "qualitative" camp (namely Weber's "interpretative sociology").

One can wonder why a review on a book on Weber starts with a description of the typologies of sociologists. My first explanation is that despite being a young discipline compared to other social sciences, sociology is extremely diversified and rife with inner distinctions. This leads to the situation that when we study to become sociologists we usually have a very brief and general overview of all the classical works (the canons differ but Weber is omnipresent) and then focus on some classical ideas taken out of the context of their works and time. For example, if you focus on qualitative approach, you will study Weber's "theory of action" and "theory of interpretation" as the purely methodological foundations of empirical work; if you are more interested in management, you will study Weber's "theory of power" and "theory of bureaucracy" as providing key ideas and notions for the analysis of contemporary systems of control and governance, and so on. Therefore, officially Weber is a kind of a 'sacred canon" for the theory and history of sociology (let us be honest and admit that not too many sociologists want to specialize in both for different reasons, including financial), but in empirical and applied research there seems to be many different Webers to justify our different terms, hypotheses, interpretations and forecasts.

My second explanation is that the book of Kieran Allen is great not only in the analysis of the Weberian legacy and tradition (of both admiration and criticism) but also in underlying and eliminating divisions between sociologists and within sociology. Before I make myself clear on both points, I have to warn the reader that this review is an extremely (undeservedly and even offensively) general and short enumeration of the book's ideas. This is not surprising given that the book "arises from an experience of teaching a course on classical sociology to first year students for over 20 years" (p. vii). Moreover, it would be strange to retell in the review all basic and well-known ideas of Weber as they are presented in the text. The book provides all necessary introductory information for a student who wants to be aware of the ideas and role of Weber in contemporary sociology (the author's task set in the Preface); explains the necessity for a critical reexamination of the traditional interpretations of Weber's ideas in the context of his own works and biography (in the Introduction); focuses on the historical and ideological context of Weber's life (in the first chapter); devotes another eight chapters to the justification and detailed clarification of the ways for the proposed critical reexamination of Weber's legacy as applied to his different theories (the spirit of capitalism, Asian underdevelopment, methodological issues, social and political differentiation, power and bureaucracy, the fall and rise of the West, capitalism and socialism, war and revolution); and makes some final

conclusions and provides a bibliography and suggestions for additional reading. It is a complete course for sociology students. The review presents the book's key ideas and explains why its special combination of findings and weaknesses makes the book definitely worth reading.

In the Preface, Allen argues that numerous standard textbooks present "a similar package" of Weber's key ideas as the canon of sociology, which certainly provides younger generations of sociologists with "some pearls of wisdom" and "insights into modern society" but does not teach or encourage them to critically examine Weber's ideas especially because they hide his political agenda. The Introduction explains the reasons for the dominant "traditional" perception of Weber's legacy. One of them is the implicit typology of sociologists based on the idea of "an objective social science" (perhaps, the most questionable claim of our discipline). Allen identifies two groups of sociologists: the first profess sympathy with the left or radicals, for instance, denouncing corporate capitalist globalization and becoming radical critics of the social system (like Bourdieu); the second support the existing framework of society and offer advice on how best to adapt to the new challenges posed by globalization (like Giddens and Beck) (p. 2); and the question is who wins in interpreting the past and present.

According to Allen,

> sociology is mainly a site for conflict about interpretations about society. It may profess to be non-political — to focus on wider social trends rather than immediate political issues [the question arises on the author's definition of "political" as opposed to "social"] — but it nevertheless deals with issues that people passionately fight over. Sociologists often adopt a non-political guise because of the pressure of their jobs and careers — even as they make the most outrageously political statements. Many of the disputes within sociology occur at a highly abstract theoretical level, often surrounded by the most forbidding jargon. However, in their complex and confusing ways, they often reflect debates in the wider society about whose interests should be served or which direction society needs to go in. (p. 2–3)

Allen argues that Weber made clear political statements and never hid them under any pressure, but they were ignored by his translators, propagators and interpreters especially under the prevailing opposition of Weber by another founding father of sociology — Marx — who provided an equally comprehensive overview of modern capitalism.

