Politeiai and Reputation in Plato's Thought

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ABSTRACT

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Despite the fact that reputation is a feature of Plato's work and context, scholars have scarcely addressed the place of reputation in Plato's thought. Herein I ask: 'what is reputation (*doxa*) for Plato?' and provide an answer by turning to the political orders (*politeiai*) described in the *Republic*, *Laws*, and *Menexenus*.

In Chapter 1 I demonstrate the horizontal relationships of mutual dependence between rulers and ruled in the *politeia* of the *Republic*. It is in the epistemic configuration of the ruled where the economy of reputation is sourced and distributed. I argue that, first, the text explicitly engages with and seeks to correct the common opinions about justice and its relationship to political power and, second, that the philosopher must care about how philosophy appears to the city at large. I end with a consideration of how the *Republic* attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of philosophy. The images of the cave, the ship, and the bride show how and why philosophy's bad reputation is contingent rather than necessary.

In Chapter 2 I establish the role of reputation in the circumstances described and enacted in the founding of Magnesia, the *politeia* of the *Laws*. Through its exhortation to the incoming Dorian colonists to pursue a reputation for virtue, the law code exercises normative force over the disposition of human nature to excessive self-love and also transforms the colonists into Magnesian citizens. The legislator, voiced by the Athenian Stranger who is the principal interlocutor in the dialogue, urges each individual to appear

as they are, and reinvents the undesirable features of Dorian constitutions. If this *politeia* is to come about, its founder and interlocutor in the dialogue, Cleinias the Cnossian, must become a Magnesian; the Athenian must succeed in exhorting the ambivalent Cleinias to seek a good reputation among the future Magnesians.

In Chapter 3 I turn to how Magnesia is maintained. This *politeia* suffers from, and has to cope with, the pathologies of agonism. It does so via the operation of the social mechanisms of praise and blame that the law code sets forth and the citizens act out. The institutional practices such as the daily athletic contests encourage Magnesians to become similar in judgment and, therefore, to correctly distribute political honors and offices. I go on to argue that the city's foreign policy aims at peace and at deterring aggressors. Such a policy is conducive to a more stable interpolis environment, which, in turn, maintains Magnesia.

In Chapter 4 I argue that the vision of the *politeia* found in the *Menexenus* is best understood as an intergenerational multitude. Reputation is key to reconstituting order in these intergenerational relationships. In a dialogue that contains a funeral oration written by Aspasia and delivered by Socrates to the young Menexenus, reputation is a defining characteristic of the *politeia* with the multitude being the source of reputational judgments. Reputation also operates remedially at a critical juncture in the life of the city. I show the explanatory power of these claims by considering Aspasia's role in the dialogue. I propose the Socrates-Aspasia fusion, a device that is symbolic of the correct understanding of what constitutes a good reputation in a *politeia*: men and women, citizens and non-citizens, locals and foreigners. As a device, the fusion functions to block

a reputation from accruing to the orator. This brings into focus the dialogue's explicit argumentative target: the Athenian orator-general Pericles.

According to Plato, reputation is a permanent source of instability for *politeiai*; yet, not only can this disruption be mitigated, but reputation also acts as a boon to political affairs. Reputation is a liminal space between the subjective and objective and as such is under the sway of the multitude. Therefore, reputation is both an explanatory and political concept. With an eye to future research, I conclude with a critical discussion of the findings of the dissertation.

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For Daphne

'My working week and my Sunday rest'

Introduction
Why Plato? Why Reputation?[1]

What is reputation (*doxa*) for Plato? Reputation is a permanent source of instability for political order (*politeia*). Yet, not only can this disruption be mitigated, but reputation also acts as a boon to political affairs. I claim that reputation is instrumental in founding regimes and that reputation maintains a regime by promoting cooperation. The form and content of Plato's dialogues evidence the concern with those who make up the political order.[2] Reputation is a liminal space between the subjective and objective and as such is under the sway of the many (*hoi polloi*, *to plêthos*). Thus we can conclude that, for Plato, reputation is both an explanatory and political concept. This conclusion is the major finding of this dissertation.

To establish the existence of a relationship between reputation and *politeia* is to raise the question of what Plato is trying to achieve through it.[3] This dissertation opens new avenues of research by showing how much there is to be said about the role of reputation in politics and that Plato is concerned with reputation as a phenomenon that impacts philosophy, justice, and the practice of virtue. This dissertation also begins a task that it must necessarily leave incomplete, namely, to address the place of reputation in Plato's thought. It does so by engaging with the *Republic*, the *Laws*, and the *Menexenus*.

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[1] For each chapter, I cite the relevant Platonic dialogue in the main body of the text, i.e. the *Republic* in chapter 1, the *Laws* in chapters 2 and 3, and the *Menexenus* in chapter 4. Unless I state otherwise, the

[2] 'The core meaning of *politeia*', Schofield writes, 'is "citizenship", "the condition of being a citizen"'. Schofield, 2006, p.33. '*[P]oliteia* as such – the meaning and range of the term – has received surprisingly little attention as a lens into ancient ideas about politics and ethics', note Harte and Lane, 2013, p.1.

[3] Aristotle describes *politeia* as the 'sort of life of city-state (*hê gar politeia bios tis esti poleôs*)'. *Politics*, IV.11, 1295a40-41. Monoson expands upon this nicely: 'A city's politeia [sic.] encompasses not only its organization of legislative, judicial, and administrative authority but also the patterns of life and ideology that distinguish its civic culture…Traversing civic space, participating in particular ways in a procession or public sacrifice, attending the theater, heading a household, performing the dithyramb, acting in a chorus, as well as many other activities were all strands of a web of practices through which eligible individuals experienced their Athenian democratic citizenship.' Monoson, 2000, pp.6-7.

I begin by making explicit my commitments and presuppositions in reading Plato. I go on to describe the dissertation's narrative in such a manner as to establish my major claim. In so doing, I provide a non-linear account that is consistent with the make-up of this dissertation. I also reveal the fault lines in the narrative by way of showing that Plato's conceptualizations of *politeiai* can be fruitfully understood via the lens of *doxa*-as-reputation and I address two challenges to my argument. I then proceed to describe the ways in which my reading engages Plato's political theory and conclude by giving preliminary answers to the questions "why Plato? why reputation?". I revisit these answers in the dissertation's conclusion.

1. Reading Plato

Generally speaking, my scholarship shares the commitments outlined in Frank's explanatory framework.[4] According to Frank, political theorists who study politics in the classical world are committed to treating (i) authors not as systematic philosophers but as educators; (ii) authors as immanent critics of democracy; (iii) the classical canon as expansive (and interconnected); and (iv) classical texts as a possession for all time, i.e. as bringing a past to the present. Apart from these substantive claims, I welcome Frank's framework because it blurs what has become in the history of political thought a Manichean distinction between the so-called Straussians and the rest. In so doing, Frank moves us beyond Anglo-American scholarship of the late twentieth century.

This dissertation proceeds from historical evidence that Plato wrote in a context rife with concern about reputation. An overview of the oratorical corpus of the time betrays an obsession with the reputation of one's self, with the reputation of one's legal

[4] Frank, 2008, pp.177-181.

adversary, and, when apposite, with the reputation of Athens as a whole. Historians of ancient Athens and historians of political thought alike have established that the Athenians institutionalized accountability; society at large was invited to scrutinize power holders via political institutions such as the *dokimasia*, the *euthuna*, the ostracism, and the laws on sycophancy.[5]

Close textual reading and attention to the frame of the dialogues are the signature trademarks of this dissertation. M.M. McCabe captures my approach to the dialogues: 'Plato's dialogue form is not uniform, nor are its purposes either evident or singular. But these are its virtues. For these dialogues provoke us to reflect on the dialogue itself: on how it works and why it should.'[6] My research process involved, first, identifying the uses of *doxa*-as-reputation and then following the thread of this usage within the dialogue itself. To some extent this has led me to propose readings of the dialogues as a whole; I do so not because I think that the dialogues ought to be read as self-contained wholes but from considerations of persuasiveness. In most cases, *doxa* and its cognates are translated as 'appearance', 'opinion', and/or 'belief'; the enactment formula of the Athenian assembly was 'it appeared [right] to the people' (*edoxe toi demoi*). Unsurprisingly, this is where the (political) philosophical interest of scholars has fallen. Yet, reputation, and the concern that goes with it, was an irrevocable part of Plato's world.

In interpreting Plato's dialogues I have begun and tried to keep to the instances of *doxa* and its cognates; while this introduces some artificiality, it preserves the connection with

[5] Dover, 1974; MacDowell, 1978; Cohen, 1991, 1995; Hunter, 1993; Allen, 2000; Euben, 2001; Ober, 1989, 1998, 2008; Markovits, 2008.

[6] McCabe, 2006, p.52. To the objection that because Plato is an aristocrat by class, his ideas are politically favorable to that class, we can respond through Monoson: 'If Plato works with the imagery and language of both partisans of democracy and elite opponents of democracy, and no doubt he does, interpreters should inquire as to the range of substantive meanings and implications set in motion by such tactics and not assume he is betraying a political bias'. Monoson, 2000, p.16. A forceful articulation of the objection can be found in Wood and Wood, 1978.

the fecund triad of appearances, opinions, and beliefs.[7] Doing so also decenters concerns about honor (*timê*). I do not deny the obvious psychological and political overlaps between honor and reputation; rather, I arrive at these overlaps via textual analysis. I think this is appropriate on account of the elusiveness of *doxa*. Yet, one may grant that the word is elusive and insist that *doxa* is most often translated as 'opinion'. What do we gain by translating it as 'reputation' instead of, to put it most pointedly, 'public opinion'? I think the difference is that reputation more readily lends itself to the predicates 'good' and 'bad', especially with respect to individuals. With a hint of exaggeration we may posit that reputation has greater normative valence than public opinion. Here is Cassio in Shakespeare's *Othello*: 'Reputation, reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. My reputation, Iago, my reputation!'[8] Layman's language may support this suggestion. When we speak of public opinion we tend to use the predicates 'favorable' or 'unfavorable'; one's reputation is good, the public opinion of one is favorable towards him or her. Again, while it would make sense to say that one pursues reputation; conversely, it would be strange to speak of the pursuit of favorable public opinion.[9]

That I have employed dialogues that vary in the form and degree to which they are dialogical reveals two more presuppositions: Plato's thought is not reducible to a single

[7] In the *Cratylus* Socrates gives an etymology of *doxa*; while likely to be spurious, the conceptual linkages the etymology betrays are at once psychological, epistemological, and political in character. I therefore think that the word of Latin origin, 'reputation', captures these dimensions. Here is the passage in full: ''*Doxa*' ('opinion') either derives from the pursuit (*diôxis*) the soul engages in when it hunts for the knowledge of how things are, or it derives from the shooting of a bow (*toxon*). But the latter is more likely. At any rate '*oiêsis*' ('thinking') is in harmony with it. It seems to express the fact that thinking is the motion (*oisis*) of the soul towards every thing, towards how each of the things that are really is. In the same way, '*boulê*' ('planning') has to do with trying to hit (*bolê*) some target, and '*boulesthai*' ('wishing') and '*bouleuesthai*' ('deliberating') signify aiming at something (*ephiesthai*). All these names seem to go along with '*doxa*' in that they're all like '*bolê*', like trying to hit some target.' *Cratylus*, 420b-c.

[8] Shakespeare, 1604, Act II, Scene 3, l.1416-1419.

[9] This last point becomes clear when we speak of a 'climate' of public opinion.

dialogue, nor is Plato's thought reducible to a single mode of writing. Most readings assume what Blackburn dubs 'the sovereignty of the *Republic*' in the universe of Plato's political thought.[10] While my dissertation does not seek to replicate this move, it nevertheless grants the descriptive claim that the *Republic* does occupy a privileged position, not least with respect to the ontology posited in books 5 through 7. However, whether the *Republic* ought to have sovereign status is a question that the make-up of this dissertation denies. Plato theorizes politics by using different genres of political expression. Thus, in these philosophical dramas we see reputation at its worst and at its best.[11]

Burnyeat writes that 'to understand Plato we have to argue with him, not merely read and study what he wrote. Questions of truth proceed *pari passu* with hermeneutics.'[12] If Burnyeat and McCabe are right, then we can think with Plato. One way of thinking with Plato is by reinterpreting his political thought, in this case by providing a narrative about the role of *doxa*-as-reputation.[13] We should admit that to consider Plato's thought about reputation from our own perspective is to, in part, project our own perspective onto Plato. This is welcome insofar as the text acts as the final authority: we thereby reveal something new, apart from authorial intention and/or the text's immediate context.[14] Via this process, we come to revise our own existing thoughts about reputation. My approach,

[10] Blackburn, 2006, p.15.
[11] Writes Lane, 2015, p.180: Plato 'made philosophy into a performance piece of dramatic confrontation, one in which each reader is invited to play a part in coming to understand himself afresh'. Several interpreters, including Cicero, read Plato as a rhetorician: see North, 1991; Yunis, 1996; Griswold, 2002 and 2010; Markovits, 2008. The view of Plato as an enemy of rhetoric can be found in Havelock, 1963 and 1990; and Halliwell, 1994, *inter alios*.
[12] Burnyeat, 2001, p.7.
[13] 'It is, or should be, obvious that the relevance of historical texts in political thought cannot consist in the provision of blueprints which are self-evidently desirable and unproblematically applicable to present problems.' Lane, 2002, p.38. Following Green, 2012 I consider myself a pupil of the history of ideas, rather than a historian of ideas.
[14] Cf. Mara, 2003, p.741, fnt 4 and Mara, 2008.

therefore, is a mixed one, captured by what Green describes as a melding between history and philosophy.[15] In the round, I understand my dissertation to be an exercise in the interdisciplinary field of history of political thought, a field usefully described by Lane as 'a reflection on reflection…a form of (historical) understanding which can also contribute to forms of political understanding.'[16]

2. Dissertation Narrative

For Plato, reputation is a liminal space between the subjective and objective and as such is under the sway of the many. While an individual experiences his reputation at the subjective level, an individual's reputation is not entirely within that individual's subjective domain. The reputation of an individual is always in the hands of others, that is, those who attribute it. In Platonic epistemology, this attribution proceeds from the *doxai* or beliefs of the attributors, rather than the knowledge they might possess. This is what we mean when we say that reputations can be created and destroyed; if they were necessarily connected to knowledge, then they would just "be", creation and destruction not being applicable to them. To discover the reputation of an individual, one need not encounter the individual themselves, but only those who know of him.[17] It is plausible and possible, therefore, that the site of reputation comes within the purview of the many. It is to the many that Plato turns, as evidenced in the form and content of his dialogues. In

[15] Green, 2015 (forthcoming). According to Green, canonical texts that exemplify this approach include Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*, and Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*; recent examples of political theorists who pursue this approach are Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt. The criteria by which we might assess political theoretical works are coherency of argumentation and 'the potential worth of the conceptual apparatus the author employs to make his or her case', Green argues. I thank the author for sharing a draft of the article.
[16] Lane, 2002, p.38.
[17] To pursue this thought further, we might say that what is relevant is not an agent's action, but the context in which these actions manifest. Those who make up this context are the judges (of the act). In this sense, reputation takes on the quality of rising up spontaneously: it is an *anaduomenon*.

so doing, reputation assumes the character of a political concept, that is, a concept that is rooted in those who make up the *politeia*, broadly understood.

The *Menexenus* is unequivocal in its suggestion that the sources of judgment are not delimited to the group of male citizens: women, metics, and foreigners are all potential sources of judgments pertaining to reputation. Such judgments can originate from just about any domain: public and private, domestic and foreign. To realize this is to realize what is necessary to securing a stable political order. This is why the defining characteristic of the political order is that it is 'an aristocracy upon which the many bestow a good reputation (*met'eudoxias plêthous aristokratia*)' (238d). Reputation is a defining characteristic of the *politeia* with the multitude being the source of reputational judgments (238c-d), putting the rulers and the ruled in a reciprocal relationship.[18] To theorize reputation thusly is to affirm the fiendishness of politics: there is no such thing as a central agency distributing to deserving individuals their just desserts. Indeed, there can be no such agency.

Similarly, in the *Republic* and the *Laws* alike, Plato deploys rhetoric to persuade the many. While the *Republic* contains no explicitly oratorical passages, it is nonetheless 'an exhortation to philosophy'.[19] The dialogue urges the many to lead an ethically just life despite the fact that doing so is both laborious (*epiponon*) and difficult (*chalepon*). Plato seeks to persuade them via the images of the ship of state, philosophy as a bride, and the cave; these images are at the level that is epistemically appropriate for the majority of

[18] Throughout this dissertation the phrase 'reputational judgment' refers to the individual or collective judgment about the character, action, and behavior of a subject (individual or collective); it is not a meta-judgment, that is, it does not refer to the judgment of the reputation of the subject.
[19] Rowe in Plato, 2012, p.xiv.

people.[20] Successful persuasion here means substituting false beliefs for true ones, thus bringing people to a better epistemic configuration and fulfilling a fundamental desire each individual has: to not be deceived about the truth.[21]

Often deplored as the driest of Plato's works, the *Laws* stands out among the dialogues in proposing itself as a legal document and educational text for the city it proposes. Significantly, rhetorical preambles (*prooimia*) to the laws exhort the citizens of Magnesia to pursue a good reputation, exercise positive and negative reputational judgments, and watch over one another. Magnesian education seeks to stabilize the judgments people make about each other, that is, the judgments that come to constitute an individual's reputation. Magnesians are expected to engage in collective practices, not least the arduous athletic contests in which men and women participate sporting arms. Such contests both teach the citizen *athlêtes* robust judgment and are good at giving the each their due: the best athletes are those who win the contest.[22] By participating and thinking in terms of athletic contests the community's judgment is therefore stabilized, reputations are deserved, and the state of appearances maps onto reality. It fulfills Socrates' claim that 'Whatever is in good condition…admits least of being changed by anything else'.[23]

[20] Plato 'did not expect to win us over by argument alone…The Ship of State, like the later images of the Sun, Line and Cave, gives us temporary access to the transcendent view, accustoming us to look on ordinary human experience from outside and above. This is not an argument, but it does help us make sense of the direction in which the arguments are leading.' Burnyeat, 2001, p.13.
[21] Here is Socrates in the *Gorgias*, 505e: 'we should all be striving for the prize (*philonikôs*) when it comes to knowing what is the truth of the things we are talking about, and what false. It is a general good for everybody, after all, that it should become clear.'
[22] For the historical backdrop of these proposals, as well as a discussion of their sociopolitical significance, see Pritchard, 2013.
[23] *Republic*, 2.381b.

As a doxic concept under the sway of the many, reputation is a permanent source of disruption to *politeiai*.[24] The principal way in which reputation threatens to cause political disorder is that it privileges appearances at the expense of reality: a reputation for justice, say, is both preferable and sufficient to the actual possession of justice. In the *Republic*, Glaucon and Adeimantus want Socrates to defend justice without the benefits that a reputation for justice brings. The problem is that a pursuit of reputation for justice brings political office irrespective of whether an individual is actually just. When individuals earn political office because of an appearance of justice without actually being just, the outcome is to the detriment of the city. This is the burden of books 8 and 9, which put on display an array of disordered *politeiai*. Plato's solution is to give power to those who want it the least: just or philosophic individuals. Only they can properly wield political power. Unlike the *Republic* which is set during the Peloponnesian war, the *Menexenus* is set a generation after the end of the Peloponnesian war. The *Menexenus* is Plato's political theoretical comment upon Pericles and his funeral oration as written by Thucydides. Pericles displays the power of reputation when it accrues to one man who appears as a stand-in for the city: he plunged Athens into a war that brought the city to the verge of extinction. Plato undercuts this overreliance on this orator-general,

[24] For Plato the political world belongs to the protean realm of becoming. In such a world, a well-ordered polis is characterized by a dynamic stability: the stability of the polis depends not only on the goals it pursues, but also on the processes available to it, with which it might pursue these goals. Plato's perfectionist and teleological political thought ought to be understood as operating within such an ontological framework. The opposite view is summed up by Havelock, 1990, p.22: 'Platonic politics takes no account of time as a dynamic process of change. Its demand for metaphysical stability, required by the realization of ideal form, makes this impossible'. If we ask "under which circumstances are *politeiai* necessary?" we confront the paradox that they are needed only in middling circumstances, that is, in situations that are neither wholly good nor wholly bad. Here is Plato's Socrates: 'the true lawgiver oughtn't to bother with that form of law or constitution (*politeias*), either in a badly governed city or in a well-governed one – in the former, because it's useless and accomplishes nothing; in the latter, because anyone could discover some of these things, while the others follow automatically from the ways of life we established'. *Republic*, 4.427a. *Politeiai* are therefore structurally analogous to *doxai*: they occupy a middle ground between ignorance and knowledge.

symbolically by having no single identifiable individual giving the funeral oration of the dialogue (Socrates ventriloquizes Aspasia) and theoretically by focusing on the intergenerational make-up of the city. In the *Laws*, Plato confronts the issue of how reputation is itself disruptive because it originates in spirited or thumetic motivations and drives. The agonistic environment of Magnesia is bedeviled by envy (*phthonos*) and anger (*orgê*). These thumetic moral psychological pathologies that distort the equally thumetic pursuit of a reputation for virtue and obedience to the law.[25]

Since reputation is a mainstay of political affairs, the question that follows is, how could its threat to political order be mitigated? To put it differently, how might we make appearances consistent with how things are, thereby making reputation a boon to political affairs? Plato is not naïve about the difficulties involved here. Consistent with his expressed view about the arduousness of living an ethically just life, Plato holds that it is demanding for individuals and cities to appear as they are (or as they should be). The answer is in the role reputation plays in statecraft, which I understand to consist of the twin political theoretical categories of founding and maintaining. In short, reputation is a mainstay of the processes that constitute a stable *politeia*.

Each dialogue presents us with different founding circumstances and reputation is in various ways instrumental in such moments. The *Republic*, considered as an artifact, takes the first step towards the founding of the beautiful city by rehabilitating the reputation of philosophy in the eyes of the many who hitherto regard philosophy as useless at best and harmful at worst. To live in a well-ordered *politeia* is to live in a world where political power lies with those individuals who know how to philosophize. Plato

[25] A reputation for virtue and a reputation for obeying the law are co-extensive in Magnesia.

moves us to a world of philosophy, 'a new world in which goodness and reputation can never again drift apart'.[26]

Whereas the *Republic* presents us with a hypothetical city, the *Laws* presents us with a city *in utero*.[27] Magnesia is a colony commissioned by Cnossos, and its first inhabitants are Dorian immigrants. By transcribing Dorian laws and practices into Magnesian ones, the lawgivers urge a selective forgetting upon the incomers. The law code exhorts the immigrants to appear as they are and to pursue a reputation for virtue and obedience to the laws. Therefore, Magnesia cannot get off the ground without the colonists' pursuit of reputation for virtue among their peers. In the *Laws* the problem of founding also becomes a problem of the founder. Cleinias of Cnossos, Magnesia's founder and interlocutor in the dialogue, must be persuaded to pursue a reputation as a lawgiver among the Magnesians and overcome the ties that bind him to his city of origin. In both cases, to appear as one is becomes a strongly normative injunction: one *is* who one wants to be.

This holds in the *Menexenus* too. The funeral oration this dialogue contains is Plato's attempt at harmonizing reputation with reality at a moment when the *politeia* is in crisis.[28] Following a military defeat, the Athenians must not only bury their dead, but also

[26] Nehamas, 1999, p.320. Precisely because the philosopher's truth sounds like one opinion among many – 'the moment the eternal [truth] is brought into the midst of men it becomes temporal' as Arendt puts it – the reputation of philosophy has to change. Arendt, 2004, p.432. 'Plato's invocation of compulsion in Kallipolis also amounts to a recognition that there is imperfection within the model of *ideal* politics itself…Kallipolis is maximally harmonious and happy despite the fact that not every part of it is (by itself) maximally happy ([7.]519e1-520a4), and this point is underscored by the fact that some compulsion in the form of a law must be given to induce the philosophers to rule. By making compulsion necessary even in the ideal city, Plato is demonstrating that there is a need to adjudicate between conflicting interests in order to make political community possible.' Brown, 2000, p.15.

[27] For the claim that Aristotle was the first to pair *Republic* with *Laws* under *politeia* reading, see Nightingale, 1993, p.281.

[28] The *Menexenus* stretches the limits of the founding-maintaining distinction; for a regime to pull through a crisis, a second founding might be needed. I have in mind the reconstitution of democracy in Athens in 403 BC following the thirteen-month reign of the Thirty Tyrants.

cope with the reality of a decimated citizen body. The city itself is to replace the dead, its very reputation becoming a normative concept that both commands the people's obedience and urges them to live up to it. The reputation of the city is principal here: without it, the claim that the city acts as father to the orphaned children – orphaned because of the city's war – loses its normative valence. The continuity of the city is premised on it preserving a good reputation, that is, on the next generation being persuaded to live up to the reputation of their immediate ancestors who died fighting for their way of life. If the *politeia* is best understood as an intergenerational multitude, it follows that the task is to order these intergenerational relationships as they pertain between both the young and the old, and the dead and the living. The oration casts the city as a *tertium quid* upon which these generations can meet.

Reputation not only helps found a regime, but also assists well-ordered rule.[29] Praise (*epainos*), blame (*psegos*), slander (*diabolê*), and reproach (*oneidia*) constitute the economy of reputation. These mechanisms show the two senses in which cooperation must be promoted: praise promotes cooperation among deserving entities (individuals or states), whereas blame, slander, and reproach discourage cooperation among undeserving entities. The proper operation of these mechanisms leads to a correct distribution of political honors (*timas*) and offices (*archas*).

In the *Laws*, the law code incentivizes cooperation by having both Magnesians and Magnesia pursue a reputation for virtue, among their fellows and in the interpolis environment, respectively. Those who pursue such a reputation by unfair and devious means are to incur the blame and wrath of the community and the city, respectively. In

[29] Here Plato anticipates contemporary findings across a host of disciplines informed by Darwinian principles: in biology, see Alexander, 1979; in political science, see Axelrod, 2006; in behavioral economics, see Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; and in social psychology, see Haidt, 2012.

the *Menexenus*, reputation applies to generational entities. The living generation of Athenians is urged to compete in a struggle (*agôn*) with the generation of men whom they are eulogizing. The former aims at surpassing the reputation for virtue the latter have earned. The competition between the living and the dead is productive, for it perpetuates the city by creating a cross-temporal community. In the *Menexenus*, Plato is trying to recuperate the reputation of the city, whereas in the *Republic* the focus is on the reputation of philosophy. The *Republic* proposes that, if there is to be agreement (*homonoia*) throughout the beautiful city, it is not enough for philosophers to be installed into power. The proper role of a philosopher's spirited part (*thumoeides*) is to get him to care for the reputation of philosophy – that is, to care about how philosophy appears to the city at large – and to pursue the kinds of honors (*timai*) which Kallipolis makes available to him. In such a situation, the rewards of a reputation for justice can be restored. On the contrary, when philosophic types recede into quietude and ignore the way they appear, the *politeia* becomes worse off. And if these types ignore philosophy's reputation they will suffer ridicule at best and persecution at worst. Kallipolis and its rulers are not free from the economy of reputation, an economy sourced and distributed among the many.

Thus far, I may have given the impression that Plato is saying the same thing in three different ways.[30] To dispel this impression I will reveal the fault lines in the narrative by inquiring into how each dialogue stands apart from the other two.[31] Doing so also shows

[30] To claim that Plato is saying the same thing in three different ways would be to read Plato as a 'unitarian'. While such an approach is out of fashion (see the 'developmentalists' Klosko and Christopher Bobonich), its proponents remain highly influential (e.g. Kahn, Popper, Strauss, Bloom).

[31] My language is deliberate: for the exercise to work, it is imperative to "reveal" the fault lines rather than introduce them exogenously.

that Plato's conceptualizations of *politeiai* can be fruitfully understood via the lens of *doxa*-as-reputation.

How, then, do the environments of Plato's *politeiai* differ? First, unlike the *politeiai* of the *Laws* and the *Menexenus*, in the city of the *Republic* reputation is not a sociopolitical sorting mechanism among equals. In Kallipolis the sorting mechanism is education: achievement in education tracks social hierarchies.[32] Second, the acutely agonistic setting where envy is endemic is unique to Magnesia, the city of the *Laws*. The *politeiai* of the *Republic* and the *Menexenus* are relatively harmonious environments.[33] Third, the *Menexenus* moves away from the 'persuasive strategy' of the city-soul analogy, proposing instead a cross-generational *politeia*.[34] However, the city-soul analogy is operational in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, both of which suppress intergenerational problems in their best regimes. In Kallipolis and Magnesia, Plato resets the generational counter to zero; the most efficient way to bring about Kallipolis is to dismiss those above the age of ten in a given population, while Magnesia's starting population are all immigrants.[35]

This last observation is not just a claim about the environments of the cities as we find them in the dialogues. It makes an assertion about the structure of Plato's thought. The *Menexenus* is valuable because it makes us think differently about this structure, i.e. in a way that does not include the city-soul analogy. Plato may have had good reasons for dropping the analogy in the *Menexenus*: men like Pericles try to mold the city in their

[32] I do not deny the major role education (*paideia*, *trophê*) has to play in the city of the *Laws* and in the aims of the *Menexenus*. For the former see Jaeger, 1986; for the latter see Pappas and Zelcer, 2015.
[33] The concept of the *agôn* is alive and well in contemporary political thought. It is conspicuous in the political theories of agonistic democracy and agonistic pluralism, associated with postmodern theorists such as Connolly, Honig, and Mouffe. The concept plays a role in so-called liberal and communitarian political theorizing, such as that of Dunn, 2000, p.192 and Walzer, 1983, pp.310-311, respectively.
[34] I lift the phrase quoted from Lane in Plato, 2007, p.xxvii.
[35] See *Republic*, 7,540e-541a and *Laws*, 3.702c.

image. At a moment of crisis, the city can turn either to its great leader such as Pericles, or it can turn to its generational heritage. Plato opts for the latter, showing that the best way to stabilize a political order is to rely on the social mechanisms ever-present in a multitude.[36]

Two further challenges might be posed to the view of Plato elaborated in this narrative. First, that in this understanding of Plato, the many are able to judge what is best for them despite their lack of philosophical credentials. Yet, in the words of Kraut, it is 'a pervasive feature of Plato's political philosophy [that] [t]hose who are limited in their conception of what exists and what is worthwhile are not the best judges of their own interests'.[37] My argument does not deny this; what it does is to reformulate the problem. Instead of starting from Kraut's position, I begin by noticing the extensive involvement of the many in the form and content of Plato's dialogues. 'The justification he [Plato] is looking for,' writes Williams, 'is in fact designed for the people who are largely within the ethical world. And the aim of the discourse is not to deal with someone who probably will not listen to it, but to reassure, strengthen, and give insight to those who will.'[38] Via his characters in the *Republic*, not only does Plato present the many with images, he also uses their value judgments as premises in argument.[39] In the *Laws* the founding project is necessarily directed at the incoming colonists; their Dorian stock and human nature is taken into account in the fashioning of Magnesia. The human material with which the founders are working is neither inert nor a blank slate. In the *Menexenus*, by contrast to

[36] In a discussion of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, Balot writes that the analogy between city and soul is a 'strategy [that] brings home the close connection of ethics and politics'. Balot, 2006, p.198. In the *Menexenus*, such a strategy would be supererogatory.
[37] Kraut, 1992, p.12.
[38] Williams, 1985, p.26. Williams is writing about the philosopher's confrontation with a moral skeptic, specifically the *Gorgias*' Callicles.
[39] For example, at *Republic,* 8.544c.

trial or Assembly speeches where the audience is composed of (male) citizens only, Plato trucks in the oratorical genre that addresses itself to the most diverse audience possible. This choice is intimately related to the role the many have to play in countering the influence of men like Pericles. The best *politeia* depends on their approval (*met' eudoxias*). As an immanent critic of democracy, it is the many whom he must persuade.[40]

The second challenge to my understanding of Plato is that in it virtue is 'merely made the stilts of reputation': instead of pursuing virtue, individuals will pursue a good reputation.[41] Isn't this what Glaucon and Adeimantus are worried about in book 2 of the *Republic*? Two things should be said in response. First, if virtue is meant as a translation of *aretê*, then the contrast between virtue and a reputation for virtue is overdrawn. To have *aretê* is to be outstanding or distinguished; this logically demands that one is outstanding by comparison to others *and* that others award one that distinction.[42] *Aretê* should be understood as success when applied to the sociopolitical world that human beings inhabit. Here is Nehamas: 'we might try to understand *aretê* as the quality that makes something outstanding in its group, as the feature that accounts for its justified notability. This idea involves three sets of elements: the inner structure and quality of things, their reputation, and the audience that can appreciate them. This is as it should be. *Aretê* (like "success") always had a public aspect. When the fourth century orator Hypereides, for example, wrote that those who die for their country "leave *aretê* behind them," he was thinking of virtue in such public terms.'[43] Second, the dialogues I discuss contain implicit and explicit examples of individuals who pursue reputation for its own

[40] 'We need, that is, to be alert to the way Plato mobilizes the language, imagery, and principles that the Athenians themselves used to fashion their orthodox civic self-understanding'. Monoson, 2000, p.4.
[41] I lift the phrase from Wollstonecraft, 1996, p.103.
[42] This premise informs Frank's reading of Aristotle's political thought; see Frank, 2005.
[43] The work by Hypereides to which Nehamas refers is a funeral oration. Nehamas, 1999, pp.319-320.

sake. This is precisely the problem, I claim, that Plato meets head-on by confronting the world of appearances. From the formulation of the best *politeia* in the *Menexenus* – 'an aristocracy upon which the many bestow a good reputation (*met'eudoxias plêthous aristokratia*)' (238d) – two strict opposites follow: either a regime where the best do not rule with the approval of the many or a regime where the many approve of those who are not the best. In both cases, things have gone awry in the realm of *doxai*. In Kallipolis, the rulers have to maintain philosophy's reputation for ruling, against the likely slanders they receive by those who do want to rule for the sake of a high reputation, that is, those *thumetic* individuals who make up the auxiliary classes. In the *Laws*, the law code designs institutional arrangements to cope with those whose observed behavior creates a distance between what it means to have virtue and what it means to have a reputation for virtue. For a thinker who is as focused on stability as Plato is, it makes sense that what his political theory must address is the world of becoming, that is, the world that is always and necessarily unstable.

My narrative reconciles Plato's various polemical targets in an overall argument about Plato's political thought.[44] In the *Menexenus* it is general-orators like Pericles whose reputation earns them such a degree of political power so as to make them dangerous to the city. In the *Republic* it is the sophists whose behavior gives philosophy a bad reputation.[45] In the *Laws*, the new *politeia* has to compete with the constitutions the interlocutors critique in book 3: Sparta because it makes its citizens too aggressive, Persia because it is excessively authoritarian, and Athens because it is excessively free.

[44] I do not mean to suggest either that these are the sole targets in each of these dialogues or that these targets can only be found in these dialogues.
[45] For a distinction between sophists and rhetoricians see T.H. Irwin, 1992, p.67.

3. Revisiting Platonic Politics

In the Academy today Plato the philosopher is lauded, whereas Plato the political theorist is excoriated. This is an early discovery any scholar of Plato's political thought is bound to make. Unlike most early discoveries that tend to be refuted with an increasing awareness of the secondary literature, this one persists. To restate the problem in a milder form: whereas grandiloquent statements about the importance of Plato abound, they have no impact on the overall negative view of Plato's politics.[46] The objections by intellectual giants such as Popper and Havelock are well known and influential. Currently, both within and outside Plato scholarship it is dangerous to speak of Plato and politics, lest this means Straussian Platos and neoconservative politics.[47] Readers sympathetic to Plato go as far as to claim that he 'is a non-political thinker, in that he does not assume the existence of political opposition. This unconcern for the political is perhaps the *Republic*'s most dangerous legacy.'[48]

A suspicious reader of the secondary literature on Plato's politics in Anglo-American philosophy might remark that this literature is structured in such a way so as to be immune from the Popperian and Havelockian critiques.[49] For example, Schofield's introduction focuses on what is living and what is dead in Plato's utopianism, 'approach[ing] Plato's political philosophy through a study of the matrix from which it

[46] Burnyeat, 2001; Lane, 2001; Williams, 2006; and Blackburn, 2007.
[47] For this charge see, *inter alios*, Havelock, 1990, p.19.
[48] Pappas, 2003, p.211. For the argument that the *Republic* is ethical, not political, see Annas, 1981 and 1999. Contrast Bloom, 1991, p.350: 'Philosophy is invoked in the city only for the purpose of solving a political problem', i.e. judging friends and enemies by the criterion of knowledge and ignorance. I agree with Bloom and the scholarly majority who read the *Republic* as an ethical-political work. See Wallach 1997 and 2001; Williams, 2006; Schofield, 2006; Balot, 2006; and Lane in Plato, 2007.
[49] Some welcome exceptions that show that it is possible to fruitfully think about Plato's politics from within the Anglo-American tradition are Wallach, 1997 and 2001; Kamtekar, 2005; Lane, 2012 and 2015; and Frank, 2014.

emerged'.[50] Bobonich sees Plato's political thought as 'a response to certain unresolved issues and problems that arise in the Socratic dialogues'.[51] The historicism of the first strategy and the introverted – if not insular – nature of the second strategy are evident.

We should not deny the idealist and elitist elements in Plato's political thought. Yet, overemphasis of (e.g. Popper, Havelock), or oversensitivity to (e.g. Schofield, Bobonich), these elements has led to a distorted view of Plato's political thought. Generously interpreted and generally stated, this overemphasis has led to a corresponding de-emphasis of how Plato fashions his *politeiai* on *doxai*, generally, and specifically, on the role of reputation.

We can restate the implications of the difference at stake as a disagreement over the relationship between theory and practice. Plato is often painted as an ideal theorist whose political proposals are necessarily detached from worldly practice. Writes Balot: 'Plato…tried to displace the contemporary politics dedicated to courage and imperialism and to establish his own utopian politics based on transcendent knowledge.'[52] Dunn claims that politics comes second for Platonists; a vision or understanding of the truth must come first.[53] When these ideas are set free from the transcendental world of the Forms, they become reactionary. Even if we grant this characterization of Plato's political proposals, this picture is complacent, moving all too quickly from the characterization of 'ideal theorist' to the claim about detachment from practice. Unlike Aristotle, Plato did not distinguish between theoretical and practical knowledge.[54] On my reading, the

[50] Schofield, 2006, p.4, cf. pp.332-333.
[51] Bobonich, 2008, p.333; cf. Bobonich, 2002.
[52] Balot, 2006, p.140.
[53] Dunn, 2000, pp.192-194.
[54] In a contemporary treatment that is pitched as a biography of the *Republic*, Simon Blackburn distinguishes between Plato and Plato-lite. Generously interpreted, we might say that such a distinction might apply to any philosopher. If so, then there is nothing particular about Plato that necessitates such a

relationship between political theory and political practice is not one of detachment. The former is not isolated from and elevated above the latter.[55]

To see this gives us a reason to reject orthodox readings of Plato as a truth-lover and *doxa*-hater. Among political theorists, Arendt is a prominent and influential example of such a reading, noting 'Plato's furious denunciation of *doxa*, opinion'.[56] To the juxtaposition of truth and opinion, Arendt attaches compulsion and persuasion respectively. Driving a wedge between the author Plato and the character Socrates, Arendt avers that the former is with truth and compulsion, the latter with opinion and persuasion.[57] Despite the fact that Arendt is discussing Plato's Socrates, she writes that according to *Socrates*, 'For mortals the important thing is to make *doxa* truthful'.[58]

Arendt's now orthodox view of Plato relies on her understanding of philosophy. Arendt affirms Plato's 'desire to make philosophy useful for politics…[with the result that] Plato in a sense deformed philosophy for political purposes'.[59] The problem here is that Arendt treats philosophy as if it were (for Plato) a well-defined subject. Yet, both historically and textually, this does not bear out. Nehamas is one among several scholars who have pointed this out. He writes that 'in the fourth century B.C. terms like "philosophy",

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treatment. If it is specific to Plato, a less generous interpretation suggests itself: the figure of Plato the idealist metaphysician casts such a spell that contemporary philosophers find it necessary to distill Plato-lite in order to make Plato more palatable. Whereas Blackburn does not cite R.M. Hare's 1983 introduction to Plato, his move is strikingly similar to Hare's division between 'Pato' and 'Lato'.

[55] For a formulation of Plato's political thought that avoids the error I describe in this paragraph, see Wallach, 1997, p.379: Plato's political thought 'consists of the discordant relationship between a critical discourse (*logos*) of virtue (*aretê*) and practical power (*ergon*)'.

[56] Arendt, 2004, p.428. Despite this disagreement, I share with Arendt the commitment that it is essential to understand *doxa* if we are to understand Plato's thought. Moreover, Arendt acknowledges that '*doxa* means not only opinion but also splendor and fame. As such, it is related to the political realm, which is the public sphere in which everyone can appear and show who he himself is.' Arendt, 2004, p.433, see p.439.

[57] For a recent expression of this view in the context of an argument against epistemic democracy, see Urbinati, 2014.

[58] Arendt, 2004, p.437. Lane, 2001 points out that the "Plato bad, Socrates good" approach is distinctively Anglo-American, German scholarship never being tempted by such a distinction.

[59] Arendt, 2004, p.452.

"dialectic", and "sophistry" do not seem to have a widely agreed-upon application. On the contrary, different authors seem to have fought with one another with the purpose of appropriating the term "philosophy," each for his own practice and educational scheme.'[60] Arendt reifies philosophy, ignoring the fact that it is a contested concept.[61] As I argue herein there can be no confluence of politics and philosophy as long as the latter carries the reputation its concurrent practitioners give it.[62] To rehabilitate the bad reputation of philosophy is, in part, to wrest it from the hands of the sophists. It is also to reconstitute philosophy, a subject about which Plato holds an 'astonishingly ambitious conception'.[63]

By attending to the hitherto unexplored relationship between reputation and *politeiai* in Plato, this dissertation allows us to set aside both the standard juxtaposition between *alêtheia* (truth as good/desirable) and *doxa* (opinion as bad/undesirable) associated with Plato and the rule of experts. Plato's use of the metaphor of reputation is symbolic of his political project: a stable *politeia* is one where rulers and ruled appear as they are. Arguably, this is a vehicle for spurring political change, a plea for patterned political action, both descriptive and enactive. 'Plato wrote to affect politics, and Athenian politics specifically. His dialogues function as, and are full of, 'paradigms," or conceptually rigorous symbols meant to help readers to right opinions that will affect their actions and so the politics that flows from them.'[64] In other words, we should not let the vertical

[60] Nehamas, 1999, p.110; cf. Balot, 2013, pp.183-184. Kraut, 1992 begins his 'Introduction to the study of Plato' with this problematic.
[61] For a persuasive and extensive case of how philosophy was contested, see Nightingale, 1995.
[62] For an account of the development of the concept of *theoria* in classical times, see Nightingale, 2004.
[63] Kraut, 1992, p.2.
[64] Allen, 2010, p.108. More recently, Balot's view about Plato's transcendent politics appears to have softened, arguing as he does for a 'dialectical relationship between political life and philosophy'. Balot, 2003, p.181 *et passim*. Brunt holds the view that Plato was not animated by a concern to improve the polis. Brunt, 1993, pp.282-342.

relationships of power that persist in Plato's *politeiai* obscure the horizontal relationships of mutual dependence that a focus on *doxa*-as-reputation reveals. By insisting on these relationships, Plato points to what one scholar calls the 'abdication of judgment among the citizens' that took place following the Peloponnesian war.[65] Thus, we should not hesitate to embrace what Griswold calls 'Plato's doxic starting point…Opinion is not an axiom or theoretical construction; it gives us an *already intelligible*, but nonmethodological "beginning" for our philosophizing'.[66] This is consistent with the way Plato writes, leaving his readers with 'no reliable hermeneutic for tracing a monologic authorial stance (about anything) within Platonic dialogue'.[67]

The focus on reputation delivers what scholars have called Plato's legacy: the close connection between psychology and politics.[68] This is because reputation originates from the 'the central transformational region of the soul' known as the *thumos*.[69] In his discussion of spirit, Burnyeat observes the truth in this picture: 'Even if in today's Western world we find the language of honor somewhat foreign to us, it is undeniable that we are still often motivated by ideas about how we are judged by others…the language of 'status' or 'standing' remains familiar'.[70] From a moral psychological standpoint, *thumos* is the key to the virtuous *politeia* in the three dialogues. This is because the motivations behind the pursuit of reputation are thumetic: a desire for honor, a desire to be recognized, a desire for just desserts, and so on. Accompanying these are the quintessential thumetic emotions of fear, anger and envy. Plato uses these motives

[65] Frank, 2014, p.337; cf. Frank, 2007.
[66] Griswold, 2010, p.147. Here, and elsewhere, emphasis is in the original unless otherwise stated.
[67] Halliwell, 2009, p.19.
[68] See Lane in Plato, 2007. Trying to separate philosophy from psychology 'is like trying to peel a raspberry', in Appiah's memorable phrase; Appiah, 2008, p.14.
[69] Murdoch, 1977, p.81. *Thumos* continues to fascinate Platonists and non-Platonists alike, see Hobbs, 2000 and Goldstein, 2014 respectively.
[70] Burnyeat, 2006, p.12.

and emotions to achieve institutional and attitudinal stability in his *politeiai*. Hence, thumetic motivations characterize a class of men and women in Kallipolis, the citizen body as a whole in agonistic Magnesia, and the intergenerational struggle in the *Menexenus*.[71] As Meyer notes: 'His goal is to articulate and defend a conception of excellence that is civic and political – one that can be inculcated in the citizens of a *polis* collectively, and that can be perpetuated stably across generations'.[72]

Why Plato? Why Reputation?

This study on Plato's thought reveals the role of reputation in the constitution of politics. In Plato's *politeiai*, judgments and claims about reputation are systematically related to those conditions that enable a virtuous and happy life for their citizens. Plato 'was concerned throughout with how people can change their lives so as to become good', writes Murdoch.[73] Plato's dialogues call attention to the discrepancy between how people think things are and how they ought to be. Indeed, taken in the round, Plato's political thought is a testament to human beings' power of imaginative extraction from their actual circumstances.[74]

Reputation matters because it is pivotal in making the world know what things are. Reputation draws our attention to the relationships of mutual dependence between rulers and ruled. Reputation is never a single individual's to give, it can never be exclusively in the hands of the reputation-bearer, and it can accrue to individuals despite themselves.

[71] An oft-forgotten advantage of the *thumos* vis-à-vis rational motivation is its presence in children, and hence crucial to *paideia* understood both as education and as play. Plato takes full advantage of this is the *Republic* and the *Laws*.
[72] Meyer, 2008, p.32. Meyer is writing about the *Republic* and *Laws* only.
[73] Murdoch, 1977, p.21.
[74] See Allen, 2000, pp.251-252.

For these reasons, Plato shows us that the possessors and exercisers of political power are obliged to confront the problem of their reputation. We can expect, therefore, that they will attempt to manage it accordingly. Even if we grant that they hold office on account of their good reputation, political power has a corrosive effect upon its bearers. Those with Gyges' ring – a metaphor for the invisibility which political power affords its bearer – will manipulate the way they appear in order to appear better than they are or, failing that, to maintain their hold on power. In reserving a role for the many, Plato's *politeiai* counteract this situation.

