

Kurt Birrenbach and the Evolution of German Atlanticism

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## ABSTRACT

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This dissertation explores the multifaceted life of Kurt Birrenbach as a window into the historical evolution of a Liberal German Atlanticism during the post-World War II era. While tracing the development of this Atlanticism into a “mature,” establishment phenomenon, themes addressed include the founding and financing of an elaborate infrastructure, the creation of extensive political networks also stretching abroad, the execution of ambitious public relations actions, and distinct tendencies towards geographic and thematic expansion. Those challenges confronting Atlanticism in the Federal Republic, among them the persistence of Conservative *Abendland* perspectives and, later, the rise on the Left of interrelated pacifist, anti-nuclear and environmental movements, are touched upon as well. The broader historiographical issues examined encompass postwar continuity and discontinuity in the Federal Republic, processes of Americanization, the functioning of transnational networks, the impact of generational change, and the political engagement of West German business.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

### A. Kurt Birrenbach as a Window into the German Atlanticist Milieu

German Atlanticism, with its core postulate of an essentially unitary north Atlantic civilization, underwent a significant and multi-faceted evolution in the postwar Federal Republic. Existing initially as a fledgling presence confronting a persistent Occidentalism that saw especially the United States as at best a mere appendage to the West European *Abendland*, German Atlanticism had developed by the late 1960s and beyond into a mature, establishment phenomenon, itself the subject of emerging challenges, primarily from the left of the political spectrum, to its constant efforts to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations. In the course of this broad, overarching process, German Atlanticism also evolved with respect to a multitude of its more specific features, among them its infrastructure, personnel composition, financing methods, thematic content, modes of activity and reproduction; the structure and scope of its internal, German, and external, transnational, networks; and, finally, the obstacles and challenges it faced both within the Federal Republic and abroad. This dissertation seeks to explore the evolutionary development, to identify its component elements, to determine its most powerful driving forces and to assess its wider impact.

The life and career of Kurt Birrenbach as they are utilized in this, not strictly biographical, study serve well as a crystal clear window into this unfolding world of Atlanticism in the Federal Republic in the critical decades following the Second World War. In addition to being among the most crucial and prominent of German Atlanticists during this period, Birrenbach also represented a relatively novel and still quite rare, though increasingly common, figure in German society: the politician-businessman.

Indeed, from the mid-1950s until well into the 1980s, in large part due to his roles as CDU parliamentarian, Thyssen steel executive and philanthropic foundation president, Birrenbach's career simultaneously spanned the domains of *Politik* and *Wirtschaft* as well as that of the *Wissenschaft*. Concentrating on Birrenbach, therefore, provides a valuable opportunity to observe German Atlanticism operating in a plethora of seemingly disparate spheres and levels and to bring these diverse but intimately connected realms of activity together into a coherent narrative over an extended period of time.

### B. Historiographical Trends and Debates Revolving around German Atlanticism

This dissertation touches on a number of major historiographical trends and debates, some of considerable practical import, in the voluminous scholarship related to postwar German Atlanticism. One such tendency involves a gradual expansion of focus in the study of trans-Atlantic networks. The first historical accounts of West German foreign policy and the relationship to the US appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as attention shifted away from tracing the roots of the National Socialist regime; as German foreign relations transitioned into a new era, as exemplified by the *Ostpolitik*; and as relevant sources, such as Adenauer's memoirs, became increasingly available.<sup>1</sup> During the 1970s, political, economic and business historians began to enlarge the study of German-American relations both thematically, to include subjects like American occupation policy, and methodologically, as attested to by a number of quantitative

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<sup>1</sup> Gerhard Wettig, *Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955: Internationale Auseinandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967); Wolfram Hanrieder, *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1967); Arnulf Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie* (Munich, Oldenbourg, 1969); Waldemar Besson, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Maßstäbe* (Munich: R. Piper, 1970); Bruno Bandulet, *Adenauer zwischen West und Ost: Alternativen der deutschen Außenpolitik* (Munich: Weltforum, 1970). However, long after the appearance of these initial studies, the "thirty-year rule" continued to restrict access to many archival sources.

analyses.<sup>2</sup> Yet up to the early 1980s, the literature, largely works of an historically minded political science shaped by the centrality of the Cold War, was characterized by narrow accounts of traditional diplomatic history.<sup>3</sup> Such research has, admittedly, inspired fruitful controversies, for example regarding the relationship between and relative importance attached by German and foreign leaders to Western integration and German reunification, thus stoking a debate originating among contemporaries in the 1950s,<sup>4</sup> as well as the impact of the Marshall Plan on West German economic recovery, this latter dispute swirling especially around the work of Werner Abelshauser.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, despite these developments, historians had explored the postwar elite trans-Atlantic networks existing in their respective fields still to an only limited extent, the main exception being the connections evaluated by diplomatic historians among the small group of top governmental personalities wrestling with issues of “high politics.”

However, there are indications today that the literature of postwar German Atlanticism and trans-Atlantic networks is beginning to embrace perspectives that also consider levels of international interaction below the uppermost political tier. In so

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<sup>2</sup> A path-breaking work on the American occupation was Lutz Niethammer, *Entnazifizierung in Bayern* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1973).

<sup>3</sup> Ernst Nolte, *Deutschland und der kalte Krieg* (Munich: Piper, 1974); Roger Morgan, *The United States and West Germany, 1945-1973: A Study in Alliance Politics* (London: Oxford University, 1974); Andreas Hillgruber, *Deutsche Geschichte, 1945-1982: Die “deutsche Frage” in der Weltpolitik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983).

<sup>4</sup> Episodes, most notably that of the “Stalin note” of March 1952, have been dissected to determine whether Adenauer (and, to a lesser extent, other Union leaders) and the Western Allies were sincere in their commitment to German national unity or actually placed a dearer value on ties to the West. While Hans-Peter Schwarz and Klaus Gotto have seen a symbiotic connection between *Westbindung* and reunification, others, among them Josef Foschepoth and Rainer Zitelmann, have argued that the emphasis on *Westbindung* obstructed possible, ultimately missed, chances for reunification. On this, see the analysis in Ronald Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 50 ff. See also Rolf Steininger, *The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification* (New York: Columbia University, 1990).

<sup>5</sup> For Abelshauser’s downplaying of the significance of the Marshall Plan and other outside aid, see Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948* (Stuttgart: DVA, 1975). Along similar lines but on a broader scale, see Alan Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51* (Berkeley: University of California, 1984). Opposing judgments can be found in Hans-Jürgen Schröder, ed., *Marshallplan und westdeutscher Wiederaufstieg: Positionen-Kontroversen* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990).

doing, this parallels larger trends in the historiography of the Federal Republic with its greater interest since the 1980s in social history. In part, such innovative perspectives have been facilitated by the altered overall framework as a tight focus on the Cold War and the issues and academic debates entangled with it, such as *Westbindung* or the German Question, have been deprived of their contemporary relevance and underpinnings.<sup>6</sup> Political scientists also deserve some credit for this expansion. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, Werner Link and Thomas Risse-Kappen have all demonstrated particular interest in transnational relations, with the first two having co-authored and edited seminal works addressing the universal theme and the latter two having produced worthy studies specifically on trans-Atlantic networks.<sup>7</sup> These scholars have investigated and debated the theoretical and concrete influence of transnational relations, including in the postwar Atlantic context, on individuals, societies and international relations and vice-versa. Meanwhile, though not explicitly concerned with international affairs, sociologists have, especially since the late-1970s, created and contested a variety of intricate models, methodologies and concepts to analyze the formation, reproduction, transformation and effect of networks in general on processes of social change and have given birth to a considerable literature, including historically based empirical studies and

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<sup>6</sup> For instance, views and controversies about Adenauer's policies were often based, even in the 1970s and beyond, on current political perspectives.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1972); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989); Werner Link, *Deutsche und amerikanische Gewerkschaften und Geschäftsleute, 1945-1975: Eine Studie über transnationale Beziehungen* (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1978); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1995); Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996). Link especially was among the first to sketch the networks that developed both within the American zone of occupation and across the Atlantic.



specialized network journals.<sup>8</sup> Such undertakings in the social sciences have provided historians with a multitude of helpful insights and approaches for exploring transnational networks.

At the same time, historians themselves are now delving more intensely into the German transnational connections across the Atlantic. Over the past three decades, and especially in recent years, they have produced a number of works tracing the development of the distinct components of the German link in these political trans-Atlantic networks. Usually solid, if unspectacular, these include Ralph Uhlig's earlier study of *Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* and, more recently, Daniel Eisermann's account of the Research Institute of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtiges Politik*, Ludger Kühnhardt's somewhat simplistic and patently celebratory work dealing with the *Atlantik-Brücke*, and Albrecht Zunker's study on the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. In contrast to some more polemical approaches, including the essays contained in the volume edited by Holly Sklar, Stephen Gill has applied Gramscian theoretical concepts of hegemony, historic blocs and organic intellectuals to analyze the meaning of the Trilateral Commission for the prolongation of United States supremacy in the world. While not ostensibly concerned with the German trans-Atlantic relationship, Rainer Nicolaysen has examined the birth and development of one of the Atlanticist network's

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<sup>8</sup> See on this theme and its related sociological literature especially the article and bibliography of Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 99, No. 6, May 1994. The specialized journals I allude to are *Social Networks* and *Connections*, both founded in the late 1970s. Trailblazing works of sociological network analysis include John A. Barnes, "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish," in *Human Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February 1954), pp. 39-58; and Elizabeth Bott, *Family and Social Network* (London: Tavistock, 1957).

most generous financial sources located in the Federal Republic in *Der lange Weg zur Volkswagenstiftung*.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to these institutional studies, certain individual German Atlanticists have also enjoyed some attention from historians. With respect to Birrenbach himself, Hans-Peter Hinrichsen has published a lengthy biography on *Der Ratgeber* (The Counselor) that concentrates primarily, as its subtitle suggests, on determining Birrenbach's, ultimately rather minimal, direct personal influence on West German foreign policy. Meanwhile, Matthias Schulz has examined in essay form "Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach." Like a number of other German Atlanticists, Birrenbach also produced useful memoirs, covering what he called *Meine Sondermissionen* (My Special Missions). Thanks to this recent uptick in scholarly interest, we have a noticeably better but still fragmentary understanding of the manifold transnational relationships formed by Atlanticist-minded Germans that were so vital in fostering trans-Atlantic relations after 1945.<sup>10</sup> Informed by this general trend, the present dissertation distinguishes itself from the hitherto dominant strain of historiography

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<sup>9</sup> Ralph Uhlig, *Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 1949-1983: Der Beitrag ihrer "Königswinter-Konferenzen" zur britisch-deutschen Verständigung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); Daniel Eisermann, *Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 bis 1972* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Ludger Kühnhardt, *Atlantik-Brücke: Fünfzig Jahre deutsch-amerikanische Partnerschaft, 1952-2002* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002); Albrecht Zunker, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Entwicklungsgeschichte einer Institution politikbezogener Forschung* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2007); Holly Sklar, ed., *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management* (Boston: South End, 1980); Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991); Rainer Nicolaysen, *Der lange Weg zur Volkswagenstiftung: Eine Gründungsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> Hans-Peter Hinrichsen, *Der Ratgeber: Kurt Birrenbach und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, 2002); Matthias Schulz, "Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die 'Präambel' zum Elysee-Vertrag von 1963," in *Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Andreas Wilkens, ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999); Kurt Birrenbach, *Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984). Another example from the relevant memoir literature is Karl Carstens, *Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen* (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1993).

through its examination of a still relatively unexplored but essential elite level of the complex transnational linkages spanning the Atlantic, existing below, but still intertwined with and impacting on, the more visible plane of top-level policymakers. This work also aims to transcend that focus on discrete organizations and individuals typical of the previous research and to explore more coherently the phenomenon of postwar political German Atlanticism, its extensive transnational, trans-Atlantic network and the considerable international and domestic significance of its activities.

Another notable trend in the historical scholarship pertaining to German Atlanticism on which this dissertation dwells is the increased interest, beginning in the 1980s, in the process of Americanization in the Federal Republic, a subset of the literature on the American role in the remarkable and rapid changes in Western Europe since 1945. At times employing the techniques of cultural history and the history of perception from below, scholars such as Volker Berghahn, Victoria De Grazia and Ralph Willett have stressed the indispensable role of American hegemony and pinpointed the processes, formal and informal, conscious and impersonal, and the impact, political, economic, social and cultural, of postwar Americanization.<sup>11</sup> To highlight just one fertile avenue of investigation, a considerable amount of original research has been produced over the past two decades on the efforts of the United States government and its assorted

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<sup>11</sup> Volker Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986); Ralph Willett, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949* (London: Routledge, 1989); Hermann-Josef Rupieper, *Die Wurzeln der westdeutschen Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-1952* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993); Reiner Pommerin, ed., *The American Impact on Postwar Germany* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995); Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, eds., *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970* (Frankfurt, Campus, 1997); Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005); and Alexander Stephan, ed., *Americanization and Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). On the inter-war Americanization of German industry, see Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford University, 1994).

agencies, most notably and covertly the CIA, as well as those of large, private American foundations to promote Americanization through the waging of a “cultural and intellectual Cold War” in the Federal Republic and the rest of western Europe.<sup>12</sup> The literature on the theme of Americanization after 1945 has generated a number of historiographical debates. One such controversy, echoing arguments voiced polemically in political, business, cultural and intellectual contexts by both Left and Right throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Germany, including in the Wilhelmine and Weimar periods, addresses the sheer desirability or undesirability of the purported Americanization, with some treatments welcoming the effects, citing for instance the emergence of a liberal-democratic state and a capitalist market economy, and others deploring the quasi-imperialist destruction of German, indeed European, traditions, values, ways and ideologies, not least an anti-capitalist socialism.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, another controversy regarding the concept of Americanization has erupted around the accuracy with which this designation captures postwar change in the Federal Republic. Prompted in part by larger historiographical shifts, including the employment of different categories of historical agents and institutions and the embracing of more reciprocal notions of causation and influence, some scholars have recently

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<sup>12</sup> Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Letters* (New York: New Press, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-War American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002); Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-1960* (London, Frank Cass, 2003); Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2008). On the private foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, see Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shephard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2001), which explores the cultural aspects of the Cold War trans-Atlantic relationship, including its socio-cultural networks.

<sup>13</sup> For unabashedly positive and negative accounts of Americanization, see respectively Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, *The Rebirth of the West: The Americanization of the Democratic World, 1945-1958* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1994).

challenged the Americanization perspective. While not dismissing American influence entirely, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Hartmut Kaelble, Michael Ermarth and others have downgraded that factor's centrality and instead underscored a complex array of German and West European (including British) circumstances, conceptions, models and agency and also pointed to broader, more impersonal, parallel processes of Europeanization, Westernization and globalization affecting all advanced industrial societies.<sup>14</sup> Uta Poiger has been among those reminding us of the need to consider how Germans themselves appropriated and transformed American ideas and products, from technology to popular music, to suit their own ends.<sup>15</sup> Finally, spurred by a trans-Atlantic malaise in the wake of the Cold War, several works, some regrettably flaunting a childish neo-conservatism, have addressed explicit German resistance to Americanization.<sup>16</sup> Though not presuming to settle definitively the questions raised in this controversy, this dissertation will assess the relative roles of Americanization and other contributing factors in the German

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<sup>14</sup> For an accent on non-American influences, see Michael Ermarth, "Introduction"; Arnold Sywottek, "The Americanization of Everyday Life? Early Trends in Consumer and Leisure-Time Behavior"; and Hans Woller, "Germany in Transition from Stalingrad (1943) to Currency Reform (1948)," all among the essays in Michael Ermarth, ed., *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955* (Providence RI: Berg, 1993); and Hans Mommsen, "Der lange Schatten der untergehenden Republik," in *Der Nationalsozialismus und die deutsche Gesellschaft* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1991), pp. 362-404. For an example of the Europeanization thesis, see Hartmut Kaelble, *Auf dem Wege zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft* (Munich: Beck, 1987). On Westernization, see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); and Holger Nehring, "'Westernization': A New Paradigm for Interpreting West European History in a Cold War Context," *Cold War History* 4, no. 2 (2004): 175-91.

<sup>15</sup> Uta Poiger and Heidi Fehrenbach, eds., *Transactions, Transgressions, Transformations: American Culture in Western Europe and Japan* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000). Also in this vein, see Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel, eds., *Americanization and its Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000); and Akira Kudo, Matthias Kipping and Harm Schröter, eds., *German and Japanese Business in the Boom Years: Transforming American Management and Technology Models* (London: Routledge, 2004).

<sup>16</sup> The more recommendable include Michael Ermarth, "The German Talks Back," in Michael Ermarth, ed., *America and the Shaping of German Society, 1945-1955* (Providence RI: Berg, 1993); Alf Lüdtke, Inge Marssolek and Adelheid von Saldern, eds., *Amerikanisierung: Traum und Alptraum im Deutschland des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1996); and Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999).

Atlanticist phenomenon, whether *vis-à-vis* the nature of its infrastructure, its methods or its perspectives, ranging from those on particular issues like security to broader visions of Atlantic Community and the world-at-large. Where appropriate, it will also gauge the degree to which such elements of Americanization as did exist were the upshot of deliberate efforts by identifiable trans-Atlantic elites, both German and foreign.

The notion of Americanization, as well as the possibility of alternative processes of change, have also occupied a salient place in the on-going historiographical debates surrounding the matter of continuity and discontinuity in the Federal Republic. Like some of the other previously discussed controversies, the scholarly disputes about the significance of May 1945 emerged from contemporary debates, which in this case had raged since virtually war's end. The initially dominant interpretation of "a new beginning," a *Stunde Null*, posited a variety of modernizing factors, including the National Socialist revolution, a process of Americanization, and the consequences of World War II, with the latter comprising not only the division of Germany but also massive population dislocations, the dissolution of Prussia and the collapse of the conservative, aristocratic military and agrarian ruling strata. All this led to a radical break with the authoritarian *Sonderweg* and a dramatically recast, "normal" Western nation and society, basking in peace, prosperity and stability.<sup>17</sup> However, amidst the

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<sup>17</sup> Works espousing the "new beginning" thesis include Alfred Grosser, *Germany in our Time* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Jürgen Kocka, "1945: Neubeginn oder Restauration?", in Carola Stern and Heinrich August Winkler, eds., *Wendepunkte deutscher Geschichte, 1848-1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1979), pp. 141-68; Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988); and Dennis Bark and David Gress, *A History of West Germany*, 2 vols. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1989). The collection edited by Broszat, Henke and Woller periodizes the transition, characterized by a radical social transformation, as beginning during the war, especially from 1943, a year of mounting military casualties, the stunning defeat at Stalingrad and intensified Allied bombing, accelerating with defeat in 1945, and ending, in western Germany, with the stabilizing currency reform of June 1948. For pre-war social

social unrest of the late 1960s and 70s, some revisionist-minded historians on the Left began to espouse a “restoration” thesis that stressed long-term continuities, including of National Socialist and conservative elites and of various political, economic and demographic structures, rather than the discontinuities, in postwar society.<sup>18</sup> In contrast to the *Stunde Null* account’s glowing assessment of Americanization and more in line with that of the Wisconsin School, the restorationist approach often considered American influence during the Cold War a key conservative factor in an imposed reaction that foiled radical German plans to implement genuine democracy and socialism. Hereafter, the “new beginning” and “restoration” theses came to function as historical means to attack or defend the legitimacy of the Federal Republic and its society.<sup>19</sup>

While the “restoration” thesis never succeeded completely in replacing its “new beginning” counterpart, the historiography of the continuity-discontinuity controversy has been characterized since the early 1980s less by dichotomy than by a more sophisticated synthesis. Though diverging on specifics, historians have increasingly acknowledged that the postwar Federal Republic experienced both continuity and

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transformation, see David Schoenbaum, *Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).

<sup>18</sup> Examples of the restoration thesis include Eberhard Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-52* (Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1970); Ute Schmidt and Tilman Fichter, *Der erzwungene Kapitalismus: Klassenkämpfe in den Westzonen, 1945-48* (Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach, 1971); Ernst-Ulrich Huster, et al., *Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945-1949* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972); Theo Pirker, *Die verordnete Demokratie: Grundlagen und Erscheinungen der Restauration* (Berlin: Olle und Wolter, 1977); Richard Detje, et al., *Von der Westzone zum Kalten Krieg: Restauration und Gewerkschaftspolitik im Nachkriegsdeutschland* (Hamburg: VSA-Verlag, 1982); and Lothar Gall, “Die Bundesrepublik in der Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte,” in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 239 (1984): 603-13.

<sup>19</sup> Alongside and even before the emergence of this historiography, the critical notion of a restoration existed, already at the latest by the 1950s, among small circles of intellectuals and in certain press and literary forums. For instance, surveying bastions of power like the foreign office and its diplomatic corps, the journalist Eugen Kogen bemoaned the return of the “Hindenburg Germans.” On such themes, see the essays from the previous two decades contained in Eugen Kogen, *Die unvollendete Erneuerung: Deutschland im Kräftefeld 1945-1963* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1964). Frustration regarding an alleged restoration was not exclusive to the left-wing at this early stage, as conservative Catholics and Protestants came to regret the lack of a thoroughgoing re-Christianization, including a *Grundgesetz* they considered too secular.

discontinuity in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres and devoted greater attention to analyzing precisely the elements, balance and agents of change and stasis, their subjects now also encompassing hitherto ignored *mentalités*, habits and traditions.<sup>20</sup> While this evolution can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the unearthing and utilization of new kinds of evidence, the improved historical perspective offered by the passage of time, and the flow of generational change among historians, it was also due in large part to the thawing of the Cold War, and eventually to German reunification, which undermined the East-West opposition so crucial to perpetuating the historiographical dichotomy. Thus, our knowledge of continuity and discontinuity on previously unplumbed levels has been enriched by Lutz Niethammer and others with the appearance, beginning in the 1980s, of the first social histories of the Federal Republic,<sup>21</sup> and, more recently, by the findings of James Diehl, Robert Moeller and Heide Fehrenbach illuminating points of intersection between top-down, political history and bottom-up, social history.<sup>22</sup> By exploring the struggle between a budding Atlanticism and an older Occidentalism and, then, the challenges later confronted by that triumphant Atlanticism,

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<sup>20</sup> A range of evidence and assessments regarding the significance of 1945 as a radical break, supporting propositions of both continuity and discontinuity can be found in Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, ed., *Neubeginn und Restauration* (Munich: dtv, 1982) as well as Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., *Ende des Dritten Reiches-Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs: Eine perspektivistische Rückschau* (Munich: Piper, 1995). Berghahn's work on the Americanization of German industry adduces evidence of just such an amalgamation of continuity and discontinuity in the rebuilding process, in this case in areas like the composition of industrial elites, stamped largely by the former, and the concepts of industrial organization.

<sup>21</sup> Often relying on oral and life histories, pioneering works of social history from the first half of the 1980s that examined the issue of continuity and discontinuity, paying ample heed to the former, include Lutz Niethammer, ed., *Lebensgeschichte und Sozialkultur im Ruhrgebiet 1930-1960*, 3 vols. (Bonn: Dietz, 1983-85), a project on the Ruhr working class; and Werner Conze and M. Rainer Lepsius, eds., *Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Beiträge zum Kontinuitätsproblem* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1983).

<sup>22</sup> James Diehl, *The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1993); Robert Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993); Heide Fehrenbach, *Cinema in Democratizing Germany: Reconstructing National Identity after Hitler* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1995); Robert Moeller, ed., *West Germany under Construction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1997).



my dissertation will further this line of inquiry by contributing to our understanding of the core factors relevant to the existence of both continuity and discontinuity in the unique context of the postwar Federal Republic.

Finally, this dissertation reflects a broader historiographical trend characterized by an enhanced awareness of autonomous European perspectives, behavior and decisions in explaining Cold War history, rather than primarily focusing on those of the United States, particularly of the American government. One prominent work in this more recent vein that has aroused considerable debate is that of Geir Lundestad, which views American hegemony over western Europe as an “Empire by Invitation” that, far from being imposed, was actually encouraged by those Europeans eager to reap its benefits.<sup>23</sup> Other experts, such as Anne Deighton specifically in regard to Britain, have stirred controversy by calling attention to the essential part played by the actions of European states in bringing about the Cold War.<sup>24</sup> While clearly different from these works of a more conventional diplomatic history, the social histories that started to appear in the 1980s, along with some of the studies pertaining to the Americanization debates, likewise had the effect of highlighting the active roles performed by West Germans themselves, rather than by Americans and other foreign occupiers and governments, during the Cold War and in shaping the development of the Federal Republic. Without exaggerating the weight of the German Atlanticists in determining events and policies within the larger Western framework, my dissertation will strive to offer an account of their efforts, via the

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<sup>23</sup> Geir Lundestad, *The American “Empire”* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget AS, 1990). John Lewis Gaddis has also invoked the concept of “Empire by Invitation” at times.

<sup>24</sup> From this school, see Anne Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) and the essays in David Reynolds, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven: Yale University, 1994).

construction and maintenance of a far-reaching transnational network, to exercise such influence in the Cold War environment and of the challenges they confronted in doing so.

### C. Primary Sources and Dissertation Outline

While the germination of this study relied greatly on the heretofore cited secondary literature, the dissertation itself is grounded in extensive research in the primary sources. Chief among these has been the Birrenbach *Nachlaß*, housed at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Augustin, near Bonn. This large collection of some twenty-six shelf meters boasts a wide variety of record types, including correspondence, reports, memos, meeting protocols, government documents, newspaper clippings, speeches and publications. These papers are divided into several sections, including materials dealing specifically with Birrenbach's private life and business dealings; general correspondence and documents; papers pertaining to particular countries, the largest part being devoted to the United States; correspondence with particular individuals, again the majority of such contacts being Americans; papers relevant to Birrenbach's involvement with key organizations, particularly the Atlanticist institutions to be discussed in this dissertation; and finally important speeches and publications, including many drafts. Birrenbach was a strikingly prolific writer of letters, a fact reflected in the copious correspondence contained in the *Nachlaß* describing his activities and depicting his views on the events and people of the day as well as his musings on broader topics of interest. Among the most stimulating and enlightening records are those pertaining to the Atlanticist organizations which include memos and proposals, financial documents, and accounts of various meetings, all of which offer terrific insight into the functioning and outlooks of these institutions.

Yet while superbly covering most relevant aspects of Birrenbach's existence, the *Nachlaß* leaves a few significantly underdocumented, unavoidably rendering this study in some senses incomplete. The period prior to his return to the Federal Republic from exile in South America in the early 1950s garners very little attention, a gap precluding us from knowing with much certainty about some, potentially explosive, themes, notably his attitudes towards National Socialism. However, even some more recent aspects of Birrenbach's life, occasionally of interest for this study, are given short shrift. In general, private life and even business dealings receive only sketchy coverage. More importantly, his activities in connection with certain institutions, including the Atlantic Institute, are dealt with in just a few files covering scattered years, thus leaving wide swaths of his time there unrecorded in any systematic way. The same goes for his activity by the DGAP prior to becoming president in 1973, thus obscuring to some extent his precise, though obviously vital, role in the study groups there. Other episodes of Birrenbach's life remain shrouded in a secrecy stemming from the strict treatment of certain subjects by the German authorities, particularly the foreign office. For instance, the files addressing Birrenbach's 1965 mission to Israel and its aftermath are, more than forty years later, still not open to researchers. Finally, the "*Sperrfrist*" as a rule denies researchers access to files not yet thirty years old. This potential obstacle, which at the time would have prevented me from inspecting files from the mid-1970s onward, was surmounted by the Adenauer Stiftung's special permission to examine these documents. Yet even with this privilege in hand, certain later files, particularly those repository to the DGAP's financial information, remained blocked. Despite these limitations, the Birrenbach *Nachlaß* ultimately proved a magnificent resource for the exploration of German Atlanticism.

Were this dissertation to be published in book form, some of these holes would inevitably remain, but possibilities would also exist to tap further primary sources in Germany and perhaps elsewhere, including here in the United States. An examination of the papers of some German and foreign personalities associated with Birrenbach in his diverse fields of endeavor, for example the Atlantic Institute, would probably yield some benefit. With time, documents in the Birrenbach *Nachlaß* previously blocked by the *Sperrfrist* are gradually becoming available, particularly those files referring to the DGAP during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although I did not actually visit the DGAP in Berlin or the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung in Cologne, I did receive permission from them to examine their relevant documents, in the former case particularly those pertaining to the study groups organized there during the 1960s. Finally, it might be of some use to conduct interviews with personalities who worked with Birrenbach. However, while these sources would no doubt contribute a few intriguing details, it is extremely doubtful they would significantly alter the substantive account and conclusions I present here.

This study employs a hybrid chronological-thematic approach to best illuminate fundamental aspects of the evolution of postwar German Atlanticism. This introductory chapter has primarily served to position the work in its proper historiographical context. Chapter 2 examines Birrenbach's "early" life up to the late 1950s, when he finally entered the Bundestag, relating it to his future experiences and to the Atlanticist phenomenon as a whole, while Chapter 3 delineates the nature, ideas and structures of German Occidentalism, the most serious obstacle facing the upstart Atlanticism well into the 1960s. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 portray the efforts of the German Atlanticists during the 1950s and 60s to create an effective infrastructure, to finance that infrastructure (with

special attention to the construction of a private German *Stiftung* system) and to stage public relations actions at home and abroad, and evaluates the internationally integrated Atlanticist sub-networks existing in each of these fields. Meanwhile, Chapter 6 analyzes the personal trans-Atlantic political network Birrenbach assembled with the indispensable assistance of the Atlanticist infrastructure and demonstrates some major consequences of these undertakings. Chapter 8 pushes the account into the late 1960s and 70s, stressing the expansion of the geographical scope of Atlanticism and the emerging internal and external challenges confronting the now firmly established German Atlanticist phenomenon. Finally, Chapter 9 surveys Birrenbach's twilight years and broaches some fresh themes, such as the retrospective aspects of Atlanticism in the late 1970s and 80s. With its exploration of Atlanticism as well as a surfeit of connected themes, among them German identity, philanthropy in international affairs, and state-society relations, what follows should prove eminently rewarding for those fascinated with the international but also the political, economic, social and cultural history of the Federal Republic.

## Chapter 2: A Tortuous Path to Influence - Birrenbach's Turbulent "Early" Life

### A. Introduction

Providing an account of Kurt Birrenbach's life prior to around 1954 is a rather tricky proposition given the relative dearth of primary sources. Furthermore, we are reliant in such an undertaking almost exclusively on Birrenbach's own *Nachlaß*. The extent to which the vicissitudes of German history that Birrenbach and others experienced, stretching from *Kaiserreich* through Weimar and Third Reich all the way to the Federal Republic, encouraged frequent modifications in the relating of one's personal autobiography provided, even at the time, rich fodder for jokes. This naturally presents problems of reliability with regard to particular themes, most notably Birrenbach's relationship to National Socialism. Though any account of Birrenbach's life will, in the end, leave many questions unanswered, we can console ourselves in some other important respects. Using the *Nachlaß* as the main primary source, it is indeed possible to construct at least an overall sketch of the first forty-five to fifty years of Birrenbach's existence, all the while keeping in mind the potential weaknesses in certain regards in an approach utilizing such narrow source material. Most significantly, Birrenbach's activities prior to the 1950s are principally of relevance for us only in so far as they shed light on that which came afterwards, especially on his own later, explicit Atlanticism, and thus have bearing on the overall theme of this study, the evolution of the wider postwar German Atlanticism. The *Nachlaß* appears to be generally reliable and well suited to this somewhat more focused task.

## B. Youth and Education

Kurt Birrenbach was born on 2 July 1907 in the town of Arnsberg in the Westphalian *Sauerland* to Dr. Hermann Birrenbach, an internal and heart specialist and ultimately *Chefarzt* at the St. Franziskus-Hospital in Münster, and his wife, Antonia. Birrenbach grew up in Münster, the rapidly growing provincial capital, in what he would later characterize as a “liberal-Catholic” household. Throughout his youth, he attended the tradition-rich *Stadtkirche* St. Lamberti on the *Prinzipalmarkt*, where he would come to know and like his eventual priest, the later bishop and cardinal Clemens August von Galen.<sup>1</sup> The young Birrenbach was enthusiastic about sports and achieved considerable success in district championships in track and field and in hockey, though a hockey accident also rendered him blind in one eye. Birrenbach attended, from 1913, the *Ludgeri-Volksschule* and, beginning in 1917, the esteemed humanistic *Gymnasium Paulinum*, one of the oldest schools in Europe. Educated at a time when the *Gymnasium* of Humboldt mold was still important, Birrenbach many years later still valued the broad, subtle benefits this style, with its emphasis on not only math, German or geography but especially on Greek and Latin along with the study of history (including cultural history), had bestowed on him. Later, though training to become a jurist, he would also attend lectures at university on classical philology. This fascination with the ancient world and its languages is ironic in light of his later opposition to an *Abendland* concept that often

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<sup>1</sup> For autobiographical narratives of Birrenbach’s “early” life, see the interviews “Zeugen der Zeit”: Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Werner Hill, 27 December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, ACDP K213/1; and “Zeitgenossen”: Dr. Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Dr. Wolfgang Bergsdorf und Henning Röhl, aired on 7 September 1980, Südwestfunk, 2. Programm, ACDP K213/1. Birrenbach preserved some ties to Münster throughout his life, returning at times for special occasions, such as birthdays, or to give talks and maintained contact with certain friends from his youth, like Max Horst and Carl Spannagel. Even many years later, Birrenbach described Münster as “a very beautiful city, in which the inhabitants also still have substance.” [KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2]. On Birrenbach’s repeated admiration for “the familiar *Schloß*” whenever he was in Münster, see KB to Prof. Dr. Heinrich Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.

sought legitimacy and roots with reference to that world.<sup>2</sup> Though he later professed to have had much understanding and “high appreciation” at the time for the “very remarkable” young people of the “*Generation der Jugendbewegung*” who belonged to the Wandervogel and Quickborn organizations, including many friends, Birrenbach never joined them, an early reflection of his life-long temperament as a self-conscious loner.<sup>3</sup>

Aside from the attention devoted to sports and the classical world, some of Birrenbach’s other serious pursuits foreshadowed, at a quite precocious age, his eventual career path. From the first years of his time at the *Gymnasium*, he found himself particularly drawn to history and politics, stirred during this period by his experiences of and lively interest in the inception and early stages of the Weimar Republic. Already during the Weimar years, Birrenbach personally knew and thought highly of Heinrich Brüning, a fellow native of Münster and Paulinum alumnus whose sister happened to be friends with Birrenbach’s mother.<sup>4</sup> Even more specifically, he focused his attention on international affairs and foreign policy. During his *Gymnasium* period, he built up a library of books and materials on international relations, indeed a rather large one for somebody his age, and engaged in numerous conversations with friends about the foreign policies of the Weimar Republic and the other European powers. For his *Abitur*, which

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<sup>2</sup> Birrenbach would continue to pepper his later correspondence with Latin phrases and repeatedly utilized classical imagery, for instance the need to find a way between “Szylla und Charybdis” in KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 15 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.

<sup>3</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, Münster, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>4</sup> The Birrenbach-Brüning relationship continued after the Second World War. Birrenbach took up contact with the ex-chancellor, in exile in the United States (Vermont), in the mid-1940s, initially via an occasional correspondence. Beginning in the 1950s, the first half of which Brüning temporarily spent in the Federal Republic, they also saw one another face-to-face quite frequently, especially in West Germany, for instance Cologne and Münster, but also in the US. For Birrenbach’s “joy and satisfaction” when he was able to talk with Brüning about questions of general interest; for Birrenbach’s valuing of Brüning’s advice and wisdom; on the admiration and friendship of Birrenbach and his family for Brüning and his now deceased sister; and for Birrenbach’s efforts to convince Brüning to remain for good in the Federal Republic, rather than in the United States, a situation that was “very painful” for Birrenbach, see KB to Heinrich Brüning, Hartland, Vermont, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.



he received in Spring 1926 at the age of eighteen, Birrenbach voluntarily wrote an ambitious and sophisticated essay of over seventy typed pages, entitled “Der englische Imperialismus,” dealing with the dramatic changes in British foreign policy during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially addressing the “*Einkreisungspolitik*” while highlighting the central role of King Edward VII. In the process, this work also depicted the larger context and background conditions of the “*großen Politik*” in Europe and the world since the final decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, including the industrial and naval competition between Britain and a rising Germany.<sup>5</sup> This effort was indicative not only of Birrenbach’s foremost youthful “passion,” that for foreign policy, but also of at least an incipient interest in the Anglo-Saxon powers and of a perspective that looked beyond the horizon of continental western Europe.<sup>6</sup>

Birrenbach’s post-*Gymnasium* schooling took him far afield as he studied *Rechtswissenschaft* and *Staatswissenschaft*, first at the universities of Geneva and Paris in 1926 and later Munich, Berlin and, much closer to home, Münster. This intentionally peripatetic approach, particularly the periods spent abroad, would yield future benefits,

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<sup>5</sup> In his essay, Birrenbach praised British policy for bringing the country out of its dangerous isolation by settling festering disputes with and obtaining the support of nations like France, Russia, Italy, America and Japan (“almost the entire world”) and for its effectiveness in fashioning a unique diplomatic and political system of counterweights against the German *Reich*. All of this had increased the power and respect of England in the world and even secured a certain, qualified supremacy, not least as the strongest European power. Birrenbach also demonstrated the linkages between foreign policy, party struggle and public opinion and between arms policy, resulting deficits and a tax policy needed to produce positive balances, while simultaneously pointing to the dominance of the liberal *Weltanschauung* in England throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Though acknowledging the respect Edward VII’s great political and diplomatic talents had evoked among the European nations and noting his popularity among the English people, Birrenbach ultimately argued that the policy carried out during his reign did not, in the long-term, achieve its goal of preserving for England the peace, “the first task of a ruler,” rather contributed to endangering it. [Der englische Imperialismus, 14 December 1925, ACDP K206/1]. Nevertheless, almost fifty-five years later, Birrenbach remained impressed by the shrewdness [*Klugheit*] of the British government at the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially in contrast to the current American government [KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1].

<sup>6</sup> Birrenbach’s essay displayed a basic knowledge of American history, including themes like the Civil War and industrialization. While pointing to the crucial entrance in modern times of the United States and, later, Japan as extra-European great powers into world politics, he cited control [*Herrschaft*] over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico as the goal of contemporary American imperialism.

with Birrenbach crediting his semester in France, for example, with bringing him closer to and encouraging him to endorse warm relations with that country, while teaching him to communicate with Frenchmen in a manner that later enabled him to win their friendship.<sup>7</sup> Birrenbach combined academics with work as a foreign affairs correspondent for several Westphalian newspapers, covering the League of Nations while in Geneva and French policy while in Paris, where he was also invited to the house of Wladimir d'Ormesson, editor at *Le Figaro*.<sup>8</sup> In June 1930, Birrenbach took his first legal *Staatsprüfung*, the *Referendarexamen*, at the *Oberlandesgericht* Hamm, shining with grades of “good” overall and “very good” in *Staatsrecht* and *Völkerrecht*. His requisite practical preparation in the Prussian *Justizdienst* took him from Hamm and Münster to Berlin. In January 1933, while still in the midst of this *Referendariat*, he earned a doctorate in law from the University of Tübingen with a dissertation on “Der Realisierungszwang im Tarifrecht” that received a rating of “very good.” This work dealt with the controversial issues and relationships of state authority, *Wirtschaft*, trade unions, arbitration law and *Arbeitsrecht*, especially in connection with the *Arbeitskampf* in the German steel and iron industry in 1928.<sup>9</sup> He concluded what he believed to be his career training at the *Kammergericht* in Berlin, where he spent time as *Referendar* for the

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<sup>7</sup> For Birrenbach’s belief, even late in his life, that his experiences attested to the merits of such a foreign stay, see KB to Holzamer, 10 July 1978, ACDP K160/1. On his view that the Paris he had experienced in the 1920s was “more amusing [*amüsanter*] than it is today,” see KB to Hesselbach, 6 July 1979, ACDP K160/1. As of 1978, Birrenbach still claimed to love France and was at least willing to entertain the notion of the French as the first *Kulturvolk* on earth (KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1).

<sup>8</sup> KB to Sohl(?), 19 December 1977, ACDP K173/1. Always intrigued by international affairs, d’Ormesson would eventually become a French diplomat and ambassador. These Westphalian newspapers included ones in Dortmund and Münster, among them the *Westfälischen Merkur*.