The writings of both founding fathers lack the typical present-day data of detailed quantitative and qualitative studies, present grand searches for what constituted the fundamental dynamics of modern society, reflect interpretations of relative strangers not accustomed to capitalist societies, and ignore any rigid divisions between different academic subjects, thus, "reaching for the totality of expertise of life under capitalism" (p. 3). However, unlike Weber, Marx managed to maintain his political context due to his open advocacy of revolt and links with the socialist movement, and such a clear political emphasis together with his economic reductionism allowed Weber to win the debate within classical sociology. Allen provides the following comparison ensuring the victory of Weber as a "sophisticated doyen of value-free sociology" (p. 4): Weber advocated a complex

multi-class model, Marx advocated a two-class model; Weber appreciated multi-factoral causation, Marx appreciated economic determinism; Weber warned of the impeding danger of bureaucratization, Marx had naïve hopes for a better world; Weber focused on the complexities of modern society, Marx advocated revolution. Moreover,

> Weber's sociology fits in more easily with a form of academic learning which defines itself as neutral while disguising its own hierarchies and biases. . . . Weberian sociology can recognize the existence of social conflict — but it can also imply that there is no need to challenge the wider system. . . . Weber's overall pessimism, which assumes that domination of human beings by fellow human beings is inevitable, enables sociologists to make a critique of society — but also to imply there is little prospect of overall systemic change. All of this cuts the link between the critical knowledge and political action — and that is extremely helpful to a purely career-minded academic. (p. 4)

Allen emphasizes that our abstract apolitical reading of Weber's texts and our earnest ignorance of his openly declared and passionately expressed political views doe not make Weber a value-free sociologist: "Weber was an ardent German nationalist and a free market liberal . . . the packaging of the academic Weber began after his death and owed much to mainstream American sociology" (p. 5). Allen reconstructs the main steps of this packaging: Weber's minimal influence in Germany immediately after his death; the activities of three key figures that determined the growth of his influence — his wife's Marianne editing of the collection of his works and the writing of his standard and basic biography, which aimed to construct a great man; after the Second World War, Winckelmann's selective assembling of Weber's works as representing an alternative account of historical development to Marx ("eliminated all polemic writings . . . to put together a timeless piece of value-free sociology"); and in the Cold War era, Parsons's reference to Weber's works as representing the classical European tradition and supporting Parsons's construction of "a grand theory that focused on how common values and norms helped to generate a stable and ordered society." Finally, in the late 1930s, "Parsons helped place Weber at the head of the sociological canon, suggested that Weber was 'fighting . . . against the positivistic tendencies of Marxian historical materialism', . . . played down Weber's emphasis on power relations, . . . and, in brief, Americanized Weber" (p. 7–8).

The Americanization of Weber was continued by Shils, who praised Weber as prophetic in warning against bureaucratization, as a classic free market liberal and a supporter of the American way before his time; by Bell and Lipset, who found arguments for their concept of the "end of history" in their particular interpretation of Weber's pragmatic grounds of rationality, efficiency and realism as suitable for many former left intellectuals; by Mills, who helped to establish Weber as the founder of the theory of stratification and domination, emphasizing certain aspects of Weber's writings to make them seem more left-wing liberal than they really were, and together with Gerth "presented Weber as a more sophisticated sociologist who had corrected Marx's lack of emphasis on human freedom . . . and represents humanist and cultural liberalism rather than economic

liberalism, . . . Weber's deep pessimism about the possibility of changing capitalism and his ambiguous critique of its cold, bureaucratic machinery had a strong appeal to intellectuals" (p. 10).

Once Weber acquired such a dominance in American sociology, it allowed the re-establishment of his reputation in Germany and his canonization as the main classical sociologist of the free world was complete. Later his reputation was challenged by student revolts and the radicalization which revived some Marxist ideas and by academic studies which revealed his strong German nationalism (Mommsen), inherent elitism of his critique of popular democracy (Hirst) or implacable opposition to socialism (Bottomore). Nevertheless, especially after the collapse of socialist regimes, which convinced many academics in having no alternative to capitalism, Weber achieved a near hegemonic status: "In brief, Weber had become the touchstone for many modern theorists who accept the inevitability of capitalism and impossibility of change. More than that, he had become the fountainhead for the established wisdom of sociology itself" (p. 12).

After the Introduction, the rest of the book is devoted to fulfilling the author's intention to offer both an introduction to Weber by summarizing his arguments on different issues and critiques of his ideas as belonging to a sophisticated ideologue for capitalism. Thus, Weber is presented as a sociologist of empire who not only describes the historical development of capitalism but also defends it as the best of all possible worlds, albeit on the grounds of tragic necessity. Allen "removes the conventional packaging in which Weber was wrapped and looks at his writings in their actual context" to reveal that throughout his life Weber was concerned with three central issues: "One was the question of empire: why was imperialism in Germany's interest? The second was the leadership of Germany: after its unification, who was to lead the German nation? Finally, there was the question of class division and the rise of Marxism: how best was Marxism to be combated?" (p.15). While finding answers to these questions in Weber's writings, Allen comes to the conclusion that he saw himself as a "bourgeois scholar" and wanted Germany to be a great power, which determined the combination of sociology and political commentary in Weber's writings and made his imperialism "militant, direct and above all realistic" engaging in cold calculation about what was necessary for Germany to become a great power (p. 20).