The relationship between reputation and political order shows us that, contrary to a widespread prejudice, Plato does have an answer to the question "who is guarding the guardians?" Hence there are good exegetical reasons to put this question back on the radar of Platonic scholarship. And insofar as this question strongly resonates with concurrent worries about the distribution and exercise of political power in liberal democracies, there are good political theoretical reasons to think about this question with Plato.[75] Like the ancient Athenians, we may not be able to hope for reluctant rulers; yet, we are able 'to subject…office holders to citizens. Only then will it be clear to everyone that office is a form of service and not yet another occasion for tyranny'.[76]

That reputation is both an explanatory and political concept is variously surprising. From the conventional view of Plato, we would not expect to find such a position in the dialogues at all. Not only this, but from the view of those who do acknowledge the importance of reputation as a category of social practice in ancient Athens, it is surprising

[75] Goldstein, a professional philosopher outside Plato scholarship, recently made a strong case for Plato's general relevance to the contemporary world; see Goldstein, 2014, especially pp.55-57.
[76] Walzer, 1983, p.160. Lane in Plato, 2007 reads the *Republic* as an argument against tyranny. Landauer, 2013 shows the closeness between tyranny and accountability in the Athenian imaginary.

to discover that Plato contributes to this discussion. It is also surprising from the perspective through which we theorize reputation today, to wit, that reputation is power, to discover that Plato agrees. To first establish and then to think through the connection between reputation and *politeiai* both adds to any picture of Platonic politics and provides a political theoretical tool with which to theorize reputation as a concept.

Chapter 1
The Economy of Reputation in Plato's *Republic*

It is a central thesis of Plato's *Republic* that philosophers, or men and women who both are and appear just, must have political power to rule the city. The standard interpretation posits that Plato's political thought organizes the *politeia* into a rigid hierarchy. Herein I seek to demonstrate the horizontal relationships of mutual dependence between rulers and ruled, as revealed when we study the text via the lens of reputation (*doxa*). I suggest, therefore, that a satisfactory account of Kallipolis must take into account the complex, unequal and many-directional relationships in the city and soul alike. Despite its contextual relevance in Plato's Athens and its textual appearances in Plato's *Republic*, the role reputation plays in the relationship between philosophy and power has gone underappreciated in the secondary literature on the dialogue.

It is a characteristic of the concept of reputation that the reputation-bearers are not principal. In fact, it is those who attribute reputation who constitute and determine the reputation of the said reputation-bearers. As a proxy for these reputation-attributors, I use the textual instantiations of the many (*hoi polloi*).[1] It is here where the economy of reputation is sourced and distributed, that is, the social mechanisms of reputation such as praise (*epainos*), blame (*psegos*), slander (*diabolê*), and reproach (*oneidia*). There is an instructive ambiguity in this talk about the many: I mean both the many as such, and the

[1] In this respect, my approach is not novel; it has been attested to by contemporary authorities that otherwise share few philosophical and exegetical premises. *Inter alios*, see Strauss, 1964, p.54 and Annas, 1981, p.239. As we shall see, the *hoi polloi* are a device the author of the *Republic* employs to various ends, be it as a foil to other positions in the dialogue or to somehow co-opt the audience. Harte's 'doxastic responsibility' provides an independent justification for why the many might be of concern in the *Republic*. In reference to mimetic art, Harte writes 'that the harmful effects of mimetic art are a kind of joint progeny of both artist and audience […] establishing that the audience is a co-genitor of the harmful effects of art allows the attribution of what I shall call "doxastic responsibility" to the audience of art'. Harte claims that doxastic responsibility 'evokes praise and blame because the responsibility-generating components are *psychological states* (beliefs, desires, feelings, etc.)'. Harte, 2010, pp.70 and 87 respectively.

many individually. The former refers to the fact that reputation is something that takes a life of its own apart from individuals; the latter acknowledges that the rehabilitation of philosophy can only occur one individual at a time. My approach to the dialogue necessitates keeping both these alternatives in view. Put differently, while reputation is a subject-oriented concept it is not wholly subject-centered.

In section 1, I outline the common opinions about justice and its relationship to attaining and wielding political office. To describe these opinions is to answer the question: how does the economy of reputation operate with respect to justice and political power? Such opinions hold that actual justice is both burdensome and difficult to achieve; therefore, for the many, the appearance of justice is both preferable and sufficient. As the story of the ring of Gyges shows, the social dynamics emanating from the epistemic configuration of the many are riddled with deception; these allow the unjust man who may appear just to assume political power. The evils that result from an ungrounded reputation for justice should urge the many to reconsider both their preference for an appearance of justice and their view that a mere appearance is sufficient to wield political power. Since a reputation for justice earns political office for its bearer, I argue that it is the burden of the descriptions of the 'moral character…civic values…and civic life' of the *politeiai* in books 8 and 9 to show the many what happens when a reputation for justice lacks actual justice.[2] The desirable alternative is that the ruled judge their rulers at face value because the latter both appear and are just. In the metaphors of the text, they ought to treat them as statues, rather than chimeras. Thereby, the problem of political deception is ameliorated.

Nonetheless correcting the epistemic configuration of the ruled proves to be insufficient for a central political claim of the dialogue, namely, that philosophers ought to rule. In

[2] Ferrari, 2003, p.76.

section 2 I consider the objection that, since the love of reputation is located in the spirited part of the soul, why should the philosopher, characterized as he is by the rational part of his soul, care for reputation? I claim that the proper role of the philosopher's spirited part (*thumoeides*) is to get him to care for the reputation of philosophy – that is, care about how philosophy appears to the city at large – and to pursue the kinds of honors (*timai*) which the *politeia* makes available to him. The philosopher and the city are co-dependent. In Kallipolis, therefore, and contrary to what Aristotle contends, the economy of reputation is well ordered. In such a situation, the rewards of a reputation for justice can be restored.

In section 3 I turn my attention how the *Republic* as a text intervenes in the economy of philosophy's reputation. I do so by discussing three images: the Cave, the Ship, and the Bride. By showing how and why philosophy is misunderstood, its bad reputation being contingent rather than necessary, the *Republic* attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of philosophy.[3]

1. Revising the Common Opinion about Justice

Glaucon reports that most people take the performance of justice to be painful or laborious (*tou epiponou eidous*) and hard to bear or tiresome (*chalepon*). The many think that it is only the benefit of appearing just that motivates men to choose justice over injustice solely; this is what good repute (*eudokimia*) does. 'People value it [justice] not

[3] Plato's *Republic* is a text that both contains and seeks to motivate the move from the descriptive to the normative. While I focus on the content of the text, I also treat it as an artifact, in line with interpreters of varying philosophical commitments. I list three such interpreters here. Allen's book-length effort: Allen, 2010. Morrison, who reckons that 'the *Republic*…gives them [the philosophers] a *political* reason to promote the cause of philosophy within their own society, in order to hasten or make more likely the day when philosophers rule.' Morrison, 2007, p.247. And Ophir, who treats 'the *Republic* as a political act': Ophir, 1991, pp.6 *et passim*.

as a good but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity' (2.359a). The many (*tois pollois*, 2.358a) think justice 'is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from a reputation for justice (*ho misthôn th' heneka kai eudokimêseôn dia doxan epitêdeuteon*), but is to be avoided because of itself as something burdensome (*hôs on chalepon*)' (2.358a).[4] The many agree with Thrasymachus that tyranny is the best regime and that the tyrant is in the happiest condition. Pleonexia – 'the desire to outdo others and get more and more' (2.359c) – is what motivates the unjust man to do better.[5] Pleonexia is taken as a fact about human nature rather than a claim about convention: it is 'what anyone's nature naturally pursues as good (*ho pasa phusis diôkein pephuken hôs agathon*)' (2.359c).[6] This is a jaundiced view of societal and political arrangements: those who are in power are those who only appear to be just and do so for the sake of political power.

It is worth noting that the non-Thrasymachean definitions of justice put forth by Cephalus, Polemarchus and Socrates are indeed laborious and conform to the 'saying [that] fine things are really hard to achieve (*to legomenon ta kala tô onti chalepa*)' (6.497d). Arguably, telling the truth and paying one's debts to men and gods (1.331c), distinguishing friend from foe in order to harm the latter and benefit the former (1.331e), and fulfilling the principle of specialization (4.433a-b) are tall orders to execute because

[4] Perhaps this is unsurprising given 'that the majority believe that pleasure is the good (*tois…pollois hêdonê dokei einai to agathon*)' (6.505b).
[5] As Burnyeat emphasizes, 'This term [*pleonexia*] covers *both* the desire for more and more *and* the desire for more than others have'. Burnyeat, 2006, p.21.
[6] Commenting on this line, Reeve notes: 'This political theory seems itself to be rooted in a theory of the psyche.' Reeve, 1988, p.15. Barney observes that this is an unexamined assumption that and that 'the following nine books of the *Republic* will be, among other things, a demonstration of how much he [Thrasymachus] is leaving out.' Glaucon makes this assumption 'explicit' in his renewal of Thrasymachus' *logos*. Barney, 2006, pp.46-47. Strauss points out another assumption that Glaucon and Thrasymachus share, namely, that 'there is an insoluble conflict between the good of the individual and the common good.' Strauss, 1964, p.88.

they demand virtuous behavior. Cephalus' definition requires the practice of moderation (*sophrosunê*), Polemarchus' definition demands courage (*andreia*), and Socrates' definition stipulates both of these. Thus, while non-Thrasymachean justice is hard to accomplish, Thrasymachean justice cannot result in a stable, well-ordered state of affairs. This problem, the many think, is resolved by effecting Thrasymachean justice with a face of good repute (see 2.358a). Thus, not only is acquiring a reputation for justice somewhat easier than being just, but also the odds are loaded against the possibility of there being a motivation for a reputation for justice that is irrespective of whether this will materialize in a desirable outcome (such as gaining political power). [7]

Nonetheless, the many are already familiar with the definition of justice which Socrates favors: 'we've heard many people say (*touto allôn te pollôn akêkoamen*)…that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what isn't one's own' (4.433a-b). This familiarity is important if understated in the secondary literature. As Pappas puts it: 'He [Plato] wants to challenge and change his readers' *conception* of justice in order to produce a better world, but he also wants to preserve their *allegiance* to justice enough not to destroy the world as it stands.'[8] The aim of the argument for justice should be understood in this broad sense: 'the ideal on which Socrates' defense [of justice] relies is available and appealing to everyone', writes Singpurwalla.[9] The many have to understand that justice 'isn't concerned with someone's doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, what is truly himself and his own' (4.443c). To achieve this would be to

[7] It is easier to simulate the appearance of a thing rather than the thing itself, as Socrates notes with the mirror (*katoptron*) example at 10.596d-e. However, as is the case in the example, such a claim is premised on the thing itself (i) already being there and (ii) being visible. Here, the thing itself (justice) falls short of (i) and is unclear how it meets (if at all) (ii).
[8] Pappas, 2003, p.82.
[9] Singpurwalla, 2006, p.276.

disabuse the many of the wrong impression they have of justice.

Glaucon 'recognizes the power of the reputation of justice', as Bloom puts it.[10] Plato's brother wants Socrates to show that justice is beneficial for its own sake and, in addition, that the just man should continue to be just despite the reputational costs he suffers.[11] Glaucon raises Herodotus' myth of Gyges' ring as part of his 'renewal' of Thrasymachus' argument (2.358c). Specifically, he is attempting to show that the just and unjust man will behave in the same unjust way if (physically) invisible (2.359c-360d).[12] The story is a comment upon crowd psychology. It explains how the unjust man becomes the object of public praise (*epainos*). In the absence of the assumption, to wit, that one must cause injustice if one is given sufficient opportunity to do so, fear-motivated praise might not accrue to the ring-bearer. Glaucon hypothesizes that 'for someone who didn't want to do injustice, given this sort of opportunity [i.e. the use of Gyges' ring], and who didn't touch other people's property would be thought wretched and stupid (*athliotatos…kai anoêtotatos*) by everyone aware of the situation, though, of course, they'd praise him in public, deceiving each other for fear of suffering injustice (*epainoien d'an auton allêlôn enantion exapatôntes allêlous dia ton tou adikeisthai phobon*)' (2.360d). Glaucon hypothesizes that (i) if anyone with the ring should deny doing wrong,

[10] Bloom, 1991, p.339.

[11] Henceforth, and for the most part, the *Republic* abandons the *elenchus* of book 1 in favor of a mode of dialogue dominated by Socrates' exposition. While the *elenchus* is inextricably related to the interlocutors' personal beliefs and has etymological connotations of shaming, in book 2 both Glaucon and Adeimantus take up mock positions to goad Socrates into making the best case for justice. Thrasymachus claims that Socrates' *elenchus* is in order to 'satisfy your competitiveness or love of honor (*philotimou*)' (1.336c); Socrates later admits that 'I seem to have behaved like a glutton' (1.354b). These are plausible reasons for abandoning the *elenchus*.

[12] Strictly speaking, I do not think that the story shows this for it collapses the gap between opting for a condition of invisibility and employing that condition to commit injustice. In the myth the agent can choose whether or not to turn the ring and be invisible; he is not compelled. That is, the moral dilemma of the story issues from the choice of whether or not to *use* the power of invisibility, as much as it comes from the actions that issue only after he uses it (2.360b). Thus, we may hazard that the unjust man and just man will have different attitudes with respect to the former.

the many would think him a fool and that (ii) they are motivated to praise him because they fear that if they do not they will suffer at his hands. That they do so is a symptom of a disfigured epistemic order. The story of Gyges's ring shows that the practice of justice is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for public praise. 'No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private (*hôs ouk agathou idia ontos*), since…[when one] thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it' (2.360c). The many agree with Thrasymachus that 'Those who reproach injustice do so because they are afraid not of doing but of suffering it' (1.344c).

The set of beliefs the many collectively hold about the world disbars them from considering either that abstention from injustice when it would go unpunished is possible, or that such abstention is permanent. They praise the man with the ring because they fear that his abstention from injuring them is a façade. And, as if this were not enough, the overall outcome of this praising encourages suspicion and sustains fear. In short, these are circumstances that breed and sustain deception. That is, their fellows misperceive the fear-motivated praise in which they engage as being praise of an unqualified kind. Each in fact thinks that he who abstains from wrong while in possession of the ring is a fool who does not deserve the praises of the many. Therefore, instead of praising the one who will make them happy, the many praise the one who has the power to harm them! Therefore it is inaccurate to say, with Allen, that 'Gyges' ring allows him to operate outside the contexts of social networks of sight and communal knowledge and memory.'[13] The ring-bearer is still very much within these contexts; instead, the use of the ring reveals these contexts to be treacherous for the practicing of praise and blame.

What must the culture be like in order for this awry outcome to manifest? Adeimantus

[13] Allen, 2000, p.258.

proposes that the fault lies in what those with authority say to those in their charge, specifically in the relationships between fathers and sons. 'When fathers speak to their sons, they say one must be just…But they don't praise justice itself, only the high reputations it leads to and the consequences of being thought to be just, such as the public offices (*ouk auto dikaiosunên epainountes alla tas ap' autês eudokimêseis, hina dokounti dikaiô einai gignêtai apo tês doxês archai te*)' (2.362e-363a). Had the fathers wanted to make their sons just, they would have praised justice itself. Instead, they – and the surrounding cultural atmosphere for which the poets are responsible – praise the consequences of justice: 'they tell me that an unjust person, who has secured for himself a reputation for justice, lives the life of a god (*adikô de doxan dikaiosunês pareskeuasmenô thespesios bios legetai*)' (2.365b). The future citizens grow up, therefore, with the impression of a loose association between being just and reaping the rewards of justice, be it in this life, or the next (see 2.366b).

What happens when an unjust person 'rules his city because of his reputation for justice (*archein en tê polei dokounti dikaiô einai*)' (2.362b)? The answer is in the description of the disordered characters and *politeiai* of books 8 and 9, where we see the far-reaching and adverse consequences for individuals and cities alike when political spoils are awarded on the basis of a reputation for justice that is unsupported by actual justice.[14] Plato hammers home the point that there are high stakes riding on the reputational effect of justice, to wit, the award of political office.[15]

[14] Annas also recognizes that 'Books 8 and 9 form an integral part of the answer to Glaucon's challenge'. Annas, 1981, p.294.

[15] Political power is the independent variable here. The most wretched (*athliotatos*) tyrant is the one who gets into power and not the one who never manages to seize political office (see 9.575a-d). The opposite may be said about the philosopher: the happiest philosopher is the one who gets a chance to rule and not the one who never does (see 6.496e-497a).

However, before Socrates embarks on the description of what happens after Kallipolis falls, he and his interlocutors must decide on how such a description will be ordered.[16] At this juncture Socrates explicitly co-opts the many: it is the praises (*epainoi*) of the many (*tôn pollôn*) that decide the ordering of the regime change and the (un)happy lives (8.544c).[17] Their mistaken beliefs about justice resurface, for they believe that it is the tyrant who is the happiest of men. Instead of listing the happiness of the character-types in ascending order, as the praises of the many would predict, what ensues catalogues the happiness in descending order. The message, put in this simple structure, can be delivered: the truth is the inverse of what the many think is the reality.

In short, the many are in for a surprise as Socrates employs their own ranking, informed by their own beliefs and assumptions about the world. In books 8 and 9, Plato's strategy is gradualist: beginning from the current epistemic ordering of the many, he presents the souls and the *politeiai* one by one and in declining order. By the time we arrive at the worst regime and the worst character it is too late to turn back; the realization that the value system of the many was inverted is too strong to resist. In these books, Plato portrays 'with remarkable psychological acuity how unruly spirited and appetitive desires

[16] Socrates' claim suffers from indeterminacy since the text divulges not one but two explanations for the proposition that timarchy follows from Kallipolis: (i) because this is the most likely outcome given the mistake Kallipolean rulers made in the assortative mating processes and (ii) because this is how the praises of the many rank the constitutions. The relationship between these two explanations is not obvious. Here I highlight (ii) because the showcasing of the epistemic disfigurement of the many as revealed in their distribution of praises is a sufficient reason for the introduction of (ii) as the decision-rule to order the *politeiai* of books 8 and 9.

[17] Aristotle often begins from 'reputable opinions' (*endoxa*), which is similar to Plato's move here. Annas, 1981, p.165 makes a similar observation. Sheffield argues that the five speeches of love that precede Socrates' in Plato's *Symposium* exemplify the endoxic method; I agree with Sheffield that 'Plato finds value in the things said by non-philosophers, and some *philosophical* value in particular'. Sheffield, 2006, p.45. Cf. Pappas, 2003, p.81 and Griswold, 2010, p.147. This does not prevent Adeimantus from complaining: 'Socrates, it doesn't seem right to me for you to be willing to state other people's convictions (*dogmata*) but not your own' (6.506b-c).

ruin one's ability to think clearly about one's own good.'[18] A timarchy 'will be afraid to appoint wise people as rulers' (8.547e). An oligarchy 'is filled with a host of evils' (8.544c) breeding 'civil war and counterrevolution (*stasis dê kai antistasis*)' in the oligarch (8.560a) until a democratic revolution overthrows it and welcomes back with great pomp from exile 'insolence, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness' (8.560e). Finally the tyrant arrives, first in disguise as a protector of the people (*dêmos*) and then openly as their killer (he is a parricide, [*patraloian*, 8.569b]). Thusly the most wretched (*athliotaton*) city and man come into being (9.578b). '[I]n the place of the great but inappropriate freedom they enjoyed under democracy, they [the people] have put upon themselves the harshest (*chalepotatên*) and most bitter slavery to slaves' (8.569c). This presentation concludes that it is the tyrant's rule – the rule of the greatest injustice – that is the most *chalepon* and *epiponon* occurrence to befall a city. The tragedy is that the democratic constitution is judged 'to be the most beautiful…[by] many people (*kallistên an polloi krineian*)' (8.557c), while those who judge (*krinein*) a tyrant from the outside 'are dazzled by the façade that tyrants adopt for the outside world to see' (9.577a).

Socrates thus sets up a standard of comparison: if the many think (as they do) that justice is *chalepon* and *epiponon* then what would they say about the tyranny just described? The suggestion is surely that justice is less *chalepon* and *epiponon* than tyranny. As Shields argues: 'If Plato is right, and most people misunderstand justice, they also misunderstand its demands; it remains a possibility, consequently, that when they come to understand justice rightly, most people will come to appreciate why they should want to be just after all.'[19] The man they thought the happiest is the most wretched and

[18] Singpurwalla, 2006, p.270.
[19] Shields, 2006, p.65.

his regime enslaves the people, a move that harks back to the very chains of the cave dwellers depicted at the outset of book 7.[20] To prevent the just man from seizing power is to unleash upon the polis the evils we see transpire in the *politeiai* of books 8 and 9.

The fact that the regimes and the types who live in them are contiguous with one another serves to raise the stakes even further.[21] The spoils of a reputation for justice for unjust men lead to bad outcomes the severity and extent of which can neither abate nor be contained within their own generation. It was the praises of the many that triggered this domino effect. This decline is rhetorically forceful, a near-deterministic account of events. The only conclusion that avails is that the rewards of a reputation for justice are a poisoned chalice unless the soul of the man who gains them is just. Thus, the descriptions of the *politeiai* and the archetypal individuals that mark them both urge the many to reconsider their position and constitute Socrates' direct riposte to Glaucon's ideal man who was unjust but had a reputation for justice (2.360e-361d).

At the end of Glaucon's challenge, Socrates tells Plato's brother that he has 'scoured off each of the men [the completely just and completely unjust] for our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for an art competition (*hôs errômenôs hekateron ôsper andrianta eis tên krisin ekkathaireis toin androin*)'; the former has a reputation for injustice while the latter has a reputation for justice (2.361d). These statues at once constitute simplifications and idealizations of what they represent. In the corresponding discussion about the relationship between justice and reputation, another image arises: the

[20] There is a reversal of values here: the *athliotatos* is not the tyrant, that is, the man who stops at no injustice thanks to Gyges' ring, but the man who desists from using the ring to commit an injustice. That the many think the latter *athliotatos* is a value-attribution they should revise if the dialogue proves persuasive. At the end of the text the superlative predicate *athliotatos* is reserved for the tyrant and the condition of the city he presides over (see 9.576c *et passim*).

[21] Lear highlights the 'dialectic' process of the decline, each regime and soul following from the previous one; see Lear, 1997, pp.75-76.

man-looking chimera description of the soul (9.588c-590e). The respective content of these images makes contrasting suggestions: the statues imply that there is no disjunction between what is and what appears, while the chimera implies that there is.[22] From this follow two different prescriptions. Like the tyrant and his theatrical façade (see 9.577a), the chimera image warns us to be suspicious of appearances. While internally the chimera is comprised of three things, externally it appears as one of those things. The more one looks at a chimera, the more suggestive the image becomes in terms of what it actually is: we can never be sure, and we can argue interminably about whether it is more a lion than a beast, or vice-versa, or neither, or both. It is this suggestiveness and wide range of possibilities that destabilizes the world of appearances.

By contrast to chimeras, statues do not contain a hidden form and they thereby do not destabilize the world of appearances. They are blocks of marble that are sculpted into a shape; to efface a statue is to deprive it of its form altogether. The philosopher ruler, who is the principal example of someone who appears just because he is just, is like the statue: efface him and you efface justice. As Glaucon avers, 'Like a sculptor (*hôsper andriantopoios*), Socrates, you've produced ruling men that are completely fine (*pagkaloi*)' (7.540c). These *pagkaloi* are and appear as perfect in body and in mind, like statues, which are easily and once-and-for-all identifiable *as statues*.[23] If Plato's Socrates is correct about justice, then we may judge the rulers along the lines prescribed by the image of a statue. The alternative is to treat rulers as chimeras: as men who only appear just because they are motivated by the prospect of political office and men we would

[22] My approach here follows Allen, who posits: 'Plato's assignment to Socrates of the role of ideal image maker and rhetorician of justice must affect our reading of how Plato conceives the place of the philosopher in political life.' Allen, 2000, p.281.

[23] At 4.420c-d, Kallipolis itself is likened to a statue (*andrianta*), and the guardians as the eyes 'which are the most beautiful (*kalliston*) part'.

praise lest they inflict injury on us. While the juxtaposition between chimeras and statues may be insufficient to motivate preferring the statues, it still shows the problem with a world full of chimeras. It is not that statues exist and may come into being as fabrications of human beings, while chimeras do not exist and are mere fabrications of the imagination. The problem is that a world of appearances modeled on the thought process encouraged by the image of the chimera, will be a world where deception is rampant in an unstable collective political life.[24]

As the story of Gyges' ring showed, praise can be problematic because it allows seeming to be detached (led astray from) from being, thus resulting in a situation where each person deceives one another (*exapatôntes allêlous*) (2.360d). [25] This is what happens when a person can choose to commit a host of wrongful acts with impunity, with the result being that he earns the fearful praise of his fellows. This has a significant and perhaps counter-intuitive ramification for political life: the praises of the many may deceive an otherwise decent individual that he is a true statesman ('*osoi exêpatintai up' autôn kai oiontai te alêtheia politikoi einai, oti epainountai upo tôn pollôn*', 4.426d). Revising the beliefs of the many about justice is half the task; how are the philosophic types motivated to rule?

[24] 'The superiority of justice over injustice will not lie in the profitability of particular actions, but in the profitability of being a certain kind of person, or organized in a certain social pattern.' Pappas, 2003, p.47. One might think that the chimera urges us to be critical thinkers, while the statues have the opposite effect. 'In Athens, Socrates does better with his fellow citizens by demanding that they examine their ordinarily unquestioned assumptions; in logopolis [read: Kallipolis], it is immoral to question the status quo or to encourage others to do so.' Ober, 1998, p.223.

[25] Indeed, Glaucon draws the distinction between truth (*alêthos*) and appearance (*dokein*) in his opening statement. The definitions of justice in book 1 took 'the appearance of what is done as the standard by which justice is to be appraised.' Moors, 1981, p.5. Adeimantus goes on to refer to the possibility of gods being deceived (incidentally, a possibility absent from Cephalus' definition of justice); see Moors, 1981, pp.82, 94 *et passim*.

2. Motivating the Philosophers

The political theory of the *Republic* stands out for its conundrum that those who rule should not want to rule (see 7.520d) and that 'political power and philosophy entirely coincide (*touto eis tauton sumpesê, dunamis te politikê kai philosophia*)' (5.473d). I do not seek to resolve this conundrum here.[26] If philosophy is necessary to justice, we must confront the worry that, because the philosopher will not pursue political rule, justice will never be achieved. This worry is based on the psychological theory of the dialogue, which posits that each soul has three communicating parts. These parts are normatively ordered from higher to lower: reasoning (*to logistikon*), spirited (*to thumoeides*), and appetitive (*to epithumitikon*).[27] Socrates notes that 'the most decent men…reproach the love of honor (*hoi epieikestatoi…to philotimon…einai oneidos legetai kai estin*)' (1.347b, emending Grube/Reeve). Therefore, those who are principally characterized by the rational part of their soul (i.e., the philosophic types) do not seek a reputation for wisdom

[26] In the round, I agree with Brown's emphasis on the founders and founding laws of Kallipolis: 'the philosophers' ultimate willingness to rule depends on two factors: the founders' compulsion, in the form of a law that those who have been educated by the city as philosophers will rule the city, and a conception of justice which makes obedience to just laws obligatory. If the founders were not to legislate that the philosophers must rule, the philosophers would not rule…Rather, they would act on their preference for the philosophic life.' Brown, 2000, p.9.

[27] See Cooper, 1999, pp.138-149. Annas captures the *sine qua non* of this theory: 'We will not understand an individual's actions unless we see that actions do not come from a single motivational source. There is more than one origin of behaviour within a person, and the way the person lives and acts indicates how these sources of behaviour are related.' Annas, 1981, p.124. As Kamtekar observes, 'Socrates' argument for the partitioning of the soul does not appeal to the function of the different parts of the soul, but rather to conflicting desires or judgments'. Kamtekar, 1998, p.324. To speak of types – spirited, appetitive, and rational – is not to speak of categories that are sharply divided from one another; imagine the color spectrum rather than geographical borders. '[R]eason evaluates, ranks, and orders alternative pursuits […] The difference between reasoning or the intellectual part and the other motivational elements of the person, is to be found in this [i.e. its] capacity for overall evaluation and selection.' Nussbaum, 2001, p.138. If this is correct, then we must hold on to two claims: (i) that the just soul in which each part does its own is one where reason rules, which implies that an appetitive type is not ruled by appetite but instead that (ii) the extent to which a type can partake in the life of reason varies. Thus, even if reason rules in every just soul, it prescribes different behaviors. On this reading, reason – a faculty or power (*dunamis*) that has its own desires – does much more than pursue wisdom. In fact, it throws the rational or philosophic types into a land of motivational conflict that may be no less peaceful than that experienced by appetitive or spirited types; faction (*stasis*) is a permanent threat to the harmony of the soul.

since reputations (*doxai*) belong by definition to the domain of human affairs. Those whose soul has ascended to the 'intelligible realm…are unwilling to occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time above' (7.517b). By contrast, the motivational source of reputation in the soul lies in its spirited part, which is characterized by a love for reputation (*philodoxia*) and honor (*philotimia*) (see 9.581a). The tripartite theory suggests that those who will seek the approval of the many (and consequently be awarded political office) are not the philosophically inclined, whereas those who are so inclined are pulled in a different direction by their psychological constitution. As Nussbaum summarizes: 'the demands of philosophical contemplation pull against the claims of rulership.'[28]

Why is the love of reputation located in the spirited part of the soul? Cooper has answered this question in reference to esteem and self-esteem, rather than reputation.[29] Burnyeat too, in his discussion of spirit, writes: 'Concern for one's status and honor is an *essentially* social phenomenon. It presupposes a set of social relations'.[30] To say that the types of motivation that concern us are those of the spirited part of the soul is to prescind from – on the working assumptions of Plato's dialogue – those motivations that issue from the appetitive (*to epithumitikon*) and the rational (*to logistikon*). If a love for reputation comes from the spirited part of the soul then it is not obvious what role such a motivation will play in the philosophic or rational type of individual.[31] The text seems to

[28] Nussbaum, 2001, p.158.
[29] 'On Plato's tripartite theory, then, competitiveness and the desire for esteem and self-esteem are an innate form of human motivation, distinct from the appetites and reason itself and equally as basic as they are to human nature.' Cooper, 1999, p.136.
[30] Burnyeat, 2006, p.10.
[31] '[T]he love of learning is the same thing as philosophy or the love of wisdom (*to ge philomathes kai philosophon tauton*)', Socrates tells us in a general definition of what is meant by the term (2.376b; cf. 'those who love the sight of truth' at 5.475e or are possessed by 'a true erotic love for true philosophy' at 6.499b).

suggest that such a soul has no desire for reputation: 'it is clear to everyone that the part with which we learn is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies and that, of the three parts [of the soul], it cares least for money and reputation (*doxês*)…wouldn't it be appropriate for us to call it learning-loving and philosophical (*philomathês de kai philosophôn*)?' (9.581b).[32] The claim that the love of reputation is located in the *thumoeides* must be accommodated with the interpretation of a well-ordered soul as that in which each part is doing its own. In the tripartite soul the love of reputation, located in the *thumoeides*, must (a) obey the *logistikon* and (b) constrain, in alliance with its master (*summachon tô logô*, 4.440b), the *epithumetikon*.[33]

By observing how spirited types operate in a timarchy and an oligarchy we can establish that (i) depending on what a regime values, there are different types of reputation in each regime and (ii) there is a co-dependence between the individuals typical of the regime and the regime itself. Doing so will enable us to discuss Kallipolis via these claims.

Arguably, a spirited type would be most at home in a timarchy (8.548c).[34] The timarchy follows immediately after Kallipolis and it is 'something akin to the Cretan or Spartan constitution'. According to Socrates, 'because of the predominance of the spirited element, one thing alone is most manifest in it, namely, the love of victory and the love of honor (*diaphanestaton d'en autê estin en ti monon upo tou thumoeidous kratountos,*

[32] Note the text does not say: "it cares naught for money and reputation". If that were the case, then it would be nonsensical for the institutional design of Kallipolis to aim at properly controlling, rather than eradicating, the *philochrêmatikon* and the *philodoxon* in the philosopher rulers.

[33] The characterization of the appetitive part leaves why it requires an unequal alliance of reason and spirit to subdue it: 'the appetitive part, [is that] which is the largest part of each person's soul and is by nature most insatiable for money' and has the capacity to 'become so big and strong that it…attempts to enslave and rule over the classes it isn't fit to rule, thereby overturning everyone's whole life' (4.442a-b).

[34] Plato 'is not saying that a spirited polis, say, is spirited simply in virtue of having spirited citizens, but in having spirited citizens who are successful in shaping the polis in their image.' Lear, 1997, p.69. Lear argues that the city-soul analogy in the *Republic* is best understood isomorphically, with its two composites in a dynamic relationship. For a rebuttal of Lear, see Ferrari, 2003, esp. pp.50-53. Ferrari argues for an analogical or proportional, as opposed to a causal, understanding of the city-soul metaphor. The analogy is not a heuristic device, but used rather for 'communication with the reader'. Ferrari, 2003, p.81.

philonikiai kai philotimiai)' (8.548c). When discussing the ideals of the timarch Annas writes that, 'a life devoted to the pursuit of glory has a built-in tendency to dislocation between *what is seen as* admirable and *what one is actually* motivated to do.'[35] In contrast to the aligning of seeming and being that is characteristic of the Kallipolean, the timarch is already distancing what appears from what is. Put differently, the 'public and private lives of its [the timarchy's] members have become dissociated.'[36]

It is the awry outcome of just such measuring that starts the shift out of a timarchy and into an oligarchy. The son of the timarch is adversely influenced by the disaffection and disdain others express towards his father. In fact it is his father's submissiveness to authority (he is a *philarchos*, 8.549a) that the house servants and the timarch's wife misconstrue as a weakness (8.549c-e). In this episode the actors are making judgments of worth, the *sine qua non* of what spirit does.[37] The disaffected wife thinks that her timarchic husband is an underachiever who fails to live up to the worth at which she values their family; as result she feels 'at a disadvantage among the other women' (8.549c). The son comes under the influence of his angry mother who 'tells her son that his father is unmanly (*anandros*)' (8.549d) and of the goading servants who 'urge the son…to be more of a man than this father' (8.550a). As a result, the son comes to fear such judgments being made upon him and resolves to embrace a value-system where the rulers don their worth more conspicuously for others to observe and measure: 'in the end, victory-loving and honor-loving men become lovers of making money, or money-lovers '

[35] Annas, 1981, p.297 (emphasis mine).
[36] Ferrari, 2003, p.66. Yet, they are still in some order; contrast 'the breakdown of domestic hierarchy' in the description of the democracy. Ferrari, 2003, p.74.
[37] I borrow the phrase 'judgments of worth' from Kamtekar (who, in turn, borrows it from Charles Taylor). Kamtekar argues that the spirited types of Kallipolis or auxiliaries (*epikouroi*) love value for its own sake. 'What is involved in a judgment of worth is a sense of how one's action or condition reflects on oneself; this presupposes having a conception of oneself both in terms of how one is and how one ought to be.' Kamtekar, 1998, pp.325 and 330, respectively.

(8.551a).

In an oligarchy, claims to political rule are made based on a property criterion, where property signifies more than just an enclosure of land; it is a source of measuring one's own self-worth and the worth others ascribe to one.[38] Honor is harder to measure than material wealth, both objectively and subjectively. The content of judgments of worth are closer to the surface, as it were, in an oligarchy and this is because of the lessons the son has learned growing up in a timarchic environment. Yet this man 'who makes a profit from everything and hoards it [is of] the sort the majority admires (*hous dê kai epainei to plêthos*)' (8.554a).[39] And this is the man who engages in evildoing (*kakourgia*) in cases where he has 'ample opportunity to do injustice with impunity' (8.554c). Whereas 'in those other contractual obligations, where he has a good reputation and is thought to be just (*en ois eudokimei dokôn dikaios einai*) he's forcibly holding his other evil appetites in check…not by persuading them that it's better not to act on them or taming them with arguments, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his other possessions' (8.554c-d). Hence, the oligarchic man's reputation is of a thrifty kind. As a result, he 'is a poor contestant for victory in a city…for he's not willing to spend money for the sake of a fine reputation (*eudoxias*)' (8.555a).

A feature of the descriptions of these *politeiai* is that the pursuit of honor or reputation is not merely an attribute of character, but a constitutive factor of political life. This is what we would expect from a concept, such as reputation, that is not wholly subject-centered. One way, therefore, in which a philosopher would be motivated to assume political rule is

[38] That the characteristic of the oligarch is rule by his necessary desires does not make him a hedonist; to be ruled by such desires and such desires alone is to live an austere life.

[39] As opposed to the blame they heap on those who practice philosophy because 'the majority cannot be philosophic (*philosophon men ara…plêthos adunaton einai…kai tous philosophountas ara anagkê psegesthai hup' autôn*)' (6.494a). The mechanism being posited here is that of sour grapes.

by caring for the reputation of what he loves, that is, for the reputation of philosophy. To be concerned with the reputation of philosophy is to recognize that philosophy is subject to the economy of reputation. Annas notes that the *Republic* 'begins from the premise that philosophers should not ignore the problems of the imperfect world around them; they should become aware of them and do something to solve them.'[40] What the philosopher should be aware of and not indifferent toward is that a reputation is acquired in spite of one's self. To put it in a positive way: the philosophic types care about reputation in the sense of wanting philosophy to appear as what it is and what it can do for the polis.[41]

Indeed, a philosopher is aware of the reputation he holds in the eyes of others *qua* philosopher. As long as they are power-holders, these men maintain a reputation for justice. When we speak of a motivation for reputation it cannot be of the sort that is disconnected with how others see the motive-bearer. An example of such a motivation is the self-directed anger (*orgên*) Leontius experiences because he is unable to suppress his (sexual) appetite to view the dead corpses (4.439e-440a).[42] 'Leontius humiliates himself in an attempt to rescue his reputation,' notes Burnyeat.[43] Presumably, if Leontius inhabited a society that did not frown upon necrophilia, he would not experience this social emotion. By contrast, a motivation for drink such as thirst (4.437e-438a) and a

[40] Annas 1981, p.18.
[41] While Burnyeat recognizes the 'truth' about Plato's description of spirit, namely, that 'concerns about how we are regarded by others – seem to be to be a reasonable, if again rough and ready, grouping of desires and tendencies in the psyche', he does not discuss how philosophic types may also care about reputation and how this introduces a dependence on the rest of Kallipolis' denizens. Burnyeat, 2006, p.13.
[42] Socrates deploys the story about Leontius and the dead bodies to distinguish spirit from appetite. Cf. Socrates' citation from Homer where Odysseus' reason rebukes his anger at the way in which the suitors of his wife Penelope have overrun his household in his absence (3.390d, and repeated following the Leontius story at 4.441b). Both accounts show 'a striking degree of complexity to its [spirit's] judgments: that reason is authoritative, that the appetites are to be overridden, that it would be base to do such-and-such an action, that it is not fitting for a person like myself to be so treated, that it is right to be punished for injustice.' Kamtekar, 1998, p.328.
[43] Burnyeat, 2006, p.11.

motivation to contemplate the Good (*to kalon*) itself (7.540a) are both divorced from how others see the motive-bearer. The motivation to have a good reputation (*eudoxia*) and avoid a bad one (*adoxia*) is other-dependent. It is part of what should be their lifelong belief (*para panta ton bion*): 'that they must eagerly pursue (*pasê prothumia poiein*) what is advantageous to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite' (3.412d-e). In Kallipolis in particular, this holds true irrespective of whether an individual philosopher is ruling at a given moment in time. Put differently, the reputation of philosophy is not reducible to the current philosopher rulers. Tending to the reputation of philosophy is one strategy through which the philosophic type comes to acknowledge the good of others as his own.[44]

What other reason do we have to think that the philosopher rulers will respond to slander? This was Aristotle's concern, for he worried that the rulers of Kallipolis would have a reputation problem: 'there are other difficulties that it is not easy for the established rulers of this sort of community to avoid, such as…slanders (*diabolai*)'.[45] One answer is motivated by the proper training of the body in Kallipolis; as things stand, we are told, people blame philosophy for causing 'headaches and dizziness' that are actually caused by the 'excessive care of the body'. It is the latter, not the former, that proves 'troublesome (*duskolos*) in managing a household, in military service, and even in sedentary public office (*hedraious en polei archas*)' (3.407c). In the correct environment, the body should be trained so that philosophy may 'acquire a helper (*hupêresian*

[44] '[W]hile the philosopher and the non-philosopher have, respectively, clearer and dimmer apprehensions of the good, both are motivated by the idea that their interest is realized in acting out of concern for the good of others.' Singpurwalla, 2006, p.280; this is an echo of Kraut, 1973. Contrast with Nussbaum, 2001, pp.158-159: 'the superior harmony of the philosopher's life results directly from this reduction in the number of his or her commitments [i.e. internally unstable pursuits such as love, sexual activity, power-seeking and money-making].'

[45] Aristotle, *Politics*, II.4, 1262a24-26.

philosophia ktômenous)' (6.498b). The institutions of Kallipolis fashion the rulers into 'athletes of war and guardians (*hôsper de athlêtas te polemou kai phulakas*)' (8.543b-c; see 3.404a, 3.416d, 7.521d, 7.525b). In their capacity as thumetic warriors, these philosophers will become angry when philosophy's reputation is slandered. As Weiss puts it, theirs will be a 'thumotic rush to philosophy's defense'.[46] Plato paints Socrates as having this experience: 'I looked upon philosophy as I spoke, and seeing her undeservedly besmirched, I seem to have lost my temper (*legôn gar hama eblepsa pros philosophian, kai idôn propepêlakismenên*)…as if I were angry (*hôsper thumôtheis*) with those responsible for it' (7.536b-c). The love of philosophy motivates behaviors not readily associated with philosophers.

The philosopher needs the city: 'ruler and city are codependent'.[47] The well-ordered or just soul of the philosopher urges him away from quietism ('*hesuchian echon kai ta autou pratton*', 6.496d; see 7.519c) and into politics. This is in contrast to a philosophic type who is 'satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content.' Emphatically, 'this isn't the greatest' accomplishment for this can only happen in 'a constitution that suits him' (6.496d-497a). In such a situation both the community (*koina*) and he remain unsaved, for constitutions that are unworthy for philosophic natures will inevitably pervert and alter them (cf. '*strephesthai te kai alloiousthai*', 6.497b).

A life in politics is *ipso facto* a life where honor is at stake, as the story about the soul of Odysseus choosing its next life implicitly shows: 'relieved [of] its love of honor (*philotimias*), it went around for a long time, looking for the life of a private individual

[46] Weiss, 2012, p.80.
[47] Ober, 1998, p.237.

(*bion andros idiôtou apragmonos*)' (10.620c). It is therefore not the case that the philosophers do not seek honor. They 'despise present honors (*tôn men nun timôn kataphronêsôsin*), thinking them slavish and worthless' (7.540d); in Kallipolis, however, their pursuit of knowledge and service to justice will bring honor upon them. As Cairns puts it, 'the perfect society develops the love of honour correctly, deviant societies do so incorrectly.'[48] They are 'to be honored in life and to receive after his death the most prized tombs and memorials' (3.414a; cf. 'distinguished deaths [*eudokimêsas teleutêsê*]', 5.468e). In fact, 'they'll live a life more blessedly happy than that of the victors in the Olympian games…They receive rewards from their own city while they live, and at their death they're given a worthy burial' (5.465d-e).[49] In fact, the best guardian is 'anyone who distinguishes himself and earns high esteem (*eudokimêsanta*)' during the city's military expeditions, 'eager to win the rewards of valor (*prothumoteros ê pros to taristeia pherein*)' such as marriages and children (5.468b-c).[50] The philosophic type 'will willingly share in and taste those [honors] that he believes will make him better, but he'll avoid any public or private honor that might overthrow the established condition of his soul' (9.591e-592a). Even if we indulge the objection that these honors are sops to the many, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a city with such concessions is close to single-mindedness than a city without them. Therefore, the absence of a political role for the many in Kallipolis notwithstanding, the institutionalization of such honors recognizes

[48] Cairns, 1993, p.391.

[49] If we 'practice justice with reason in every way…[we will be] like victors in the games who go around collecting their prizes – we'll receive our rewards' (10.621c-d). Burnyeat is somewhat misleading insofar as he suggests that it is only the auxiliaries or 'military class' who receive these honors. Burnyeat, 2006, p.21.

[50] This implies that there is competition among the guardians and, presumably, the absence of private possessions is intended to prevent such competition from turning awry. Pappas is correct to worry about this issue: 'Surely a desire to be the city's bravest warrior could bring two guardians into unhealthy competition.' Pappas, 2003, p.111.

the role of the many.

These honors which constitute Kallipolean political life evidence an important sense in which the philosophers are political animals. To Glaucon's immediate suggestion that this person 'won't be willing to take part in politics', Socrates confidently ripostes: 'Yes, by the dog, he certainly will, at least in his own kind of city (*en ge tê heautou polei*)' (9.592a). The reputation of the philosopher rulers in Kallipolis is the expression of the co-dependence between the city and its rulers. Therefore, while strictly speaking it is true that the philosopher ruler 'will never *exchange* his wisdom for…symbolic, or political capital', as Nightingale claims, by tending to philosophy's reputation he is earning such capital for the rule of wisdom.[51] Therefore, Kallipolis is a city that tends to the good reputation of philosophy via the allocation of civic honors.

Kallipolis ensures that the rulers are just indeed, and not performing justice or appearing to be just for the sake of political spoils. For 'if the guardians of our laws and cities are merely believed to be guardians but are not (*mê ontes alla dokountes*), you surely see that they'll destroy the city utterly, just as they alone have the opportunity (*ton kairon*) to govern it well and make it happy' (4.421a). The entire foundation of Kallipolis rests upon the selection and education of men and women who constitute the right suitors for philosophy.[52] The institutional design of the *politeia* does some of the work towards redressing the philosopher's disadvantage vis-à-vis eager, less capable candidates for political rule. The city's education system demands its participants to 'show themselves to be lovers of their city (*dein autous philopolidas te phainesthai*)' (6.503a). As Kraut

[51] Nightingale, 2004, p.91 (emphasis mine).
[52] 'Philosophy, spirit, speed, and strength must all, then, be combined in the nature of anyone who is to be a fine and good guardian of our city (*philosophos dê kai thumoeidês kai tachus kai ischuros hêmin tên phusin estai o mellôn kalos kagathos esesthai phulax poleôs*)' (2.376c; cf. 6.503c).

notes, 'Assuming that the tests are successful in weeding out egoistic candidates, Plato is entitled to a high degree of confidence that the philosopher will not fail to do his assigned job of governing'.[53] The institutional design of the communal living arrangements also helps. As Bloom writes, 'they have no place where they might store illegally acquired things or enjoy forbidden pleasures. They are always seen by men, if not by gods, so that the secrecy needed for successful lawbreaking and the gaining of an unfounded good reputation are lacking.'[54] Only within a properly designed institutional setting can the philosophic nature be just. Just as philosophers help the other classes to be just, Kallipolis maintains the just character of philosophers.