<sup>9</sup> Birrenbach’s dissertation was an early manifestation of his talent in and tendency towards abstract problem-solving, investigation and legal reasoning. In this project, Birrenbach dealt with and apparently accepted the validity of but does not seem to have been overly enthralled by the social- and economic-political ideas of the controversial authoritarian Catholic political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt, as expressed in recent works like *Der Hüter der Verfassung* (1931) and *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1932) and including the notion of the struggle between state and *Wirtschaft* for the realization of the “total state.”

prominent Jewish defense counsel Prof. Max Alsberg and in 1934, at the Reich Justice Ministry, passed his final tests, the *Assessorexamen*, each with “*Prädikat*.”<sup>10</sup>

So far as they can be ascertained, Birrenbach’s views during this period with regard to international relations already intimated, in part, some of their later, more fleshed-out, versions. For instance, and most obviously, Birrenbach seems, already during the 1920s and 30s, to have embraced the enthusiasm for the anti-nationalist idea of “Europe,” which found prominence, at least rhetorically, in the international relations and foreign policies of that time. Birrenbach dated his own unwavering commitment and engagement for this concept, and for unification as the only path “to save Europe,” to the era of Briand and Stresemann (specifically 1926) and the time of their meeting in Stresa, explicitly lauding the latter’s foreign policy as “a constructive one.”<sup>11</sup> According to Birrenbach’s testimony of later years, he had recognized already during the 1920s that the interests of the nation-state could no longer enjoy exclusive priority. He had no contact with the organizations of the interwar “political” youth like the *Jungstahlhelm*, the *Jungwolf*, the *Kyffhäuserverband* and the *NS-Jugendorganisation*, claiming that “[t]he one-sidedness [*Einseitigkeit*] of the nationalist variant was too strong to me. I... thought in other categories than these youth.”<sup>12</sup> In line with these pro-European convictions, he familiarized himself with some of the related ideas floating around during this period, for

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<sup>10</sup> Alsberg committed suicide in Swiss exile in September 1933.

<sup>11</sup> On Birrenbach’s early recognition of unification as “the unique opportunity to save Europe,” see KB to Jean Monnet, 20 July 1972, ACDP K140/2. For Birrenbach’s reference to himself as “a European of the first hour,” see KB to Shirley Williams, MP, Secretary of State for Education and Science, London, 25 July 1977, ACDP K074/1. For Birrenbach on the Franco-German understanding that had been arduously reestablished in Locarno and Stresa, and Herriot’s speech related to American policy before the Palais Bourbon that provided the final impetus for the shaking of that understanding, see KB to Dr. Hans Schäffer, Sweden, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2. Birrenbach claimed that he had first “*erlebt*” Briand in 1926 in Geneva, when he was studying there. For Birrenbach’s belief at the time, in a situation that was admittedly different than that of today, that Stresemann’s policy was “a constructive one,” and that his death would be a turning point in the politics of the Weimar Republic, see the Birrenbach interview “*Zeitgenossen*,” 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1.

<sup>12</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, Münster, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2.

instance the elitist, Catholic conservatism of the Austrian Prince Karl Anton von Rohan, the founder in 1924 of the “European *Kulturbund*,” reading the articles in his respected journal, *European Revue*, and attending one of his talks in Berlin during the early 1930s. On the other hand, though he later professed that he had been “extraordinarily interested” already since the times of Stresa in the “*Verbindung*” with the Anglo-Saxon states, the United States does not yet seem to have loomed very large in his international interests at this relatively early stage of his life.<sup>13</sup>

### C. Relationship to National Socialism

Although clearly interested in political affairs, Birrenbach never belonged to a political party during the Weimar Republic. This was largely due to a personal disposition that, as we have previously noted, inclined him already in his youth towards a pensive solitude. However, he did vote prior to 1933 and, given the Catholic milieu in which he grew up in Münster, it should come as no surprise that he cast his ballot exclusively for the *Zentrum*. By the early 1930s, with the republic incapable of forming a tenable parliamentary basis and suffering the effects of the dire economic situation, Birrenbach had recognized many symptoms of and even foreseen the decline and demise of Weimar. Looking back, he would point to “defects” that existed in Weimar democracy from the start, including the abrupt break with the imperial state tradition and the population’s lack of identification with the new state form; to external factors, like the

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<sup>13</sup> On this “extraordinarily interested” Birrenbach see KB to Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2. On the US foreign political and finance-political failure during the interwar period, including the Senate’s rejection in 1920 of Wilson’s proposals, among them an American entrance into the League of Nations that would have strengthened the European security system and, thus, probably rendered impossible the military conflict of the 1930s, and the Republican government’s lacking the courage and strength [*Kraft*] in 1932 to write off the war debts, which would have immediately solved the German reparations problem, thus helping to undermine Franco-German understanding and possibly failing to impart to the world economic crisis an alternative course, see KB to Schäffer, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2. In contrast, Birrenbach argued that with the 1931 Hoover Moratorium the US had met all German expectations at that time with respect to war debts and reparations.

French occupation policy; and, finally, to the hopelessness engendered by mass unemployment, the ruin of the middle-class *Bürgertum* and the failure to mold a stable, functioning government. While he later denied ever having advocated a form of “conservative dictatorship” before 1933, he did believe at that time that the only possible way to overcome the debilitating crisis and to stabilize the republic against the onslaught from Right and Left was the rule of “a government with authority,” which would essentially implement “conservative-liberal” policies. Observing the unfolding of actual events, he considered figures such as Franz von Papen or Kurt von Schleicher unsuitable to wield this authority. As the Weimar state entered its final stages, Birrenbach therefore continued to favor the *Zentrum* because of its efforts to form a broad parliamentary majority that he hoped would be able to master the crisis without instituting an outright authoritarian resolution, for instance via the now notorious Article 48.<sup>14</sup>

As already indicated, Birrenbach’s relationship to Hitler and the National Socialist movement remains somewhat ambiguous. Many years later, he claimed that he had never been, even for a second, enthused by Hitler, on the contrary that he had maintained an extremely cold attitude towards him from the start. As a student during his one semester in Munich in 1927, he had gone to see Hitler at an assembly in the *Bürgerbräukeller* at the advice of his friends. He pronounced himself so “disgusted” by Hitler and found his speech so “mediocre,” that he walked out of the beer hall “appalled” after only about twenty minutes, therefore right in the middle of the talk, in protest.

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<sup>14</sup> However, for Birrenbach’s defense of Chancellor Brüning and his cabinet, particularly with regard to the paucity of currency- and finance-political options genuinely available in the early 1930s given the foreign policy imperative of eliminating reparations and the fact that the revolutionary ideas contained in Keynes’ *General Theory* (1936) had not yet emerged, see KB to Schäffer, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2. Birrenbach was already familiar during the early 1930s with Keynes’ prior ideas, having acquired his fundamental work *Vom Gelde* immediately after its appearance in Germany in 1932.

Nevertheless, four weeks later, once more at the encouragement of his friends, who wanted him to engage with this phenomenon again, he went along with them to listen to Hitler, this time in the *Zirkus Krone* on a Sunday morning, and was “astonished” that the great masses there were like “clay” in his hands. Birrenbach also recounted similar occasions taking place many years later, but also including the period up to 1933, in places like Münster and Berlin in which the audience (“the devil knows whom”), stood on the chairs in enthusiasm, though here it is not clear if Birrenbach himself was in attendance. Groping for some sort of elucidation of these perplexing spectacles, an admittedly baffled Birrenbach was ultimately resigned to fall back on the notion that the enthusiasm exhibited for Hitler at such events by what he considered “mad” people was a type of inexplicable “*Volkshysterie*.”<sup>15</sup> Years later, Birrenbach claimed that from this point on he had fully recognized the “*Fatalität* of this personality” and that it was already clear to him how the regime would develop.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, in assessing the rise of the NSDAP to within a hairsbreadth of power, Birrenbach also still found room for broader factors, not only world economic crisis but also the post-WWI policies of certain Allies.<sup>17</sup>

Despite his evidently low regard for Hitler and the masses he moved so effectively and his later claim of having never voted for National Socialism, Birrenbach

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<sup>15</sup> On these experiences, during which Birrenbach claimed to have remained “*eiskalt*,” see the interviews “*Zeugen der Zeit*” (27 December 1979) and “*Zeitgenossen*” (7 September 1980), both in ACDP K213/1.

<sup>16</sup> For instance, KB to Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2.

<sup>17</sup> Though his 1925 essay on “the English imperialism” was praised for also attempting to do justice to the standpoints of Germany’s rivals, Birrenbach consistently rejected throughout his life the idea that a war-mongering Germany was chiefly responsible for the outbreak of World War I. Instead, he noted the role of other powers, particularly France, obsessed with its imperial past and the idea of *revanche*, and Russia, with its Pan-Slavist pressure on the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. These were the main drivers of European *Politik* that hindered a definitive peace settlement, generated the crises of the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (e.g. Morocco, Balkans) and made a conflict unavoidable sooner or later. To a lesser extent, Birrenbach also criticized *Weltmacht* Britain for its passive support of France and Russia, in its efforts to maintain the European balance. Meanwhile Birrenbach acknowledged the strengths, but also pointed to the weaknesses, of the Central European continental powers (and Triple Alliance). For an example of Birrenbach continuing to hold to such views much later in life, see his 1981 Discussion Contribution in ACDP K075/1.

entered the NSDAP “with a very heavy heart,” also joining the SA as an *Anwärter*, after the Potsdam spectacle of March 1933.<sup>18</sup> Probably motivated then by political and careerist opportunism, Birrenbach cited afterwards the “vacuum” of alternative starting points for political engagement, already highlighted by an *Ermächtigungsgesetz* of 24 March 1933 that “was certainly no recommendation for the democratic parties at the time,” as well as a desire to avert disaster by influencing what he perceived as an incoherent and erratic party from the inside. However, according to Birrenbach, he came to realize during his time in Berlin not only the criminal character of the regime but also the futility of attempting to shape it from within. Key in his turn away from the party were the events, some in the capital itself, surrounding 30 June 1934, the “Night of the Long Knives,” which precisely confirmed the party’s dominant elements and led him to resign immediately from the NSDAP and SA via registered letter to the *Reichsleitung*. Birrenbach maintained that his consistently negative attitude towards the National Socialists also manifested itself in an earlier incident in 1934, when, as a still fairly new party member, he had brought about a vote among his colleagues in the *Assessorenlager* in Jüterbog directed at the dismissal of the *SS-Lagerleiter*. Whether this episode was truly indicative of genuine resistance against Hitler and National Socialism, as Birrenbach later asserted, or stemmed from personal or institutional differences or something else entirely is not clear. Though successful, the action resulted, as Birrenbach was informed by the justice authorities after passing his law exams, in a suspension of his legal career that left his prospects of becoming a lawyer or judge in tatters.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> On Birrenbach’s “heavy heart,” see KB to Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>19</sup> For those “fateful [*schicksalvollen*] years” which led to the National Socialist seizure of power, see KB to Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4. On “the tragedy of National Socialism,” see KB to Bundestag President a.D. Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1. For

Consequently, after some months, Birrenbach began working in 1935 at a consulting firm on Berlin's *Viktoriastraße* as an economic, financial and foreign currency advisor for both big German and, especially, foreign firms and banks, including American ones. Aided by his ability to speak English and French, his work centered on legal matters pertaining to the flow of capital and goods at a time when German foreign trade, striving to control foreign exchange, was characterized by offset and linkage deals and parallel operations, all of which made possible certain transactions but, more importantly in Birrenbach's future thinking, also presented obstacles to smooth trade. A number of Birrenbach's clients were, as he put it, affected "*auf das Schärfste*" by the National Socialist regime. Birrenbach had already become acquainted with important, in some cases historic, personalities, prior to embarking on his professional career: Brüning, d'Ormesson, Galen. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Birrenbach also met his cousin Ernst Plessner, the Catholic scholar Goetz Briefs and the banker Carl Goetz, all in Berlin. Now, through his professional work, Birrenbach continued to expand his contacts in Germany, for instance meeting the bankers Siegmund Warburg and Ernst Spiegelberg together in 1935.<sup>20</sup> However, with a clientele comprising primarily foreigners and

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Birrenbach on the impossibility of "globally" judging the rise of Hitler, including the fact that "a people [*Volk*] does not consist of martyrs"; the considerable number who were neither for nor against Hitler but did not risk opposing him; the opportunistic careerists, especially in the "middle layers" that he presumed otherwise would have immediately rejected the regime; and those on Left and Right who refused to cooperate with and opposed the regime, see the interview "Zeugen der Zeit," 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1. For Birrenbach's argument, in the context of his defense of the industrialist Alfred Krupp, that "millions of Germans joined the National Socialist party because they hoped in this way to get the support of the state," see the document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1. About the sudden political "vacuum" from 1933 on and Birrenbach's negative assessment of the democratic parties' role in the *Ermächtigungsgesetz*, again see the interview "Zeugen der Zeit," 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.

<sup>20</sup> Before returning to the Deutsche Bank, Plessner would become directly engaged with the iron industry, and thus the August-Thyssen-Hütte, in his role as director of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Birrenbach henceforth developed a friendly, understanding relationship with Warburg, including after WWII, despite repeated temporal interruptions and the latter's emigration to London. In contrast, at some point, Birrenbach lost contact with Spiegelberg, an associate of Warburg, and never heard from him again.



foreign firms, Birrenbach only now established his first substantial international contacts, including a variety of prominent personalities, among them a number of ministers, not only in France but also in Britain and the United States. Indeed, this appears to have been Birrenbach's first extensive direct experience with Americans, the source of his later claims that these close connections dated back to the mid-1930s, the "*Mittelalter*," as he put it.<sup>21</sup> Birrenbach garnered further international experience and contacts through pre-war travels abroad connected to his work, for instance to Yugoslavia and Poland.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, Birrenbach maintained, for the most part, only a distant relationship to politics, such as it was, during the "fateful period" of National Socialist rule. While he had still been politically active during his *Referendar* years in Berlin, these pursuits were mostly limited under the reign of National Socialism to the reading of various political literature. As a form of political articulation prior to 1939, as Birrenbach claimed, he also established, or in some cases maintained, contact with a number of figures who, unlike himself, would at least eventually play some role in the conspiracies against the regime. In fact, he was already closely connected with several such personalities prior to 1933, though he was never explicit about the identities, though perhaps he was referring to figures like Galen. While he linked his contacts to the plot of 20 July 1944, he also pointed out that they were not at all with those who ultimately comprised and supported the assassination group itself, rather they were with several personalities who rejected the

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As of June 1975, there were also references to Birrenbach's old acquaintanceship with Ferdinand Friedensburg and his connection to Friedensburg's *Elternhaus* (Friedensburg to KB, 20 June 1975, ACDP K042/1).

<sup>21</sup> KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1.

<sup>22</sup> Among the initial firms for which Birrenbach functioned as financial and currency advisor was the National Krupp GmbH, which led to his making the acquaintance of the industrialist Alfred Krupp in 1938. Birrenbach's expertise was especially in demand due to the severe currency restrictions existing in Germany during the late 1930s as a result of deep economic crisis [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1].

very idea of an assassination.<sup>23</sup> Despite the nature of these contacts and his professed respect for the views of personalities like Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, Birrenbach came to believe, by his own account, that in light of the impending catastrophe, the opportunity to avert disaster had to be seized, regardless of the means. Once it quickly became clear that the National Socialist regime would not to be overthrown by a revolution from below, Birrenbach pinned his hopes on a *Staatsstreich* by the *Reichswehr*. However, with the regime moving from strength to strength in the 1930s with its series of foreign policy successes in the Rhineland, Austria and the Sudetenland, he despaired that many in Germany had come to terms with the regime and abandoned any expectation of a *Putsch* by the armed forces.<sup>24</sup>

#### D. Emigration

Near the end of 1938, Birrenbach resolved to leave Germany, ultimately departing in March 1939 following the occupation of Prague. He claimed to have decided on this course, which entailed renouncing his “excellent position” in Berlin as well as other opportunities in Germany, of his own free will and for strictly political reasons, assigning

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<sup>23</sup> In the office on the *Viktoriastraße*, Birrenbach was closest to a Hubert Breitenfeld, who seems to have shared his attitudes regarding the Third Reich. Birrenbach first met Hans Speidel in the summer of 1937 in the Berlin (Schmargendorf) residence of Max Horst, who was Birrenbach’s friend and Speidel’s brother-in-law. For Birrenbach’s vague mention of having met an adversary of Hitler in Berlin at the end of the 1930s, see KB to John McCloy, 25 September 1980, ACDP K178/2. Among Birrenbach’s earliest post-WWII political contacts were Walther Hensel and Karl Arnold, who, along with Jakob Kaiser, Heinrich Körner (a victim of 20<sup>th</sup> July) and other members of the former Christian trade unions and personalities from the circle of the Kölner Ketteler-Haus, had participated in considerations about the shaping of new political and social conditions after the then foreseeable end of the dictatorship. Perhaps Birrenbach’s ambiguity with respect to the nature of his opposition contacts reflected the ambivalence that existed in postwar West German society regarding the 20<sup>th</sup> July assassination attempt.

<sup>24</sup> On the National Socialist foreign policy successes reconciling many, otherwise opposition-minded, Germans with the regime and on Birrenbach’s claim to having recognized, perhaps in National Socialism as a whole but at least in its foreign policy, a “dynamism” that at a certain point could not be braked, see the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit”, 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1. For Birrenbach’s references to the “freeing” of the Rhineland and “the reunification with Austria” (but also to “the conquest of the Sudetenland”), see again the Birrenbach interview “Zeugen der Zeit”, 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1 and KB to Axel Springer, Berlin, 10 August 1981, ACDP K033/2. Such phrases may indicate a certain fundamental sympathy with at least the goals of these particular efforts.

a crucial role in later years to the regime's anti-Semitism, including the "profound" impression left on him by the *Kristallnacht* of November 1938.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the events of 30 June 1934 had already convinced him that Germany would meet a terrible end, that "National Socialism would bring our country to ruin."<sup>26</sup> In summation, nearly twenty-five years after the fact, Birrenbach ascribed his emigration to the same reasons that had at least in part motivated the 20<sup>th</sup> July conspirators: reasons of conscience.

[Hitler] was considered as a kind of anti-Christ. I cannot explain to you the despair of the German patriots and the loneliness we felt in the midst of the National Socialist revolution. Since that time I had to realize again and again how difficult it is for people from other countries, particularly in the West, to understand what it means to live in a totalitarian country. Only a person who lived in such an environment knows how difficult it is to make an active opposition against such a kind of regime.... I left Germany in 1939 in complete despair because I did not see anymore a way out of that disaster.<sup>27</sup>

Birrenbach's attempts for his first-choice destination, North America, met with failure since the American firm to which he had switched, one he had advised in Berlin, believed it impossible to attain a work permit for him there. Instead, Birrenbach sailed for Buenos Aires for a position at the firm's South American headquarters. Far from well-prepared, this undertaking had all the makings of a desperate leap in the dark. At age thirty-two,

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<sup>25</sup> For the racism and anti-Semitism of the regime as being among Birrenbach's primary motives in quitting Germany, see KB to Eugene Rostow, 9 April 1980, ACDP K209/2 and KB to Axel Springer, 10 August 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>26</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Helmut Schelsky, 15 December 1981, ACDP K033/2. On further anticipated National Socialist foreign policy successes, including with respect to Poland (i.e. Danzig and the Polish Corridor), and for Birrenbach employing the language of the "excesses" of National Socialism, see the Birrenbach interview "Zeugen der Zeit," 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.

<sup>27</sup> KB to Mrs. John McCloy, 23 December 1963, ACDP K210/1. For Birrenbach's reference to this "disastrous [*unseligen*]" period of German history from 1933-45, see his expositions at the press conference of 2 November 1962 staged for the publication of the first report on the activities of the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, ACDP K077/1. Though Birrenbach had no direct experience of Germany during and immediately after the war, he believed that, having endured there until 1939, he had gained a clear idea of the functioning of the totalitarian state. For example, as a currency and financial advisor of German firms, he had become acquainted with the interventions of the National Socialist regime in industrial plants and claimed to have never seen a single case where an economic decision by the regime was rejected by an owner or high official of such a plant. Indeed, Birrenbach argued that the state "practically controlled the industry." [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1].

Birrenbach voluntarily emigrated from his homeland under very difficult circumstances, indeed almost without means thanks to German foreign currency regulations.<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, at the time, he had not even received a firm job offer in response to his request, only an oral commitment from the American firm's vice-president in Berlin.<sup>29</sup>

The move to South America obviously signaled major changes in Birrenbach's life. In 1939, after emigrating, he married Ida Wangemann, the partly Jewish woman who had left Germany with him. They would later, within the span of a few years during the early 1940s, have two children there together, Thomas and Irene.<sup>30</sup> At first, Birrenbach knew practically no Spanish, but, with the help of his classical training in Latin at the *Gymnasium*, learned the language within six months well enough to be able to give talks. In July 1939, he began working for the American firm that, as described, had loosely offered him a job before his departure from Germany. This firm in question was the National Cash Register Company of Dayton, Ohio, a large "world concern" that Birrenbach had formerly represented, beginning in February 1936, as one of his clients in his previous capacity as financial and foreign exchange advisor.<sup>31</sup> Based in Buenos Aires throughout his stay in South America, Birrenbach, after a short time, took over the leadership of the NCR's government business in Argentina in 1940 and appears to have enjoyed considerable success in his work, which focused primarily on sales.

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<sup>28</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3. These foreign currency regulations prevented him from taking more than a mere ten *Reichsmark* in his pocket.

<sup>29</sup> Birrenbach received the offer of a position in the NCR's regional headquarters from this American vice-president, a Mr. George A. Marshall, through the intermediary of the director-general of the National Krupp GmbH, a Mr. Luzius. Given the circumstances, Birrenbach considered his emigration "a courageous step." [KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1].

<sup>30</sup> From 1947-52, Thomas attended elementary school at the Escuela Argentina General Belgrano in Buenos Aires.

<sup>31</sup> For Birrenbach's involvement, beginning in 1938, in negotiations and transactions between the National Krupp GmbH, the National Cash Register Company and the Ministry of Economics (especially its *Reichsdevisenstelle*), culminating in the signing, in Birrenbach's presence, of an agreement in Amsterdam, see KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1.

Nevertheless, he freely left the company in December 1941, upon the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States, explaining that, while he regretted the hostilities,

to have a nationality as English, French or German, is a destiny which one has to accept, as well in good as in bad days. In spite of being opposed to the actual regime I cannot deny my own origin. This fact obliges me to remain in times of war at least neutral. Furthermore, to remain in the Company would fall short of a kind of demonstration, which would endanger the situation of my family in my country.<sup>32</sup>

He resigned his position with the full understanding, apparently of the director-general of the American enterprise, that he would resume his work at the firm after the war.<sup>33</sup>

In the meantime, Birrenbach required gainful employment. An interim phase followed his NCR departure. Two weeks after leaving, he was sought by Gen. Manuel Savio, whose planning would undergird the Argentine steel industry, as “controller” for the nation’s military factories, an enticing prospect squelched by the neutrality resolution emerging from the January 1942 Rio Conference. In February, he opened an independent consulting office for company foundings, commercial and industrial organization, production and cost control, and corporation finance. By the following year, it had developed into the coordination department in these fields of the Thyssen-Lametal SA, a big firm serving as the South American subsidiary and representation in Argentina of the powerful Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG (Düsseldorf), which controlled much of the Argentine iron market. Here, Birrenbach assumed a top function of a scope beyond his narrow realm of sales at NCR, administering a large foundry and steel mill while supervising complementary firms and holding companies of the concern in Buenos Aires

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<sup>32</sup> As recounted in KB to G.A. Marshall, NCR, London, 27 June 1942, ACDP K206/4.

<sup>33</sup> Birrenbach later presented his leaving the American firm “a question of tact.” (KB to F.J. Strauss, Minister-President of Bavaria, Munich, 26 March 1980, ACDP K034/1). Birrenbach’s concerns about family in Germany were directed especially towards his mother, his sister and her children.

and elsewhere in Argentina. For the first time, Birrenbach came into contact with Thyssen and the Stahlunion, the ThL's exclusive German supplier. The war, black lists and almost complete halting of iron imports impinged on the ThL, hindering material purchases and sales. From 1943 on, it endured sharpening state intervention, including the appointment of new directors whose approval was needed for all transactions. At the start of May 1945, once Argentina had declared war and imposed measures against numerous German institutions in the country, the concern was expropriated and nationalized with widespread summary dismissals, though the government and Col. Vila, the firm's new chief, requested Birrenbach, alone among leading men, continue in a top position to ease the management transition, retaining him almost a year as an advisor.<sup>34</sup>

However, this, too, was not to last. The revolutionary upheaval in Argentina that would bring Perón to power in 1946 then resulted in Birrenbach once again moving on to another position. The board of directors, which Birrenbach advised and which he now considered to be composed of "excellent men," resigned. With the leadership posts now occupied by representatives of the Perónist party, the new Board was, for Birrenbach, of a completely different political and economic outlook from the previous one and not at all comparable in quality. Considering it impossible to stay on and cooperate with these personalities, he quickly resigned his position, in open defiance of the Foreign Ministry's

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<sup>34</sup> Bereft of any long-term organic growth, the VSt had come about in 1926 as a "*Krisengründung*" combining four large *Montangruppen* (Thyssen, Rheinstahl, Phoenix and Rhein-Elbe-Union). Important figures included Fritz Thyssen (chairman of the *Aufsichtsrat*) and Albert Vögler (General Director). The Thyssen-Lametal also came into being in 1926 through the fusion of the firm Thyssen with the La Metal Soc. De Resp. Ltda., with the shares owned by the NV Centrale Handelsvereinigung (Rotterdam) but sold during the war to the Soteria AG Maienfeld (Zurich). The firm represented in Argentina the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, the Centrale Handelsvereinigung, Großrohr-Verband GmbH (Düsseldorf), Röhren-Verband GmbH (Düsseldorf), Demag AG (Duisburg), Polte AG (Magdeburg-Armaturen), Weise & Monski (Halle), Linke Hofmann AG (Breslau), Deutsche Werke Kiel AG, Flohr AG (Berlin), and the Stahlwerks-Verband (Düsseldorf), as well as several firms based in Argentina itself. Up to November 1944, the Thyssen-Lametal was still functioning with a total personnel of about three thousand men. For further information, see the undated Report on ThL, ACDP K207/4.

Board of Vigilance. Almost immediately, within fourteen days, after the end of the war, he had again received, and accepted, an offer from the NCR, with which he had remained in close contact, to resume his managerial activity in that firm, indeed again in an executive capacity in the same field of work. However, his return to his old firm was delayed by several months until 1946, in part by the American embassy's insistence on continuing to enforce the anti-German wartime restrictions, especially the Trade With the Enemy Act, which prohibited the entrusting of members of the enemy states with such a responsibility. The firm's best efforts in Washington, DC, proved to be of little avail. Undeterred, the NCR thereupon adopted a somewhat devious solution, awarding Birrenbach the position *de facto* while, at least temporarily, withholding the formal title. In 1947, thanks to new American legislation, Birrenbach was finally able to accept the position openly. He thus returned to his successful work at the NCR, his activities again based in the firm's South American headquarters in Buenos Aires.<sup>35</sup>

Not long after the end of the war, Birrenbach was already eager to return to Germany as soon as circumstances permitted. This yearning was founded in no small part on his desire to assist in the process of reconstruction. In the meantime, he kept an eye on the *Politik* and on international developments, especially as they related to his homeland. In a letter of December 1945, Birrenbach gave some idea of the direction in which his thoughts were running in that regard:

I hope that the experiences of European history since 1918 and particularly of the last two years will on the long run convince the European nations of the vital necessity to forget their old-aged feuds and to form a free federation of the European states, achieving in this way the goal of the best political thinkers of more than a century. If this war really brings about the rule of law among the free

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<sup>35</sup> For a certificate honoring Birrenbach for his work at the NCR in 1947, see ACDP K206/2.

nations of the world, either by the menace of atomic destruction or by mutual agreement, then the wounds struck by this cruel war will heal sooner.<sup>36</sup>

From Argentina, Birrenbach also continued to nurture contacts in Germany, always seeking to facilitate his professional re-integration. Nevertheless, a variety of factors precluded a rapid return: after long years away, Birrenbach no longer had sufficient relevant contacts and starting-points there, while the state of war between Argentina and Germany persisted long after May 1945 as did his difficulties in acquiring a valid passport.<sup>37</sup> The latter was a particularly thorny problem, since he wished to avoid renouncing his original nationality, but a new German passport had yet to be created and obtaining a “double nationality” was problematic. Birrenbach’s efforts, in several countries, to obtain the coveted passport utilized his network of connections throughout the southern part of the continent, in Argentina, where he enjoyed the best such links, but also in Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. As he put it, “[y]ou can imagine that in the normal way it is impossible to settle such a matter.”<sup>38</sup> Despite such efforts, Birrenbach, too, had to await the creation of a German passport from above.

In addition to these impediments, there were the terrible conditions of postwar Germany to consider. Through his contacts and communication, such as they were, with official and private personalities in Germany and from the reports he received as one of

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<sup>36</sup> KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President in Charge of Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 13 December 1945, ACDP K206/4. For Birrenbach toying with the idea of returning already in 1945, “when everything there in Germany lay in ruins [*daniederlag*],” see the Birrenbach interview “Zeitgenossen,” 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1.

<sup>37</sup> A telling experience for Birrenbach was that with Hubert Breitenfeld, one of the first people Birrenbach would call on after his return to Germany, only now to find that, after such a long period, distance, geographical but perhaps also in a figurative sense with regard to their respective current fields of activity, severely limited the extent of this renewed contact over subsequent decades to a pretty bare minimum. The Argentinian government did not issue a declaration terminating the state of war with Germany until 1951. For Birrenbach’s expectation that there would now be restitution of German institutions in Argentina by the Argentinian government, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.

<sup>38</sup> KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President in Charge of Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 22 February 1947, ACDP K206/4.



the leading representatives, from 1946-52, of the Quaker's American Friends Service Committee in Argentina for Relief in Central Europe, he was well aware of the hardships that awaited on the other side of the Atlantic.<sup>39</sup> For Birrenbach himself, this may not have been an overwhelming consideration, given his determined conviction that "it is necessary in this moment to direct the view forwards, in order to save from that which remains to us what still is to be saved."<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, he also had to take into consideration the interests of his family members, and he hesitated to bring them back into the chaotic conditions of postwar Germany. Birrenbach's wife, in particular, was not ready to return just then, not least because she had been warned by those in Buenos Aires with knowledge of the current situation in Germany that such a step could very well prove fatal. Possible solutions to this problem were further limited since Birrenbach was also plagued by serious money problems well into the postwar period. This lack of money was in large part due to the fact that, as a result of the vagaries of history, he had either lost or resigned his position no less than four times within a span of less than eight years. Therefore, it had not been possible for him to save enough money to maintain his family outside Germany for any considerable period of time, and he was unable to accept any position in Germany unless he received a significant portion of his pay in foreign currency. This represented a daunting problem to solve in its own right.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Perhaps Birrenbach's Quaker activity was related to the fact that Edmund Stinnes, a Quaker who was the oldest son of Hugo Stinnes and one of Birrenbach's contacts established in Argentina, engaged after World War II in a worldwide activity in the Quaker relief organization stretching from Argentina to Japan to Germany.

<sup>40</sup> KB to Waechter, 23 February 1947, ACDP K206/4.

<sup>41</sup> KB to George A. Marshall, 21 May 1948, ACDP K206/4. For Birrenbach on the trying German conditions as he had gotten to know them in the postwar time and also, more recently, during a trip to Germany, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen, Jr., Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4. On Birrenbach's dismal contemporary view of an "impoverished, beaten and shattered Europe"; of "the German catastrophe" following "total defeat," with a German *Volk* "placed in question as a nation, occupied by foreign powers, disarmed and deprived of the crucial attributes of its sovereignty," and

As it turned out, Birrenbach remained employed at the NCR until German trade with Argentina and the rest of South America was taken up again in 1949. When such foreign trade with the Federal Republic became possible, he, along with several other German, Argentinean and French business partners, thus utilizing both domestic and foreign capital, co-founded and built up the Lametal-Union SA in Buenos Aires. As an importer, this joint-stock company primarily represented in Argentina and, via sub-agents, elsewhere in South America the interests of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, then the largest steel works in Europe, or, perhaps more accurately, of its subsidiary, the Stahlunion-Export GmbH (Düsseldorf), the VSt's largest German steel export organization, indeed the largest German steel export firm, period.<sup>42</sup> While therefore essentially a new Thyssen branch in Birrenbach's eyes, in many ways the successor of

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engaged in "the bitter struggle for the new acquisition of a precarious life basis"; of a former *Reich* experiencing "the shrinking of the eastern half" and "division into the Soviet and western Allied sphere of influence"; of a situation in which "[t]he Soviet troops control today as occupying power the center of Berlin, and the borders of the Soviet zone push right up to within a hundred miles of the Rhine," leaving the Germans "as a nation... whose eastern half stands as security [*Faustpfand*] under the [USSR's] iron control"; and belief that a "threat of war" had and still emanated "from the East," see "Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg," by Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse* (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1. For Birrenbach having "deeply regretted" not having experienced the first years of the Federal Republic, but also on the impact on him of the expectation in South America following World War II that the continuation of the war was imminent, see KB to Gerstenmaier, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1.

<sup>42</sup> The Lametal-Union functioned in an environment in which interaction and negotiations with the Argentinean government and state, whether individuals such as high-level cabinet members and provincial authorities or entities like the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI) and the Transport Ministry, was essential to its undertakings. The securing of government and state as a potential partner or customer in or supporter of capital goods operations and other deals (however unreliable it might be with its payments) and efforts to attain certain certifications and registrations, for example marking the firm as a direct importer or as the exclusive supplier of Stahlunion articles, all hinged on such relations. Therefore, Birrenbach's attention was necessarily directed quite broadly, towards politics, elections, government composition, foreign and other policies, as well as economic situations, practices, activities and plans. For Birrenbach analyzing the "situation in Argentina after the presidential elections of 11 November 1951, with special consideration of the German interests," including a Perón regime whose political power, behind a "pseudo-parliamentary curtain," was based on the army, the Perónist party, the CGT ("the trade unions brought into line [*gleichgeschaltet*] by the state"), and the church; a constitution that foresaw the American presidential system, meaning that "the power of the executive is, in itself, already almost unlimited"; the development of Argentina, including forced industrialization, raw material shortages, foreign currency policy difficulties, inflation and foreign trade; the social revolution carried out under the Perón government; and a positive assessment of the possibilities for promoting and improving the current German-Argentinian relations, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4.

the Thyssen-Lametal, the Lametal-Union retained a certain freedom of action and also represented, with lower priority and no objections from the Stahlunion, the interests of English, Dutch and American firms.<sup>43</sup> From 1949 to 1952, Birrenbach served as an executive member of the board of directors and became head of the firm. In 1950, the Stahlunion asked Birrenbach to continue leading the Lametal-Union for another year or two, after which it would grant him his wish and engage him in a corresponding position in Germany. In the meantime, by June 1952, Birrenbach had become not only a delegate of the Stahlunion in Argentina but also the Stahlunion supervisor for the entire South American continent. At a time when coal and steel were the principle products of Germany, France and other European countries, the Stahlunion kept its word and bestowed on Birrenbach the position of its deputy managing director.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> For Birrenbach's warnings about the potential for unavoidable collisions of interests within firms with other representations, in addition to the Stahlunion export program, clearly oriented towards other countries (including the United States), see KB, Buenos Aires, to the Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.

<sup>44</sup> In general, Birrenbach defended the work and achievements of the Lametal-Union and its staff and praised the high quality of his colleagues, the "excellent people," there (KB to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 10 December 1951, ACDP K207/4). For Birrenbach on the happy name established by the Lametal-Union for itself among hundreds of firms in Argentina, an "asset" whose acquisition was aided by its identification in the market with the goodwill that had accrued earlier to the Thyssen-Lametal and now the Stahlunion, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. However, for Birrenbach's admission that the firm still left something to be desired in many regards and on the "holes and defects of our organization," including limited personnel, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. Birrenbach insisted that the firm's failure yet to achieve the hoped for success (indeed, in 1952, heavy losses and the decision of the board of directors, at Birrenbach's proposal, to sell off the factory) was also due to especially difficult circumstances in South America and the "anormal and irregular" situation in Argentina in particular, including economic crisis, strikes, a lack of foreign currency, lengthy processes and procedures characterized by prolonged formalities, and "universal and total corruption." [KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o Stahlunion-Export, GmbH, Düsseldorf, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4 and KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. Pointing to the impact on the activities of the Lametal-Union of the currently available capital means and the corrupt form of license-issuing in Argentina, Birrenbach argued that "in so far we all bear also here the consequences of the lost war." [KB to Nyssen, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4].

### E. Assessment of the Argentina Exile

In attempting an overall assessment, we can conclude that Birrenbach's time in South America was something of a mixed bag. Healthwise, it turned out to be nothing short of a personal disaster. When he emigrated from Germany, the medium-statured Birrenbach seems to have been in reasonably good health, at least there does not appear to have been any significant propensity towards serious illness. This was to change dramatically in Argentina, beginning quite early on during his stay when he suffered a two-year bout with fever. We shall come back to the question of Birrenbach's health later on. For the time being, it suffices to establish that this health seems to have been shattered by his time in South America, an experience from which it never fully recovered. This was compounded by the fact that in the mid-1940s, Birrenbach began to suffer from a serious, incurable, permanent insomnia. Looking back many years later on his sojourn in Argentina, Birrenbach believed that he had "lost a good part of [my] bodily and mental [*seelischer*] substance, which, I fear, is irrevocable. Everything in life has its price. This price I have paid."<sup>45</sup> Aside from illness, Birrenbach's overall physical experience in Argentina was an unpleasant one, due in no small part to the brutally hot temperatures that persisted, even at night at over 30 degrees Celsius, for most of the year.<sup>46</sup> All of this contributed to Birrenbach's departure, despite a possibility that he might have remained longer on "a further temporary vacation," courtesy of the Stahlunion. Instead, he noted that his demanding toils for the sake of the Lametal-Union had taken him to the limit of his physical powers and insisted that his endangered health condition had deteriorated to the point that he, in turn, could do little more there for the

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<sup>45</sup> KB to George Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Dept. of Neurological Surgery, 20 July 1956, ACDP K116/1.

<sup>46</sup> KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1.

Lametal-Union: “I can simply no longer physically survive [*durchhalte*] another summer in Buenos Aires.”<sup>47</sup>

Birrenbach’s self-imposed exile also had a variety of professional drawbacks. However successful his endeavors, the positions that he occupied abroad, particularly with the National Cash Register Company, were generally a source of disappointment and frustration. He was convinced that his business talents were never properly utilized at the NCR and found himself frustrated by the small scope of his activities there, largely due to the currency restrictions that so limited at least certain areas of the firm’s business operations in Argentina.<sup>48</sup> We have already pointed out that the frequent changing of professional positions, both between Germany and Argentina and within Argentina itself, prevented Birrenbach, despite his diligent work, from accumulating any substantial wealth. As of 1946, Birrenbach could still bemoan the fact that “my knowledge and experience...constitute the only capital which I own.”<sup>49</sup> Thanks to his time in Argentina, Birrenbach became acutely conscious of the difficulty of breaking through the “inhibiting layers of tradition” in a foreign country to achieve one’s due recognition.<sup>50</sup> Finally, after so many years in South America, Birrenbach’s personal and professional links to Germany were largely severed and he possessed almost no contacts in the Federal

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<sup>47</sup> KB, Rio de Janeiro, to Boehlingk, 8 October 1952, ACDP K207/4. To cite one instance for the purposes of illustration, Birrenbach stayed in the hospital for six weeks from the middle of November 1951, including some of this time in the German hospital. This stay included a serious operation on a double hernia with an intestinal loop that resulted in complications, among them post-operative abdominal hemorrhaging and a high traumatic fever. Consequently, Birrenbach remained absent from the office for a lengthy period, only returning on 2 January 1952 for a few hours a day and even afterwards finding himself physically unable to keep an eye on everything going on at the Lametal-Union.

<sup>48</sup> KB to George A. Marshall, Vice-President, Overseas Operations, NCR, London, 21 May 1948, ACDP K206/4.

<sup>49</sup> KB to Chickering, 4 May 1946, ACDP K206/4. For Birrenbach working twelve hours per day during his time in Argentina and having only limited leisure time during the evening, see Dr. Tatjana Jelkic, Buenos Aires, to KB, 24 June 1975, ACDP K042/1; and KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>50</sup> KB to Siegmund Warburg, 16 June 1966, ACDP K066/1.