Allen argues that Weber

> assumed that Africans were "kulturlos" and could be legitimately colonized. He criticized Bismarck's "accommodating policy" of forging diplomatic alliances because it was "disinclined to all thoughts of overseas expansion." He supported von Tirpitz's plans to break from the traditional Prussian restraint in naval matters and develop a battle fleet that could challenge Britain's. . . . Weber believed that imperialism was in the direct interest of German industry. He claimed that the expansion of trade "must now once more lead to a situation in which individual nations will share in economic control of the world." He persuaded his close associate Naumann to move from a Christian socialist outlook to one that embraced national power politics and imperialism. In a speech in 1896 on unemployment, Weber spelled

> out explicitly his rationale: "It is a vital matter for us that the broad masses of our people should become aware that the expansion of Germany's power is the only thing which can ensure for them a permanent livelihood at home and the possibility of progressive improvement." (p. 20–21)

According to Allen, Weber's sole concern was the interest of the German nation state; therefore, even his support for democracy was subordinate to his aim of expanding Germany's sphere of influence:

> He saw the parliament primarily as an institution that was best suited to fulfilling the function of training a leadership that could avoid the irresponsibility and capriciousness of the German monarchy . . . and provide a mechanism to conciliate the working class and win them to an imperialist outlook. . . . Weber's central theme was that [German] national greatness had to be fought for rather than assumed. Generalizing from the imperialist culture of his age, Weber assumed that the struggle between peoples was the key feature of human life. . . . Weber made no bones about his view of academic science: "The ultimate goal of our science must remain that of cooperating in the political education of our nation." By political education he meant a mission to lead the German empire. (p. 22, 24, 26)

Nevertheless, Allen admits that Weber was brilliant enough to focus at the same time on the "disjunctures — between economic resources and political will, between the stability guaranteed by bureaucracy and the need for leadership to overcome its inertia, between the grandeur and bluster of empire and the need for sharp, realistic assessment of how to win" (p. 26).

Allen argues that Weber had no sympathy with socialism, saw the advocacy of an equal society as utopian, regarded any independent working-class politics with suspicion, and expected militant action by the working class to undermine progress including by pushing the elites in reactionary directions that would strengthen the old regime. So, despite being an acute observer of his society (he was one of the few commentators outside the ranks of the far left to predict the integration of the Social Democratic Party into German society in the war years), Weber "presented Marxist ideas implicitly as crude, one-sided and lacking the sophistication necessary to analyze complex societies" (p. 30). According to Allen, Weber defended the use of scientific and academic methods, but his very sociology generalized from the political polemics he was engaged in, therefore, his sociological writings should not be considered timeless and devoid of context.

> Weber sought to awaken the German bourgeoisie to a sense of its heroic mission by romanticizing the origins of capitalism and creating an image of a moral and honest entrepreneur (the story of slavery, the theft of common lands, the ruthless economic terrorism used to turn peasant into workers virtually disappeared). He naturalized the imperialist outlook of his day by blaming the religious cultures of colonized countries for their colonization. More fundamentally, his peculiar view of rationality conveyed an impression that capitalism and bureaucracy were inevitable. (p. 173–174)

Another of Allen's claim about Weber is that he explained and romanticized the Western spirit of capitalism by a simplistic standardization of Protestantism around a particular ideal model of belief and by the readings of social action from religious texts (i.e. modern capitalism was established in Western Europe by modest, dour, determined moral men with a mission) without explaining how the Reformation became successful. Allen continues: Weber explained how the affinity between Protestantism and capitalism worked in an inadequate chronological order, ignoring indications that capitalism had begun to expand inside the framework of feudalism before the 17th century, and providing no satisfactory explanation for how early capital was accumulated. He presented capitalism as a by-product of rationalizing forces without mentioning "the brutal role of force in accumulating capital, in imposing new disciplines on labor and in subjecting the colonies to the economic needs of the metropolitan countries" (p. 45).

Allen gives examples of China and India to underline Weber's romanticization of Western capitalism and European imperialism: he presented both countries as unchanging societies, imprisoned in a cultural time warp until colonialism arrived. As was typical for European societies of his time, Weber did not admit the economic developments of China before the mid-17th century (see: Pomeranz, 2000); in India, he assumed the rigid caste system to be primordial rather than the outcome of the complex relations between colonial intervention and indigenous tradition, describing Indian society as if it needed imperialism to attain peace and not to turn into a chaotic mass of tribal conflicts, and Weber never mentioned the destructive and retarding impact of colonization on India's development. According to Allen, it is this legacy of Weber that allowed (and still allows) developed countries to blame the cultures of underdeveloped countries for their failure to modernize, and it is this legacy that helped to construct the "modernization-dependency" debate and became a classic example of what later came to be referred to as Orientalist discourse.