By introducing into politics a type of person who cares about his reputation in the sense of wanting philosophy to appear as what it is and what it can do for the polis, Plato addresses the problem of deception. By beginning from the inside (the just soul) and working outward (the just polis), Plato eradicates the worry about the rulers not being what they appear to be.[55] The philosopher ruler is, by definition, just. Thus the denizens of the *politeia* need not second-guess the appearance of justice in their city. Kallipolis is the only political environment that makes seeming and being align, since philosopher rulers make its 'constitution perfectly ordered (*hê politeia teleos kekosmêtai*)' (6.506a). Hence Kallipolis is a place where the citizens call their rulers 'preservers and auxiliaries (*sôtêras te kai epikourous*)' (5.463b).

Importantly, this meets a normative epistemic demand Socrates repeats in the *Republic*,

[53] Kraut, 1973, p.338.
[54] Bloom, 1991, p.369.
[55] 'The achievement of internal justice entails the exhibition of interpersonal justice.' Lane, 2012, p.115.

namely, that no one wants to be deceived about the truth (see 2.382a; 3.413a; 7.535e).[56] 'Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good…but everyone wants the things that really *are* good and disdains mere belief here (*alla ta onta zêtousin, tên de doxan entautha êdê pas atimazei*)' (5.505d).[57] Indeed, it is the fact that judgment begins from appearances that allows deception to take place. Since philosophic types privilege what is over what appears to be – they are *gnêsioi* (7.535c), true or genuine men rather than illegitimates or bastards (*nothoi*) – when they pursue reputation they should actualize a confluence that results in a stable environment. Such an environment is one where appearances do not mislead those who exercise political judgment, where there is healthy political judgment.[58] In this way, 'those who are inexperienced in the truth [and] have unsound opinions' (9.584e), those who 'wander in this way throughout their lives' (9.586a) might be brought to a more truthful state. They come to the same conclusion, irrespective of their perspective. 'Whether we look at the matter from the point of view of pleasure, good reputation (*eudoxian*), or advantage, a praiser of justice tells the truth, while one who condemns it has nothing sound to say and condemns without knowing what he is condemning (*ho men epainetês tou dikaiou alêtheuei, ho de psektês ouden hugies oud' eidôs psegei hoti psegei*)' (9.589c). The economy of reputation has been properly ordered.

This is why, in such a situation, it is safe to return what Glaucon borrowed from justice: 'the reputation (*doxês*) justice in fact has among the gods and humans…and that we agree

[56] As Harte puts it, Socrates proposes 'a normative view of soul: the soul properly aims at truth.' Harte, 2013, p.150.
[57] '[O]ur psychology has a natural affinity with the truly good'. Nussbaum, 2001, p.161.
[58] 'Because just and unjust actions are no different for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body' (4.444c); 'Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health (*aretê men ara, hôs eoiken, hugeia te tis an eiê*), fine condition and well-being of the soul, while vice is disease (*kakia de nosos te*), shameful condition, and weakness' (4.444d-e). For an application of this aspect of Plato's thought to environmental ethics, see Lane, 2012.

that it does indeed have such a reputation and is entitled to carry off the prizes it gains for someone by making him seem just…that it gives good things to anyone who is just and that it doesn't deceive (*ouk exapatôsa*) those who really possess it' (10.612d). These rewards include political office, should they want it (*en tê autôn polei archousi te an boulôntai tas archas*, 10.613d). If, as Ferrari claims, 'one reason for aristocratic quietism' was that '[p]olitical life in a democracy is dangerous to one's reputation', then Kallipolis is one kind of answer to this problem.[59] Hence, Plato comes across as an immanent critic of his Athens.

When the many attribute to philosophy a reputation for goodness and wisdom and the philosophic types are motivated to tend to philosophy's reputation, the groundwork for the confluence of the political world and philosophic types will have been laid. Now we can turn to how the *Republic* attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of philosophy.

3. Rehabilitating the Reputation of Philosophy

It is by intervening in the economy of philosophy's reputation that the text performs the rehabilitation.[60] This task is immense, for the view of the philosophic nature as that which is 'guided by the truth and always pursue[s] it in every way…[is] completely contrary to the opinions currently held' (6.490a). In fact, 'it's no wonder that the majority of people (*tous pollous*) aren't convinced by our arguments, for they've never seen a…man or a number of men who themselves rhymed with virtue, were assimilated to it as far as

[59] Ferrari, 2003, p.24.

[60] Plato 'is a sophisticated literary artist who is aware of the effect he is producing.' Annas, 1981, p.2. 'Socrates' use of symbols is not untheorized by Plato. Both Plato and his Socrates are masters of the rhetorical technique that Aristotle will later described as "setting things before the eyes" of the audience (e.g., *Rhet*. 3.1.6).' Allen, 2000, pp.251-252. For a similar approach with an emphasis on Socrates' *atopia*, see Schlosser, 2014.

possible and ruled in a city of the same type' (6.498d-499a). What's more, Socrates is well aware of the stakes: if they get it wrong, they will 'let loose an even greater flood of ridicule upon philosophy' (7.536b).[61] Rehabilitating the reputation of philosophy is a dangerous task.

It is through images (*eikones*) that the rehabilitation of philosophy's reputation is to occur. Images can expand the political imagination of the audience.[62] Allen's verdict is helpful here: 'in the *Republic*, Socrates is explicit about the fact that he is introducing symbols and stories to make ideas that have been hitherto inconceivable to his audience conceivable. He is explicit about the fact that he is trying to change the topography of the conceptual world underlying his interlocutors' habitual practices and way of life.' My study of these *eikones* can be understood as fulfilling a promissory note found in Vogt: 'The similes do not turn us into knowers. They can only offer beliefs for us to think about…It is good for us to engage with them, and they make us see things about the good.'[63] As Frede writes: the topics Socrates and Plato discuss 'help to form our character and our general outlook and attitude. They help to determine where we see our interests, they shape our ambitions.'[64]

Plato reveals the tenor of this approach following Adeimantus' reaction to Socrates'

[61] 'These arguments in defense of philosophy are directed to soothing the people's anger and apprehension.' Bloom, 1991, p.400.

[62] By 'audience' I mean anyone to whom the dialogue, as a whole or in its parts, might speak. Three features of the *Republic* favor this ecumenical if underdetermined understanding. First, the frame of the *Republic* gives no indication to whom Socrates is narrating the conversation that populates the content of the dialogue. Second, the present yet silent audience of the *Republic* – Polemarchus' brothers, Lysias and Euthydemus, as well as Charmantides of Paiania (see 1.328b) – suggests that being a part of the conversation does not mean being active in it. And third, the vocal yet absent audience of poets such as Hesiod, Simonides, and Homer, suggests that being absent from the conversation does not mean that one's voice will not be heard. Principal and prior to these features is the fact *that* Plato wrote; as his *Phaedrus* claims, the *logos* of a text (*graphê*) 'doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not'. *Phaedrus*, 275e. Cf. Kamtekar, 1998, p.322.

[63] Vogt, 2009, p.23.

[64] Frede, 1992, p.215. Annas, Nussbaum, and Griswold share a similar position: see Annas, 1981, pp.2-3 *et passim*; Nussbaum, 2001, pp.155 and 163 respectively; and Griswold 2002, pp.95 and 100 respectively.

paradox that philosophers should become rulers. Adeimantus says that 'the majority (*tois…pollois*) don't share your opinion' (6.499d); Socrates is quick to respond by rebuking Adeimantus. 'You should not make such wholesale charges against the majority (*tôn pollôn*), for they'll no doubt come to a different opinion (*doxan*), if instead of indulging your love of victory (*philonikon*) at their expense, you soothe them and try to remove their slanderous prejudice (*diabolên*) against the love of learning, by pointing out what you mean by a philosopher' (6.499d-500a).[65] A love of victory need not and should not antagonize a good reputation. That a good reputation and a love of victory need not be coterminous is evidenced in a moment when Plato has Socrates break from the dialogue to narrate that Thrasymachus 'wanted to earn their [the other guests at Cephalus' house] admiration (*eudokimêsein*) by giving it [his answer], but he pretended that he wanted to indulge his love of victory (*philonikein*) by forcing me to answer' (1.338a).

The *Republic* contains several instantiations of philosophy's reputation among the many. Through the ship analogy and the personification of philosophy as bride (both from book 6) and the cave simile (book 7) we discover that philosophy has a bad reputation.[66] These 'figurative explanations' are images: metaphorical descriptions that construct a visual representation in the minds of the audience.[67] *Qua* images, on the epistemology of the *Republic*, they are especially suitable for the majority who roll around in intermediates, between what is and what is not (see 5.479d). That is, the epistemic condition of most people demands that Plato casts the correct content in the

[65] The *philonikia* mentioned here is a jibe against those sophists who let their love of victory dictate what they tell the many. It also makes Adeimantus a candidate for being a spirited type. His brother Glaucon is often taken to be such a type, e.g. by Bloom, 1991, pp.337 *et passim*.
[66] Heretofore I use 'Cave', 'Ship', and 'Bride' as shorthand to refer to these images.
[67] I lift the phrase quoted from Pappas, 2003, p.141.

medium of images. I analyze these images along three dimensions: how philosophy is represented, how those who interact with philosophy are represented, and what effect this could be said to have on the audience of the *Republic*.

Let us begin from the most celebrated of these images: the Cave (7.514a-517a).[68] In this 'strange image (*atopon…eikona*)' (7.515a), we see a man at three successive stages of his life: before he becomes a philosopher (when he is chained along with fellow dwellers in the cave), on his way to becoming a philosopher (when he is unchained and wearingly begins the ascent from the cave, as well as the entirety of his life spent in the outside world), and after he has become a philosopher (his descent into the cave). Upon his return to the cave ('through persuasion or compulsion', 7.519e; see 7.539e) he unsuccessfully tries to convince the cave dwellers that they do not dwell in reality.[69] He is not well received; on the contrary, he is ridiculed because he can no longer participate in the competitions held in the cave. The 'honors and praises (*timai de kai epainoi*) of these competitions no longer motivate him (7.516c, emending Grube and Reeve).[70]

Both sides are at fault: the cave dwellers find the returning philosopher ridiculous and/or in an unrecognizable (and therefore) bad state (see 7.516e-517a), while the philosopher himself no longer wants to participate in the life he once shared with them. We can scold the returning philosopher for not being sensitive enough to the life led by those in the cave. Surely he should know better than to be so abrasive towards his fellow cave dwellers. Surely he has the requisite intelligence to know that to tell them that their lives

[68] There are other justifications that urge beginning from the Cave. For example, Burnyeat claims that 'the central aim of the *Republic* [is] dramatized in the parable of the Cave'. Burnyeat, 1999, p.305. Alternatively, and according to the ring-composition reading of the text, to begin from the Cave would be to begin from the heart of the dialogue: see Barney, 2010.
[69] For a discussion of the descent as 'a psychological revisitation', see Scott, 2000.
[70] By contrast, the honors and prizes that Kallipolis makes available should properly motivate its philosopher rulers.

fall far from the truth – that they are in fact deceived about the truth – is not something that they can tolerate. He is likely to be charged with arrogance, and justifiably so: unlike the cave dwellers who cannot even imagine that there is even a world outside of the cave, he knows that there are two worlds, being the only one who partook in both. The traveler who, upon his return home, rejects the values of his upbringing for the sake of what he learned in his travels is likely to appear churlish, and even ungrateful, to his compatriots. The returning philosopher is a failure but in the eyes of the audience he remains a sympathetic failure: the physiological and psychological pain he has undergone is testament to this (see 7.515e).

There is another way to read the philosopher's disinterestedness, to wit, as a critique of the existing practices of the Cave dwellers. These practices need not be thought of as a closed system; as Weiss notes, 'the prisoners in the Cave might conceivably be tipped off to the unreality of the shadows when they find something contradictory or puzzling in them. The intellect, we know, is awakened by puzzling features of large and small, soft and hard ([7.]523a-524d).'[71] The philosopher might, therefore, be seen as the instigator of this critique. However, he is not. We might ask, therefore, what must be the case for the philosopher's return to have been perceived as such? Arguably, had he had a good reputation to begin with, this might have been strong enough to sustain his critique. That is, a good reputation acts as a kind of armor that protects its bearer against inevitable pushback from a community that is told that it has been living a lie. What this admittedly speculative answer reveals is the fragility of the arrangements inside the cave: they cannot withstand critique.

Can the audience of the *Republic* withstand such critique? Upon the presentation of this

[71] Weiss, 2012, p.57, fnt.21.

eikona, the audience will want to resist the implication that they are like the cave dwellers. The effect of the Cave on the audience is to bring to the forefront the same premise that arguably operates in the minds of the cave dwellers, namely, that no one wants to be deceived about the truth (see 2.382a; 3.413a). Yet this is not what happens in the story. The premise about not wanting to be deceived about the truth has a bad outcome insofar as it grounds why the cave dwellers so vehemently reject the returning philosopher. It is not that they are unconcerned with the truth, but that they cannot accept that they have been deceived about it all this time. The problem is attitudinal, not cognitive in kind.

Whereas the premise forecloses the minds of the cave dwellers, the premise drives the audience in the opposite direction. Although the simile only dimly forecasts the possibility of philosophic rule (see 7.519e), the audience who are persuaded by it ought to subsequently cast doubt on their current epistemic configuration. Their beliefs about the world may be the products of deception. They fail to see how their epistemic configuration is *as if* they were chained and only forced to look in one direction and at epistemically inferior objects, and, ignorant of this, they may even kill the only person who can order their way of life in a better way.[72] They might imagine the possibility that the targets of their praise and blame are badly chosen.

The Ship, Socrates notes, 'resembles cities and their attitude to the true philosophers…tell this simile to anyone who wonders why philosophers aren't honored

[72] Whereas the Divided Line metaphor that precedes the Cave image allows for the possibility of an ascendance from shadows to the things that cast shadows and so on (see 6.509d-511e), for the chained cave dwellers there is no such possibility. If the truth lies outside of the cave then, considering Plato's construction of the Cave, it is hard to overemphasize how far removed the chained cave dwellers are from it: the entirety of their lives consists of seeing shadows of animal puppets projected onto a cave wall (see 7.514b-c).

in the cities (*ekeinon ton thaumazonta hoti hoi philosophoi ou timôntai en tais polesi didaske te tên eikona*)' (6.489a). The city is analogous to a ship at sea (6.488a-e).[73] A self-reflective moment about the nature of dialogic practice precedes the analogy. Employing the language of the law courts, Socrates sketches the position of the 'prosecutor of philosophy (*ton egkalounta tê philosophia*)' (6.489d). This is the person who might admit that he is unable to resist the conclusions to which dialogic practice of philosophy arrives, 'yet he sees that of all those who take up philosophy…the greatest number become cranks (*allokotous*), not to say completely vicious (*pamponêrous*), while those who seem completely decent (*epieikestatous dokountas*) are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend' (6.487c-d). Like the art of navigation, philosophy at once appears useless and exclusionary to the many.[74]

In the Cave and the Ship alike, the many reject the person who knows the truth about the situation (that cave-life ought to be oriented by what is outside the cave) or who possesses the relevant craft (what it takes to navigate a ship from port to port).[75] In both cases, moreover, the awry endings are made possible by those dynamics that come into being when individuals amass into crowds. In the Cave the rejection comes because of the cave dwellers' refusal to accept that they may have been deceived about the truth for their entire lives and because of the philosopher's newfangled unwillingness to participate in their games. In the Ship, the rejection of the philosopher is because of the

[73] The analogy is explicitly introduced as akin to what painters do when they try to portray something unnatural; that is, Socrates takes himself to be painting a picture (*eikona*) in order to capture the situation he seeks to describe.

[74] 'The parable of the ship stresses the vulnerability of philosophy to misunderstanding and, as a result, to a reputation for being politically useless.' Monoson, 2000, p.124. Pappas clarifies: 'Socrates is not merely explaining why philosophers *seem* useless in existing societies, but why they really *are* useless ([6.]489b).' Pappas, 2003, p.119.

[75] Note that the craft of navigation is not all that is needed to run a ship – hence it's appropriateness as a metaphor for a city.

sailors' pleonectic desire to rule. They clamor around the ship owner, 'quarreling with one another (*stasiazontas pros allêlous*) about steering the ship, each of them thinking that he should be the captain, even though he's never learned the art of navigation' (6.488b). The analogy bears with it objections not only to democratic regimes (regimes where the sailors or the *demos* want to rule) but also to any regime where the form of rule is not based on art or skill (*technê*). 'Therefore, it isn't easy for the best ways of life to be highly esteemed (*eudokimein*) by people who, as in these circumstances, follow the opposite ways' (6.489c-d). As was the case in the Cave, the Ship puts the reputation of philosophy among the many on display.

As Monoson observes, it is not that they will not understand that 'the true captain (*alêthos kubernêtikon*)' must be versed in 'the craft of navigation (*tên kubernêtiken*)', but that they cannot understand it (6.489e).[76] They deceive the ship owner, 'they call the person who is clever at persuading or forcing the shipowner to let them rule a "navigator," a "captain," and "one who knows ships" (*pros de toutois epainountas nautikon men kalountas kai kubernêtikon kai epistamenon ta kata naun*) and dismiss anyone else as useless (*psegontas hôs achrêston*)' (6.488c-d). They have no idea that the true pilot must attend to climate phenomena and to the stars in the sky, while their praise and reproach is both misguided and misspent.

As in the Cave, the audience must resist identification with the many who are represented by the sailors in the image. Yet, unlike the *atopon eikona* of the Cave, Socrates can rely on complicity from the audience for they already know that a ship needs a captain. Thus if they are persuaded to imagine their polis as a ship out at sea, then it follows that their city needs men who possess the art of politics. What is perhaps news

[76] Monoson, 2000, p.124.

to them is that they should expect that these men would not be able to convey that they have knowledge of this art. Just as someone who did not know that ships need captains or helmsmen (i.e., individuals who possess the knowledge of sailing) would find it preposterous if a candidate helmsman were to say to him "I navigate according to the stars", so a person who is in the current epistemic condition of the audience would find it preposterous if a candidate ruler said unto him "I will rule the city according to my knowledge of the invisible, immutable and everlasting Forms" (see 532a, *et passim*). Subsequently, those who are persuaded by the analogy are led to doubt whether they can in fact recognize those who are best suited to rule.[77]

The Cave implicitly repeats the moral of the Ship: that some person may know the truth about reality yet when he relates it to others it sounds incredible. It changes this moral by tweaking its proximate cause: in the Cave it is not *pleonexia* that is to blame for the behavior of the many, but it is living in 'false consciousness'.[78] The moral in itself is more poignant: the presumed preposterousness of the captain's claims are not connected in any way to what the sailors are supposed to know. If we read the Cave as utilizing the continuous categories of the Divided Line metaphor that precedes it, the challenge posed to the prisoners by the returning philosopher is more profound than the challenge of the captain.[79] Whereas the sailors think "it is preposterous that the art of sailing has anything to do with a thing as remote as the stars", the prisoners think "this man, who was once one of us, thinks he is better than us because where we see shadows (and these of puppets projected onto a wall by a fire), he sees the light (and that of the sun, which is the principal source of light)." Thus they are likely to take offense because of the comparison

[77] The educational institutions of Kallipolis take this decision out of the hands of the many.
[78] Annas, 1981, p.253.
[79] See Annas, 1981, pp.253-256.

the returning philosopher forces them into, to wit, that their epistemic configuration is inferior to that of someone who was once no different from them.

At the end of the Ship, Socrates identifies his most important target when he proclaims that, 'By far the greatest and most serious slander on philosophy (*polu de megistê kai ischurotatê diabolê gignetai philosophia*), however, results from those who profess to follow the philosophic way of life' (6.489d). This takes us into the last image we will consider as revealing the reputation of philosophy among the many: the personification of philosophy as a bride (6.495c-496a).[80] The Bride image is seldom, if at all, mentioned in the secondary literature.[81] Just like the Ship analogy, the Bride is meant to capture 'the reasons why philosophy is slandered and why the slanderer is unjust (*to men oun tês philosophias, ôn eneka diabolên eilêphe kai oti ou dikaios*)' (6.497a).

While the bride – philosophy – is not short of suitors she is eventually left 'desolate and unwed (*erêmon kai atelê*)' (6.495c).[82] It is the host of unsuitable suitors who earn a bad reputation for her, 'men who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily (*tous anaxious paideuseos, otan autê plêsiazontes omilôsi mê kat' axian*)' (6.496a). These 'unworthy wooers…attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with (*alloi epeiselthontes anaxioi êschunan te kai oneidê periêpsan,*

[80] The personification of 'abstract nouns which denote emotions, forces or conditions' was a commonplace in Plato's times. Dover, 1974, p.142. From the wider purview of Plato's thought, the feminization of philosophy should not strike us as strange; see, most evidently, Socrates ventriloquizing Aspasia in the *Menexenus* and Diotima in the *Symposium*, the description of Socrates as a midwife in the *Theaetetus*, as well as the description of the political art in the *Statesman* as weaving, i.e., a *technê* that was exclusive to women in Plato's Athens.

[81] Yet, given that Socrates is 'greedy for images' (6.488a), we should not be surprised that Plato has him follow up the Ship with another image. Although it is never called an image (*eikona*), from the perspective of the Divided Line we can observe that it occupies the same epistemological region as the others, i.e. the lowest part of the Line called 'imaging (*eikasian*)' (6.511e). What is more, although the personification may not be in tune in letter with the other two, it is in tune with them in spirit.

[82] Adam notes that *atelê* 'is said with reference to the rites of marriage', while both Lee and Shorey translate '*atelê*' as 'unwed'. For a nice discussion of *erême* in the context of Isocrates and in relation to Plato's *Laws*, see Nightingale, 2013, pp.250-251.

hoia kai su phês oneideizein tous oneidizontas)' (6.495c). Crucially, they prevent those 'to whom she properly belongs' from having her. The wrong suitor 'looks exactly like a little bald-headed tinker who has come into some money and…got himself up as a bridegroom, and is about to marry the boss's daughter because she is poor and abandoned' (6.495e). The offspring they produce will necessarily 'be illegitimate and inferior (*notha kai phaula*)…what are properly called sophisms (*sophismata*)' (6.496a; cf. 7.535c). The wrong suitor is purposefully described so as to repulse the audience, while the offspring of this union offends both *nomos* and *physis*. The wrong suitors include the sophists and those who come to philosophy too early in their lives (see 6.494e). Conversely, if philosophy were to interact with those suitors who were in fact suited for her then she need not be looked upon as useless or dangerous.[83] The personification of philosophy as a bride whose integrity and offspring were compromised by unsuitable suitors turns into an institutional proposal that seeks to secure the best men and women for her. It is failure in this task leads to the downfall of Kallipolis (see 8.546d).

Ober argues that it is the many who are responsible for the demise of philosophy: it is they who encourage youths to behave in such ways.[84] This is correct as far as it goes; the Bride helps bring out why Ober's claim is too strong. Those who consort with philosophy – more specifically, those who both profess to and are known to consort with philosophy – are those who are responsible for its reputation. The personification suggests that the reputation of A can be the result of A's interaction with B where B is unfit for A. The

[83] That these are the two possible outcomes is explained by the premise that great natures can do either great good or great evil, whereas smaller natures can (comparatively) do a smaller good or a smaller evil (see 6.495b; cf. *Crito*, 44d). The former are those who are considered dangerous, while the latter are thought useless. We may use the language of Newton's third law of motion to describe the premise: for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The same premise is operational in the explanation of how a democracy, a condition of extreme freedom, leads to tyranny, a condition of extreme subjection (see 8.569c).

[84] Ober, 1998, p.238.

interaction between individuals and philosophy refers us to the under-described dialectical practices with which philosophy is associated.[85] What Socrates brings out in the Bride is an image of philosophy as a dialogue between individuals that aims at, and is motivated by, the truth. It is not philosophy as a constituted body of thought, nor is it philosophy as the outcome of the rigorous education system of Kallipolis. It is instead an umbrella term for the behavior of individuals who pursue truth or wisdom. The concern is for those who stray from this pursuit and pander to the many, those who 'aim at nothing except reputation and disputation (*doxan kai erin*)' (6.499a).[86] It makes sense – on the premise that philosophy is a contested and contestable term – that Plato's target would not be the many, but the sophists.[87]

The premise of the Bride is that philosophy *is* attractive to some, and in fact attractive to a wider pool of suitors than are appropriate to her. Philosophy, we are told, 'retains a far higher reputation (*to axiôma megaloprepesteron*) than other occupations, a reputation

[85] 'Plato says virtually nothing positive and direct about' the dialectic the philosopher rulers are meant to practice. Annas, 1981, p.276.

[86] The result of this practice by the young *eristikoi* is that 'they themselves and the whole of philosophy are discredited in the eyes of others (*autoi te kai to holôn philosophias peri eis tous allous diabeblêntai*)'. On the contrary, a sober 'older person…will be more sensible himself and will bring honor rather than discredit to the philosophical way of life (*to epitêdeuma timiôteron anti atimoterou poiêsei*)' (7.539c-d). The burden of the argument is that 'the pleasure of studying things that are cannot be tasted by anyone except a philosopher (*tês de tou ontos theas, hoian hêdonên echei, adunaton allô gegeusthai plên tô philosophô*)' (9.582c).

[87] An objection to this claim – and a passage which might appear to support Ober's interpretation – is at 6.492a-c where Socrates calls 'the greatest sophists of all' and the corruptors of a young philosophic nature not those whom 'general opinion' avers that they are corrupted by the 'private teaching' of the sophists, but those who 'are sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd (*koinon plêthous*), they object very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or blame (*psogou kai epainou*) and double it. In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on a young person's heart?...[He would] be carried by the flood wherever he goes, so that he'll say the same things are beautiful or ugly as the crowd does, follow the same way of life as they do, and be the same sort of person as they are'. I reproduce the graphic description in full because it shows that the critique is directed not at the *plêthos* but at the combined effect of, on the one hand, a loud minority in the *plêthos* and, on the other, the institutional design of collective gatherings. Such a situation confers a disproportionate influence to those few, who go on to single out individuals as sophists and to accuse them of corrupting the youth. There follows, in fact, a likely reference to Socrates who was also reputed to be a sophist: 'the greatest compulsion of all…is what these educators and sophists impose by their actions if their words fail to persuade...[to wit] disenfranchisement, fines, or death' (6.492d).

which these stunted natures covet' (Lee, 6.495d). This is a clear instance of rhetoric: 'an exhortation to philosophy', as Rowe characterizes the entirety of the *Republic*.[88] Individuals are drawn to philosophy on account of its attractiveness. And although, unlike the Cave and the Ship, there is no majority in this image with which the audience can resist identification, Plato provides a target for their censure: the 'pseudo-philosopher marplots'.[89] The message to the audience is clear: philosophy has a bad reputation because the wrong sorts of men are consorting with her, while the right sorts of men remain in the margins. Philosophy and its offspring only stand a chance if she is wedded to the latter. The Bride implies that philosophy is a generative process; the way that philosophy should propagate when married to the right person is by urging him to rule the city. Thus, it is a hopeful message insofar as the right kind of suitor is out there. Crucially, by holding up philosophy as desirable, Plato at once urges the many to consider her favorably *and* to disabuse themselves of the confusion that concurrently bedevils them: that philosophy is at best useless and at worst harmful.

Collectively, via these images, Plato shows that the poor reputation of philosophy is contingent and accidental, rather than necessary. These images also intimate that the many are not at fault for philosophy's bad reputation. The strongest statement of is at 6.500b: 'the harshness the majority exhibit towards philosophy is caused by (*tou chalepôs pros philosophian tous pollous diakeisthai ekeinous aitious einai*) those outsiders who don't belong and who've burst in like a band of revellers, always abusing one another, indulging their love of quarrels, and arguing about human beings in a way that is wholly inappropriate to philosophy'. The Bride image leaves the audience with the

[88] Rowe in Plato, 2012, p.xiv.
[89] I lift the phrase from Ober, 1998, p.238.

impression that the right suitors do exist but have not been properly identified.

These images attempt to offset the reaction to the *Republic*'s audacious political theoretical proposal: that philosophers should rule. This proposal should not provoke 'laughter and disrepute (*adoxia*)' (5.473c, my translation). The awkward behavior of the philosopher who returns to his cave 'appears most ridiculous (*phainetai sphodra geloios*)' to the others (7.517d). In the Ship the target of the sailors' praise is the man who can persuade and coerce the ship owner, while the man with the true art of piloting (read: philosophy) is thought to be useless and is instead censured (*psegôntas*, 6.488d). In the Bride reproach (*oneidizontas*, 6.495c) is brought upon philosophy as the wrong types of men consort with her, while the right kind of men fall by the wayside. The operation of these mechanisms throws philosophy into disrepute, thus revealing both the disfigured epistemic condition of the many and how it is largely through them that philosophy will earn and maintain a good reputation. Via images that constitute the apposite conduits of persuasion, therefore, Plato has begun to rehabilitate philosophy by intervening in its reputational economy.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have attempted to show the relationships of mutual dependence that emerge between the reputation-attributors (the many) and the reputation-bearers (the philosophers). Within Kallipolis and outside of it Plato's political theory aims at a stability that can only come from aligning what is with what appears to be. The *Republic* wagers that political power cannot be properly handled when those who wield it are not actually just and are not recognized as such. In the next two chapters on the *Laws* we will

see Plato construct another city in speech, one which will place a far greater emphasis on the reputational drives of its founder and its citizens.

Chapter 2
Reputation and the Challenge of Founding the *Politeia* of Plato's *Laws*

The greatest number of textual appearances of *doxa*-as-reputation appears in Plato's longest dialogue, the *Laws*.[1] While this may be an artifact of the length of the text, it nonetheless warrants our attention insofar as the dialogue's subject matter is none other than the founding and maintaining of a colony of Cnossos called Magnesia. This chapter discusses the founding of the *politeia*, the next its maintenance.[2] My focus on reputation introduces some textual unity to a dialogue that notoriously lacks it.

How, then, do the circumstances described and enacted in the founding of Magnesia determine the city's *politeia*? I identify three such circumstances. The first two pertain to the incoming colonists: that they share a common human nature and are of Dorian stock. The third circumstance is found in the drama of the *Laws*: the presence of (one of) Magnesia's founders, Cleinias of Cnossos as an interlocutor. I establish the role of reputation (*doxa*) in these circumstances of founding. In so doing, I draw attention to what most scholars overlook: the obstacles that attend Magnesia's founding.

In section 1 I argue that, through its exhortation to Magnesians to pursue a reputation for virtue, the law code attempts to exercise normative force over key traits of human nature such as pleasure, pain, and the disposition to excessive self-love. Contrary to those who see the public domain interfering with the private domain, thereby implicitly positing a

[1] T.J. Saunders's translations of *doxa* and its cognates as reputation: 1.631b; 1.646e-647a; 5.729d; 5.731b; 5.732e-733a; 5.734d-e; 5.745a; 6.763e-764a; 6.784e; 7.814b; 9.878a; 11.914a; 11.918c; 11.919e; 11.936b; 12.950a-d; 12.951a; 12.951c-d; and 12.969a-b.

[2] On the relationship between the title and subject of the dialogue (*nomoi*) and *politeiai*, we may quote Brisson: 'When *nomos* is used in its general sense, to designate the totality of the laws, it also denotes all the prescriptions that are imposed on the city, such that the term can be used synonymously with that of *politeia*. This testifies in the simplest possible way to the intermixture of juridical and institutional considerations, as well as to the way in which, for the Greeks, discourse on law is always, and immediately, a discourse on the civic community and its constitutional organization.' Brisson, 2013, p.100. The Greek title of the *Republic* speaks for itself: *politeia*.

desirable distinction between the two domains, I claim that the law code imbricates the two domains to respond to the human nature of the colonists; reputation is critical to the way in which the law code achieves this.

However, the common Dorian stock raises more problems than it solves with respect to the first generation of colonizers who descend upon the city. In section 2 I argue that, in order to underwrite the stability of the *politeia*, the law code transforms the Dorians into Magnesians.[3] This is done via an ethical injunction to each individual to appear as they are, and through a reinvention of undesirable features of Dorian constitutions such as their zealous love for victory. The aim is to arm the citizens in their lifelong struggle for a good reputation. Once the city acquires a reputation for itself, the observers (*theôroi*) – the men with the best reputation for virtue – will reinforce the citizens' Magnesian identity. To create and reinforce a Magnesian identity is to pull the city and its citizens away from their original constitutions and from the Dorian city that initiated the founding, Cnossos.

Who conducts the *ergon* of founding Magnesia? In section 3 I turn to the founder himself: the liminal figure of Cleinias of Cnossos. For this *politeia* to come about, the Cnossian will have to become a Magnesian. Cleinias will have to constitute the regime which the colonists will find upon their arrival to Crete. The problem for Cleinias is that he will have to legislate differently from those founders of Cnossos he praises at the beginning of the dialogue. Magnesia's theological principles and aims notwithstanding, Cleinias cannot rely, as those erstwhile founders did, on instruction from the gods. To

[3] To create an identity in a *politeia* is to create the set of moral psychological reasons and emotions that make an individual feel at home (*oikeion*) in that polis.

overcome the quandary in which Cleinias finds himself, the Athenian exhorts the founder to seek a good reputation among the future Magnesians.

Before I move on, I should be clear that I do not deny what the dialogue asserts, namely, that the interlocutors are engaged in a theoretical exercise. Using the language of the familiar Greek distinction between *logos* and *ergon*, the Athenian Stranger observes that 'we are operating at the moment on a theoretical rather than a practical level' (5.736b; cf.1.636a for the same language). However, this denial must be qualified. The most cursory of readings cannot miss that Plato is concerned with the contingent aspects of founding such as Magnesia's natural resources (4.704a-705c), climate influences (5.747d-e), population size (5.737e; 5.740b-741a), and land distribution (5.737c-d; 5.739e-740a *et passim*).[4] These aspects are connected to Plato's decision to situate this late dialogue outside Athens and to confront old men with the problem of new, colonial foundings.[5] These foundings are, in part, the result of necessity: 'Such migrations occur because of the pressures of land-shortage…sometimes a given section of the community may be obliged to go off and settle elsewhere because it is harassed by civil war (*stasesin biazomenon*), and on one occasion a whole state took to its heels after being overcome by an attack it could not resist' (4.708b). The imminent new world order in Greece, which meant the end of the city-state as Plato and Aristotle knew it, situates the theoretical enterprise of founding accordingly.

[4] I therefore disagree with Wallach's assessment of 'the purely imaginary form of the hypothetical state of Magnesia'. Wallach, 2001, p.358, cf. pp.370-371.
[5] See Morrow, 1993, pp.4 and 592.

1. A Shared Human Nature

If '[t]he only indispensable material factor in the generation of power is the living together of people', then what do the *Laws* say about this material?[6] Schofield underwrites the text's self-conscious approach to the matter: 'the *Laws* envisages itself as trying to cope with human beings as they actually are.'[7] The legal framework and laws of Magnesia exhort the citizens to pursue a reputation for virtue. The ostensible target is the excessive love of self.[8] Magnesia gives honors and material rewards to those who earn a reputation for virtue among their fellows.

There is a general lament in the secondary literature about the way in which the legislator constitutes Magnesia's private and public domains. 'The end result of Plato's prescriptions', Klosko writes, 'is an all-embracing public opinion, intruding into every aspect of people's lives.'[9] There is no 'area of private life with which law may not, in principle, interfere', Stalley complains in a more measured way.[10] Laks writes that, in Magnesia 'the whole of human life can become the object of legislative attention.'[11] In response, we should first remember that, historically speaking, Magnesia is wholly unexceptional in this respect. We know that in Sparta the sphere that could be called 'private' was very small, and that in Athens, 'a man's whole life – private as well as

[6] Arendt, 1958, p.201.
[7] Schofield, 2010, p.23. Following Arendt, we might call human nature 'material'. Cf. Bobonich who agrees that 'the *Laws* is highly sensitive to the fact that human nature sets limits on the attainment of what would be ideally best'. Bobonich, 2002, p.110; cf. pp.385 and 451 where Bobonich speaks about human nature as imposing constraints. While Bobonich emphasizes the limits of human nature, my approach looks at how human nature provides a common denominator for the legislator. Brill also relies on the category of human nature to understand the dialogue: Brill, 2013, pp.172ff.
[8] The private domain is not eradicated: 'Everyone should have a part to play in private suits too (*dei de dê kai tôn idion dikôn koinônein kata dunamin hapantas*), because anyone excluded from the right to participate in trying cases feels he has no stake in the community whatsoever' (6.768b).
[9] Klosko, 2006, p.225.
[10] Stalley, 1983, p.24. Cf. Morgan, 2013, p.288.
[11] Laks, 2005, p.286.

public – was subject to examination' in the scrutiny (*dokimasia*).[12] Second, we should not think about these prescriptions as Klosko does, i.e. by asking what they amount to, but rather inquire into why they are there and how they are meant to work.[13] Such an approach is exegetically preferable, given the positive value we place upon the separation between private and public today.

Why would Plato structure the *politeia* thusly? The stakes become clear once we state the vision that antagonizes this one. Pericles expressed it in his funeral oration: 'We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kind of black looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people's feelings. We are free and tolerant in our private lives (*ta idia*); but in public affairs (*ta dêmosia*) we keep to the law'.[14] The *Laws* reject this distinction as it is expressed here. 'If public interest is well served, rather than private, then the individual and the community alike are benefited (*kai hoti sumpherei tô koinô te kai idiô, toin amphoin, ên to koinon tithêtai kalôs mallon ê to idion*)' (9.875a-b).[15] The pursuit of a good reputation structures the private and public domains. Elements belonging to the private – such as the experience of pleasure and pain, desires that lead to marriage and adultery, and the coveting of material reward – are tied closely to the pursuit of a good reputation.

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[12] Morrow, 1993, pp.216-217. Cf. Hunter, 1993, pp.106ff.

[13] In this respect, the essay by Morgan, 2013 does a service to scholarship: 'If no area of life in the city remains private, each act, and speech act, is public, performed for one's own benefit and that of one's fellow citizens'. Morgan, 2013, p.288.

[14] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.37. At 6.15 we hear how the *hoi polloi* came to fear (*phobêthentes*) Pericles' adopted son, Alcibiades: 'Although in a public capacity his conduct of the war was excellent, his way of life made him objectionable to everyone as a person'. Plato would agree with Lysias, when Cephalus' son urges jurors to 'not simply remember the public (*tôn dêmosiôn*) liturgies, but bear in mind also my private (*tôn idiôn*) activities'. Lysias, 'On a Charge of Accepting Bribes', 19.

[15] When Euben writes that the Athenians were in the business of 'incessantly judging each other's lives insofar as how they lived affected how they performed their responsibilities as citizens', he overlooks the difference between a Platonic and a Periclean understanding of how to constitute the relationship between what is *idion* and what is *koinon* or *dêmosion*. Euben, 1997, p.104.

The normative propositions about Magnesian citizens are premised on an understanding of human nature.[16] As we are told in the general preamble to the laws, the best Magnesian man is a man of virtue, which is to say that he is indeed virtuous and is acknowledged by others to be such.[17] The legislator couches this in epinician language familiar to his audience from the poetry of Xenophanes and Pindar: 'In dealings with the state and one's fellow-citizens, the best man (*aristos*) by far is the one who, rather than win a prize at Olympia or in any of the other contests in war and peace, would prefer to beat everyone by his reputation for serving the laws of his country (*doxê hupêresias tôn oikoi nomôn*) – a reputation for having devoted a lifetime of service to them with more distinction than anyone else' (5.729d).[18] The same kind of attitude can earn victory for its bearer in either domain.[19] This victory is given to him by the recognition of others. Aristotle affirms as much: 'And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life'.[20]

[16] Iris Murdoch captures this move from the normative to the descriptive when she writes that Plato 'combin[es] a great sense of human possibility with a great sense of human worthlessness'. Murdoch, 1977, p.20. Considered as a dictum, Murdoch's characterization helps us avoid oversimplified and false binaries such as whether Plato has a positive or negative attitude to human nature and whether Plato's view of human nature grew more or less optimistic from the *Republic* to the *Laws*.

[17] As my use of the preambles betrays, I agree with Bobonich that 'we should not draw a sharp distinction between passages explicitly designated as preludes and the rest of the text.' Bobonich, 2002, pp.112-113. Laks makes an important connection between the preambles and the laws proper: 'a citizen who obeys the persuasive instructions of the general preamble would thereby *ipso facto* anticipate and respect the content of the legislation that follows the organization of the magistracies.' Laks, 2005, p.265.

[18] For the argument that the *Laws* is littered with the epinician language and themes poets Pindar and Xenophanes, see Morgan, 2013. Independently of my argument herein, Wilburn observes that 'there is significant positive emphasis throughout the preludes and laws, and in the Athenian's characterization of the lawgiver's aims throughout the dialogue, on the love of victory and good reputation'. Wilburn, 2013, p.91.

[19] By definition, to draw an analogy between victory in athletics and victory in the life of virtue is to deny equating the two. A modest inference that might be drawn from this is not that Plato aims at superseding the poets, but that the language and themes of epinician poetry are somehow appropriate to statecraft.

[20] Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, I.8, 1099a3-5.

The focus on the reputation of 'the noblest life (*ton kalliston bion*)' that the best man will lead is premised on a particular understanding of 'human nature (*phusei anthrôpeion*)'. The best man operates under the ethical injunction to appear as he is (see 12.950c). To be recognized as such, those judging him must already have sufficient epistemological acuity. The text admits as much: 'people in general (*hoi polloi*) don't fall so far short of real goodness that they can't recognize (*krinein*) virtue and vice when they see it in others' (12.950b).[21] The judgment of the many (*hoi polloi*) is a proxy for the kind of judgment human nature can form and deliver. Reputation is already of concern to the many: it provides a ready path to virtue.

The pursuit of a good reputation is grounded in this nature that 'involves above all, pleasures, pains and desires…That is why we should praise (*epainein*) the noblest life – not only because it enjoys a fine and glorious reputation (*mê monon hoti tô schêmati kratei pros eudoxian*) but because…it excels in providing what we all seek: a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout all our lives' (5.732e-733a). The noblest life deserves praise for two reasons: because of the reputation it earns among others and because it gives its bearer a predominance of pleasure over pain throughout our lives. Pleasures and pains 'correspond to the most extensive part of a state, the common people (*dêmos te kai plêthos poleôs estin*)' (3.689b). Since a good reputation must always and necessarily depend on others, whereas the experience of pleasure and pain need not, it is clear why the ideal for any citizen must be the former. 'Whether the figure you cut in the eyes of others is good or bad, you should never underestimate its importance' (12.950b). By urging the pursuit of reputation, the legislator establishes interdependence among the

[21] Plato's sanguineness in the epistemological acuity of the many reappears in the discussion of the Magnesian courts of justice (6.768a-c).

citizens: he demands both that they render judgments on others and that they not discount the judgments others make of them. Hence the universal proposal that 'every citizen of every state should make a particular effort to show that he is straightforward and genuine (*haplous de kai alêthês aei*), not shifty, and try to avoid being hoodwinked by anyone who is' (5.738e).

The Magnesian desires a good reputation, that is, he desires to be seen as virtuous in the eyes of the other citizens. A good reputation is earned by fulfilling the twin ethical injunctions: to obey the laws and to appear as you are. When a Magnesian has a reputation for virtue, his life is one wherein pleasure predominates pain. The corollary shows what is impossible in Magnesia: to have the best reputation among your fellows, yet experience more pain than pleasure in your life. Even pain and pleasure are not wholly private: they have a social basis and referent. Plato is aware of the tension between the life that pursues a good reputation and the life that orients itself around the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure.[22] Heraclitus juxtaposed the pursuit of pleasure to the pursuit of fame: 'the best men (*hoi aristoi*) choose one thing over all else: everlasting fame (*kleos aenaon*) among mortals. But most men stuff themselves like cattle'.[23] The human nature in the *Laws* reproduces Heraclitus' juxtaposition, but insofar

[22] Commenting upon this passage, Laks writes that '"human" forms of praise, involving an appeal to personal pleasure, are to be instituted in contrast to other forms of praise appealing to "honour" and "reputation", and thus qualifying as divine'. This is an instance of one of the 'four main forms which together constitute the encompassing framework for the legislative work'. Laks, 2005, pp.269-270.

[23] Quoted in Gagarin and Woodruff, 1995, p.153. Taylor, 1960, p.484 slips in this phrase in his chapter on the *Laws* and *Epinomis*. While the pursuit of reputation is traditionally an aristocratic value, we need not say, with Nussbaum, that Plato is engaged in a revaluation of values. Nussbaum, 2001, p.163. Not only did Athens encourage distinction, but transforming the heroic virtues found in poets such as Homer and Pindar so that these cohere and inform *politeiai* ought to be understood as a mode of self-constitution particular to Athenians since the fifth century. 'One way to characterize this development [of the culture of accountability in Athens] is to see it as an expansion of an aristocratic ethos that emphasized both an agonistic conception of political and social life and an intensely egalitarian spirit'. Euben, 1997, p.99. See Balot, 2006, pp.145 *et passim*; Cartledge, 2005, pp.15-16; Arendt, 2004, p.435 and Arendt, 1958, p.197; Coleman, 2000, pp.28-29; Cohen, 1995, p.62 *et passim*.

as Magnesia privileges the pursuit of reputation, Plato envisions a polis where the many pursue what otherwise only the few would seek. Pleasure over pain seems to be the most foundational thing individuals want; when it conflicts with reputational concerns, individuals disregard the pursuit of reputation.[24]

By pitting a citizen's pursuit of reputation against his lower desires, the laws exploit the tension in human nature.[25] Should a citizen pursue a reputation for obeying the city's laws this would moderate the pursuit of his own reputation that he is likely to confuse with his own gratification. The Athenian proposes that a life of victory over oneself and over others (see 1.626c-e) is measured by the extent to which one obeys the city's laws. These two are connected in the sense that a victory over oneself involves not only suppressing illicit pleasures and withstanding pains, but also overcoming the 'excessive love of ourselves (*sphodra heautou philian*) [that is…] the cause of each and every crime we commit' (5.731e). To love oneself excessively is to engage in a 'false mode of self-honor'.[26]

To illustrate how reputation minimizes the tension between public and private, consider what the dialogue says about individuals' love of material goods and, in particular, the love of money (cf. 1.644a; 5.743e; 8.832d; 11.938b-c). What Plato abhors is not the existence of money, but the attitude it encourages in its bearer.[27] This is why Magnesia permits a restricted use of money but forbids commerce.[28] Commercial competitiveness

[24] Therefore, Klosko's utilitarian-sounding claim that 'Law is a public calculation of pleasures and pains in the state' is too reductive to be true. Klosko, 2006, p.221.
[25] 'Some [Magnesian] citizens are thereby allowed to guess that once one takes away reputation, it is no longer easy to argue that civic justice is pleasant for men by nature'. Pangle in Plato, 1980, p.457.
[26] Friedländer, 1969, p.429.
[27] To abhor the desire for money does not presuppose denying its existence; it is on account of the ubiquity and intensity of this desire that Plato takes it so seriously in the *Laws*.
[28] Magnesia has a local currency, a public treasury, its citizens engage in economic activity, and the law code often imposes financial penalties as a punishment for disobedience (see 6.774b, 9.855a *et passim*).

is destructive of societal relations because it rewards the love of money, promotes self-honor and, in so doing, it diverts the citizen's attention from the bonds he shares with his fellows.[29] The individual's effort is inseparable from the community he lives in, as this extract from the law on retail trade occupations reveals: 'Anyone who by some trick goes in for retail trading in a way forbidden to a gentleman should be indicted by anyone who wishes before a court of judges with a high reputation for virtue, on a charge of disgracing his clan (*ean de doxê anaxiô epitêdeumati katarrupainein tên hautou patrôan hestian*)' (11.919e). In Ernest Barker's felicitous phrase, Plato has an 'ethical aversion to the deceitfulness of riches'.[30] This deceitfulness has knock-on effects. It worsens first the condition of one's soul, then the individual's relationship with his clan, and eventually the relationships among Magnesians. In his discussion of Magnesia's law for a public suit against unscrupulous litigation (11.938b-c), Morrow nicely poses the contrast between avarice (a greed for material wealth) and spiritedness: 'contentiousness, being a part of the spirited element in human nature, is not intrinsically bad and can be redirected, but avarice can neither be redirected nor cured.'[31] We can modify Morrow's last clause: by denying avarice the constellation of values in which it can thrive, the right environment might in fact cause avarice to atrophy.