Republic, a place where, by his own account, he knew practically nobody at this point. It was these professional disadvantages, incurred largely through his emigration, that led Birrenbach to see himself at the beginning of the 1950s, therefore at a time when he was already approaching his mid-forties, starting from “practically *Null*.”<sup>51</sup>

The years Birrenbach spent in Argentina were agonizing years of alienation. At no point did he ever believe there was a real chance of finding a new home there in South America. On the contrary, he was constantly nagged by the sense, perhaps a guilty one, that it had been wrong to emigrate and that his true place remained in Germany. These conflicted feelings troubled him during all these years in spite of, or perhaps because of, his “total anti-Hitlerism.” Indeed, Birrenbach followed “with great intensity” the events of 20 July 1944, “one of the crucial days of my life,” through every possible broadcast. “A hope that I had cherished for more than a decade appeared to be fulfilled,” but he was “deeply shaken” when he learned a few hours later that the attempt to overthrow Hitler had failed.<sup>52</sup> Then there was the dismal nature of his place of exile. Years later, he would explain that he had lived, speaking of Latin America in general, on “a continent that always remained foreign [*fremd*] to me.” Rather than being ameliorated with time, “this has, quite honestly, remained so to the end of our stay in Argentina.” An important element in this regard was that Birrenbach existed there “in an almost total intellectual

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<sup>51</sup> KB to Heinrich Köppler, Chairman of the Landesverband Rheinland of the CDU Germany, 13 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.

<sup>52</sup> KB to Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2; and KB to Gerstenmaier, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1. On Birrenbach being especially interested in and “deeply innerly moved” by expositions about and accounts of 20 July 1944, familiar to him from “a rich literature” and “contact with a series of participants,” again see KB to Weizsäcker, 30 May 1984, ACDP K031/2. For Birrenbach’s “deepest sympathy” for these “German heroes” of 20 July 1944, see KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 8 May 1981, ACDP K033/3. Among those personalities involved in the active resistance and the 20<sup>th</sup> July, to one degree or another, with whom Birrenbach interacted in the postwar era were Gerstenmaier, Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Hans Speidel and Julius Speer.

[geistigen] vacuum.”<sup>53</sup> This impoverishment was particularly striking for Birrenbach since, as he would remark even decades later, the entire atmosphere of his immediately preceding Berlin period of 1928-39, but especially the late 1920s and early 30s, was still “alive [*lebendig*]” in him and “[i]n the cultural respect, this time was the high point of my life,” an era in which he had been able to enjoy a wide variety of experiences, whether, for instance, appearances of the cabaret artist, writer and painter Joachim Ringelnatz or numerous theater performances, with stage sets created by the likes of Caspar Neher.<sup>54</sup>

For Birrenbach the exile in Argentina was a time during which, despite his best efforts, he wanted desperately for worthwhile talks, literature and theater. “In the more than ten years [of our stay], we have, in Spanish-speaking South America, never seen a performance in the theatre of Calderón or Lope de Vega, to cite as examples only these authors, whom we could see annually in our home city, Münster.” His repeated efforts to form a lecture- or reading circle resulted in failure, as Birrenbach found that he ended up having to give all the talks, “which was also not the point of the matter.”<sup>55</sup> This dismaying situation was not much improved even by the fact that Birrenbach was in contact with the sizeable German emigrant community in Argentina that already existed both in Buenos Aires as well as in the interior of the country.<sup>56</sup> He found that of all these people, only one, an “outstanding” emigrant journalist named Dr. Silberstein, offered the

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<sup>53</sup> KB to Heinrich Köppler, 13 July 1972, ACDP K080/1. For Brüning and his sister symbolizing during Birrenbach’s stay in Argentina the possibility of overcoming “the feeling of frustration in a strange, unloved world through the return to the *Heimat*,” see KB to Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4.

<sup>54</sup> KB to Staatsminister a.D. Otto Schmidt, Wuppertal, 11 July 1967, ACDP K080/3. As a student in Munich, Birrenbach had personally met Ringelnatz, “so that he remained to me... an extremely familiar [*vertraute*] figure.” (KB to Walter Hesselbach, 7 July 1983, ACDP K082/2).

<sup>55</sup> KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>56</sup> The German colony in Argentina could boast of, among other organizations, an Argentinian-German chamber of commerce, German clubs, a German-Argentine cultural institute, schools and charitable institutions.

opportunity for interesting and intelligent political discussion.<sup>57</sup> However, this particular acquaintance, not struck up until after the end of the war, lasted only about a year and a half, truncated by Silberstein's death in 1946. Birrenbach and other refugees from Nazi Germany represented only the latest wave of German immigration to Argentina, part of the larger, centuries-old, phenomenon of German colonies in Latin America. Aside from Silberstein, Birrenbach found the Germans in Argentina completely out of touch with the realities in their homeland and the world. "Pictures of Wilhelm II hung in the houses, or people still believed in Hitler."<sup>58</sup> This was not to suggest that he had not also come into contact with and befriended pleasant people. "However, I found nobody from whom I could receive real and genuine stimulation." To exist in such an environment for a period of more than ten years was an "enormously difficult situation", "for a man of my age, at that time, a very heavy burden."<sup>59</sup>

Given such experiences, it is probably not all that shocking that in the future Birrenbach did not enthusiastically seek to maintain closer contact with Latin America. He certainly did not, indeed could not, cut himself off from the region entirely in later years. He stayed in contact through the mail and even had the occasional meeting, on their visits to West Germany, with a number of personal friends, colleagues and acquaintances from his time in Argentina.<sup>60</sup> However, in most of these instances,

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<sup>57</sup> Silberstein was former head of the Berlin office of the liberal-democratic *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

<sup>58</sup> The Birrenbach interview "Zeitgenossen," 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1.

<sup>59</sup> KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1. For Birrenbach's assessment that, at the time he was in South America, the quality of the German immigration in Chile was better than that of most South American countries, yet his overall impression, again based on his own past experiences, that the German colonies in South America were "frozen and no longer very creative," see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>60</sup> Among the sporadic connections Birrenbach maintained, to one degree or another and sometimes even decades later, from his Argentina time were those to Edmund Stinnes (German industrialist, oldest son of Hugo Stinnes and Haverford College professor from 1942-46) and George Udvarhelyi, who would become a doctor at Johns Hopkins. While some of these personalities were still in Argentina, others had since



Birrenbach appears to have been more a polite participant, primarily responding to the initiative of others, rather than a genuinely enthusiastic one. Business matters also necessitated some involvement in and on rare occasions the odd trip to Latin America, and his stock holdings, amount indeterminate, in certain South American ventures were the subject of some correspondence. As a result of his future positions, Birrenbach also often had to interact with and manage the relationships of the Thyssen family, and its surrounding entourage and business associates, centered on Buenos Aires. He, thus, inevitably became a constituent element in the sometimes soap operatic lives of not only, for instance, the countess Anita but also of her two sons, the counts Federico and Claudio, an involvement whose frictions often contributed significantly to his worries and mental stress.<sup>61</sup> However, on the whole, Birrenbach demonstrated no great desire to maintain his links to South America any more than absolutely necessary, rather he essentially sought to close the book on that chapter of his life.<sup>62</sup> Many years later, Birrenbach's view of Latin America, given its myriad political, economic and social

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moved on to other locations, for instance to the United States or Brazil. Such communication often revolved around one another's lives and families, with Birrenbach's career and achievements in the Federal Republic being followed especially earnestly, as well as the conditions in their respective countries. In or sometime shortly before June 1975, Birrenbach kindly secured a much-needed pension for a Frau Cerwenka in Buenos Aires.

<sup>61</sup> This is probably what Birrenbach was referring to when, reminiscing on his time at Thyssen, he remarked that "the human [*menschliche*] side was not always a pleasure." (KB to Sohl, 16 July 1979, ACDP K160/1). Some frictions emerged simply from the fact that personalities based in Argentina were not as familiar with, or at least did not view from the same perspective, certain problems as Birrenbach and other figures in Germany. Other discord stemmed from Birrenbach's support of measures, such as capital increases, where what he saw as the essential interest of the entire Thyssen firm, the common interest, clashed with the putative interest of the Thyssen family, a minority interest. Claudio and Federico were being gradually groomed to participate in major roles in Thyssen business affairs.

<sup>62</sup> Writing to a friend on that continent, Birrenbach admitted that "[m]y desire to fly to South America is very low." (KB to Federico Kobrak, Prov. Buenos Aires, 4 June 1965, ACDP K045/2).

problems, remained dim, leading him to remark that, “Argentina remains therefore, to quote Clemenceau, a country of the future.”<sup>63</sup>

On the other hand, the balance sheet of Birrenbach’s exile in Argentina was not entirely negative. His experiences abroad had left a beneficial mark on him in several important respects. It was during this time in Argentina that Birrenbach seems to have especially developed his appreciation of and honed his valuable abilities at networking, a particularly indispensable element of business life in Latin America. This aptitude at developing contacts, which we have already alluded to in connection with his passport difficulties, had enabled Birrenbach, for instance, to acquire accurate inside knowledge of the situations and goings-on within the principal government offices in Argentina.<sup>64</sup>

Birrenbach’s exile from Germany also imparted to him a more robust perspective on the world. His extensive experiences in South America underscored for him the significance in international relations of what would eventually become popularly known as “the

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<sup>63</sup> For the Clemenceau citation, see KB to Freda Gräfin Douglas, Buenos Aires, 13 July 1983, ACDP K082/2. On Birrenbach’s bleak assessment of a destabilized South America “in a process of upheaval,” characterized by left-progressive governments (“progressive in the Marxist sense”) in places like Cuba, Bolivia, Peru and Chile under Allende; the collapse of the three social pillars, namely the circle of the “deux cents familles,” the army (which had functioned as a constitutional moderator), and the church (which had now begun to turn to left-progressivism); complicated economic problems that were in part the fault of the capitalist countries but also very much of the Latin American countries themselves; an exaggerated gap between rich and poor; violence as the trademark of active resistance; perhaps even worse than doctrinaire totalitarian states, anarchist tendencies in a general population that did not think in intellectual, and therefore Marxist, concepts; and, finally, on the need for reform, see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1. For Birrenbach seeing a situation in Brazil and Argentina in the early 1980s that was “anything but satisfactory,” see KB to Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, ACDP K032/1. To Chancellor Kohl, who had just returned from a trip to the region, Birrenbach remarked “[i]t is only to be asked if by your next visit you will find the same heads of state. That is always the problem in Latin America,” see KB to Kohl, 13 July 1984, ACDP K029/2.

<sup>64</sup> For Birrenbach’s contact in Paraguay with the Banco del Paraguay, including helpful confidential information regarding the imminent issuing of foreign currency contracts, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. For Birrenbach, on his periodic visits to Asunción, ascertaining the, quite good, relations of a certain business associate with the various government posts, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4. For Birrenbach having had the chance to examine the local embassy’s correspondence with Bonn, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export, Düsseldorf, 25 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.

Third World” and the multitude of challenges it confronted. More broadly speaking, Birrenbach believed that as a result of his extended period in exile, as with his earlier university studies abroad, he had “learned to see the world and our country from the perspective of other peoples [*Völker*].” Far from being merely academic or philosophical in nature, this faculty to readily empathize with foreigners had practical application for the future, for “[t]hat makes it simpler to make clear the German matters of concern [*Anliegen*] to the politicians of other states and at the same time to recognize the latter’s own concerns [*Sorgen*].”<sup>65</sup> Birrenbach also developed a certain bond and empathy with others who, like him, had emigrated, regardless of their destination, “by all recognition of the hard fate which an emigration always means.”<sup>66</sup>

Also essential for Birrenbach in the future was the development of his affectionate relationship to Americans and the United States during the stay in Argentina. In this period, Birrenbach formed close, friendly links with numerous individual Americans, and

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<sup>65</sup> KB to President Gustav Heinemann, Bonn, 10 July 1972, ACDP K080/1. For Birrenbach’s conviction that “one must today know the development of the world in order to understand the future,” and his counsel that this, including extensive time abroad, was more important than working for a party in the Federal Republic, see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1. Beginning in late Spring 1952, Birrenbach undertook for the Stahlunion a series of excursions to and generated reports about a number of significant South American countries, among them Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil (with plans for Venezuela and the possibility of Ecuador). For Birrenbach’s desire to familiarize himself and deal with, beyond the immediate matters at hand, the entire state of affairs of each of these countries, in so far as they related to “our branch,” so that in the future he would be able to judge concrete questions from his own awareness of the conditions on the spot, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. Decades later, Birrenbach still asserted that the time he had lived in Latin America conferred on him special experience and knowledge of that region as well as insights into the way of thought there. For Birrenbach’s familiarity with the circumstances in South America easing his argumentation with respect to certain business matters, see KB to Dir. Alberto Borchardt, Buenos Aires, 8 July 1958, ACDP K118/1. On Birrenbach knowing South America since the 1930s and his claiming to know not only Argentina but most of the countries of this continent, including Chile, see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1. For Birrenbach insisting that he, therefore, understood better than other Europeans what the current problems in that region meant for the United States, see KB to Haig, 24 February 1981, ACDP K146/2. Finally, on Birrenbach boasting that, as an “authority [*Kenner*]” on Latin America and especially Argentina, he had correctly estimated the English intervention in the Falkland Islands already from the second day on and had also advised his firm in this sense, see KB to Federal President Prof. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, ACDP K033/1.

<sup>66</sup> KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1.

his interest in and rapport with the US, albeit from a distance, became quite strong. Already while in Argentina, Birrenbach was extensively examining the problems of the American *Politik*, including foreign policy, and acquired a comprehensive knowledge of American literature and press.<sup>67</sup> Such developments were, of course, due in no small part to his employment in an American firm. Whatever his grouching about the nature of the work, Birrenbach would years later describe the NCR as “an important and personally pleasant [*angenehmes*] refuge” during his years of emigration. He, furthermore, would speculate that his engagement for the strengthening of European-American and German-American relations was ultimately due not only to the objective necessity of the closest possible friendship between these entities, but also to more personal reasons: namely, his lasting gratitude for the fairness and friendship of the Americans when he had departed Germany in 1939; and the “extraordinarily good experience” he had had in the NCR at, for him, a critical time.<sup>68</sup> During his employment with this American firm, Birrenbach also gained a certain sense of the American character, including what he considered a remarkable ignorance regarding international relations and the situation and concerns of other states and peoples (and sometimes vice-versa).<sup>69</sup> Perhaps the fact that Birrenbach

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<sup>67</sup> KB to John McCloy, 19 December 1968, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>68</sup> KB to Rolf Hennig, Buenos Aires, 21 February 1973, ACDP K039/1. On the links between Argentina and the US, including considerable foreign trade, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4. Also, for the Lametal-Union’s current negotiations with an American finance group aimed at securing the financing of a particular transaction (unusually involving Südwerke), since the local, Argentinean, state authorities were not able to pay cash, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen, Jr., Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4.

<sup>69</sup> KB to Ministerialdirektor Berndt von Staden, BKA, confidential, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1. Birrenbach’s later concerns about US protectionism were based in part on his having worked in an American “*Weltfirma*” where he had, nevertheless, seen the extent to which exports were treated “with the left hand” (KB to Wilfried Guth, Vorstand member, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, ACDP K153/1). Birrenbach saw the incomprehension and lack of understanding between Americans (more broadly, the North Americans) and Latin Americans, who themselves suffered from an inferiority complex, as mutual. For Birrenbach explaining that during his many years of contact with South America he had repeatedly observed “how foreign these two worlds are to one another [*wie fremd diese zwei Welten einander gegenüberstehen*],” see “Die Herausforderungen der achtziger Jahre,” by KB, intended for Dr.

had not witnessed the wartime destruction of Germany further curbed in him any of the, admittedly anyway remarkably little, animosity that existed between former German and American foes. This sympathy appears to have been undented by what Birrenbach considered a certain neutralist, even anti-American, sentiment in Argentina at the time.<sup>70</sup>

Of course, Birrenbach's time in South America also paved the way for his future business activities in the Federal Republic. The knowledge of the steel industry that he gained during the war years and after 1949 was, in his own words, "invaluable," and formed the foundation on which he later built his career in Germany.<sup>71</sup> Even more specifically, as he himself remarked, "[t]he painful way of voluntary emigration became for me the bridge of my political activity and also of my contact to Thyssen."<sup>72</sup> As already noted, this contact with the Thyssen complex dated from his experiences in Argentina with the Thyssen-Lametal and the Stahlunion-Export. Finally, though Birrenbach's emigration was potentially problematic in certain respects, in so far as even repatriates were viewed for quite some time thereafter with an irreconcilable suspicion in the Federal Republic by some German nationalists, he seems to never have had to

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Spethmann, 16 September 1982, ACDP K075/1. On the serious psychological mistakes the US had committed in dealing with Central America, see KB to Brzezinski, 20 January 1982, ACDP K146/1.

<sup>70</sup> For Birrenbach's analysis of Argentina's foreign policy as being characterized by the idea of a neutralist "third position" vis-à-vis the two large power blocs confronting one other in the world today, therefore a negative position towards Russia without identifying itself with the policy of the Atlantic powers; and by the government's related stress on preserving its sovereignty and resisting all outside intervention and influence in the Argentinian *Politik*, whether by the UN, the United States (from which Argentina feared efforts at democratization) or others, to the point where it even rejected any financial relationship with the US; and on the traditional Argentinian friendship with England in international politics having come to an end, see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4. On the constant propagandistic attacks and accusations against the US, which Birrenbach attributed to domestic political reasons, again see KB Report to Ellscheid, 21 November 1951, ACDP K207/4. For Birrenbach's assessment that the South American's relationship to the United States was generally worse than his good relationship to the large European nations, including a Germany, and then Federal Republic, that was still very beloved in Chile at the time Birrenbach was in South America; and the opportunities this offered a clever European policy to influence the situation favorably in the long-run in a place like Chile (unless Marxism really did triumph there), see KB to Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>71</sup> KB to Max Bade, Buenos Aires, 16 March 1956, ACDP K213/4.

<sup>72</sup> KB to Julius Speer, 18 July 1977, ACDP K173/1.

surmount noteworthy hurdles in this regard and was henceforth always able to claim, including to his American and other foreign contacts, that he had emigrated to Latin America on account of his wholehearted opposition to, indeed profound suffering under, Hitler and National Socialism.<sup>73</sup> This was particularly advantageous in bolstering his credentials, given at least the perception that the German *Wirtschaft* without exception had been complicit with the National Socialist regime, a perception reinforced by the postwar incarceration and trial as major war criminals at Nuremberg of some of the leading German industrialists, also from the steel industry, and the dismissal of thousands of officials and skilled workers as part of the efforts at denazification, demilitarization and democratization.<sup>74</sup> It does not seem that Birrenbach's apparently short-lived National

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<sup>73</sup> The controversial issue of whether repatriated émigrés from the Third Reich were treated as traitors or fellow citizens in the Federal Republic became something of a touchstone for the Allies regarding fundamental German attitudes toward freedom. For Birrenbach boasting of his voluntary and principled departure from Germany in 1939 as a means of demonstrating his moral rectitude, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach's later claim that he "detested" the National Socialist regime, see KB to Hanna Holborn Gray, 7 February 1980, ACDP K158/1. On his "total rejection of National Socialism," which he had viewed as a "completely unacceptable," "extreme *Politik*," see Sowjetisch-westlicher Handel-Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, April 1981, ACDP K075/1.

<sup>74</sup> Among those current and future Thyssen personalities interned for extended periods after the war was Fritz Thyssen himself, as well as Hans-Günther Sohl and Ernst Wolff-Mommsen. Radio Moscow and other Soviet propaganda consistently painted a picture of Birrenbach as a Nazi war criminal, with reference to his listing in the 1965 "Brown Book" authored by the DDR's Albert Norden, and the intermediary of the Ruhr monopolies to the American economic leadership. He had allegedly not only joined the NSDAP in 1933 and entered the ranks of the SA, but had also taken part in anti-Jewish pogroms and left Germany for Argentina in 1939 at the behest of the Ruhr magnates, including the criminals of the chemical combine IG Farben, and established links there to the American monopolists. Birrenbach, for his part, denied any contact with and even knowledge of possible war criminals, including any personalities linked to the Third Reich working in Buenos Aires (for instance for IG Farben), during the war. As of 1981, Birrenbach claimed he had only once in the last twenty years had an encounter in circles of the *Wirtschaft* with National Socialism, when, "startled," he had left a function with his wife shortly after surveying the host's library (KB to Prof. Hermann Lübke, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, 23 April 1981, ACDP K032/1). Nevertheless, Birrenbach could also be critical of postwar Allied measures directed at alleged war criminals. For Birrenbach's argument that the trial of Alfred Krupp was "no fair procedure," see KB Document of 21 July 1983, ACDP K178/1. As of 1951, with respect to German rearmament, Birrenbach regretted the plight of the only military element that remained fit for action in western Germany: the German soldier, whose army had been not only destroyed in the Second World War, but then dissolved, "defamed," and many of its representative leaders branded "war criminals." At the same time, "[t]he solidarity of the western defense" was incompatible with "the existence of two kinds of rights and duties" that would have "a second-class soldier spread out in combat teams among foreign divisions from the North Cape to Sicily." Understandably, "[t]he echo to the Allies' hitherto neither clear nor convincing twelfth-hour appeal is extremely mixed.... nobody will be ready to take up the weapons that one considers

Socialist affiliations ever resulted in real scandal or inhibited in the slightest his re-integration into German society.

F. At Thyssen

The early 1950s formed a transitional period for Birrenbach between South America and Germany, during which he ever more actively prepared his return “from the New World.”<sup>75</sup> Starting in 1950, he was able to visit the Federal Republic on several occasions, sometimes staying months at a time on business, and finally returned for good in early December 1952. Whatever the previous ups and downs of his life, Birrenbach quickly reacclimated himself to German conditions, and his business career advanced rapidly thereafter. From his appointment at the end of 1952 until 1955, he served as the deputy managing director of the Stahlunion in Düsseldorf. In this position, he almost immediately assumed responsibility for significant operations, especially in the carrying out of consortium deals with governments and economic organizations, both in Europe, including with East bloc states, and overseas, as well as in the initiation and promotion, despite certain resistance, of a policy stressing the sale of complete plants and facilities

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pressing into his hand full of misgivings and in insufficient extent.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” by Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse* (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1).

<sup>75</sup> Prior to departing South America, Birrenbach sought, at the desire of the Lametal-Union board of directors, to wrap up several remaining matters in the hope of securing the future of and minimizing the dangers confronting the firm. These included the initiation of his successor on the board as well as negotiations regarding particular deals and talks related to the creation of a unified representation, between the Lametal-Union and Rofmadel, of the Stahlunion interests. On Birrenbach’s influential role in the Lametal-Union/Rofmadel negotiations “as honest broker,” practically acting as a “Stahlunion Vertrauensmann,” see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. For Birrenbach’s friendly, trusting but also businesslike contacts with key figures at Rofmadel, which considerably eased his work in these negotiations, also see KB to Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 27 August 1952, ACDP K207/4. On Birrenbach’s urgent efforts in Argentina rendering him unable to address a series of tasks in various other South American countries and on the recent Stahlunion request that, as arranged, he now, after repeatedly granted vacations, return to Germany to help relieve the hard-pressed *Geschäftsführung* there, see KB, Rio de Janeiro, to Boehlingk, 8 October 1952, ACDP K207/4. Finally, on Birrenbach’s earlier resolve to leave, even if all issues at the Lametal-Union were not entirely settled, see KB to Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 27 August 1952, ACDP K207/4.

(*Anlagengeschäfte*). Thus, Birrenbach functioned in 1953-54 in an expert capacity to help guide a German steel industry consortium in delicate negotiations, conducted by the *Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft*, in Berlin and Vienna with a delegation from Romania about the extensive compensation arrangements that would undergird the first postwar trade agreements with that country, inclusive of a major sales operation with Canada. Later, he was also influential in hammering out the deal leading to the sale and construction of the first German oil refinery in Greece, the state refinery in Aspropyrgos opened in November 1958, both in the meetings among the four German and American firms comprising the consortium and in that consortium's talks, including in and around Athens, with the Greek government.<sup>76</sup> Other, less important, operations in this vein included the sale, involving the firm Diehl, of a munitions factory, again, to Greece.

In September 1954, in a core event for his career, Birrenbach was appointed by Anita Gräfin de Zichy-Thyssen, daughter of the deceased Fritz Thyssen, plenipotentiary (*Generalbevollmächtigter*) for the management of her interests in Germany. As such, he became chairman of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf),

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<sup>76</sup> The Greek oil refinery venture, which benefited from a Hermes export credit guarantee, unfolded within the context of an increasing involvement of the German *Wirtschaft* in major development projects in that country after the conclusion of a November 1953 agreement on economic cooperation between the Federal Republic and Greece. It also existed in a framework of efforts at collaboration on large oil refinery projects, both among German enterprises (e.g. Thyssen, Gutehoffnungshütte; Krupp, Mannesmann-Hoesch, Phoenix-Rheinrohr, Hydrocarbon) as well as on an international basis with, for instance, Belgian, English, American, French, Dutch and Italian firms. Such undertakings planned during this period included the BP Ruhr refinery in Dinslaken, which came into operation in 1960. The German firms in the Greek oil refinery consortium were the Stahlunion-Export GmbH (represented by Birrenbach), the Fried. Krupp Maschinen- und Stahlbau Rheinhausen and the Hydrocarbon Mineralöl GmbH (Düsseldorf), with the American member, the New York-based Hydrocarbon Research, Inc., functioning as a consulting firm. Among the matters Birrenbach dealt with on this project was the *Kurssicherung* (exchange-rate hedging), with respect to which he pushed for the contract to be converted to dollars rather than marks, based on his assessment that the dollar would be the more solid currency in the long-run. As of November 1960, an impressed Birrenbach believed the work on the refinery in Greece "has borne such rich fruits" and saw fit to point out the undertaking to economics minister Ludwig Erhard and his *Ministerialdirektor*, Hermann Reinhardt, as a positive result of international private economic cooperation in development aid (KB to Dr. F. Ringer, 7 November 1960, ACDP K207/2).



the holding company for her inherited share of her father's deconcentrated and restituted fortune, essentially large groups of securities of select successor firms of the liquidated VSt. In 1966, after the death of Amélie Thyssen, Anita's mother, he would become chair of the *Verwaltungsrat* of the newly founded Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH (Düsseldorf), a fusion of the Thyssen Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen mbH (into which the AG had been transformed in 1964) and counterpart Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG (Cologne), that now administered the Thyssen family's entire *Aktienpaket*.<sup>77</sup> By 1955, to fulfill his task of representing family and company in the firms in which they controlled sizeable capital, Birrenbach also entered, and over the next decades by and large remained in, the *Aufsichtsräte* of the enterprises belonging to the Thyssen group after the dissolution of the VSt. These included, most importantly, the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG (Duisburg), as well as the Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG, Niederrheinische Hütte AG, Westfälische Union AG, Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG, Handelsunion AG and Thyssen & Co. AG.<sup>78</sup> So, he embarked on his primary business career as a manager of

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<sup>77</sup> Fritz Thyssen was the oldest son and, at least in some ways, truest successor of the steel magnate and firm founder August Thyssen. The Allies had divided up the VSt into eighteen separate entities. In line with the deconcentration plan, the Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG was founded on 18 December 1953 with Amélie Thyssen, Fritz Thyssen's widow, as the sole shareholder, and the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen was founded (initially registered and based in Cologne) on 5 February 1954 with Anita Gräfin de Zichy-Thyssen as sole shareholder, with each initially containing shares of the VSt in the nominal amount of about RM 47.7 million. From these shares emerged a claim of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, with a *Grundkapital* set at DM 20 million, to shares of the VSt successor companies of approximately a nominal DM 145.8 million. Other principal VSt shareholders engaged in the deconcentration process included the Rheinische Stahlwerke (Essen), the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Hoogovens en Staalfabrieken NV (Holland), the Opriba Handels- und Verwaltungs-KG, and the Allianz Versicherung AG. On all this, see the Plan for the Deconcentration of the Thyssen Participation in the VSt. AG in Liquidation, 10 February 1953; the Note regarding the Gewerkschaft Preußen and Thyssen Deconcentration Plan; the Business Report of the Vorstand of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen about the First Business Year from 9 March to 30 November 1954; and the Overview about the exchange of VSt-successor shares between the Thyssen I and Thyssen II, each in ACDP K206/5. Birrenbach actually became a member of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen on 15 July 1954 shortly before replacing the Cologne lawyer Anton Comes as chairman.

<sup>78</sup> In 1954-55, Birrenbach was a member of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the VSt, therefore during the process of and up to its final liquidation. As of April 1976, the TVV GmbH held, since the ending of the deconcentration measures, shares (a *Schachtelbeteiligung*) in the ATH with a nominal value of 275 million DM.

the Thyssen industrial assets, a task he carried out jointly with Robert Ellscheid, initially the other pole of the *Vermögensverwaltung* as *Generalbevollmächtigter* of Amélie Thyssen and thus, up to 1966, AR chairman of the FTV.<sup>79</sup> In this context, Birrenbach also cooperated with Hans-Günther Sohl, chairman of the ATH *Vorstand*, therefore a key figure at Thyssen, and one of the most eminent postwar German *Unternehmer*.

Here, Birrenbach also found himself in contact and cooperating in various forms with those in fields beyond the *Montanindustrie*. Unlike the US and Britain, West Germany featured a symbiotic system of inter-locking company directorates, with the ATH AR including over the years leading representatives from the boards of firms like Siemens and the Volkswagenwerk. In line with the cozy relationship in West Germany between industry and the big banks, something that also differed from the US and Britain, Birrenbach found himself not only collaborating in a business sense with, for instance, the Commerzbank, but also sitting in AR meetings with personalities from the Deutsche Bank and serving from 1962 as a member of the *Zentralbeirat* of the Dresdner Bank AG (Frankfurt).<sup>80</sup> As a member of numerous “*mitbestimmten*” ARs (such as that of the ATH

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<sup>79</sup> Ellscheid had been the *Generalbevollmächtigter* and co-executor (along with the Buenos Aires-based Carlos Linck) of the will of Fritz Thyssen. In 1966, following the death of Amélie Thyssen the previous year, Ellscheid entered the *Verwaltungsrat* of the TVV GmbH as one of the two deputy chairs. Birrenbach was also in contact about business affairs with the Buenos Aires-based Guillermo von Winterhalder, Anita's *Bevollmächtigter* for her affairs outside of Germany, an often contentious relationship that prolonged Birrenbach's peripheral involvement with South America and in which his prior experiences there, for instance with the Lametal-Union, played a prominent role in the discussions surrounding future decisions. Birrenbach's outrage at the potential impact of Winterhalder's extravagant South American transactions resulted, in connection with the 1964 reorganization of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in the founding of the Südamerikanische Vermögensverwaltung GmbH in Luxembourg, with a capital of Lfrs. 20 million, as a holding for Gräfin Anita's South American shares and in which the, now, Thyssen Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen mbH held a 51% stake. Later on, the Zichy-Thyssen Real Estate Ltd. was founded in Canada as a subsidiary of the TVV. In 1971, Birrenbach also became *Bevollmächtigter* for Anita's two sons, the counts Zichy-Thyssen.

<sup>80</sup> Birrenbach identified the origins of his links to the Dresdner Bank in his decades-long and, despite his lengthy time away, still close and personal connection to Carl Goetz. Later on, from 1970-79, Birrenbach was also a member of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Colonia Versicherung AG (Cologne), the second-largest German insurance company at the time.

itself), Birrenbach claimed that he had “always had understanding for the questions of the co-determination” and that, in general, he always had very good personal and political relations to the trade unions, including being “on very good terms” [*auf sehr gutem FuÙe*] with the successive DGB chairmen like Willi Richter, Ludwig Rosenberg and Heinz-Oskar Vetter, who themselves belonged to these ARs.<sup>81</sup> Embracing what he considered the great tradition created by Hans Böckler, the first president of the DGB, and the concept of a social partnership of *Unternehmer* and *Arbeitnehmer*, Birrenbach welcomed and saw himself promoting the harmonious climate essential to the constructive solution, despite conflicting interests, of their mutual problems and tasks regarding the Thyssen group. In a remark that applied not only to the development of the economy but also, in a socio-political sense, of the wider *Gesellschaft*, he even suggested “it is unthinkable we could have accomplished what we did without the complete cooperation of labor.”<sup>82</sup> Thus, Birrenbach could boast, “[n]obody has ever considered me *unsozial*.”<sup>83</sup>

Birrenbach’s rise within the Thyssen complex, especially during the early years, was aided by a number of valuable contacts. These included, perhaps most importantly, the Thyssen family itself, with which he had forged a “*Vertrauens-*” relationship in Buenos Aires after the war. This manifested itself not only in a friendship with, but also in a personal advisory role to the family while he was in South America. However, Birrenbach had also first begun encountering other key, Germany-based personalities during the very late 1940s and early 1950s that likewise facilitated his accession, initially

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<sup>81</sup> KB to Prof. Hermann Lübke, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2.

<sup>82</sup> Clipping about Birrenbach’s talk to representatives of the “West Coast business schools” in the United States on 1 July 1963, ACDP K157/1. On the lack of protests, even the consent, of the labor unions with respect to reconcentration, see *Pressespiegel* Nr. 25, Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke AG, Allgemeine Verwaltung Pressestelle, Mülheim, Ruhr, 26 January 1957, ACDP K078/2.

<sup>83</sup> KB to Prof. Hermann Lübke, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2. For Birrenbach’s belief that in the current situation it was important to support the DGB against “the rabble-rousers from above” [*Aufriührer von oben*], see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.

in the role of “*Schützling*,” within the Thyssen firm: from 1949, Robert Nyssen, the *Geschäftsführer* of the Stahlunion; Ellscheid, the Cologne lawyer and Thyssen family advisor, whom Birrenbach initially met in the Hotel Plaza in Buenos Aires in the early 1950s; and Sohl, a *Vorstand* member of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke then given responsibility by the Allies for its liquidation, whom Birrenbach had first met in Buenos Aires after Fritz Thyssen’s death there in February 1951. At various times, these individuals encouraged him to return to Germany, offered valuable business and career advice; brought him into connection with particular firms, for instance, Sohl with respect to the VSt and later the August-Thyssen-Hütte; helped pave the way for him to secure particular positions, notably Nyssen with regard to the Stahlunion and, then, Ellscheid with respect to the position of *Generalbevollmächtigter* for the Gräfin Zichy-Thyssen; and, finally, assisted him in developing further vital contacts with individuals and firms within the Thyssen area. It is hard to imagine Birrenbach’s rise within the Thyssen concern without the essential aid provided by such personalities.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> On the need to properly consider the interests involved in certain business undertakings so as to ensure that the friendly relations with the Thyssen family, “which are important for more than one reason,” not be endangered, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Wilhelm Riester, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4. For Birrenbach’s consultations with the local advisors of Anita Thyssen and the Thyssen family and with the leading personalities within the Thyssen administration there in Buenos Aires, see again KB to Riester, 23 May 1952, ACDP K207/4 as well as KB, Buenos Aires, to Geschäftsführung of the Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 30 June 1952, ACDP K207/4. It was a visit by Nyssen to Buenos Aires that had resulted in the transfer to the Lametal-Union of the Stahlunion representation and to Birrenbach’s being entrusted, at the behest of the Stahlunion *Geschäftsführung*, with the leadership of the Lametal-Union, at the expense of its apparently inferior earlier chief, Ernesto Nicolai [see, for example, KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. W. Riester, in Firma Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 14 September 1951, ACDP K207/4]. For Ellscheid’s role in 1954, along with that of other personalities, in successfully proposing Birrenbach, including to Winterhalder, for the position of *Generalbevollmächtigter* of the countess Zichy-Thyssen, see, for instance, Ellscheid to KB, 28 September 1954, ACDP K206/5. Ellscheid, Sohl and Pieter Sanders formally offered Birrenbach the post, in the name of *Gräfin* Anita Zichy. Sanders was a Dutch jurist who had administered the German assets seized by the Netherlands after World War II, including those of Fritz Thyssen, and then became a long-time member of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, the *Verwaltungsrat* of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH and the *Aufsichtsrat* of the August-Thyssen-Hütte. Decisive in Birrenbach’s acceptance was his talk with Ellscheid on a long morning walk, with Ellscheid’s wife, along one of the Bavarian lakes. On Birrenbach feeling great warmth for Ellscheid since they had known one another, his insistence that “I personally have never

Meanwhile, Birrenbach absorbed and embraced the ethos prevalent at the time among these and other top personalities at Thyssen, and indeed in much of the West German business milieu. He admired *Generaldirektor* Sohl and other particular *Unternehmer* that he worked with, especially those he considered self-made men, for their far-sightedness, breadth of activity, risk-taking, energy and leadership qualities. His own international knowledge and experience were highly valued in this environment that was so indicative of the postwar structural changes that had imposed their stamp on the hitherto inward-looking industry of the Ruhr. Stress was now placed on frequent travel abroad and on interaction with foreign shareholders. Connections and cooperation with foreign companies, steel or otherwise, were sought out, with existing firms engaged and new branches founded abroad with the specific intent to preserve and promote interests there. A keen sensitivity flourished towards variations in international *Konjunktur*, trade and currency order. Efforts were undertaken to locate foreign sources of capital and financing as well as supplies of raw materials, like coal, ore and scrap metal, abroad. Not only were foreign markets sought out as potential export opportunities but practices of acquisition, processing and production were also carried out in an international context. While Europe, including countries like Austria and Switzerland, played a significant role in all of this, North America, especially the United States and Canada, represented an overseas focal point.<sup>85</sup>

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forgotten nor ever will forget what you have done for me since my return to Germany,” and the affability existing between the Birrenbach and Ellscheid families, see KB to Ellscheid, 9 November 1955, ACDP K206/5.

<sup>85</sup> As of the late 1950s, the West German *Hüttenwerke* had discovered that, with the *Wirtschaftswunder*, the pre-war domestic, Swedish and (to a lesser extent) North African ore supplies no longer sufficed and also found themselves using large amounts of American coal. Meanwhile, the desire to export may well have sparked Birrenbach’s objections during the mid- to late-1950s to what he considered a dangerous revaluing of the mark, including relative to the dollar, and his stress on the need for an eventual all-European

Likewise, Birrenbach propounded the at times seemingly incoherent but, upon closer inspection, actually shrewdly self-interested perspective of the state's proper role in the economic world typically entertained in some way, shape or form by so many businesspeople. On the one hand, he touted flexible market economic systems that were expected to provide indispensable stability, security [*Sicherheit*], freedom and growth to a strong private *Wirtschaft*. He criticized and hoped to contain the public budget's "flood of expenditures," insisting that those expenditures deemed desirable should be oriented to the growth of the social product. Birrenbach argued that the federal government should exercise reserve in its *Wirtschaftspolitik* and avoid hasty overreactions, via "a global steering [*Steuerung*]," to every short-term fluctuation of the data. The *Wirtschaft* had to be shielded from "all disruptions of its normal course, regardless of from which side they come," so that its "self-healing forces" could develop unhindered. On the other hand, even in the midst of a tight budgetary situation, Birrenbach believed that "*die öffentliche Hand*" should utilize its expenditure, economic and finance policies to engage in "an active *Konjunkturpolitik*." He also insisted on collaboration in R&D between state, *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft* to keep pace with technological developments and promoted a more trusting cooperation between the state and the two *Tarifpartner*, management and the labor unions, though without impairing free collective bargaining [*Tarifautonomie*].<sup>86</sup> Though hardly surprising in light of his vocation, Birrenbach thought, perhaps not exclusively, but certainly principally in terms of how the state at any given time could

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currency alignment involving a rectification of the exchange rates of the franc and, in the longer run, the pound.

<sup>86</sup> On "the flood of expenditures," see Birrenbach's speech at the ATH Hauptversammlung on 28 March 1963, ACDP K077/2. On the protection of the *Wirtschaft* from disturbances to its normal development, on the "*selbsteilenden Kräfte*," and on the need for a "*Sanierung*" (rehabilitation) of the public budget, but also for "an active *Konjunkturpolitik*," see Birrenbach's speech at the ATH HV of 19 April 1968, ACDP K063/1.

benefit business and industry (and especially the steel industry), whether through action or inaction.