Concerning methodology, Weber is presented in the book as (1) a methodological individualist, who generalized economic marginalism into a meta-theory of society and "smuggled the methods of conventional economics into sociology" (economic examples and ideal rational economic actors, who have full knowledge of their future needs and the resources available) instead of focusing on social structure; (2) a scholar of his time who tried to stand on very slippery slope of "marrying a subjective focus on values with the desire for objective methodological rigor" (p. 76), or of "navigating the rapids between the traditional German idealist emphasis on the active mind creating reality and the requirements of modern research" (p. 75); (3) a creator of the theory of rationality, who used three different definitions of it; and (4) an author of careful formal definitions and typologies filled at random from very diverse phases of history [we all tend to do that, at least when explaining complex phenomena to our students]. For example, Weber's charismatic leaders include bounty hunters, monarchs and revolutionary socialists from the dawn of time to the early 20th century, which Allen considers irrelevant for scientific discourse; however, this is relevant if we take Weber's typologies as requiring historical clarifications

(charismatic leaders in different times needed different qualities to be perceived as charismatic). Allen concludes that

> Weber's calculating rational man . . . is by no means a neutral figure. . . . He acts according to the abstractly formulated psychology of the calculating individual agent of capitalism. Where . . . the people do not follow this calculating culture, Weber steps down from his academic chair, to pronounce that they are "not of this world." In other words, the psychology of the sober bourgeois is the norm — all else is interesting but entirely ineffective. (p. 80)

Weber's sociology is defined rather as ideological (supporting the First World War, deeply hostile to the growth of the revolutionary left in the aftermath of Germany's defeat, etc.) than as offering an objective value-free account of modern society. Allen argues that the problem is not so much that Weber's multi-class model won over Marx's two-class model but that Weber's stratification theory dismisses the Marxist idea of exploitation, thus, supporting capitalism by directing class analysis to the normative concerns centered on the interest of capitalists — efficiency and rationalization. Such ignorance

> played down the role of masses of people in bringing change. The dialectic of history, for Weber, was torn between bureaucratization and charismatic leaders who acted as spellbinders for a passive population. Revolts of whatever kind — particularly those in highly-bureaucratisized societies — simply did not figure in his vision. . . . His implicit contempt for the self-activity of masses of "ordinary people" led to an overarching pessimism that ultimately justified an acceptance of capitalism and bureaucracy. (p. 178)

According to Allen, Weber is believed to have developed a powerful intellectual alternative to Marx's historical materialism, but Weber's sociology presents the rationality of the West as the end point of history, which "only emerged because of a combination of necessary elements, and no one element in this combination is deemed to have a causal primacy — it is the combination as a whole that counts" (p. 123). This is the only reference in the book to Collins's *Weberian Sociological Theory* (1986: 35) saying that "this makes world history look like the result of configurations of events so rare as to appear accidental." In the section on Additional Reading Allen calls Collins "Weber's hugely sympathetic follower" for his interpretation of Weber's theory of history (p. 201) and does not approve or accept such a "too sympathetic" presentation of Weber's legacy.

Moreover, according to Allen, Weber's main objections to the socialist experiment in Russia (he did not believe that the Bolsheviks could hold power) were determined primarily by his theory of bureaucracy as unbeatable.

> Instead of assuming that bureaucracy was inevitable, an alternative method might be to analyze the specific historical circumstances of Russia to see why its revolution failed. Thus, one might look, for example, at how bureaucratic tendencies grew from Russia's international isolation, the destruction wrought of the country by the civil war and the conflicts that arose between the peasantry and the urban workers. . . . Weber makes no distinction between the different types of bureaucracies

> that emerge in workers" movements and in wider society. . . . He assumes apathy is a permanent state of affairs and can simply not explain how the process of revolt is possible. (p. 149, 153)

Allen reproaches Weber for considering as real actors only the elites, the charismatic heroes and the leaders of great states who enforce their domination; however, this is one of the well-known types of the theory of elites, so Weber just provided his own explanation for it in his theory of domination and bureaucracy.

In conclusion, it would be fair to apply the critical approach suggested by Allen to the very book that insists on its indiscriminate application to any sociological work. Unfortunately, I am not an expert in Weber's legacy and cannot critique the details or completeness of his biography, selected works or interpretations, especially taking into account that this is a very small book with the very big goal of presenting a comprehensive overview of Weber's key theories and critics — the text inevitably misses some names and points. Nevertheless, there are some obvious questionable assumptions and overly strong conclusions.