Nonetheless, the relationship between the pursuit of a good reputation and material goods is not solely antagonistic: a reputation for virtue can bring material rewards in its train. In the event of properties that can no longer be claimed by their rightful owners 'the

[29] While Cleinias testifies that Magnesia's geographic location is favorable to the construction of a harbor, the Athenian forbids such an enterprise (see 4.704b-d). The Athenian denies that there is a relevant difference between commercial enterprise and imperialistic military adventures: both seek to increase material acquisitions. 'The foundations of imperialism are moral, Plato thinks.' Morrow, 1993, p.99.
[30] Barker, 1960, p.374, fnt. 1.
[31] Morrow, 1993, p.294.

Guardians of the Laws pick out a family that has the best reputation for virtue of all the families in the state (*ê tôn en tê polei eudokimôtaton pros aretên*) and is at the same time fortunate enough to have produced several children' (9.878a). The conditions that must be met – the best reputation for virtue and several offspring – are conditions that at once depend upon, and will redound to the benefit of, the city.

The provisions for marriage and adultery also illustrate how reputation brings the public and private domains closer together. In marriage 'we should seek to contract the alliance that will benefit the state, not the one that we personally find most alluring' (6.773b).[32] Hence the provisional law on adultery: 'After the period of child-bearing, the chaste man or woman should be highly respected (*panta eudokimos*) *the promiscuous* should be held in the opposite kinds of "repute" (though *dis*repute would be a better word) (*ho de tounantion enantiôs timasthô, mallon de atimazesthô*)' (6.784e).[33] A good reputation is an incentive to be chaste, whereas a bad reputation is an incentive to avoid promiscuity. Insofar as chastity and promiscuity provoke opposite kinds of gossip, they are matters of societal concern. As Hunter notes of Athens, 'gossip penetrated into the privacy of the oikos [sic.]…Gossip thus represents a point of articulation of family and community, oikos [sic.] and polis [sic.]'.[34] It acts, we might say, as an enforcement mechanism. What the law on adultery instructs the Magnesian individual is that the pursuit of a good

[32] See Taylor, 1960, p.480 and Jaeger, 1986, p.243. Indeed, insofar as it is a '*thumotic eros* which underlies marriage and the family', we should not be surprised that it comes under the purview of the law code. The phrase is from Pangle in Plato, 1980, p.472. An elected committee of women will supervise the first ten years of marriage, i.e. when the couple is to beget children (7.794b); that the next generation is supervised by women is evidence of Plato's commitment to using the human resources of a polis to their fullest.

[33] It is 'provisional' because 'When the majority of people conduct themselves with moderation in sexual matters, no such regulations should be mentioned or enacted; but if there is misbehavior, regulations should be made and enforced after the pattern of the laws we've just laid down' (6.785a). See Saunders, 1972. Bobonich agrees: 'There is an open texture to the political and social institutions that Plato sketches and we should allow for a range of ways of implementing the basic structure.' Bobonich, 2002, pp.394ff. Cohen emphasizes that the laws are alterable. Cohen, 1993, p.314. Both Stalley and Klosko disagree with the general point about provisionality; see Stalley, 1983, p.82 and Klosko, 2006, pp.250-251.

[34] Hunter, 1993, p.116

reputation is achieved through a marriage wherein the respective halves remain faithful to one another. By logical necessity, the provisional law on adultery looks back to the marriage law (4.721b-d). As a union between two persons it is an example and a symbol of the union of the citizens. Its existence and progeny secure the future (stability) of the city.

As part of the founding project, monogamy in marriage is reflective of the monogamy in allegiance to the city. As Jaeger has done well to point out, it is the claim of each individual to immortality: 'It is the family, which, in the narrowest sense possesses this fame and carries on the name.'[35] This should not surprise us, for it is consistent with the pursuit of a good reputation throughout one's life. The incoming colonizers are thus reassured that in *this* city they will have the opportunity to attain a good reputation. Magnesia's law on suicide highlights the importance of one's name in the city: those who commit suicide are buried on the city's borders, apart from the rest, in unmarked graves (9.873b-c). The permanent absence of a marked grave is a blemish upon the perpetrator's family. The individual is understood as being part of a family (*genos*). Indeed, political office depends on this, for 'if your candidates are to deserve promotion to positions of power, their characters and family background must have been adequately tested, right from their childhood until the moment of their election' (6.751c). Therefore, for example, in the nominations for the office of Guardian of the Laws, the name of each nominee comes with 'the candidate's father, tribe and deme' (6.753c).

[35] Jaeger, 1986, p.243. Cf. Schofield, 2006, p.320. Diotima gives us a variant on the theme: 'this is how mortal creatures achieve immortality, in pregnancy and giving birth'. *Symposium*, 206c. The attention lavished upon the prelude to the marriage laws cannot be understood without acknowledging that marriage itself is a religious duty. Yet, humans are worthless by comparison to the gods, as the text claims time and again: 'man…has been created as a toy for God' (7.803c; cf. 10.903c *et passim*). By fulfilling their duty to multiply they increase the overall worthlessness in the world! We can soften the paradox if we acknowledge its rhetorical force: it is a way of reducing the perceived differences among incoming colonists.

It is likely that the tendency to self-honor will be especially acute in the first generation of colonizers. Lacking a common identity, the experience of pleasure and pain will probably be more salient in their judgments, making prospective unity tenuous. Magnesia is a new settlement; these citizens begin by mutual strangers and must transition from this to being friends. This takes place when each citizen pursues a good reputation because this is what the best men seek, and via the promotion of intrastate competition among thusly motivated citizens. As Cohen remarks, 'social relations are essentially evaluative and competitive…a politics of reputation'.[36] This competition reveals how things are, making the world of appearances less deceptive. Thus the pursuit of a reputation for virtue is to redound to Magnesia's benefit.

2. Constructing a Collective Identity

In getting the city started, Cleinias and the motley crew of colonizers who descend upon the city are similarly placed with respect to the positive and negative preconceptions they bring in their train. The initial population that colonizes the city will be Greek foreigners 'of Dorian stock'.[37] The Athenian is serious about addressing their situation: 'we should assume our colonists have arrived and are standing before us' (4.715e).[38] If the city is to last they must become a company of friends (cf. 3.693b-c, 5.743c, 8.837a).

In fact, we are explicitly and elegantly told that they lack unity. 'So it won't be at all

[36] Cohen, 1995, pp.62-63. Cohen is writing about Aristotle's discussion of anger in *Rhetoric*, II.2, 1378a32-1380a4.
[37] Morrow, 1993, p.62; cf. pp.11 and 59. See Meyer, 2006, p.384; Gill, 2003, p.45; and Pangle in Plato, 1980, pp.422 *et passim*.
[38] As Schofield notes, the audience of the *Laws* is broadly construed: 'Plato wanted two things above all of the discourse he was to develop in the *Laws*: first, that it should reflect and embody a sense of a transcendent moral framework for political and social existence; second, that it should be capable of being persuasive – because *inter alia* generally intelligible – to a population at large, not to just an intellectual elite.' Schofield, 2003, p.13. Cf. Yunis, 1996, p.236. For the multiple audiences of the *Laws*, see Rowe, 2010, pp.32ff.

easy for the Cretan states to found their colony. The emigrants, you see, haven't the unity of a swarm of bees: they are not a single people from a single territory settling down to form a colony with mutual goodwill between themselves and those they have left behind' (4.708b). The Athenian describes the task using an aqueous metaphor: 'it's as though we have a number of streams from several sources, some from springs, some from mountain torrents, all flowing down to unite in one lake (*eis mian limnên*). We have to apply ourselves to seeing that the water, as it mingles, is as pure as possible, partly by draining some of it off, partly by diverting it into different channels' (5.736a-b).[39] If the lake is to be preserved, it needs to be managed.[40] The juxtaposition of the metaphors is revealing: the unstable, malleable, life-constituting medium that is water is more befitting to the arriving colonists than a metaphor which shows many individuals acting for the sake of the species. The legislators have their work cut out for them if 'the laws in force [are to] impose the greatest possible unity on the state (*kata dunamin hoitines nomoi mian hoti malista polin apergazontai*)' (5.739d). In other words, if unity is to be achieved, a common Magnesian identity is necessary. As Barker notes, the colonists 'are prone to cling blindly to the laws and institutions of their original home'.[41]

Since the colonizers will be 'new to the laws (*apeirois andrasi nomothetoumen*)' (6.752b) it is surprising that the issue of how Magnesian identity is created and transmitted has largely escaped the notice of Plato's commentators.[42] When the Athenian says 'let's suppose we've recruited our citizens and their purity meets with our approval'

[39] For the claim that we should not be serious about the varied origins of the colonizers, see Brunt, 1993, p.253, fnt.33.
[40] This aqueous metaphor befits the two related traits of human nature: 'pleasure and pain, you see, flow like two springs released by nature' (1.636d).
[41] Barker, 1960, p.365.
[42] Efforts such as the ones collected in Peponi, 2013 have begun to address this lacuna.

(5.736b-c), he is not assuming the creation of a Magnesian identity. He recognizes 'that at the start they won't readily accept any [of the laws] at all' and he allows greater changes in the law during the first decade of Magnesia's existence (6.752c). As Morrow notes, Magnesia's 'future citizens bring with them the Dorian traditions of their native cities.'[43] The 'project of citizenship' demands that these traditions be addressed.[44] The colonizers are to obey a city that is unlike that of their respective origins.

The injunction to the incoming colonists to appear as they are levels the playing field, as it were: 'the soundest and most important rule is this: if you mean to be perfect, you should seek to live in good repute only if you are really good in the first place, but not otherwise (*to men gar orthotaton kai megiston, onta agathon alêthôs houtô ton eudoxon bion thêreuein, chôris de mêdamôs, ton ge teleon andra esomenon*)' (12.950c).[45] The operational principle behind this is that 'There can be no greater benefit for a state than that the citizens should be well-known to one another' (5.738e). In Morgan's words: 'the first necessity for a happy life is the presence of truth'.[46] As each citizen struggles to be recognized as the most obedient servant of the laws and values of Magnesia, he will emerge from the shadow of the reputation of his former city and make his character known to his fellows.

Still, this is insufficient to lay the groundwork for Magnesian identity. Plato employs a moral psychological strategy to achieve this. He starts by pointing out the inadequacy of the Dorian attitude (i.e. the attitude which Cleinias and Megillus share), and then he re-

[43] Morrow, 1993, p.11.
[44] I lift the phrase from Brill, who does not discuss the creation of Magnesian identity. Brill, 2013, p.167.
[45] The injunction is mentioned in the context of Magnesia's reputation; ergo, it applies to and to cities alike.
[46] Morgan in Peponi, 2013, p.272.

describes an extant experience and adjusts it to suit Magnesia.[47] Therefore, it is not true that 'Plato sets out to create a written text that is designed to destroy the citizens' memory of earlier, different cultural practices', as Nightingale argues.[48] An unconditional break from the past or an indiscriminate import of the past, would each pose a threat to Magnesian identity. Hence, Plato reinvents rather than beginning anew. To do so is to apply a Dorian lesson, to wit, that 'it is necessary to start with a definite ideal of human character, a fixed conception of aretê [sic.].'[49]

If Magnesia is to be brought to fruition it is necessary to reform the narrow and therefore perverted Dorian love of victory. In Magnesia, the citizens' moral psychology must aim at the whole of virtue, rather than its lower part, courage (*andreia*).[50] As Bobonich observes: 'The injunctions of the Cretan and the Spartan law codes to act bravely must be brought under some conception of the good'.[51] Cleinias reports the standard worldview of a victory lover: 'what most men call "peace" is really only a fiction, and that in cold fact all states are by nature fighting an undeclared war against every other state' (1.626a). Megillus admits that he shares this pugilistic position on account of his identity: 'what other answer could one possibly make, if one is a Spartan?' he says (1.626c). However, victory in war brings about a lack of education (*apaideusian*)

[47] 'Dorian' is often an apposite characterization of the Cretan and Spartan 'kindred laws (*adelphois nomois*)' (3.683a, Bury's translation). As Morrow puts it, there is a 'kinship between the institutions of the two communities represented by Cleinias and Megillus [and this] is a fundamental feature in the design of the *Laws*'. Morrow, 1993, p.35. *Qua* Dorians, 'Megillus is scarcely indistinguishable from him [Cleinias] in type'. Rowe, 2003, p.97. 'Plato tends to conflate the Cretan constitution with that of the Spartans'. Nightingale, 1999, p.101, fnt. 3. It is Aristotle who distinguishes between Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Aristotle, *Politics*, II.10, 1271b20 ff.
[48] Nightingale, 2013, p.244.
[49] Jaeger, 1986, p.221. Lyons, 2011 agrees that Plato co-opts existing social norms.
[50] Brisson recognizes that 'the Athenian Stranger modifies the very notion of courage' but otherwise says tantalizingly little about the matter. Brisson, 2012, p.297.
[51] Bobonich, 2002, p.122.

and makes men more insolent (*hubristoteroi*) (1.641c).[52] The point is true to the history the Athenian relates: whereas it was Sparta who had the reputation for being a warlike city, it was Athens that rescued Greece from the clutches of Persia (3.698b-699d). This is to illustrate that it was out of a freely given obedience to their laws that the Athenians managed to deliver Greece from Persia on the battlefield. The Athenian characterizes the moral psychology behind the Athenian victory by conjoining fear (*phobos*) and modesty (*aidô*), as the Athenians were saved from cowardice by being overtaken by fear 'they had learned to experience as a result of being subject to (*douleuontes*) an ancient code of laws' (3.699c).

Thus, from the perspective of a Dorian who wishes to measure a people by its successes in war, it now seems like Athens is the greater city.[53] The Spartan Megillus can avoid this undesirable conclusion by subscribing to what the Athenian proposes, in language that is closer to home: a life of victory over oneself and over others (1.626c-e) is measured by the extent to which one obeys the city's laws.[54] The Athenian shifts the focus from victory understood as a victory of one polis over another, to victory understood as victory

[52] 'Education has for its aim the development of all the virtues, not merely the virtues of the soldier.' Morrow, 1993, p.299.

[53] Thucydides describes the love of victory that takes hold of the Athenians by the time of the Sicilian expedition as 'such a state of obstinate resolution (*philonikian*) that no one would have believed it possible if he had been told of it before it actually happened…now, in the seventeenth year after the first invasion, having suffered every kind of hardship already in the war, here were the Athenians going out to Sicily and taking upon themselves another war on the same scale as that which they had been waging all this time with the Peloponnesians'. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 7.28. As for the history put into the Athenian's mouth, we must agree with Barker that 'Plato's use of history is Platonic; and it would be impossible to find anything in the actual history of Greece to correspond to much in his account of its past.' Barker, 1960, p.356. This is consistent with the motivated history of the funeral oration in the *Menexenus*.

[54] Pangle argues that in the exchange between the Athenian and Megillus about the Spartan-led Dorian league and its failure (3.683c-688d), 'the Athenian allows Megillus to admit the [i.e., his] error [of thoughtless admiration for the league] without losing his dignity'. Pangle in Plato, 1980, p.432. Contrast the account in Herodotus where Demaratus, the King of Sparta attributes his people's courage in battle to 'a master, and that master is Law (*despotês nomos*)'. Herodotus, *The Histories*, 7.104.4.

over oneself which then brings victory over others in its train.[55] Having shown the inadequacy of the Dorian attitude, the Athenian declares the reinvention in the lawgiver's preamble to Magnesia's law code in book 5.

Since the Dorian love of victory tends to a hardening of character it is unsuited to the ideal at which every Magnesian citizen aims: 'every man should combine in his character high spirit with the utmost gentleness (*thumoeidê men dê chrê panta andra einai, praon de hôs hoti malista*)' (5.731b).[56] The victory-lover must always be in a position to know who is a friend and who is an enemy. In fact, to be a victory-lover, one needs to operate on the friend-enemy distinction.[57] The danger is that a hardened victory-lover poses a threat to the city because he eventually looks for enemies within. Indeed, 'these gymnastic exercises and common meals, useful though they are to a state in many ways, are a danger in their encouragement of revolution' (1.636b).[58]

By raising the issue of the regulated symposia and drunkenness immediately after the discussion of war against internal and external enemies, the text suggests that the symposia are, in Canto's words, 'a form of mock combat in which each person must publically overcome and vanquish his or her desires'.[59] Virtue requires such combat, and therefore a reinvented love of victory that allows the softening benefits of pleasure is

[55] Dover writes that in the earlier part of the fourth century *philonikia* is treated as a virtue, but is later used in a derogatory way as well. Dover, 1974, pp.234-235.

[56] The author of the *Laws* poignantly instantiates the hold the love of victory has on individuals when he shows us this desire take hold of the Athenian himself, as the Stranger seeks to prevail against the three forms of impiety (*asebeia*) in book 10. The Athenian has a hard time escaping it, for no sooner has the Athenian faulted his desire for victory (*philonikian*) for his vehement or excessive speech, than he expresses the wish that his prelude dissuades the impious (10.907b-d).

[57] One of Socrates' objections to Polemarchus' definition of justice as harming enemies and benefitting friends invokes the language of seeming (*doxa*) and being (*onta*): 'Someone who is both believed to be useful and is useful is a friend; someone who is believed to be useful but isn't, is believed to be a friend but isn't. And the same for the enemy'. *Republic*, 1.334e-335a.

[58] Socrates tells Glaucon that the reason one engages in 'physical exercises [is] in order to arouse the spirited part of his nature, rather than to acquire the physical strength for which athletes diet and labor'. *Republic*, 3.410b.

[59] Canto, 1994, p.60.

indispensable.[60] Institutions such as the symposia counter such hardening by acting as a gateway to the pleasures of wine and by reinforcing the effect of shame (see 2.671a-672e).[61]

The argument for the symposia relies on human nature, specifically, 'that human beings are so imperfect that they cannot be controlled through persuasion alone: they must also be trained in the proper use of their desires'.[62] Symposia, like wars, gymnastics, and music, principally address themselves to the spirited motivations of the soul. Both Dorians resist the Athenian's recommendation that drinking parties are useful for a city on patriotic grounds: the Stranger is from a city that allows symposia, whereas they are from cities that bar them altogether. For them, the Spartan and Cretan institution of the mess hall (*sussition*) is sufficient as a school of virtue.[63] Contrary to the Dorian purge of pleasure from the *politeia*, however, Magnesia will have city-regulated symposia combined with choruses in which men as old as the interlocutors will be expected to participate (see 2.670a). The public feature of the symposia is significant: reputations are made and broken here. Wine is a God-given drug that produces fear and shame (*aidôs*) in the soul (1.647e; 2.672d). As Belfiore observes, 'The artificial arousal of fear by a fear drug helps us permanently in bravery, and the arousal of shamelessness by wine helps to purge us of vice and to produce *sôphrosynê* [sic.]'.[64] According to Wilburn, symposia 'do

[60] See *Republic*, 4.440c-d for a similar worry in the description of spirit (*thumos*).
[61] The institution of the symposia is 'an instrument of political education', writes Friedländer, 1969, p.401. Indeed, insofar as the domain of moral education includes children, it is important that the intoxicated individual 'reverts to the mental state he was in as a young child' (1.645e).
[62] Murray, 2013, p.111.
[63] Contrary to Dorian practice, both women and men are to participate in Magnesia's mess halls (see 6.781a-d).
[64] Belfiore, 1986, p.433.

not merely *test* a person's sense of shame, but also *reinforce* and *shape* that sense of shame'.[65]

As these remarks indicate, an understanding of fear and shame are nested in the reinvented love of victory. In an extensive passage, we are told that there are two kinds of fear. One kind of fear is when we expect evils to occur. The other kind is when we

> 'fear for our reputation, when we imagine we are going to get a bad name for doing or saying something disgraceful (*phoboumetha de ge pollakis doxan, hêgoumenoi doxazesthai kakoi, prattontes ê legontes ti tôn mê kalôn*). This is the fear which we, and I fancy everyone else, call "shame" (*aischunên*) […] it resists pains and the other things we dread, as well as our keenest and most frequent pleasures […] The legislator, then, and anybody of the slightest merit, values this fear very highly, and gives it the name "modesty" (*aidô*). The feeling of confidence (*tharros*) that is its opposite he calls 'insolence' (*anaideian*), and reckons it to be the biggest curse anyone could suffer, whether in his private or his public life (*megiston kakon idia te kai dêmosia pasi nenomiken*) […] So this fear not only safeguards us in a lot of crucial areas of conduct but contributes more than anything else, if we take one thing with another, to the security that follows victory in war. Two things, then, contribute to victory: fearlessness in face of the enemy, and fear of ill-repute among one's friends (*tharros men polemiôn, philôn de phobos aischunês peri kakês*)' (1.646e-647b).

This passage takes aim at the total fearlessness that Dorian *politeiai* cultivate, as reflected in the contempt Cleinias and Megillus display towards fearfulness. The Athenian had already identified fear as one of the four iron strings in the puppet or marvel (*thauma*) (1.644c-645c).[66] Its counterpart was daring (*tharros*), while the other couplet was pain and pleasure. The Dorians assume that the lawgiver must avoid fear, encourage daring, avoid pleasure, and endure pain (see, for example, Megillus at 1.636e-1.637a). Yet, the Dorian cannot be imported wholesale into Magnesia. In fact, there is an

[65] Wilburn, 2013, p.77.

[66] The *thauma* may be thought of as a self-mover; Frede argues that 'Plato seems to have in mind wind up toys that move by themselves, rather than marionettes.' Frede, 2010, p.116. Following Kahn and Wilburn, I do not privilege this passage in understanding the moral psychology of the *Laws*. Kahn argues that the puppet is not the soul, but 'an image of moral phenomenology…the explicit reference of [which]…is not to the psyche as such but to factors of human motivation, what goes on inside us that leads us to act.' Kahn, 2004, p.362. Cf. Wilburn, 2013, p.67.

appropriate way to cultivate fear so that it benefits individuals and the city: 'fear can play a valuable role in moral education'.[67] It is not enough, reckons the Athenian, that citizens resist fear and withstand pain. Granted, in the face of an enemy, it is desirable to be daring and fearless. Yet when it comes to the conduct of private and public life, the legislator should dub this experience 'insolence' (*anaideia*, literally, without *aidôs*). Dressing his point in language dear to the Dorians – 'war', 'fighting', 'courage', 'victory' – the Athenian proposes a reinvented normative attitude to fear: before one's friends one ought to be full of fear, whereas before one's enemies one ought to be free from fear.[68]

The Athenian appropriates a commonplace experience and renames it in an attempt to endow it with normative valence. What most people call 'shame', the legislator will call 'modesty'. To rename this shame is to give the colonizers a positive reason to withstand their keenest and most frequent pleasures. Therefore, by setting them on their path to modesty, it counters the arousal of its opposite: shamelessness, the biggest curse anyone could suffer both privately and publically.[69] In order 'to make a man *afraid*, in a way consistent with justice…[and] realize his potentialities for virtue' he will have 'to fight and conquer (*prosmachômenon kai nikônta*)' pleasures that spur him to shamelessness, just like the courageous have to fight and conquer their fears that spur them into cowardice. In order to realize 'more than half' of his 'potentialities of virtue', a man must not be inexperienced (*apeiros*) and untrained (*agumnastos*) in the struggles (*agônôn*) against cowardice and shamelessness (1.647c-d). Courage in Magnesia is not fearlessness. The courageous and the cowards alike experience fear, the difference being

[67] Stalley, 1995, p.480.
[68] This shows implicitly that fear is nested in the love of victory, for the background assumption is that there are no enemies at home, only friends.
[69] 'Plato sees the love of true fame and the fear of true shame as indispensable reinforcements for the norms of morality.' Lyons, 2011, p.360; cf. Strauss, 1975, p.30.

that the former respond to it in the proper way. By distributing honor and dishonor to the courageous and the cowards respectively, the legislator 'prepare[s] the whole state to be an efficient fighter in the real struggle that lasts a lifetime' (8.831a).

Thus the incoming colonizers are encouraged to appear as they are, by way of corroding the preconceptions each brings with him, while their new identity will be informed by a moral psychology that is based on reinvented Dorian values. They will fear for their reputation among their fellows, they will fear the imputation of shamelessness, and they will have the opportunity to test themselves and one another in the Magnesia's pleasure-inducing symposia.

Once Magnesian identity has been established, and the Dorian proclivities of the citizens have been purged, the task becomes how to maintain it. Enter the city's reputation. In times of war and peace alike, this reputation is to reinforce the citizens' Magnesian identity. As Stalley observes, the restrictions these foreigners suffer are aimed at 'preserving the status of the citizens.'[70] The collective identity of the Magnesian citizen body is fortified via a comparison with the property-less non-citizens who may visit or take up residence in their polis.[71] The familiarity most Magnesians have with other cultures is second-hand and the individual citizen's pride in being a Magnesian presumably benefits from such a comparison. What is more, the laws encourage

[70] Stalley, 1983, p.108.

[71] Metics, who reside and work in Magnesia, may acquire as much, but no more property as that owned by a citizen in the third property class. Bar the granting of an extension of stay, they must depart Magnesia after twenty years (see 8.850b, 11.915b). Admitting metics is not a risk-free policy, as Morrow observes, for Magnesia runs the 'danger of having in the city a large class of permanent residents possessing wealth but lacking political power.' He argues that 'Plato's intention [is] to preserve the integrity, as he conceives it, of the citizen body'. Morrow, 1993, p.148. To be a citizen one must be a member of one of the 5040 households, therefore 'it follows that one of the qualifications for citizenship is descent from citizen parents. There is no provision for the adoption of aliens.' The other citizenship requirement is that youths undergo the public education system, which includes military service. Morrow, 1993, pp.112, 115-116, and 130. Cf. Bobonich, 2002, p.106. For the opposite view see Samaras, 2002, p.224.

Magnesians to source their pride about their city in the reputation it has among other cities. 'We must send representatives to take part in the sacrifices and games [abroad]…and we must send as many representatives as we can, the finest and noblest of our citizens, who will do credit to out state (*hoitines eudokimon tên polin*) in these sacred gatherings of peace and win it renown (*doxês*) to match that of her armies on the field of battle. And when they return, they will tell the younger generation that the social and political customs of the rest of the world don't measure up to their own (*elthontes de oikade didaxousi tous neous hoti deutera ta tôn allôn esti nomima ta peri tas politeias*)' (12.950e-951a).

The office of the observers tersely shows that Magnesia's survival is both premised on, and threatened by, its foreign interactions. The observers (*theôroi*) are to sustain Magnesian identity. An observer is a citizen between 50 and 60 years old who has already held office in Magnesia for a decade and is otherwise incorruptible (*adiaphthartos*). Their reputation is as robust as can be, and they are therefore fit for exposure to foreign lands and to subsequently act as mouthpieces for maintaining the citizens' identities. The Nocturnal Council (in which the observers otherwise participate) must cross-examine them because they are liable to import a foreign attitude that would pose a threat to the workings of the Magnesian constitution.[72] Thus, despite the fact that these citizens are 'specimen (*deigma*)' Magnesians (12.951d), what the Athenian is

[72] An observer who is found to have compromised his incorruptibility because of his travels abroad is forbidden to interact with other citizens. Should he be found guilty in court for violating this stricture, he will be put to death; if his meddlesomeness is evident, but 'none of the authorities takes him to court when that is what he deserves, *it should* count as a black mark (*oneidos*) against them when distinctions are awarded' (12.952c-d).

implicitly acknowledging is that the legislators should never underestimate the influence and attraction of the foreign.[73]

The institution of the observers further vindicates the distinction between being virtuous and having a reputation for virtue, and specifically the appropriateness of the latter. As specimens, these observers embark on their foreign missions armed with a reputation for virtue. Can we presume that a non-Magnesian would concede anything more than the reputation for virtue? The *doxai* of the Magnesians could be wrong, after all. Insofar as it is the case that, from a non-Magnesian perspective, it is easier to concede a reputation for virtue, then we can say that the law code's insistence on a reputation for virtue holds promise for Magnesia's foreign affairs.

To establish and to reinforce a Magnesian identity is to pull the city and its citizens away from their original constitutions and from the Dorian city that fathered the founding, Cnossos. The institution of the observers will further this distancing, and the relations between colony and metropolis will sour. We can expect, the Athenian says, that 'any child is going to fall out with his parents sooner or later' (6.754b). This brings us to the Cnossian founder of Magnesia, Cleinias. The Cnossian, it could be said, assumes the role of a proto-observer of the *politeia* that is still in *logos*.

3. Cleinias the Cnossian, Cleinias the Magnesian

Cleinias the Cnossian – the individual who has been tasked with actualizing Magnesia – is present from the beginning of the dialogue. The circumstances of the founding pass

[73] The dual constraint that the observer can only be abroad for a maximum of ten years, and only when he is between fifty and sixty years old, also attests to this (12.951c-d). We can infer that this the optimal decade when, first, a citizen is least likely to be corrupted and, second, has yet to reach the age where his mental and physical stamina has started to abandon him, allowing for the reversibility of any corruption he does happen to suffer.

through this interlocutor. However, the text presents us with an oddity: why does Plato hide Cleinias' unique situation until the end of book 3? After all, Cleinias need not have been present from the start of the dialogue, for it often occurs in Plato's philosophical dramas that the main interlocutor(s) make a delayed entrance (e.g. the sophist Protagoras and the geometer Theaetetus in the dialogues that bear their names). Nor is this a case of dramatic irony, i.e. where the author reveals to the audience something unbeknownst to the interlocutors.[74] What necessitates Cleinias' presence in the dialogue from the start?

I claim that Cleinias's reticence results from his hesitant attitude towards his founding task; an appeal to his reputation might overcome such an attitude. I also claim that this authorial device of having a character withhold key information is instrumental to the project of founding insofar as it allows reputations that might otherwise confound the founding come unstuck. It follows from this that a view of the dialogue where either Cleinias is coupled with Megillus under the heading of 'evaluative audience' or that fails to distinguish between the two is unsatisfactory.[75] On my reading, Cleinias is a privileged interlocutor because the founding of Magnesia passes through him.

The interaction in which the foreigners of the frame engage is analogous to the initial interactions among the incoming colonists. Three old men populate the frame: an Athenian who remains nameless throughout, the Spartan Megillus, and the Cretan

[74] For a discussion of these issues, see Griswold 2002. Both Straussian (e.g. Strauss, Pangle) and Continental (e.g. Friedländer, Canto) scholars attend to the dialogue's frame, while Anglo-American scholarship has reluctantly but firmly followed suit. Writing in that tradition, Stalley notes 'that the work has a very complex literary character…[wherein] the interplay between them [the three interlocutors] is certainly important for the understanding of the work'. Stalley, in Plato, 2004, p.xix. Kahn charges Bobonich with insufficient attention to the frame of the *Laws*. Kahn, 2004, pp.343 and 352. *A fortiori* this is an indictment of work that pays no attention to the frame whatsoever; an example of such work is Brunt, 1993, pp.245-281.

[75] For an example of the former, see Morgan, 2013, p.267; for an example of the latter, see Zuckert, 2004. I accept that Cleinias and Megillus are part of the same evaluative audience only insofar as they are Dorians. This, however, is insufficient to explain their respective roles in the *Laws*.

Cleinias from Cnossos. They are in Crete, on a pilgrimage to the shrine of Zeus (1.625a-b). The pilgrimage points to the piety both of the interlocutors and of the future Magnesians; it is also a nod to the legendary trek Minos, the founder of Cnossos, undertook every nine years to the self-same location where the god Zeus instructed him in the art of legislation.[76] Led in discussion by the Athenian, the three men engage in a conversation of Greek and non-Greek ideas about values, education, and government. At the beginning the expectation is that each interlocutor will have preferences that match their heritage: as Dorians, the Spartan and the Cretan will overlap, whereas the Athenian will stand out.

To put it differently, the reputation of their respective cities skews their conversation. We have seen evidence of this in the discussion of the symposia above. As such, both Dorians share a suspicion towards the Athenian. To mitigate this suspicion, Plato deploys the language of friendship and guest-friendship (*philia* and *xenia*) to inscribe affection or goodwill (*eunoia*) from each Dorian towards Athens. Megillus' family represent Athenian interests in Sparta ('they are *proxenoi*', 1.642b) and, by listening to Spartans blame and praise Athens, he has 'acquired a whole-hearted affection for her, so that to this day, I very much enjoy the sound of your accent' (1.642c). Cleinias's affection for Athens is decidedly religious and related to the past survival of Athens: the 'divinely inspired' Epimenides – an *oikeios* to his family – 'obeyed the command of the oracle to go to Athens, where he performed certain sacrifices which the god had ordered' and told the Athenians that it would take the Persian invasion a decade to manifest, and that the invasion would fail. 'That was when my ancestor formed ties of [guest-]friendship (*exenôthêsan*) with you Athenians, and ever since then my forebears and I have held you

[76] *Minos*, 319c; scholars do not agree whether Plato is the author of this dialogue.

in affection' (1.642e-643a). The Athenian later extols the seer Epimenides and his practical (*ergô*) achievement (3.677d-e).

In the *Laws* what is initially most salient about these foreigners is where they come from. The nameless Athenian cannot have a personal history, only a history of his city.[77] 'Plato's choice of an Athenian Stranger to be the interlocutor with the two Dorians', Morrow notes, 'indicates clearly his intention to confront the Dorian way with the traditions of his native city.'[78] We may agree, but we must add that this is done for the sake of constructing something altogether new. That the early conversation takes place in the absence of public knowledge about the imminent city forestalls the suspicion of ulterior motives that (could be perceived as being) sourced in the reputation of an interlocutor's city of origin.[79] That books 1 through 3 have in part an instrumental character, is shown when the Athenian urges Cleinias to 'cast your mind back to the beginning of our discussion and watch what I'm up to', not long after we discover about the intention to found Magnesia (4.705d). As Meyer notes, referring to discussions of other *politeiai* in book 3: 'Deliberations in the original legislative moment [i.e. what the three interlocutors are engaged in], since they concern the relative merits of different sets of norms, are in effect exercises in comparative politics. Such comparisons feature in

[77] Nightingale suggests that Plato's decision 'to leave the Athenian nameless' is related to his attempt to make 'his lawcode [sic.] appear objective, impersonal, and timeless'. This explanation may create more problems than it resolves: why is he an *Athenian* and not a simply a stranger? Nightingale, 1993, p.284.

[78] Morrow, 1993, p.74. More than this, in fact, for in contradistinction to the Persian monarchy and to the Athenian democracy, the Dorian constitutions are hard to classify because they are mixed (3.693d-e). Both Megillus and Cleinias find it hard to classify the Spartan constitution (4.712e) and Cleinias has trouble classifying Cnossos (4.713e). A future student of Magnesia might say the same about Cleinias' colony, as is in fact evidenced by the range of characterizations of Magnesia from Bodin's 'the most democratic ever' to Popper's totalitarian state. Bodin, 1992, p.103; see Popper, 2003, pp.108-109 *et passim*.

[79] In other Platonic dialogues, Socrates' interlocutors will accuse him of harboring ulterior motives. Thrasymachus of the *Republic* is a case in point at 1.337a.

every legislative moment described or enacted in the text of the *Laws*.'[80] The prolonged absence of the task of founding Magnesia allows an airing and subsequent leaving aside of reputational assumptions that might otherwise obstruct the project of founding a city that is made up of laws both local and foreign (3.702c). Once this has been sufficiently achieved, Cleinias may comfortably divulge his secret about the task of founding he had known all along: 'I won't keep you in the dark about my position (*ou gar apokrupsomai sphô to nun emoi sumbainon*)' (3.702c). Cleinias can oblige the Athenian's demand for a 'test (*eleghos*)' for 'what would be the ideal way of administering a state, and the best principles the individual can observe in running his own life (*pôs pot' an polis arista oikoiê, kai idia pôs an tis beltista ton hautou bion diagagoi*)' (3.702a-b).

When the laconic Megillus says to the Athenian that, 'it's his [Cleinias'] state (*toutou gar hê polis*)' (4.722a), we realize that the interlocutors' respective commitment to the new city is far from equal. The Athenian Stranger and Megillus do not have to compromise their respective identities in any permanent way. The creation of Magnesian identity passes through the frame of the dialogue, first and foremost, through the founder Cleinias. Moreover, that the Athenian talks to Cleinias in the second person, puts the *Laws* at the beginning of a tradition of political theoretical texts on foundings that choose this mode of address, the most famous of which is Machiavelli's *Prince*.[81]

Cleinias is one of ten Cnossians who are assigned the task of legislating for the colony of Magnesia. If Arendt is to be believed, the precondition of founding seems to be that the founder(s) must never be assimilated: 'for the Greeks…the lawmaker was like the builder of the city wall, someone who had to do and finish his work before political

[80] Meyer, 2006, p.384.
[81] For an exposition and extension of this point, see Williams, 2005, pp.57-58.

activity could begin…[he] could be called from abroad and commissioned without having to be a citizen, whereas the right to *politeuesthai*, to engage in the numerous activities which eventually went on in the *polis*, was entirely restricted to citizens'.[82] On this view, Cleinias' task is solely an act of foreign policy on behalf of his home city. However, the *Laws* violate this distinction. Cleinias is not only a founder of Magnesia, but also a future citizen who will participate in its institutions as a Guardian of the Laws. The Athenian raises the issue in the context of the 'special duty' the citizens of Cnossos have towards Magnesia. This justifies why 'It's absolutely vital to give your best attention to choosing, first of all, Guardians of the Laws (*nomophulakas*)' (6.752d-e). There will be thirty-seven of these, nineteen of whom will be drawn from the incoming colonists and eighteen from Cnossos including Cleinias. The Athenian insists that Cleinias be made a citizen of this colony (*kai auton se politên einai tautês tês apoikias*) (6.753a). Cleinias' knee-jerk reaction is to seek help from the Stranger and Megillus. Unfortunately, the response he receives from the Athenian is not encouraging: 'Athens is haughty…and Sparta also is haughty, and both are far distant: but for you this course is in all respects proper' (6.753a, Bury translation).[83] Once again, Megillus and the Athenian find themselves on different grounds to those of Cleinias.

By this point in the dialogue, Cleinias is used to being put on the spot. In fact, as the pivot of the Magnesian enterprise, the Athenian perturbs Cleinias from the very

[82] Arendt, 1958, p.194.

[83] In discussing this passage, Lane, 2010 focuses on the Athenian's rider to the claim that Cleinias in addition to seventeen of the Guardians of the Laws will be Cnossians: 'either by persuading you or compelling you, with a measured amount of force' (6.753a, Pangle trans.). I thank the author for sharing with me the original English manuscript.

beginning.[84] The Athenian asks Cleinias whether the founder of Cretan laws was a man or a god; Cleinias responds – probably with hesitation – that it is a god.[85] This is a dilemma for Cleinias. He knows that this answer secures the highest normative authority for the laws of his city, Cnossos. Had he answered 'man' he would have foregone this advantage. It would, however, have made Cleinias' future task of founding Magnesia easier to embark upon. After all, he is all too aware he is not a god: if Cleinias is sincere about god being the lawgiver of Crete and its cities, then when founding Magnesia he should imitate *those* divinely-informed laws rather than begin anew in collusion with a pair of non-Cretans. Perhaps it is the Athenian's opening gambit that makes it psychologically plausible to the audience that Cleinias would withhold the founding task. When this task becomes common knowledge and Magnesia has been constructed, Cleinias knows that to translate their *logos* into *ergon* means is to rethink what he came into the dialogue believing about the Dorian constitution of his city of origin. There is another bite to Cleinias' situation: his words and actions put him on the verge of committing impiety. By saying that a god was the founder of the Cretan constitution, his own founding of Magnesia will be all-too-human. All this, as Cleinias is on a pilgrimage to the cave of Zeus, mimicking the founder of Cnossos.

The suggestion is, therefore, that laws are needed that will allow future Magnesians to respond as Cleinias does to the first question, to wit, that Magnesia was founded by a god. In his search for an explanation as to why 'it is no accident that the laws of the

[84] Contrary to Zuckert, therefore, I do not think that the Athenian saves his interlocutors' blushes. The Athenian's demand that Cleinias become a citizen of Magnesia (6.753a) is compelling evidence to this effect. Zuckert, 2004, p.379.

[85] Cleinias's answer is: 'A god, sir, a god – and that's the honest truth (*theos, o xene, theos, hôs ge to dikaiotaton eipein*)' (1.624a). Pangle's translation, unlike Saunders', readily betrays the hesitation in the Cretan's words: 'A god, stranger, a god – to say what is at any rate the most just thing.'

Cretans have such a high reputation (*eudokimoi*) in the entire Greek world' (1.631b), the Athenian divides the benefits of the laws into two classes: human and divine, the 'former depend[ing] on the latter' (1.631b-632a). Human laws should be grounded in, and look towards, the divine.[86] Hence, to steep Magnesia in theology and religion is to psychologically nudge Cleinias into wholeheartedly proceeding with the *ergon* of founding of the new city.[87] Cleinias must have the courage of his conviction that they 'stick to the path on which…God himself is guiding us' (12.968b) even if, unlike the founder of Cnossos, he has had no rapport with the god. Perhaps if Cleinias sees that the Magnesians will in fact attribute their founding to a god, he can proceed with the task of founding. 'Let us therefore summon God to attend the foundation of the state (*tês poleôs kataskeuên*)', the Athenian prays (4.712b).

Before the curtain falls on the dialogue, the Athenian makes sure to explicitly address Cleinias' pivotal role.[88] Via an appeal to Cleinias' future legacy among the yet-to-be Magnesians, he exhorts the Cretan to proceed with the founding. He calls upon Cleinias to 'establish the state of the Magnesians…and if you're successful you'll win enormous fame (*kleos arê megiston*); at any rate you'll never lose a reputation for courage (*andreiotatos einai dokein*) that will dwarf all your successors' (12.969a-b). The reward of fame and reputation is very much a reward that mortals can give. We know that Cleinias is susceptible to such an appeal because it was he who first, and from the very beginning, showed concern about a legislator whose high reputation is justified: 'We

[86] '[T]he *Laws* itself aims at articulating a certain tension, one which mirrors the radical and irreducible polarity between the human and the divine.' Laks, 2005, p.267. Note that even if courage ranks last among the virtues, it still falls into the category of divine virtues (1.631c).
[87] 'The laws [of Magnesia]…are surely not revealed by god; but, just as surely, they are proposed with an eye to god at all times.' Pangle, 1976, p.1059.
[88] Pangle also notices that the Athenian appeals to the founder Cleinias' fame. Pangle in Plato, 1980, pp. 416-417.

Cretans would say [about Rhadamanthus] that he won this reputation [for justice] because of the scrupulously fair way in which he settled the judicial problems of his day'. The Athenian was quick on the uptake: 'A distinguished reputation (*kleos*) indeed, and one particularly appropriate for a son of Zeus' (1.625a). If the *politeia* is to manifest, then it is Cleinias' reputation among its future denizens to which the Athenian ought to appeal. The textual evidence resists a retreat to the dogmatic position that, to quote Wilburn, 'the desire for fame cannot be the right Platonic reason for doing anything'.[89]

Why must the Athenian exhort Cleinias at the end of the dialogue? The exhortation is necessary because we have good reason to think that the manner in which Magnesia's laws and preambles were presented distances the Cnossian too much from the *ergon* at hand. Throughout the dialogue, the Athenian puts the preambles and the laws in the mouth of an ideal lawgiver.[90] The emphasis on the ideal lawgiver should not obscure the pivotal role of Cleinias. If the legislation is, ultimately, aimed at Cleinias, the dissociation helps mask the tension between Cnossos and Magnesia that Cleinias no doubt perceives. The device of the legislator permits the delivery of the account (*logos*) of the *politeia*. The Athenian's exhortation (*parakeleuomai*) is a last call for Cleinias to set aside the thoroughly Dorian values he held at the beginning of the dialogue and to seek for himself a reputation among the future citizens of Magnesia.[91] The Athenian's reference to courage (*andreiotatos*, 12.969a) is an allusion to the Dorian value system, a system that can only be admitted in part and reformed in Magnesia. The courage Cleinias must

[89] Wilburn, 2013, p.95, fnt.60.
[90] Nightingale, 1993, p.285 draws attention to this feature of the *Laws*.
[91] Given the Cnossian's lukewarm reaction to the Athenian's exhortation, the reader may doubt whether Cleinias is convinced. The dialogue ends with a rapport between the Spartan and the Cretan. Megillus urges Cleinias to enlist the Athenian's help for the sake of Magnesia's founding, Cleinias accepts and asks for Megillus' help too, which Megillus proffers (see 12.969c-d). The Athenian's corresponding silence about his own commitment to Magnesia is deafening.

display is non-conformist.[92] Indeed, there is a self-absolving element to Cleinias' act of founding, for only by compromising his commitment to Cnossos can he carry out, and be part of, Magnesia. We should expect Cleinias to embark upon the *ergon* of founding with moderate fear.[93]

By appealing to Cleinias' reputation, the Athenian's exhortation drives a wedge between Cnossos and Magnesia. For the paradox – which the secondary literature ignores – is that Magnesia, while a colony of Cnossos, will self-consciously resist imitating the principles of its mother. 'Cleinias of Cnossos' (1.629c) will be the first to make this step, the first dissenter from Cnossos, as it were, who has to opt for a potential city rather than an extant one. Whether Cleinias can (or will want to) take solace in the fact that Magnesia, as a Cretan city and a colony of Cnossos, will partake in the 'high reputation (*eudokimoi*) in the entire Greek world' of Cretan laws (1.631b) depends on how far he thinks Magnesia deviates from these laws.[94] Thus the dialogue closes as it had opened, namely, with a dilemma for Cleinias.[95]

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[92] In an effort to rethink our sociopolitical attitudes to the environment, Lane makes a claim that we might project onto Cleinias: 'The person who embodies a new outlook becomes in virtue of that very fact a code in a new political imagination, the first step to creating a new social ethos.' Lane, 2012, p.64.

[93] Strauss claims that the prelude to the law about last wills and testaments (11.923a-c) 'is meant to persuade in the first place Kleinias [*sic*.] himself'. Strauss, 1975, p.162. Indeed, as one of the city's founders, Cleinias may find it even more difficult than the average Magnesian to relinquish what he has helped bring into existence.

[94] The quote about 'high reputation' is what the Athenian thinks Cleinias ought to have said about the Cretan laws so as to avoid the implication – which Cleinias wrongly draws – that the Athenian's criticism has 'reduce[d] our Cretan legislator to the status of a failure' (1.630d).