The two major processes molding Thyssen during Birrenbach's career there were an intimately related rationalization and reconcentration. With the “*Entflechtungs*”-measures imposed by the victorious Allies, the property of Fritz Thyssen, as contained in the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, had been broken up into smaller units.<sup>87</sup> Especially for the Americans, decartelization and other organizational reforms of West German industry, including iron, steel and coal sectors, aimed not just at preventing an undue influence of particular individuals but also at integration into a liberal-capitalist international system dominated by the US. Ironically, given his pronounced Atlanticism, Birrenbach at the very least served as an instrument of those still-powerful elements in the *Wirtschaft* who, adhering to older traditions, resisted these policies, which they saw as a discriminatory, economically nonsensical *Politikum* with, as Birrenbach put it, “fatal” impact. In light of an increasingly competitive and constantly expanding national and international market in Europe and beyond, displaying extraordinary economic growth and technological development and an ever tighter interweaving of the large economic areas, Birrenbach considered it essential to reverse the deconcentration and to rationalize the firms of the Thyssen group into more closely cooperative entities capable of enhancing productivity and investment and reducing costs. He viewed this as part of an international trend actually towards concentration in the *Montanindustrie*, evident at West German firms like Mannesmann, Hoesch and Klöckner, and really in all capital-intensive growth industries, whether (perhaps especially) in the US and Britain, the nationalized economic branches

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<sup>87</sup> These measures were based on orders issued by the Allied High Commission, including Law Nr. 27 of 16 May 1950 and, more specifically, its Combined Steel Group's order of 29 April 1953.

of the Western world or the *Kombinaten* of the Soviet bloc. In the case of Thyssen, the process posed tough financial, legal, tax and human problems and, moreover, involved a struggle against the Allied conditions prohibiting just such a reconcentration.<sup>88</sup>

Partial reconcentration, centered on the ATH *Stammwerk*, ultimately succeeded, largely due to the efforts of Birrenbach and Ellscheid, as the FRG attained a measure of sovereignty and US influence in this area waned. Perhaps driven not only by old perspectives and conditions but also by changed circumstances, interests and needs, the process began in 1956 with the liquidation of the *Gewerkschaft Preußen* and the takeover of its assets, already seen as a “silent victory” in the struggle against the Allied conditions, followed over the years by other complicated “*Einbringungs*”-transactions involving the Niederrheinische Hütte, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke, Handelsunion and Phoenix-Rheinrohr. While the takeover of Phoenix in 1964 represented a crowning act, the mergers continued into the late 1960s and beyond. After Phoenix, reconcentration became mere concentration, involving firms outside the former “Stahlverein,” such as the Hüttenwerke Oberhausen AG (1968) and Mannesmann-Röhrenwerke AG (1969), and generating new constellations.<sup>89</sup> This approach did not simply focus on horizontal

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<sup>88</sup> For Birrenbach on the “fatal [*verhängnisvoll*]” effects of the “overly strong *Entflechtung*,” see KB to Winterhalder, Buenos Aires, 8 February 1954, ACDP K206/5. On the size of American steel concerns far exceeding that of the VSt, see *Pressespiegel* Nr. 25, Rheinisch-Westfälische Eisen- und Stahlwerke AG, Allgemeine Verwaltung, Pressestelle, Mülheim, Ruhr, 26 January 1957, ACDP K078/2. On the tax privileges enjoyed and the “extraordinarily high tax obligations” and possible prohibitions of the German *Entflechtungs*-law avoided thanks to a Thyssen Deconstruction Plan entailing that each of the two heiresses of Fritz Thyssen transferred their shares to new holding companies founded precisely for this purpose, instead of to their private assets, see KB to Guillermo von Winterhalder, Buenos Aires, 1 April 1955, ACDP K206/5. For Birrenbach’s consultations with experts familiar with the complex *Entflechtungs*-material, namely Georg Eichhorn, *Finanzpräsident* a.D. in the *Oberfinanzdirektion* Düsseldorf, and Erwin Rheinlaender, the tax expert of the VSt, with respect to particularly difficult tax and legal questions concerning the holding, again see KB to Guillermo von Winterhalder, 1 April 1955, ACDP K206/5.

<sup>89</sup> Such efforts go far in explaining the only mixed results borne by Allied decartelization measures, despite their being buttressed by legislation passed by the Federal Republic itself. Perhaps also of relevance, even as they persisted in this course (still at least to some extent as of 1957), the Allies themselves, influenced by the drain on their own taxpayers and by initially bleak conditions in West Germany, increasingly



integration but also aspired to a degree of vertical (re)integration with coal, trade (Handelsunion AG) and, later, processing (Rheinstahl AG, 1973).<sup>90</sup> The development of the ATH was that of a unique enterprise but also reflected the course of the German steel industry and *Wirtschaft* as a whole. Almost entirely in ruins at its belated “re-founding” in May 1953 due to heavy war damage and the dismantling of its few intact plants, a vestige of the draconian Morgenthau Plan, the ATH underwent a rapid revival to become the biggest German steel company and private European steel group and to assume its place among the largest of German enterprises and Western steel firms. Testament to a certain postwar continuity of elite personnel and organizational concept in the German steel industry, reconcentration stands as Birrenbach’s supreme achievement at Thyssen.<sup>91</sup>

### G. Into Politics

While Birrenbach would maintain close ties with Thyssen throughout the rest of his life, he early on set about intensively expanding his horizons in the Federal Republic beyond the world of business into that of politics, befitting a man who described himself as “a politician from passion from childhood.” Far from following a spontaneous path,

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questioned the value and feasibility of such policies in the *Montanindustrie*. The Gewerkschaft Preußen (Mülheim/Ruhr) was a private holding company, a *Gewerkschaft neuen Rechts*, created by Fritz Thyssen that contained his shares in the VSt, namely an *Aktienpaket* of an approximate nominal value of RM 95.4 million. Representing 20.75% of the VSt *Aktienkapital* this had been reduced from the original 26% of the VSt *Grundkapital* due to measures taken against Thyssen by the National Socialist government.

<sup>90</sup> Major transactions intended to secure a sufficient coal basis involved, for instance, the GBAG (Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG) in 1957, therefore before the onset of the coal crisis, and the HABAG in 1965, in the midst of the crisis. The GBAG was the largest German coal-mining company at the time. Even prior to these transactions, the ATH had a majority share in the Erin Bergbau AG, while the property of the Gewerkschaft Preußen had also included coal fields. Die GBAG and Essen-based Rheinstahl were erstwhile parts of the VSt. The Handelsunion was the parent company of the Stahlunion.

<sup>91</sup> The *Demontage* of the ATH was halted on the basis of the Petersberg Agreement of November 1949, which also permitted West Germany to resume international trade and obligated it to implement decartelization legislation in accord with the occupation statutes. While the destroyed and dismantled ATH had a remaining annual production of just 400,000 tons of raw steel, by April 1973 it had an annual capacity of 15 million tons (Excerpt from Birrenbach’s Speech at the ATH HV on 17 April 1973 in Duisburg, ACDP K067/2). As of October 1980, the Thyssen AG (formerly the ATH) had 150,000 workers and annual sales of DM 25 billion worldwide (KB to Helmut Kohl, 20 October 1980, ACDP K032/1). Such a recovery lends some credence to Birrenbach’s claims that he had returned, after a long absence, to a Federal Republic in the midst of what he called its “founding phase.”

Birrenbach's career evinces an explicit, though rudimentary, long-term plan, a blueprint bereft of a concrete timetable but consisting of broadly conceived, interrelated steps. As he explained in these terms, his entrance into politics represented "the second stage of my goals." However, it was first necessary to complete the initial stage, that of establishing an economic base, a firm anchoring in the *Wirtschaft*, as the material foundation for his life and especially for autonomous political activity. This desire for political independence, described by Birrenbach as his "motto," was a corollary of his broader yearning for personal independence, which he considered "the deciding condition for me in life." Experiences in Weimar and National Socialist Germany and in Argentina had impressed upon Birrenbach the central import of political and economic independence. At the latest by the transitional period 1950-52, he had drawn the connection between the two and was already eyeing, upon his impending return, a career combining both business and politics, hopefully including a Bundestag seat. Birrenbach's belief that he himself had first of all "to earn my own basis [*Boden*] in the industry," an essential part of his plan, explains in no small part the deliberateness with which he entered politics as well as his continued activity in the *Wirtschaft* long after he had embarked on his political career.<sup>92</sup> Fortunately, at Thyssen, Birrenbach could attain, with his comfortable income,

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<sup>92</sup> For Birrenbach's passion "*von Kindesbeinen an*," and his conviction that he had to "*den Boden selbst verdienen*," see the Birrenbach interview "Zeugen der Zeit," 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1. For Birrenbach's hope that he would be in a situation, beginning in January of next year, to devote himself to a greater extent to those things, presumably meaning politics, that really interested him, see KB to Brüning, 18 November 1955, ACDP K213/4. On his progress with respect to "the second stage of my goals," see KB to Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Hospital, 19 December 1955, ACDP K116/1. For Birrenbach's motto [*Devise*] from the start that one should remain "independent" in politics, for this being the reason he would retain his position at the Thyssen concern even during his time in the Bundestag, and on such independence, as he had seen in Weimar, being a fundamental precondition for him being able to openly, clearly and objectively express his opinions, unhindered by party considerations, see the Birrenbach interview "Zeitgenossen," 7 September 1980, ACDP K213/1. On "the deciding condition," see KB, Buenos Aires, to Brüning, Cambridge, MA, 5 September 1951, ACDP K001/1. Birrenbach depicted his career decisions and itinerant existence in the framework of his desire for personal independence, the endangering of which he cited as a significant motive for leaving Germany in 1939, for resigning positions

financial security for himself and his family, as well as the related trappings, whether a healthy investment portfolio, a luxury car or a favorably located Düsseldorf-area home.<sup>93</sup>

Almost immediately after his permanent return and even as he was establishing his all-important economic base, Birrenbach became engaged in politics, at least on the periphery, and started to prepare his grand entrance onto this stage. In August 1953, the former *Zentrum* voter was taken up as a member of the Christian Democratic Union. He began to make a name for himself in political circles and to attract his party's attention through a variety of activities, especially in his own state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Federal Republic's largest *Bundesland* and industrial zone. By this point, he was too old for the *Junge Union*, the party's youth organization and a typical path of advancement for aspiring politicians. Forced to look elsewhere, Birrenbach seized the opportunity to give numerous talks, including at an assortment of party functions. Intensifying the postwar journalistic activity he had undertaken intermittently since 1950, both in Argentina and Germany, itself tracing its roots back to his student days, Birrenbach published a series of articles on contemporary international relations,<sup>94</sup> opposing neutrality<sup>95</sup> and advocating a

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several times in Argentina and for rejecting the initial offer made to him already in Buenos Aires in the early 1950s to become the *Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen daughter. In the latter case, he believed that he should first stand on his own two feet and "earn my spurs" before accepting such an offer [Birrenbach Draft in ACDP K073/2].

<sup>93</sup> Birrenbach lived in Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, on the Bergische Landstraße and, later, on the Sauerweg, while his Thyssen office was located in the heart of Düsseldorf, on the Königsallee and, later, on the Berliner Allee. From home, Birrenbach could also make the trip to Bonn in perhaps a bit less than an hour. For those curious about Birrenbach's, and the German businessman's, taste in such things, as of 1976, his primary car at home was a current model year Mercedes 450 SEL.

<sup>94</sup> See KB to R. Tüngel, Hauptschriftleiter of Die ZEIT, 12 September 1953, for an instance of Birrenbach's efforts to have his work published. Examples of such articles include "Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg," 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse* (Buenos Aires); "Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins," 10 September 1953; "Um das Schicksal der EVG", 9 May 1954; "Von London nach Paris", 19 October 1954; and "Wird Frankreich ratifizieren?", 26 January 1955, all contained in ACDP K001/1. Birrenbach had first written on such topics after the war in 1950 in Buenos Aires in the German-language *Freie Presse* and in Germany itself in the transitional period 1950-52, when he had accepted, for instance, to write in a local newspaper on the issue of rearmament. In these pieces authored during the first half of the 1950s, Birrenbach was making foreign policy proposals that employed the language of Germany, Europe and the West, and their interests. These works also featured

federative, continental, West European unification<sup>96</sup> and a German rearmament<sup>97</sup> in the context of a broader military buildup.<sup>98</sup> By 1954, he had joined a multi-partisan working

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his detailed analyses of the domestic politics and foreign policies of countries like France and Russia, their interaction with and impact on one another, and their consequences for other nations. On the cooperation Birrenbach had arranged in principle with Reinhold Heinen, the publisher and editor of the CDU-near *Kölnische Rundschau*, but also on one of Birrenbach's articles not having appeared in this newspaper since it did not conform to the framework of the current CDU guidelines, and on the need for Birrenbach to clarify his views, see KB, currently at the private Munich clinic of Dr. L. Schmitt, to Heinen, 3 June 1954, ACDP K001/1.

<sup>95</sup> Birrenbach's opposition to a neutralization of Germany, assuming no or insufficient armament, was seemingly in line with Adenauer's policy. As of September 1953, Birrenbach believed such a neutralization might be acceptable to the new Russian government since it would either leave unchanged or change in favor of Russia the existing power relationship in Central Europe. On the other hand, it might be unacceptable if the government feared such a concession would lead to repercussions for the Russian position in the satellite states. Earlier, in February 1951, Birrenbach had objected to the increasing "voices in all continental European countries, especially however in France and Italy and recently also in Germany" calling for the preservation of a Western European neutrality and himself urged a "voluntary joining with the West" in the context of "the great dispute between West and East." He justified this by arguing that "[i]n the center of international fields of tension there never is and never was a genuine neutrality unless the neutral power was in the situation to earn respect for its neutrality with its own military means. Which of the West European powers could militarily assure its neutrality today in the case that the Soviet rulers should decide to actively employ the Red Army in Europe?" At the same time, Birrenbach was warning of "the decline of European morale and the flight into an illusory neutrality.... [T]hen Soviet Russia would have certainly won the crucial battle in Europe without firing a single shot. In such a case, nobody will save the advocates of European neutrality from the fate met by the Beneschs and Masaryks, the Tatarescus and Tildys in the Sovietized southeast belt of Europe." ("Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost," 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse*, ACDP K001/1).

<sup>96</sup> As of 1951, Birrenbach believed continental Europe, "the old Europe," had become "a no-man's land between East and West," "a military-political vacuum" exercising a "fatal" "attractive power on the forces of aggression." The political-military strength of the western half of the continent had been "weakened seriously, if not critically [*lebensgefährlich*]." As national states, the European nations had, without exception, lost the character of great powers: "The vision of those great political thinkers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Alexis de Tocqueville, Donoso Cortés and Jakob Burckhardt has become bloody reality." Dismayed by "the hopelessness [*Ausweglosigkeit*] of the current situation," Birrenbach only found solace in so far as "[a]lso the recognition of this painful reality necessarily belongs to the process of a European self-determination." The creation of a new Europe required a foreign political, political, military and economic "unity [*Zusammenschluß* or *Einheit*]" with the goal of overcoming on a higher level, through the "bona fide" integration of all the strength [*Kräfte*] of all the members of the European *Staatengemeinschaft*, the "capitis diminutio" and "disempowerment [*Entmachtung*]" of the European nations and the restoring to the continent "in the age of the *Großräume*" at least the political importance that was its due. The mere aggregation of "antiquated [*überlebter*]" national states that retained their independence was insufficient. The fundamental condition was the mutual renunciation of "outmoded" sovereignty rights and their transfer to a European order recognizing the same rights and duties for all. Such an integration would automatically safeguard against "the emancipation and striving for hegemony" of any of the integrating powers and meant "not the end of these historical nations, rather the only chance for their preservation." ("Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost," 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1). In his pieces in the first half of the 1950s, Birrenbach concretized this advocacy for a vitally necessary *Europapolitik* and European unity by expressing his support at various points for the Brussels Pact of March 1948; a truly European solution to the problem of the Saar; the European Defense Community and a strong central Europe; in case of a French rejection of an EDC that he interpreted as being part of France's own *Europa* concept, the creation of a European coalition army within NATO featuring, even if initially only limited, real integration; what

group, founded in the early postwar years by the SPD *Finanzpolitiker* Heinrich Troeger,

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he considered the new, clear, realistic and constructive approach of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden; and, finally, the Paris Agreements of October 1954.

<sup>97</sup> By February 1951, Birrenbach argued in support of West German rearmament that Europe had to “out of necessity mobilize *Menschenreserven* by its own efforts for the defense of the western half of the continent and these are, aside from Spain, only still available in Germany.” At the same time, the unpopularity in Germany of the idea of a German army highlighted that “[t]he times of European national states are definitively over. That is nowhere felt more clearly than in Germany.” In acknowledging the objections among the majority of western European nations against German rearmament that had still not been entirely overcome, Birrenbach traced France’s “tenacious struggle,” with considerable success thus far, against the revision of the Allied Germany *Politik* in this regard. Birrenbach fumed that the French directed their security concerns at those ten German divisions that would exist in a more or less distant future, “while the one hundred and seventy Soviet ones a few tank hours further to the east are almost overlooked.” On the other hand, the Americans, especially Secretary of State Dean Acheson, had first raised and now assumed the leadership in the question of the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the Atlantic defense. Meanwhile, and crucially in Birrenbach’s view, the “English” government followed the Americans “only very hesitantly” in this matter, despite his apparent belief that the British objections were relatively low in principle. (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1). For Birrenbach’s view of the EDC as the most constructive form of German rearmament, as of early June 1954, but also his recognition that an alternative solution might become necessary if the EDC was not ratified, for instance by France, see KB to Heinen, 3 June 1954, ACDP K001/1.

<sup>98</sup> As of 1951, Birrenbach pointed to an “alarmingly thinned out continental European defense.” Warning against “a further neglecting of the western defense,” he reproached the Anglo-Saxon nations and the leadership of the western states for having been “blinded... regarding the task of re-establishing the disturbed military balance in the world.” Continental Europe “persisted” in its defenseless condition, exhibiting (even when taking England into account) a “total military impotence.” He no longer saw any European nation, not even the collective power of the European peoples [*Völker*] (again, including England), able to ward off the power of Russia, “that deadly danger which today threatens Europe.” Noting the limits of European military power, Birrenbach argued that the insufficient contingents the West Europeans currently deployed, especially the “*Randvölker*” (France, Belgium, Italy and Holland), were perceived by the USSR “not as a threat, but just as little as an obstacle to possible expansion.” He believed that “[t]he hope of preserving the peace and the lack of agreement among the Atlantic powers about the tempo and extent of the necessary armaments are the greatest allies in the West of Soviet aggression.” It was crucial that “the will to self-assertion and defense of its present, truly last European defense line unanimously and without qualification fills all western nations. The challenge of the western world is so immense in size and danger that only the absolute readiness of all free nations, oriented towards a single goal, would be in a position to prevent a decisive defeat of the West.” Here, he promoted the creation of a military power in line with the concept of “classical military strategy,” requisite for the policy of “containment” of “communist aggression” and to assure the survival of the western nations. The West needed to reconstruct “the European defense line” and provide an effective, somehow comparable, military power for waging war “or better still for the avoidance of such a war,” as it was imperative “to dare the attempt” to induce the Soviet Union “to refrain from an open military action in Europe.” According to the “estimates of military experts,” about sixty divisions from all the western nations would have to be stationed on the continent regardless of the readiness of further armed forces in their extra-continental home bases. With respect to the forces now emerging on the continent (in “Atlantic positions”), including German contingents, he insisted on a size suited “only for defense against an unprovoked attack,” one not felt as threatening, and on the “elimination [*Ausschaltung*] of any idea of a western preventive war.” Meanwhile, he welcomed all negotiations “that can be initiated with a minimal guarantee for a favorable outcome,” with the solution of all “territorial questions” reserved for “a future peaceful settlement.” As Birrenbach asserted, “[a]ny preparation of a military aggression in West Europe would necessarily provoke the Soviets [*auf den Plan rufen*] and lead to a disastrously rash action [*Kurzschluß*], which must be avoided in the interest of all nations.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1).

that met from time to time to discuss foreign policy issues with the aim of bridging existing inter-party divides.<sup>99</sup> In 1956, Birrenbach attended the CDU *Bundesparteitag* in Stuttgart, taking part in the plenary meetings as well as in those committee meetings pertaining to foreign policy, economics and finance. That same year, he gained entrance into the CDU's District Economic Committee in Düsseldorf. International conferences provided yet another means for Birrenbach to "profile" himself, and from the mid-1950s on, he participated regularly in the British-German Königswinter Conferences.<sup>100</sup>

At the same time, Birrenbach actively sought in this period to establish contacts, initially quite limited, in the German political firmament. Especially from 1954 onwards, he strove to secure the support of the Union's political apparatus by forming relationships with the party's most important personalities in the *Bund* and in Nordrhein-Westfalen. A number of these contacts ultimately played a major role in paving his way into politics, including the two figures Birrenbach came to consider the "godfathers" of his political career: Heinrich von Brentano and Heinrich Krone, the latter of whom also earned the distinguished sobriquet "*Parlamentsvater*" for his assistance in this area. In addition to these figures, Birrenbach established contact during this period with a bevy of other

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<sup>99</sup> SPD personalities in the Troeger circle, aside from Troeger himself, included Erwin Schoettle and Herbert Kriedemann. Other figures belonging to the group included Ellscheid; Walther Hensel, the *Oberstadtdirektor* of Düsseldorf; and the Cologne publisher Joseph Witsch. Once Birrenbach entered the Bundestag and the European Parliament and confronted an accumulating workload, he attended meetings of the circle far less frequently. Nevertheless, he would maintain contact for quite some time thereafter, and as late as January 1964, he gave a talk to the group about a trip to the United States as well as the bases of American foreign policy. As of July 1967, Troeger, now vice-president of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, and Birrenbach were both members of the DEW *Aufsichtsrat*, thus providing them with the opportunity, on some level, to continue their exchange of ideas.

<sup>100</sup> Birrenbach was taken up in the CDU's Kreisverband Düsseldorf when he joined the party. For Birrenbach's various CDU membership cards (e.g. CDU Landesverband Rheinland, CDU Deutschland), as well as his membership cards for other organizations, including the Görres-Gesellschaft (Cologne), the Rhein-Ruhr Klub, e.V. (dated 1960) and the Wirtschaftsrat der CDU, e.V. (dated 7 June 1967), see ACDP K206/2. For Birrenbach's acknowledgement that when he returned to Germany he had, in a sense, "gone into politics on practically the first day," see the Birrenbach interview "Zeugen der Zeit," 27 December 1979, ACDP K213/1.

helpful personalities in the CDU, such as Karl Arnold, the minister-president of Nordrhein-Westfalen; Wilhelm Johnen, the chairman of the CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen; and Franz Etzel, the vice-president of the ECSC High Authority.<sup>101</sup> Aside from such primarily party-political luminaries, Birrenbach also secured support in his political endeavors from the *Wirtschaft* in the form of the powerful *Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie* (especially its president, Fritz Berg, and its *Hauptgeschäftsführer*, Gustav Stein) and the *Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahlindustrie*.<sup>102</sup> As a whole, Birrenbach's contacts offered him encouragement and valuable advice, provided him with their endorsement and valuable recommendation, aided him in establishing links with other important personalities, facilitated his engagement within the party (for instance, his entrance into the party's district economic committee), assisted him in obtaining particularly desirable positions and, generally, helped "prepare the field" for him and played an essential role in his political advancement.

However, in identifying the contacts that provided such vital assistance in Birrenbach's political rise, pride of place must go to the Cologne banker Robert Pferdmenges, the chairman of the ATH *Aufsichtsrat* with whom Birrenbach enjoyed a close, personal relationship. Pferdmenges was Birrenbach's first real contact and, more importantly, *the* key contact with regard to his political career. After all, it was

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<sup>101</sup> Arnold was a prominent figure on the party's left wing. On Birrenbach's talks with Krone over the last ten years and on how much Birrenbach (and men like "your friend" [Johann Baptist] Gradl) were "obliged [*verbunden*]" to Krone, see KB to Heinrich Krone, Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. Other important contacts included: *Generaldirektor* Heinrich Kost, head of the CDU economic committee in Nordrhein-Westfalen; Walther Hensel, the *Oberstadtdirektor* of Düsseldorf, whom Birrenbach already knew personally; Josef Gockeln, *Oberbürgermeister* of Düsseldorf; and Artur Sträter, Finance Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Birrenbach's economic activities facilitated the acquisition of valuable contacts, not only within the Thyssen complex and with leading industrialists from other concerns, but also early on with men such as Franz Meyers, the future minister-president of NRW whom Birrenbach met at a DEW function.

<sup>102</sup> Sohl was president of the *Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie* from 1956-69.

Pferdmenges who, in addition to all his other support, first brought Birrenbach into connection, in some cases at Pferdmenges' own home, with figures of the magnitude of Adenauer, Brentano, Erhard and Krone. Beyond this, Pferdmenges served for Birrenbach as something of a model, or at least a stimulus of already existing tendencies. In Pferdmenges, Birrenbach found a man of broad understanding, feeling and authoritativeness who combined business activities with an extensive participation in politics and international affairs and who staunchly espoused the virtues of personal political independence. Pferdmenges was not only a member of the Bundestag but also a trusted advisor, including in political matters, to the Chancellor himself, as well as to personalities like Sohl. In fact, at Thyssen, Birrenbach entered a corporate culture that, at least among the top men, promoted a grasp not only of business matters but also political affairs, a culture shaped by the entwining of the two in areas like reconcentration. While men like Sohl and Ellscheid also personified this attitude, Pferdmenges was undoubtedly the best exemplar. Indeed, Birrenbach can be accurately characterized as a successor in many respects to Pferdmenges, most obviously with regard to particular offices, for instance the influential ATH *Aufsichtsrat* chairmanship, which Birrenbach assumed in 1962 following Pferdmenges' death. However, the process of succession also occurred in subtler, but no less significant, ways that will become clearer later in this account.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Pferdmenges died in September 1962 at the age of eighty-two. It was not even unheard of for journalists to confuse Pferdmenges and Birrenbach from time to time in their articles. Pferdmenges was part of, until 1953 a long-time partner in, the Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. Pferdmenges' banking activities were also international in nature and entailed his spending time abroad, for instance in Britain. In addition to his other positions, Pferdmenges belonged to the *Aufsichtsrat* of the holding of Amélie Thyssen and to the Troeger circle. For Birrenbach holding up the "deeply fulfilled [*erfüllte*] life" of the "loyal [*treuen*] friend" Pferdmenges, "a just as humanly [*menschlich*] as professionally [*fachlich*] important personality," as an "obligation [*Verpflichtung*]" to himself (and others), see Birrenbach's speech at the ATH HV on 28 March 1963, ACDP K077/2. In part, Birrenbach's respect for Pferdmenges centered on what he considered the latter's outstanding abilities and gifts, among them his energy, experience, "careful acumen [*behutsame Klugheit*]" and judgment ["*seiner überlegenen Kunst klugen Abwägens*"] as well as his skill in the



Thanks to his political engagement and contact-building, Birrenbach had by 1957 finally positioned himself well enough within the party to attain the coveted Bundestag mandate, thus joining a group of talented Union politicians who first secured mandates in that election.<sup>104</sup> Triumph though this may have been, there were also sobering elements to consider. Due to circumstances, Birrenbach was just beginning his political career proper as he approached the age of fifty, “twenty years too late,” as he put it, when others were already nearing their peak. This was all the more difficult to swallow in light of the discovery that, as he would remark years later, “[w]hen you enter the Bundestag, it takes years to settle in and become known [*bekanntwerden*].” Furthermore, Birrenbach found himself forced to enter parliament from the party list, having failed to acquire a *Wahlkreis* from which he could be elected, a blow to his cherished political independence. Seeking to make the best of things, he immediately went to work to secure the *Bundestag* positions he desired, especially within the various committees, a largely successful endeavor in which his political and economic patrons provided

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“reconciling [*Ausgleich*]” of diverse interests in personal talks, “*von Mensch zu Mensch*.” However, at various points, Birrenbach also professed to admire Pferdmenges for his embodiment and deeply rooted sense of the virtues: open-mindedness [*Aufgeschlossenheit*], modesty, selflessness, a readiness to sacrifice, honesty, integrity [*Lauterkeit*], simplicity and moderation in all things, notably including with respect to the possibilities and limits of the German state at each moment. For Birrenbach citing Pferdmenges’ crucial advice always “to exercise moderation [*Maß zu halten*],” see Birrenbach’s speech to the ATH AR of 31 August 1965, ACDP K079/1.

<sup>104</sup> This group also included Rainer Barzel, Theodor von und zu Guttenberg, Bruno Heck and Gerhard Stoltenberg. For *Direktor* Dr. Kurt Birrenbach speaking on 27 August 1957, at the high-point of the election campaign, as part of a trio of economic and finance experts running for Bundestag seats, also including Pferdmenges and the Aachen lawyer Gerhard Philipp (*Hauptgeschäftsführer* of the *Unternehmensverband Steinkohlenbergbau Aachen*), to a circle of more than two hundred local economic and political personalities at a large CDU economic conference in Oberbruch (by Aachen), see the relevant, but unidentified, newspaper articles in ACDP K001/1. In together offering an overview of the acute issues of West German economic, finance and currency policy, these candidates adhered to the party’s now famous electoral slogan by opposing “experiments” in these fields. Birrenbach, billed here as an intimate authority on the *Ruhrwirtschaft* and on the fine complexities and interactions of international economics, also discussed and presented proposals on the international economic and currency questions and problems the Federal Republic was facing with its partner countries.

invaluable support.<sup>105</sup> He soon became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the *Fraktion's Arbeitskreis V*, which was responsible for formulating policy on foreign-political, defense-political, inner-German and development aid issues. He also attained a seat on the Foreign Trade Committee (*Ausschuß für Außenhandel und Wirtschaft*), a position he would, however, relinquish within a short period of a few years due to a lack of time and relative interest. Finally, on a related but larger, West European level, Birrenbach entered the *Montanunion* parliament, soon to become the European Parliament for the three communities, as a result of his co-optation on 22 October 1957, at a time when this Strasbourg-based institution did not yet have direct elections.<sup>106</sup>

If these particular positions fell to Birrenbach rather quickly, his ascension to the role of “America expert” within his party and *Fraktion* occurred in a somewhat more roundabout manner. While Birrenbach was clearly interested in international relations from the very beginning, the United States did not occupy his immediate focus. Rather,

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<sup>105</sup> In his push for his preferred Bundestag committees and committee positions, Birrenbach enjoyed the backing of Pferdmeniges, Etzel and others, among them, as Pferdmeniges indicated, even Adenauer himself, along with that of economic associations like the BDI and WVES (Pferdmeniges to Direktor Hugo Scharnberg, MdB, 27 September 1957, ACDP K001/1). For Birrenbach's explanation that emigration had “paralyzed” his ambitions and activities, explicitly including those of a political nature, and his assessment that “National Socialism has taken twenty years from me that I am no longer able to recover,” see KB to Monnet, 8 November 1978, ACDP K158/2.

<sup>106</sup> The transformation in 1958 of the *Montanunion's* “Common Assembly” into the European Parliament for the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM was a result of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. For an example of a Birrenbach intervention at the Common Assembly, here engaging in a debate with the French Gaullist Michel Debré, see Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, Gemeinsame Versammlung, 26 February 1958, Verhandlungen/Reden, ACDP K075/2. Over the years, Birrenbach and other top personalities of the Thyssen *Vermögensverwaltung* and the August-Thyssen-Hütte, like those of the German steel industry and *Wirtschaft* as a whole, nurtured links to and often dealt with leading German public officials, whether in the federal government or the finance administration (e.g. federal finance ministry, NRW finance ministry, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), as well as non-German public institutions, like the Allied High Commission's Combined Steel Group, and European bodies, including the ECSC High Authority and EC Court of Justice (both in Luxembourg). Such institutions and the links to them had major ramifications for matters like the negotiating and implementation of the Thyssen Deconcentration Plan, the taxation of the holding companies of the Thyssen heiresses and the *Aktien* transferred to them, the reconstruction of the ATH, the approval of the often burdensome conditions impacting on the reconcentration of the VSt, the importing of American coal, and the creation of common European import policies and financial assistance funds.

that honor belonged to Great Britain, due largely to the especially strained Anglo-German relations existing early during Birrenbach's tenure in the Bundestag.<sup>107</sup> Though Birrenbach himself described his main area of interest in his very early Bundestag period as the Federal Republic's relations with the Anglo-Saxon countries, especially Britain, one could even convincingly argue, based on his various activities, whether trips, articles, or conference participation, that well into the late 1950s, Birrenbach was at least as, and perhaps significantly more, interested in continental European affairs than in the United States, with his first and, to this point, only trip there (indeed to North America as a whole) coming in 1950.<sup>108</sup> This changed dramatically by the end of 1958. Largely as a

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<sup>107</sup> Earlier, in February 1951, Birrenbach had approved of England's refusal to participate in a federative European union since, due to its historical development and distant overseas interests, England belonged to "a different supranational unit" that could not be identical with continental Europe. He included England among those European nations that had, as national states, lost the character of great powers. In world councils, it remained a first-rank political power merely as the center of the "*Staatengemeinschaft*" that was the Commonwealth. Moreover, having lost its earlier military significance, "England has many tasks, which far exceed its physical possibilities." Not only were the British Isles themselves now on the "front-line" but it was also necessary to defend the control of those "numerous positions of the globe" where the British Commonwealth had become weak and "vulnerable" in the long-run in the face of a potential "breakthrough [*Einbruch*] of Soviet power" (e.g. the Mediterranean Sea, the Near East with the Suez Canal, Southeast Asia). "In a global war, the former English empire [*Weltreich*] would be engaged on all continents of the world." Therefore, England simply lacked the military manpower to contribute substantial contingents to the continental European defense and in a military conflict between East and West would be "only a factor of secondary importance." Nevertheless, Birrenbach was still cognizant of and desired the mobilization of the potential power, including military power, of the Commonwealth. Indeed, there existed a common interest in that the security of the European "*Vorfeld*" was just as vital for England as for Europe, itself, since the channel had ceased to form a natural border and "the inclusion of West Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence would result in the military and political paralyzation of England." Ultimately, Birrenbach argued in favor of a cooperation and association of Britain with the united European continent in a form in which its voice, although not officially represented in the councils of Europe, could never be ignored and that did not conflict with the interests of the Commonwealth. This vital "partnership" would include a security alliance to guarantee the European union externally and the German-French border internally, thus contributing to the "solution of the European question" by helping overcome French feelings of worry and mistrust, especially in the military field, that any "community [*Gemeinschaft*]" would have to "transcend [*sprengen*]" in the long-term. ["Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost," 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1].

<sup>108</sup> Perhaps Birrenbach's February 1951 series of articles sheds some light on his initial neglect of the United States. Basing his analysis, in part, on "the experiences of the two first world wars," Birrenbach noted the "limits" of the "Atlantic military power." Specifically, he bemoaned the spatial distance of the United States; the "in no way unlimited American manpower reserves"; the amount of time necessary "until the power of the USA... can be brought into action [*zum Einsatz*] on the European continent"; and the "isolationism" that had flared up in the US and was espoused by major personalities, like Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft, in the "profound debate [*Auseinandersetzung*]" following the defeat of the UN

result of the brewing confrontation over Berlin, it became clear to Birrenbach by this point that the relationship of the Federal Republic to the United States would be *the* crucial relationship for the foreseeable future.<sup>109</sup> This realization occasioned a rapid and

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troops on the Yalu. Especially this isolationism brought into question “the entire foreign policy of the United States since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 through the Marshall Plan to the Brussels and Atlantic Pacts” and represented a “danger emerging” that “cannot be taken seriously enough.” Even if the US went beyond employing its air and sea forces in Europe and supplying weapons to the European nations, the number of American land divisions that, judging by current discussions, might be stationed on the continent would be insufficient, even “symbolic.” Furthermore, Birrenbach referred to “[t]he Maginot complex of the atom bomb possession” and reproached the leadership of the western states, including the Anglo-Saxon nations, for the “criminal” frittering away of the “respite [*Atempause*]” granted the West by the American atomic bomb monopoly (since broken by the Russians in 1949) and for their stress on the “hopelessly obsolete” concept of defense through a “push-button war.” A skeptical Birrenbach remained uncertain about the ability of even the United States “to cause the Soviet Union to be content with the frontiers of its current zone of influence.” Now, “[a]fter communism has not shied away from the risk of openly challenging the United States, transitioning from cold to hot war in Korea, the remote impact [*Fernwirkung*] of a later American intervention [*Einsatz*] can no longer be relied upon without hesitation [*bedenkenlos*] for the deterrence of the Soviet Union.” At least at this point, Birrenbach saw the United States as “an insular power whose military means, so far as the possession of large land armies stands in question, are extremely limited in view of the task to be dealt with.” All this seemed to render the US unable to ensure the defense and security of Europe, in particular to stop an attack on the Elbe, even more disturbing since, given the experiences from Poland to Korea, Birrenbach rejected a “liberation after a preceding Soviet occupation.” No wonder Birrenbach believed that the USSR, implicitly not the US, “represents the only real world power today.” (“Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost,” 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1). For Birrenbach’s later explanation and analysis of “the new American defense strategy” (Eisenhower’s “New Look,” including massive retaliation), its rationale but also his own criticism of that strategy, see “Die neue amerikanische Verteidigungs-Strategie,” by Kurt Birrenbach, ACDP K001/1. Here, Birrenbach also pointed to and aligned himself with a lengthy list of doubters in the United States (including Democratic leader Adlai Stevenson, some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Admiral Robert Carney) and Canada (including Foreign Minister Lester Pearson) as well as in England and France. Birrenbach’s concerns regarding American “isolationism” were probably exacerbated during the mid-1950s by the statements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the NATO Conference in February 1954 broaching the possibility of an “agonizing reappraisal” of American foreign policy and by a recent report of the Senators Stuart Symington and Styles Bridges, all referred to in KB to Heinen, 3 June 1954, ACDP K001/1.

<sup>109</sup> Though expressing grave doubts regarding the efficacy of the United States with respect to the defense of Europe, Birrenbach’s series of articles in 1951 also presented some justification for a heightened interest in that nation. After all, Birrenbach viewed US assistance as “the only alternative” available to Europe. The US was that “power of continental size” which, in addition to the Soviet Union, had emerged from the last world war as the only victor. America had decided the first and second world wars with its economic strength and, as the largest industrial country, was economically equal, if not superior, to all other hypothetical combinations in the world. On the basis of its incomparable military-economic possibilities, the US could indeed become “the arsenal of the world.” An air and sea power, the US was already the second greatest, potentially *the* greatest, military power in the world. In the emerging, altered situation deriving from the current state of technology, the US could assume England’s historical role vis-à-vis the European continent, constituting a danger of the first order for any continental opponent and confronting the USSR and its immense land power with an ability to conduct operations on all the borders of its extended land mass. A “coherent [*in sich geschlossenes*] Europe,” supported by the US and successfully mobilizing the war potential of the Western hemisphere before it was too late, would represent a power that could prove to be superior even in comparison to the USSR. Events in Persia, Greece and Berlin as well as

significant shift in his attention in the late 1950s towards the United States. By 1959, he had immersed himself in this subject and, in March, assumed the role of *Referent* for his party and *Fraktion* with regard to the US, a position he would occupy throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s. Birrenbach's assumption of the *Referat* "America and Canada" in the AKV involved written and oral reports about relevant current events, problems and developments in that subject area, along with the establishing of contacts and regular discussions with the responsible *Referenten* in the Foreign Office (AA).<sup>110</sup>

#### H. Conclusion

This admittedly selective account of Birrenbach's life up to the late 1950s serves not only a narrative function but also offers insights into the man's nature and experiences which will prove of some significance later on. Birrenbach was obviously a

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the Korean campaign had demonstrated that "[t]he rulers [*Machthaber*] of the Kremlin are cold calculators [*Rechner*], not at all concerned with prestige- or initial-*[Anfangs-]* successes whatsoever. They have, to now, understood only one language, that of power." Indeed, Birrenbach recognized only one foreign-political factor preventing the USSR from extending "the boundaries of Soviet rule [*Herrschaft*] up to the shores of the Atlantic: concern about a total military intervention [*Einsatz*] of the United States in the framework of a global war." Moreover, a vital American interest was also at stake here, since "seen from the USA, the inclusion of West Europe in the Soviet sphere of influence would result in... the total isolating of North America in the world." ("Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost," 7-10 February 1951, ACDP K001/1).