First, being so insistent in revealing the hidden and ignored ideological foundations and content of Weber's theories, Allen becomes as radical in the politicization of Weber's writings as the authors whom Allen criticizes for their radical de-politicization. This begs the questions: what are the limits for taking into account the political-ideological context of scholar's biography to explain their scientific views? Who has the right to set such limits? How unchangeable should they be when: (a) the scholar is alive and can enter the debates, (b) their contemporaries and colleagues can speak on their behalf, and (c) we find ourselves in completely different times providing us with nothing other than multiple interpretations and critical discourse analysis persuading us to consider every "text" within its discursive and social contexts (see, e.g., Fairclough, 1993), although both are impossible to reconstruct "from within" and unambiguously? When mentioning that students are not encouraged to "be overly critical of Weber," Allen does not provide necessary or sufficient criteria for criticism. For example, the proposed focus on the imperialistic dimension of Weber's ideas would be too politicized for a scholar who believes that Weber exaggerated the methodological individualism.

In Weber's time, a public intellectual possessed much more "totality" than scholars today. The latter should be aware of their different affiliations (and their requirements) when presenting their data and interpretations, and they should change their presentations for different audiences: for administration, scientific foundations, students, decision-makers who require clear recommendations without too much science-theory-methodology, and for a wider audience — as an expert speaking about some situation in general or evaluating a particular problem that affects his everyday life, and for his colleagues — friends and opponents. All these contexts today (but not in the times of Weber) imply different types of publicity, demand different types of discourses and allow different levels of ideological enrichment. In other words, today one might give different lectures on Weber's theory of power to experts on Weber, to sociology students, to students of arts or

engineering, to politicians at the round table on national social-economic strategy, and to a wider television audience (for example, Allen's term "the ruthless economic terrorism used to turn peasant into workers" does not seem appropriate for a scientific debate).

Weber could have been mistaken, as we all can be in the pressing social context, and Weber's "imperialistic" desire to expand his country's sphere of influence is more or less typical for all of us (there are many "nationalistic" directions in political and scientific circles today). So, Allen's emphasis on Weber's ideological mythologization often seems a bit much, especially taking into account that "Weber's aggressive nationalism did not blind him to the sources of German weakness" (p. 25) or that Weber was "an acute observer of the political scene" (p. 29); however, this emphasis is relevant for Weber's devoted admirers who purposefully ignored or hid excerpts of his writings. To define Weber as solely a "sociologist of empire" is also too strong. Today the word "empire" is often used as a name for a "natural" and "positive" social phenomenon presented in different ways because most peoples lived in empires throughout human history and, despite the bad reputation of empires, they often "promoted peace and prosperity" (see, e.g., Lal, 2004).

Allen insists that Weber's writings should not be considered timeless and devoid of context but sometimes does not follow this rule. For example, despite admitting that Weber "avoided the cruder forms of racism which were common at the time" (p. 54), Allen accuses him of "colonial imagery" and of the "deeply condescending and offensive tone of a shrill confident European imperialist to the people of India" (p. 53). Weber is not to blame for the European imperialist-orientalist discourse of his time, which was based on colonial administrators, missionaries and travel descriptions and focused on the historical and ahistorical study of other cultures' past through religious aspects detached from social evolution (and we still witness this discourse's discriminatory manifestations today). It is hard to imagine that Weber could oppose this discourse instead of reproducing it or that he could criticize the social construct of "traditional India." It is not fair to call Weber a racist and to say that "his more "educated" speculations about Chinese culture are even worse than the casual racism of the missionaries" (p. 63), because the very understanding of racism today differs greatly from Weber's time, when it was a social norm for both the "educated" and missionaries (though the latter should have been educated too). Certainly, Weber and "many German gentlemen" possessed "an imperialist disposition," but many English, French and other gentlemen and ladies also painted India and China (and many other countries) in dark colors as stagnant, passive, eternally "traditional" societies just because they believed in such a world due to their time's dominant discourses.

Second, Allen sometimes makes statements that are too strong. Some of them are rather idealistic, for example, that students who enroll in courses in sociology have a sense of unease about the growing violence and inequality and want to study how the world functions to change it for the better; or that social scientists can be divided into radical critics and supporters of any system (the division is much deeper, and one can criticize some aspects of the social system but devotedly support other its features); or that Weber's theory, cutting the link between critical knowledge and political action, is

extremely helpful to a purely career-minded academic — career trajectories depend on the social context, so political actions (both critical and supportive) can be a direct path to academic career (today authoritative regimes establish sociological centers as if to study public opinion but in reality to affect it).