[95] Zuckert, 2004, pp.381-382 emphasizes the difficulty – but not impossibility – of founding Magnesia. Not unlike the Speaker who relates the message of Lachesis in the Myth of Er, to wit, that 'the responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the god has none (*aitia helomenou: theos anaitios*)', the end of the *Laws* leaves us wondering whether Cleinias will go ahead with the founding. *Republic*, 10.617e. The language of *aitia* (cause, responsibility) and the question of its locus is in the Athenian's salvo with which the *Laws* opens: 'Tell me, gentlemen, to whom do you give the credit for establishing your codes of law? It is a god, or a man (*theos ê tis anthrôpôn humin, ô xenoi, eilêphe tên aitian tês tôn nomôn diatheseôs*)?' (1.624a). As in the *Republic*, the three Fates make their appearance towards the end of the *Laws* at 12.960c-d.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have attempted to establish the role of reputation in the circumstances of the founding of Magnesia. Above all, my reading shows the magnitude of the founding task at hand: 'however you organize a society (*en pasê kataskeuê politikê*), it looks as if there will always be trouble and risk' (5.736b). Through its exhortation to the incoming Dorian colonists to pursue a reputation for virtue, the law code exercises normative force over the disposition of human nature to excessive self-love and transforms the colonists into Magnesian citizens. The law code urges each individual to appear as they are, and reinvents the undesirable features of Dorian constitutions. If this *politeia* is to manifest, its ambivalent founder will have to become a Magnesian and assume an active role in its institutions. The Athenian must exhort Cleinias to seek a good reputation among the future Magnesians. By placing Cleinias on the verge of committing impiety, Plato alerts his audience to the high stakes of founding *politeiai* in an age when humans cannot rely on the instruction of the gods.[96] The secondary literature has been far too casual in its approach to the 'good start' that the *ergon* of Magnesia demands; the scholarship vindicates the Athenian who complains that 'no one has yet given [to this good start] the praise it deserves' (6.753d, cf.6.775e).[97] Prior, therefore, to the contentious issue in the scholarship of whether Magnesia is meant as a second best constitution (the best being Kallipolis of the *Republic*) or as best *simpliciter* (see 5.739b-e; 7.807b-c), we must attend to the circumstances of founding the *politeia*.

[96] Hence, even if Nightingale is correct to say that the *Laws* is a 'text [that] does not invite its readers to practice philosophy', if the transition from *logos* to *ergon* is not self-evident, then we can say that there are philosophical issues awaiting discovery and resolution. Nightingale, 1993, p.300. For the premise which interpolates the previous sentence see Williams, 2005, p.28: it is a 'basic truth…that no political theory, liberal or other, can determine by itself its own application. The conditions in which the theory or any given interpretation of it makes sense to intelligent people are determined by an opaque aggregation of many actions and forces'.

[97] For example, Balot, 2006, p.223: Magnesia is a city that can be 'founded on consent'.

Now suppose that Magnesia has been founded. What is it to maintain this *politeia*? I answer this question in the next chapter.

Chapter 3
Reputation in the Agonistic City: Maintaining the *Politeia* of Plato's *Laws*

The second of two chapters on Plato's *Laws* seeks to characterize how Magnesia is maintained and to establish the role of reputation (*doxa*) in this process. My overarching question is: what keeps the newly constituted *politeia* stable? I break this question down as follows. I begin by asking: what kind of environment is Magnesia? In section 1 I discuss two kinds of proposals found in the secondary literature: that of a static city populated by obedient automatons and that of a conflict-free association of friends. I counter-propose a picture of Magnesia as an agonistic and agonistically passionate city. I submit that because citizens individually aim at a good reputation, Magnesia suffers from the pathologies of agonism, such as envy and hubristic or prideful impiety.

This leads me to my second question: how does Magnesia cope with the posited agonistic environment? The answer, generally stated, is via the social mechanisms of praise and blame that the law code sets forth and the citizens act out. I expand upon this answer in three subsections to section 2. First, laws and their preludes respond directly to those disruptive motivations that encourage self-love and impiety. They do this by urging citizens to yoke their reputation to that of the city and by making the city a theocracy. Second, the practices in which Magnesians engage, specifically the war-cum-athletics (to adopt Saunders' awkward yet useful translation), aim at making citizens similar in judgment. Third, in an effort to minimize the pathologies of an agonistic citizenry, political institutions both encourage and depend upon Magnesians to watch over one another.

Finally, I argue that in order to have a more complete grasp of how Magnesia is maintained, we have to attend to Magnesia's reputation as a city in world of other cities.

In other words, the domestic arrangements of Magnesia are insufficient to maintain it. In section 3, I argue that the city's foreign policy aims at peace and at deterring possible aggressors. Magnesia's domestic policy with regard to foreigners suggests a kinder approach to non-Magnesians by comparison with its mother, Cnossos. All this is conducive to a more stable interpolis environment, which, in turn, maintains Magnesia.

I conclude that an important feature of Magnesian institutional design is that its citizens are politically motivated. Insofar as this design implicates reputation as an attribute of individuals and cities alike, it reveals an inherent conceptual limitation of Plato's method; it is far from straightforward that the reputation of an individual is of a piece with the reputation of a city.

1. What Kind of Environment is Magnesia?

To prepare the ground for a consideration of the variety of answers to the question this section poses, we should confront a commonplace about the *Laws*, to wit, that its author argues for the rule of law as opposed to the rule of men.[1] The claim is usually is made by juxtaposition to the *Republic*. There, it is said, Plato puts political power in the hands of men; in the *Laws*, he takes it away.[2] What Wolin describes as 'Plato's deep and abiding suspicion of power', is precisely why in Magnesia, according to Kraut, 'Plato widely distributes the functions of government and establishes an elaborate system of safeguards against the abuse of power'.[3] The history of philosophy attests to this view: Lord Acton is said to have coined his famous maxim about the corrosive character of power after

[1] For a recent example of this claim from outside of Plato scholarship, see Kenny, 2012, p.53. For a recent example by a Plato scholar, see Lane, 2015, p.177. From within Plato scholarship examples include Morrow, 1953, pp.244-245; Kahn, 2004, p.337; Klosko, 2006, p.246 and Klosko, 2008, p.456.
[2] The *Republic*'s rulers 'rule less by law than by judgment'. D.L. Williams, 2013, p.369.
[3] Wolin, 2004, p.51, citing passages from the *Laws*; Kraut, 1992, p.20.

reading Plato's *Laws*.[4] In a speculative comment, Arendt suggests that this is a unifying thread in Western thought: 'Perhaps nothing in our history has been so short-lived as trust in power, nothing more lasting than the Platonic and Christian distrust of the splendor attending its space of appearance, nothing – finally in the modern age – more common than the conviction that "power corrupts."'[5]

Fixating on the primacy of the rule of law has led some scholars astray in their portrayal of Magnesia and its citizens. Finley avers that in Magnesia 'the good life [is]…impos[ed] from above…[it is] a closed, authoritarian society'.[6] Wood and Wood argue that 'Even the *Republic* leaves too much to chance by depending too much on the judgment of men, albeit philosophers, to distinguish the good from the bad and to determine who shall belong to the ruling class. The *Laws* removes that decision as much as possible from the realm of human choice and error.'[7] Klosko writes that Magnesians 'are not actors, but acted upon', and goes on to aver that the 'ideal state is static'.[8] Tarrant chooses a medical metaphor to describe Magnesia: it is a 'sanitized state [where…] life operates in accordance with an oppressively prescriptive set of rules, allowing room for little individual expression.'[9] Brisson avers that the *raison d'être* of education in the *Laws* is

[4] Cited in Kahn, 2004, p.337 and in Morrow, 1993, pp.xvii-xxviii, p.xxiv.
[5] Arendt, 1958, pp.204-205.
[6] Finley, 1977 p.133. The language is unmistakably Popperian.
[7] Wood and Wood, 1978, p.200.
[8] Klosko, 2006, pp.220 and 251. To the former contrast Jaeger: 'His ideal of paideia [sic.] is ultimately self-control, not control by the authority of others'. Jaeger, 1986, p.226. Klosko's latter claim echoes Popper's idealist Plato whose formula is '*Arrest all political change!* Change is evil, rest divine.' Popper, 2003, p.91. Contrast Bobonich, 2002, p.398: 'Plato holds that the need for improvement is not limited to a short period of time, but is a permanent feature of political life.'
[9] Tarrant, 2003, p.58.

'to mold the citizen's behavior and morals in advance so that he conforms to the law automatically, as it were.'[10]

The passage from the *Laws* that lends support to these claims comes under the discussion of seven titles (*axiômata*) to authority, 'the most important claim [being the]…spontaneous and willing acceptance of the rule of law' (3.690b-c).[11] Yet this need not make us imagine Magnesians as passive citizens. Short of coercive power – which the passage explicitly rejects – a willing acceptance of the laws requires that the citizen be given an incentive to obey.[12] How else will the individual without knowledge (*anepistêmona*) be motivated to 'follow the leadership of the wise and obey his orders (*ton de phronounta hêgeisthai te kai archein*)' (3.690b-c)? As Lyons puts it, Plato 'wants to make people eager to comply, not just reluctantly willing.'[13] As I showed in the preceding chapter, the pursuit of a good reputation, with the concomitant increase of pleasures and decrease of pains, is a principal example of such an incentive.

Overemphasizing the rule of law leaves us with a city where 'public opinion is to be unchanging', a city that has emptied itself of men and replaced them with unthinking, soulless automata.[14] Still, even if one were to grant automatic conformity to the law, this

[10] Brisson, 2005, p.118. Brisson flirts with self-contradiction when he claims on the one hand that, like the *Republic*, the *Laws* aims to marry knowledge and power, and, on the other, that Magnesians are akin to automata. What saves him is the claim that Plato gives power to a small elite (most notably the members of the Nocturnal Council); it follows that *they* are not automata. In his effort to disprove Bobonich's claim of a virtuous Magnesian citizen body, Brisson paints Magnesia as a machine that requires a minimal if necessary supervision by the few.

[11] Unlike 'Pindar the wise' who thinks that nature decrees that the stronger should rule and weaker should obey, the Athenian thinks that this title to authority is the decree of nature (3.690b-c).

[12] Cohen, 1993 and Bobonich, 2002 make a good case for how submission to the law is voluntary. It is unnecessary to rehearse the arguments against the position that Plato's laws aim to indoctrinate the citizens. We are navigating here between the claim that law is coercive, and the claim that law is educative. Laks notes that 'to strip the law of its intrinsic violence…is the most important aspect of the whole project [of the *Laws*].' Laks, 2001, p.111. Cf. Laks, 1990, p. 224; therein Laks writes that this in itself is 'a *criticism* of [the form of the] law'. Laks, 1990, p.222. Cf. Laks, 2005, pp.286 ff.

[13] Lyons, 2011, p.370.

[14] Klosko, 2006, p.225.

cannot be the last word on the matter. First, as Cohen indicates, behavior is not reducible to 'rule-determined adherences and violations'.[15] Indeed, if honors and praises are to accrue to those who obey the laws, it is implied that that all citizens will obey the law to the same extent.[16] Second, automatic conformity discounts the feelings of envy and foul practices that Magnesia is likely to experience on account of its laws. As Robinson argues, 'the society of the *Laws* envisages crime and rebelliousness as ongoing features of the system, [and] not [as] an indication that the system has in fact collapsed.'[17]

The choice between the rule or power of law, on the one hand, and the rule or power of men, on the other, is a false dilemma. Before the institutional design of Magnesia begins in earnest, the Athenian explicitly addresses the conjoined problems of power-holding and judgment. '[I]f your candidates are to deserve promotion to positions of power, their characters and family background must have been adequately tested, right from their childhood until the moment of their election. Furthermore, the intending electors ought to have been well brought up in law-abiding habits, so as to be able to approve or disapprove of the candidates for the right reasons and elect or reject them according to their deserts (*orthôs krinein kai apokrinein dunatous gignesthai tous axious hekaterôn*)' (6.751c-d). The *politeia* of the *Laws* cannot be understood without coming to terms with how Magnesians exercise political power. This is how we should understand what Stalley calls 'the major contribution of the *Laws* to political theory…[namely] The idea that moderation can be secured through a constitution in which different elements act as a

[15] Cohen, 1991, p.238.
[16] Allen notes that 'the concept of *timê* signif[ies] the guiding political principle of a city.' Allen, 2000, p.278. For an elaboration, see Morgan, 2013, pp.278-287.
[17] Robinson, 2001, p.118.

check on one another'.[18] The interactions among Magnesians demand formal and informal political management.[19] The commonplace that the *Laws* argues for the rule of law as opposed to the rule of men fails to capture the political dynamics of Magnesia.

Like existing political constitutions, in Magnesia the opportunities to turn a blind eye abound and it is only rightly motivated citizens who will seek to fulfill the law to its greatest degree. As Annas avers, 'one thing Plato does not do, is to thin out his citizens' disposition to obey the laws, making it mindless, merely habitual or motivated by avoidance of sanctions.'[20] This is what it is to have learned the 'moral' of the Age of Cronus, namely, to 'make every effort to imitate the life men are said to have led under Cronus; we should run our public and our private lives, our homes and our cities, in obedience to what little spark of immortality lies in us, and dignify this dispensation of reason with the name of "law"'(4.713e-714a). Magnesian virtue remains fragile, for it is based on a human nature whose elements are in tension and always subpar with respect to the life of mortals under the direction of a god.[21]

One characterization of Magnesia's environment that I would like to challenge is that found in Morrow and Bobonich, both of whom are sympathetic to Plato. Morrow describes the life in Magnesia as 'more like a festival than a corvée, a life filled with

[18] Stalley, 1983, p.75. 'Plato uses "law" to denote all the rules, whether moral or legal, whereby the individual's life can be made orderly and comely ([4.]718a).' Morrow, 1993, p.560, cf. pp.565-566. 'In the *Laws*, the law is *instrumental and constitutive*: the law is the proper means used by the legislator to found the city and set it in order.' Pradeau, 2002, p.142. See D.L. Williams, 2013, p.382ff for an attempt to explain Magnesia's institutional design as a manifestation of 'Plato's concern about the susceptibility of rulers to corruption', rather than an increasing optimism about the capacities of human beings. The latter position is found in Bobonich, 2002; Samaras, 2002; and Balot, 2006.

[19] 'It is the task of the laws to supervise the citizens in the midst of this movement of men and circumstances, intensified by good fortune and misfortune, sickness, war, poverty, and their opposites, to supervise the citizens and establish the norms of human action, to honor what is just and fair and to punish the opposite.' Friedländer's description reveals a dynamic understanding of Magnesia. Friedländer, *Plato 3,* 1969, p.393, cf. p.419.

[20] Annas, 2010, p.91.

[21] See Kraut, 2010, pp.66-68. 'In the *Laws* Plato is perhaps more acutely aware of human frailty than he is in any other dialogue.' Bobonich, 2008, p.332.

play, but play limited by the seriousness with which they must prepare for the defense of the land and safeguard the laws by which they live'.[22] Morrow reckons that '[g]ood citizens, therefore, will compete with one another in virtue, a form of competition that results in multiplying the goods to be shared, so that all are the gainers'.[23] While it is true that Magnesia is animated by the ideal of friendship – an ideal of 'sharing' and 'support' – we can only pack so much into this ideal given the undesirable yet inevitable outcomes of the individual and collective pursuit of a good reputation. At the individual psychological level, an excessive love of self is always around the corner (see 5.731e).[24] Those who seek a good reputation are likely to think highly of themselves, deserving of a good reputation. The overall result of the pursuit of a good reputation can lead to a politics of envy that threaten the friendship that is supposed to characterize Magnesia. Bobonich's account emphasizes the virtuous character of political participation in Magnesia, claiming that 'the most important sorts of goods for Plato are not essentially competitive'.[25] Yet, the absence of conflict does not follow from the expectation of cooperation. On Bobonich's picture the shared goals, cooperative activities, and agreement among Magnesians about virtue leave no room for the partiality that is

[22] Morrow, 1993, p.532.
[23] Morrow, 1993, p.563. Cf. Taylor, 1960, p.476.
[24] See Taylor, 1960, p.476.
[25] Bobonich, 2002, p.472. Cf. Bobonich, 2008, pp.332-334 omits conflict from the extended and extensive participation of Magnesian citizens in political activity. Here is a rare moment of agreement between him and Brisson: 'For Plato, politics is defined not as the art of resolving conflicts, but as the art of making conflict impossible.' Brisson, 2013, p.103. As this chapter shows, Brisson's alternatives are not exhaustive of the realm of possibilities: politics may not resolve conflict, but instead use it productively while seeking to ameliorate its worst effects. Sassi's characterization of Magnesia as a city that is 'perfectly at peace with its inner conflicts' is ambiguous as to whether these conflicts persist (as I claim) or whether these conflicts are eradicated (as Bobonich and Brisson claim). Sassi, 2008, p.147.

characteristic of friendship as well as individual choice of which friendship is supposed to be an expression.[26]

Cohen recognizes Plato's 'moral psychological account of the divisive force of envy'. Still, Cohen's discussion is restricted to the economic relationship between rich and poor, rather than the citizen body as a whole.[27] Morgan does recognize 'the presence of a broad agonistic structure [in Magnesia]. The city is engaged in a 'contest' for virtue in which all citizens must compete and practice…The result of this contest is a fair reputation for the city, but the project is endangered by the slanderous and envious citizen'.[28] Nonetheless, and despite the fact that 'the most perfect praise is awarded to a citizen who is not just obedient but proactive', Morgan claims that Magnesia 'is emotionally disengaged…a city where passion has been disengaged'.[29] The Magnesians are dispassionate performers of an '*agôn* [that] is lifelong, a performance that integrates soul and body, sport, war, festivals, and dance'.[30] There is a problem with the plausibility of Morgan's argument. Even if we grant that Magnesians are supposed to be dispassionate, the activities in which they partake are often fervid if not violent. Short of a radical (and ahistorical) disjunction between soul and body, there is no reason to anticipate that Magnesians will remain dispassionate for long.

Contrary to Morgan, I claim that Magnesians are passionately agonistic in their struggle for a reputation for virtue.[31] The Athenian's lawgiver broadcasts the ideal at which every Magnesian citizen aims: 'every man should combine in his character high spirit with the

[26] Compare his earlier, more sober statement in Bobonich, 1996, p.276.
[27] Cohen, 1993, pp.310 ff.
[28] Morgan, 2013, p.274.
[29] Morgan, 2013, pp.275-277, citing 7.822e-823a.
[30] Morgan, 2013, p.278.
[31] Dover describes Greek society as being 'addicted to comparison and competition', overriding the influential distinction Adkins, 1972 makes between competitive Homeric society and the cooperative classical polis. Dover, 1974, p.237. Cf. Whitehead, 1983.

utmost gentleness' (5.731b). The legislator proclaims that 'the life of physical fitness, and spiritual virtue too, is not only pleasanter than the life of depravity but superior in other ways as well: it makes for beauty, an upright posture, efficiency and a good reputation (*eudoxia*), so that if a man lives a life like that it will make his whole existence infinitely happier than his opposite number's' (5.734d-e). The relevant point is the comparison that the legislator urges: this is what we would expect from a *politeia* that seeks to encourage spirited desires in its citizens. If it is a characteristic of spirited drives to pursue things such as honor, victory, and reputation, it follows that Magnesians are agonistic citizens.[32]

The Athenian acknowledges the dangers endemic to such a city. The competition among Magnesians is based on a comparison that cuts both ways: it is necessary for any feelings of envy to develop, as it is for the wherewithal to resist self-love and graspingness (see 9.875b). Contrary to Morrow, Cohen points out that such competition 'can take the form of a zero-sum game. One man enhances his standing at the expense of those who are his rivals; his elevation involves their defeat.'[33] Nonetheless, while a vice such as envy may make Magnesia worse-off, it also makes it more understandable. With virtues it is the

[32] Klosko, 2006, does not mention spirited drives at all. Brisson argues that the tripartite soul persists in the *Laws*, but reputation is absent from the picture. Brisson, 2012, pp.297-299. Stalley's discussion does not take into account spirited desires as a category, but only considers the example of anger. See Stalley, 1983, pp.46-48. Like Stalley, Bobonich seems to conceive of anger as the paradigmatic spirited emotion. In turn, this circumscribes his outlook on spirited emotions as a whole. Bobonich finds little space for what he calls the 'spirited emotions' partly because he sees Plato as reverting to a unitary conception of the soul in the *Laws* and partly because this unitary soul is governed by reason. 'Bobonich, 2002, pp.292, 365, 278; see pp.343-350 for the 'spirited emotions' discussion where Bobonich focuses on anger and shame and does not mention reputation at all. Sassi, 2008 argues that in the *Laws* there is *thumos*, but no *thumoeides*. Pangle contends that the theology of the text 'satisfies most of the major demands of *thumos*'. Pangle, 1976, p.1075. Wilburn argues, with Pangle, and against Sassi and Bobonich, that the *thumoeides* is present in the *Laws*. Wilburn, 2013, pp.63-102. Wilburn, like Pangle and myself, acknowledges the role of reputation.

[33] Cohen, 1995, p.63; see Morrow, 1993, p.563, quoted above. Finley affirms this logic: 'A gain on either side automatically entailed a corresponding loss on the other side, and naturally led to resistance from that side. This is what underlay *stasis* in the Greek city-states'. Finley, 1981, p.81.

opposite; a virtuous citizen often defies belief. There is something to be said, therefore, about the persuasiveness of this picture.

Thus, agonistic Magnesia is not free from conflict. Apart from the involved competition for the various positions for which a citizen is eligible (e.g., of the guardians of the laws at 6.753b-d), Magnesians engage in all sorts of contests: musical, athletic, and religious. It is rather remarkable that when Saunders – a translator of the *Laws* to boot – asks the question 'One enters Magnesia…one strolls around; what does one see?' nowhere in his response does he mention the daily contests in which Magnesians compete.[34] The agonistic environment is the ideal soil in which spirited motivations such as envy can be sown and reaped. By focusing on the city, the Athenian warns the future citizens of two elements endemic to an agonistic setting: foul practices and jealousy. 'We want everyone to compete in the struggle for virtue in a generous spirit, because this is the way a man will be a credit to his state – by competing on his own account but refraining from fouling the chances of others by slander. The jealous man, who thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages (*athumian*) his competitors by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation (*eudoxian*), in so far as it depends on him' (5.731a-b). The passage asks not whether foul practices such as slander (*diabolê*, *diabolais*) or unfair criticism (*adikôs psegesthai*) should be outlawed, but instead assumes that such behavior is to be expected from a competitive mindset. The legislator acknowledges that envy (*phthonos*) will be a mainstay of any competitive society where the love of victory is encouraged and rewarded. Envy is a powerful spirited

[34] Saunders, 1992, p.473.

motivator that will inevitably develop in the competition for the highest reputation as the best Magnesian.[35]

2. How does Magnesia Cope with the Pathologies of Agonism?

The citizens of Magnesia are performers within the context proposed by a law code in which the social mechanisms of praise and blame are operative. The laws motivate individuals' pursuit of reputation, via the distribution of praise and blame (see 1.632a). Importantly, as the general preamble of the legislator divulges, praise and blame are expected to have educational effects on individuals. 'The next question for consideration is the sort of person he must be himself, if he is to acquit himself with distinction in his journey through life; it's not the influence of law that we're concerned with now, but the educational effect of praise and blame (*epainos paideuôn kai psogos*), which makes the individual easier to handle and better disposed towards the laws that are to be established' (5.730b). The psychological foundations of the law are at stake. Insofar as praise and blame persuade, they resemble the preambles to the laws and are indeed 'continuous with the rest of the citizens' education.'[36] Jaeger and Friedländer's quip that 'legislation is

[35] 'It is much more agreeable to be the object of envy (*phthoneesthai*) than of pity', says Periander, the Corinthian tyrant and one of the Seven Sages. It is not surprising that a single ruler should say this. In the so-called 'constitutional debate' of the *Histories*, the Persian nobleman Otanes points out that 'The typical vices of a monarch are envy (*phthonos*) and pride (*hubris*); envy, because it is a natural human weakness, and pride, because excessive wealth and power lead to the delusion that he is something more than a man'. Herodotus, *The Histories*, 3.52.5 and 3.80.3-4, respectively. By extension, and rather surprisingly, the monarchic element in the mixed constitution of Magnesia is in the citizens' experience of envy and pride.

[36] Bobonich, 2002, p.106. The preambles lend themselves to a variety of readings. Morrow enigmatically describes them as 'persuasion at the high level of rational insight suffused with emotion.' Morrow, 1993, p.558. Laks's position is to some extent a disambiguation of Morrow: 'under ideal circumstances [the preambles] – take the form of quasi-philosophical discussions carried out by means of rational argument.' He regards preambles as mostly 'speeches of praise and blame'. Laks, 2005, pp.272 and 289. Cf. Stalley, 1983, pp.42-44. Bobonich argues that the preambles have a strong rationalistic element and that the whole citizenry should be able to follow 'the more sophisticated preludes' as well. This is in line with Plato's provision of 'explanations of the reasons behind the law [which are] to be available and to be studied. The preludes…serve as a lifelong encouragement and opportunity for the citizens to come to appreciate the

education' could be Magnesia's motto.[37] The 'institutionalization of structures of praise and blame' is how Plato's legislator impresses the reputational dynamics that result from such judgments upon the workings of the law.[38]

It is important to recognize the distinction between the claim that 'offices are distributed on the basis of virtue'[39] and the claim made herein that offices are distributed on the basis of a reputation for virtue. To see the importance of the distinction, consider how the phrase 'offices are distributed on the basis of virtue' applies to the philosopher rulers of Kallipolis. They receive political office on the basis of virtue as determined by the educational program they undergo from an early age to the age of fifty. In Magnesia, by contrast, the sorting mechanism is reputation (I elaborate on this below). The Magnesians do both the distributing and, through the law code, the communicating of virtue. Therefore 'our praise of the citizen who is preeminent for virtue (*ho tou diapherontos politou pros aretên gignetai epainos*) will not be complete when we say that the virtuous man is he who is the best servant of the laws and the most obedient (*hupêreteêsanta tois nomois arista kai peithomenon malista*); a more complete statement will be this, – that the virtuous man is he who passes through life consistently obeying the written rules of the lawgiver, as given in his legislation, approbation and disapprobation (*epainountos kai*

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rational basis of the beliefs they may have adopted on other grounds.' This is the connection, as Bobonich understands it, between rational persuasion and virtue. Bobonich, 2002, pp.114-115. Cf. Brill, 2013, pp.177, 203, and 207. Brisson, 2005, is the most vocal critic of Bobonich on this as well as other points. For alternative readings, see Annas, 2010; Yunis, 1996, which includes a helpful classification at pp.227-229; and Nightingale, 1993.

[37] Jaeger, 1986, p. 243; see Friedländer, 1969, p.424 and Stalley, 1983, p.8. Accordingly, this should take the sting out of statements like 'education goes on from the womb to the grave' in Magnesia. Brunt, 1993, p.251.

[38] I lift the phrase from Morgan, 2013, p.265. If, as Morgan claims, 'the lawgiver is a poet of praise and blame', then this educational task should not surprise us: ever since Homer, the poets were the educators of Greece.

[39] Samaras, 2012, pp.18-19, *inter alios*.

psegontos)' (7.822e, Bury translation).[40] If, then, approbation and disapprobation are sourced and distributed by the demos, is it any surprise that Jean Bodin found Magnesia's constitution to be 'the most democratic ever'?[41]

2a. Yoking Individual Reputation to the Theocratic City

Having identified the role of praise and blame, we may now focus upon how Magnesia copes with the pathologies of agonism. The law code proposes to deal with excessive competitiveness among individuals and the enviousness this breeds by fighting fire with fire. Assuming a connection between the reputation of the individual citizen and the reputation of the state, the legislator says that the man who indulges in unfair competitive practices and is overcome by envy ends up diminishing the reputation of the state as a whole (5.731a-b). Whatever else a pursuit of a reputation for being the best citizen is, it must always be understood within the context of the city. A citizen takes his cue from the city and he is acknowledged in and by the city: the 'conception of the city and of citizenship is part of the citizens' self-conception'.[42] Thus, a citizen's effort at being the best man in a virtuous city necessarily depends upon that city being virtuous. And if he engages in unfair practices, then not only will his reputation for virtue suffer, but his city's reputation will suffer as well. Reputational concerns, rooted as they are in the spirited drives of individuals, are yoked to the reputation of the city in which they play out.[43]

[40] For an argument independent of Plato to the effect that the forces of esteem in society are 'virtue-compatible', see Brennan and Pettit, 2004, pp.260-263.
[41] Bodin, 1992, p.103.
[42] Bobonich, 2002, p.417; cf. p.432.
[43] Stalley and Laks both notice the presence of this analogy. See Stalley, 1983, p.86 and Laks, 1990, p.221.

Contextualizing a citizen's reputation within that of the city is not the only strategy the Athenian proposes to counteract the negative side effects of an agonistic culture. Another can be found in the substance of the claim that Magnesia is a theocracy. The gods permeate Magnesia's cultural and social life.[44] If a god is at the starting point of legislation and such legislation aims at being godlike, then the individual must orient his psychology within such a framework. Thinking about the immaterial acts as a prophylactic to insolence and impiety. The Magnesian is a god-fearing and god-loving individual who experiences the deities in the private and public domains.[45] In his effort to be recognized as the most virtuous citizen, the Magnesian is especially vulnerable both to the onslaught and charge of insolence (*anaideia*, *hubris*) and impiety (*asebeia*).[46] Spirited desires may encourage the individual to distinguish between the religious domain and the domain of the city. Behavior that is motivated by such a distinction would prove catastrophic for the city and its religion alike. As Pangle points out, 'The civic virtues become problematic even or especially insofar as their practice reaches beyond material needs toward spiritual fulfillment.'[47]

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[44] 'Religion is not something apart from other areas of life; it penetrates them all.' Morrow, 1993, p.468. 'The last word of his political theory is in effect theocracy.' Barker, 1960, p.409. Cf. Strauss, 1975, pp.59 *et passim*. The word 'theocracy' does not appear in the dialogue. We should take care to distinguish claims about the religion of Magnesia from claims about Magnesia being a theocracy. We may follow Morrow when he writes that, 'Plato is not writing theology by laying down religious law, following in the main the long-hallowed practices of his countrymen'. Morrow, 1993, p.457. Laks is probably correct to insist that it is not easy to distinguish between what is theological and what is intellectual (i.e. noetic). Laks, 2005, p.291, cf. p.286. Hence Klosko miss the mark when he reaches for an entirely doxastic explanation: 'in the *Laws*, the ideal of rule by reason…gives way to rule by faith.' Klosko, 2006, p.251. Contrast Bobonich's argument that 'Magnesia is designed precisely to avoid the outcome that everyone takes the laws on faith [i.e. blind obedience]' Bobonich, 2002, p.405.

[45] When Weil wrote that 'the social feeling is so much like the religious as to be mistaken for it', she might as well have been providing a sociological observation that could ground Plato's wish. Weil, 2009, p.5.

[46] Taylor articulates the premise behind such thoughts: Plato believes that 'the denial of these [truths about God] leads directly to practical bad living.' Taylor, 1960, p.489. Bobonich notes that 'the theology of Book 10 assures us that there is a coincidence between what is best for the individual and what it best for the whole in the long run.' Bobonich, 2002, p.472.

[47] Pangle, 1998, p.385.

The very disruptiveness of the spirited desires makes it vital that the two strategies – the yoking of the individual's reputation to the city's reputation, and the theocratic character of the city – work in tandem upon the individuals who make up what Pangle calls Magnesia's 'spirited citizenry'.[48] With Wilburn we can say that 'moral education in the *Laws* should be understood as aiming primarily at the spirited part of the soul'.[49] If citizens pursue a good reputation, and if the laws set the parameters and goals of such a pursuit in a religious framework, then what we have is an operative political theoretical principle that is appropriate for the all-too-human business of politics.[50]

2b. Athlete Citizens who are Similar in Judgment

It is upon the correct distribution of praise and blame that the city's maintenance depends. '[I]f a state is going to survive (*sôzesthai*) to enjoy all the happiness that mankind can achieve, it is vitally necessary for it to distribute honors and the marks of disgrace on a proper basis (*dei kai anagkaion timas te kai atimias dianemein orthôs*). And the proper (*orthôs*) basis is to put spiritual goods at the top of the list (*timiôtata*) and hold them – provided the soul exercises self-control – in the highest esteem; bodily goods and advantages should come second, and third those said to be provided by property and

[48] Pangle in Plato, p.501. I therefore must disagree with Sassi's claim that 'in the *Laws*, the regulatory force of the law is intended precisely to fill the gap between the rational and the irrational that is opened up by the reduced motivational role of *thumos*…[and] that a primary aim of legislation is the repression of the *whole* plane of emotions'. Sassi, 2008, p.138. Wilburn directly responds that 'the gap that the laws fill is not left by a demoted *thumoeides*. It is left rather by a reasoning part that in most cases never achieves reliably stable belief'. Wilburn, 2013, pp.97-98

[49] Wilburn, 2013, p.64.

[50] This is not trivial in Platonic political theorizing. As my chapter on the *Menexenus* suggests, Plato is preoccupied with the fact of birth, death, and contingencies that surround these two necessary events. Politics are required only after the age of Cronus; the pre-political age of Cronus is one of dependency on non-human rulers (see 4.713a-714b). For a discussion of the age of Cronus in the *Laws*, see van Harten, 2003. For a useful study of the pre-political/political distinction in Plato's *Statesman*, see Lane, 1998.

wealth' (3.697a-b).[51] This passage straightforwardly divulges the proper ordering in the pursuit of happiness, an ordering which depends upon the value-system of the *politeia*. I propose that we read this ordering as continuous rather than discrete: psychic, bodily, and material goods are interconnected. Magnesia's institutions bear witness to this.

Reputational judgments, both delivered and received, constitute part of the Magnesian education in virtue. When citizens 'have no insight into each other's characters and are kept in the dark about them, no one will ever enjoy the respect he merits or fill the office he deserves or obtain the legal verdict to which he is entitled' (5.738e). In so doing, an enforcement mechanism is created: individuals must heed the collective judgment of their equals. Wallach writes that the Athenian 'belie[ves] in the generally competent moral and political judgment of ordinary citizens'.[52] This is a reflection of the arrangements in the *politeia* as a whole; 'no citizen is completely deprived of a legislative or judicial role', Kraut notes.[53] These judgments are part of the universal public education the legislator prescribes for the city.[54]

Magnesia must display a certain kind of stability in its struggle for virtue. In Jaeger's words: it is about 'finding the right ethos for the state, an ethos which is based on the

[51] 'The origins of war…[are] those same desires that are most responsible for the bad things that happen to cities and the individuals in them'. *Republic*, 2.373e. 'Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, for all wars are due to the desire to acquire wealth, and it is the body and the care of it, to which we are enslaved, which compel us to acquire wealth'. *Phaedo*, 66c-d. It is on this passage from the *Laws* that Morgan, 2013 relies to make the argument about soul (*psuchê*) over body (*sôma*). We should not underestimate the caveat about moderation (*sôphrosunê*), because it is a clue to how a soul can become moderate through participation in the city's laws and institutional practices, which penetrate all the aspects of life *and* life itself i.e., in its temporal entirety.

[52] Wallach, 2001, p.380.

[53] Kraut, 1992, p.20.

[54] 'This is perhaps Plato's greatest innovation', and where 'Plato's legislator eventually stakes all his chances'. Morrow, 1993, pp.130-131 and 541, respectively. Jaeger notes how universal public education according to virtue is a transposition of the 'early aristocratic ideal of shaping the entire human character, man's whole personality.' Jaeger, 1986, p.245.

healthy structure of the individual soul.'[55] There are two ways to understand this ethos. First, in the rationalist manner which Bobonich proposes. He attempts to show that the citizens' reason is sufficiently developed so that citizens are able to grasp what is good about the good life and are thereby able to lead it. An 'ethical education' that focused primarily on 'shame, honor, and pleasure' would not achieve this.[56] The alternative is Cohen's understanding of Magnesia's ethos as a kind of habituation. For him, law is to be understood 'as the *institutionalized judgment* of a community about proper and improper pains and pleasures'.[57] Cohen suggests that 'the metaphor of musical training' is a befitting description of this judgment.[58] Although I am partial to Cohen's view, my aim is not to assess or judge which of these two views is best; instead I want to understand how citizens who are 'similar in virtue' are also similar in judgment.[59] How, in the legislator's words, it is the case that all the citizens 'see and hear and act in concert. Everybody feels pleasure and pain at the same things, so that they all praise (*epainein*) and blame (*psegein*) with complete unanimity' (5.739c-d).[60]

The *politeia* of the *Laws* suggests a distinctive way to address two distinct problems that bedevil judgment: it is hard to make and it is uncertain. Plato prefigures this way in another late dialogue: the *Theaetetus*. After a discussion of mathematical powers, young Theaetetus is disheartened because he cannot meet his geometry teacher's expectation and provide Socrates with a definition of knowledge. Theaetetus says that Theodorus (his teacher) was 'a false witness after all.' Socrates's response is what interests us: 'suppose

[55] Jaeger, 1986, p.233.
[56] Bobonich, 2002, p.117, cf. pp. 114-115 *et passim*.
[57] Cohen, 1993, p.305.
[58] Cohen, 1993, p.306.
[59] I lift the phrase quoted from Klosko, 2006, p.219.
[60] My position commits me to rejecting the proposition that praising and blaming, on the one hand, and understanding, on the other, are mutually exclusive.

now it was your running he had praised (*epainoôn*); suppose he had said that he had never met anyone among the young people who was such a runner (*dromikô*) as you. And then suppose you were beaten by the champion runner in his prime – would you think Theodorus' praise had lost any of its truth (*heêtton ti an oiei alêthê tond' epainesai*)?' Theaetetus replies: 'No, I shouldn't.'[61] The judgment of Theodorus and the praise that issues from it is robust because, first, it can withstand the challenge the hypothetical runner's defeat to a champion poses and, second, the fact that Theodorus is not an expert in running or the judging thereof (he is a geometer) does not prevent his judgment of the hypothetical runner Theaetetus from being correct.[62]

If we presume that formal and informal judgment is formed out of the daily practices of Magnesians, then we can gesture that the *politeia* promotes the kind of judgment outlined above. It makes citizens into athletes. The legislator, the Athenian claims, should ask himself '"once I've organized the state as a whole, what sort of citizen do I want to produce? *Athletes* are what I want – competitors against a million rivals in the most vital struggles of all"' (8.829e-830a). We read that the legislator 'has a duty of instructing that manoeuvres on a small scale, without arms, should be held every day, if possible (and for this purpose he should arrange teams to compete in every kind of gymnastic exercise), whereas the "major" exercises, in which arms are carried, should be held not less than once per month' (8.830d).[63] Magnesians engage in military training for the majority of

[61] *Theaetetus*, 148b-c. The comparison between the *Laws* and the *Theaetetus* can also be justified on the basis of similarities in the frame of the dialogue. 'The Athenian's treatment of Clinias and Megillus should remind us of Socrates' treatment of the elderly geometer Theordorus in the *Theaetetus*', Bobonich urges. Bobonich, 1996, p.266.

[62] This is unlike an aesthetic judgment, which is less robust; see *Theaetetus*, 143e-145a.

[63] In ancient Greece, the religious is often connected with encounters among foreigners; witness Socrates' curiosity about the festival of the Thracian goddess Bendis, which was what initially took him 'down to the Peiraeus'. *Republic*, 1.327a. Sporting events such as the Olympics were steeped in religion and it is where people from different cities met. 'The Greeks also believed that *kudos* or divine aid was required for victory

their lives, in addition to the music contests (e.g. 8.834e-835b) and religious festivals that also involve contests (e.g. 8.828a-d).[64] In Magnesia athletics (*gymnastike*) and war (*polemos*) should be understood as conjoined: 'we are establishing gymnasia for all physical exercises of a military kind (*gumnasia gar tithemen peri ton polemon hapanta tois sômasi diaponemata*)' (7.813d), while no contest shall be set up for 'unarmed competitors' (8.834d).[65] Running, which takes a variety of forms, is privileged in this program, whereas the pancratium and boxing are altogether excluded (8.832e-834a).[66] Magnesia 'will be unique among contemporary constitutions in finding room for the military training-cum-sport (*hê toiautê katastasis politeias monê dexait' an tôn nun tên diaperantheisan paideian te hama kai paidian polemikên*)' (8.832d). To make Magnesians into athletes is to transform what was once the ideology and practice of the few into the ideology and practice of the individuals who comprise the *politeia*.[67] Still, Magnesia is consistent with what one scholar has called 'the militaristic culture of ancient

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on the sportsfield just as much as on the battlefield'. Pritchard, 2013, p.184 *et passim*. Moreover, as Helmut Kyrieleis notes, 'The dominant idea of ancient Olympia was not peace [as it is with the modern Olympic ideal] but victory, both in sport and armed conflict'. Quoted in Pritchard, 2013, p.187. There is a lot to be said about overlaps between agonism (as manifested in athletic contests) and religion (as manifested in choristry, libations, sacrifices, etc.). Both can be highly ritualistic, while it is likely that the participants are individually motivated by something immaterial. It is not negligible that only by participating in such collective enterprises can the individual realize something that he cannot otherwise attain.

[64] 'One striking feature of the educational program in the *Laws* is its emphasis on music and gymnastics, from the very beginning up to the very end of a life', note Bobonich and Meadows, 2013. Striking for us, presumably, since it is probably not so from an Athenian perspective; see Connor, 1996.

[65] Dancing (*horchêsis*, a part of gymnastics) and choristry (*horeia*) are also a big part of the daily practices of Magnesia but I have not included these to avoid cumbersomeness. See Morrow's discussion, pp.302-318 and 336-337. The essays in Peponi, 2013 do much to advance scholarly discussion on these overlooked aspects of the *Laws*.

[66] 'Running (*dromos*) was the oldest of all the familiar contests at Olympia and appears in Plato's program [for Magnesia] in an even greater variety of forms than was known in his time…It is evident that Plato has set up a panel of sports in frank rivalry with the classic Olympic contests.' Morrow, 1993, pp.383 and 388; cf. Jaeger, 1986, p.249. 'Undoubtedly Plato's chief reason for rejecting boxing and the more savage pancratium [as the name implies, a sport of person-to-person engagement that was almost no holds barred] is that, being contests without arms, they do not serve his conception of preparation for war. But another reason that one may plausibly attribute to him was the danger of overdeveloping the *thumos*, the spirited element in human nature.' Morrow, 1993, pp.385-386.

[67] Pritchard notes that 'in the most prosperous and democratic city of the classical Greek world athletics remained a preserve of the upper class'. Pritchard, 2013, p.209.

Greece'.[68]

It is hard to overestimate the ubiquity and constancy of these practices in the life of a Magnesian.[69] These practices are meant to use and counteract 'this excessive love of ourselves (*sphodra heautou philian*) [which]…makes us bad judges of goodness and beauty and justice (*hôste ta dikaia kai ta agatha kai ta kala kakôs krinei*)' (5.731e-732a).[70] Contrary to Sassi, who reads these practices as an attempt to suppress *thumos* altogether, I read these as processes that co-opt *thumos* in the ruling of Magnesia.[71] To the prior question of whether *thumos* can be co-opted, the *politeia* of the *Laws* provides an affirmative answer. In the event of incurable criminality, impassioned citizens are to let loose their anger upon the criminal: 'when you have to deal with complete and unmanageably vicious corruption, you must let anger (*orgên*) off its leash' (5.731d).[72] While this language may suggest that anything goes, to say so would be inconsistent with a well-ordered polity that makes a place for anger. To let anger off its leash is to set off a chain reaction of words and deeds that follow a societally determined and psychologically fulfilling formula.[73]

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[68] Balot, 2006, p.69. 'The Greeks found war both emotionally exciting and intellectually compelling'. Balot, 2006, p.140. 'The classical Athenians value *polemos* or war more highly than any other secular activity. They were immensely proud of their military history, viewed active military service as a public benefaction and a confirmation of *aretê*, and were convinced that the battles which they fought benefited significantly their city's international standing'. Pritchard, 2013, pp.188-189.

[69] These practices generate results that reverberate through time: Magnesian lore will memorialize great individual achievements and failures. As Pritchard points out, victory in athletics 'could confirm the *aretê* which an athlete had inherited from his ancestors'. Pritchard, 2013, p.177.

[70] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, VII.16, 1335b5-11.

[71] Sassi, 2008, pp.142-143. Since there is no distinct auxiliary or warrior class, the problem of an overdeveloped *thumos* is arguably more acute for Magnesia than it is for Kallipolis. As the Athenian says: 'these gymnastic exercises and common meals, useful though they are to a state in many ways, are a danger in their encouragement of revolution' (1.636b).

[72] 'This is the *only* place in the Platonic corpus that Socrates, or one of his substitutes, recommends the use of *orge* [sic.].' Allen, 2000, p.281. On the contrary, I suggest in chapter 1, anger is to be expected and sanctioned in Kallipolis as well.

[73] It is therefore misleading to present this anger as 'a force that only destroys'. Allen, 2000, p.281.Indeed, that anger can and should be measured when it is expressed is a view we find in Aristotle's characterization

If what Plato is after is commitment as opposed to conformity, then the advantage of athletics is not only that it is hard to fake appearances, but also that those who do better are those who are committed, rather than those who conform. '[I]t is difficult if not impossible for people to become excellent judges of performance if they do not take part in it', notes Aristotle.[74] Athletics conjoins objects (such as the victor's wreath and other material boons) to personal goods (such as honor and public praise). Magnesia's institutional design suggests that we need this association if we are ever to pursue the latter. The men who deserve the offices of Magnesia are those who are motivated by desires that are shared by the best warriors and the best athletes. In the case of the observers, specifically, we are told that those who hold such office must 'have gained a good reputation generally, and particularly in war (*eti de tôn eudokimôn ta te alla kai eis ton polemon estô gegenêmenos*)' (12.951c).

In Magnesia, therefore, 'citizens will compete with each other throughout the country' (8.830d), thus providing a spectacle-to-be-judged that, when compared with the spectacle of the sophist or orator or poet, makes the ensuing assessment of what appears possess a greater likelihood of corresponding to what actually is. This claim is implicitly comparative: to the extent that we can make sense of judgment according to the seeming-being distinction, then the victory-bent sophist, the sweet-tongued orator, and the inspired poet are worse models of judgment than the athlete or the warrior.[75] In these activities, or under this mode of judgment, the agent who wants to be the best must actually be the

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of the virtue of gentleness: 'good temper is a mean with respect to anger' (*praotês d' esti mesotês peri orgas*). Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, IV.5, 1126b26.

[74] Aristotle, *Politics*, VIII.6, 1340b24-26.