<sup>110</sup> Nevertheless, during the period 1957-60, Birrenbach did travel on political matters to Britain, principally London, at least once a year, including at the arrangement of the British Conservative Party's Overseas Bureau, for a few days at a time. His trip in 1957 occurred in December, therefore after the Bundestag election. For Birrenbach's discussions in November 1958 with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, Defense Secretary Duncan Sandys, and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling in locations like the House of Commons as well as the homes of the British hosts on themes such as the free-trade zone (including the alternative facing Britain to either join the Common Market or to create a European Free Trade Association) and the status of Berlin, and the role of Birrenbach's English friends in enabling such talks, see KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2; and KB, Düsseldorf, to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2. Birrenbach's trip in July 1960 was undertaken with Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU), minister-president of Schleswig-Holstein, and Günther Serres (CDU), chairman of the Bundestag's foreign trade committee. To cite an example of Britain's ongoing importance early in this period, Birrenbach, at the CDU economic conference in Oberbruch in August 1957, stressed the pivotal role Britain would have to play in bringing about a desirable European currency-political agreement, also involving France, that would be based on the free convertibility of the currencies and required the financial and tariff-political support of the United States (see the unidentified newspaper articles in ACDP K001/1). On Birrenbach, in August 1959, also preparing for, among other urgent professional matters, a political visit in Warsaw, see KB to Hans Schäffer, Sweden, 21 August 1959, ACDP K004/2.

well-educated and ambitious man, trained in law and the social sciences and willing to make considerable sacrifices to advance his career. He was a deliberate, methodical person, who felt most comfortable adhering to an overall plan. Among the most salient motivating factors that can be traced throughout his actions was the desire to retain his personal independence. Thanks to his experiences in Germany and Argentina, he had become quite adept at establishing and utilizing well-placed contacts, whether in the fields of business or politics. In the former, Birrenbach honed his diplomatic and negotiating skills and gained an understanding of the complex, inter-related elements involved in the management of a work. However, while quite successful in business, his passionate interest actually lay in the realm of politics, especially international relations. His cosmopolitan existence, as student, businessman and exile, nurtured in him a broad perspective on the world and enabled him to interact more effectively with foreigners. As we shall see, certain elements in his background, such as his birthplace, Catholicism, *Gymnasium* education and fascination with the classical world, might have suggested it was unlikely this man would become one of the most ardent of Atlanticists in the Federal Republic. However, other aspects suggested a predisposition towards precisely this possibility: his frequent interaction with Americans in the business world, his employment for several years by an American firm and his long sojourn across the Atlantic, albeit in South, rather than North, America. Perhaps it is not too surprising that by the late 1950s, Birrenbach found himself exceedingly interested in the United States.

### Chapter 3: German Occidentalism - Abendland

#### A. Introduction

During the first part of the 1950s, at least into the middle of the decade, a powerful current of Conservative-Christian thought enjoyed considerable, even predominant, influence in the Federal Republic. One of the defining characteristics of the atmosphere during this period was the quite pervasive presence (including in political discourse) of an Occidentalistic sensibility centered on the concept of “*Abendland*.” This was an idea embraced by a wide range of individuals stretching far beyond the narrow band of what might plausibly be dismissed as mere propagandists. Nor was its appeal limited to Conservatives or to the influential *Bildungsbürgertum*, though it appears to have enjoyed its warmest reception among these groups. Given its rather nebulous character, the *Abendland* worldview conjured up a diverse spectrum of visions amongst its adherents, yet with a little effort, using primarily the available secondary sources, it is still possible to sketch a general outline and, most importantly, call particular attention to those elements of special importance for our own purposes.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The secondary literature dealing with the theme *Abendland*, on which this chapter heavily relies, includes Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung, 1920–1970* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005); Wilfried Mausbach, “Erdachte Welten: Deutschland und der Westen in den 1950er Jahren,” in Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert, eds., *Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Detlef Junker* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004), pp. 423-448; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Occidentalism: Rhetoric, Process, and Postwar German Reconstruction,” Diss., Columbia University, 2001; Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949,” in *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 67 (1995), pp. 278-308; Doris von der Brèlie-Lewien, “Abendland und Sozialismus: Zur Kontinuität politisch-kultureller Denkhaltungen im Katholizismus von der Weimarer Republik zur frühen Nachkriegszeit,” in Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, eds., *Politische Teilkulturen zwischen Integration und Polarisierung: Zur politischen Kultur in der Weimarer Republik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990), pp. 188-218; Heinz Hürten, “Der Topos vom Christlichen Abendland in Literatur und Publizistik nach den beiden Weltkriegen,” in Albrecht Langer, ed., *Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1985), pp. 131-54; Richard Faber, *Abendland: Ein politischer Kampfbegriff* (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1979); Klaus Schwabe, “Anti-Americanism within the German Right, 1917-1933,” *Amerikastudien*, vol. 21 (1976), pp. 89-107.

## B. Content

To put it briefly, in their efforts to find sources of a durable identity and models to rebuild their shattered world, the proponents of the *Abendland* idea gazed into the ancient and medieval past. Especially prominent in their minds was the notion of Europe as Latin Christendom, particularly as it had existed in the early medieval empire, especially in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries, of the Germanic-Frankish king Charlemagne. In geographic terms, this empire, in some senses a medieval successor of the cosmopolitan Roman empire, had stopped not far to the east of the Rhine and extended from Rome in the south to the English Channel in the north. This *Abendland* had strived for, and to a large extent achieved, an unprecedentedly intimate and symbiotic relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the state and was characterized by what was later described as a distinctively Christian humanist civilization. Amidst all of the turmoil surrounding them, the fundamental aim of the contemporary *Abendländler* was to gather the still extant remnants and restore an updated version of this Carolingian *sacrum imperium*, this ancient unity and culture of continental Western Europe. They perceived in this *abendländisch* project and identity a potentially regenerative force, including in a spiritual sense, and an essential means to save their besieged civilization.

And besieged it was, for the *Abendländler* saw a civilization in fundamental crisis. Their perspective was marked by ambivalence, even hostility, towards many aspects of the modern world. These ills, often interwoven with each another, comprised a rather lengthy catalogue: *Vermassung*; collectivization; atomization; secularization; industrialization; bureaucratization; alienation; urbanization; and *Technisierung*, by which they essentially referred to technology run amok, were amongst the more



significant ones. In addition to these deleterious, essentially impersonal, processes, the *Abendländler* were also highly critical of the ideologies and misguided systems of thought so prevalent in the modern world: secularism, nihilism; Marxism; Socialism; Liberalism; capitalism; mammonism; militarism; nationalism; national-state etatism; rationalism; scientism and the belief in human progress; and, perhaps most fundamental of all, materialism in all its guises. In their analysis, the adherents to the *Abendland* idea identified a series of baneful historical epochs that had resulted from or even had been crucial in setting these pernicious trends and ideologies in motion and in providing them with forceful impetus. Particularly prominent in this regard were the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The upshot of all these phenomena had been a move away from a healthy *Abendland* and towards civilizational crisis, most recently manifested and intensified by the twin catastrophes of National Socialism and war.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever its sweeping condemnations of the modern age, the *Abendland* worldview was actually a rather optimistic one, insofar as it offered a prescription for renewal through a return to the path of the *Abendland*. In this sense, the entire postwar *Abendland* phenomenon lends some credence to the contention of the Conservative British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott that the most striking aspect of modern European politics is the pervasiveness of rationalism, even amongst those claiming to be strictly opposed to rationalism. Within Germany (and beyond), where the ground seemed to have been cleared by recent events, the path to regeneration largely consisted of the re-Christianization of society. In general terms, the *Abendländler* understood this process as

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<sup>2</sup> By portraying National Socialism as the product of a civilizational crisis, the *Abendländler*, whether intentionally or not, at least implicitly absolved the Germans of sole responsibility.

the rejection of the idea of the *Gesellschaftsvertrag*, the social contract, in favor of the construction of a traditional, pre-modern, God-ordained social order based on natural law. Broadly conceived, such a social order would be quasi-rural, family-centered, *berufständisch*, peaceful and cooperative: a genuine communal *Gemeinschaft*. Great emphasis was placed in this regard on the notion of “distributionism,” namely a just distribution of wealth and, related to this, the according of the opportunity to each of the members of society to own and settle on one’s own property. Significant as such overall visions of society may have been in their own right, they are only of tangential importance for our current investigation.

### C. The Political

More directly relevant is that the vision of the *Abendländler* of such a traditional, pre-modern, re-Christianized social order extended into the political realm. Here, they displayed ambivalence towards an ineffective, even open criticism of a destructive, mass parliamentary and party democracy, derisively referred to as a mere *Formaldemokratie*. They correspondingly harbored profound reservations towards the Federal Republic’s *Grundgesetz*, dismissing it as an interim construct at best. On a philosophical level, there was the infusion of a pronounced anti-rationalism and anti-materialism into political thought. After all, the *Abendländler* traced the contemporary crisis in which modern man found himself in no small part to his arrogant presumption that he could comprehend the world solely through a resort to his own reason (*Ratio*) and sensory experience. In opposition to this dogma, the *Abendländler* countered with the religious dogma of revelation, arguing that there existed phenomena, also in the political arena, only to be perceived and understood through faith. Another effort to transcend *Formaldemokratie*

was the attempt to revive the idea of an *abendländische Freiheit* that emphasized inner, “*geistige*,” independence. This concept stood in contrast not only to totalitarianism and fatalism but also to the nihilistic and delusional liberal notion of freedom, with its exaggerated stress on external, individualistic autonomy and on political freedom from the state. For the *Abendländler*, freedom, to avoid resulting in man’s enslavement to his own worldly desires and natural evil, required a more definitive fixing of its content and values and was ultimately inseparable from *Ordnung*. Given their concerns about the dangers posed by the impulsive masses, the *Abendländler* also supported a far-reaching federal structure in the *Bundesrepublik* that would have the added benefit of offering the individual a greater sense of proximity to and control over his or her government.

As one of the most prominent aspects of their struggle against mass *Formaldemokratie*, the *Abendländler* placed considerable emphasis on the need for a robust *abendländische* elite. In concrete institutional terms, ideas were entertained, for instance, of a second parliamentary chamber endowed with extensive rights. Reflecting the overall social structure, this chamber would be a *Ständeversammlung*, containing representatives of all branches of society, and would therefore better embody the desired Christian elite than was possible in a parliament comprising merely the representatives of the parties. Plans were also broached for the reformation of the electoral process, aiming to ameliorate the insidious impact of mass elections characterized by the universal and equal right to vote, for instance through the establishment of indirect voting, intended to progressively circumscribe the electorate to the point where only a small elite circle would be entrusted with actually choosing the head of state. Regardless of the particular institutional or electoral arrangements, the overarching idea was that a Christian elite

stratum would effectively offset the role of the a-religious mass man and of unlimited parliamentarism and contribute to the healthy spiritual orientation of the state.

Closely linked to this idea of a Christian elite was the notion of the wise and benevolent Christian statesman serving as a powerful head of state. This archetypal figure was characterized by his steadfast Christian faith and his devotion to the culture of the *Abendland*. Rather than being dependent on a parliament, itself often essentially responsible to no one, such a statesman was primarily responsible for his actions to the divine authority of God. Awareness of a later judgment by God was considered ultimately the best protection against the hubris of power.<sup>3</sup> For many *Abendländler* (especially Catholics), their admiration for the Christian statesmen of the Iberian Peninsula, Francisco Franco and António de Oliveira Salazar, was one of the main reasons that Spain and, even more so, Portugal represented for them healthy core models for the *Abendland*. The extensive powers attributed to such a Christian statesman also meshed well with the view of the state held by the *Abendländler*, according to which that entity's role was to be strictly limited in those areas of society that were able to function on their own, thus in harmony with the principle of subsidiarity, but was significantly enhanced in other areas, such as foreign policy, where this was deemed not to be the case. Taken as a whole, the salutary upshot of the extensive re-Christianization of society advocated by the *Abendländler* would be an organic, hierarchical and structured order that would hopefully contribute to overcoming the elements of crisis that currently boasted the upper hand.

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<sup>3</sup> Such ideas were closely linked to the work of the Austrian sociologist Othmar Spann, which had been quite influential in the interwar period. However, the notion of the Christian statesman was actually a late medieval model, had found expression in the papal encyclicals (for instance, *Rerum Novarum* in 1891) and was, in fact, anticipated at the latest by the pagan Stoic Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius in his famous *Meditations*.

#### D. Cosmopolitanism

Glancing beyond the organization of domestic society, the *Abendland* concept, apparently so backward looking, actually favoured a particular form of the very modern and cosmopolitan project of West European unification as a means of confronting the external and internal threats to the *Abendland*. Looking once more to the medieval Carolingian era, the *Abendländler* turned decisively against the national state, as well as against phenomena like militarism, ethnic prejudice and nationalism and embraced instead a vision of a united Christian *Abendland*, a supranational, organically structured *Gemeinschaft* based on the distinctive historical and cultural heritage of Western Europe. At the same time as it advocated a far-reaching supranational federalism, the *Abendland* vision continued to recognize the distinct identities and interests of the ancient nations of western Europe. In actuality, at least some *Abendländler* were even willing, if dictated by practicality, to depart from supranational ideals and to promote merely international and inter-governmental cooperation. Western Germany's own role in the supranational *Abendland* project varied in particulars, although it was often conceived of as a central one, at least in a spiritual or cultural sense. Exhibiting the persistent German penchant for particularism, a few even stressed the unique mission within the *Abendland* of particular regions, especially Bavaria or the Rhineland.<sup>4</sup> Whatever the specific details, this western European unification was considered an essential element in the regenerative restoration of a version of the Carolingian *sacrum imperium*.

The cosmopolitan nature of German Occidentalism, in both a temporal and geographical sense, was also reflected in the wide-ranging canon of intellectual works

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<sup>4</sup> For instance, the CSU's Hanns Seidel stressed the special Bavarian "mission" [*Sendung*] as an "outpost" [*Vorposten*] for Germany and Christendom; as a counterweight against the idea of a centralized, unitary German national state; and as a key part of the free Europe.

from which it drew sustenance. From the distant past, the Occidentalists embraced a broad range of European writers and thinkers, whether Virgil from antiquity, Dante from the Middle Ages, or Novalis from the Romantic movement. More recently, there were the influential products of German thinkers such as Oswald Spengler (*Untergang des Abendlandes*, 1918 and 1922), Carl Schmitt, Theodor Haecker (*Vergil: Vater des Abendlands*, 1931), Ernst Robert Curtius (*Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*, 1948) and Albert Mirgeler (*Geschichte Europas*, 1953). However, a prominent place was also accorded to the works of foreign figures, including many Spanish and, oddly enough as we shall see, British thinkers. Amongst the former, there was the elitist Jose Ortega y Gasset, probably the most widely-read philosopher in West Germany from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s, with his warnings about *The Revolt of the Masses*; and Juan Donoso Cortés, the philosopher of freedom and order, particularly admired for his idea of the freedom of the moral personality. From Britain, there were figures like the historians Christopher Dawson, who enjoyed a wide reception in Germany from the 1930s into the 1960s, and Arnold Toynbee as well as the Christian apologists C.S. Lewis and G.K. Chesterton, the poet and Catholic royalist T.S. Eliot and the novelist Aldous Huxley.

With respect to its confessional basis, the *Abendland* worldview was intimately intertwined with Catholicism and Catholic thought. This can be seen, for instance, in the reverence that existed for the state-philosophical concepts of St. Thomas Aquinas, the federalist ideas of St. Augustine and the social doctrine of the papal encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (Leo XIII, 1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (Pius XI, 1931). Granted, there were Catholic intellectuals who did not subscribe to the idea of *Abendland*, even

explicitly opposed it, for instance the circle of the Liberal-Catholic *Frankfurter Heft* that included Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogen.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the world of Catholicism, particularly the more conservative quarters, was the most fruitful source of *Abendland* thought as well as the forum in which it enjoyed its most positive reception. In geographic terms, the *Abendland* idea correspondingly found its basis in the Catholic strongholds of the German West and South, such as the Rhineland, Westphalia and Bavaria, as evidenced whether in the influential role of Catholic intellectuals in, for instance, Cologne or Munich or in the locations of the various Occidentalists institutions.<sup>6</sup> However, despite the Catholic nature of *Abendland* thought and the fact that this tradition had previously been relatively foreign to them, Conservative Protestants after 1945 increasingly turned to their own variation on *Abendland*.<sup>7</sup> Of course, the Protestant vision differed somewhat from the dominant Catholic version due to theological considerations and the tempering of some of the more anti-Protestant aspects.<sup>8</sup> However, whatever the variations and tensions, the *Abendland* idea, in a process actively facilitated by certain Catholics, ultimately performed a crucial integrative function between the

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<sup>5</sup> Other Catholic critics of the *Abendland* worldview, many of whom engaged in heated debates with their *Abendländler* counterparts over themes as diverse as the Enlightenment and contemporary Spain, included the Austrian historian and journalist Friedrich Heer and the theologian Romano Guardini. For criticism of the *Abendland* idea as an ideology bereft of historical understanding, see Walter Dirks, "Das christliche Abendland: Sein Nachwirken in den Konfessionen der Bundesrepublik," in Klaus von Bismarck and Walter Dirks, eds., *Christlicher Glaube und Ideologie* (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1964).

<sup>6</sup> For example, consider the sites of *Neues Abendland* (Augsburg), *Deutsche Tagespost* (Regensburg, later Würzburg), the *Abendländische Akademie* (Munich) and the *Abendländische Aktion* (Munich).

<sup>7</sup> Prominent Protestant *Abendland* advocates included the theologian Helmut Thielicke, the canonist Hans Dombois, the bishop and theologian Wilhelm Wilhelm Stählin and the provost Hans Asmussen.

<sup>8</sup> With respect to the tempering of anti-Protestant aspects, Prussia was generally treated in a more positive light, there was a more benign view of the Reformation and the association of Protestantism and anti-Catholicism with materialism and National Socialism was less manifest. Regarding divergences stemming from theological considerations, Protestants tended to exhibit a more pronounced cultural pessimism and to exercise an even more intense criticism of modern innovations, from the electronic mass media to consumptionism, but also evinced a greater willingness to recognize the emerging parliamentary democracy.

confessions, at least their Conservative elements, albeit under a distinctly Catholic supremacy.<sup>9</sup>

### E. Dissociation

However, in spite of such cosmopolitan-integrative aspects, the *Abendland* concept simultaneously exhibited significant inward-looking features, which had the effect of focusing the attention of its adherents on western Europe. These probably contributed, for example, to the widespread indifference in the early Federal Republic towards wide swaths of the world not directly connected to its vital interests, especially what came to be known as the Third World. Nearer to home, towards the East, the *Abendland* saw itself confronted with a persistent and threatening barbarism, currently assuming the form of a Bolshevism very much akin to National Socialism in its root causes.<sup>10</sup> There was even a decidedly negative attitude towards the German East, especially what had been predominantly Protestant Prussia (actually dissolved in 1947), a sentiment deeply embedded in the Catholic worldview and focusing on that state's myriad failings, among which were to be counted the oft-cited ones of materialism (the root of virtually all its other flaws), militarism, nationalism, secularism, Marxism, economic gigantism, and a faulty conception of an omnipotent state vis-à-vis the individual. The unfortunate influence of the Prussian worldview had led Germany astray from its previous, and hopefully future, home in the *Abendland*, and ultimately to

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<sup>9</sup> In terms of early domestic politics, this integration is especially noteworthy insofar as it helped bring Conservative Protestant groups into the CDU and the government camp.

<sup>10</sup> Although, to briefly return to the theme of integration, the interpretation of this danger from the East provided by the *Abendland* framework did help cement the loyalties to the new Federal Republic early in the postwar period of some otherwise skeptical Conservatives.



catastrophe.<sup>11</sup> Their disastrous experiences with Prussian predominance further encouraged the *Abendländler* in their support for an extensive federalism that already had a broadly based tradition in Germany, especially in regions like Bavaria.

Perhaps even more striking was the ambivalence and suspicion with which many *Abendländler* viewed the Anglo-Saxon nations, particularly the United States. To be sure, the negative attitude towards the latter was less intense than it had been prior to 1945. Considerations of *Realpolitik* alone would have dictated close relations to the Anglo-Saxons, as the Soviet threat rendered an alliance of Carolingian Europe with especially the militarily, politically and economically superior United States necessary for the defense of the *Abendland*. In addition to such strictly pragmatic considerations, and perhaps also keeping them in mind, there were some *Abendländler* who even attempted to reconceptualize the relationship between the United States and the *Abendland*, for instance depicting the former as an offshoot, admittedly a degenerate one, of the latter. These efforts exhibited also a geographic element insofar as stress was placed on the *abendländischen* character of certain regions of the United States, such as the Midwest or the South, in contrast to the decidedly un-*abendländischen* nature of the Northeast and the East Coast. Drawing on such ideas, blueprints were drafted of a trans-Atlantic alliance characterized by an “*abendländischen Geist*” in which Europe was assigned a key position as a “*geistige Wirkungseinheit*.” At the very least, this all meant that the *Abendland* idea did not outright preclude a temporary trans-Atlantic alliance with

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<sup>11</sup> Such claims served as the subject of passionate postwar historical debates with politicians like Kurt Schumacher and with Gerhard Ritter, Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Friedrich Meinecke and the Prussian-national historians, who pointed to the Prussian Enlightenment, Weimar Prussia and the plot of 20 July 1944 in defending the “inner values” of the “other Prussia” against German *Abendländler* as well as foreign, including Anglo-American, detractors.

the Anglo-Saxons and could, to some extent, even form a subtle buttress of such a grouping.

Nevertheless, as a whole, the proponents of *Abendland* viewed the United States as an entity standing apart from their vision, certainly not as an element proper in a restored *sacrum imperium*. Whatever allowances might be made, the United States was ultimately lacking in the essential *abendländischen* heritage and *Geist* (spirit). In the field of international politics, this conception contributed, at its most extreme, to a view that equated the United States and the Soviet Union, whatever the differences in their tactics, as atheistic, power-hungry entities. For other *Abendländler*, the lack of the necessary spiritual weapon of Christian humanism seriously crippled the value of the Anglo-Saxons in tackling the problems facing the Occident and especially as allies in the pseudo-religious struggle of *Weltanschauungen* with the totalitarian atheism of the East. Not only did this failing undermine their resistance to this danger, it rendered them unable even to properly understand the true nature of the threat and to recognize the underlying, long-term and decisive spiritual element of the struggle. Consequently, the Americans found themselves misguidedly focused on the merely practical, esoteric minutiae of political and security issues, distressingly liable to distraction (also, in a geographic sense, by their world concerns), and vulnerable to foolish ideas like *détente*. Furthermore, whatever the short-term practical military and economic advantages, close trans-Atlantic cooperation or integration, especially under American aegis, threatened to occur within the framework of the much-despised Liberal ideas, values and phenomena; the superficial, soulless *Zivilization*; the frivolous, vulgar *Unkultur*; and the meaningless, non-idealistic, conformist, regimented way of life naively purveyed by the degraded and

decadent Anglo-Saxons, especially the Americans. Far from being conducive to regeneration, these could only undermine the basis of the *Abendland*.

Thus, for the *Abendländler*, profound differences cast serious doubts on the prospects for a fruitful integration or even the desirability of an intimate and durable cooperation in international affairs between the Anglo-Saxon nations and the peoples of the *Abendland*. True, very few explicitly advocated a political, in addition to a cultural, equidistance from both the East *and* the Anglo-Saxons. However, the subtle upshot of such perspectives was the ever present idea of an essentially independent Christian *Abendland*, tentatively allied with the Anglo-Saxons against the East but diligently maintaining a healthy distance from the United States and warily avoiding integration with or any kind of subordination to or dependence on the Anglo-Saxon powers.

Assuming this posture and *modus operandi*, the nations of the *Abendland* would resist the competing ideologies of both American-style capitalism and materialist secularism, on the one hand, as well as Soviet communism and totalitarianism, on the other. This, then, was a variation on the theme of the “Third Way” or the “Third Force,” here emerging not from a German nationalist perspective, but rather deriving from an intense cultural and civilizational consciousness of the existence of a discrete Christian *Abendland*. It was believed that the successful execution of the necessarily delicate balancing act vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon powers would help preserve the distinct interests, ideas, values and identity of the *Abendland*, not just from the East but also from the Anglo-Saxons.

#### F. Practice

Far from being mere theory or rhetoric, the desire to return to the path of the *Abendland* manifested itself in many spheres of postwar West German life, indeed too

many to cite more than just a few examples. For instance, in a departure from the positivist tradition of German jurisprudence but in line with the *abendländischen* stress on natural law, the Federal Republic's *Grundgesetz* recognized the existence of fundamental human rights and an unwritten moral law superior to the laws of the state. Meanwhile, the state made extensive efforts via social policy to accommodate itself to and support those pre-political institutions key to the divinely endowed *abendländischen* order, such as the traditional Christian family and the church. In economic life, the stress of the *Abendland* perspective on cooperation, rather than conflict, contributed to the institution of *Mitbestimmung*, worker co-determination, in West German industry. Employers broadened their training of, for example, miners well beyond technical instruction in an effort to avert *Vermassung*. The inspiration of the *Abendland* concept also revealed itself in the heated debates surrounding popular consumer culture, usually imported from or at least influenced by the United States, and the messages and values implicit in that culture, particularly as they impacted on West German youth. Conservatives considered the crass, sometimes salacious, products of this repugnant *Massenkultur*, prominently featuring modern dance, movies and rock music, potentially subversive of the ideal of the *abendländischen* individual and destructive of the *Abendland* itself.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the *Abendland* worldview, with its concept of the state and of the Christian statesman, played an indispensable role in shaping the *Kanzlerdemokratie*, a towering fact of political life in the Adenauer period, as we shall see later on with respect to Birrenbach's own experiences.

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<sup>12</sup> In some cases, physical action was taken against such offensive products, for instance the protest activities and police interventions directed against the 1951 German film *Die Sünderin*.

Finally, and significantly for our purposes, the *Abendland* idea markedly stamped the foreign policy and international relations of the Federal Republic. As alluded to earlier, this concept is vital in explaining the enthusiasm of German Conservatives for a supranational project of European integration based especially on close relations with France. In stark contrast, it simultaneously encouraged a certain distance to the Anglo-Saxon powers and even contributed to the rising strains in ties with the United States. Of great importance here was the role of the Rhenish Catholic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in whose policies the former American High Commissioner John McCloy believed to detect “a certain lack of understanding for the Anglo-Saxons... or too much thinking in terms of the renovation of the ‘*Reich* of Charlemagne.’”<sup>13</sup> A man whose political thought was not at all attuned to the categories of *Weltpolitik*, Adenauer was an unwavering *Europäer* whose Eurocentric perspective was only further buttressed later on by his personal contact with de Gaulle. Over time, Adenauer was increasingly plagued by doubts about the vigor and resolve of the United States in the confrontation with the Soviet Union; constantly feared American overtures and appeasement, at German expense, in the arms race and on reunification; criticized the technocratic American style of policymaking; and raised the specter of a subservient dependence on the United States. Reinforcing Adenauer in these convictions were his reservations from the start towards a looming Americanization and, then, in the Kennedy years by his low regard for and lack of a strong relationship with the President and his, often academically oriented, advisors.<sup>14</sup> Though Adenauer may have realized that the defense of Europe would

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<sup>13</sup> See Birrenbach approvingly quoting McCloy’s contribution to the book *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), in KB to McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>14</sup> Adenauer’s wariness with respect to Americanization was, for instance, partially reflected in his preference for Bonn as the new capital of the *Bundesrepublik* rather than what he considered a much more

require United States support for quite some time, he also entertained what one close observer, perhaps not so charitably, termed a “long-term European *Wunschdenken*.”<sup>15</sup>

At times, Birrenbach himself implicitly addressed the appeal for and the, to him, often detrimental impact on Adenauer of the concept *Abendland*. In assessing the Chancellor’s worldview, Birrenbach argued that “Adenauer had, from his inner disposition [*Einstellung*] as a Rhinelander, continental European and Catholic, no real inner relationship to the Anglo-Saxon world in general, with which he had also never come into immediate contact before the war.”<sup>16</sup> With regard to Adenauer’s overall perspective and his relationship to the United States, Birrenbach remarked:

For his part, Konrad Adenauer had, before the assumption of his postwar political tasks, no personal or political relations to the United States. In the Weimar Republic, his thoughts [*Gedanken*] were concentrated, on the basis of his origin and experiences as a Rhinelander, on western [*westliche*] continental Europe. The fact that control [*Herrschaft*] over the Rhine was for centuries the subject of German-French disputes and wars, decisively stamped the foreign political profile of his personality. The Prussia-idea as well as the political vision of Stresemann of pursuing an independent policy between West and East were foreign to him. To a great extent, this attitude [*Haltung*] was and, up to his death, remained for him life-determining [*lebensbestimmend*]. He viewed the *Weltpolitik* fundamentally from a continental European perspective. Naturally, the enormous change of the power constellation after the Second World War and especially the fact that the friendship and power of the United States were the only effective protection against a Soviet policy of expansion, were plainly clear to him. However, the access [*Zugang*] to the American world and to its way of thinking [*Denkungsart*] only first emerged for him from the personal contacts with men like Dean Acheson, General Lucius D. Clay, John J. McCloy and others.<sup>17</sup>

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thoroughly Americanized Frankfurt. Adenauer strongly preferred Nixon to Kennedy during the 1960 presidential election campaign.

<sup>15</sup> Among the key events impacting negatively on Adenauer’s attitude with respect to the reliability of the United States were the Suez Crisis in 1956, the launching of Sputnik in 1957 and the Berlin Crisis of 1958-62, especially the aftermath of the construction of the wall in August 1961. On Adenauer’s “*Wunschdenken*,” see the letter from an unidentified source to KB, 4 August 1975, ACDP K162/1.

<sup>16</sup> Undated KB speech, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1. For another example of Birrenbach lamenting Adenauer’s lack of an “*inneres Verhältnis*” to the Anglo-Saxon world, see KB to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, ACDP K162/1.

<sup>17</sup> Kurt Birrenbach, “Adenauer und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Periode seiner Kanzlerschaft,” in *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers*, eds. Blumenwitz, et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1976), p. 478.

In examining “the nature [*Art*] of his political thinking,” Birrenbach found it to be “focused purely on the European continent” and argued that Adenauer “thought essentially in continental, not however in extra-continental, concepts [*Begriffen*].”<sup>18</sup>

Briefly put, we can say that Birrenbach rendered a mixed verdict on Adenauer. On the one hand, he repeatedly praised the Chancellor’s accomplishments, for example the “extraordinarily difficult negotiations” during the early 1950s that eventually led to the replacement of the Occupation Statute and the elimination of almost all Allied prerogatives in the Federal Republic, as well as his achievements with respect to European unification.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, Birrenbach also noted the “essential” character, in Adenauer’s mind, of the relationship especially with France (along with the other “neighboring states”) and, therefore, Adenauer’s exaggerated “inclination” towards that country, leading Birrenbach to admit that “I was of a different opinion than he in the assessment [*Einschätzung*] of the position of de Gaulle and of Gaullist France.”<sup>20</sup> Birrenbach pointed out that, even after Adenauer’s belated initiation into the American world, any evaluation of his “attitude” [*Einstellung*] towards German-American relations had to account for the paucity of his genuine “personal contact” to individual Americans and for the fact that “the intellectual leadership stratum” of the United States in the

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<sup>18</sup> KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1. In this talk, Birrenbach also rejected the hypothesis that Adenauer had an “aversion” towards England due to a “political *Einzelaktes* of an occupation power,” namely his dismissal as mayor of Cologne by the British in October 1945.

<sup>19</sup> On the negotiations of the early 1950s, see Birrenbach’s introduction of Wilhelm Grewe before the DGAP on 24 January 1967, ACDP K061/1. For an expression of Birrenbach’s admiration for Adenauer’s efforts, along with those of personalities like Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and (especially) Jean Monnet, in the field of European unification, see KB to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 19 March 1982, ACDP K033/1. On Adenauer’s engagement in 1923 in talks between Loucheur, Stinnes and Thyssen regarding the founding of a type of *Montanunion*, see KB to Hallstein, 12 January 1976, ACDP K042/1.

<sup>20</sup> On the “essential” nature of the relationship with and Adenauer’s “*Neigung*” towards France, see KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1. For Birrenbach’s “different opinion” on these themes, see KB to Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, ACDP K162/1.

Kennedy period was “completely alien” to him.<sup>21</sup> At least in part, this was due to the fact that “[t]he American mental approach [*Geisteseinstellung*], its thought in global concepts [*Globalbegriffen*], particularly in view of its history that was so different from its European counterpart, were and remained foreign to Konrad Adenauer.” This was essential in explaining what Birrenbach considered Adenauer’s “lack of understanding,” indeed his “extremes of incomprehension [*Unverständnisses*] of the American *Politik*.”<sup>22</sup> Whatever he deemed to be Adenauer’s great merits, Birrenbach was, at the same time, clearly distressed that the Chancellor’s outlook, significantly shaped as it was by the perspective of *Abendland*, diverged considerably in many key respects from his own.

### G. Sources of Strength

The widespread influence exercised by the *Abendland* concept in the Federal Republic can be attributed to a variety of factors, including some quite external to the content and virtues of the worldview itself. One must also ponder, for instance, the physically devastated and spiritually deprived condition of postwar Germany and, more broadly, western Europe. In the vacuum created by the collapse of nationalism and many other traditional beliefs, the notion of *Abendland* offered plausible explanations as well as the possibility of a desperately needed orientation at a dire time of crisis and confusion.

It contained not only a coherent account of how this terrible stage of history had been

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<sup>21</sup> KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1. Birrenbach did acknowledge certain exceptions, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, John McCloy and Lyndon Johnson. See, for example, Birrenbach pointing to Adenauer’s “close relations to a series of prominent [*bedeutender*] Americans, especially Dulles,” in KB to Kiesinger, 14 October 1975, ACDP K162/1. Nevertheless, Birrenbach also swiftly dismissed the significance of such exceptions, as when he pithily remarked, “America is not Dulles,” in KB to Bruno Heck, 30 January 1975, ACDP K162/1. In reality, Adenauer’s friendship with Dulles was quite fragile and marred by frequent bouts of distrust. Adenauer’s relatively positive contact with Johnson was symbolized by his time at the latter’s Texas ranch in Spring 1961.

<sup>22</sup> KB speech, SBKAH function on Adenauer and the United States and Britain, ACDP K164/1. In this context, Birrenbach referred to a conversation he claimed to have had in 1961 with the Chancellor, perhaps mistaking the year in the retelling, after Eisenhower had suffered a heart attack.



reached but, furthermore, provided a promising program for the future. Certain historical parallels also contributed to its allure. As so often before, whether it be with respect to Huns, Muslims or Magyars, Western Europe appeared to be once again confronted by a threatening mass of Eastern barbarians. It therefore appeared necessary to restore the united *Abendland* that had proven so effective in former times at fending off such dangers.<sup>23</sup> The demographic impact of two world wars and of considerable economic upheaval during the 20<sup>th</sup> century also contributed to the impressive strength of the *Abendland* idea, insofar as they helped produce a proportionately more elderly German population, including leadership strata, than would otherwise have been the case.<sup>24</sup> It was in these older elements, frequently entertaining an outlook still rooted in the *Kaiserreich* or Weimar and more receptive to traditionally anti-modernist attitudes and critiques, that the *Abendland* concept tended to find its generational basis. Probably also due in part to a less extensive contact with the abroad, these more senior groups often held a view of international politics that still considered Europe the center of world affairs and perhaps underestimated, for instance, the dramatically increased significance of the United States.

The German *Abendland* concept also existed in the postwar period within a larger context of trends that proved very hospitable to it. In rather general terms, it enjoyed the benefit of existing in an age of pervasive and increasing historical consciousness, with the past serving as an object of intense scrutiny and investigation as an essential means of understanding the present and perhaps, ideally, the future.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the post-1945 era

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<sup>23</sup> Regarding the threat from the East and its historical parallels, reference was often made, for instance, to the cooperation between Franks, Gauls and Romans to save the *Abendland* from Attila and to the triumphs in 955 over the Magyars and Slavs then standing before the gates of the *Abendland*.

<sup>24</sup> Moreover, many in the younger generations were politically tainted.

<sup>25</sup> On historical consciousness, see John Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

was an environment in which re-Christianization movements, whether explicitly *abendländisch* or not, sprouted up and flourished elsewhere in the Western world outside of the Federal Republic, including in the United States.<sup>26</sup> Finally, throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of a Third Way or a Third Force in which Europe, or parts thereof, could traverse and survive on a path between both American capitalism and Soviet communism, formed a dominant theme of political and social thought in Germany and indeed throughout Europe. Such ideas, including their ambivalence towards and, often, open criticism of the United States, were not limited to any one particular segment of the political spectrum, rather they existed on both the Right and the Left. Though not entirely compatible with *Abendland*, personalities like the CDU's Jakob Kaiser, the SPD's Kurt Schumacher and the politically nomadic Gustav Heinemann even made proposals for a "*Dritten Weg*" for a, hopefully, reunited Germany. Such sentiments led in the 1950s to the founding of the *Gesamtdeutschen Volkspartei* (1952) and of a multi-partisan *Gesamtdeutschen Bewegung* (1954). All of this suggests that the *Abendland* perspective was not an isolated anachronism, but rather meshed quite well with a variety of other tendencies within as well as beyond the borders of the *Bundesrepublik*.

Another reason for the widespread diffusion of the *Abendland* idea was the concept's sheer flexibility and lack of ideological stringency. The complex *Abendland* worldview consisted of a remarkably diverse array of elements, whether of a political, cultural, religious, intellectual or historical nature, and moved on a multiplicity of analytical levels. It was not necessary for individuals to subscribe to all these elements,

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<sup>26</sup> See the ever more religious flavor of this post-World War II, American-style conservatism as exemplified in the works of William F. Buckley, Jr. (*God and Man at Yale*, 1951) and Russell Kirk (*The Conservative Mind*, 1953). Compare this with the irreverent a-religious or even anti-religious attitudes of writers of the Old Right like Albert Jay Nock and H.L. Mencken. Earlier, the French *renouveau catholique* had significantly influenced German ideas of *Abendland*.

rather one might embrace particular aspects, conceptions or interpretations. Thus, the concept of *Abendland* could indeed signify among some a desire for the reestablishment of the medieval *Sacrum Imperium*, but it might also merely reflect among others an intense anti-Bolshevism. Not surprisingly, debates even existed among the *Abendländler* themselves, revolving around a broad assortment of topics, some of them potentially of considerable practical importance, with respect to the *Abendland*: its exact geographic extent, its proper role in the world, the impact on it of technology, and so forth.

Birrenbach himself provides ample demonstration that the *Abendland* worldview is more aptly characterized as a sensibility, rather than a stringent ideology. After all, he had grown up in predominantly Catholic Münster at a time when, at least early on, Protestant and Catholic children still hardly played with one another. Though not a son of the Rhineland, Birrenbach did profess admiration for the personality traits he believed sprang from the Rhenish landscape. Even late in life, he remained conscious of his own Catholic identity.<sup>27</sup> Of course, we have already noted his fascination with the classical world and languages and with classical formulations.<sup>28</sup> Through his experiences in the

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<sup>27</sup> On Protestant and Catholic children in pre-1914 Münster, see the remembrance of the deceased banker Clemens Plassmann offered by the Protestant native of Münster Werner Schütz, enclosed with Schütz to KB, 22 December 1971, ACDP K038/2. It was at the behest of Charlemagne that the Christian missionary Ludger established in the area the monastery from which Münster derived its name, in that city's official founding year of 793, and then established the *Gymnasium* Paulinum around 797. Birrenbach's reference to the Rhenish traits was directed at the deceased Pferdenges, a native of Mönchengladbach, in a speech at the ATH HV on 28 March 1963, ACDP K077/2. Among these qualities, Birrenbach cited human ["*menschliche*"] warmth, goodness and readiness to help, a soft heart and a cheerful, kind nature. For Birrenbach elsewhere praising the virtues of deep religiosity, piety [*Frömmigkeit*], purity and a moral ethos as well as an attachment to nature [*Naturverbundenheit*] and *Menschenliebe*, see his speech at Rheinlaender's funeral, 14 December 1971, ACDP K065/4. Far from being a denizen of the city, Birrenbach lived, in Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, in a rather isolated, even wooded, location, approximately ten kilometers from his office in the center of Düsseldorf. For one of Birrenbach's open references to the fact that he was a Catholic and not a Protestant, see KB to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 24 June 1981, ACDP K033/3.

<sup>28</sup> In addition to flaunting his etymological knowledge, Birrenbach at times alluded to quotations of Pericles and other classical figures and often inserted into his correspondence Latin phrases, favorites among them being *gratulor*, *ultra posse nemo obligatur*, *expressis verbis*, *pacta sunt servanda* and *circulus vitiosus*. For Birrenbach claiming to see in Greece not only a "political partner" but in the "Hellenic culture one of the

*Wirtschaft*, Birrenbach became well aware of the patent disparities between German and foreign, especially Anglo-Saxon, approaches, including with respect to industrial structure, as reflected for example in their differing board systems. As an educated man, Birrenbach evinced a considerable historical consciousness, manifested in his passion for history, a belief in a historical process, an insistence on a critical evaluation of historical events in order to form proper judgments, and his expressed respect for those of universal historical learning. His favorite leisure activity was reading not only “*schönegeistige Literatur*” but especially history and biographies, his familiarity reaching back to works of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, including those of, in his mind, its most important historian, Ranke. Birrenbach was competent to exchange views on cultural problems and saw himself as a lover of and fairly expert in the fine arts, including many non-German works. His artistic interests embraced painting, such as that of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries and the French impressionists; architecture, especially from the Renaissance and Baroque; sculpture; and music, whether Beethoven, Mozart, Schubert, Brahms or Bach. Clearly, Birrenbach was steeped in the Catholic and western European life and culture so central to *Abendland*.<sup>29</sup>

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cornerstones of Western civilization” and, therefore, his belief that “the spiritual character [*geistige Bild*] of a Europe hopefully one day united in the form of a European Union will be in part stamped [*mitgeprägt*] by this origin,” see Birrenbach’s introductory speech for the Greek Foreign Minister at the DGAP on 7 May 1981, ACDP K075/1. For his 60<sup>th</sup> birthday, Birrenbach received, in addition to a photo volume on the Catholic Xanten Cathedral, the book *Die Irrfahrten des Odysseus in Bildern* and a book about Roman art. For the regret of one of Birrenbach’s business associates that, though they had spent pleasant hours in and around Athens (in connection with the Greek oil refinery deal), they had been almost exclusively, even in the middle of the night [“*zur nachtschlafender Zeit*”] occupied in the ministry so that there had been only a brief time for the study of classical sites, see Peter Schaefer, Rheinhausen, to KB, 16 January 1959, ACDP K207/2.