Some of Allen's other statements are too critical, for example, when he compares Weberian and Marxist traditions and criticizes the dominance of the former as due to a specific interpretation and academic support (according to Feyerabend (1975), this is the normal model of scientific development, so the problem is not limited to the Weber-Marx intellectual dichotomy); or that Weber "became a valuable icon in the Cold War — an intellectual giant who rivaled and surpassed the USSR's championship of Marx" (p. 8) and even "an effective ideological tool . . . not confined just to the conservative right" (p. 9); or that "academic practitioners of sociology" prefer to discuss on television some strange correlations (crime and "family breakdown") instead of the economy or changes in the political spectrum (today, the fact that lay knowledge ousts expertise from the public space is a general and not purely sociological problem); or that "no value-free sociology is possible in a world where the production of ideas is linked to the dominance of capital" (p. 13).

Such "exaggerations" are determined by the author's too ambitious aim to provide a brief but comprehensive introduction to Weber's legacy and at the same time an overview of all the accumulated critiques of it. The book cannot be called an "anti-Weber manifesto" for there is a good balance of acknowledgements and claims in the text; however, the author's overestimation of the importance of politically engaged inquiry into modern capitalism sometimes blurs the dividing line between a clever politician and an interested scholar, and questions the very definition and status of sociology.

This is a great book that is worth reading by every sociologist. Because the author's aim is absolutely different, by no means can the book be considered a part of the disciplinary fight for the "right interpretation" of Weber's substantive studies and methodological principles (see, e.g., Scaff, 1984: 191), or a part of the attack on the idea that Weber was a sociologist or a founding father of sociology (see, e.g., Turner 2002: 231), or a part of the critique of Weber as a subjectivist or bourgeois, to defend Marx as the scientist of social formations (see, e.g., Turner, 1977), or, on the contrary, as a part of the admiring tradition arguing that Weber's macro-sociological theory provides a more general and systematic view of history and society (see, e.g., Collins, 1986, who emphasized the potential of Weberian sociology in the analysis of the "world-system" model within the geopolitical approach) than the legacy of Marx's political economy.[3] The book eliminates

3. According to B. Turner (1999: 11), the debate between Marx and Weber was much more controversial and incomplete than the supporters of either of the two try to present it, and it has been repeatedly transformed in different intellectual contexts. However, this debate had the unintended consequence of "provid[ing] an effective and clear method by which the very nature of sociology could be defined. Sociology was an academic discipline which through the intellectual interaction with Marxism produced a distinctive perspective on the structure of industrial capitalist society, generated a clear view of historical development, embraced a sociological approach to ontology and had a philosophy of social science which provided the philosophical framework for empirical social research. Weber's social theory provided contemporary sociology with a systematic

all divisions between sociologists by emphasizing our common task — to challenge any given state of affairs by critical examination with illustrative examples and convincing metaphors. For example, as Allen rightly notes, today the general trends of contemporary social science — the focus on how reality is constructed through interpretations and meanings and demand for value-free sociologists — divert our attention from the objective contradictions at the heart of social structure and do not encourage a critical or negative judgement of one's society. Such a common task also implies that we have to critically consider our sociological canon, which does not deny any of Weber's significant insights into the workings of society or sociological methodology, but demands seeing him as an outstanding scientist of a particular historical period that inevitably affected his outlook and determined his political views.

The book has the key feature of a good sociological work — it raises more questions on the state and possibilities of sociology in our strange contemporary world, which produces tremendous inequalities and unhappiness on a scale never dreamt of before, than provides answers and recommendations on how we should consider the legacy of one of the founding fathers of the discipline. Allen convincingly distinguishes (1) the ideas of Weber which can and should be used in contemporary sociological studies and the ideas which can but should not be applied as politically or methodologically (and historically) biased; and (2) the sources of such biases — those "authentically" Weberian and those constructed subsequently by the selective application of Weber's legacy. Questioning the potential and limits of Weber's "wealth of concepts" for interpreting contemporary society is a rare quality for books on the history of sociological thought despite their crucial importance for the self-identification and self-knowledge of the discipline. The author finishes the book with a very humanistic appeal to the "ivory towers of academia," which is worth all kinds of support — "to lift the shutter and let the light [apparently from "within" the disciple] — and the wind [from its outer social frontiers] — in" (p. 179).

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Слишком много веберов для одной социологии, или Сколь критично следует читать социологическую классику

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On the "Topological" Reading of Max Weber *

LEPSIUS M. R. (2016). MAX WEBER UND SEINE KREISE: ESSAYS. TÜBINGEN: J. C. B. MOHR (PAUL SIEBECK). 324 P. ISBN 978-3-16-154739-3

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The collection reviewed here, *Max Weber and His Circles*, is one of the posthumous publications of the writings of the outstanding German sociologist, Mario Rainer Lepsius (1928–2014). The book was prepared for publication by his son Oliver, a lawyer and philosopher of law, a professor at the University of Münster. It contains sixteen essays on Max Weber. Lepsius explores a wide range of issues related to the life and work of the classic of German sociology. Here are a range of topics he regards as among the most interesting ones: the meaning of the initial statement of the Weberian question and the intellectual echo of his writings, the ideas about what a professional politician should do, the political activity of Weber himself, and the biographical and historical context that formed him. The texts included in the collection were written by Lepsius over about thirty years. Some of them were discovered by his son Oliver in the researcher's archives and are published for the first time: "The Impact of Political Orders on Man: Max Weber's Hopes and Fears Seventy Years After," "Max Weber and the German University," "Max Weber in Italy," and a small treatise on Weber's house in Heidelberg ("Cultural Liberalism, Cultural Protestantism, Cultural Feminism").