[75] I do not mean to say that one cannot fake excellence (or the lack of it) in the domain of war (or athletics).

best; unlike the politician, he cannot fake it.[76] Dodds remarks that 'Any teaching which weakens the conviction that honesty is the best policy he [Plato] feels obliged to prohibit as antisocial.'[77] Strauss' comment might be read as a development of this thought: 'Every man must be an open book to every one, thoroughly sincere and not a counterfeit, nor must he allow himself to be deceived by a counterfeit.'[78] It is the difficulty the judged confront in faking, rather than the difficulty the judges have in making the judgment, which gives greater robustness to the judgment at athletic contests. This judgment is not that of the festival judge; indeed, it displaces the need for such a judge. Magnesia will not become the 'vicious "theatrocracy"' that was Athens (3.701a). Instead, as Morgan succinctly puts it, 'in Magnesia, everyone is a performer and everyone should be a critic'.[79] Following Kraut, we might call it "demotic".[80]

Demotic judgment might be understood as a solution to the problem of recognizing the expert. In the *Republic*, the wrangling sailors cast the man with the knowledge of the art of navigation aside, while the deluded cave dwellers ridiculed and even threatened the life of the returning philosopher.[81] Plato implies that the Magnesians are capable of making the right selection, and this is because he has in part changed the form of the problem: rather than having to recognize the expert, one has to recognize the good character, that is, the most willing servant of the laws. The *politeia* of Magnesia wagers

[76] See Socrates' charge against Pericles in the *Menexenus*, 236b.
[77] Dodds, 1968, p.224.
[78] Strauss, 1975, p.74.
[79] Morgan, 2013, p.270. This is consistent with Socrates' barrage of rhetorical questions at *Republic*, 3.405a-b: 'Could you find a greater sign of bad and shameful education in a city than that the need for skilled doctors and lawyers is felt…by those who claim to have been brought up in the manner of free men? Don't you think it's shameful and a great sign of vulgarity to be forced to make use of a justice imposed by others as masters and judges, because you are unable to deal with the situation yourself?'
[80] Kraut says that most Magnesians attain 'demotic virtue'; he lifts the term from *Republic*, 6.500d. Kraut, 2010, p.64.
[81] *Republic*, 6.488a-489a; 7.517a.

that the agonistic setting will bring to the surface the character credentials of each candidate; the proper exercise of judgment means picking up the character credentials of fellow citizens.[82] To make Magnesians similar in judgment, therefore, is to address a thorny problem in Platonic political thought.

Consider these judgments in relation to the political principle of Magnesia: the rotation of offices. 'This is what we must practice in peacetime, right from childhood – the exercise of authority over others and submission to them in turn' (12.942c).[83] To motivate such a situation, each citizen must believe that he can rule; it is clear that the individual pursuit of reputation can ground such a belief. What is more, if the laws and institutions of Magnesia motivate the reputational condition of those who occupy and administer them, then the populace as a whole has a significant effect on the resulting government. Writes Bobonich: 'Magnesia is committed to the central importance of political and social structures designed to encourage ethical and political discussion […] The citizens are expected to find such political activity not a burdensome necessity, but a valued part of their lives.'[84] This perspective helps explain why the offices of Magnesia are open to a large number of citizens.

Reputation, moreover, operates as a sorting mechanism in Magnesia's *politeia*. Presumably, since Magnesians are equal, they make equal claims to authority. Voting

[82] Meyer brings this out nicely; I lift the phrase 'character credentials' from there. Meyer, 2006, p.382. See Brunt, 1993, p.268.
[83] This quote comes at the end of a passage that Popper takes to signal Plato's 'truly astonishing hostility towards the individual'. Popper, unlike Plato (and Aristotle), denies the truth of the claim 'that those who are good in obeying will also be good in commanding.' Popper, 2003, pp.108, 109, and 143, respectively. Gould, who agrees with Popper that Magnesia's legislation does nothing more than indoctrinate its citizens, nevertheless remains charitable in his reading of Plato when he remarks that the passage is 'perhaps too extreme to be representative, of the social, moral and political theory of the *Laws*.' Gould, 1955, p.97. For the argument that legislation in the laws 'is a thorough-going method of indoctrination', see Versényi, 1961, p.71.
[84] Bobonich, 2002, p.207; cf. p.446.

means that many non-officeholders convert a small minority of their own into officeholders: 'in holding an election you are asking citizens to say who is most suitable to hold office and this implies that some are better qualified that others.'[85] Reputation is a sorting tool that can resolve this problem. Klosko says as much, but does not grasp its significance, his language notwithstanding. 'Especially important,' he pens, 'is the fact that public esteem attaches to virtue, not wealth. In other respects, citizens are treated equally.'[86] In fact, the very mode of election allows time for reputational judgments to be formed and heard.[87] This is why, for example, the names of the nominees for the thirty-seven available positions for Guardians of the Laws (*nomophulakes*) are put on display and, in addition, Magnesians are expected to object to (some of) the nominations: 'for at least thirty days anyone who wishes should be allowed to remove [from the relevant temple] any tablet bearing a name he finds objectionable and put it on display in the marketplace' (6.753c). To be declared elected, these officials are not simply to take an oath of office: they 'must then submit to scrutiny and be declared elected' (6.753d).[88] While selection by lot could bestow a reputation on the selected individual as favored by the gods, such a procedure is immune to the *ex ante* reputational judgments of the citizens. Plato opts for the election mechanism because of reputation: the best men are to be identified by the rest of society (see 6.751c-d). Voting for magistrates in the elections can be construed as an institutionalization of making reputational judgments.

[85] Stalley, 1983, p.119. Cf. Morrow, 1993, p.162.
[86] Klosko, 2006, p.243.
[87] '[T]he Athenian's willingness to rely on popular election to fill such important offices in the city [i.e. the guardians of the laws] is evidence of his confidence that the citizens' education…will enable them to make good judgments about candidates and to be motivated to act in accordance with these judgments ([6.]751c-d).' Bobonich, 2002, p.381.
[88] Here is a stark depiction of Plato's commitment 'to the principle that all officers should be held legally accountable for their actions.' Morrow, 1993, p.229.

2c. Political Institutions Designed to Encourage Mutual Oversight

It is through these judgments that we should understand what Barker disapprovingly calls the *politeia*'s 'mutual espionage and mutual censorship'.[89] To the extent that commentators take seriously the expansive surveillance in Magnesia, they remit themselves to expressing how unpalatable it is.[90] Yet the text deserves more interpretive generosity. Apart from the demotic judgment cultivated via participation in Magnesia's daily activities, the civic duties of the Magnesians include: attending the Assembly, attending trials, acting as informers or prosecutors on transgressions they were not directly involved in, and in some cases even delivering physical punishment themselves. The legislator proclaims: 'Anyone who makes every effort to assist the authorities in checking crime should be declared to be the great and perfect citizen of his state, winner of the prize for virtue (*ho megas anêr en polei kai teleios, houtos anagoreuesthô nikêphoros aretê*)' (5.730d). As Morgan notes, to be 'a good citizen in Magnesia involves not just obeying the law oneself but intervening and informing on lawbreaking by others.'[91] The fact that anyone can bring a charge against the deceiver implies that the defendant's reputation – even when it does not affect the accuser directly – is everybody's concern. This is what we should expect from a *politeia* where the private and public domains are closely intertwined. Magnesia is a state where everyone watches one another, where reputational judgments are unceasing.[92]

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[89] Barker, 1960, p.398.

[90] Morgan, 2013, p.266 is the exception here: 'We need then, to expand our notion of performance for this dialogue to include not only the choral performances…but also life itself as a performance…ranging from commendation of fellow citizens to reporting malefactors to the proper authorities'. For an anxious reading with a focus on how such surveillance and regulation 'circumscribe[s] the freedom of the individual', see Brunt, 1993, p.251.

[91] Annas in Bobonich, 2010, p.87.

[92] There is no room for paranoia here, since such an affliction is a symptom of an individual or of a collective who feel persecuted. This is not characteristic of free friends who together constitute a mobilized

Disjunctions between ancient Greek political practices and modern liberal democracies notwithstanding, it may help to draw some parallels between Plato's *politeia* and normative propositions made in political theory today. Doing so could make the demandingness of the notion of surveillance less implausible and perhaps render it more palatable as a whole. In his book on democratic theory, Green calls for a reappraisal of the contemporary experience of representative democracies; he grounds his theory of plebiscitary democracy in the eyes of the people. As spectators the people have available to them 'an empowered form of looking [which is] characterized by genuine and literal surveillance of its leaders'.[93] In their work on esteem, Brennan and Pettit charge that economists pose the following 'pseudo-problem': how can people 'be expected to bear the costs of keeping an eye on one another and, say, of delivering suitable gobbets of praise and blame?'[94] Inspired by Smith's understanding of human nature, Brennan and Pettit reveal the 'hidden economy of esteem' that is based on the claim that 'we all cherish the esteem, and shrink from, the disesteem, of our fellows.'[95] They go on to acknowledge that people compete 'to frame their publically observed behavior in such a way as to maximize esteem.'[96] Attending to the functioning of the law, Waldron reminds us that 'Self-application is an important feature of the way [contemporary] legal systems operate. They work by using, rather than short-circuiting, the agency of ordinary human individuals. They count on people's capacities for practical understanding, self-control,

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citizenry of equals (see 3.693b). What the legislator of the *Laws* is denying is the kind of wishful thinking in which Adeimantus indulged, to wit, that had Socrates persuaded them 'from youth [that justice is the greatest good]…We would not now be keeping an eye on one another, to guard against injustice. Each man would be keeping an eye on himself'. *Republic*, 2.367a.

[93] Green, 2010, p.11. It need not be political leaders, but also those whose enterprises have a direct impact on a public good, such as the environment: see Lane, 2012, p.176-177.

[94] Brennan and Pettit, 2000, pp.77-78. For an extended statement of their position see Brennan and Pettit, 2004.

[95] Brennan and Pettit, 2000, p.78.

[96] Brennan and Pettit, 2000, p.94.

self-monitoring, and the modulation of their own behavior in regard to norms that they can grasp and understand.'[97] Morrow expressed as much about the *politeia* of the *Laws*: the city 'must use unremittingly all possible means of persuasion, in all areas of the citizen's life, if the principles of the law are to form the character and become the inner motives of man's actions.'[98] As with Green's suggestion about how contemporary democracies could keep their leaders in check, there is nothing excessively demanding, much less sinister either about what Brennan and Pettit propose or what Waldron describes. Scholars should move beyond excoriating the mutual espionage and censorship of the Magnesian *politeia*.

The imperative of watching over one another encourages citizens to make reputational judgments upon those who, because they hold power, are most likely to be invisible. The legislator pronounces that 'Offences committed by the authorities in handling any claim should be taken to the public courts by anyone who may wish to do so' (8.846b).[99] In fact, the surveillance of Magnesia's officeholders is institutionalized, for 'no official shall fill his position, without being liable to be called to account for his actions' (6.761e). The institutions of the examination (*dokimasia*, 6.753d-e for the magistrates) and scrutiny

[97] Waldron, 2009, p.237.

[98] Morrow, 1993, p.54. As Stalley notes, 'mere conformity is not the goal. The aim is that the citizens should internalize the values embodied in the laws. To this end they are subject to continual exhortation and to a complex system of honors and rewards.' Stalley, 1995, p.486. It is not clear to me how this comports with Stalley's earlier claim that the 'legislator…inculcate[s] in them [the citizens] the right opinions'. Stalley, 1994, p.175. Allen makes the more general point that 'Law is not an *artifact*, or made object, that embodies the one will of the people once and for all, but a *practice* in which any and every citizen may be involved at any moment, through deliberation, legislation, or enforcement.' Allen, 2004, p.170.

[99] For country-wardens, see 6.762a; for common court judges, see 6.767e. If we think that a great deal is being demanded from a citizen when he is asked to be a willing servant to the laws, then *a fortiori* to be a power-holder in Magnesia is not a task for the faint-hearted. 'The desire to encourage citizens to aid in the preservation of law and order', Chase notes, 'led Plato to follow the Athenian example in offering rewards to those who gave information or brought indictments against lawbreakers.' In fact, there are counter-measures in place in order to deal with those who refuse to appear as witnesses (see 12.936e-937a). Chase, 1933, pp.160ff.

(*euthuna*, 12.946d-e) respectively test whether an acceding officeholder is worthy and whether an exiting power-holder has performed his duties with diligence. '[T]he most important control is the auditing [i.e. scrutiny] of accounts, to which all magistrates (including the auditors themselves) are subjected', Laks writes.[100]

Consider what it takes for an individual to become a power-holding scrutineer in Magnesia. Plato brings to bear a whole architecture of opinion on the election process. To be eligible for the position one must be nominated by another citizen. So it is not just about (a) what the populace thinks, but also (b) what those whose job it is to examine the conduct of the magistrates think, (c) what opinion citizens have about potential scrutineers, and (d) what opinion citizens have about the nominators.[101] Citizens who think any nomination for political office 'to be improperly written' are empowered by the law to take the nomination from the temple to the marketplace 'for at least thirty days' (6.753c). The interconnected and overlapping network of checks continues to operate after the individual has been elected into power: 'If a scrutineer relies on his election to protect him and goes to the bad, thus showing he's only too human after all, the law will order a charge to be brought against him by anyone who feels inclined to prosecute' (12.947e). Kahn notes that 'The superiority of the examiners [i.e. scrutineers] is due precisely to the fact that they are the final device for assuring the subordination of all human rulers to the rule of law.'[102] To Kahn's explanation we must add the reputational judgment of the citizen who is not an officeholder; otherwise, why make it the case that

[100] Laks, 2005, p.284.
[101] Like the Athenian, Megillus shows his awareness of the irresistible power of public opinion where the law is silent: 'when no one ventures to challenge the law, public opinion (*phêmês*) works wonders' (8.838c-d). Detienne uses this passage in support of his claim that 'The whole enterprise of the *Laws* is in the light of *phēmē* [sic.]'. Detienne, 1986, p.93.
[102] Kahn, 1993, p.xx.

anyone can prosecute the men who hold the office with the highest honor in Magnesia?[103] The trial of the scrutineer takes place before an assemblage of past and current Magnesian upper officeholders. If the prosecution wins, then the scrutineer loses 'his office, denied the special tomb, and stripped of the honours he has already received' (12.948a). There is no corresponding severity in the case of a failed prosecution. First, only one kind of failure is punished, to wit, the failure 'to win one-fifth of the votes', and second, the penalty is only a financial one and proportionally graded according to the property class to which the prosecutor belongs (see 12.948b).

There are three interrelated advantages to Magnesia's formal and informal mutual surveillance. First, it reduces the proneness to error endemic to a world that is ruled by humans for humans, and not by gods for humans (see 4.713b-714a). The fallibility of human judgment is assuaged in a network of actors committed to scrutinizing each other's behavior. Second, it reduces the accrual of deception in Magnesia. The emphasis here is not the epistemic fallibility of individual agents *per se*, but on a particularly insidious phenomenon that can only occur in groups of agents. It does so when there is a disjunction between the judgment of each individual and the judgment of the many (of which the individual judgment is part). An illustrative example is the story about Gyges' ring, which shows how public praise can accrue to a powerful, unjust man. The praises the ring-bearer receives appear to each individual judge to be unqualified; yet, each is praising from fear and the collectively held belief that unjust acts are inevitable if their perpetrator knows that he will not be punished for committing them.[104] The third beneficial effect of watching over one another is perhaps the most obvious: it prevents *ex*

[103] Once again, the Athenian shows how serious he is about the universal participation in the duties of citizenship; see Morrow, 1993, p.133.
[104] Glaucon relates the story at *Republic*, 2.359d-360d.

ante deviant behavior.[105] We should resist the temptation to be cynical here.[106] That is, we should not imagine that the sole interpretive possibility is an instrumental one involving external sanction, as expressed in the thought "I should not violate the social norm and/or law X because I'll get caught." Apart from the operational logic of legal systems Waldron discusses in the quote above, we can also say that the third effect changes the incentives of the one in possession of Gyges' ring of invisibility. In Magnesia, a citizen who has internalized the scrutiny of the polis would find no use for Gyges' ring. In Plato's language: he becomes 'a devoted and utterly obedient servant of the laws' (7.822e).[107]

If we understand the importance of watching over one another, then we can appreciate anew the importance of the background of equality against which mutual scrutinizing occurs.[108] We can expect that because equals hold things in common, Magnesians will not find it hard to watch over one another. The background of equality obstructs the salience of other social markers such as wealth or family allegiances. As long as such a background holds and the agonistic life remains sufficiently free from foul practices, most of the offices of Magnesia remain open to its citizens, making it the case that 'All citizens participate in the political life of the city.'[109] Kraut captures the desired *telos*

[105] For a similar thought, see Annas, 2010, p.87.
[106] Popper, 2003 is the archetypal case here.
[107] Laws 'are internalized in the characters of those who are raised under them.' Meyer, 2006, p.383. Kamtekar notes of the honor-lover in the *Republic*: 'the capacity to internalize different social norms is crucial for the educability of the honor-lover'. Kamtekar, 1998, p.333.
[108] 'In Magnesia, all male citizens, and perhaps women also, take part in political affairs and are eligible for all political offices'. Klosko, 2006, p.242. Cohen argues forcefully 'that by Greek standards, these reforms [about the role of women in the state of Magnesia] were revolutionary'. Cohen, 1987, p.27. For the view that Plato's *Laws* (by contrast to the *Republic*) is pessimistic about human nature in general and about women's nature in particular, see Levin, 2002.
[109] Bobonich, 2002, p.384. '[T]he citizens do choose their magistrates', Laks avers, pointing to the democratic dimension of Magnesia. Laks, 2005, p.281. 'What is *not* envisaged,' Schofield complains about the *Laws*, 'is the tabling of the legal code which shapes the life of the city and its citizens for debate. There is no provision for them to vote on whether to accept or reject any of its articles, still less to develop a

here: 'Plato has an attractive vision of a certain kind of community…one in which every member of the community leads a life that is to some degree objectively worthwhile'.[110] Certainly, as Wallach points out in his discussion of political participation in Plato's city, 'Magnesia directly involves the *demos* in the authoritative exercise of political power to a greater degree than any twentieth century democracy.'[111]

In Magnesia, positive reputational judgments amass to the virtuous, and negative reputational judgments accrue to the vicious: the 'jealous fellow (*phthonounta*)' who does not want to 'communicate ' his virtues to others (*kai allois metadidonai*) is blamed (*psegein*), while his virtuous counterpart is praised (*epainon*) (5.730e-731a). The lawgiver expects citizens to act on these judgments using the institutional mechanisms he provides. It is through collective punishment that Magnesians instantiate their negative reputational judgments. In fact, collective punishment puts an additional premium on reputation. For, if A does not know B's reputation, and A is not sure if B's act is illegal, then B can get away with committing the crime.[112] Reputational judgments in Magnesia are countermeasures to such hope, thereby confirming the city's laws. In addition, with respect to laws that pertain to a variety of domains, to violate them is to incur a reputational cost that is separate from another kind of punishment such as a financial penalty. Since 'a wrong done to the state is a wrong done to all citizens', it follows that in

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political culture in which choosing between such alternatives would be a meaningful exercise.' Schofield, 2006, p.321. He is right of course to note that the legal code is set down for Magnesia without asking its future citizens. Yet, as chapter 2 showed, it is hard to see how the disparate bunch of arriving colonists *could* agree to a law code. In other words, Schofield confounds the dual project of the *Laws*: how to found and how to maintain a *politeia*. When the Athenian insists that Cnossos provide its share of power-holders to Magnesia (see 6.752d-753a), he is bringing attention to the difference of the founding moment from subsequent efforts of maintaining the *politeia*.

[110] Kraut, 1992, p.13. While he is writing about the *Republic*, Kraut, 2010 leaves little doubt that he thinks it applies to Magnesia too.

[111] Wallach, 2001, p.380, fnt 91. I take it that the point applies to twenty-first century democracies too.

[112] Recall that in Athenian legal practice establishing fact was not essential or even central for successful prosecution; Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* illustrates this point. See Hunter, 1993, pp.108 *et passim*.

'charges of crimes against the state, the first need is to let the man in the street play his part in judging them (*to plêthei metadidonai tês kriseôs*)' (6.768a). The three cases that follow are illustrative of the rationale at work.

The first shows individuals who transgress laws of political participation. In the agonistic city one's social relations are put at risk if one does not vote. 'Voting is compulsory for all in every election, and anyone who fails in his duty and is denounced to the authorities (*eisaggelthê pros tous archontas*) should be fined fifty drachmas and get the reputation of being a scoundrel (*pros tô kakos einai dokein*)' (6.763e-764a). In short, if one does not vote, one's pocket and reputation will suffer.[113]

A second case – one that bears some resemblance to the story of Gyges' ring – is a disruption of good neighbor relations. It arises when a citizen discovers buried treasure intended for the family of another. This is a situation 'I should never pray to the gods to come across…The financial benefit I'd get from removing it could never rival what I'd gain by way of virtue and moral rectitude by leaving it alone' (11.913b). The lawgiver puts a high premium on information regarding buried treasure. 'If the informant [who reported the man who found the buried treasure] is a free man, he should acquire a reputation for virtue, but if a free man fails to inform *he must* get a reputation for vice (*doxan aretês kektêsthô, mê mênusas de, kakias*). If the informant is a slave, then as a reward he will deservedly be presented with freedom by the state, which will give his master what he is worth, but if a slave fails to inform, *he must* be punished by death'

[113] Correspondingly, in the case of an unexpected gain in wealth, the absence of punishment brings about a good reputation. 'If anyone acquires more than this by finding treasure-trove or by gift or by a good stroke of business or some other similar lucky chance which presents him with more than he's allowed, he should hand over the surplus to the state and its patron deities, thereby escaping punishment and getting a good name (*eudokimos*) for himself' (5.744e-745a). In this case, a combination of punishment and positive reputational judgment facilitate cooperation.

(11.914a). What is striking here is the claim that a bad/good reputation is to the freeman as what death/manumission is to the slave. The analogy seems exaggerated, as does the death to the slave (even if we take into account the inferiority of the slave in relation to the free man). One way to make sense of it is to argue that Plato is concerned with 'the social character of the right of property.'[114] Economic inequalities in Magnesia are to be kept at a strict minimum and, while discovering buried treasure need not radically or meaningfully disrupt this minimum, the attitude that underlies keeping the treasure or not reporting someone stealing buried treasure will eventually lead to what Foucault characterizes as the 'weaken[ing] [of] the machinery of the law'.[115] The sufficiency of reputational costs (or negative reputational judgments) testifies to the Athenian's belief that collective punishment will occur, i.e. that Magnesians will be sufficiently motivated to execute this punishment *en masse*.

The third case is a violation of censorship decisions; here, an acute reputational cost exhausts the punishment necessary. When discussing the censorship of comedies, the Athenian avers that 'an author may put before the public anything the minister (*epimelêtês*) approves of, but if it is censored, the author must not perform it to anyone personally or be found to have trained someone else to do so, whether a free man or a slave. If he does, *he must* get the reputation of being a scoundrel and an enemy of the

[114] Barker, 1960, p.382. Without grasping the role of the spirited desires it is hard to understand why, for example, property has such a motivational hold on humans. Therefore Sassi is mistaken in her claim that 'in the *Laws* there is no trace of that positive competitiveness and self-esteem associated with *thumos*'. Sassi, 2008, p.140. Laks's claim is less unsatisfactory: 'To the extent that pleasure and pain make up what man properly is, property is the paradigmatic source of pleasure.' Laks, 2005, p.276. It is not obvious how property directly yields pleasure. From a spirited perspective, it is the comparisons motivated by property differentials that matter. This is why Magnesian citizens are to have equal and inalienable landholdings and any 'economic inequality that Plato allows is in movable assets.' Bobonich, 2002, p.375. 'It was Plato's avowed purpose that concern for possessions should have the lowest place in the esteem of the Magnesians ([5.]743d). It is not then very surprising that the distinctions in wealth that he permits turn out to be a sham.' Brunt, 1993, p.265. Cf. Morrow, 1993, p.133.

[115] Foucault, 1995, p.96.

laws (*ê kakos einai doxazesthô kai apeithês tois nomois*)' (11.936a-b). The transgressor is not only a scoundrel; he is someone who refuses to be persuaded by the laws, an enemy of the state. The forcefulness of the legislator's language anticipates and counteracts a reaction of indifference to material that is not overtly dangerous. Consider how far this individual is from being a willing servant of the law if he regards the decision to censor as applying only to himself and that therefore it is permissible to pass on the censored material to others. He also fails to grasp that he has transgressed against the highest office of the city: the minister of education (see 6.765e). If 'loyalty to the laws' is Magnesia's 'point of honor' and 'legislation is education', the comedic author's offence is double.[116]

3. The Role of Magnesia's Foreign Policy in Maintaining the City

Magnesia attempts 'to restore the practice of athletics to what he [Plato] regards as its original function, the preparation of the citizen for service in war', Morrow correctly observes.[117] The general preoccupation with war should not be surprising. In Plato's world, 'War was a normal part of life…hardly a year went by without requiring a formal decision to fight, followed by a muster and the necessary preparations, and finally combat at some level.'[118] What does this mean for Magnesia's foreign policy? 'Plato will have his colony maintain good relations with the larger Hellenic community,' is all that Morrow's otherwise comprehensive volume says about Magnesia's interpolis relations.[119] Klosko and Stalley continue in this vein. 'Plato turns his back on the world of…interstate

[116] Taylor, 1960, p. 474.
[117] Morrow, 1993, p.333. Morrow cites *Republic*, 3.404a-b where Socrates describes the best gymnastics as that which concerns itself with war.
[118] Finley, 1991, p.67; cf. Pritchard, 2013, pp.188-189 *et passim*.
[119] Morrow, 1993, p.441.

relations'.[120] Dizzied by what Saunders calls the 'vertiginous complexity' of the city's preambles, laws, and institutions, interpreters have often overlooked that Magnesia is not a collection of men and women who are hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world.[121] Reading Plato's *Laws* through Aristotle's *Politics* may also lead a reader to the same result, for Aristotle is the first to say that 'the state for which he legislates is to have a[n]…isolated life'.[122] On the contrary, I argue, Magnesia is constructed with a view to what goes on outside of its borders, for this too is relevant to the city's maintenance. Indeed this is what we should expect of writer from the mid-fourth century BC; it is hard to imagine a worldview that sharply distinguishes between what goes on in the city and what goes on outside of it, or what one historian calls '[t]he international element in classical civil strife and the struggle over constitutions'.[123] Indeed, as the case of fifth and fourth-century Athens shows, *stasis* is not reducible to the social conflict between rich and poor within the city.[124]

There is ample textual evidence that Magnesia's *politeia* will take into account the dynamic created by the city's existence in a world of other poleis. The issue of a city's

[120] Klosko, 2006, p.228. Stalley connects, without argument, the claim that Magnesia 'severely limits personal freedom and initiative' to the claim that Magnesia 'will be almost literally a closed society in the sense that foreign contracts will be curtailed so far as possible'. Stalley, 1983, p.180. Stalley's book contains no discussion of Magnesia's interpolis relations. Unfortunately the secondary literature has not progressed since Barker's brief discussion under the subtitle 'peace and war'. Barker, 1960, pp.345-348.
[121] Saunders, 1992, p.465.
[122] Aristotle, *Politics*, 2.1265a21-22. It is indeed unclear which body in Magnesia is responsible for foreign affairs, but surely this is insufficient to ground an objection to my claim about attending to Magnesia's foreign policy. The complaint can be found in Brunt, 1993, p.257: 'Plato omits to say who can declare war or make treaties.' The closest candidate is the executive committee of the council (*boulê*). The Council members are to be divided into twelve groups and assume the executive leadership on a rotating basis, according to the months of the year. These officials need to be present 'whenever anyone from abroad or from within the state itself approaches them wishing to give information or inquire about those topics on which a state must arrange to answer the questions of other states and receive replies to its own' (6.758c).
[123] Lintott, 1982, p.257. Finley writes about 'the close interrelationship between domestic and foreign affairs in shaping the politics within any state.' Finley, 1991, p.60. 'At no point, especially in fifth- and fourth-century Athens,' writes Saxonhouse, 'could political activity be isolated from relations with other cities and the potential for war.' Saxonhouse, 1994, p.79.
[124] As Balot, 2006, pp.112-113 claims, book 8 of Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, especially shows this.

foreign policy is at stake from the very beginning of the *Laws*, when Magnesia's founder Cleinias argues that the worth of a city is measured by its victories on the battlefield against an external enemy (see 1.626a-b). Once Magnesia is on the scene, Cleinias' Cretan thoughts (see 'the Cretan use of the sea' locution, 4.706c) about Magnesia's geographical location are scrutinized and then rejected. Cleinias says that the city 'has harbors…which could hardly be bettered' (4.704b). Since Magnesia is inland and 'grows practically everything', the Athenian turns Cleinias' thought on its head: 'we can take comfort in those eighty stades [between Magnesia and the sea]. Even so, it lies nearer the sea than it should, and you [Cleinias] say that it is rather well off for harbors, which makes matters worse' (4.704d). This is because the sea is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbor…It fills the land with wholesaling and retailing, breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the citizens distrustful and hostile, not only among themselves, but also in their dealings with the world outside' (4.705a). A city with a harbor, in other words, can expect disruption to its domestic and foreign affairs. Moments later, we are treated to the causes that lead to Magnesian-style colonial foundings. 'Such migrations occur because of the pressures of land-shortage…sometimes a given section of the community may be obliged to go off and settle elsewhere because it is harassed by civil war (*stasesin biazomenon*), and on one occasion a whole state took to its heels after being overcome by an attack it could not resist (*ardên kreittoni kratêtheisa polemô*)' (4.708b). The passage, peppered as it is with the language of war, forewarns of the dissolution of one city by another. The persuasive force of the general preamble to the laws in book 5 is directed at the choice between orienting a life towards victory in war and/or peacetime contests versus the life oriented towards obeying the laws of the city

(see 5.729d).[125] The way a city behaves in its interpolis relations is reciprocally related to the moral psychology of its citizens. And, in the midst of the discussion of Magnesia's institutions, the Athenian avers: 'The state is just like a ship at sea, which always needs someone to keep watch day and night: as it is steered through the waves of international affairs it lives in constant peril of being captured by all sorts of conspiracies' (6.758a).[126]

The text explicitly connects the *eunomia* of the *politeia* to its reputation abroad. 'And so it will be entirely right and proper if the state we are now founding in Crete wins among men a brilliant and glorious reputation for virtue (*doxan pros ton allelôn anthrôpôn oti kallistên te kai aristên paraskeuazesthai pros aretên*)…out of all the states and countries which look upon the Sun and the other gods, Magnesia will be one of the few that are well administered (*en tais eunomois polesi kai chôrais*)' (12.950c-d). It is from a concern with the city's reputation that the interlocutors decide to extend the condition of war-readiness to Magnesian women. As Canto observes, 'women are at the heart of the city, hence they are also at the heart of war'.[127] Imagining women fleeing a city under the threat of enemy invasion, the Athenian declares that such an occurrence would cover 'the human race with the disgrace of being by nature the most lily-livered creatures under the sun (*doxan tou tôn anthrôpôn genous katachein hôs pantôn deilotaton phusei thêriôn estin*)' (7.814b). Cleinias's response picks up on the reputational effect: 'By heaven sir, no state in which that happened could avoid disgrace (*oudamôs euschêmon*) – quite apart from the damage that would be caused' (7.814b-c). The result is 'a law to the effect that

[125] Hence we should focus not only on the persuasive power of the preambles to the laws, but also on the behavior that is desirable in Magnesia. The former are not determinative of the latter.
[126] Not only is the state like a ship sailing through the sea, but individuals also sail through the voyage of life; thus it is important to get 'character-keel[s] (*tropideia*)' right (see the extended simile at 7.803a-b).
[127] Canto, 1994, p.52.

women must not neglect to cultivate the techniques of fighting' (7.814c).[128] One would think that the relevant fact about doubling the number of fighting bodies is that the city would thereby increase its chances of survival. Indeed, such a concern seems to be in place in the corresponding discussion in the *Republic*: 'if their women [guardians] joined their campaigns…this would make them quite unbeatable'.[129] Yet, Cleinias is prepared to embrace the proposition that women should be war-ready because reputation rather than the city's survival is his paramount concern. Magnesia will be, and have a reputation for being, a war-ready city that pursues peace.[130]

That Magnesians ought to be concerned about their city's reputation among other states is shown by the Athenian's insistence that 'Whether the figure you cut in the eyes of others is good or bad, you should never underestimate its importance' (12.950b). Magnesia should appear as good to other states because 'people in general (*hoi polloi*) don't fall so far short of real goodness that they can't recognize (*krinein*) virtue and vice when they see it in others… states find it an excellent precept to value their good standing with the rest of the world (*protiman tên eudoxian pros tôn pollôn*)' (12.950b-c).[131] The Athenian is emphatic that Magnesian foreign policy, insofar as it is determined by its domestic laws, aims at peace: one is 'a *genuine* lawgiver only if he designs his legislation about war as a tool for peace, rather than his legislation for peace as an instrument of war' (1.628d-e). Magnesia's focus on education confirms that war is not among the priorities of this *politeia*. The Athenian claims that war and peace are useless if they are

[128] This is a salvo directed at the way Athens fought battles since Themistocles: 'Athenian sailors were breaking with the convention of combat that only the defeated fled and with the primary requirement of bravery [or virtue] to remain steadfast'. Pritchard, 2013, p.172.
[129] *Republic*, 5.471d.
[130] On the evidence of this passage, the expansion of the public role of women appears to be a byproduct of reputational concerns.
[131] Strauss, 1975, p.173 also notices the concern with Magnesia's 'image'.

not pursued for the sake of education. This is how he breaks out of the circle instantiated by the "war now, peace later" or "peace now, war later" binary: 'in cold fact neither the immediate result nor the eventual consequences of warfare ever turn out to be *real* leisure or an education that really deserves the name – and education is in our view just about the most important activity of all' (7.803d). He turns to the ethical question Plato's readers often associate with the *Republic*. 'What then, will be the right way to live?' (7.803e), the Athenian asks moments after he has deployed the famous metaphor about the human condition, to wit, 'that man…has been created as a toy for God'. Whereas Megillus takes offence to this description, the Athenian insists that man's condition 'is the great point in his favor. So every man and every woman should play this part and order their whole life accordingly' (7.803c). The aggrandizing character of the pursuit of a reputation for virtue is constrained by the city's educational program.

The tall order Magnesia's policymakers must fulfill if their city is to survive is that their city not only be virtuous, therefore, but also have a reputation for virtue.[132] In the jargon of international relations, Magnesia's foreign policy is one of deterrence, aiming at a reputation for resolve.[133] Yet, there is a tension between Magnesia's domestic practices and its foreign policy claims: (1) it is a peace-seeking city that perpetually prepares for war, and (2) it appears as it is. What's more, Magnesia's anticipated successes at interpolis sporting events will likely contribute to this impression: 'a trophy at the site of the Olympic Games would have…publicized [a city's] military success far and wide'.[134]

[132] When discussing Kallipolis' interpolis affairs, Socrates says to Adeimantus: 'And as long as your own city is moderately governed in the way that we've just arranged, it will, even if it has only a thousand men to fight for it, be the greatest. Not in reputation; I don't mean that, but the greatest in fact (*ou tô eudokimein legô, all' hôs alêthôs megistê*)'. *Republic,* 4.423a. This juxtaposition is absent from the discussion of Magnesia's foreign affairs.
[133] The *locus classicus* in the study of international relations is Schelling, 1966.
[134] Pritchard, 2013, p.188.

It is indubitable that when another city – call it 'P' – looks upon Magnesia it will see a city that anticipates war. That is, from the perspective of P, (2) is supposed to do the work that (1) generates: it should reassure P that Magnesia is not a war-mongering city. Yet P need not confront the war-ready peace-promoting city with suspicion. Just like Magnesia is committed to presenting itself as it is – Magnesia's foreign policymakers cannot resort to deviousness either, for the principles on which the *politeia* rests explicitly rule out such behavior – so P has a stake in being correct about the appearance of the city it is judging.[135] While it may benefit P to paint Magnesia in false colors, the suggestion is that this may prove treacherous: for when war breaks out between P and Magnesia, there is no hiding of what actually is the case. When two cities go to war, the truth about their respective reputations is revealed and each city appears as it is the other. Here, as in Magnesia's agonistic domestic institutions, competition is truth-revealing. What war and, by extension, those contests that are modeled on it, achieve is a true measure of what a city is like. Such a measure will encourage interpolis relationships that are conducive to peace, the pursuit of which is the primary aim of Magnesia's foreign policy. This brings us back to the language of (1); the mutually exclusive and grandiose language of war and peace harmonizes with (2) insofar as it focuses the mind on the survival of the city and points towards a more stable arrangement of interpolis relations. If we now return to the interlocutors of the dialogue, we notice that this position successfully defeats Cleinias' worldview of the interpolis world as a natural war of all against all where, as the Athenian rephrases it, 'a well-run state (*têṣ eu politeuomenêṣ poleôṣ*)…demand[s] that its

[135] What is to be expected, given Plato's context, is that Magnesia will be urged to intervene not only in interpolis conflict between or among other cities, but also in another city's domestic affairs. Zuckert teases out another implication of Magnesia's behavior abroad: 'Citizens of this regime are not going to enrich themselves with the goods of those they vanquish'. Zuckert, 2004, p.390.

organization and administration should be such as to ensure victory in war over other states' (1.626b-c). The Dorian approach to statecraft has been defeated. P knows that Magnesia is not a Dorian state and therefore not like Cnossos. It follows that, just like its domestic arrangements differ from those of its mother colony, Magnesia will also order its foreign affairs differently from Cnossos.

This suggests that we can be somewhat sanguine about the prospects of Magnesia's interpolis relations. Magnesia's domestic policy towards foreigners confirms that this city is unlike the xenophobic and militarily aggressive Dorian states. That Magnesia must not acquire a reputation for being harsh towards foreigners motivates the Athenian to resist a conclusion that follows from his claims. In the context of emigration and immigration, and foreign travel more generally, the Athenian is worried about the 'contact between state and state [that] produces a medley of all sorts of characters, because the unfamiliar customs of the visitors rub off on to their hosts – and this, in a healthy society living under sound laws, is an absolute disaster' (12.949e-950a). The problem is that, unlike Magnesia, most states 'are not well run at all, so it makes no difference to them if their citizens fraternize with foreigners by welcoming them into the state and by going for trips abroad themselves whenever they feel like it and wherever their wanderlust takes them' (12.950a). Thus, by comparison, the stakes for Magnesia are higher and the prescription should be that Magnesia seal itself off from the outside world. The Athenian would have little trouble securing the approval for such a prescription from his Dorian interlocutors. Yet, the concern with Magnesia's reputation urges the Athenian to argue differently: 'a policy of complete exclusion and complete refusal to go abroad is just not feasible, and in any case the rest of the world would think us churlish and uncivilized: we'd get the

reputation of being a truculent and surly people (*tropois authadesi kai chalepois, hôs dokoien han*)' (12.950a-b).[136] Agreements (*sumbolaia*) made with foreigners, will be regarded 'as particularly sacrosanct (*hôs hagiôtata onta*)' (5.729e) and the city will not engage in 'Deportations of Aliens (*xenêlasiais*)' (12.950b). Infusing its attitude to foreigners with the language of piety, Magnesia is kinder to foreigners than the Dorian *politeiai* ever were.

Finally, while interpreters seldom fail to note Magnesia's Nocturnal Council, they do often miss that it is a discussion of interpolis relations that leads the Athenian to elaborate on this institution. In fact, the Nocturnal Council is the first port of call for foreign ideas about other *politeiai*. Apart from its participation in the rehabilitative apparatus deployed on those imprisoned for atheism, the Nocturnal Council is the gateway to those foreign ideas that Magnesia should adopt if it is to avoid entropy.[137] The principal importers of such ideas are those citizens with the most robust reputation, namely, the observers (*theôroi*) whom we've discussed in the foregoing chapter.[138] The observer seeks out foreign geniuses (*theioi*) whose insight will help the observer 'see to the strengthening of the customs of his country that are soundly based, and [to] the refurbishing of any that are defective' (12.951c). The Nocturnal Council debriefs and scrutinizes the returning observers (see 12.952a).[139] Pangle captures the interrelationship between domestic and foreign outlook as this is expressed in the institution of the observers: 'A sound citizen body will open itself to outside influences only from those who appear to excel in the

[136] A similar motivation could explain why in Magnesia 'Plato seems anxious to accord all free men equal protection; and he does so by in effect extending to all foreigners the privilege...of the same protection as a citizen, i.e. if he were killed the murder would be punished in the same way as that of a citizen would be.' Saunders, 1994, p.238.
[137] See Jaeger, 1986, p.260.
[138] For a stimulating discussion of the connotations of the root *thea-* with respect to Magnesia's observers, see Monoson, 2000, pp.226-232.
[139] Morrow, 1993, pp.510 and 481, respectively.

virtues the citizenry already honors'.[140]

The Nocturnal Council is the institution chiefly responsible for maintaining the city. The Athenian calls for a 'complete and perpetual security (*sôtêrian*) for your creation', and Cleinias describes the Council as a 'safety-device (*sôtêria*) for our political system and legal code' (12.960e). The Council is likened to 'an anchor for the whole state (*agkuran pasês tês poleôs*)' that will secure its salvation (12.961c). The anchor metaphor is appropriate because a ship without an anchor is still recognizable as a ship; however, an anchor apart from a ship ceases to be an anchor. Like a state, a ship requires an anchor for two reasons: first, because it needs to moor at every destination, and, second, because its watery environment is inherently unstable and unpredictable. In other words, Magnesia is a *politeia* that exists in a world that is populated by a host of other poleis that, in turn, shape the world in which Magnesia exists. Perhaps the reason why the Nocturnal Council comes at the end of the *Laws* is that only once Magnesia's constitution has been constructed in speech, is it apropos to look outward again.[141] Having traveled far enough to create a city that is unlike their respective cities of origin, the interlocutors must allow for the possibility that this city must recreate itself if it is to successfully navigate 'the waves of international affairs' (6.758a).[142]

Conclusion

The great advantage of the demanding Magnesian *politeia* is that it politically motivates its citizens. This motivation is to be understood in the round, warts and all. Passionate

[140] Pangle, 1998, p.382.
[141] I assume that the *Laws* is a consistent work. Morrow, 1993, and Samaras, 2002, *inter alios*, also assume this; a prominent detractor is Klosko, 2008.
[142] This is consistent with the view that the law code is, to some extent, provisional.

citizens compete for a reputation for virtue, for honors and offices which their fellow citizens may award them through the distribution of praise and blame. Doing so brings about some *thumetic* pathologies, most notably envy, which the law code and institutions attempt to cope with but not resolve. By implicating each citizen's reputation with that of the city, these pathologies are minimized. By encouraging Magnesians to be similar in virtue and in judgment, as well as to watch over one another and award offices to those who are and appear virtuous, the world of appearances is better ordered. Both the domestic and the foreign policy domains are governed by the same normative attitude toward the relationship between appearance and reality: inside Magnesia everyone must appear as they are, while in the interpolis environment the city of Magnesia must appear as it is.

This conclusion brings to the foreground an unstated assumption in Plato's theorizing of reputation: that the reputation of an individual is of a piece with the reputation of a city.[143] A plausible explanation is that Plato falls within the limits of Greek popular morality here. Remarking upon the 'essential features of Greek attitudes to interstate morality', Dover stresses that 'no one seems ever to have hesitated to apply to any sovereign nation, in respect of its dealings with other sovereign nations, the same array of evaluative words as were applied to an individual in his dealings with other individuals: 'just' or 'unjust', 'honest' or dishonest'…and so on'.[144] To ascertain whether Plato is actually reflecting a style of thinking that belongs to his cultural and linguistic context is a task for the intellectual historian. We might instead seek a line of approach that closer

[143] Barker notices this too, but does not discuss it. Barker, 1960, p.401. The phrase 'Plato's theorizing of reputation' is meant to capture the ways in which Plato discusses reputation in his work; it does not mean that Plato has a theory of reputation.
[144] Dover, 1974, p.310.

to home. I am referring to Plato's use of the city-soul analogy. Might this justify the assumption that the reputation of an individual is of a piece with the reputation of a city?[145]

At the risk of belaboring the point, I will point to several instances in which the city-soul analogy appears throughout the *Laws*. The analogy is found in the language of the ostensible project of the dialogue. The old men are looking for 'the ideal way of administering a state, and the best principles the individual can observe in running his own life (*pôs pot' an polis arista oikoiê, kai idia pôs an tis beltistan ton hautou bion diagagoi*)' (3.702a-b). Prior to that, when comparing 'pleasure and pain' to 'two springs released by nature', the Athenian notes that 'If a man draws the right amount from the right one at the right time he lives a happy life [and vice-versa…]. State and individual and every living being are on the same footing here (*kai polis homoiôs kai idiôtes kai zôon hapan*)' (1.636d-e). The image of the soul as a puppet (1.644d-645c) likewise suggests the city-soul analogy. The Athenian tells us that the city is to 'incorporate it in the form of a law to govern both its internal affairs and its relations with other states' (1.645b). Finally, the Athenian's demand for 'military training in peace-time' is premised on the city-soul analogy, for what applies to the individual applies to the state (*tauton de touto hesti kai polei huparchein*), namely, that 'the first requirement for a happy life is to do yourself no injury nor allow any to be done to you by others' (8.829a-b).[146]

Discussing the city-soul analogy in the *Republic*, Lear argues for bidirectional psychological processes that connect the city and the soul.[147] As Lane notes, Lear

[145] Asserting the presence of the city-soul analogy in the *Laws* need not be related to whether one thinks that the tripartite soul described in the *Republic* persists in the *Laws*.
[146] These examples do not exhaust the instances of the city-soul analogy in the *Laws*.
[147] See Lear, 1997.

captures 'the psychodynamics of the interaction between the city and the soul'.[148] There is a truth to Lear's reading when applied to Magnesia. Magnesian individuals are to yoke their reputation to that of the city, they will form judgments via their continuous participation in the city's institutions and, as we saw in the previous chapter, the city's reputation will constitute the Magnesian identity of each citizen.

Nonetheless, this reading cannot rescue the assumption – that the reputation of an individual is of a piece with the reputation of a city – from its conceptual problems. If the city is a whole and the individual citizens are its parts, it is not obvious how the reputation of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts (as is surely the case with Magnesia) is of the same kind as that of each individual part. And even if we were to speak about cities without distinguishing between, on the one hand, attributing desires, motives, needs, and actions to a city and, on the other, attributing these to individuals, we would still need an argument about why the judgment another state makes about Magnesia is of the same kind as that made about individuals by other individuals. Even if, following Dover, attributing character traits to cities permits such a move, this does not dispel the lingering worry that we are treating cities as individuals and/or individuals as cities. Finally, to the extent that the analogy is sometimes expressed in the language of health and disease, if we apply this language to reputation it introduces further ambiguity.[149] For what is it to say that a reputation (of a city or of an individual) is healthy or diseased? If we cannot rescue the assumption that the reputation of an individual is of a piece with the reputation of a city, then we have identified a

[148] Lane, 2006, p.178, and see Lane, 2015, p.159.
[149] In defense of this language in the *Republic*, Lane writes about 'the basic parallels and points of intersection between soul and city, psychological stability and social stability…stability itself is only possible on the basis of an underlying value of health. It is health, as essential for happiness, which emerges as the key value of the *Republic* for both individual and city'. Lane, 2012, p.101.

shortcoming in the way Plato theorizes reputation in the *Laws*. In the next chapter I suggest that the *Menexenus* offers a workaround to this problem.