<sup>29</sup> Birrenbach was well acquainted with literature from especially the 19<sup>th</sup> and, to a lesser extent, 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. By all appearances far from a modern art enthusiast, Birrenbach populated his own personal art collection with works purchased from galleries. On Birrenbach’s plans to travel to Ansbach for several days for the upcoming Bach Woche, see KB to Bundesminister a.D. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Birrenbach regularly gave, and received, books, music and wine, among other items, as gifts.

Moreover, Birrenbach had early on come into contact with the explicit concept of *Abendland* and had developed an affinity for some aspects of that worldview. As already noted, he familiarized himself with the ideas of Prince Karl Anton von Rohan and his *Europäischen Revue*, founded in 1925, of which the notion of *Abendland* was a central component and which Rohan raised up against what he considered the artificially constructed “Pan-Europa” that was advocated by Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi. As a young student at the end of the 1920s, Birrenbach had read Spengler’s *Untergang des Abendlandes*, confessing many decades later that, “in the mood one was in at the time,” he had been “impressed, even if not fully convinced,” by the work; had later read Spengler’s *Preußentum und Sozialismus* and *Jahre der Entscheidung*; and even as late as 1980 planned to again buy and re-read *Untergang*. Over the years, Birrenbach had also read and re-read the works of Toynbee.<sup>30</sup> Already during his Berlin period, Birrenbach had been close, “albeit [*allerdings*] with certain reservations [*Vorbehalten*],” to *Der Tat* and the *Tat-Kreis* and had links to personalities like Hans Zehrer, Giselher Wirsing and others.<sup>31</sup> Birrenbach also claimed that at that time he had found “great” a certain “Edgar Johann Jung” [probably referring to Edgar Julius Jung], a man he considered “a parallel figure” to the personalities of the *Tat-Kreis* and with whose work in the 1930s he had

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<sup>30</sup> For Birrenbach reading Spengler and Toynbee, see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, c/o Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 25 June 1980, ACDP K034/2. Here, Birrenbach also admitted that after reading one of Lübke’s essays (entitled “Historisch-politische Exaltationen”), “practically nothing remains of Spengler [*bleibt von Spengler so gut wie nichts übrig*]” and that “also by the re-reading of Toynbee, similar ideas [*Gedanken*] come to me [Birrenbach] as to you [Lübke] by Spengler.” However, for Birrenbach elsewhere professing to “think not so negatively as Lübke” about Spengler, also including with regard to the book *Preußentum und Sozialismus*, see KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>31</sup> For Birrenbach’s “reservations” and for his having been “less [*weniger*] impressed” with Ferdinand Fried, see KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2. Schelsky had also apparently been close to the *Tat-Kreis*. In 1957, Birrenbach sent the *Griechische Tagebuch* (1936) of Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann as preparatory reading for an upcoming trip to Greece (KB to Dr. F. Richter c/o *Klinik* Dr. Schmitt, Munich, 25 September 1957, ACDP K116/1). In December 1980, Birrenbach still referred to Zehrer as an “outstanding personality.” (KB to Axel Springer, 5 December 1980, ACDP K033/2).

been “very impressed.”<sup>32</sup> Likewise, Birrenbach acknowledged having been “very impressed in the youth” with the likes of Hans Freyer and Hellmuth Plessner.<sup>33</sup> The eminent Catholic scholar Goetz Briefs, whom Birrenbach had met in Berlin by the early 1930s and who would become a long-term contact, was among the editors of the Weimar journal *Abendland*. Finally and much later on, in the Federal Republic, Birrenbach became a member of the Catholic Görres-Gesellschaft, which was based in Cologne.<sup>34</sup>

The impact of such activities and encounters seems to have left a mark on Birrenbach and continued to manifest itself long afterwards. Some passages of his early 1950s journalism, though never outright employing the term “*Abendland*,” rather referring to the “West” and a “Europe” that was clearly geographically larger than and at least subtly culturally different from a strictly delineated *Abendland*, might still have been at home in works emerging from that worldview. Such passages included his bemoaning “the destruction of the dams [*Dämme*] on which the *ostslawische* flood [*Flut*] tended to break in history” and which had represented the “‘Limes’ of the European mainland towards the East.”<sup>35</sup> Though we will come to know Birrenbach as a convinced

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<sup>32</sup> KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>33</sup> KB to Prof. Schelsky, 16 March 1981, ACDP K033/2.

<sup>34</sup> For an example of Birrenbach explicitly engaging with the concept *Abendland* in the Federal Republic, see his assessment of what he considered the historian Peter Berglar’s “brilliant” and “entirely accurate” piece addressing the “*politisch-staatengeschichtliche* development” from the “*abendländischen Christenheit*” to the “European *Machtordnung*,” which included an overview dealing with the “*abendländischen* development” up to the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, see KB to Berglar, 5 November 1977, ACDP K151/2. Birrenbach considered reading this work “of great profit,” especially due to its linking of “political and *geistesgeschichtlicher* development.”

<sup>35</sup> “Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” by Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse* (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1. In this February 1951 series, Birrenbach defined a Europe that consisted of “all these countries, in which according to their tradition the human being [*Mensch*] is or was a value in itself [*Wert an sich*]” and that in his view, therefore, also comprised at least much of Eastern Europe (but apparently not the USSR) and the Balkans. On the other hand, he also referred here to a “European core [*Kern*]” that appeared to not encompass these areas, rather that was centered more on Western Europe. Elsewhere in this series, Birrenbach mourned “the shattering [*Zerschlagung*] of the historic European defense bastions” and the “breakthrough [*Einbruch*] of the Soviet flood into the Central European area [*Raum*].” This had become possible, in part, because “the West itself has, in a misjudgment [*Verkennung*] of the historical development, eroded [*abgetragen*] the

Atlanticist, he entertained at times a view of the United States that was far from uniformly rosy. While exhibiting a great respect for some aspects of American life, such as its *Wissenschaft*, he was distinctly unimpressed when the subject turned to other areas, such as its culture.<sup>36</sup> As of the early 1950s, Birrenbach was arguing that “the power of the USA... rests fundamentally [*im wesentlichen*] on its economic-technical [*technisch*]-organizational ability [*Potenz*]” and that a certain political importance “was due [*zukommt*]” the European continent on the basis of its “cultural primacy [*Vorrang*],” which was “even today still effective [*wirksam*].”<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach’s often

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dams which history had erected [*aufgerichtet*] between the Europe of Western *Kultur* and the *Ostslawen*.” For Birrenbach, these “dams” included Poland, “eroded” in the partitions “around the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and at the start of the Second World War”; the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, “in the peace treaty of Trianon” [actually concluded only with Hungary], and “the German Bastion,” at Versailles, Yalta and Potsdam. “None of the Western powers, including Germany, can absolve themselves of the guilt of having misjudged [*verkannt*] the signs [*Zeichen*] of history.” Now, Birrenbach argued for the need “to construct [*aufbauen*] the dam there against the communist flood where it can, and must, be held [*gehalten*] if everything should not be lost, i.e. in Europe.” With respect to borders, Birrenbach insisted that “Europe ends not on the Elbe, rather there, where once those dams [*Dämme*] have stood that have constituted the ‘Limes’ of the European mainland [*Festland*] towards the East [*nach Osten*].” The lines along which the new Lime should be erected were “fluid.” Their fixing would probably only be possible by taking into account the historical development that had occurred in the last decades. Meanwhile, Birrenbach expressed his related belief that continental Europe, if one included England in this assessment, was still superior, even today, to “the Soviet colossus” in the quantity and quality of its human [*“menschlichen”*] potential. However, Birrenbach also emphasized that none of the nations of the Brussels Pact [of which the Federal Republic was not a member] disposed of “experiences in the struggle with Eastern peoples [*Völkern*].”

<sup>36</sup> For Birrenbach sending a standard American volume on economics [*“Volkswirtschaftslehre”*] as a “stimulus” to carry out future study “in the necessary breadth and depth” but also to demonstrate “in what vivid [*anschaulicher*] way the Anglo-Saxons are in the situation to treat difficult economic themes,” see KB to Claus-Gerrit, 22 March 1957, ACDP K116/1. For Birrenbach being astonished that in the long-term “the American way of life” did not fully satisfy Udvarhelyi “in the scientific [*wissenschaftlicher*] respect” but not being at all surprised at Udvarhelyi’s dissatisfaction with it “in the cultural respect,” see KB to George Udvarhelyi, Johns Hopkins Dept. of Neurological Surgery, 20 July 1956, ACDP K116/1. Nevertheless, setting the bar rather low in his own eyes, Birrenbach did concede to the wife of the historian Hajo Holborn that “[h]owever, when one compares [to Argentina], in what an intellectual environment [*geistige Umgebung*] you and your husband have come, one can envy you... for the intellectual [*geistige*] atmosphere that you have found in the United States.” Birrenbach further stated that “the tremendous abundance [*ungeheure Reichtum*] of people [*Menschen*] of quality with whom you interacted in the United States has impressed me. Be happy that it has been so.... There [in Argentina], your life could not have been so rich as it has developed in the USA. Therefore, I am pleased for you that fate has brought [*verschlagen*] you to North America.” (KB to Annemarie Holborn, 21 January 1971, ACDP K158/1).

<sup>37</sup> “Deutschland und Europa zwischen West und Ost: Die Lage Deutschlands nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg,” by Kurt Birrenbach, 7-10 February 1951, *Freie Presse* (Buenos Aires), ACDP K001/1. In this same piece, Birrenbach warned against a “too far-reaching fragmentation [*Zersplitterung*]” of the American manpower [*“Menschenreserven”*] since the structure of the American military power, in contrast to the continental-

negative perspective on modern life included components typical of the *Abendland* outlook. For instance, he complained at times about the “competitive struggle of all against all in the modern mass society” and bemoaned the “complete materialization of life” characteristic of the present time.<sup>38</sup> While Birrenbach was most definitely not to be counted amongst the die-hard *Abendländler*, it is also clear that he, too, subscribed, even if only implicitly, to particular elements of their worldview.

Furthermore, the notion of *Abendland* did not suddenly emerge in the wake of World War II, rather its history in Germany stretches back at least to the 16<sup>th</sup> century when it surfaced as a constitutive antithesis to the *Morgenland* (Orient) in the Gospel of Matthew in Luther’s translation of the bible. This was a history principally characterized by gradual evolution and transformation. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, actually beginning around the turn of the century with the ascendance of Romanticism, the *Abendland* concept acquired a more specific meaning, coming to be associated with the ideal of the medieval unity of Christendom and Europe. By the second half of the century, it had become intertwined, culturally, with the idea of an amalgamation of antiquity, Christianity, and the Germanic and Romance peoples and, spatially, with central and, especially continental, western Europe, essentially excluding the Slavs and maintaining a

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European ones, especially however to the Eastern armies, “grants the crucial priority to highly *technisierten* troop units [*Teilen*].”

<sup>38</sup> On the “competitive struggle [*Konkurrenzkampf*] of all against all” as well as the dangers of “falling victim to the dehumanization of life by a suppression of the development of extremely personal qualities by a total clamping in [*Einspannung*] in a profession,” see KB to Ernst Hase, Münster, 24 September 1959, ACDP K047/2. On the “complete materialization of life,” see KB to Gräfin Renate Hardenberg, 28 December 1955, ACDP K213/4. In the same letter to the Münster painter Ernst Hase, Birrenbach stated that “the engagement with spiritual forces [*geistigen Kräften*]... is ultimately the vital principal [*Lebenselement*] for every person [*Menschen*] who does not live solely in the purely material order of things” and expressed admiration for those inextricably linked, with “love and devotion [*Liebe und Anhänglichkeit*],” to their home cities as well as for those involved in professions that fulfilled them “inwardly [*innerlich*]” and that offered their practitioners the opportunity “to live to some extent on the periphery of the era [*am Rande der Zeit*],” to nurture their own “artistic development” and to occupy themselves with and base their lives on “art and nature.” (KB to Ernst Hase, 24 September 1959, ACDP K047/2).



reserved attitude towards the Anglo-Saxons. Thus, *Abendland* had by this point shed its earlier reference to the entirety of Christian Europe. Aside from pieces of a more journalistic bent appearing in the *Feuilletons* and elsewhere, key works in the evolution of the *Abendland* perspective in the 19<sup>th</sup> century included those by Novalis (*Europa*, 1799), Friedrich Schlegel (*Philosophie der Geschichte*, 1828), Leopold von Ranke (*Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, 1839) and Jakob Burckhardt. Throughout this history, whatever its other content may have been, the *Abendland* outlook was also usually linked with the imperative of the defense of the threatened *Abendland* against a variety of enemies, both external and internal, whether it be hordes of heathens, especially those of Arabic and Turkish Islam prior to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, or later on, for example during the Metternich era, the ideas of the French Revolution.

However, it was not until after World War I, during the interwar years, that the *Abendland* concept truly cohered into an explicit, concrete and, at least sometimes, political program. This was primarily the work of Catholic-Conservative intellectuals, based above all in the Rhineland in centers like Bonn, whose university was home at the time to essential personalities like the *Romanist* Hermann Platz and the political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt; the Benedictine monastery Maria Laach, located in the Eifel region and led by the abbot Ildefons Herwegen; and, of course, Cologne.<sup>39</sup> Their feverish activity was largely a response to the horrors of the recent war and its chaotic aftermath as well as to the sensational work of Oswald Spengler. Following in the footsteps of Nietzsche's ominous prophecies of nihilism and cultural decay, Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes*, with its elaborate *Kulturmorphologie*, first brought widespread

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<sup>39</sup> Herwegen was Adenauer's old Cologne schoolmate, and Adenauer was able to stay for a year at Maria Laach as a guest following his dismissal as mayor of Cologne and president of the Prussian State Council by the National Socialists in April 1933.

currency to the expression and concept of “*Abendland*” and also functioned as a catalyst for an outpouring of *kulturkritischer* literature and other such related efforts. These Catholic intellectuals, sometimes employing the virtually equivalent Reich concept, propagated a vision of *Abendland* with crucial similarities to that which thrived after 1945. Strikingly different was the openly authoritarian, imperial and Germano-centric character of these ideas, elements that were considerably tempered after World War II.<sup>40</sup> Noteworthy journals propagating the *Abendland* worldview during the Weimar era included *Abendland*, founded in 1925 by Platz in Cologne, as well as *Die Tat*, especially in the heyday of the influential “Tat-Kreis” once Hans Zehrer had assumed leadership of the publication in 1929.<sup>41</sup>

While at first glance a singularly inhospitable environment, the Catholic *Abendland* idea, or at least elements of it, lived on during the Third Reich in a diversity of forms and forums and with varying degrees of profundity or lack thereof: despite the obvious contrasts with National Socialist ideology, in the regime’s anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semitic and anti-plutocratic propaganda, including that emanating from Hitler and Goebbels themselves<sup>42</sup>; the interpretation of the war by even some non-National Socialists as a heroic defensive struggle of the united *Abendland*, under German leadership, against the dual mortal threats posed by Bolshevism (or Sovietism) and Anglo-Saxonism (or Americanism); in the Catholic Church itself, where it helps explain the resistance towards certain Nazi policies, such as the euthanasia campaign, as well as

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<sup>40</sup> For many, an authoritarian Germany was expected to play an indispensable role, not least as continental hegemon, with the German ruler serving as Emperor of the *Abendland*. Such an arrangement was considered a cosmological requisite to maintain the order of the universe and the essential balance with the popes.

<sup>41</sup> The journal *Abendland* was subtitled *Deutsche Monatshefte für europäische Kultur, Politik und Wirtschaft*, while *Die Tat* styled itself an *Unabhängige Monatsschrift zur Gestaltung neuer Wirklichkeit*.

<sup>42</sup> See Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 11 December 1941 declaring war on the United States and Goebbels’ front-page article of 19 July 1942 on “Die sogenannte russische Seele” in the weekly *Das Reich*.

the support proffered for others, among them the invasion of the Soviet Union<sup>43</sup>; among the members of the Conservative resistance, for instance within the Kreisauer circle, as reflected not only in their opposition to the regime but also in their broad designs for a future Germany and Europe<sup>44</sup>; and among those intellectual “internal emigrants” like Max Bense, Reinhold Schneider and Werner Bergengruen, some of them befriended with one another, engaged in their wide-ranging, seemingly innocuous and obscure undertakings, whether of a literary, historical or philosophical nature. All this meant that, aside from some necessary adaptation to circumstances, the *Abendland* concept evinced deeply rooted continuities and enjoyed a firm foundation in German thought, a state of affairs that contributed mightily to the flourishing of *Abendland* after 1945. In fact, one can detect a certain continuity from Weimar to the Federal Republic not just in philosophy and social basis but also with respect to the personalities that comprised the respective *Abendland* circles, as we shall soon see, for instance, in the journalistic field.

#### H. Institutions

When assessing the impressive durability of the *Abendland* concept, one must keep in mind that within the Federal Republic there existed a number of institutional pillars striving to maintain and propagate the idea. Among the most important of these was the *Abendländische Akademie*, founded in 1952 in Munich. This institution was structurally well developed, with its own *Vorstand*, *Kuratorium*, *Beirat*, *Sozialreferat* and *Studienleitung*, as well as a full body of officers. It could boast of a considerable number of influential and eminent individuals from diverse walks of life occupying these bodies

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<sup>43</sup> An example combining both praise (of the invasion) and criticism (including of euthanasia) is the well-known pastoral letter of Münster’s Bishop von Galen of 14 September 1941.

<sup>44</sup> See, for instance, the record of the results of the Kreisauer circle discussions of 22-25 May 1942, calling for “den Neuaufbau des Abendlandes.”

and amongst its friends.<sup>45</sup> The *Akademie* staged speeches, discussion sessions, seminars and conferences with the centerpiece of its activities being the annual multi-day conferences usually held in the Bavarian *Bischofsstadt* of Eichstätt and attended by several hundred members of the *abendländischen* intelligentsia. As was typical in much of the *Abendland* movement, academy organizers made conscious efforts to overcome hyper-confessionalism and to ensure at least a limited bi-confessional participation in the leading organs and in the various events. Engaged in many of the same types of activities and also of significance was the Institut für Europäische Geschichte in Mainz, which emerged in 1950 from the work of the *Arbeitskreis christlicher Historiker*. From 1953 on, this institute was housed in the Domus Universitatus at the University of Mainz, thus underscoring the assistance provided by certain *Hochschulen*, with the annual conferences of the Abendlandische Akademie also held at least at times in such venues. These institutions were intended as forums where the *Abendland* tradition could be nurtured and a broad spectrum of fundamental themes and problems of *Abendland* thought explored in a Christian spirit on a theoretically ambitious level, with the aim of rendering such ideas fruitful, whether in a political, cultural or some other sense.

Naturally, the churches, especially the Catholic Church, a great proponent of the *Abendland* concept, represented a powerful institutional strength of Occidentalism in the Federal Republic. In the postwar years, the Catholic Church especially enjoyed great prestige and authority, due in large part to its resistance against the National Socialist

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<sup>45</sup> Chairman of the academy's *Vorstand* from 1952-56 was its co-founder Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte, professor of law at the University of Mainz and then, from 1954, at the University of Würzburg. Members of the academy's *Kuratorium* included Heinrich von Brentano (MdB, CDU), Richard Jaeger (MdB, CSU), Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (MdB, DP), Hermann Weinkauff (president of the *Bundesgerichtshofs*), Basilius Ebel (abbot of Maria Laach) and Paul Wilhelm Wenger (Rheinischer Merkur editor).

regime and, later on, against many of the measures of the Allied occupying powers. The Catholic Church was also revered due to its remarkable continuity, particularly when contrasted with numerous other seemingly transient institutions of society, and not least the very forms of the state itself. The influence of the Catholic Church was further enhanced in West Germany during this period since national division and the loss of the primarily Protestant East meant that Catholics no longer found themselves in such a pronounced minority position in the new Federal Republic. In an effort to further augment this far-reaching sway, Catholic academies were founded, beginning in 1951 in the diocese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, aimed at creating and reinforcing linkages between the Church and the leadership strata of other elements of society. The number of these Catholic academies, themselves modeled in part on the Evangelical academies that had already first appeared in 1945 in Bad Boll, steadily grew to seventeen by 1960. Among their activities, these confessional academies staged many conferences that served, at least to some extent, the propagation of the *Abendland* idea. Meanwhile, clergymen also took part in entities like the *Abendländischer Akademie*.<sup>46</sup>

While Occidental-minded Germans may have looked to the medieval past for their models and identity, and vehemently criticized the propaganda and mental engineering aspects of mass marketing and advertising, they were also quite skilled in the use of modern instruments and institutions of media and public relations to further their cause. The *Abendland* idea and culture were disseminated on public radio, for instance in the influential cultural and evening programs, as well as in various print outlets, including

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<sup>46</sup> Among the co-founders of the *Akademie* was the Jesuit Father Franz Georg Waldburg. In addition to the already mentioned Basilius Ebel (abbot of Maria Laach), the *Kuratorium* of the academy included Hugo Lang (abbot of the cloister St. Bonifaz in Munich), Lorenz Jaeger (archbishop of Paderborn), Josef Schröffer (bishop of Eichstätt) and Father Gilbert Cormann (Institut für katholische Sozialarbeit, Dortmund).

books, newspapers and journals. The *abendländischen* institutions carried out their own publication activity. Key Occidentalists publishers included the Verlag Eugen Diederichs, which thus pursued some of its long-cherished themes, and the Verlag Neues Abendland, just founded in 1951.<sup>47</sup> Among the many postwar periodicals and journals focused on *Abendland*, a pivotal position was occupied by *Neuem Abendland*, which first appeared in 1946 and saw itself upholding the tradition of the Weimar journal *Abendland*. The extensive Catholic press, including the diocese newspapers as well as publications such as *Hochland*, *Neue Ordnung* and *Stimmen der Zeit*, was a reliable source of Conservative *Abendland* thought. Other publications that could be expected to trumpet *Abendland* included the CSU's *Bayernkurier*, the *Rheinische Merkur*, the *Münchener Merkur*, the *Deutsche Tagespost*, and the Protestant *Christ und Welt* and *Sonntagsblatt*.<sup>48</sup> The admittedly short-lived *Abendländische Aktion* (1951-53), founded in Munich, intensified these efforts to shape public opinion by staging public rallies, gatherings of journalists and other functions, and generally circulating Occidental ideas.<sup>49</sup> Symbolic *Abendland* imagery, often conveyed via photographs, such as the emotional presence of Adenauer

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<sup>47</sup> The Verlag Eugen Diederichs was located since 1948 in Düsseldorf and Cologne, while the Verlag Neues Abendland, founded by Erich Fürst von Waldburg zu Zeil und Trauchburg, was based in Munich.

<sup>48</sup> *Neues Abendland* was founded and initially published by Johann Wilhelm Naumann in his Verlag Naumann (Augsburg). Beginning in 1951, it was published by the Verlag Neues Abendland (Munich). Editors-in-chief included Emil Franzel from 1948 and Gerhard Kroll from 1951, both of whom had close links to the CSU. Other periodicals appearing in the mid- to late-1940s that endorsed a restoration of *Abendland* included *Aussaat*, *Begegnung*, *Besinnung*, *Sammlung* and *Zeitwende*. Franzel, a Sudeten German whose book *Abendländische Revolution: Geist und Schicksal Europas* had already appeared in 1936, represents just one example of post-1945 continuity with respect to *Abendland* personalities, not just at the *Neuen Abendland* but in the journalistic profession in general. Also exemplary in this regard were the postwar careers of the Weimar-era editors of *Der Tat*, with figures like Hans Zehrer, Ferdinand Fried and Giselher Wirsing assuming central positions at publications like *Die Welt* (Hamburg), *Christ und Welt* (Stuttgart, founded in 1948 by the then-theologian Eugen Gerstenmaier and other figures close to the church, with the support of Theophil Wurm, the *Landesbischof* in Württemberg), and *Sonntagsblatt* (Hamburg). Such postwar continuity was certainly not limited to journalists, as can be observed, for instance, in the cases of the philosopher Alois Dempf and the writer Werner Bergengruen.

<sup>49</sup> Gerhard Kroll, the editor of *Neuem Abendland*, also served as chairman of the *Abendländischen Aktion*.

and de Gaulle at the High Mass in Reims Cathedral in July 1962 and at the signing of the Élysée Treaty in January 1963, fortified the Occidental appeal among a broader audience.

Of particular significance for our purposes, one can to a certain extent also classify specific political parties and indeed the state itself as institutional foundations and proponents of the *Abendland* worldview during this period. Many federal ministers, members of the Bundestag, as well as political personalities at the *Land* level, were considerably influenced by such conceptions. While *Abendland* perspectives might have been found amongst Social Democrats and Free Democrats, this characterization applies in the political realm especially to elements of the mainstream *bürgerlichen* parties, most prominently the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union, a dual grouping that was, by its own account, inspired by and descended from its Christian, and especially traditional Catholic, heritage of both a political and moral nature.<sup>50</sup> With regard to the eminences at the heart of government and power that dealt with matters of international affairs, one can point to the impact of *Abendland* on the thought of not only “*dem Alten*,” Konrad Adenauer, but also of other prominent figures in the CDU like Heinrich von Brentano, Heinrich Krone, Eugen Gerstenmaier and Kurt Georg Kiesinger as well as in the CSU, so proud of its south German Catholicism, like Franz-Josef Strauß, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg, Richard Stücklen and Richard Jaeger.<sup>51</sup> As already implied in our earlier brief discussion of the broad weight of such ideas in postwar West German society, with the Union and other like-minded parties in power and especially under Adenauer, the institutions of state, including the governmental centers of

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<sup>50</sup> Other parties noticeably influenced by the *Abendland* concept at this time were the *Deutsche Partei*, the *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* and the *Bayernpartei*.

<sup>51</sup> Some examples in other fields of federal ministers that embraced *Abendland* perspectives: Franz-Joseph Wuermeling (CDU, *Familienminister*), Hans Schubert (CSU, *Postminister*), Joachim von Merkatz (DP, *Bundesratsminister*) and Prof. Dr. Theodor Oberländer (BHE, *Vertriebenenminister*).

some of the Chancellor's closest advisors such as the Chancellery and the Foreign Office, became hotbeds of *Abendland* thought and practice.

Far from operating in isolation, the individuals and institutions that exalted and promoted the *Abendland* worldview existed in an environment characterized by extensive linkages and mutual arrangements. Within this context, they served as officers and members simultaneously in multiple Occidentalist organizations, exerted powerful influences upon one another, and participated in and supported each other in their various *abendländischen* endeavors.<sup>52</sup> Such aid might comprise, for example, monetary and logistical backing, with the latter including the provision of meeting and work rooms, the securing of accommodations for conferences, as well as assistance in publications and the like. In some cases, the facilities of the state were utilized to provide such logistical and financial support for *abendländische* organizations.<sup>53</sup> This reciprocal assistance was not confined to within the Federal Republic, rather the already-noted cosmopolitan face of German Occidentalism also manifested itself in the efforts on the part of *Abendländler* and their institutions to work actively with like-minded counterparts abroad. Leaving aside the cross-border links and contacts existing between government figures, clergymen

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<sup>52</sup> At least while he was still a professor at the University of Mainz, Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte of the *Abendländischen Akademie* enjoyed considerable influence on the *Institut für Europäische Geschichte*. The CDU MdB Hermann Pünder was a member of the academy's *Kuratorium* and president of the German section of the *Internationalen Comité zur Verteidigung der christlichen Kultur* in Bonn. The academy also maintained links to the *Internationalen Gesellschaft für christlichen Aufbau*, founded in 1952 in Heidelberg by Max Ilgner.

<sup>53</sup> For instance, the federal government permitted the *Abendländische Akademie* to hold its approximately quarterly round-table discussions dealing with natural law and legal positivism in the *Bundesgerichtshof* in Karlsruhe. This can be traced back to the role of Hermann Weinkauff, president of the BGH, in the academy and as the leader of its working group on these themes. Moreover, the *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* subsidized the academy, covering half the costs of its annual conferences, a practice that would ultimately provoke considerable controversy. The academy also nurtured ties to the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischer Kreise*, which had been founded by the federal government in 1951. Wealthy individuals like Erich Fürst von Waldburg zu Zeil und Trauchburg and, following his death in 1953, his son Georg were essential in the funding of *Abendland* institutions and activities. Firms represented in the *Kuratorium* of the *Abendländischen Akademie*, which assisted in financing matters, included the Duisburger Kupferhütte and the Bossong-Werke (Düsseldorf).



and so forth, this phenomenon can be readily observed with regard to the *Abendländische Akademie*, which was intended after all as a forum for *international* cooperation and discussion. Therefore, several foreign members graced the *Kuratorium*, while non-German speakers and participants were regularly invited to the academy's major events. Collaboration was particularly intense with a number of foreign Occidental-minded institutions located elsewhere in Europe, most notably the European Documentation and Information Center (CEDI) in Madrid, which had also been founded in 1952 and staged its own annual congresses.<sup>54</sup> Ultimately, a semblance of an Occidentalist network developed both within the Federal Republic as well as on an international scale.

### I. Conclusion

The impact of the *Abendland* worldview represents one of the most prominent elements in the history of the Federal Republic during a considerable stretch of the period we shall be exploring. While Occidental ideas may indeed have waned somewhat in force, at least in the broader society, after the mid-1950s, they did not simply vanish thereafter but remained an influential factor for years to come, including in the realm of politics and foreign affairs.<sup>55</sup> For instance, it seems that *Abendland* fed significantly into

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<sup>54</sup> Other such institutions included the European Forum (Austrian College) that, starting in 1945, annually carried out "International Summer Seminars" in Alpbach; the *Forschungsinstitut für Fragen des Donauraumes* (FID), which had been founded in 1953 in Salzburg and moved to Vienna in 1957; as well as the *Comité der Beneluxstaaten*. The Sudeten German Rudolf Lodgman von Auen, a member of the *Kuratorium* of the *Abendländischen Akademie* and chairman of the *Verbandes der Landsmannschaften* (Munich), played a major role in the founding of the FID. The academy's *Kuratorium* also included Albert Karl Simon of the Sudeten German *Landsmannschaft*. In this spirit, the academy also maintained a *Referat für übergroßkische Ordnung*. Otto von Habsburg, the first president of the CEDI and grandson of the last emperor of Austria (and, therefore, the Austrian heir apparent), was a regular participant at the academy's conferences. His fellow Austrian Georg von Gaupp-Berghausen functioned as general-secretary of both the CEDI and the *Abendländischen Akademie* as well as director of the Verlag Neues Abendland. In West Germany, the CEDI published the *Dokumentation der Woche*, which was intended as a source of political information.

<sup>55</sup> This ongoing relevance is demonstrated by the continued appearance of books and essays on the subject *Abendland*, for instance Erich Przywara, *Logos, Abendland, Reich, Commercium* (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1964); Walter Dirks, "Das christliche Abendland: Sein Nachwirken in den Konfessionen der

the Gaullist phenomenon well into the mid-1960s, therefore even after the rise of personalities like Ludwig Erhard to Chancellor and Gerhard Schroeder to Foreign Minister and the virtual exclusion of Gaullist stalwarts from the federal government.<sup>56</sup> Birrenbach was well aware of this still precarious situation when he remarked in the mid-1960s with respect to one especially salient aspect of the *Abendland* perspective:

Many by us, and especially a part of the Catholic element of my party, forget the basics [*das Einmaleins*] as a result of the fascination in regard to the “Christian statesman”.... I consider that very dangerous, especially in a divided country like Germany. In open battle [*Feldschlacht*], these people always lose here, but domestic and foreign political events could change that. Therefore, the utmost attention is in order [*am Platze*].<sup>57</sup>

Whatever the personal political enmity, party-political calculations and inter-confessional rivalries that played a role, Birrenbach fully recognized that genuine convictions and substantive differences were also at the roots of the Gaullist-Atlanticist rift, including the intra-Union conflict.<sup>58</sup> Whatever the state of the *Abendland* idea at this time in society as

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Bundesrepublik,” in Klaus von Bismarck and Walter Dirks, eds., *Christlicher Glaube und Ideologie* (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1964); and Hugo Rahner, *Abendland: Reden und Aufsätze* (Freiburg: Herder, 1966).

<sup>56</sup> A notable exception was the remaining presence of Heinrich Krone as *Bundesminister* throughout the Erhard Chancellorship. On apparent strains and disagreements between Birrenbach and Krone, which Birrenbach characterized here as regrettable and unusual, and for Birrenbach’s surprise that Krone’s name was repeatedly linked “with certain people [*mit bestimmten Leuten*],” perhaps an allusion to *Abendland* or Gaullist personalities, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.

<sup>57</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 6 August 1964, ACDP K015. Birrenbach expressed himself elsewhere around the same time in a similar manner: “The minority either has succumbed to [*unterliegt*] the fascination with the ‘Christian statesman à la Salazar’ and in the process forgets the basics [*das Einmaleins*], or makes personal profit [*Geschäfte*] with the strange [*fremden*] fascination. I reject both, just like the majority in the Federal Republic.” (KB to Dr. Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1). For Birrenbach’s criticism to Henry Kissinger that, with respect to the importance of the alliance with the United States, including in the matter of defense, as “the vital basis of our existence” and even while he acknowledged France as essential [*“unsubstituierbar”*] for the construction [*“Aufbau”*] of Europe, “[t]here are people in Germany, whom you know well [*gut kennen*], who on the basis of the fascination [perhaps intended in general terms or again with reference to the “Christian statesman” but possibly referring specifically to a fascination with de Gaulle] forget the ABCs [*das Einmaleins*] or also profit from them [*mit ihm Geschäfte machen*; “*ihm*” perhaps referring as translated here to “the ABCs,” but also possibly referring to de Gaulle, or perhaps even a grammatical error actually intended to be “*ihr*” referring to “fascination”],” see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2.

<sup>58</sup> With respect to such party-political calculations, the late 1950s and 1960s was a period during which the SPD was increasingly advocating Atlantic cooperation, while at the same time seeking to reconcile with the

a whole, for Birrenbach it clearly continued to play an influential role in political thought in West Germany well into the 1960s and, far from abruptly disappearing, was poised to play an even larger one if care was not taken. In no small part, this work is a study of the efforts of Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists to counter the persistent impact of *Abendland* thought in the Federal Republic and especially in its international relations.

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Catholic church and attract Catholic voters. Some in the Union, including Adenauer, Strauß and Guttenberg sought to differentiate their own respective parties from this apparently moderating SPD.

## Chapter 4: Integrating a German Atlanticist Elite - The Emergence of an Atlanticist Infrastructure

### A. Introduction

The vitality of German Atlanticism, of its organizations and activities during the post-1945 period did not exist in a vacuum; rather it constituted part of a broader Liberal trend in West German society. As alluded to in the previous chapter, Conservatives remained vocal well into the late 1950s and 1960s, but by then the strength of the Occidental *Abendland* perspective was noticeably beginning to wane in favor of increasingly ascendant Liberal conceptions of politics, economics, society, culture and, in general, of a modern Western world. This development found broad expression in German society, both in the general population as well as in specialized fields such as politics, academia and the media. Historians have attributed the dawn of a more Liberal era in the Federal Republic and the concomitant decline in the appeal of the Conservative worldview to a number of causes: a thaw in the international Cold War that also contributed significantly to a relaxation of the domestic atmosphere; the prosperity and material abundance unleashed by the *Sozialen Marktwirtschaft* and *Wirtschaftswunder*; the changes in official Catholicism that occurred with the passing away in October 1958 of Pope Pius XII, the directly following ascension of Pope John XXIII and the approach of the Second Vatican Council that would eventually occur from 1962-65; and, finally, the inexorable process of generational succession. While all were significant factors, our aim in this chapter is to illuminate yet another element contributing to this sea change

from Conservative *Abendland* thought to more Liberal perspectives, particularly in the realm of foreign policy and international relations.<sup>1</sup>

To begin to illustrate this, we can sketch the biography of Kurt Birrenbach in a direction considerably divergent from that taken in Chapter 2. There, we focused on the progress of Birrenbach's career in the worlds of business and politics. However, even as Birrenbach was enjoying some measure of success in those areas, his career was also developing in a somewhat different, albeit related, field. In 1955, Birrenbach joined the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik* and in 1957 the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*. In December 1960, Birrenbach was unanimously elected at the Atlantic Institute's first Board of Governors meeting to be one of the vice-presidents of that body. From the outset, he was also a member of the AI's important Policy Committee and, in November 1963, was selected by that committee as its chairman.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, Birrenbach, who had already represented Heinrich Krone at one recent meeting, had accepted the invitation of the Frenchman Jean Monnet in 1961 to join his Action Committee for the United States of Europe, and in 1962, he became a member of the *Atlantik-Brücke*. As we shall see, Birrenbach did not merely join but also advanced within these organizations. What is being alluded to in this brief alternative career

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<sup>1</sup> On this development, see the works of Axel Schildt, including *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999). The Liberal trend was manifested in the media, for instance, in the more elevated journalism and in the cultural radio programs; in academia, for example, in the works of the sociologist Helmut Schelsky and the treatises of Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard; and, to some extent, even within the churches and their related academies, particularly on the Protestant and less so on the Catholic side. In this environment, Liberal definitions of freedom, culture and the like noticeably gained ground in the discourse, while phenomena like civilization (as opposed to community), capitalism, industrialism, technology, mass culture, consumptionism and social change came to be viewed in a more positive light that in some ways, though only in some ways, embraced a greater pluralism. Meanwhile, the distinctively Liberal notion of an "end of ideologies," effectively directed at undermining both Conservatism as well as Socialism, was gaining currency not only in the Federal Republic but also in the United States and elsewhere in Western Europe, its most prominent advocates abroad including the sociologists Daniel Bell, Edward Shils and Raymond Aron.

<sup>2</sup> Birrenbach succeeded the deceased American Eric Johnston as chairman of the AI Policy Committee.

outline is one of the most significant undertakings, arguably *the most significant* undertaking, of the German Atlanticists and their like-minded friends abroad: the creation of and participation in a rather elaborate Atlanticist infrastructure. Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists played a key role in the construction and functioning of both the primarily German elements of this infrastructure that existed within the Federal Republic as well as of many of those international elements located beyond its borders elsewhere in the Atlantic world.<sup>3</sup>

### B. Components

The Atlanticist infrastructure that came into existence consisted of a number of basic elements of varying nature. Among the key components were the large-scale conferences that began to emerge in the early 1950s, some of which proved to be merely one-time affairs, but also a number of others that developed into ongoing series over the subsequent years. Among the latter, the most important for Birrenbach were the annual spring Königswinter Conferences, launched in 1950 and staged by the DEG; the annual spring Bilderberg Conferences begun in 1954; the annual fall NATO Parliamentarians Conferences first held in 1955; and the German-American Conferences inaugurated in 1959 and staged by the AB. These conferences were multi-day gatherings conducted in both large plenary sessions as well as smaller panel meetings and provided Birrenbach and other delegates with plentiful forums for frank speeches, discussion and debate about

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<sup>3</sup> For studies of individual institutions, see Daniel Eisermann, *Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 bis 1972* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999); Ludger Kühnhardt, *Atlantik-Brücke: Fünfzig Jahre deutsch-amerikanische Partnerschaft, 1952-2002* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002); Ralph Uhlig, *Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft, 1949-1983: Der Beitrag ihrer "Königswinter-Konferenzen" zur britisch-deutschen Verständigung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986); and Albrecht Zunker, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Entwicklungsgeschichte einer Institution politikbezogener Forschung* (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2007). Birrenbach was also a rather half-hearted member of a number of other organizations, serving for instance as a vice-president of the *Europa-Union Deutschland* (Bonn) from 1957-65.

overarching themes along with more specific issues. Birrenbach's real initiation into the Atlanticist conference system came in 1959, when he attended not only the KWC, but also the Atlantic Congress in June in London (at the arrangement of the Union delegates to the NPC), and the NPC itself in Washington, DC. Thanks to the intervention of Prof. Arnold Bergstraesser, Birrenbach also secured an invitation to the first German-American Conference, though he was ultimately unable to attend.<sup>4</sup> In May 1960, Birrenbach attended his first Bilderberg Conference, in Switzerland, thanks to an invitation obtained for him by Fritz Berg and Otto Wolff von Amerongen, personalities who also took the time to educate him about the conference itself.<sup>5</sup> Finally, in February 1961, he participated in his first (and the second overall) German-American Conference, in Washington, DC. Among other things, all of this served Birrenbach in part as an indispensable means to "profile" himself still early in his political career.<sup>6</sup>

Another vital element of this Atlanticist infrastructure was the action committee. These bodies consisted of a relatively limited number of influential individuals who met periodically to formulate recommendations and then returned to their respective realms of endeavor to promote their implementation. While the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, founded by Monnet in October 1955, was undoubtedly the most significant such organization, having already contributed to the "*Relance* of Europe" as embodied in the ratification of the Treaty of Rome in Spring 1957 and the birth of the Common Market and EURATOM, it was far from the only Atlanticist-minded action committee operating during this period. Over the years, Birrenbach himself was also an

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<sup>4</sup> Birrenbach had already missed the 1958 KWC due to illness.