The author's long and diverse study of the personality and intellectual legacy of one of the founding fathers of sociology can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that Lepsius, who has received several honorary scientific awards (including an honorary doctorate) and was a member of several academies (including some foreign ones), was for many years a full professor at the University of Heidelberg, with whom Max Weber's work is closely associated. His works include studies on various aspects of modern society: the development of institutions in modernity,[1] the theory of democracy,[2] German reunifica-

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В данной работе использованы результаты проекта «Между политической теологией и экспрессивным символизмом: дискурсивные формации позднего модерна как вызов социальному порядку», выполняемого в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2019 году.

1. *Lepsius M. R.* (1990). Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

2. *Lepsius M. R.* (1993). Demokratie in Deutschland: Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

tion and European integration,[3] the social structure of industrial society,[4] and the history of sociology as a self-reflection of modernity.[5] But he is no less famous as a co-editor of the 47-volume Max Weber Complete Edition (Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe [MWG])[6]. This unique historical and critical edition set new standards for research on the history of sociology throughout the world. The last volumes of this project, which lasted more than 30 years, were published in 2018. According to many of those involved in this project, Lepsius played a key role in the implementation of this grandiose intellectual enterprise, starting with a discussion of its concept in the mid-1970s.

Despite the fact that he does not have a large volume of writings, and that his books are mainly collections of articles like the one reviewed here, in the eyes of Weber scholars from around the world Lepsius is considered to be a leading figure or "grandseigneur," according to Dirk Kaesler, the famous German sociologist.[7] Moreover, he was one of the most influential social scientists, first in the West and then in the united Germany of the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. His outstanding scientific work and organizational talent received official recognition: from 1971 to 1974, Lepsius was the chairperson of the German Sociological Association, founded in 1909 by Max Weber, Ferdinand Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Georg Simmel.

The book consists of five parts:

Section I, "The Scholar and His Impact" (pp. 1–75), is devoted to the Weberian research program in the broadest sense. It highlights the following topics: (a) the research of the uniqueness and potential of Weber's sociology (pp. 3–19); (b) the applicability of his approach to the study of institutions in the context of German reunification (pp. 20–37); (c) Weber's prognostic gift in relation to the risks of modernity (pp. 38–50); (d) the applicability of Weber's concept of charismatic authority to Adolf Hitler's "Führerstaat" (pp. 51–57); and (e) Weber's role as the founder of modern social sciences (pp. 58–75). Especially should be noted the importance of Lepsius's analysis, done through Weber's conceptual framework, of deinstitutionalization processes which happen in the political and legal order of modernity under charismatic rule when "the tyranny of a ruler is not limited by any institutional boundaries" (p. 54).

Section II, "A Politician" (pp. 79–114), consists of two small texts: one about Weber's activity in the establishment of the German Sociological Association mentioned above, and the second about his relations with German universities. In Section III, "The Travel-

3. *Lepsius M. R.* (2014). Institutionalisierung politischen Handelns: Analysen zur DDR, Wiedervereinigung und Europäischen Union. Wiesbaden: Springer.

4. *Lepsius M. R.* (2015). Soziale Schichtung in der industriellen Gesellschaft: Mit einer Einführung von Wolfgang Schluchter. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

5. *Lepsius M. R.* (2017). Soziologie und Soziologen: Aufsätze zur Institutionalisierung der Soziologie in Deutschland. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

6. *Weber M.* (1984ff.). Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe (MWG). 47 Bände / Hrsg. H. Baier, G. Hübinger, M. R. Lepsius, W. J. Mommsen, W. Schluchter, J. Winckelmann. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

7. *Kaesler D.* (2017). Die Weberei, sie höret nimmermehr auf. Available at: https://literaturkritik.de/lepsius-max-weber-seine-kreise-weber-max-weber-gesamtausgabe-weber-max-weber-gesamtausgabe-weberei-sie-hoeret-nimmermehr-auf,23023.html (accessed 22 June 2019).

ler" (pp. 117–140), Lepsius gives unique data about Weber's trip to the United States in August-November of 1904, and of his repeated stays in Italy between 1899 and 1913.