Chapter 4
An Intergenerational *Politeia*: Reputation in Plato's *Menexenus*

Plato's *Menexenus*, a dialogue that brings Socrates back from the dead to converse with the young Menexenus, is better known for the funeral speech (*epitaphios*) it contains. The city is poised to commemorate those who died in Athens' defeat at the end of the Corinthian War which was concluded by the King's Peace of 386BC: this is both the occasion and subject of the encounter between the two men. Socrates divulges that the oration was Aspasia's patching together of the leftovers of the speech she had written for Pericles to deliver. Following much goading by Menexenus, Socrates recites the speech taught to him by his teacher Aspasia. The oration is an account of Athenian history, from the birth of the city to the present moment, crowned with a prosopopoeia of the dead. The dialogue concludes with Socrates' promise to Menexenus to confide in secret more of Aspasia's political speeches (*logous politikous*, 249e).

This *précis* suggests that Rowe is correct to note that the *Menexenus* 'contains all the complexities, and raises all the questions (about the intended relationship of author to audience, and so on), that attach to its larger counterparts in the corpus.'[1] Furthermore, recent scholarship on the *Menexenus* demonstrates its relevance to Platonic political thought, especially by discussing it in association with other dialogues.[2] Still, in a recent

[1] Rowe, 2007, p.14, fnt. 43. Apart from – and despite – this footnote, Rowe devotes no more space to the *Menexenus* in his book. That one of the most prominent Plato scholars can, in a book that otherwise seeks to say something general about Plato's thought, without justification simultaneously admit the importance of the dialogue and ignore it vindicates Pappas and Zelcer when they aver that 'the *Menexenus* has not found a place in the modern Platonic canon'. This failure was by no means foreseeable when, in 1587, the *Menexenus* was the first Greek text published by the printer for Cambridge University Press. Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, pp.1 and 86.

[2] Here are some prominent examples. For the *Menexenus* and the *Phaedrus*, see Cooper 1997, p.950: 'it may show (as indeed the *Phaedrus* claims) how very much better a skilled philosopher is at the composition of speeches than the usual rhetorical 'expert'.' For the *Menexenus* and the *Gorgias*, see Dodds, 1959 and Schofield's introduction in Plato, 2009. Unlike Dodds, Schofield reads the dialogue – as he clarifies in Schofield, 2006, p.94, ent. 64 – as 'A pastiche, not a parody'. For the *Menexenus* and the *Republic*, see Pappas and Zelcer, 2013 and 2015. For the *Menexenus* and the *Statesman*, see Saxonhouse,

overview, Bobonich omits the *Menexenus* from his list of 'the dialogues of Plato that are of the most obvious importance for his political philosophy'. Bobonich's list does include, however, the *Apology*, and it is often said that the death of Socrates signaled the beginning of Plato's philosophizing.[3] Might we not generalize this point? That is, if theorizing means making sense of a world that seems out of joint, then a dialogue dealing with the mass death of citizens on the battlefield is a call to the city and its citizens to find its place anew.[4] The *Menexenus* is, and should be, a candidate for what scholars might consider as being "of the most obvious importance for [Plato's] political philosophy". Thus, the broader target of my attempt herein is to erode the skepticism of a reader who is not inclined to approach the *Menexenus* seriously by showing the political theoretical fecundity of this dialogue.[5] In this chapter I argue that the *politeia* is best understood as an intergenerational multitude. It follows that the task is to order these intergenerational relationships as they pertain between both the young and the old, and the dead and the living. I contend that key to understanding the best ordering of these relationships is reputation (*doxa*).

1992. The dialogue is often read together with Pericles' funeral oration from Thucydides, e.g. Monoson, 1998, and the edition by Collins and Stauffer, 1999[a] which sets the two orations side by side. Unlike Kahn, and thanks in part to efforts such as his in making the *Menexenus* a dialogue worthy of the attention of Plato scholars, I do not view the dialogue as a puzzle to be explained any more than I see the *Republic* as a puzzle to be explained. I take it that those scholars who now study the *Menexenus* in comparison with other dialogues implicitly share this position. In so doing , we are closer to Plato's contemporaries than we are to late *Menexenus* scholarship: 'This almost unique glimpse of Plato as a man with his feet squarely planted in a particular time and place may displease those admirers who prefer to think of him as the philosopher described in the *Theaetetus*, who does not know the way to the Agora or to the council house and whose thought soars above heaven and earth. Plato's contemporaries would have no such conception of him, and they no doubt found the *Menexenus* a good deal less enigmatic than we do.' Kahn, 1963, p.232.

[3] Bobonich, 2008, p.311. The *Crito*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws* are the other dialogues that Bobonich mentions.

[4] The general point is eloquently made and developed by Euben, 2003, pp.85-111. A connection with the characterization of philosophy as a 'mediation on death' in the *Phaedo* suggests itself: the oration as a whole is a meditation *by* the dead, i.e. Socrates, Aspasia and, in its consolation and encouragement in particular, by the war dead.

[5] The skeptical reader might be one who thinks the *Menexenus* is a parody; see Popper, 2003, p.102. Like Glaucon and Adeimantus who believe that justice should be praised for its own sake but want to hear an argument for this position, such a reader might suspend their belief about the *Menexenus*' status.

I build the case for these claims as follows. Contrary to those who reduce the *Menexenus* to the funeral oration it contains, I claim that we should read it as a dialogue. Attending to the interaction between the young Menexenus and the old Socrates both before and after the oration reveals the intergenerational tension between the two interlocutors. This tension manifests in the main task of the funeral oration, to wit, the 'harmonization of reputation and reality', necessitated by the fact that the political order is under strain on account of having lost its leaders and citizens.[6] The oration recounts heroic deeds (239a-246b) in its effort to reconstitute the intergenerational links that unite the city's multitude under a political identity, casting the city as a *tertium quid* upon which the generations can meet. As was the case for the rulers of Kallipolis, the ostensible threat is that family allegiances threaten to override allegiances to the city.[7] Plato's answer lies in his innovation to the funeral oration genre: the prosopopoeia of the generation of men who died in battle (246b-247c). This is when reputation – understood as a normative goal for the living – is transmitted from one generation to the next. At a critical juncture in the life of the city, therefore, reputation operates remedially. In fact, reputation is a defining characteristic of *politeia* with the multitude being the source of reputational judgments, putting the rulers and the ruled in a reciprocal relationship. An important consequence of this intergenerational focus is the recognition of the broader constituent elements of the *politeia*: the multitude (*plêthos*), not only the citizens (*polites*).

[6] Loraux, 2006, p.216. Although the six extant written funeral speeches (or fragments thereof) that have survived 'constitute a nearly incommensurable bunch…[they] do share a general structure', admit Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.67. In addition to Plato and Thucydides, we have a fragment by Gorgias (fifth century BC), and orations by Demosthenes, Lysias, and Hypereides (fourth century BC). The orations begin with a preamble (*prooimion*), then go on to praise of the dead (*epainos*), and conclude with the consolation and encouragement (*paramuthia*). See Ziolkowski, 1981.

[7] Pappas, 2003, p.111 makes the point about the *Republic*.

In the second section I show the explanatory power of these claims. Aspasia's role in the dialogue has puzzled interpreters. Against those who ask 'why does Plato introduce Aspasia?', I claim that the more fruitful question is 'how does her introduction affect our reading of the dialogue?' My answer is what I call the 'Socrates-Aspasia fusion', a device that is symbolic of the capacious category of the *plêthos*, symbolic, that is, of the right understanding of what constitutes a good reputation (*eudoxia*, 238d) in a political order: men *and* women, citizens *and* non-citizens, locals *and* foreigners. Moreover, considered as a device, the Socrates-Aspasia fusion functions to block a reputation from accruing to the orator. This brings into focus the dialogue's argumentative target: the Athenian orator-general Pericles. Pericles' attempt to refashion the city in his image and erode the distinction between the reputation of the city and his own, shows that he fails to understand that the reputation of the city cannot and should not be coextensive with that of a single man.

1. The *Menexenus* as a Dialogue: Intergenerational Relationships and Reputation

Like the *Apology*, the *Menexenus* is more monological than dialogical. Unlike the *Apology*, which includes a series of trial speeches, the *Menexenus* includes a funeral oration. While there is much about which to disagree in the *Menexenus*, if there is one gravitational pull in the scholarship it is that scholars conflate the dialogue with the funeral oration that it includes.[8] Schofield's recent analysis of the dialogue in a proffered translation to English is illustrative. Schofield breaks down the dialogue into twenty parts, two of which he labels 'introductory conversation' and 'concluding conversation'.[9]

[8] Saxonhouse, 1992, pp.113-117 and pp.121-122 is a felicitous exception.
[9] Schofield in Plato, 2009, p.116.

That interpretative bias is at work here is shown by the fact that his analysis is discordant with the overall number of Stephanus pages that make up the dialogue: out of sixteen pages (234a-249d), a sum total of three are devoted to the framed dialogue (234a-236d and 249d-e). By comparison, therefore, Schofield's analysis posits that the *Menexenus* is only ten percent (two of twenty) framed dialogue, whereas the raw data doubles that amount (three of sixteen). On Schofield's analysis, if we equate the *Menexenus* to the oration that it contains, we ignore only a tenth of the dialogue. Yet, a mere page count reveals that we are actually ignoring a fifth of it.[10]

While Pappas and Zelcer parse the dialogue differently from Schofield, the outcome of their interpretative commitments is similar. They divide the dialogue into six sections, two of which refer to the opening and closing conversations between Socrates and Menexenus. While this interprets these conversations to be one third of the total dialogue, they do not pay attention to this third. Their persistence in calling this conversation 'the framing dialogue' already subordinates the conversation to the speech; after all, a frame without content is empty.[11] What is more, their turn of phrase – 'the *Menexenus* and its funeral speech' – betrays that they do not think of it as a dialogue.[12] In fact, their approach towards the dialogue restricts them from doing so, for they want to compare the speech in the *Menexenus* with that of Pericles: 'We will address the question of parody by asking not whether the *Menexenus* is serious or funny, but whether its speech is intended to improve upon the original in Thucydides.'[13]

[10] These calculations are illustrative of one reader's unstated interpretative commitment to reduce the *Menexenus* to a funeral oration. I am not making any additional claims about where the philosophical interest of the dialogue may lie.
[11] Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.6.
[12] Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.9.
[13] Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.6.

We should not be dismissive of the parts that are not devoted to the oration.[14] As scholars have emphasized time and again, that Plato chose to write dialogues is revealing of his philosophical commitments. Other things being equal, therefore, an interpretation that treats the *Menexenus* as a dialogue is preferable to an interpretation that treats the *Menexenus* as a funeral oration that happens to be bookended by dialogue. Treating the *Menexenus* as a dialogue rather than as an oration, generally, and attending to the conversation between Menexenus and Socrates, in particular, reveals Plato's preoccupation with intergenerational affairs.[15] This conversation focuses our attention on the confrontation between generations with respect to ruling.[16]

In the opening gambit, Socrates is befuddled as to why Menexenus would be at the council-chamber: 'You, going to the council-chamber (*bouleutêrion*)? Why, in particular?' (234a).[17] Socrates then puts words into the boy's mouth and singles him out as a representative of the younger generation who want to rule over the old: 'No, don't tell me, you think you've reached the end of education and philosophy, and you're planning to move on to greater things, fully equipped as you now are. Your aim is to hold

[14] Plutarch's influence is largely responsible for this: 'even though the beginning of Plato's *Menexenus* is not entirely serious (*ei kai meta paidias ta prôta gegraptai*), it still contains an element of historical fact when it states that it was Aspasia's rhetorical skill which was commonly supposed to be the reason why a number of Athenians spent time with her.' Plutarch, 'Pericles', 24. The Neoplatonist Proclus (421-485) might be seen as recommending the opposite approach; he reads the prelude as a packaged version of the philosophy of the dialogue, see Proclus's *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* 658.34–659.23; quoted in Burnyeat, 1998, p.2.

[15] Collins and Stauffer, 1999a, pp.5ff also pick up the preoccupation of the *oration* with generational affairs. Their treatment of the *Menexenus* pays attention to the opening conversation but ignores the closing conversation.

[16] This is consistent with Dean-Jones's thesis that Menexenus is the son of Socrates, as opposed to Menexenus, son of Demophon who is an interlocutor in Plato's *Lysis* and is cited as present at Socrates' deathbed in the *Phaedo*. Dean-Jones, 1995. Rosenstock also thinks Menexenus is the son of Socrates, but that Socrates is 'a "shade" speaking to his son'. Rosenstock, 1994, p.340. 'Menexenus must be around the age of 18 since he is represented as about to take up the political duties and privileges of an Athenian citizen', note Collins and Stauffer, 1999, p.89, fnt. 7.

[17] Given the political education that an older, free citizen was socially expected to confer upon a younger, potential citizen, we should not be surprised by Socrates' sexual overtures to the boy (see 236d). Read as such, this is a challenge to the arguments in Rosenstock, 1994 and Lesley Dean-Jones, 1995.

high office among us (can you believe it – at your age!), despite our seniority' (234a).[18] Socrates does not stop there. He jibes that Menexenus' motives lack public virtue: 'You don't want a time ever to come when your family (*oikia*) is not providing someone to keep an eye on us' (234a-b). According to Socrates, the young Menexenus' desire to rule the city originates from his family heritage.

In his rejoinder, the young man displays none of the expected deference towards the older man. Menexenus' initial response is conciliatory – 'With your permission and guidance I shall be very glad to hold high office' (234b) – before he corrects Socrates that the reason he was at the council-chamber is because he wanted to see who would be chosen to fulfill the ancient custom of giving a funeral speech for the dead. His motives are civic, not familial. The reconciliation between the two interlocutors is short-lived. Unlike the seasoned Socrates, this imminent citizen is enthralled both by the process of choosing a speaker and by the act of giving a funeral speech (235c). Socrates' persistent belittling of the latter leads Menexenus to challenge the old man: 'Do you think *you* would be capable of making the speech, if you had to – if the council chose you?' (235e).

Menexenus grows impatient at what he must perceive as prevarications, persistently badgering Socrates: 'So what would you find to say, if you did have to speak?...Why not recite it [the speech Socrates claims to have heard from his teacher in oratory, Aspasia], then?' (236a-c). Eventually, the boy turns belligerent towards the old man: 'Nonsense, Socrates. No, make the speech…I don't care if it's Aspasia's speech you want to deliver,

[18] This description is cognate to that which Socrates provides of those who study philosophy early 'But just when they reach the hardest part – I mean the part that has to do with giving a rational account – they abandon it and are regarded as fully trained in philosophy'. *Republic*, 6.498a.

or whose – just make the speech…Just make the speech. I insist' (236c).[19] After airing his worry that Menexenus will think that he is 'playing the fool at my age (*an soi doxô presbutes ôn eti paizein*)' (236c), Socrates proceeds to deliver Aspasia's oration.[20]

Menexenus' behavior conforms to the 'uniform picture of the bellicosity of the young', which Dover posits as typical of the time.[21] Even after the oration is over, Menexenus is dazzlingly impervious to Socrates' persistent qualifiers about this being his teacher's speech: 'Heavens, Socrates, how gifted you make Aspasia out to be. Fancy a woman being able to compose a speech as good as that' (249d). In fact, Menexenus cares naught for whose speech it is: when the old man promises to deliver 'more of the fine speeches she [Aspasia] writes for political purposes' as long as the young man does not betray him, Menexenus urges Socrates to 'Just keep bringing them' (249e).[22] Observe Socrates' willingness to deliver these speeches; despite his age, he does not think them hackneyed.

The conspiratorial ending notwithstanding, the communication between the two generations remains fraught. I therefore hesitate to accept Zuckert's reading which holds that because Socrates does not think that Menexenus is implacable in his determination to rule, 'Socrates presents his young associate with an interpretation of Athenian history that would lead him to advocate adherence to the old laws and not to undertake revolutionary

[19] A young man bamboozling Socrates into doing something he is not inclined to do recalls the opening of the where Polemarchus insists that Socrates change his plans and stay in Piraeus. *Republic*, 1.327c.
[20] Socrates' offer is appropriate for a young, not old, man, and it betrays how the old and the dead want to be remembered: in the prime of their life, at their most statuesque. By way of contrast, the Athenian says in the *Laws*, 7.802a: 'But to honor a man with hymns and panegyrics during his lifetime is to invite trouble: we must wait until he has come to the end of the course after running the race of life successfully'.
[21] Dover, 1974, p.105.
[22] Menexenus is hungry for *logoi*, not unlike Socrates in the *Republic* who concedes Thrasymachus' reproach and calls himself 'a glutton (*lichno[s]*)'. *Republic*, 1.354b. It is easy to note how far Menexenus' attitude is from that of the reluctant philosopher rulers of Kallipolis. 'Menexenus is the one who thinks Socrates is joking and actually hates all rhetoric; it is Menexenus who believes that Aspasia could not have written the speech. Socrates by contrast keeps claiming that Aspasia is a skilled rhetorician, and does not change his story. When readers of the *Menexenus* say they hear the joke and mockery in the speech, they are sounding like the brash and cocky interlocutor'. Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.43.

projects the way Alcibiades and Critias did'.[23] In a similar vein, Saxonhouse argues that 'The speech that Socrates gives via Aspasia will moderate [Menexenus'] competitive spirit…dampen[ing] any desire for public glory'.[24] Still, it is worrisome that Menexenus – even after the speech is over – fails to detect what is surely a decisive factor for a speech that is meant to be delivered by a worthy citizen: did a foreigner or a citizen compose it? Arguably, Menexenus is envious of a female foreigner who possesses a skill set on which the Athenians placed great value. Both Zuckert and Saxonhouse underemphasize what is an implicit assumption of their respective readings: that Socrates and Menexenus do not see eye-to-eye.[25]

Perhaps I have overemphasized the bellicosity of Menexenus. After all, as Plutarch maintains, the opening conversation is playful, while the boy's promise to keep secret any further Aspasian speeches that Socrates relates suggests friendliness rather than enmity.[26] My riposte to the former is that to concede the possibility of levity to the opening conversation does little to undo the fraught communication between Socrates and Menexenus. For malice to appear in a jocular tone is neither a novelty nor a peculiarity. As Pappas and Zelcer observe, Menexenus 'is the only one laughing' in reference to what the boy takes to be Socrates' ridicule of the orators (235c).[27] As for the note of secrecy on which the dialogue concludes, Menexenus says in response to Socrates' condition for relaying more of Aspasia's political speeches: 'Don't worry, I

[23] Zuckert, 2009, p.817.
[24] Saxonhouse, 1992, p.122.
[25] We cannot help but wonder whether Socrates is about to corrupt *this* youth with his speech; if the oration is satire, he might be doing just that.
[26] Plutarch, 'Pericles', 24.
[27] Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.91. I therefore disagree with Collins and Stauffer who characterize the conversation as 'playful, friendly'. Moreover, their understanding of such a characterization is unconventional, given that they identify Socrates as 'chiding his young friend [and as one who makes]…an effort to take some wind out of Menexenus' sails'. Collins and Stauffer, 1999a, pp.3, 16-17.

won't betray you (*tharrei, ou katerô*)' (249e). The Greek is indeterminate as to whether the two men are conspiring or if Menexenus is delivering a veiled threat. It remains in Menexenus' power to report or denounce (*katerô*) Socrates to the city for privately relaying to an imminent citizen speeches intended for public consumption. To add insult to injury, these speeches fail to meet two conditions for citizenship: neither an Athenian, nor a man composed them.

Still, one might retort that my interpretation underemphasizes the playful erotic overtures of the interaction between the two interlocutors. These are evidenced in Socrates' offer 'to strip and dance…seeing that there's only the two of us here' (236d), and they are consistent with the pederasty that was institutionalized in the coming-of-age of the Athenian young men. With respect to Socrates' offer to strip, Sennett is helpful: 'To the ancient Athenian, displaying oneself affirmed one's dignity as a citizen…These mutual acts of disclosure were meant to draw the knot between citizens even tighter.'[28] The offer to strip should not be taken merely or even predominantly as playful.[29] It is an offer that refers to the practices of citizenship. In general, therefore, these overtures, far from loosening the tautness of the interaction between Socrates and Menexenus, in fact heighten it. Far from being consensual and coordinated in character, the practice of pederasty was fraught with psychological and physiological violence.[30]

[28] Sennett, 1994, p.3.
[29] Democracy is guilty, according to Socrates, for badly ordered intergenerational affairs: 'the young imitate their elders and compete with them in word and deed, while the old stoop to the level of the young and are full of play and pleasantry, imitating the young for fear of appearing disagreeable and authoritarian'. *Republic*, 8.563a.
[30] See Halperin, 1990.

The tension between Menexenus and Socrates suggests that they would not receive the speech in the same way. The young are there to learn, the old are there to remember.[31] For the old have certainly heard such a speech before, whereas the young may be hearing it for the first time. Indeed, Socrates' explanation for why Menexenus was at the Assembly is insufficient; a desire to rule need not manifest in an eagerness to see who is selected to give the funeral oration. The old rediscover what has become part of their own lives living in a city; the speech is recognizable to them (or should be) as a part of a living polis. The old recall that their second nature (being an Athenian) is an acquired one; they can only make such a discovery after it has become second nature. In addition, the old will recall the last time they heard such a speech and come to anticipate its content.[32] As Thucydides intimates when he introduces 'the procedure at these burials', it won't have been long since they last heard it.[33] The young, who are the future of the polis, bring to it an excitement that does not guarantee they will embrace what it says; they are in a position to undercut the city's values.[34] *That* Menexenus is eager to follow the process by which the speaker is selected and is hungry for the speech is at once a welcome and a problematic attitude; welcome because he might be persuaded to continue the work of his ancestors, problematic because he is eager to rule irrespective of whether he continues their work.

[31] These are one and the same, under Plato's description of education in *Republic* and/or in Socrates' description of 'finding knowledge within oneself recollection' in the *Meno*, 85d.
[32] The persuasive force of Plato's protreptic writing also functions in this way. See Kahn, 1996 and Allen, 2010. In the *Republic*, Glaucon claims that the founding myth of Kallipolis will be more persuasive to 'later generations and all the other people who come after them' (3.415d), rather than the first generation of guardians.
[33] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.34.
[34] See Carter, 1986 and Connor, 1992.

In her landmark study on funeral orations, Loraux describes the function of the oration as an attempt at 'a harmonization of reputation and reality'.[35] The discord that Loraux's turn of phrase presumes is that the circumstances that demand a funeral oration for the dead are such that the political order of the city is under strain because citizens – leaders of the *oikos* and the *polis* – have died.[36] As Barry Strauss notes, 'while they [the Athenians] prized equality, they equated the supreme power of the Athenian people in the constitution with the power of an Athenian father in his household…paternal authority was intimately connected with political authority.'[37] This double loss undercuts the foundations and legitimacy of the *politeia*.[38]

Hence, it should not be surprising that the individual as a unit of explanation is suppressed in the speech. Unlike Thucydides, Plato has no individual making the speech. Unlike Lysias, Plato does not consider Themistocles important enough to mention as a contributor to Athenian glory.[39] The unit of explanation is the city and, as the secondary literature attests, its unified identity is at stake.[40] The majority of the oration recounts the deeds of generation upon generation of Athenians up until the Peace of Antalcidas or

[35] Loraux, 2006, p.216. Admittedly, this phrase is somewhat gnostic: I take it only as evidence of the fact that a widely cited scholar thought reputation to be central to the task of the funeral oration genre.
[36] 'The funeral oration has its place in Athenian paideia [sic.], that vast educative complex comprising institutions and cultural models that from childhood to death took charge of the citizen'. Loraux, 2006, pp.204-205.
[37] Strauss, 1993, p.10.
[38] After Pericles had finished giving his oration in honor of the dead at Samos, a woman, Elpinice, does not greet him 'as if he were a victorious athlete' but scolds him for having 'caused the deaths of large numbers of brave Athenians…in subduing an allied city, a city of fellow Greeks'. Plutarch, 'Pericles', 28.
[39] Lysias, 'Funeral Speech', 42. Kahn argues that the *Menexenus* is a response to the funeral orations in Thucydides and Lysias. Kahn, 1963, pp.230-232.
[40] See Carter, 1991. As Finley notes: 'the appeal to, and argument from, the ancestral past habitually crosses lines…It is, in short, ideology in its classic form.' Finley, 1986, p.45. Cf. Loraux, 2006, pp.350-351, 411. For a more sanguine reading, see Mara, 2008, p.140.

King's Peace of 386 BC that concluded the Corinthian War.[41] In recounting these deeds the oration relates the coming and going of generations, a historical account that aims at shoring up the links that constitute the community. The 'most obvious topic' of the oration is, as Collins and Stauffer insist, 'Athens'.[42] The city 'becomes a central character, unifying both the speech and its hearers', writes Carter.[43] 'From its origins in autochthony (237b), the creation of the city's identity is achieved without going into the individual soul.[44] As Saxonhouse observes: 'No special praise of actions that might separate one actor from another is offered. All are enclosed in the city.'[45]

The oration creates a narrative not only for the sake of identity but also for the sake of going on together.[46] What the oration must do is frame the situation of defeat in such a way so as to encourage the city to carry on. Veyne notes that, 'One cannot be lying when speaking more highly of values than one strictly should.'[47] We might take this further and say that one needs to do so, that is, one needs to create this excess because only thusly will one properly symbolize the collective power that is the city, over and above individuals. The *tertium quid* for the generations, as it were, is the city carrying on. This *tertium quid* is not yet in existence. It is (re)created by positing the city as a single, unified unit of explanation acting in the past as well as the future. The *Menexenus*, Monoson writes, 'self-consciously aim[s] not to describe Athenian life accurately but to

[41] Called 'King's Peace' because the Persian King Artaxerxes brokered it (Antalcidas was the Spartan who negotiated the peace with the king). Its major effect was to reestablish the influence of Persia in Ionia and the Aegean.
[42] Collins and Stauffer, 1999a, p.4.
[43] Carter, 1991, p.227.
[44] Scholars sometimes remark upon the levity with which Socrates-Aspasia describe the Athenian civil war. Swearing an oath to *mê mnêsikakein* (not to remember past wrongs) sealed the amnesty upon the restoration of democracy in Athens in 403 BC. The reconciliation Plato describes is not so far-fetched. This act of willful forgetting might be re-described as wiping clean of reputations after an otherwise unforgettable civil war.
[45] Saxonhouse, 1992, p.116.
[46] I lift the phrase 'going on together' from Ober, 2007.
[47] See Veyne, 1988, p.79.

illuminate the political and personal virtues to which people should aspire, that is, to illuminate the possibilities for the city.'[48] The reason why the oration describes the city as acting as a parent is in order to displace the claims to authority that emerge from the family realm with renewed force at a moment such as this: 'to those who have died she [the city] acts as son and heir; to their sons, as father; and to parents and other relatives, as protector' (249b-c).[49]

The connection between the familial and the political is implicitly articulated. To the disruption of the family relationships the oration proposes a political rather than a familial response. Since there is no ready way to replace the natural heads of the families, the city must somehow maintain the political relationships of equality, which, in the normal course of things, depend upon hierarchical family relationships. As Ober and Strauss write of Athens: 'Both the dissonance between egalitarianism and elitism *within* political society, and the discontinuity between political society and the larger society of the polis, produced considerable tension.'[50] In the *Menexenus* the political spills into the perforated familial, for what political cohesion demands at this very moment is to reconstitute the broken intergenerational links and tend to the acephalous families. Orphans are treated along the lines of what the institutional arrangements of Kallipolis propose, whereby the sons of the Guardians need not be biologically related to their parents. As Aristotle puts it, referring to these arrangements: 'Each of the citizens acquires a thousand sons, but they do not belong to him as an individual: any of them is

[48] Monoson, 1998, p.505. As Allen writes of Athens: 'The community's networks of social knowledge and social memory were the executioner of reputation not only in the city's public spaces but also across time'. Allen, 2000, p.203.
[49] 'Mother of all citizens, father of war orphans, *hê polis* seems to transcend the distinction between male and female.' Loraux, 2006, pp.356-357; see *Republic*, 5.470d for another instance of the city as 'nurse and mother'.
[50] Ober and Strauss, 1990, p.237.

equally the son of any citizen'.[51] The intrusion of the city into family life nullifies the cultural existence of orphans: both they and the families from which the city's citizens are drawn, are to forget the salience of their circumstances as orphans and whole families, respectively.[52] The focus turns away from the city's familial units and onto the intergenerational relationships. If Socrates forgets himself after listening to funeral orations (235a-c), we can be confident that the audience will also forget that their bare life depends upon their families.[53]

To privilege the city by rejecting its disaggregation into its families, is to provide a remedy distinctive to the situation of the city's defeat. By contrast, familial language is reserved for the reconciliation appropriate after a different situation, to wit, that of civil war. This is evidenced in the description of Athenian behavior during and after the city's civil war. The reason both for the restrained way in which that war was fought and for the ensuing reconciliation is 'the true kinship (*tô onti suggeneia*)' they shared (244a). By implication it is in civil war that brother is set against brother, father against son. Confronted with acephalous rather than divided families, the appropriate response is to transpose the role of the household master to the city.

[51] Aristotle, *Politics*, II.3, 1261b38-40.

[52] See Huby, 1957 who reads the dialogue as a response to the Athenian orphan law. Kahn takes the form of Huby's approach (rather than its content) a step further to argue that what is unique about the *Menexenus* is that 'This is the only time we know of that Plato spoke out publicly on a matter of Athenian policy'; the stumbling block to this hypothesis is, as Kahn might implicitly realize, Plato's choice 'to speak anonymously and indirectly'. Kahn, 1996, p.54. Burnyeat, 2001; Balot, 2006; and Allen, 2010, all see Plato as intervening in events in contemporary Athens. At *Republic*, 8.554c, the guardianship of orphans is proposed as a test case for the oligarchic types because it is a situation 'where they have ample opportunity to do injustice with impunity.'

[53] Monoson observes 'the complete absence of any suggestion on Pericles' part that the relationship between citizens and city is in any way like that between children and parent. In fact, Pericles' speech is unusual among funeral orations for the absence of such a representation'. Monoson, 1994, p.266.

When the history of the speech ends, Plato introduces an innovation in the funeral oration genre: the prosopopoeia.[54] Plato personifies the generation of men for whom the funeral oration is being held: 'What I am going to say to you will be what I actually heard from their own lips, and also the kind of thing they would want to say to you now if they could, judging by what they did say then. You must regard the message you hear from me as being spoken by them in person' (246c).[55] The reputation of the men who died in the Corinthian war is to act as a normative standard for their offspring and as a mollifier of the misfortunes of their parents (246d ff).[56] When Kraut writes about the relationship between being virtuous forever and creating virtue, his reasoning captures the logic of the proposopoeia: 'I can create virtue in someone who will survive me and who will in turn create virtue in someone who survives him. If each member of this chain inculcates virtue in another who survives him, then there will always be some bit of virtue in the world for which I am a cause, and this is a state of affairs similar to the state of my being virtuous eternally.'[57] This logic is consistent with fourth century views of the relationship between the dead and the living. As Aristotle puts it, 'both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honors and dishonors and the good or bad fortunes of children, and in general of descendants'.[58] Such views betray an anxiety about divine punishment: according to Solon, divine

[54] Salkever, 1993, p.135; Rosenstock, 1994, p.336; and Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.27 all emphasize the novelty of the prosopopoeia.
[55] '[W]hat makes the personification so effective for *all* the listeners, not just those most immediately affected' is giving voice to the dead heroes who are models for the living. Carter, 1991, pp.229-230.
[56] Scholars who find the speech to be a parody (yet a parody worthy of attention) have trouble accounting for the unequivocal seriousness of this section of the oration. Henderson explains it away by saying that, despite his misgivings about Athens, 'Plato was still an Athenian', as if the fact that Plato is an Athenian suddenly becomes salient at the closing moments of the oration. Henderson, 1975, p.45.
[57] Kraut, 1973, p.340.
[58] Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, I.10, 1100a18-21.

punishment may fall upon the wrongdoer, or it may be deferred to his children.[59] When the dead speak in the *Menexenus* the appropriate response is one of piety towards them and their achievement of dying for their city.[60] To put it differently, the hold that the dead have on the living is that of authority (*kurion*), a quality that is necessary both in the household and in the political realm. The dead are like the law (*nomos*), both insofar as they express authority in its traditional garb and in their dependency on the living to fulfill their prescriptions.

The prosopopoeia reveals that the funeral oration is an opportune moment in civic life when intergenerational conflict can be productive and therefore help stabilize the *politeia*: 'let each man among us urge their descendants, as we would in time of war, not to break ranks with their forefathers' (246b). By refusing to be silenced, the personified dead forbid the city from going without them. By writing this dialogue and by bringing the dead to life, Plato shows that, in reconstituting a community, it is those who have died who give a sense of direction to those who must go on.[61] The prosopopoeia begins with an unmistakable intergenerational theme: 'Children, that you are born of brave fathers, the present occasion of itself makes clear' (246d). It continues with an agonistic call, as the ancestors urge the living 'to outd[o] us and those before us in glory (*eukleia*); failing that, then be aware that if we are victorious in our contest of courage (*aretê)* with you, victory brings us disgrace (*aischunên*)' (247a). By reversing the desired outcome of a struggle (*agôn*) among the living (where defeat brings shame, rather than victory), Athenian norms can continue their work by unifying the dead and the living. The

[59] Solon, fr.1.25ff; cf. *Laws*, 6.775d.
[60] See the Spartan King Archidamus' exhortation to his troops 'not to appear worse than your fathers'. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.11.
[61] In *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, Marx expresses the opposite view: 'The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.' Cited in Euben, 2003, p.108.

'greatest of goods' is to become 'courageous and of good renown (*agathous kai eukleeis*)' (247d).[62] Therefore, unlike what Collins and Stauffer claim, the voice of the dead represent not 'the voice of familial authority', but of the city.[63]

The agonistic language of the dead is clothed in military metaphor. When the city's continued existence is under threat, the logic of the *agôn* is turned on its head. The dead say that defeat in reputation would please them and make the current generation their friends. Given that any city that seeks to perpetuate itself must confront the problem of human mortality, we must infer that this *agôn* cannot and must not ever cease. Thus, the two logics – an *agôn* the living must win, and an *agôn* the dead must lose – operate together. What is subversive is that the necessity of the city's survival forces it to pit one generation against another *and* claim that defeat will be well-received by the dead. This broaches contradiction, for the mentality of the *agôn* subsists not because of the possibility of defeat, but of victory. The contradiction never materializes, however, since the dead cannot compete or plead their case: they are always reliant on what the living make of them. Should they speak, they must speak through someone living, as they do in the *Menexenus*. The tension manifests in the famous anachronism of the speech: Socrates

[62] Loraux, 2006, p.142 writes of 'the astonishing persistence of the agonistic motif throughout the history of the [funeral oration] genre.' Elsewhere she speaks of 'the agon [sic.] of the funeral oration' and of the oration as 'an *agonisma* [sic.]'. Loraux, 2006, pp.274 and 361, respectively, *et passim*.

[63] Collins and Stauffer, 1999a, p.12. For Hume this is all very far from the norms of a "cultivated" nation. 'It is indeed observable, that, among all uncultivated nations, who have not, as yet, had full experience of the advantages attending beneficence, justice, and the social virtues, courage is the predominant excellence; what is more celebrated by poets, recommended by parents and instructors, and admired by the public in general.' The remark that follows strongly suggests that Hume had read the *Menexenus*: 'The ATHENIANS pretended to the first invention of agriculture and of laws; and always valued themselves extremely on the benefit thereby procured to the whole race of mankind. They also boasted, and with reason, of their warlike enterprises; particularly against those innumerable fleets and armies of PERSIANS, which invaded GREECE during the reigns of DARIUS and XERXES. But though there be no comparison, in point of utility, between these peaceful and military honors; yet we find, that the orators, who have writ such elaborate panegyrics on that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in displaying the warlike achievements. LYSIAS, THUCYDIDES, PLATO, and ISOCRATES discover, all of them, the same partiality; which, though condemned by calm reason and reflection, appears so natural in the mind of man.' Hume, 1983, pp.65 and 67 respectively.

died in 399 BC, well before the Corinthian war had even started (395 BC), while Aspasia is supposed to have died in 400 BC. In the *Menexenus*, it is the dead who speak for the dead.

Zuckert recognizes that reputation is at stake. Zuckert argues that the reason for the prosopopoeia is that 'Recognizing that she [Aspasia] (like Socrates) has less status with the children of the dead heroes than their fathers, she puts the admonition not to soil the reputation of their ancestors by acting ignobly into the mouths of the dead heroes'.[64] Zuckert's argument is internally inconsistent because, by contrast with the rest of her interpretation of the dialogue as 'a Socratic public or political work', suddenly and only for a brief moment, the relevant perspective is Aspasia's.[65] As a justification independent of its context, Zuckert's claim is unpersuasive because it raises the question of why Plato would have Aspasia deliver *any* part of the oration given that the children of the dead are always part of the audience? Surely it would be best if Plato had Socrates give the speech himself.

In the prosopopoeia the analogy between wealth and reputation is used to correctly order intergenerational behavior. The personified dead advise as follows: 'You must realize that to a man who has any opinion of himself at all nothing is more shameful than presenting himself to the world as an object of distinction not because of anything *he* has done, but because of the fame of his ancestors (*gnontes hoti andri oiomenô ti einai ouk estin aischion ouden ê parechein heauton timômenon mê di heauton alla dia doxan progonôn*)…to use up a treasure – be it in money or distinction – and not leave it to your children, because you have no personal wealth or reputation of your own is shameful and

[64] Zuckert, 2009, p.825.
[65] Zuckert, 2009, p.825.

unmanly (*chrêsthai de kai chrêmatôn kai timôn thêsaurô, kai mê tois ekgonois paradidonai, aischron kai anandron, aporia idiom hautou ktêmatôn te kai eudoxiôn*)' (247a-b). The personified dead tell the living 'not to treat the reputation of your ancestors as something you can draw upon for day-to-day spending (*progonôn doxê mê katachrêsomenoi mêd' analôsontes autên*)' (247b). The personified dead claim that it is virtue that gives value to behavior and to material things (247e-248a). The anxiety of the ancestors who speak is evident: the current generation must not abuse the reputation of their ancestors, while they must also leave enough for their own descendants.

In addition to the role of reputation in the right ordering of the relationship between the dead and the living, Plato's funeral oration explicitly theorizes the role reputation must play within the city.[66] The defining characteristic of the *politeia* is that it is 'in fact, an aristocracy upon which the many bestow a good reputation (*esti de te alêtheia met'eudoxias plethous aristokratia*)' (238c-d, my translation).[67] The emphasis is on the *plêthos*, a category more capacious than *polites*. As the formulation states what is at stake is the *eudoxia* of the *plêthous*.[68] Therefore, reputational judgments are sourced not in 'the world of the citizen' but in 'the world that the citizen and the noncitizen coinhabited'.[69] While such judgments can be partly controlled by the institutions of the polis, they can never be wholly constrained or reduced to them. Insofar as *plêthos* is a syncretic

[66] Monoson, 1998, p.493.
[67] This is not far from the language used to describe Kallipolis in the *Republic*: 'if indeed the ruler and the ruled in any city share the same belief (*hê autê doxa*) about who should rule, it is in this one' (4.431d-e). Later we are told that Kallipolis 'has two names. If one outstanding man emerges among the rulers, it's called a kingship; if more than one, it's called an aristocracy' (4.445d; see 8.544e).
[68] Scholars who explicitly comment on this line have overlooked this point: Salkever, 1993, p.138 and Monoson, 1998, p.493. Principal among the primary meanings s.v. *plêthos* is 'a great number, a mass, throng crowd'. Liddell-Scott, 1891, p.564. Even when the meaning of *plêthos* is restricted to the citizens (e.g. in Aristotle, *Politics*, II.5, 1264a13-14), the conceptual point still stands: while the opinions of non-citizens do not formally count, the use of *plêthos* suggests that these opinions still interact with and have a causal impact upon the opinions of those who do count, i.e. the *polites*.
[69] I lift the two phrases from Ober and Strauss, 1999, p.239.

category, Plato does not assume the difference between the sphere of the family and the sphere of the city. 'The household was a fundamental constituent of the ideology of the Athenian state,' Strauss notes. 'Polis and oikos [sic.] were less antithetical institutions than mutual and interdependent ones.'[70] This is consistent with Athenian experience where, in the words of Finley, 'family law cut across political rights and political systems'.[71]

Scholars contest the status and meaning of the description of the political order as 'in fact, an aristocracy upon which the many bestow a good reputation (*esti de te alêtheia met'eudoxias plethous aristokratia*)' (238c-d, my translation).[72] This attests to the importance of the description: 'it is misleadingly simple to write off the *Menexenus*' characterization of the Athenian *politeia* as purely pointless humor', notes Salkever.[73] Mahoney's is a recent reading, which we might classify with those who are eager to wish

[70] Strauss, 1993, p.11. 'We need to be suspicious of the notion of *homo politicus* and of the supposed dichotomy between *homo politicus* and *homo economicus*, which is overly schematic and compartmentalized. In Athens, for example, the theoretical distinction (a) between the citizen community and everyone else and (b) between politics and everything else was not only vitiated by practices…but was expressed by recourse to the very categories that were supposed to be excluded. What, for example, defines an Athenian citizen? Age, parentage, and (for practical purposes) gender – all ostensibly "strictly non-political" terms.' Strauss, 1993, p.9. Indeed, we might regard the 450/1 BC citizenship law as attributing even greater value on these non-political terms. Here is Finley: 'a Greek had his freedom severely restricted by law in any activity that entailed the introduction of new members into the closed circle of the citizen body. That meant, in particular, tight restriction in the field of marriage and family law. The state determined the legitimacy of marriage…Pericles' law of 451 or 450 BC, prohibiting marriage between a citizen and a non-citizen, is only the most famous instance.' Finley, 1981, p.87.

[71] Finley, 1981, p.87.

[72] I list several English translations in their entirety, to show that the key word – *eudoxia* – is contested: 'but is really an aristocracy or government of the best which has the approval of the many' (Jowett trans., 1892); 'but it is, in very truth, an aristocracy backed by popular approbation' (Lamb trans., 1925); 'in reality, it is government by the best men along with popular consent' (Ryan trans. in Cooper, 1997); 'in truth, she is an aristocracy with the approval of the multitude' (Collins and Stauffer trans., 1999a); 'what is, in truth, an aristocracy tempered by the approval of the masses' (Griffith trans. in Plato, 2009). In a comment on the passage Shorey, 1910 concurs, rejecting a Pindarean reading (cf. Loraux, 2006, pp.293-294 for a recognition of Pindar's influence on Plato). Tsitsiridis, 1998 has doubts about the translation of *eudoxia* as approbation or consent, the most important one being that, just like the verb *eudoxeô*, the noun derived from it always has a passive, not an active meaning. For Tsitsiridis, *eudoxia plêthous* can only mean that 'the many are standing in good reputation'. Consequently, the translation should be: 'an aristocracy according to the good reputation of the many.' I thank Jan Maximilian Robitzsch for drawing my attention to Tsitsiridis and for his kindness in translating the relevant passage from the original German.

[73] Salkever, 1993, p.138.

away the meaning of the description.[74] Motivated as he is to show the self-undermining nature of Aspasia's speech, Mahoney notes that since 'the Athenian "aristocracy" cannot faultlessly identify its *aristoi*' the result is that Athenian nature, which orders its regime, does not know itself […] who can and should rule in Athens is the result of *doxa*, and not true knowledge'.[75] Two objections might be made to this. First, Mahoney sets the bar too high: who can faultlessly identify the *aristoi*, after all? Political judgment about who is fit to rule can only be just that, *doxa*; it cannot be knowledge. Second, the point being made is that it is not easy to classify ancestral Athens *because* it is mixed. That people will call a *politeia* by different names is not a sign of a disordered regime. We might bring these objections to bear on Kahn, who writes that 'The emphasis on *dokein* points to the defect (from a Platonic point of view) of even the best features of the Athenian constitution; even where election is according to merit (e.g., for the generals), it is those who are *thought best* by the populace, not those who are *truly* best, who rule.'[76] *Doxa* and its cognates are not terms which, upon their mere mention, are to be regarded as Platonic slurs. That political life necessarily occurs in the realm of seemings or appearances is not a problem that we can wish away.

The passage following the description of the political order states: 'Equality of birth in the natural order makes us seek equality of rights in the legal and defer to each other only in the name of reputation for goodness and wisdom (*mêdeni allô hupeikein allêlois ê aretês doxê kai phronêseos*)' (239a). Therefore, natural equality of birth is the foundation

[74] Those who see it as important: Saxonhouse, 1992, pp.119-120; Morrow, 1993, p.89; Salkever, 1993, p.138; Loraux, 2006, p.219; Zuckert, 2009, p.822, fnt. 8; Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, pp.149 *et passim*. Those who see it as unimportant: Vlastos, 1953, p.361, fnt.78; Coventry, 1989, p.9; Morgan, 1998, p.106; and Trivigno, 2009, pp.36-38.
[75] Mahoney, 2010, p.46; cf. Coventry, 1989, p.12.
[76] Kahn, 1963, p.226.

of the structures of command and obedience of the *politeia*, and what maintains it is 'the reputation for goodness and wisdom'. Those who rule are those good and wise citizens with a good reputation, as opposed to natural superiors. Goodness and wisdom, therefore, must be accompanied by a good reputation. To be good and wise and appear to be good and wise are the conditions for right rule in conditions of equality. This is a powerful political theoretical proposition that answers the question of 'who rules when everyone is equal?' The *primus inter pares* conundrum is decided by, on the one hand, individuals being good and wise, and, on the other, having a reputation among others for being good and wise.[77]

How difficult it is to attain a good reputation even if you actually are good is a theme in Plato's political theory. Consider, for example, Socrates' failure to attain a good reputation in Athens, or the return to the Cave of the philosopher, or even the preambles, laws, and institutions of Magnesia in the *Laws* which collectively attempt to concentrate the efforts of individuals towards attaining a good reputation. In this respect, as the funeral oration relates, it is an achievement that Athens' 'reputation for invincibility (*doxan gar…hê polis eschen mê pot' an katapolemêthênai*, 243d)' on land and sea was 'justified' (*alêthê edoxen*, 243d).[78] In the *politeia* of the *Menexenus*, reputation puts rulers and ruled in a reciprocal relationship: the good and wise citizens must not only *be* good and wise, but appear to be so as well and this appearance must be accessible to the *plêthos*. Far from being a casual statement incidental to Plato's political philosophy, this description of the regime is specific and demanding of both those who command and

[77] This is consistent with the proposal of the *Laws*. For a linkage between the *Laws* and the funeral oration, see Morgan, 2013, pp.281-287.
[78] *Apology*, 18b-19a and *Republic*, 7.514a-517a, respectively.

those who obey.[79] The constitution of such a reputation lies, therefore, in the hands of the reputation-bearers and in the hands of the reputation-attributors. Yet, this gives the advantage to the latter, for an individual's reputation can never be wholly under that individual's control; in fact, we might fully discover an individual's reputation by bypassing the individual themselves and asking only those who know him.

2. *Contra* Pericles: The Socrates-Aspasia Fusion

The perspective through which the funeral speech is rendered – what I call the 'Socrates-Aspasia fusion' – symbolizes Plato's capacious understanding of the multitude. Before elaborating on this we must first broach a question that has exercised the relevant scholarship: why does Plato introduce Aspasia?