<sup>5</sup> Berg was president of the *Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie*, while Amerongen was leader of the *Ostauschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft*.

<sup>6</sup> Birrenbach ceased attending the NPCs from the mid-1960s onward.

engaged member of similar bodies focused on issues like economic integration in Europe, peace in the Middle East and economic development in the border regions of Greece and Turkey.<sup>7</sup> Beyond this, in 1963, Birrenbach, together with Hans von der Groeben (a member of the EEC Commission in Brussels) and Hellmuth Wagner (the BDI *Hauptgeschäftsführer*), created the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, essentially his own German action committee that met in Cologne and sought to influence, depending on the framework situation, the government or the Union leadership.<sup>8</sup> One example of an Atlanticist action committee of which Birrenbach was *not* a member but of which he was aware was the Atlantic Action Committee for Economic Growth, which was created in 1967 and sought, most immediately, to help achieve a maximum success of the Kennedy Round of GATT talks and its aftermath.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, a number of research institutes emerged as essential components of the Atlanticist infrastructure. Among the most important of these, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* was constituted in March 1955. In addition to the activities of its research institute proper, the DGAP created a pair of landmark study groups during the

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<sup>7</sup> For instance, at the invitation of the *Vorstand* of the *Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung*, Birrenbach joined an economic commission set up in January 1959 by that body to monitor the measures for European economic integration taken by the European communities as well as by organizations like the OEEC and to make independent proposals. This commission was led by Wilhelm Beutler (BDI). The other members were Otto Bach, Walter Bauer, Willi Birkelbach, Heinrich Deist, Rudolf Meimberg, Hans Niehaus, Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim, and Johannes Semler. On a broader level, the “*Aktionskomitee der Internationalen Europäischen Bewegung*” had formed an international economic commission, of which Birrenbach was *not* a member (but of which other Germans were), for the same purpose. This *Commission d’Application du Marché Commun du Mouvement Européen* held its constitutive meeting on 30 January 1960 in Brussels.

<sup>8</sup> As we shall see, this procedure appears to have worked to a satisfactory extent while the Union remained in the government but was far less effective once it moved into an opposition role. Aside from its three founders, the original members of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle were *Generaldirektor* Josef Rust (Wintershall AG), Professor Ulrich Scheuner (University of Bonn), and *Rechtsanwalt* Hans-Helmut Kuhnke (Klöckner). Other members would include Josef Hermann Dufhues (*Geschäftsführender Bundesvorsitzender* of the CDU).

<sup>9</sup> Also known as the Action Committee for Atlantic Economic Cooperation, this entity aimed to influence governments as well as the private sector and was composed of internationally prominent businessmen.



first half of the 1960s: Study Group I, which dealt with issues of international security and arms control in Europe, held its first meeting in January 1962, while Study Group II, focusing on Western, and particularly German, relations to the Soviet Union and the other countries of the East, staged its first meeting in December 1965.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, the Atlantic Institute began operating in January 1961 and distinguished itself from national institutes like the DGAP through its aspiration to attain a truly broad international character. Finally, though the final settling of its institutional position occupied many of the following years, the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* was founded in Fall 1962 to function closely with the federal government in the fields of international politics and security. Such research institutes, taken as a whole, generated a considerable number of significant studies.<sup>11</sup>

The creation of this infrastructure occurred in a decades-long series of stops and starts, driven largely by perceived necessity and a sensitivity to the fluid domestic and international environment. The first wave occurred roughly in the late 1940s and first half of the 1950s, a period in which such undertakings became viable given the gradual improvement of political and economic conditions in postwar western Germany and, moreover, were even given impetus by events like the Berlin blockade (1948) and the defeat of the European Defence Community (1954). This initial flurry of institution building included the founding of the DEG (1949) and its Königswinter Conferences (1950), the AB (1951), the Bilderberg Conferences (1954), the Monnet Committee (1955), the NPC (1955) and the DGAP (1955). After a pause during the latter half of the 1950s, a second wave commenced around 1959 and lasted until the mid-1960s,

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<sup>10</sup> The successive chairmen of the DGAP Study Group I (West), all SPD personalities, included Fritz Erler, Helmut Schmidt, Karl Mommer, Alfons Pawelczyk and Egon Bahr.

<sup>11</sup> Works of the SWP were especially utilized by the West German Foreign and Defense Ministries.

stimulated by the accession of a Kennedy administration embracing novel foreign policy ideas, including in the fields of security and development aid; détente and its impact on the German *Ostpolitik*; and the disturbing role played by Adenauer and de Gaulle, for instance their rejection of the British application for entrance into the EEC in 1963.<sup>12</sup>

This phase saw the initiation of the AB's German-American Conferences (1959) and the constitution of the AI (1960), the SWP (1962), the DGAP Study Groups (1962 and 1965) and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle (1963). By 1965, this second period of intense activity had concluded, and another stretch of relative calm ensued until the early 1970s, when quite new structures, especially the Trilateral Commission, were created (see Chapter 8). While the founding of individual institutions was often a difficult and lengthy process involving years of planning and effort ("*Vorarbeit*"), no long-range, overall blueprint existed, and a certain spirit of improvisation reigned.<sup>13</sup>

Absent or otherwise preoccupied, Birrenbach played virtually no part in the first wave of institution building but a major role in the latter two. This was the case not only with respect to the creation of the AI (as a constituting member of the Board of Governors), the DGAP Study Groups and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, but also with regard to the SWP. Here, Birrenbach was a member of the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wissenschaft und Politik*, the Munich-based organization, constituted in January 1962 at

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<sup>12</sup> In particular, the Kennedy administration jettisoned the familiar and easily understood doctrine of massive retaliation, replaced it with a more complex policy of flexible response, and embraced the notion of arms control, all of which added particular impetus to the creation, for instance, of the DGAP Study Group I.

<sup>13</sup> Already in 1957, a "continuing committee" was established to explore the idea of and determine the preconditions for founding an Atlantic Institute, and it was more than a year from the time of the October 1959 meeting in Brussels to organize a provisional committee and the actual beginning of the AI's operations. The German members of the provisional committee were Fritz Berg (one of its vice-presidents), Wilhelm Beutler and Prof. Ulrich Scheuner, while Arnold Bergstraesser was the German member on the related steering committee. To cite another illustrative example, the preparation of the DGAP Study Group II required approximately two years.

the proposal and under the leadership of Prof. Bergstraesser, that played a crucial role in the establishment of the SWP, its most central task and achievement. Birrenbach's interest in infrastructure was stimulated by his extensive travel and contacts abroad (see Chapter 6), which contributed to his and his fellow German Atlanticists' recognition of relevant international developments. Thus, his impression of the strategic policies of the Kennedy administration, including its strong interest in disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, impressions he had gathered in part on his October 1961 *Sondermission* to the United States, encouraged his support for the construction of the DGAP Study Group I. As a man intensely interested in international affairs but who never himself entered the actual government, Birrenbach exemplifies the sort of personality so essential to this overall process of creation. Whether one assesses the parts played by groups of Atlanticist-minded German citizens (DEG, AB, DGAP, SWP), multi-national groups of parliamentarians (NPC), or personalities like Jean Monnet (Monnet Committee) and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands (Bilderberg), this Atlanticist infrastructure was not primarily the product of government action, rather it was largely founded and then maintained at the initiative of a significant movement of politically conscious, but non-governmental and ultimately private, individuals.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Suggestive is the *Vorstand* of the AWP, which comprised Prof. Arnold Bergstraesser (University of Freiburg), Prof. Hans Raupach (University of Munich), Dr. Richard Freiherr von Weizsäcker (C.H. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim) and Dr. Hans Kruse (the *Geschäftsführer*). Likewise, the successive 1<sup>st</sup> Chairmen of the *Atlantik-Brücke* were the journalist Ernst Friedlaender, the scholar Arnold Bergstraesser and the banker Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen. Meanwhile, the successive DEG 1<sup>st</sup> Chairmen included Prof. Emil Lehnartz (University of Münster), who was also one of the organization's founding members, and the former State Secretary Hans von Herwarth (Munich). To provide yet another example, Monnet only founded his famed action committee several months after his resignation as President of the ECSC High Authority. Finally, the NPC was created by parliamentarians from the fifteen NATO states, with strong impetus provided by a Canadian parliamentary group. It was established by ad hoc agreement among the national legislatures, as opposed to the inter-governmental agreements that launched, for example, the European assemblies.

### C. Composition

Within the individual elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, Birrenbach interacted with members and participants that varied considerably in number depending on the organizations and activities in question as well as over time. To take an extreme example on the high end of the quantity scale, the June 1959 Atlantic Congress in London was attended by about seven hundred private delegates, including about seventy Germans. However, far more typically, even the rather larger international conferences, such as the German-American and Königswinter Conferences, though still welcoming well over a hundred participants, were much more restricted in size, and Birrenbach's first Bilderberg Conference, in May 1960 in Switzerland, played host to only about forty to fifty attendees. Meanwhile, a body like the Monnet Committee comprised only about thirty members, and some of the smaller action committees might even consist of as few as around ten. An expanded membership, with well-chosen new members enjoying outstanding connections, offered to an institution enticing prospects of greater influence in both the Federal Republic and abroad, ideally including in the United States, as well as a boost in funding. On the other hand, certain factors dictated adherence to a quite cautious overall plan and against a rapid, haphazard expansion, namely the desire of these organizations both to preserve the proper quality and balance of the various components of their membership or participant circles and to prevent such circles from becoming bloated in their overall size and, therefore, unwieldy. Given these considerations, the Atlanticist institutions and functions in which Birrenbach was engaged, even those in

which interest in membership ran strong, far from becoming mass organizations, always remained stringently affairs of a relatively small elite stratum.<sup>15</sup>

The composition of officers, members and participants with which Birrenbach dealt in the Atlanticist infrastructure was also quite variegated. While the strictly German elements naturally consisted almost exclusively of German citizens (aside from guests), the international elements comprised a broader spectrum of nationalities, primarily hailing from throughout the North Atlantic basin and notably including Americans and Britons as well as a considerable German presence.<sup>16</sup> Whatever the particular imbalances, the infrastructure as a whole brought together many professions largely, though not exclusively, from the private sector: politicians, *Wirtschaftler*, bankers, trade union leaders, *Wissenschaftler*, military officers, and media and even cultural figures.<sup>17</sup> Given the stress on non-partisanship, Birrenbach, serving as an independent individual but also, at least in theory, as a representative of the Union, industry and the FRG, found himself regularly cooperating not only with similar personalities but also with members and sympathizers of the SPD, FDP and trade unions.<sup>18</sup> On at least some level, a common

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<sup>15</sup> With respect to variations over time, the DGAP Study Groups manifested a considerable rise in at least nominal membership during the 1960s. By the middle of the decade, the number of members in the Study Group I had swelled to about fifty from approximately thirty at the start. By mid-1971, Birrenbach's Study Group II, originally expected to encompass thirty-two members, had increased in size to fifty-six. Nevertheless, the hard core of regularly active participants in these DGAP Study Groups was actually quite a bit smaller.

<sup>16</sup> The nationalities involved in the Atlanticist infrastructure also included neutrals to a certain extent, as becomes manifest when one closely examines, for instance, the Atlantic Institute.

<sup>17</sup> Among the *Wissenschaftler* were usually to be found international relations specialists, political scientists, contemporary historians, economists and jurists.

<sup>18</sup> Such non-partisanship or, perhaps more accurately, multi-partisanship was evident, for example, in the Monnet Committee, whose German members over the years, aside from Birrenbach, included prominent figures from the CDU (e.g. Rainer Barzel, Heinrich von Brentano, Franz Etzel, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Heinrich Krone), the SPD (e.g. Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler, Erich Ollenhauer, Helmut Schmidt, Herbert Wehner), the FDP (e.g. Erich Mende, Walter Scheel), the DGB (e.g. Willi Richter, Ludwig Rosenberg, Bernhard Tacke, Heinz-Oskar Vetter) and the individual trade unions, among them the IG Bergbau und Energie (e.g. Walter Arendt, Heinrich Gutermuth) and the IG Metall (e.g. Otto Brenner). The efforts of the Atlanticist institutions to embrace representatives from each of the major political parties and trade unions were the subject of a variety of formal and informal rules. At the DGAP, the occupation of the top offices

Atlanticism united these figures, whatever their disagreements on domestic political, economic and other issues.<sup>19</sup> Harmonious relationships were facilitated by links in the business world, for instance the ATH-Klößner cooperation involving DGAP president Günter Henle or the presence of key labor personalities, like Heinz Oskar Vetter, in the ATH *Aufsichtsrat*.<sup>20</sup> While both the German and international elements of the Atlanticist world were almost exclusively male, reflecting elite composition, some notable German exceptions did exist, most significantly for Birrenbach the journalist Marion Gräfin Dönhoff.<sup>21</sup> In integrating such diverse and authoritative figures via its organizations,

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was divided up in such a manner that, in practice, the president and one vice-president were drawn from the field of industry, while the other vice-president was furnished by the SPD (Erlar from 1956-67, then Helmut Schmidt). In the SWP *Stiftungsrat*, the presence of a personality from each of the three major Bundestag *Fraktionen* was explicitly ensured. The participation of their party's representatives thus secured, key FDP figures engaged in the Atlanticist infrastructure included the already mentioned Erich Mende and Walter Scheel as well as Wolfgang Mischnick, therefore comprising, at the time of their activity, members of the *Bundestag*, chairmen of the party *Fraktion*, and chairmen of the party itself.

<sup>19</sup> Birrenbach captured this spirit when he remarked upon the death of the SPD's Fritz Erlar in 1967 that "His death is a loss for our country and our mutual cause [*gemeinsame Sache*]." (KB to Hajo Holborn, 9 March 1967, ACDP K098/1). With regard to disagreements, Birrenbach over the years repeatedly expressed his opposition, for instance, to wage demands and wage increases that exceeded productivity increases. As early as 1963, Birrenbach was complaining about West German labor costs being the highest in Europe and that profits were thus being squeezed at a time when business "desperately" needed to build up its reserves. In the last couple of years, West Germany's "disciplined" labor force had forgotten that "you cannot have your cake and eat it too." (Clipping from 1963, ACDP K157/1). For his later reference to the "worrying [*beunruhigend*]" rise in German wages in 1970, which was "not only to be explained with a certain catching-up [*Nachholbedarf*] of the wages," see Birrenbach's expositions at the 17<sup>th</sup> *Ordentliche Hauptversammlung* of the ATH AG, 27 April 1971, ACDP K065/3.

<sup>20</sup> Henle was president of the DGAP since its founding and enjoyed extensive national and international connections. Prior to becoming head of the important Klößner steel concern in the post-1945 era, he had spent extensive time abroad during the interwar period in the German foreign service, including at the embassy in London. From 1949-53, he had also been a CDU member of the *Bundestag*. For the good personal relations, even much later on, between Birrenbach and Henle, see Henle's "regret" at having to decline Birrenbach's invitation to a party in January 1975 in Düsseldorf, perhaps at Birrenbach's home, since, as Henle put it, "we have always especially enjoyed ourselves at your place," in Henle to KB, 30 December 1974, ACDP K042/1. To cite another example of such external business links, Birrenbach interacted from the mid-1970s into the early 1980s with both Jürgen Ponto as well as the former FDP Economics Minister Hans Friderichs not only at the DGAP, where Ponto and, then after him, Friderichs functioned as treasurer during this period, but also within the context of the Dresdner Bank *Beirat*, due to the position of Ponto and, then again, Friderichs as spokesman [*Sprecher*] of the bank's *Vorstand*. With respect to labor, the successive chairmen of the Düsseldorf-based DGB (Walter Freitag, Willi Richter, Ludwig Rosenberg and Heinz-Oskar Vetter) were all involved in the Atlanticist infrastructure.

<sup>21</sup> Dönhoff worked as an editor at and eventually became editor-in-chief of *Die Zeit*. A number of female members of the *Bundestag* also took part in the NATO Parliamentarians Conference. Birrenbach himself was not generally fond of a female participation in politics, citing their role in terrorist movements

German Atlanticism secured itself a solid foundation, ensured a wide range of ideas, interests and perspectives and established links and influence in vital areas of society.<sup>22</sup>

Birrenbach's own experiences attest to the efforts to impart some measure of *Überparteilichkeit* and political balance within the Atlanticist infrastructure. During the early 1960s, he was compelled to hear out the concerns of Konrad Kraske, the CDU *Geschäftsführer*, regarding SPD and trade union predominance in the Monnet Committee. Birrenbach's entrance into the DGAP's *Geschäftsführendes Präsidium* in 1964 seems to have somewhat allayed the CDU/CSU *Fraktion*'s expressed frustration regarding the seeming relegation of a number of major Union politicians, including some leading *Fraktion* members, like Rainer Barzel, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Hermann Kopf, Ernst Lemmer and Gerhard Schröder to the mere *Präsidium*.<sup>23</sup> Birrenbach's chairmanship of the DGAP Study Group II, which he assumed from its inception despite his real desire to chair the Study Group I, was in part designed as a means to offset Fritz Erler's SPD chairmanship of the Study Group I, in which Birrenbach also served from the start as the key CDU representative.<sup>24</sup> With his excellent connections to the German political left, Birrenbach played a significant role in the attempts, of varying degrees of success, to rectify the numerical deficits in the institutions and functions of the

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(including in West Germany during the 1970s) and arguing, for instance, that "in National Socialism, women in emotional form belonged among the most radical elements." (KB to Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, ACDP K153/1). In later years, Birrenbach was rather, though perhaps for him not outlandishly, critical of Margaret Thatcher, assuring others that, having personally been around her at times in small circles, "the contact with the British Prime Minister is no pleasure" (KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984, ACDP K029/2) and judging her an "icy lady," who "cannot understand, due to her temperament, the way of thinking of the Criollo nation [here referring to Argentina]" (KB to Haig, 7 June 1982, ACDP K146/2). Summing up his attitude towards Thatcher, Birrenbach remarked "[m]asculine women are always dreadful [*schrecklich*]." (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1984, ACDP K029/2).

<sup>22</sup> As Birrenbach put it, here regarding the *Deutsch-Atlantische-Gesellschaft* (see Chapter 7), "[t]he more *überparteilich* our *Gesellschaft* is, the greater will be its importance in the Federal Republic." (KB to Jaeger, 14 May 1962, ACDP K009/1).

<sup>23</sup> Such irritation appears to have been stoked by the domination, at least at times, of the *Geschäftsführenden Präsidium* by figures from the SPD and the private *Wirtschaft*.

<sup>24</sup> Birrenbach did occasionally get to chair the Study Group I, in the absence of the regular chairman.

infrastructure called attention to at different points by prominent Atlanticists like Helmut Schmidt and Erler, who insisted on the imperative of an increased SPD and trade union representation in the memberships of the AB, of certain DGAP organs and of the AI Board as well as among KWC participants.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, striking imbalances, not exclusive to any particular political or trade union tendency, emerged or persisted in many Atlanticist organizations, and, spurred on by the protests of aggrieved elements on the right or left, the necessity of an adequate political balance remained an ongoing theme that considerably influenced personnel decisions.<sup>26</sup>

#### D. Structure

Over his many years of activity within the elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, Birrenbach advanced into virtually each of their relatively small internal executive committees. These included the AI Board of Governors (which he entered in 1961), the DEG *Präsidium* (1962), the *Präsidium* and *Geschäftsführendes Präsidium* of the DGAP (1962 and 1964, respectively), the AI Policy Committee (1963), the AB *Vorstand* (1964), the SWP *Stiftungsrat* (1964), and the international steering committees

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<sup>25</sup> For instance, Birrenbach was in contact during the early 1960s with his friend Ludwig Rosenberg, at the time vice-chairman of the DGB, for advice on the matter of the occupation of the Atlantic Institute board.

<sup>26</sup> To cite a few examples, in 1961, the Atlantic Institute, perhaps in response to Schmidt's urgings, explicitly sought to appoint more left-wing governors, and Schmidt himself eventually became a member of the AI board. Also by the early 1960s, Erler was suggesting that the *Atlantik-Brücke* take on more members close to the SPD, since, aside from Prof. Karl Schiller, all the others either belonged to or were close to the middle-class parties. While the *Brücke* would seek to retain Schmidt and other SPD politicians as members of the organization when, for whatever reasons, they departed the *Vorstand*, the AB membership continued to demonstrate a preponderance of businessmen, and as of February 1971, of the AB's total of ten members who were politicians, six of these, including Birrenbach, came from the CDU/CSU, just three from the SPD, and one from the FDP. Meanwhile, the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* repeatedly attempted to attract personalities from the German trade unions. Finally, the FDP found itself somewhat underrepresented in certain organizations, with Birrenbach's DGAP Study Group II, for instance, not only evincing a pronounced CDU dominance among its parliamentarians but also a virtual dearth of figures from the FDP. In his own work, Danial Eisermann has referred to a pronounced "*Industrieklub-Atmosphäre*" at the DGAP [Eisermann, *Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion*, p. 241].



that organized the German-American and Königswinter Conferences.<sup>27</sup> However formally democratic their statutes and even in those organizations with general member bodies, usually docile entities engaged in largely unanimous rubber-stamp elections and votes, these influential supervisory organs in practice determined overall development and substantive policy: high-level personnel decisions, membership co-optations, conference agendas and work programs, structural modifications, scheduling, budgets, indeed all those decisions crucial to achieving the aims of a given institution.<sup>28</sup> As in the Thyssen firm, Birrenbach and other figures of his stature could simultaneously occupy so many top-level positions (along with his *Bundestag* seat and Thyssen duties) thanks to a division of labor that saw administrative entities, for instance a *Sekretariat* or *Geschäftsführung*, handling time- and effort-consuming day-to-day affairs while the executive bodies usually came together no more than several times a year for relatively brief periods of at most a few days at a stretch. Ultimately, Birrenbach's leadership roles in the international elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, for instance at the Atlantic Institute, powerfully testify to the trust that German Atlanticists enjoyed from their foreign counterparts and amply manifest a quite prominent West German presence in this particular environment.

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<sup>27</sup> Technically, Birrenbach was an honorary member of the DEG *Präsidium*, actually a member of the *Ehrenpräsidium*. Among the other Honorary Presidents of the DEG were Karl Arnold, Heinrich von Brentano, Marion Dönhoff, Willi Eichler, Fritz Erler, Ernst Friedlaender, Otto Friedrich, Marie-Elisabeth Lüders, W. Alexander Menne, Rudolf Pechel, Ludwig Rosenberg and Theodor Steltzer. With the unanimous acceptance of the DGAP *Präsidium*'s proposal by the *Mitgliederversammlung* of 27 June 1962, Birrenbach along with Brentano assumed the spots in the DGAP *Präsidium* previously occupied by Prof. Ulrich Haberland (Bayer AG, Leverkusen) and Hans Goudefroy (Allianz-Versicherung AG, Munich), both recently deceased. In the SWP *Stiftungsrat*, Birrenbach (Union) served with personalities like Fritz Erler and, then, Helmut Schmidt (SPD) and Thomas Dehler (FDP).

<sup>28</sup> The Policy Committee, which consisted of six people including Birrenbach, was the actual *Steuerungsorgan* of the Atlantic Institute. From his position as chairman, one could argue that Birrenbach, along with the AI Director-General, exercised the decisive influence within the entire organization.

As a member of these high-level executive bodies as well as of certain dedicated structures and also in a more informal individual capacity, Birrenbach gradually assumed the role of an influential gatekeeper for the Atlanticist world. This essential screening task entailed identifying and recruiting the best possible officers, members, participants and other vital personnel, while denying access to or dismissing those deemed unqualified or undesirable. Of course, to enter and advance within the Atlanticist institutions, Birrenbach himself had first had to secure the approval of such key gatekeepers prior to joining their select group (see Chapter 6). As a gatekeeper whose insight and judgment were often solicited, Birrenbach was well positioned to determine an individual's access to the Atlanticist infrastructure and, therefore, represented a valuable contact for aspirants. In fulfilling this role, Birrenbach stressed the importance of inducting personalities of stature who enjoyed connections with the United States and who would enhance the national and international reputation of the Atlanticist infrastructure and, not surprisingly, looked particularly favorably on individuals generally sharing his own political and economic views.<sup>29</sup> Birrenbach's exercise of this crucial function was facilitated not only by his prominent position within the Atlanticist infrastructure but also by his outstanding connections across the political spectrum as well as in the realms of *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft*, not just at home but also abroad, especially in the United States.<sup>30</sup> Thanks to these connections, he was also able to act in

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<sup>29</sup> For some of Birrenbach's considerations in this process, see KB to Jaeger, 14 May 1962, ACDP K009/1.

<sup>30</sup> Dedicated organs of which Birrenbach was a member included the various DGAP Admission ["*Aufnahme*"] Committees that played a central part in deciding the co-optation of members into the organization as a whole as well as into its individual study groups; the DEG's Königswinter Conference Steering Committee, which met in London (including in the House of Commons) well before the actual conference and consisted of regular conference participants; and the AB's German Preparation Committee for the German-American Conferences, which included the AB *Vorstand* as well as representatives from the *Bundestag*. Birrenbach, along with Amb. a.D. Walther Becker (DGAP *Geschäftsführender* vice-president), Wilhelm Cornides (director of the DGAP Research Institute), Fritz Erler (chairman of the study

this gatekeeping capacity with respect to the German political left and on an international level, in the latter case often in cooperation with American, British, and other foreign counterparts.<sup>31</sup>

Birrenbach's rise in the Atlanticist infrastructure partly reflected a process of politicization within certain organizations, notably the DEG, AB and DGAP. Most striking during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when it received impetus from larger events, this trend manifested itself in the composition of these institutions, particularly the gradual increase in the relative weight of politicians both in the leadership organs and

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group) and Prof. Ulrich Scheuner (chairman of the DGAP Research Committee), was one of the initial members of the Admission Committee for the DGAP Study Group I. Birrenbach first entered the KWC Steering Committee in the approach to its upcoming meeting of 25-26 January 1961, in place of and at the request of his colleague the CDU MdB Johann Baptist Gradl and at the invitation of the British Conservative MP Evelyn Emmet. Birrenbach became a member of the AB's German Preparation Committee for the first time in 1962, therefore even before he entered (but apparently at the request of) the AB *Vorstand*, and thus played a pivotal role in proposing to that *Vorstand* the Union members, essentially parliamentarians and minister-presidents, who would take part in the forthcoming German-American Conference. In structural terms, the entities engaged in the gatekeeping process were not all institutions of the Atlanticist world *per se*, rather were in part the organizations that individual participants, often informally, represented. For instance, the Bundestag *Fraktionen*, including that of the Union (and especially particular elements thereof, among them the chairman), exercised such functions to some extent regarding their own members' involvement in Atlanticist activities, whether it be DGAP Study Groups, German-American Conferences or the NATO Parliamentarians Conference (as was the case with Birrenbach's selection for the latter in October 1959). Likewise, the federal government played a certain part, for example insofar as it proposed its own representatives in the SWP *Stiftungsrat* (see later in this chapter).

<sup>31</sup> For instance, with respect to the representation of the SPD and the German left, Birrenbach's negative assessment of Karl Schiller, more specifically of his lack of political activity and influence, early in the history of the Atlantic Institute contributed greatly to the appointment of Ludwig Rosenberg to the Board of Governors, despite the hesitance of the SPD leadership. As another example of such processes in action, Birrenbach was planning to talk with Heinz-Oskar Vetter as of April 1979 about the candidacy of an appropriate trade union representative in the DGAP *Präsidium*. With respect to the international aspects of gatekeeping, Birrenbach and his fellow Germans made suggestions and undertook efforts to help the Americans put together as high-quality a delegation as possible for the German-American Conferences. In this, Birrenbach consulted with and was assisted by key personalities and contacts such as Chris Emmet (American Council on Germany), John McCloy, Shepard Stone, George Ball, Lucius Clay, Robert Murphy and Jacob Javits and other American senators as well as the respective German ambassadors in the United States, for example Rolf Pauls beginning in the late 1960s. The ACG, taking into account the *Atlantik-Brücke* Preparation Committee's proposals and the particular emphasis of the AB on the quality of the American congressional delegation, was crucial in organizing and securing the participation of the members of the US delegations to the German-American Conferences, and Birrenbach's efforts included contacting and recruiting American congressmen and politicians on the ACG's invitation list. Other German figures similarly involved in such a wide array of gatekeeping activities, also with respect to the German side, included the CDU MdB Erik Blumenfeld.

in particular functions; as well as in the more explicitly political nature of AB and DEG activities, with the former, for instance, initiating its German-American Conferences and the latter focusing its KWCs on more concrete contemporary events and political goals, especially paving Britain's path into the EEC.<sup>32</sup> Particularly instructive are Birrenbach's experiences with the AB, where despite his close connections and services rendered, he found his entrance blocked due to a policy, stressing the organization's strictly private character, against co-opting politicians.<sup>33</sup> Only in 1962, when the AB altered this rule and welcomed several parliamentarians, did he become a member. In February 1964, he finally entered the *Vorstand*, part of an expansion of that body that again included other parliamentarians.<sup>34</sup> This testifies to an AB evolving during this period into an institution significantly active in the political arena and accounting for this in its composition, not least to enhance its influence in that realm. However, the expansion of the *Vorstand* was the subject of extensive discussion among AB members, with questions raised about the advisability of such a politically tinged organ. Long afterwards, the AB still prohibited its chairman from being a *profiliertes* politician, insisted that *Vorstand* members belong *à titre personnel* rather than as representatives of a particular interest group or political

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<sup>32</sup> Hitherto, the DEG and AB had essentially focused on general, fundamental goals, including analyzing the mistrust and misunderstandings that had burdened German relations with the Anglo-Saxon nations in the past and reducing still extant mistrust and misunderstandings. In explaining the shift, the DEG's own literature cited the decade or so "experienced under the shadow of de Gaulle." Another example of these more overt political activities was the open letter the *Atlantik-Brücke* published in American newspapers in response to the dismaying events of early 1963 (see Chapter 7). Though the crucial change came during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Königswinter Conferences had actually been undergoing a certain process of politicization with respect to themes and participants for much of the 1950s, especially as a result of the Korean War and what was seen as the increased salience of the German Question. In contrast, the first KWC (1950) was a relatively small conference of social workers dealing with the theme "Social Work," while the second had consisted primarily of journalists addressing the "Responsibility of the Press."

<sup>33</sup> Stahl to KB, 12 January 1960, ACDP K002/2.

<sup>34</sup> Proposed by Falkenhausen (the AB 1<sup>st</sup> Chairman), the 1964 expansion of the AB *Vorstand* ensured that there would be at least one member from each Bundestag *Fraktion* in that organ. The SPD MdB Fritz Erler was among those that also joined the *Vorstand* at that time. By this point, Birrenbach had already contributed significantly to the preparation, execution and, it was believed, success of projects and activities like the German-American Conferences and the 1963 open letter (see Chapter 7).

party, and imposed a low ceiling on the number of politicians in its membership.<sup>35</sup> Thus, despite the overall trend, some resistance to politicization endured, at least in the AB.

Largely due to his myriad leadership positions, Birrenbach developed a persistent institutional network centered on directing the Atlanticist organizations. This network consisted of key German and foreign personalities in this field, among them Monnet and Max Kohnstamm (Monnet Committee); Walter Stahl (*Atlantik-Brücke*); Lilo Milchsack (*Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*) and Evelyn Emmet (Königswinter Conferences); the MdBs Richard Jaeger and Georg Kliesing and Senator Jacob Javits (NATO Parliamentarians Conference); Paul van Zeeland, John McCloy and John Loudon (Atlantic Institute), and the successive AI Directors-General (Henry Cabot Lodge, Walter Dowling, John Tuthill and Martin Hillenbrand); Prof. Klaus Ritter and Hans Speidel (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*); Walther Becker and Gebhardt von Walther (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*); and James Huntley.<sup>36</sup> Within this context,

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<sup>35</sup> Of the *Atlantik-Brücke*'s total of sixty-four members as of February 1971, only ten were politicians, as already noted six of these, including of course Birrenbach, from the CDU/CSU, three from the SPD and one from the FDP.

<sup>36</sup> Monnet served as president and Kohnstamm (Netherlands) as vice-president of the Monnet Committee. Stahl was the executive director (*Geschäftsführer*) of the *Atlantik-Brücke*. Lilo Milchsack was the secretary-general (*geschäftsführende Vorsitzende*), and one of the co-founders, of the DEG. The MP Evelyn Emmet chaired the Conservative Overseas Bureau and was the key person on the British side in organizing the KWCs. Jaeger (CSU) and Kliesing (CDU) functioned for periods as members of the NPC Standing Committee and as NPC vice-presidents. Javits chaired the NPC Economic Committee and various NPC Special Committees. Zeeland, former Belgian prime minister and foreign minister; McCloy, former US High Commissioner for Germany; and Loudon (Netherlands), connected to the Royal Dutch/Shell petroleum concern, were successive chairmen of the AI's Board of Governors. Lodge, Dowling, Tuthill and Hillenbrand were all Americans, and both Dowling and Hillenbrand were former US ambassadors to the Federal Republic in Bonn, while Tuthill had been an envoy and head of the economic department at the embassy and Lodge would later become ambassador there. According to the Atlantic Institute, President Kennedy had personally asked Lodge to assume the Director-General post. Ritter became the director of the SWP Institute in 1965. Speidel, a retired general, was chairman of the SWP *Stiftungsrat*. Walther, a former ambassador (a.D.) including by NATO, succeeded Becker, also a former ambassador (a.D.), as the DGAP's *Geschäftsführender* vice-president. Huntley (US) was an Atlanticist theorizer and organizer who, among other things, played a noteworthy role in the establishment of the AI. While Prince Bernhard functioned as the Bilderberg chairman, more familiar to Birrenbach within the Bilderberg organization were Prof. Ernst van der Beugel (secretary-general for Europe, in the Hague) and

Birrenbach was able to significantly contribute to shaping the nature of the Atlanticist organizations and activities by exchanging information, proposals and advice on virtually all the crucial matters concerning the infrastructure, even during the often lengthy intervals between formal meetings. In addressing each of these issues, Birrenbach became one of the most explicit proponents of the utilitarian ethos and of an infrastructure that did not devolve, for instance, into a mere debating society, rather one whose *raison d'être* was the exercise of practical political influence and the achievement of immediate, concrete results.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach departed from the European Parliament in 1961 and, at approximately the same time, eagerly entered the Monnet Committee not only due to the overburden of work but also as a result of his sheer boredom and lack of interest in dealing with what he considered merely theoretical resolutions.

Often complementary in function, the German Atlanticist organizations, in addition to their internal synergies, maintained relatively harmonious relations with one another at both the national and international levels. There existed not only a far-reaching symmetrical and asymmetrical cooperation between themselves but also with their mainly national “sister” institutions located in the US and elsewhere abroad (e.g. Council on Foreign Relations, American Council on Germany, Atlantic Council of the

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Joseph E. Johnson (secretary-general for the United States and president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in New York City).

<sup>37</sup> To cite an example of the impact of such a perspective, Birrenbach explained, with respect to the need to secure an American Director-General for the AI, “[t]his is the decisive precondition for the success of our institute. I feel that the institute cannot gather political importance unless an American will be in charge of the general directorship.” (KB to William Foster, 25 March 1961, ACDP K128/1). Along the same lines, at the AI Policy Committee meeting of 27 November 1966, Birrenbach insisted with regard to the proposed Atlantic Action Committee for Economic Growth (a proposal that had emerged from a June 1966 conference in Geneva sponsored by the AI), “the group must come up with specific recommendations and not merely study the situation.” (Draft Minutes of PC Meeting on 27 November 1966, ACDP K107/2). For Birrenbach’s approval of the early efforts in the Policy Committee “to make the Atlantic Institute into a political action center and not into a political academy,” see KB to Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, Bonn, 19 December 1960, ACDP K128/1.

United States, Brookings Institution, RAND Corporation, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Royal Institute of International Affairs (London), *Istituto Affari Internazionali* (Rome), *Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère* (Paris)).

Birrenbach was among those regularly nurturing the links to these foreign institutions.<sup>38</sup>

Such partnerships facilitated the coordination and joint execution of studies, conferences and other projects, for instance with respect to their organizing and staging or the

providing of space and participants from the *Wissenschaft* and elsewhere.<sup>39</sup> Birrenbach

played a central role in proposing, consulting on, and organizing several joint

conferences, including one, in which he also participated, on “Europe and America in the

World of Tomorrow,” carried out by the *Atlantica* and the *Evangelische Akademie*

*Loccum* in November 1963 at the EAL in Lower Saxony.<sup>40</sup> In 1961, the German

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<sup>38</sup> Founded in 1952, the American Council on Germany was essentially headed by Chris Emmet, its executive vice-president, and served as the main partner institution of the *Atlantik-Brücke* in the United States, especially assisting in organizing the German-American Conferences. The Atlantic Council of the United States emerged in 1961 from a fusion of the Atlantic Union Committee (itself founded in 1949), the American Council on NATO and the US Committee for an Atlantic Institute. The International Institute for Strategic Studies was founded in 1958 and boasted an international membership, though primarily hailing from Britain and the Commonwealth. Birrenbach was himself a “corresponding member” of the IISS, while the IISS International Advisory Council included the Germans Fritz Erler (SPD) and General Frido von Senger und Etterlin (at this point a prominent military commentator). The successive directors of the IISS included Alastair Buchan (a journalist), François Duchêne (from the United Kingdom) and the German Dr. Christoph Bertram. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House, was founded in 1920. Among the personalities associated with it during the 1960s and 1970s were Sir Duncan Oppenheim (chairman), Kenneth Younger and Andrew Schonfield (successive directors), and Prof. Roger Morgan (assistant director).

<sup>39</sup> With respect to the provision of space, Chatham House at times hosted the KWC Steering Committee meetings. At the start of 1961, at the arrangement of the Italian government, the *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale*, chaired by the industrialist Alberto Pirelli, temporarily made office space in Milan available to the fledgling Atlantic Institute at no cost, in addition to permitting, at Birrenbach’s proposal, Prof. Gerolamo Bassani, the Italian institute’s director, to function briefly as interim AI director. The DGAP study groups featured prominently in the institutional linkages and cooperation. For instance, the work of the DGAP Study Group I was connected from an early point with the activities of the European Study Commission, an international study group addressing similar issues that had been organized by the IISS, DGAP and CÉPÉ but also included representatives from other West European countries.

<sup>40</sup> See Chapter 5 for more information on the *Atlantica*. The conference on “Europe and America in the World of Tomorrow” ended on the morning of the day of President Kennedy’s assassination and had approximately 170 participants, among them German personalities from the relevant federal ministries, the European communities and state and local public life as well as figures from certain foreign representations, including American and British embassies and consulates in the Federal Republic (US

Atlanticists began to foster collaboration domestically through annual conferences staged by the AB and other German organizations and internationally via conferences conducted especially by the AI, all of which brought together key institutional representatives.<sup>41</sup>

With his presence in virtually each of the major German Atlanticist organizations, Birrenbach's experiences attest to the further cementing of this institutional cooperation through an extensive implicit and explicit interlocking of personnel.<sup>42</sup>

### E. Integration

In line with their striving to integrate various professional and party groupings, one of the key endeavors of personalities like Bergstraesser and other German Atlanticists was the pronounced effort to strengthen what they considered the tenuous and hitherto insufficient connection between *Wissenschaft* and *Politik* in the Federal Republic, particularly with regard to the field of international affairs. Confronted with a rapidly changing contemporary environment characterized by broad, complex political,

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Ambassador George McGhee was one of the speakers). Birrenbach helped prepare the conference especially with the EAL's Dr. Alard von Schack, soon to become director of the academy's *Außenpolitischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (APAG), which was founded the following year (1964) and of which Birrenbach was among the informal "Protektoren." The *Atlantik-Brücke* occasionally conducted conferences with other institutions in the Federal Republic, including the Evangelical Academies at Hofgeismar (Hesse) and Loccum, Inter Nationes, the *Akademie für politische Bildung* in Tutzing (Bavaria), and the *Haus Rissen* (Hamburg).