Section IV, "The man in his relationship" (pp. 141–271), the most voluminous one, is devoted to the most personal, even intimate moments in Weber's life. It includes five studies of his biography, personal connections and social milieu. The range of topics discussed here is broad — from the issue that has key significance for the whole of Weber's scholarship and concerns the historical contextualization of sociology of the early 20th century (pp. 143–158) to the reconstruction of the life of Weber's family in the house at Ziegelhäuser Landstrasse, 17 in Heidelberg (pp. 159–209) and the confused story of his love affairs with Mina Tobler (pp. 210–231) and Else Jaffe (pp. 232–251). The section ends with a study of the role of Munich in Weber's life and the preservation of his memory in the Bavarian capital (pp. 252–271). Here the reader can learn more not only from Weber's personal, but also from his intellectual life, for example, the fact that despite being an international celebrity, Weber was elected with only a small majority of votes a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences.

According to some critics, it is this biographical section which reveals Lepsius's outstanding skills in clarifying particular moments of Weber's life or interpreting specific Weberian ideas and his own social affiliation with the same bourgeois environment which Weber himself openly described as his own background. The articles in this part of the collection clearly express the author's subtle understanding of this milieu with its vital and stylistic features, such as its urban character, education, rhetorical power, the charm and sovereignty of the high modern culture holder. For example, in the article called "Cultural Liberalism, Cultural Protestantism, Cultural Feminism," Lepsius, using the example of Weber's family house in Heidelberg, masterfully reconstructs the family and public life of the Protestant "bourgeoisie of education" in Germany at the turn of the 20th century, emphasizing their liberal spirit and slightly diminishing the economic basis of their cherished openness — the large family property. It is not a big surprise that under Lepsius's pen Weber's villa, built in 1847 by Max's grandfather, turns with its numerous inhabitants into a meeting place for various luminaries, descendants from famous German scientific, entrepreneurial and creative dynasties — the author himself gave entertaining tours around the building.

In this regard, it is striking how the pretty four-storeyed Max Weber House on the picturesque bank of the Neckar River is now used by the University of Heidelberg — not as a museum,[8] as might be expected — but as an international educational center where students from abroad attend language training courses and receive a career guidance in advance of their further studies. It was here, in the apartment on the second floor, that the Weber couple lived from 1910 to 1919 and it was here that Marianne Weber returned after Max's death in Munich in June of 1920. She lived there until her death in 1954, having pragmatically transformed her salon not only into a place for weekly meetings of Heidel-

8. Of course, the university museum does have Max Weber materials, but they are presented there in their standard "museum-like" version.

berg intellectuals ("Geister Tee"), but also into a significant center for the reception and promotion of her husband's intellectual heritage (pp. 188–195).

In the final section V, "Max Weber Complete Edition" (pp. 275–313), the author tells us about the design, structure and bibliographic features of this project, which has long been the most important event in the world of Weber scholarship. It should be noted that Oliver Lepsius was assisted in the preparation of the book under review by another co-publisher of the MWG and no less important scholar of Weber, Wolfgang Schluchter.

In exact accordance with its own title, the book depicts, with literary elegance and sociological precision, the thematic, personal and geographical circles which Weber himself was the center of. Without slipping into nastiness in the reconstruction of Weber's confused affairs with Else Jaffa or with musically gifted Mina Tobler, the author while analyzing these tangled personal relationships comes to important conclusions: for example, the genealogy of Weber's sociology of music becomes much clearer within this constellation.

It remains a matter of regret that Lepsius did not have enough time to write a separate piece about the most important woman in Weber's life — his wife Marianne — who after his death became an active promoter of her husband's ideas. This gap in the book is partially compensated for by the extensive passage devoted to her in the text about Weber's Heidelberg apartment. In particular, the reader can learn some underreported details of Marianne Weber's own intellectual activity — for example, of her public position as the president of the League of German Women's Associations and her political position as a representative in the federal state parliament of Baden or her book titles, including *Wife and Mother in the Development of Law*, for which she was awarded an honorary doctoral degree by the Faculty of Law of the University of Heidelberg.

Dirk Kaesler described Lepsius as "a small forms master": even small texts written by Lepsius provoke, in the prepared reader, a peculiar effect of presence, infecting the reader with the author's confidence that this was the case in Weber's circles and that this is how the works of the classic should be interpreted. Despite the essay genre, this is a volume of outstanding scholarship of Weber's intellectual heritage, which allows the audience to join the highest intellectual culture and feel the passion of Weber approaching his subject. These are characteristic not only of the author, but of his hero as well. We hope that this wonderful book will become available not only to the German-speaking public, but also to the global scientific community interested in the life and work of a great sociologist.

О «топологическом» прочтении Макса Вебера

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