Scholars display a wide range of attitudes to Aspasia. Some readily dismiss Aspasia for the sake of Socrates: Aspasia is merely 'the nominal speaker'.[80] In fact, 'The reader is plainly to understand that this is being represented as Socrates' own speech'.[81] Perhaps she is an ironical device for Plato to distance Socrates from the speech.[82] Other scholars sidestep the issue altogether by simply denoting Socrates-Aspasia with the locution 'the speaker' or the 'Socratic/Aspasian oration'.[83] A popular and textually supported view is

[79] If Monoson is correct to say that 'Pericles' metaphor [of *erastês* and *erômenos*]…does not divide the citizenry into leaders and the led [and that] Pericles used the metaphor to develop a conception of citizenship', then all the more reason for Plato to propose a rival account of the relationship between rulers and ruled. Monoson, 1994, p.270.
[80] Stern, 1974, p.505. Loraux is similarly dismissive, mentioning Aspasia only on six pages in a book that exceeds four hundred pages. In Clavaud book-length treatment of the dialogue, the 'rôle d'Aspasie' is an afterthought, confined to Clavaud, 1980, pp.251-9. Collins and Stauffer, 1999 are an example of a rough-and-ready treatment of Aspasia. For an argument that necessarily whitewashes Aspasia, see Rosenstock, 1994.
[81] Cooper, 2007, p.950.
[82] Engels, 2012, p.19. Loraux and Zuckert also read the introduction of Aspasia as a way of Plato distancing Socrates from the oration; Loraux, 2006, p.402 and Zuckert, 2009, p.818.
[83] Nightingale, 1995, p.96, fnt. 12. The 'Socratic/Aspasian oration' locution is from Monoson, 1998, p.493.

that her presence makes the *Menexenus* a direct riposte to Thucydides' Pericles.[84] 'Plato's target must be the Periclean funeral oration'.[85] This is her speech, glued together from the remnants of Pericles' speech (236b). Still others reckon that 'Plato uses the figure of Aspasia to emphasize the way in which both the *epitaphios* and the other forms of patriotic oratory are forced by their nature to draw upon a stock of standard themes and thus allow no scope for originality or moral instruction.'[86] Finally, there is an umbrella approach: 'Aspasia becomes a link figure, the famous speech ascribed to her indicating what most interested Plato about the genre whose techniques as a whole she represents.'[87]

Aristotle also motivates a reason why Plato might put Aspasia's speech in Socrates' mouth: 'For a man would seem a coward if he had the courage of a woman, and a woman would seem garrulous if she had the temperance of a good man'.[88] Ergo, this is not Aspasia's courage but a man's and not Aspasia's delivery but Socrates'. To this we might add a reason proffered by the dialogue. Menexenus is at the precipice of being a citizen. He is about to pass into political life proper, that is, he will no longer be the beneficiary of the education reserved for youths, but will be expected to provide an education to future young men and to participate in political affairs. Plato addresses this imminent citizen through a man who is giving voice to a woman. Extant prosopographical affinities between Socrates and Aspasia might lend plausibility to this inference. Like Socrates,

[84] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.35-46.
[85] Kahn, 1963, p.232. See Friedländer, 1964, pp.218-220 and Kerch, 2008. Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.50 write: 'Whatever Plato's attitude toward Athenian history is in the end, it begins with the political reality that Pericles created…the *Menexenus* makes its image of imperial decline the indictment of Periclean policies'.
[86] Pownall, 2003, p.61; followed by Kerch, 2008. Contrast Pappas and Zelcer's hypothesis: Plato is offering an account of history of a kind that he believes other orators ought to have given'. Pappas and Zelcer, 2013, p.30.
[87] Coventry, 1989, p.3.
[88] Aristotle, *Politics*, III.4, 1277b20-22.

Aspasia becomes a target for the comic poets, and of Aristophanes in particular.[89] Like Socrates, she too was prosecuted for impiety (*asebeia*).[90] A personal link between the two might have been Socrates' stance 'against the mass call for a collective trial and execution of six Athenian generals in 406…[one of whom] was Pericles the son of Pericles and Aspasia […] Even if they had never met, she [Aspasia] would have known him [Socrates] as the man who wanted to save her son.'[91]

There is no good way to select among these options, nor are we obliged to do so. Instead, I ask a question which the internal evidence of the dialogue itself can answer sufficiently. This question is not 'why does Plato introduce Aspasia?' but 'how does her introduction affect our reading of the dialogue?' This allows us to seriously consider the fact that it is Socrates who mediates her presence in the dialogue.[92] It is not only a matter of explaining Aspasia's presence, but, additionally, of understanding what comes into being because of her introduction.

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[89] Referenced in Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, pp.24, 32. Henry groups Plato's *Menexenus* with the negative portrayals of Aspasia in Old Comedy. 'Plato alludes to Aspasia's comic reputation as a whore [pornê] in several comments, which include Menexenus' ambiguous "I've met her many times and know what she's like"' (249d). Henry, 1995, p.35. It is curious that "Aspasia the whore" is predominant in contemporary readings when this is only one representation of her among several in the ancient corpus. Here are Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.36: 'Far from demeaning Aspasia, Plato may be said to liberate her concerns from the focus on courtship and marriage that existing conceptions of woman imposed on everything a woman said…Plato sees, as Aeschines and Xenophon fail to see, that Aspasia merely uses womanly subjects to communicate philosophical teaching.'

[90] Thanks to Pericles, Aspasia was acquitted; see Plutarch, 'Pericles', 32.

[91] Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, p.25. This was after the battle of Arginusae (406 BC), and Socrates failed in his opposition.

[92] Bloedow, 1975, p.33 takes Aspasia seriously: 'the question why Plato chose Aspasia as the architect of the oration [is]…inseparably interwoven with the question concerning the ultimate object of the work.' However, Bloedow goes too far, as it were, because he ends up whitewashing Socrates. Bloedow, 1975, p.44. The same might be said of Mahoney, who regards 'Aspasia's speech…as an indictment [of Athenian democracy] in the guise of praise'. Mahoney, 2010, p.39. If Aspasia is to be read negatively as 'a co-architect of the Sophistic movement' (Bloedow, 1974, p.48) or by way of emphasizing an Athens that 'does not facilitate philosophy' (Mahoney, 2010, p.51), then why – we might ask Bloedow and Mahoney – does Plato bother with Socrates? She might as well appear in *propria persona*.

I propose, therefore, to speak of the Socrates-Aspasia fusion.[93] This device fuses the overlapping binaries of male-female, citizen-noncitizen, local-foreigner, symbolizing the constituent elements of reputational judgments. The fusion is symbolic of the correct understanding of what constitutes a good reputation (*eudoxia*, 238d) in a political order, namely, the *plêthos*: men *and* women, citizens *and* non-citizens, locals *and* foreigners. Plato's fusion keeps these elements in play when the *patrios nomos* is to be fulfilled, pointing to the fact that reputation as a concept is constituted both by what the bearer of the reputation thinks of themselves (or what we can expect from a funeral oration by an Athenian for Athenians) and by the attributor of reputation to the reputation-bearer (which corresponds to the test for a good oration).[94] Plato's use of the Socrates-Aspasia fusion responds to the challenge that the problematic of reputation raises, to wit, that the ascription of reputation to an entity always depends on another entity. Henry grasps this nettle: 'Aspasia is her reputation, and her reputation is what men say it is. The real woman is encapsulated within her reputation just as the dead [of the *Menexenus*] are enclosed within their own reputations (*doxa*) and fame (*eukleia*)'.[95]

The respective genders and status of Aspasia and Socrates did not determine their political involvement. On his own account, Socrates the Athenian opted out of politics, for example, in his refusal to concur with demands of the Thirty.[96] In fact, it is Socrates' insistence to never leave the city, to never journey abroad makes him 'totally out of

[93] By 'fusion' I understand the combination of two distinct elements to form an impression that is not additive but syncretic. '[T]he very figure of Aspasia herself is gender-bending, subversive of the gender dichotomy that haunts Greek politics.' Long, 2003, p.60. This echoes Loraux, 2006, p.357: 'Removed from all representation and faceless, the city of the epitaphioi [sic.] is therefore also without gender.'

[94] *Patrios* is cognate with "fatherland" (*patris*) and its root is "father" (*pater*). To fulfill this custom, therefore, is to perform a duty to the fatherland *and* to the fathers (of this land). That Athens is feminized while the *patrios nomos* is fulfilled might be read as the victory of male ideology or, more fruitfully perhaps, as the coming together of male and female in the funeral oration.

[95] Henry, 1995, p.36.

[96] See *Apology*, 32c-e.

place' (*atopôtatos*), exactly like a stranger.[97] That Aspasia was a Greek foreigner in Athens did not prevent her from directly affecting Athenian politics. Pericles led the Athenian response to revolt of Samos in 440 BC 'to gratify Aspasia' whose home city Miletus was at war with Samos.[98] Aspasia, therefore, is far from being 'the quintessential outsider'.[99]

That Aspasia should be concerned with such matters is not surprising. Aspasia is directly involved in the questions of what a citizen is and what it means to be recognized as one. 'Aspasia of Miletus' (249d) was a free woman, not a slave, which was the condition for her living as the *de facto* wife of Pericles and, after Pericles' death, to the Athenian general and democratic leader Lysicles. That her illegitimate (*nothos*) son with Pericles (born in 445 BC) was ineligible to be an Athenian citizen was the result of the 450/1 BC citizenship law.[100] Yet, when he returned to politics, Pericles asked for the law to be repealed 'in order to stop his name and lineage from completely dying out for lack of an heir'.[101] Thus Pericles the younger became a citizen.[102]

The audience of the funeral oration, as both Socrates (235b) and Pericles remind us was composed of 'both citizens and foreigners'.[103] A city's reputation is determined by both what Athenians think about their city and what foreigners think about Athens. This meets the test of a good oration, to wit, that it blurs the very distinction between foreign and

[97] See *Phaedrus*, 230c.
[98] Plutarch, 'Pericles', 24.
[99] Henry, 1995, p.37.
[100] Nails, 2002, p.59.
[101] Plutarch, 'Pericles', 37.
[102] Pericles' illegitimate son was made a citizen by decree after his two legal sons died in the plague; Monoson, 1998, p.498. At *Protagoras*, 319e-320b Socrates claims that Pericles failed to transmit his own political virtue either to his sons or to his ward Alcibiades. Pericles' failure as an educator of his biological and adopted sons is reflective of his failure as an educator of Athens. See *Meno*, 94b. At *Gorgias*, 515d-516d Socrates expands the charge to apply to Pericles in his capacity as political leader.
[103] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.34, see 2.36.

local. Prior to the oration, Plato's Socrates anticipates this blurring when he speaks of those effects of an oration that go beyond the local nature of the performance. 'I tend always to have some foreigners with me…and in their eyes too I suddenly become more impressive, since the effect on them seems to me to be exactly the same, extending not only to me but to the whole city as well' (235b). The language of the orator puts people above themselves, transgressing the boundaries of what is foreign and what is local. This test is implicit in Socrates's claim that 'it would take a good orator to carry conviction and approval (*peisontos kai eudokimisontos*)' if he 'had to speak well of the Athenians before an audience of Peloponnesians, or the Peloponnesians before an audience of Athenians' (235d).

One might object that I assume too much with respect to the elements of the fusion. Why assume that the fusion is composed of good or desirable parts? Indeed, while such an assumption may go unnoticed in the case of Socrates, we should remind ourselves that Plato does not always paint his teacher in a positive light. With respect to Aspasia, my assumption is implicit, emerging in resistance to those who all-too-readily treat her as a whore. Thus, even if one is persuaded that the fusion is a device in the dialogue, one may still ask what it is that justifies treating the fusion in a positive, rather than a negative light.[104] To remove the sting of this objection, we may ask what it requires. The objection entails one of two things, which may or may not overlap. The first is that, if the fusion is unfavorably intended, then the oration is a display of bad rhetoric. By treating the dialogue as a whole, my reading explicitly rejects this. The second is that the entire dialogue is a parody. While I have not made an exhaustive case for a non-parodical

[104] I thank Troy Catterson who put this objection to me at NPSA 2014 where I presented an earlier version of this paper.

interpretation, my reading belongs with those who have made such a case; this is betrayed in my discussion of the conversations between Menexenus and Socrates as well as my treatment of the prosopopoeia.[105] Therefore, we might reject the objection that I am assuming too much by seeing that such an objection cannot stand in a vacuum but only against a background of interpretative claims that I reject herein.

Another objection might be that the connection between the fusion and reputation is improbable because, as Loraux claims, 'the word *doxa* has meaning only in a male world in which renown is the highest reward'.[106] Even in the light of the historical fact that only men could be citizens in Athens, two possible ripostes avail. First, and directly corresponding to Loraux's ideologically-based reading of the *Menexenus*, we might reply with Strauss that, 'not only were Athenian women visible, but they were an essential part of the ideology of that supposedly all-male phenomenon, Athenian democracy.'[107] Second, Plato's attitude in the *Menexenus* is consistent with his (relative) inclusion of women in his wider thought. It is not just Socrates' ventriloquizing of Diotima in the *Symposium*, but also the philosopher queens of the beautiful city and the armed athletes of Magnesia.[108] It is a snub to Pericles' image of citizens as lovers of the city (*erastas*).[109] This image 'highlights the distinction between male citizens and the rest of the populace'.[110] Pericles pronounced to women that 'Your great glory (*megalê hê doxa*) is

[105] Most recently and comprehensively, Pappas and Zelcer, 2015.
[106] Loraux, 2006, p.208.
[107] Strauss, 1993, p.6.
[108] *Symposium*, 201e-212a; *Republic*, 5.457a-d; *Laws*, 7.805d-807c *et passim*. See Canto, 1994, pp.50-52 especially. See Schlosser, 2014, p.33 who claims that 'Socrates' conversations with women, foreigners, and slaves – to which accounts by Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon all attest – challenge the boundaries of an Athenian political imaginary that places such citizens outside the number of countable people.' Schlosser does not discuss the *Menexenus*.
[109] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.43.
[110] Monoson, 1994, p.258. As Salkever, 1993, p.136 notes, the very location of the dialogue 'blurs the bright Periclean line between the private and the public worlds'. In order to resolve the paradox in the

not to be inferior to what God has made you, and the greatest glory (*kleos*) of a woman is to be least talked about by men'.[111] Salkever astutely notes that to bring Aspasia out of the private sphere and to give her speech is to challenge Thucydides and (his) Pericles.[112] But Salkever does not go far enough.[113] To have Aspasia deliver the speech is to dramatically widen the otherwise traditional role of women in funeral ceremonies, which 'reduced [them] to the customary laments.'[114]

From Plato's perspective the Periclean claim is wrongheaded in three distinct ways: first, it categorizes individuals according to their physical natures; second, from a solely utilitarian perspective, it ignores half of the population and, third, it shows a poor understanding of reputation.[115] To elaborate on this last point, which is the most important for our purposes: the problem with Pericles' understanding is that it does not consider the multiple sources and varying dynamics of the economy of reputation. Reputation, that is, is not constituted merely by and in the domain that Pericles wants to separate out into the political.

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metaphor, to wit, that it makes the city into a passive, potentially servile object, Monoson argues that Pericles is referring to a specific type of sexual relation: that between a free male and a potential citizen. 'Pericles' use of an image of sex between man and boy suggests the irrelevance of women to politics and public life…a view made explicit later in the speech when Pericles virtually ignores the women present'. Monoson, 1994, p.261.

[111] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.45. In *A Room of One's Own* Virginia Woolf captures the contradiction in Pericles' words: 'The chief glory of a woman is not to be talked of, said Pericles, himself a much-talked-of man.' Cited in Loraux, 2006, ent. 50, p.471.

[112] Salkever, 1993, p.140.

[113] Yet he – correctly – goes further than both Saxonhouse and Zuckert. Saxonhouse, 1992, p.117 reckons that Plato and Pericles agree on this point: 'The public speech of the dialogue is to be kept private, out of the *agora* from which Menexenus had just come when he meets Socrates, that is, it must be kept within, like a woman would be kept – spoken of neither for praise nor for blame in the city at large, though men may talk of it in private, like women, among themselves.' Zuckert, 2009, p.826 paints Aspasia both conventionally (i.e. as a courtesan) and as a conventionalist: 'She would know all too well that it was contrary to Athenian customs and laws for a woman to speak in public'.

[114] Loraux, 2006, p.53.

[115] For the first and second errors see *Republic*, 5.451d-457b and *Laws*, 7.806c respectively. For a reading which, like mine, paints Pericles' political understanding as inadequate, see Saxonhouse, 2014, pp.67-76 especially.

The juxtaposition I want to draw here between Plato and Pericles is different from the commonplace contrast. Kerch is illustrative of the contrast to which I refer. 'Rather than caring for virtue as the source of honours,' he argues, 'the rhetoric of Pericles' Funeral Oration encourages care for one's reputation regardless of the condition of one's soul'.[116] That this is a false juxtaposition is shown from the fact that these are not true alternatives. Why presume that to care of one's soul and to care for one's reputation are opposites? In fact, as the *Republic* and the *Laws* tell us, reputation originates from the spirited part of the soul. Caring for one's soul and caring for one's reputation are part and parcel of the same activity. This is so even if one rejects the claim that the virtuous soul must care for reputation. A virtuous soul in this case must take heed to not care for reputation, and to do this is to take care of the soul in some way. Again, as both those dialogues show, individuals can achieve a good reputation by being virtuous; this is the very benefit of justice that Glaucon 'borrowed' from Socrates.[117]

To fuse Socrates and Aspasia is to give voice to the familiar misgivings Plato has about the encomiastic genre. One such misgiving is that the orator appears to be someone they are not. Pericles appears as Pericles, but what the audience gets is Aspasia. According to Thucydides, the man whom the city chooses to deliver the speech must be chosen 'for his intellectual gifts and for his general reputation (*hos an gnome te dokê mêaxunetos einai*

[116] Kerch, 2008, p.108, citing Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.43. Euben draws a stark contrast between the ideals of Pericles and Plato, respectively. See Euben, 1990, pp.205-6 and Euben, 1997, pp.98-99. Pericles' take on philosophy at Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.40 is also at stake between him and Plato; see Arendt, 2004, p.430. If Pericles is Athens, then Athenians can identify with Pericles; this is how we are to understand Athenian exceptionalism, i.e. via Pericles or because Pericles is exceptional. Plato's response is to love philosophy (*Republic*) and to love the *politeia* (*Republic*, *Laws*, *Menexenus*), not the man.
[117] *Republic*, 2.367e; cf. 10.612c.

kai axiôsei proêkê)'.[118] It would be a dupe on behalf of anyone, be they Socrates or Pericles, to be chosen by the city for their reputation and then deliver a speech belonging to someone else. If the speeches of other orators are directly related to their individual reputation, the Socrates-Aspasia fusion cannot admit of either a coherent reputation, or a reputational incentive on the speakers' behalf.

By making Aspasia's speech his own, Pericles violates a distinction between maker and judge. The justification for such a distinction is that the maker is biased towards what he made, unlike the judge who is better placed to say what is praiseworthy and what is blameworthy about it.[119] The maker of the speech, in both Socrates and Pericles' case, is absent. It is then up to the speaker to decide whether he should acknowledge the maker. The language of the *Menexenus* shows Socrates anxious to disown the speech – not because it is a parody – but because he should: it is not his. Indeed, he reports he had trouble learning it and he narrowly escaped a beating at Aspasia's hands when his memory betrayed him (236c). By contrast, Pericles acted as if it were his.

According to Plato's Socrates in the *Gorgias*, one reason why oratorical speeches are dangerous is because they allow the speaker to mold the audience. In particular, 'Pericles turned the Athenians into idlers, cowards, chatterboxes and scroungers'.[120] As a result, Pericles 'left them fiercer...more unjust and worse'.[121] Just like the relationship between an orator and his oration is always threatened by the assimilation of the oration into the

[118] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.34. That Menexenus reports that the speaker has yet to be chosen, shows that the 'action of this dialogue continues under the assumption that the question, "Whom should we choose?" remains open'. Monoson, 1998, p.491. The fusion device suggests that any single individual could prove problematic.
[119] The distinction and its justification are from *Phaedrus*, 275a.
[120] *Gorgias*, 515e.
[121] *Gorgias*, 516c. Socrates generalizes the point to include other generals (*stratêgoi*) who had political careers: Miltiades, Themistocles, and Cimon (Miltiades' son and Pericles' political rival). Writes Monoson, 1998, p.495: 'Its attack on the veneration of Pericles perhaps also links the *Menexenus* to another driving aim of both the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, that is, undermining the apparent attraction of tyrannical power.'

personality of the orator, so Athens is at risk of being cast in the image of Pericles.[122] The person delivering the oration, Socrates says, 'would be able to win approval (*eudokimein*)' by appearing to praise the dead when in fact he is praising the living (236a).[123] Both dangers should be avoided. Athens cannot and should not be arrogated to the reputation of one man who is urging its people to fall in love with the city.[124] The city needs a story that redeems its way of life but stops short of delimiting itself to the lifespan or political career of one man.[125]

We can expect great men to want to create cities in their image. Standing before the Athenians as the one chosen to give the oration, Pericles sounds like the cat that got the cream: 'when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses'.[126] Thucydides tells us that, in peacetime and in war, 'it was under him that Athens was at her greatest…It was he who led them (i.e. *to plêthos*), rather then they led him'.[127] As Mara observes, this is to treat 'Athens as if it were the conspicuous man write large, mapping the priorities of the daring individual in love with fame [i.e. Pericles] onto the community as a whole.'[128] Writing about 'Pericles' ideal

[122] Pericles' image was literally etched on the city's monuments: the sculptor Phidias 'included an excellent likeness of Pericles fighting an amazon' on the shield of his *Athena Parthenos* statue. Plutarch, 'Pericles', 31.
[123] Loraux, 2006, p.299. 'The author of an epitaphios [sic.] likewise seeks to bathe himself in the glory that he attributes to the Athenians'. Loraux, 2006, pp.292 and 38.
[124] See Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.36 and 2.41.
[125] Another flaw in Pericles' oration might be his privileging of his own generation, by contrast to the oration in the *Menexenus*. For this argument see Collins and Stauffer, 1999a, p.5. Saxonhouse notes that 'The dreadful, violent description of the plague attacking the human body that follows Pericles' glorious construction of Athens in speech presents multiple points of opposition that Thucydides surely intended his reader to note'. Saxonhouse, 2014, p.71.
[126] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.37.
[127] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.65.
[128] Mara, 2008, p.114. '[O]ne reason for seeing the *Menexenus* as a significant Platonic work is that it connects with all these more isolated comments about Pericles…[at every turn we find] Socrates replacing

vision of courage', Balot notes that this 'vision must remain contingent on the wise leadership of men like Themistocles and Pericles'.[129] The result is that 'in what was nominally a democracy, power was really in the hands of the first citizen (*egigneto te logô men dêmokratia, ergô de hupo tou prôtou andros archê*)'.[130] It is this we should resist, the *Menexenus* tells us. It is to intergenerational relationships that we must attend if reputational judgments are to operate so that the *plêthos* 'bestow[s] a good reputation' upon the political order (238d).[131] Otherwise, we are left to the self-destructive 'politics of self-flattery' that Pericles recommends unto Athens.[132]

Conclusion

If we consider the scholarship on the *Menexenus* published over the past twenty odd years, it is evident that taking the funeral oration seriously is not enough to pique political theoretical interest in the *Menexenus*. Perhaps what offends scholars is the intuition that critique and celebration (*encomia*) do not go together. Yet, as the argument herein suggests, scholars continue to ignore the *Menexenus* at their own risk. Not only does the

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Periclean propaganda with Platonic knowledge-claims – about education in the most pointed way, but also about rhetoric, and about the running of the city.' Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, pp.101-103.

[129] Balot, 2001, p.522. 'By contrast with Thucydides, Plato saw Pericles as simply one more leader who "pandered" to the demos' lowest instincts and appetites.' Balot, 2006, p.172.

[130] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.65. 'Athens could succeed, in Thucydides' view, only as a sort of monarchy in disguise', says Balot, 2006, p.131. Cf. Plutarch, 'Pericles', 39: 'the offensive power he [Pericles] had wielded, which had previously been dubbed autocracy and tyranny (*monarchia legomenê kai turannis*)'.

[131] Pappas and Zelcer argue that the city-soul analogy persists in the *Menexenus*. They make a strong argument for 'Aligning the *Menexenus*'s ethnic categories [i.e. non-Greeks such as those who came under the Persian empire; non-Athenian Greeks; and Athenians] with the three parts of the soul is a logical extension of the *Republic*'s city/soul analogy [i.e. appetite, spirit, and reason, respectively]…Not only the parties to the history [related in the funeral oration] but their motives and destiny too recall the *Republic*', paralleling the narrative of the history to the narrative of the regime decline in *Republic* 8. Pappas and Zelcer, 2013, pp.26-27; see Pappas and Zelcer, 2015, pp.182-213. I do not think that this account is at loggerheads with my own. Rather, there is a difference of emphases: whereas I focus on the dialogue as a whole, they focus on the funeral oration; whereas I seek to make sense of political order, they seek to make sense of the history.

[132] Saxonhouse, 2014, p.78.

dialogue attend to a problem any *politeia* must face, namely, how it deals with the deaths of its citizens, it also focuses our attention on the critical and contested domain of intergenerational relationships. At a moment of crisis, the city can either turn to its great leader such as Pericles, or it can turn to its intergenerational existence. The sudden and permanent absence of those who died puts the orphans and the young elite in volatile circumstances. The advantage of the intergenerational cast is that it accommodates the contingency brought about by the defeat in battle. The dialogue claims that the best way to frame this defeat is to create a living memory of the city through the Socrates-Aspasia fusion and the address by the dead. Therefore, the *Menexenus* as a whole makes a positive contribution to Platonic political philosophy: to guarantee the continuity of the *politeia*, we should focus on the capacious category of the multitude and the intergenerational tensions within it.

Conclusion
Theorizing Reputation

'No book can ever be finished', wrote Popper in the preface to the second edition of his magnum opus.[1] If this is true, then it applies *a fortiori* to this dissertation. To become an unfinished book, a dissertation must be sincere and critical about its findings. This conclusion, therefore, offers an archipelago of starting points that encourage conversation. I discuss the role of reputation across three binaries: philosophy and political power, the rulers and the ruled, and the individual and the city. I end by revisiting a motivation for embarking upon this study in the first place: the contrast between the prominence of reputation in contemporary social science and its absence in political theory. I suggest that this dissertation be taken as a promissory note towards changing the language political scientists employ to theorize reputation.

1. Philosophy and Political Power

Political theoretical studies of Plato must confront a problem that is at the center of his thought: the relationship between philosophy and political power. For Plato, the political world is the world of appearances. When the *Republic* posits that philosophers should rule, I claimed in chapter 1, it prompts us to ask how philosophy will appear in the political world. Even if we grant the normative proposition that philosophy should inform the institutional design of a *politeia*, we must also ask where in this design should philosophy make its appearance. There is also a question about judgment; for no sooner has philosophy made its appearance that we must consider who will judge it and what

[1] Popper, 2003, p.xii.

weight each judgment should have. What is the proper place of philosophy in the public imagination?

If Plato encourages us to ask these questions, his exposition of what philosophy is seems wanting; Annas is correct to say that readers of the *Republic* must cope with 'Plato's unclarity as to how we should think of the philosopher'.[2] As I suggested in the introduction, a reason for this unclarity is because philosophy is itself a contested notion.[3] The polemical aspect of Plato's philosophizing is never far from the surface of the dialogues, emerging vividly in the discussion in chapter 1 of the images of the cave, the ship, and the bride.[4] Why should we expect clarity in polemics? Plato's dialogues bear witness to their author's attempt to secure a reputation for philosophy that would displace his many competitors: the sophists, the orators, and those who wrote *Sôkratikoi logoi*.[5]

A memorable description of the philosopher's appearance in the world is found in the so-called digression of the *Theaetetus*.[6] This appearance seems to vindicate the stock understanding of (Plato's) philosophers as unearthly beings, whose bodies only 'live and sleep in the city'.[7] When it comes to participating in the city's institutions, 'how natural it is that men who have spent a great part of their lives in philosophical studies make such fools of themselves when they appear as speakers in the law-courts'.[8] These philosophers earn 'a reputation for fatuousness (*doxan abelterias*)'.[9] Yet, this description gets us no closer to an answer of how philosophy should appear in the world. In chapter 1 I claimed that philosophers should care about the reputation of philosophy; I highlighted those

[2] Annas, 1981, p.310.
[3] See Nightingale, 1995 and Nehamas, 1999.
[4] *Republic*, 6.496a.
[5] See Kahn, 1996, pp.1-35.
[6] *Theaetetus*, 172c-176d.
[7] *Theaetetus*,173d
[8] *Theaetetus*,172c.
[9] *Theaetetus*,174c

aspects of Kallipolis' institutional design that aim to give philosopher rulers a good reputation. It is disquieting to consider whether the philosopher should be turned into an "athlete of war" in order for philosophy to appear as it is.[10] The portrait of Kallipolis raises the general question: if we consider our *politeia* well-ordered should we expect philosophers to pursue public honors in it?

One may object that I am missing the obvious: isn't Plato's Socrates the model for the reputation of philosophy? The principal text used to justify such a view is the *Apology*; political theorists such as Villa and Kateb have relied on Socrates' defense speech to propose a contemporary model of Socratic citizenship.[11] However, the *Apology* becomes a problematic text once we desist from reading it as hagiography. From the beginning of his defense, Socrates admits that he has a reputation problem. Socrates tries to (i) destroy the reputation others have made for him, (ii) go on the offensive and saddle his accusers with a bad reputation, and (iii) build a reputation for himself.[12] If Socrates is a model for philosophy's reputation, then what are we to make of his failure to persuade the jury that his bad reputation is false?[13]

Plato insists that we think about the appearance of philosophy in the political world: the *Gorgias* also shows the difficulties philosophy has in acquiring a good reputation. The sophist Callicles excoriates and ridicules philosophy, urging Socrates to model himself 'on those who possess life and reputation and many other good things besides'.[14] Socrates and Callicles accuse one another of 'commonplace appeals to public opinion' rather than

[10] *Republic*, 8.543b-c. See Craig, 1994 and Frank, 2007.
[11] Villa, 2001 and Kateb, 2006.
[12] *Apology*, 17a-35d.
[13] In addition to his famous irony (*eirôneia*), Socrates is far from being a character that one can take at face value: 'He spends his whole life pretending and playing with people', claims Alcibiades. *Symposium*, 216e.
[14] *Gorgias*, 485d.

practicing the art of rhetoric.[15] The dialogue holds out the possibility of rhetoric that is 'admirable, bringing it about that the souls of the citizens are as good as possible, and battling to say what is best'.[16] Presumably, such rhetoric would do justice to philosophy in the political world. Aristotle broaches this issue when he identifies rhetoric as the 'counterpart of dialectic (*hê rêtorikê estin antistrophos tê dialektikê*)', that is, of philosophy.[17] The orator, Aristotle tells us, speaks capably about the *endoxa*, i.e. those things that are held in good repute.[18] Yet it is not obvious what the *endoxa* are, nor by which means they come about and fade away. All we know is that the orator is in a privileged position vis-à-vis the *endoxa*. Similar to, and independent of, Plato's dialogues, Aristotle's text gives us cause to investigate how reputation mediates the relationship between philosophy and political power. In so doing, Aristotle might constitute a point of reference in contrast to which the exclusive and peculiar features of Plato's thought can be better clarified.

2. The Rulers and the Ruled

For Plato, the category of reputation is closely related to the constitution of politics. As part of the genus of opinion and belief (*doxa*), reputation is variously and unavoidably related to the aims of a *politeia*, 'the Platonic linkage of knowledge and political rule' notwithstanding.[19] The notion of *politeia* is broader than what we today call "political"; '*politeia* in the sense of citizenness, way of life, and *politeia* as a specific political

[15] *Gorgias*, 482e.
[16] *Gorgias*, 503a.
[17] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.1, 1354a1.
[18] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, I.1, 1355a17-18 *et passim*.
[19] I lift the phrase quoted from Schwartzberg, 2010, p.463. Dunn captures the centrality of *doxai* in human life: 'no human being can have only beliefs which are unaffected by the impact of anything but other human belief. This claim can be made to look like an arresting, or ludicrously ingenuous, philosophical hypothesis. But it is probably the single dominating truth of human experience.' Dunn, 2000, p.184.

structure', as Lane puts it.[20] *Politeia* contains a cluster of meanings, for which even 'political order' – the translation of choice in this dissertation – might prove misleading. Insisting on this term is particularly helpful for a political theorist studying a concept as expansive as reputation. The interplay between reputation and *politeiai* points to a rethinking of what politics is and what it might be: 'the boundaries between the political and the purportedly non-political are themselves matters for political contestation.'[21] I pointed to one such contestation in chapter 2: that between Plato and Pericles about the question of the right constitution of the public and private domains. In our world of surveillance technologies, social networks, and new kinds of threats to state security, this question is timely.

My dissertation points to the horizontal, interdependent relationships between rulers and ruled. There are several ways in which reputation is a notion that belongs to the many rather than to the one: reputation is never a single individual's to give, it can never be wholly appropriated by the reputation-bearer, and it is independent of its bearer insofar as it can accrue to him despite himself. It is important that the economy of reputation admits entrants whom the *politeia* does not recognize as citizens. As I argued in chapter 4, to understand how reputations are formed, maintained, and destroyed, the capacious category of the multitude (*plêthos*) must be taken into account. This category cuts across the private-public distinction, for it includes those who are excluded from, yet impacted by, political institutions and decisions. The question is always posed from the perspective of the ruled: how does that which is ruled relate to that which rules it? Correspondingly, those who pursue, possess, and exercise political power must confront the problem of

[20] Lane, 2015, p.61; see Finley, 1986, pp.37-38.
[21] Lane, 2015, pp.317-318.

their reputation. This is consistent with a general feature of Plato's political thought: no matter how good institutions may be, political rule will always be highly demanding on those who exercise it.[22] Lane writes that 'the deepest [similarity between ancient and modern democracies] is a concern for controlling officials'.[23] We may therefore ask: as a social and positional good, how does the distribution of positive and negative reputation affect the distribution of power?

3. The Individual and the City

Even if we grant a correct distribution of political honors and offices, political power has a corrosive effect upon its bearers. This dissertation resists the prescription that follows from the platitude, to wit, that in the absence of just men we should opt for an unchanging rule of law. Instead, it calls attention to the performative aspect of obeying the law, that is, to individual judgment or what Schwartzberg calls 'epistemic dignity'.[24] This is Plato's answer to the question 'who is guarding the guardians?', an answer which, as we have seen, takes men as they are and laws as they should be (to borrow a turn of phrase from Rousseau's *Social Contract*).

Ober has shown that a causative force of democratic Athens was that every human being acted as a vehicle of spreading information to which politics is sensitive.[25] Political institutions invited individuals to scrutinize both power-holders and one another. The descriptions of Plato's *politeiai* give us theoretical justification for such claims. As I

[22] Walzer expresses a Platonic sentiment when he writes that 'Politics is always the most direct path to dominance, and political power…is probably the most dangerous, good in human history.' Walzer, 1983, p.15.
[23] Lane, 2015, p.125.
[24] Schwartzberg, 2010, pp.450 *et passim*.
[25] See Ober, 2008; Ober, 1998, p.149.

argued in chapter 3, mutual oversight addresses both the epistemic fallibility of individuals and phenomena that occur only when judgment is collectively exercised.[26] While scholarship on ancient Athens readily recognizes the role of reputation in the social and legal practices of the democracy, the extent to which Plato contributes to this discussion remains underappreciated.

How to fashion citizen judgment was the subject of chapter 3, where I proposed that the Magnesian *politeia* opts for a kind of judgment modeled on athletics. In contrast to the copious attention which the scholarship on Plato's *Laws* gives to the analogy of the free doctor (read: legislator) who treats his patients according to the 'double method' of persuasion and compulsion, the athlete analogy is scarcely considered.[27] Furthermore, it is likely that the combination of these analogies sheds light on Plato's political thought more broadly. It reappears, for example, in the *Gorgias*: 'Within statesmanship, the legislative process corresponds to exercise and the administration of justice to medicine.'[28] The coupling is of particular relevance for us today insofar as it insists on a physiological understanding of the processes of judgment, an understanding that is familiar to us today as the "embodied mind".[29] However, as with the philosopher-warriors of Kallipolis, the portrait of the agonistic city of free citizens is disquieting.

Unlike contemporary social scientific literature which delimits the role of reputation to the maintenance of cooperation, this dissertation shows that reputation is instrumental to the founding moments of *politeiai*. In a discussion of trust, Pettit argues that it is

[26] *Republic*, 2.359c-360d.
[27] The passage I am referring to is at *Laws*, 4.719e-720e. A coherent account of political obedience in the *Laws* must reconcile the two analogies.
[28] *Gorgias*, 464b.
[29] See, for example, Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, Penguin, New York, 1994.

'motivationally self-enforcing…It can create de novo [sic.]'.[30] From an individual perspective we can understand this in a straightforward way: as I argued in chapter 2, if Cleinias the founder proceeds with the task that has been assigned to him it will be because he is motivated by the prospect of a high reputation among Magnesians. Generally put, the pursuit of a good reputation motivates individuals to perform acts that they may not have otherwise carried out. It is because reputation sits between individual conceptions of the good that it proves a useful tool for cooperation among individuals: the pursuit of reputation can incentivize cooperation and offer a ready path to virtue.

However, when we take the perspective of a collective, it is unclear how we are to understand a *de novo* creation.[31] One way is through founding myths. This is what the Kallipolean myth of autochthony in the *Republic* and the Athenian claim to autochthony in the *Menexenus* amount to: the people of this city were born *de novo* from its land. The content of the myth functions as a definite and uncontested starting point in their histories.[32] Indeed, we can re-describe the efforts by the legislator of Magnesia we saw in chapter 2 as an intervention into the past, a selective remembering and forgetting of Dorian traditions. Something similar might be said about the history recounted in the funeral oration of the *Menexenus* given on the occasion of the Athenian defeat in the Corinthian War in 386BC. And, as we saw in chapters 3 and 4 alike, once the notional city has been established, its reputation can motivate its citizens. Reputation appears to be a contested notion across all three temporal dimensions: past, present, and future.

[30] Pettit, 1995, p.218.
[31] Cf. Arendt's emphasis on 'natality' as the ground of political freedom. Arendt, 1958, pp.8-9 *et passim*.
[32] *Republic*, 3.414e and *Menexenus*, 237e.

4. Studying Reputation

A motivation for embarking upon this study was the contrast between the prominence of the concept of reputation in contemporary social science and its neglect in political theory.[1] How, then, do social scientists use the category of reputation? We may distinguish between two approaches. The first is *a priori* and it usually employs a game theoretical methodology. This approach treats reputation as an *explanans* of the phenomenon of cooperation among human beings. Indubitably this approach is the most influential in political science in general, and in the study of international relations in particular.[2] Perhaps most prominent among the social sciences is the work in behavioral economics which employs a Darwinian framework.[3] Such a framework is also found in the second, *a posteriori* approach that treats reputation as a feature of social and cultural practices, taking rumor and gossip seriously. The originators of this approach are the sociologists Goffman and Bourdieu, while Detienne, Cohen, and Hunter *inter alios* have applied it to ancient Athens.[4]

These approaches neither emerge from, nor stand in, a vacuum; instead, they belong within broader attitudes to reputation and politics. A schematic outline of these attitudes will enable us to identify where Plato is conventionally placed.

Two strands regard reputation as desirable. First, and most influential today, is the view of reputation as a desirable sociopolitical category. On this view, reputation is power and

[1] The most expansive of encyclopedias of political theory and philosophy do not contain an entry on reputation. Zalta, 2015; Gibbons, 2015; and Bevir, 2010.
[2] See Schelling, 1966; Schelling's work is advanced by Jervis, 1982. For political science generally see Axelrod, 2006; and Greif, 2006. For international relations see Tang, 2005; Crescenzi, 2007; Tomz, 2007; and Walter, 2009.
[3] See Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004, reviewed by Fehr, 2004. In economics proper, see Kreps and Wilson, 1982.
[4] See Goffman, 1959 and Bourdieu, 1977; cf. Bailey, 1971; and Gambetta, 2009. The Darwinians are Alexander, 1979; Dunbar, 1998; Henrich and Henrich, 2007. See Detienne, 1986; Cohen, 1991 and 1995; and Hunter, 1993.

as such open to manipulation and strategizing. Given that the theoretical foundations of this view are found in the early modern political thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes it is unsurprising to find that political scientists are attracted by it.[5] Studies in organizational theory unreflectively assume such a view.[6] The second positive attitude to reputation is that which regards it as a desirable ethical category. This view is implicitly or explicitly reliant on an understanding of human nature as passionate and sympathetic, such as is found in the Enlightenment philosophers Smith and Hume. This is the view favored by political theorists who study reputation and its conceptual cognates.[7]

Two strands of thought regard reputation as undesirable. The first treats reputation as an undesirable ethical category: reputation falls outside virtue or morality. For the Stoic Epictetus, for example, there are things within our power and things outside of our power; reputation (*doxai*) falls within the set of things that are not in our power (*ouk eph' hêmin*).[8] For Rousseau, '"What people will think" is the grave of a man's virtue'.[9] And for Schopenhauer the proclivity we have towards reputation is 'a substitute for morality' which we must 'temper, as far as possible'.[10] The second is the view that reputation is an undesirable epistemological category: it construes reputation as the site of deception. On Plato's epistemology as elaborated in the metaphor of the divided line, reputation belongs to the lower, inferior parts of the line, where belief (*pistis*) and imaging (*eikasia*) are

[5] See Ostrom, 2003; in international relations, see Mercer, 1996 and Lopez, McDermott, and Peterson, 2011.
[6] See Fertik and Thompson, 2015; Picci, 2011; de Castro, López, and Sáez, 2006; and Weigelt and Camerer, 1988.
[7] See Brennan and Pettit, 2004; and Shearmur and Klein, 1997. In economics, see R. Frank, 1988. Haidt, 2012 has popularized this approach from a social psychological angle. For a Burkean reading of how reputations are part of the 'process of refining our traditions', that is, they are 'filters to access our knowledge traditions. These filters are the standards of our epistemic judgments', see Origgi, 2012, p.41. For Origgi, like Smith and Hume, passions are what motivate these judgments.
[8] Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, I. To insist that our reputation is not up to us is a nod to the category error human beings are prone to make.
[9] Quoted in Blackburn, 2014, p.89.
[10] Schopenhauer, 2013, pp.44-45.

found.[11] As such, reputation is both disconnected from the truth and often leads us away from the truth. Herein I have challenged this view, albeit in an indirect manner.

Lane urges that we 'remain alert to the Platonic question of the difference between appearance and reality.'[12] This question has motivated much of the argument of this dissertation. For Plato, appearances must correspond to, or mirror, reality. It is now time to confront the ambiguity in this claim: what does it mean for appearances to mirror reality? Arguably Popper's answer remains the most influential: '*Arrest all political change!*'[13] I have resisted this view on textual grounds: we are told that even Kallipolis, once founded, will deteriorate.[14] What answer shall we then give? Arendt's objection to the positing of a difference between appearance and reality might help us: 'In politics, more than anywhere else we have no possibility of distinguishing between being and appearance. In the realm of human affairs, being and appearance are one and the same.'[15] We might say that appearances mirror reality if and only if they are well-ordered. The attractiveness of Plato's view is that it refuses to be cynical about the possibility of well-ordered appearances. Platonic *politeiai* aim at an institutional design that resists the mistrust and cynicism associated with political attitudes with which we are all too familiar; in the language of the *Republic*, our worldview today is populated by chimeras rather than statues.[16] Plato's view insists that we must treat others at face value and that

[11] *Republic*, 6.509d-511e.
[12] Lane, 2012, p.130.
[13] Popper, 2003, p.91; see Havelock, 1990, p.22. 'In Callipolis [sic.] there is no changing', writes Saxonhouse, 1992, p.146.
[14] *Republic*, 8.546a.
[15] Arendt, 1965, pp.94-95.
[16] I have in mind attitudes to political advertising, negative and positive alike, which assume (often with good reason) that what is being said is only being said for the sake of winning political power, that what is being shown is merely an act and therefore an ersatz appearance.

others present themselves at face value. Of course it is not obvious what "face value" means, but we might heed this as a summons to our democratic imagination.

This answer might appear to defer the problem: well-ordered according to what? A Platonic answer could motivate plausible criteria from the evaluative truths found in the arguments and suggested by the images in the dialogues: that philosophy must have an appearance in the world; that political power is a dangerous good; that political office is demanding; that reputation mediates the relationship between those who possess power and those who obey; and that cultivating political judgment is a demanding task. Granted, how we understand these truths is far from obvious, but surely that is up to us, not Plato, to decide.

The way in which we theorize reputation today – to the extent that we do – is inflected with the language of political economy.[17] The conceptual apparatus of this language has seeped into the way we make sense of reputation, even when classical thought is the object of study. For example, in his discussion of 'the mentality of an agonistic society', Cohen writes that 'social relations define themselves through a politics of reputation, and the currency of that politics is honor'.[18] Nightingale tells us that the philosopher ruler of the *Republic* 'will never exchange his wisdom for…symbolic, or political capital'.[19] And it would not be difficult to point to the influence of this language in this dissertation.

If Greek political thought 'matters to us [today] because it is both like and unlike the political discourse of our time', then we must focus on the latter half of this claim: to study reputation in the Greeks should distance us from the conceptual apparatus found in

[17] See Brennan and Pettit, 2004 and Shearmur and Klein, 1997.
[18] Cohen, 1995, pp.62-63.
[19] Nightingale, 2004, p.9.

the language of political economy.[20] This is not to dismiss the main intuitions that motivate current political science studies of reputation, to wit, that reputation is power and that reputation requires an account of the moral emotions. The claim that a reputation for justice or virtue brings power in its train as well as the role of *thumos* in constituting Plato's *politeiai* capture these intuitions. One may worry that doing so take us too far in the direction of virtue politics.[21] As we saw in chapter 1, Kallipolis addresses the problem of deceptive appearances by making characters virtuous; the same may be about Magnesia. However, this objection misses the mark. If our concern is to study reputation via the conceptual apparatus of classical thinkers, then we should be motivated to identify the strengths and the weakness of such a schema. I gestured to one such weakness at the end of chapter 3: the assumption that the reputation of an individual and of a city are of a piece.

Therefore, this dissertation may be taken as a promissory note towards changing the political theoretical language of reputation. Put differently, we will theorize reputation better if we set up a rival to the current, all-too-familiar manner of thinking and talking about reputation. In so doing, we pay appropriate homage to the Greeks, for, as Popper writes, 'The war of ideas is a Greek invention.'[22]

[20] Salkever, 2009, p.4. A promising avenue to explore is those instances when reputation is made sense of by analogy to wealth (*chrêma*): see the prosopopoeia at *Menexenus*, 247a-b and Cephalus' anecdote about the encounter between Themistocles and a Seriphian at *Republic*, 1.329e-330a.
[21] Anscombe, 1958 is the *locus classicus* for contemporary discussions of virtue ethics. For the sake of argument, I assume here that such politics are undesirable. Ancient political theorists who propose such politics are Lane, 2012 and Balot, 2014; the former tries to motivate a theory of environmental ethics from Plato's *Republic*, while the latter tries to recover a theory of democratic courage from Periclean Athens.
[22] Popper, 1959, p.373.

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