<sup>41</sup> The domestic conferences were staged in various locales, with the first one being held in Munich. In September 1968, the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Amerika-Gesellschaft*, in cooperation with the *Haus Rissen*, carried out the conference in Hamburg at the *Haus Rissen*. The international conferences were placed on a firmer foundation when the Atlantic Institute, in conjunction with the International Institute for Strategic Studies, decided in 1970 to convene annual meetings.

<sup>42</sup> As an example of explicit interlocking, certain personalities, by virtue of their positions in other Atlanticist organizations, were automatically accepted as *ex officio* members of the Atlantic Institute's Board of Governors (e.g. the presidents of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and the Atlantic Treaty Association). Somewhat more implicitly, the presence of Birrenbach and other figures, among them Speidel, Ritter, Erler, Schmidt and Uwe Nerlich, simultaneously in both the DGAP and the SWP helped reduce any overlap, rivalry or friction between these two institutions, despite Birrenbach's own initial concerns. In addition to their roles at the SWP, Speidel, for instance, was also a member of the DGAP *Präsidium*, while Ritter was a member of the DGAP Study Groups, and Nerlich functioned as the *Rapporteur* of the DGAP Study Group I, a task which entailed preparing working papers and question catalogs. Later on, Gebhard Schweigler, whose American education included stints at Harvard and Berkeley, served not only as a *wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter* responsible for the United States at the DGAP Research Institute, but also, beginning in 1979, as a *Referent* on the United States at the SWP.



technical and scientific developments, the political executive was seen as increasingly disoriented and thus prone to serious foreign policy setbacks. While decision-making should remain in the hands of the constitutionally determined organs, the statesman that aspired to be something more than a mere artist-leader, operating by an instinctual *Fingerspitzengefühl*, required in this unique age the expert assistance, clarification and advice of a methodical *Wissenschaft* so as to be able to act as a liberated and constructive subject. This stress on the *Wissenschaft-Politik* linkage involved not only the stronger utilization of scholarly knowledge in political life but also an approach to research and study that eschewed a purely academic perspective for its own sake in favor of one that produced results of clear political utility.<sup>43</sup>

Birrenbach was likewise a strong proponent of a closer relationship between *Wissenschaft* and the practical *Politik*, a subject that, he claimed, had interested him his entire life and one that supplemented his insistence on a cooperation between the *Wissenschaft* and *Wirtschaft*.<sup>44</sup> For Birrenbach, *Geist* and *Macht* had existed in a healthy relationship in Germany during only a precious few historical epochs. In addition to the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, one of these brief periods was the Weimar Republic, particularly in Berlin during his time there as a young *Referendar*. In these years that he later described as the most impressive of his life, Berlin had been blessed with a society in which a single gathering would find professors, intellectuals and artists interacting with politicians and soldiers. Unfortunately, the current period was not such an era, as Birrenbach lamented that “a part of the *Geist*, in particular that which one calls

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<sup>43</sup> For a general discussion of this theme by one of the primary actors from this period, see the essay by Klaus Ritter, “Wissenschaftliche Politikberatung-Hilfe oder Alibi der Politik,” ACDP K195/1.

<sup>44</sup> Birrenbach considered this cooperation of the *Wissenschaft* with industry necessary, in part, to further develop the *Sozialstaat* that had been built up after the war (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1).

*intellektuell*, which is not to be equated with professors, has no normal relationship in Germany to the *Politik*.” In tracing the roots of a situation in which *Wissenschaft* and *Politik* existed generally bereft of mutual communication, Birrenbach mourned the loss of a now utterly dissolved Prussia, a tragedy that he felt had deprived the Germans of much of their *Substanz*, as well as the lack of a real capital, a deficit that now denied them a concentration point where all the tendencies of *Kraft* and *Geist* could fruitfully intersect.<sup>45</sup> Far from being a negligible affair, Birrenbach saw the deficiencies in the relationship between *Wissenschaft* and *Politik* in the Federal Republic as “one of the most critical elements of our current situation.”<sup>46</sup>

Central to the critique of the German Atlanticists with respect to the theme *Wissenschaft-Politik* was their dissatisfaction with the types and results of the research and other activities undertaken by the institutions currently existing in the Federal Republic. Loosely organized *Gesprächskreise* seemed of only limited fruitfulness in this regard since such sporadic, unwieldy bodies generally lacked the stable, efficient, long-term capacity, the critical mass, to produce detailed research based on extensive work in specialized materials. Though stable and powerful, governmental and inter-governmental bodies and bureaucracies were bloated and lethargic, stifled in thought and expression, preoccupied with short-term issues, administrative processes and political considerations, bereft of an adequate expert capacity to ponder long-term concerns in their full scope,

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<sup>45</sup> For these quotes, see Birrenbach’s address on his 65<sup>th</sup> birthday, ACDP K207/1. The Berlin of his *Referendar* period there during the Weimar Republic had been a time and place in which, as Birrenbach put it on this occasion, “[t]here sat in one party [*Gesellschaft*] next to your [Professor Helmut Coing’s] predecessor, Professor Butenandt, Professor Planck, General Seeckt, there sat the conductor Nikisch, there sat the painter Liebermann, there sat the actor Kraus, there sat the politician Brüning, all sat together.... These minds [*Köpfe*] have never again appeared together in pictures in Germany.” Birrenbach acknowledged that “[t]rue, that was in a declining [*verfallenen*] *Staatsordnung*, but also in the decline [*Verfall*] of Rome the *Geist* blossomed.”

<sup>46</sup> Need citation.

and inhibited in the necessary research inter-disciplinarity by traditional *Ressortgrenzen*. Here, Birrenbach expressed the consensus when he referred to even the mere word “bureaucracy” as “belittling [*herabsetzend*]”.<sup>47</sup> In addition to neglecting to include a sufficiently wide range of professions in their endeavors, German universities were likewise hampered by their traditional *Fächergrenzen* and narrow specialization as well as by simultaneous teaching and educational responsibilities, a plethora of differing work forms, and a traditional ideal of knowledge opposed to the nature of the *Politik* that left them too divorced from the practical interests of government. Despite calls for university reform, this internal structure seemed, if anything, to be further calcifying. Even many years later, Birrenbach would refer to “the clumsy apparatus [*der schwerfällige Apparat*] of the universities” that rendered it difficult to carry out certain projects.<sup>48</sup> As a whole, therefore, the Atlanticists found extant institutions incorrigibly ill-suited to perform the functions they had in mind.

Rather than accept this framework, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists opted for other avenues to promote the reciprocal engagement of *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*, most notably the creation of their own infrastructure of, ideally, lean, dynamic, flexible, private organizations. Here, their ambition to overcome the cleft between *Geist* and *Macht* found expression in countless ways. One such manifestation was, of course, the inclusion in Atlanticist undertakings of both *Wissenschaftler* and practitioners. For instance, within

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<sup>47</sup> KB to Milchsack, 9 November 1971, ACDP K103/2.

<sup>48</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 February 1978, ACDP K210/2. The university institutes that were developing parallel to the Atlanticist infrastructure came in for criticisms from the German Atlanticists similar to those expressed about the universities in general. However, Birrenbach was appointed to the *Verwaltungsrat* of the *Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Forschungsinstitutes für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen der Universität zu Köln* at the constituting assembly of the *Gesellschaft* on 30 July 1962 (which he did not attend). With Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher (CDU MdB) as chairman (succeeded in January 1964 by *Direktor* Theo Hieronimi) and Dr. Fritz Schäfer (SPD MdB) as deputy chairman, the *Förderergesellschaft* was intended to support the research institute (itself founded in 1960) substantively and in securing financing. The director of the *Forschungsinstitut* at the time was Prof. Dr. Ferdinand A. Hermens.

the research institutes and the advisory councils they established to consult on their work, Birrenbach came into regular contact and cooperated with scholars and learned figures like Bergstraesser, Ulrich Scheuner, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Wilhelm Cornides, Wolfgang Wagner, Karl Carstens and Karl Kaiser (all DGAP); Pierre Uri and Curt Gasteyger (AI); and Jürgen Nötzold and Hubert Feigl (SWP).<sup>49</sup> Even those institutions not directly engaged in research benefited from the products of the *Wissenschaft*, with the DGAP, for example, not only establishing specific *Referate* to provide its study groups with the requisite research capacity but also, along with other such institutes, supplying the international conference system with crucial working papers. Birrenbach often cited the Monnet Committee as a model, including the “Monnet method” of relying on outstanding academics to provide sound research as the basis for concrete recommendations. A number of ventures explicitly promoting the *Wissenschaft-Politik* nexus also enjoyed the support of Birrenbach and the Atlanticists, among them the Kennedy Memorial Library during the mid-1960s and the AB-EAL conference of June 1968 on “The Political Importance of the *Wissenschaft*.”<sup>50</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach captured a defining feature of the Atlanticist infrastructure in remarking, about the DGAP Study Group II, that “[t]he

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<sup>49</sup> Prof. Bergstraesser, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Cornides, Wagner, Prof. Carstens and Prof. Kaiser were successive directors of the DGAP Research Institute. As we shall see, Carstens had previously been state secretary in several ministries of the federal government. Bergstraesser (up to 1960) and Prof. Scheuner (from 1960 on), the latter based at the University of Bonn, served as the chairmen of the DGAP Research Committee, dissolved in 1969, and *Wissenschaftlichen Direktorium*, created in 1969. Other personalities on the Research Committee included the deputy chairmen Prof. Hans Rothfels (University of Tübingen), Dr. Charlotte Lützens and Prof. Karl Dietrich Bracher (University of Bonn). The AI and SWP both had Research Advisory Councils. Prof. Uri (France), who was a long-time collaborator of Monnet, and Prof. Gasteyger (Switzerland) functioned as the successive AI Directors of Studies. Dr. Nötzold and, beginning in November 1975, Dr. Feigl functioned as the successive speakers of the SWP Research Committee.

<sup>50</sup> See Chapter 7 for more on Birrenbach’s efforts with respect to the KML, whose institute proclaimed its aim to help bring together the worlds of political affairs and scholarship. The AB-EAL conference featured a program drawn up by Pastor Dr. Hans Bolewski (director of the EAL) in conjunction with Max Horkheimer, of Frankfurt School fame, and younger German and American scholars. Birrenbach acted as a consultant on this conference.

point... is to translate *wissenschaftliche* knowledge into theoretical possibilities for the practical *Politik*.”<sup>51</sup>

Despite its principally elitist nature, the German Atlanticists intended the integration of particular social groups within the infrastructure not only to further the Atlanticist cause but also, a partially related interest, to strengthen democracy in the Federal Republic. This was an urgent task given the fears among many that, regardless of current constitutional forms, the internal situation was in reality dangerously fragile.<sup>52</sup> While on a broader scale such efforts were also directed at German labor and the military, Birrenbach was most openly worried in this regard about the condition of the *Wirtschaft* and the *Wissenschaft*.<sup>53</sup> With respect to the former, the ideal was the “new businessman,” a type characterized not only by corporate self-interest but also by political and social awareness and an extensive engagement in national and international affairs beyond the narrow business realm. The Atlanticists detected serious defects in this regard in West Germany (and Europe), with Birrenbach arguing that “[a]s a rule, *Unternehmer* are not politically well versed and sometimes not good psychologists in political questions. That

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<sup>51</sup> Birrenbach remarks in the DGAP Study Group II meeting of 12 February 1966, ACDP K079/2.

<sup>52</sup> The perception that the Federal Republic was a “democracy without democrats,” whose support rested primarily on its postwar economic achievements and whose passive citizens required a “*geistige Aufrüstung*” or an “*innere Festigung*” in the context of the East-West confrontation, gave birth to the phenomenon of “*politische Bildung*,” involving public as well as private figures and institutions. Though not particularly active, Birrenbach was a member of the *Kuratorium* of the privately financed, Düsseldorf-based *Stiftung Die Mitarbeit* (*Stiftung für staatsbürgerliche Mitverantwortung*), which was founded in 1963 as a *Stiftung des bürgerlichen Rechts* and funded relevant private initiatives. Other personalities in the *Kuratorium* included Siegfried Balke (CSU), Willy Brandt (SPD), Walter Scheel (FDP) and Albrecht Düren (*DIHT Hauptgeschäftsführer*, Bonn). Key figures at the related *Stätte der Begegnung e.V.* included Werner Rietz (1<sup>st</sup> chairman) and Dr. August Sahm (2<sup>nd</sup> chairman), both of whom were also in the *SDM Vorstand*. The *SDM Stiftungsrat* included Birrenbach’s contact Walther Hensel (from 1964 on *Oberstadtdirektor a.D.*, Düsseldorf). In October 1958, the DGAP Research Institute assisted with a seminar in Kronberg (Taunus) of the *Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung e.V.*

<sup>53</sup> DGB chairmen, like Böckler, Richter and Rosenberg, were especially active in efforts to integrate German labor into the democratic Federal Republic. Birrenbach himself thought in terms of state and *Gesellschaft*, with the latter represented by the two major social partners: business and labor. For Birrenbach on what he considered, at least as of 1977, the difficult but successful integration of the army into the state, see KB to Johannes Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, ACDP K173/1.

was also the case earlier, perhaps to an even greater extent.”<sup>54</sup> Particularly in light of the “earlier” behavior of the *Wirtschaft*, indifferent at best, during the Weimar Republic, Birrenbach, himself an exemplar of this new businessman, considered this an eminently serious matter. Likewise, in assessing the potential implications of an alienated *Wissenschaft*, Birrenbach once again looked back to his experiences in the Weimar Republic and, years later, still singled out professors as being among those who had “stood there on the chairs with enthusiasm” when Hitler had given speeches.<sup>55</sup> The Atlanticist infrastructure was expected to facilitate a hitherto abortive “*sachliche*” involvement of these social forces in the process of political judgment and decision-making and thus consolidate a key basis of the young democratic order.

While impossible to portray a consensus of views among the diverse groups existing within the Atlanticist infrastructure, some overall tendencies can be delineated. Most significantly, these fundamentally Liberal personalities rejected notions of *Abendland* and the related idea of a European “Third Force” and instead propounded the concept, openly promoted by the Eisenhower administration, of an extant or incipient Atlantic Community in which the US was not a mere appendage but a vital member.<sup>56</sup> This community’s encompassing nature was evident in the breadth of themes addressed by the Atlanticist institutions as a whole, whatever their sometimes narrow and evolving

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<sup>54</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Helge Pross (Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg), 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. In 1971, dealing with the theme “*Unternehmer und Gesellschaft*,” Birrenbach remarked that “[i]n the ideologized *Gesellschaft* of today, the *Unternehmer* must be able to argue [*sich auseinandersetzen*] with his opponents ideologically. I realize that *the Unternehmer* cannot do this. On the other hand, individual *Unternehmer* who can do this must be at the fore.” (KB to Sohl, 28 July 1971, ACDP K038/2).

<sup>55</sup> The Birrenbach interview “*Zeugen der Zeit*”: Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Werner Hill, 27 December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, ACDP K213/1. Though Birrenbach also referred here to “the devil knows whom,” he did not specifically identify any other professions. It is not clear whether Birrenbach actually witnessed these scenes first-hand, for instance in Berlin or Münster.

<sup>56</sup> For Birrenbach’s assessment of the essential relationship between the Eisenhower administration and the concept of Atlantic Community, see his Speech for the Steering Committee for Königswinter, 3-4 November 1966, ACDP K061/1.

specialties, comprising the military, political and economic issues that were Birrenbach's forte, but also to some extent social, cultural and scientific affairs.<sup>57</sup> Said framework was buttressed by the perception of a burgeoning international interdependence, a prospect that led the Atlanticists to prefer multilateral, especially supranational, approaches over unilateral and even inter-governmental ones.<sup>58</sup> Rejecting totalitarianism, the Atlanticists propagated Liberal versions of the Western principles of democracy, freedom and individualism. Focused on the world of business rather than agriculture, they championed market capitalism, economic growth and a free international flow of trade and investment while opposing communism as well as autarchy. Of an empiricist and materialist bent, they embraced the widespread application of science and technology, whether it be with respect to nature or man. Shunning overt revolution, the Atlanticists placed their faith in optimistic vistas of gradual progress, welcoming the processes of modernization, industrialization and secularization and displaying an affinity for phenomena an *Abendländer* would have reviled as universalism, rationalism, gigantism,

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<sup>57</sup> A significant underpinning in this regard were the proposals for NATO reform, including possible cooperation and consolidation beyond the military field (in the spirit of Article Two of the original NATO charter), made in 1956 by the committee of the NATO ambassadors Gaetano Martino (Italy), Lester Pearson (Canada) and Halvard Lange (Norway), the "Three Wise Men" of the alliance. As of 1971, Birrenbach still considered their report the most important political document ever issued by NATO [Birrenbach introduction for Manlio Brosio speech before the DGAP, 22 April 1971, ACDP K065/3]. Such thematic diversity was especially characteristic of the NPC, which boasted a Science and Technology Committee and a Cultural Affairs and Information Committee. However, in March 1959, the DGAP Research Institute also held a conference in Bergneustadt (NRW) with representatives of the *Kultusverwaltungen* about *kulturpolitische* questions. As an example of a certain specialization among particular Atlanticist organizations, the studies of the Atlantic Institute by the mid-1960s exhibited a pronounced, though far from exclusive, emphasis on economic matters.

<sup>58</sup> Closely related to this, the Atlanticists looked askance at some aspects of national sovereignty and remained alert to signs of what they denigrated as a narrow hyper-nationalism or obsolete "national-state egoism." For Birrenbach's complaints about the "sacro egoismo," see KB to Eugene Rostow, Yale University Law School, 28 January 1974 (cc John McCloy and Karl Carstens), ACDP K211/2. On the negative impact of the "national egoisms," see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Mosler, Judge at the *Internationalen Gerichtshof*, Heidelberg, 29 November 1982, ACDP K036/1.

managerialism and social engineering. The abundant substantive wrangling among Atlanticists largely occurred within the parameters of this mutual worldview.<sup>59</sup>

#### F. Americanization

The emergence of the German Atlanticist infrastructure was a constituent element in the overarching process of Americanization in the Federal Republic and continental western Europe. In this, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists were influenced by a broadly triumphant American hegemony that provided the primary norm against which to judge allegedly acute deficits in their homeland, for instance the startling ignorance in fields like security, *Westintegration* and development; the dearth of an expert governmental capacity to analyze and plan policy; and the insufficient engagement of certain social elements, among them *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft*, with the *Politik*.<sup>60</sup> With an emphasis on their essentially private, non-partisan, integrative character, on their autonomy from the state, and on all the rest, these institutions flaunted innovative features similar to their antecedents that had emerged in the US in previous decades. In adopting American notions of the intimate link of *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*, the German Atlanticists, though not wholeheartedly Birrenbach, abjured the classical humanistic strivings of the *Abendländler* and instead embraced American methodologies, namely a technocratic

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<sup>59</sup> Such squabbling was evident, for instance, in the scramble of activity prior to the meetings of the Monnet Committee, as Birrenbach and other members crafted drafts of the overall resolution and Monnet strived, not always successfully, to achieve some semblance of unanimity. The potential difficulty of such an undertaking even within the context of the Atlanticist institutions is intimated by Birrenbach's memorably succinct dismissal of the British Labourite Richard Crossman's comments at the 1971 Königswinter Conference as "intolerable, as always." (KB to Lord Gladwyn, 3 April 1971, ACDP K066/2).

<sup>60</sup> Indeed, the distinctly Atlanticist notion of a "new businessman" was ultimately based on an American model. The efforts to ameliorate what were at least perceived to be gaping voids in German knowledge found expression in a variety of ways. Thus, the German Atlanticists were particularly eager to include foreign participants or guests, among them American and British experts in the relevant fields, in the activities of institutions like the DGAP Study Group I. Given his own lack of specialist knowledge about the East, Birrenbach relied heavily on the personalities of the DGAP Research Institute, for instance Dr. Wilhelm Haas (Amb. a.D.) as head of the preparation committee as well as Prof. Ulrich Scheuner, Prof. Eberhard Schulz and Wolfgang Wagner, to assist in planning the work of and providing background papers and other documentation to the DGAP Study Group II.



approach to the study of international relations, marked by confidence in the application of human reason and modern social scientific tools to practical problem-solving.<sup>61</sup> Far from being an impersonal, even unconnected and parallel phenomenon, as some have hypothesized regarding aspects of Americanization, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists were well aware of and made frequent reference to the nature of their undertaking. Organizations like the AB and the action committees were held to be patterned on American models, and Birrenbach repeatedly identified genealogies linking particular institutions with specific counterparts across the ocean, for instance designating the SWP and DGAP the “German RAND Corporation” and the “German Council on Foreign Relations,” respectively.<sup>62</sup>

In so far as the infrastructure adopted not only American ideas, such as Atlantic Community, but also American forms and methods, it not only promoted through its proposals and other activities a broad, ambitious program of trans-Atlantic integration under American auspices but by its very existence represented an element of such integration. Ultimately, the enthusiastic German introduction of Americanized institutions and practices as part of an effort to banish a persistent Occidentalism bears structural parallels to the efforts in the United States of Wilsonian internationalists in the post-World War I and post-World War II eras to undermine the staunch American

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<sup>61</sup> With regard to the origins of the American affinity for the *Wissenschaft*, Birrenbach referred to the “unshakeable” American faith in the “‘American way of life,’ born in the Enlightenment, in the birth hour of the American nation.” (KB to Prof. Hans Leussink, *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft*, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1). Perhaps dismayed by what might be seen as a relative Atlanticist neglect of the humanities, including history aside from that of a narrowly contemporary nature, and a complementary overstress on the social sciences, Birrenbach remarked, “[t]hat [Hajo Holborn] viewed all historical studies as a ‘humanistic endeavor’ was always especially reassuring for me in view of the fact that today the sociologists make history. About the results I need waste no words.” (KB to Annemarie Holborn, 29 July 1971, ACDP K158/1).

<sup>62</sup> For Birrenbach on the “German RAND Corporation,” see KB to Hajo Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP K098/1; KB to Admiral Arleigh Burke, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 7 May 1965, ACDP K187/1; and KB (dictated by phone) to Walter Dowling, Director-General of the Atlantic Institute, 22 August 1966, ACDP K107/2.

tradition of a supposedly exceptionalist isolationism and to encourage the US to accept the responsibilities of a world power.<sup>63</sup> While primarily endorsed for their substantive virtues, Americanized traits also possessed a demonstration value both at home and abroad (especially, of course, with Americans), among key public and private figures and institutions as well as the general publics, helping the infrastructure attain a position of trust and prestige and reassuring foreign allies that non-governmental German elites were also active in constructively shaping their international relations.<sup>64</sup> True, the German Atlanticists did not simply reproduce exactly American structures, themes and practices, but rather adapted them to their own peculiar traditions and milieu.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach's additional references to the DGAP as the "German Chatham House" and his acknowledgement that with respect to the relationship of *Geist* to *Staat* also countries like England and, to a lesser extent, France "were a model [*Vorbild*] for us" suggest not an exclusive Americanization, rather also a certain degree of Anglo-Saxonization and even

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<sup>63</sup> On the traditions of American diplomacy, see Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (Boston: Mariner, 1997). These Wilsonian internationalists were part of an Eastern Establishment focused on Europe and especially Germany and would prove valuable allies for the post-World War II German Atlanticists. The upshot of their efforts included the birth of international relations as an academic discipline and the related construction of a private infrastructure that comprised institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations (founded in 1921), the numerous research institutes housed at prestigious East Coast universities, as well as organizations like the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute that also dealt at times with foreign affairs. In many ways, the United States had already undergone and was perhaps still undergoing, *mutatis mutandis*, an evolution similar to that occurring in the Federal Republic.

<sup>64</sup> As one German Atlanticist put it, speaking of a single characteristic but in a fashion that could easily have applied to other traits of the infrastructure: "We all know, of course, how much better private initiatives are received [*ankommen*] in the USA, precisely because the Americans themselves are the people of the private initiatives." (Walter Stahl to Hellmuth Wagner, 20 January 1971, ACDP K112/1).

<sup>65</sup> For instance, even as they explored new strategic ideas and methods, the West Germans generally evinced less enthusiasm than their American counterparts about concepts and approaches like game theory, realism à la Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, and the possibilities for the mastery and calculability of modern military technology, as well as the schools of thought that relied on them.

Westernization.<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, despite these undeniable nuances, the overall process in the Federal Republic is still most aptly characterized as one of Americanization.

### G. Obstacles

In creating and maintaining their infrastructure, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists struggled in this period to overcome daunting obstacles in the Federal Republic. Most strikingly, a profound traditionalist resistance to such novel institutions flared in government and university quarters. At least early on, elements in the *Auswärtigem Amt* held to the vision of a “classical *Staatsaufbau*” and skeptically opposed the penetration of what they saw as ignorant outsiders into the field of official diplomacy.<sup>67</sup> Perhaps motivated in part by similar conceptions, the finance ministry

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<sup>66</sup> With respect to *Vorbilder*, see KB to Prof. Adolf Butenandt, 16 March 1981, ACDP K141/2. Earlier, in 1962, Birrenbach pointed to the waxing role of the *Wissenschaft* in the *Politik* in England and, to a lesser degree, in France, for instance in the field of arms control (Birrenbach Expositions in the Press Conference of 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1<sup>st</sup> Fritz Thyssen Stiftung Activity Report, ACDP K077/1). Among its various qualities, the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* was also seen by its advocates as corresponding to “the English mentality.” For an envious reference to the more widespread knowledge of security and disarmament questions in “the Anglo-Saxon countries,” see “New Publications of the DGAP Research Institute,” August 1962, ACDP K009/1. For Henle noting the long traditions of the DGAP’s older and larger “*Vorbilder*” in New York and London, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 27 June 1962, ACDP K009/1. At least in a broader sense, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, rather than conceiving of such processes as ideally an exclusively one-way street, sincerely believed that their most important allies could likewise learn, to great benefit, in specific, perhaps other, respects from particular German methods and approaches. For example, as of 1967, some German Atlanticists were proposing that certain institutions of the *Bundestag* might prove to be of use in current English conditions. Similarly, as of 1980, Birrenbach was arguing that the United States should consider adopting discrete elements present in the Federal Republic, including the system of worker co-determination, the intense efforts devoted towards export, the complete autonomy of the federal reserve bank (*Bundesbank*), and a system that assured both “a maximum of free economy” as well as, “in a restricted way,” interventions by the government in the economic process (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, ACDP K134/1).

<sup>67</sup> On the early frustrating experiences with the AA, its desire for a “classical *Staatsaufbau*,” and its “anxious frown [*besorgtem Stirnrunzeln*],” at least regarding the initial efforts that surrounded the DGAP, see Theodor Steltzer, *Sechzig Jahre Zeitgenosse* (Munich: List, 1966), p. 231. Steltzer was an essential co-founder, a “*Stammvater*,” of the DGAP and from 1955-60 functioned both as its *Geschäftsführender Präsident* (an office whose duties were looked after in the future by a *Geschäftsführenden Stellvertretenden Präsident*) as well as president of the German UNESCO Commission. For an example of AA criticism of the KWCs with respect to the one-sidedness of the composition and attitudes expressed, especially insofar as they deviated from government policy on controversial questions (including the Hallstein Doctrine), see the report on the 1961 KWC by VLR I. Schwörbel, 23 March 1961, ACDP K076/1. The distrust and even hostility the Atlanticist infrastructure encountered were not limited to the German government and officials. For instance, though arduous lobbying eventually secured its support, elements in the American

continued its role of exercising a tight rein over budget expenditures, including any funding for Atlanticist institutions. Reservations also existed regarding efforts to strengthen the *Wissenschaft-Politik* linkage, with prevailing attitudes, still impacted by Occidental views of a social order legitimized by laws of God or Nature, considering the relationship an antithetical one. Mutual contempt between academy and bureaucracy entrenched the persistent opposition between *Geist* and *Macht*. Compounding the relative backwardness and youth of international relations as a discipline in West Germany, many conscientious *Wissenschaftler*, stung by the collaboration of some of their own with the Nazi regime, saw their proper role as preserving a critical distance from the state and its activities.<sup>68</sup> Many in government regarded *Wissenschaftler* in general as incompetent “egg-heads,” oblivious to power-political realities, and those engaged in policy-making as a species of lobbyist, all the more suspect as they sought to subordinate the *Politik* not to tangible interests but to alien ideas and methods.<sup>69</sup> Even Birrenbach gave vent to such tensions, implicitly acknowledging some culpability of the *Politik* for the defective relationship to the *Geist*, but reserving his most biting criticism

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government, more specifically in the executive branch, at first assumed a reluctant posture towards the NPC’s ADELA project (see Chapter 8). The NATO governments, both in Europe and America, also consistently opposed proposals to transform the NPC into a more potent Atlantic Assembly.

<sup>68</sup> On these themes, see Gisela Gantzel-Kress and Klaus Juergen Gantzel, “The Development of International Relations Studies in West Germany,” in Ekkehart Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger, eds., *The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents* (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 197-269. Bergstraesser held the first chair of political science at the University of Freiburg from 1954 until his death in 1964 and played a central and pioneering role in promoting the systematic study of international relations. Even with the significant “progressive” contribution made by the Atlanticist infrastructure, the overall state of the discipline in West Germany well into the 1970s can largely be measured by the dearth of relevant *Wissenschaftler*, including professors at the universities, dealing with such topics. A number of historical factors help explain the sluggish development: the conservative tradition of the German *Wissenschaft*; the illiberal nature of the *Kaiserreich* and National Socialism, which limited the possible independent involvement of the *Wissenschaft* in such issues; the relatively late and, after the defeat in World War I and the consequent loss of colonies, abortive German political engagement with the world; and the narrow focus in the early Federal Republic on the German Question.

<sup>69</sup> On this, see “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: Motive und Absichten,” ACDP K149/1. Such suspicions partially reflected concerns about utopian proclivities and, in connection with them, a privileged role of experts in the political decision-making of a parliamentary democracy.

for the intelligent but “uncontrollable, unrealistic *Intellektueller*” and insisting that “politics is action and not contemplation.”<sup>70</sup>

Birrenbach experienced such obstacles to Atlanticist infrastructural ambitions in various forms. For one, Atlanticist research institutes encountered a lasting mistrust among some professors and universities that saw them as propaganda organizations and challenged the *wissenschaftlichen* character of their work.<sup>71</sup> Considerably more frustrating for Birrenbach was the government bureaucracy’s occasional withholding of support from or even efforts to stymie the construction of the infrastructure as originally conceived. The most blatant example of this was the obstructionism towards the SWP of the finance ministry, which, citing the work of well-remunerated government officials and alarmed at the implications of the appellation “German RAND Corporation” for

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<sup>70</sup> In expressing his sometimes conflicted attitudes, Birrenbach referred to the desirability in general of “[t]he engagement with intellectual forces [*die Auseinandersetzung mit geistigen Kräften*], so heated and infuriating [*erregt und erregend*] as it may be.” (KB to Ernst Hase, 24 September 1959, ACDP K047/2). On uncontrollable, unrealistic intellectuals (in this case an unwelcome German candidate for the European Commission), see KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 16 May 1984, ACDP K029/2. On politics, action and contemplation, see KB to Gerard Smith, 8 October 1979, ACDP K209/1. In 1973, while generally praising an “excellent” memo by Robert Triffin (Yale University), Birrenbach also objected, “why should we then make a recommendation in a resolution of our next meeting based on the perfect theory of Professor Triffin passing by the real facts of life?” (KB to Monnet, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2). Birrenbach openly expressed his skepticism about even those he considered first-class *Wissenschaftler* occupying policy-making positions, for instance with regard to W. Michael Blumenthal as President Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of the Treasury. In contrast, Birrenbach fancied himself a political *Praktiker*, operating from experience (KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2).

<sup>71</sup> This was true, for instance, for at least much of the DGAP’s history. Though the Atlantic Institute claimed at the start that most professors were pleased with its existence and ready to help, there was also an admission that some remained wary, at least in part due to suspicions that the AI might simply be engaged in NATO propaganda (see, for example, the summary of the meeting of AI Board and Policy Committee members, 25 September 1960, ACDP K128/1). As of April 1960, even Ludwig Rosenberg, the Atlanticist-minded vice-chairman of the DGB, wondered whether the AI was some covert US government action (Record of Interview, 27 April 1960, ACDP K003/2). Such suspicions might have found sustenance in the remarks about the institute’s role made by the Frenchman Jacques Rueff (an AI vice-president) in the December 1960 board meeting that “to make propaganda you must have something to propagate,” though Rueff obviously did not mean this in a pejorative sense (Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Institute, 12 December 1960, ACDP K128/1). The AI’s early desire to convene conferences involving directors of the major foreign affairs research institutes and, with Birrenbach’s support, to welcome figures from non-NATO countries into its Board of Governors was initially related to the organization’s efforts to demonstrate the genuinely scholarly nature of its work and to refute the notion among some academic and intellectual circles that it was, in reality, a propaganda instrument.

future expansion and costs, questioned the very need for such an institution. Imagining the SWP as a mere *Vermittlungsorgan* that did not conduct its own research, the ministry proposed organizational measures to limit the institute's size and budget and to ensure that the government, especially itself, maintained maximum control over operations and expenditures. For Birrenbach and other SWP proponents, such ideas threatened the fundamental nature of the robust organization they had in mind and the very notion of an institutionalized government-*Wissenschaft* partnership.<sup>72</sup> As Birrenbach complained:

I must openly confess to you that I recall few projects in my life, which have taken their course with such difficulty as this. Political and *menschliche* questions appear to have played a role here. However, I would say that the bureaucratic action of the finance ministry has been and still is the greatest obstacle. What has happened here is probably only to be explained through it that, seen as a whole, the German *Politik* has still not found a proper relationship to the *Wissenschaft*. That... is however not new, rather is characteristic for the past hundred years.<sup>73</sup>

In so far as these obstacles in government and *Wissenschaft* stemmed significantly, though not exclusively, from Occidental perspectives, the Atlanticist challenge to *Abendland* occurred not only over substantive issues, but also over form and practice.

#### H. Facilitating Factors

On the other hand, a number of circumstances in West Germany at this time actually facilitated the creation of the Americanized infrastructure envisioned by Birrenbach and the Atlanticists. While powerful, deep-rooted traditions, like the

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<sup>72</sup> The finance ministry broached several possibilities to achieve its goals, among them the establishment of a *Verwaltungsrat* that would remove from the SWP *Stiftungsrat* decisions about the approval of the research program and the economic plan; the application of the *Bundesangestelltentarif* (rather than that for *Beamte*), which would result in less remuneration, material compensation and respect for SWP personnel and, consequently, hinder the ability to attract the requisite talent; and a significant reduction in the size of the institution as measured in number of departments, leaders and personnel. Such proposals were opposed by Klaus Ritter, members of the *Stiftungsrat* and the *Wissenschaft*, and even the other substantively interested *Ressorts*, also in part because they impinged on their own authority. Faced with the conception of the "*Finanzamt*," one that had major consequences for the classification of SWP *Mitarbeiter*, Birrenbach was particularly active in those efforts to secure a formal position for Ritter in the *Auswärtigen Amt* or the Defense Ministry. Nevertheless, the ideas of the *Finanzamt* did find implementation to at least a certain extent.

<sup>73</sup> KB to Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, 18 April 1966, ACDP K017/1.

*Abendland* concept itself, stood opposed to such a project, there also existed long-standing, though admittedly weak, traditions, some stretching back at least to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, favoring such an endeavor. Furthermore, the overall process of Americanization enjoyed a prior history as well, beginning forcefully in the 1920s and resuming, after its interruption by war and defeat, in areas of society well beyond those considered here.<sup>74</sup> Therefore, whether with respect to civic associations, inter-disciplinarity, international conferences, or the complementary relationship of the *Wissenschaft* and *Wirtschaft* to the *Politik*, the Atlanticists did not simply import wholesale and spontaneously from abroad the elements of their undertaking after 1945, rather to some extent sought to reinvigorate often dormant elements, whatever their foreign or native origins, that already had legacies in Germany.<sup>75</sup> Also, the postwar reaction against a regime with totalitarian aspirations shattered much of the traditional respect for the state and engendered a greater receptiveness towards independent, private undertakings. Finally, within the *Wirtschaft* in particular, Birrenbach inhabited an environment that, at least in business endeavors, stressed the mutual dependence between *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*, with

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<sup>74</sup> The German fascination with America included, for instance, management and production techniques, and Birrenbach himself was among those keeping an eye on American business practices. For the Weimar period, see Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

<sup>75</sup> For instance, a desire for the unity of a growing and increasingly specialized *Wissenschaft* had existed in Germany from at least the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onward. The Atlanticist conference system borrowed from Locarno-era diplomatic procedures, including the emphasis on informal, periodic meetings outside normal diplomatic channels (admittedly featuring ministers and other officials in that earlier period), candid and reasoned discussion and debate and close personal relationships (for instance, those between Stresemann, Briand and Chamberlain), even when no clear result or resolution of particular problems was anticipated. The German Atlanticists could also look back on certain interwar efforts to institutionalize a closer linkage between *Wissenschaft* and *Politik* with respect to international relations such as the *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, founded in 1920 in Berlin, and the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik*, established in 1923 in Hamburg as a research institute patterned on those in the United States and Britain. Finally, the *Wirtschaft*, including *Spitzenorganisationen* like the *Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie* and the *Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag*, had already demonstrated some inclination to play an independent role in the foreign affairs of the Weimar period, maintaining contacts with counterparts abroad, for instance in Britain, Austria and especially France, and stressing the significance of economic power as a tool of German foreign policy during an era in which issues like reparations were of salience.

German industry continuing to represent one of the most *Wissenschaft*-oriented in the world, reliant with regard to both R&D as well as economic analyses, and with Birrenbach himself emphasizing the need in such respects for a tight relationship between *Wirtschaft* and the applied *Wissenschaft*.

Furthermore, whatever their initially obstructionist behavior, at least elements of the federal government and bureaucracy, with the passage of time and especially with the ascent of the Atlanticist-minded Ludwig Erhard to the Chancellorship in 1963, also played a more salutary role in the construction and functioning of the infrastructure in the Federal Republic. This went far beyond the often formal and peripheral activities as speakers, guests and observers; as hosts of receptions and other entertainment; or as transmitters of messages of appreciation, all of which were partaken in by German presidents, chancellors, ministers, civil servants, ambassadors and other embassy personnel, as well as by their foreign counterparts, and all of which undoubtedly conferred a greater credibility and respectability on the Atlanticist institutions.<sup>76</sup> For instance, following successful negotiations enabled by Birrenbach's establishment of the main contacts to the government and in response to the Bundestag's request of 21 January 1965, the cabinet decided on 4 May 1966 that the already extant SWP would now primarily serve the government as an independent research center for strategy, arms control and related areas. The SWP thus acquired the requisite access to secret materials and became part of a larger bureaucratic reorganization that included the prior creation of

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<sup>76</sup> For instance, Chancellor Erhard demonstrated his support for the Monnet Committee by attending its meetings in Bonn in June 1964 and in Berlin in May 1965. Likewise, Chancellor Willy Brandt hosted a reception in the *Bundeskanzleramt* for the participants in the Monnet Committee's meeting of 15-16 December 1969 in Bonn. To offer a foreign example, the Atlantic Congress of June 1959 included an opening meeting in Westminster Hall with Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister Harold McMillan in attendance.



a Foreign Office planning staff in 1963.<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, a deliberately circumscribed number of diplomats and other high-ranking civil servants from a broad range of relevant government departments also became more significantly involved, especially as members of the DGAP Study Groups and the SWP *Stiftungsrat*, among them key members of the AA planning staff like its leader, Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, and the disarmament commissioner (*Abrüstungsbeauftragte*), Swidbert Schnippenkoetter.<sup>78</sup>

While Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists functioned as central initiators and actors in the emergence and maintenance of this infrastructure, they also welcomed benevolent support over the years from the victor powers, particularly the US and, to a lesser extent, Britain. Prior to Birrenbach's involvement, Allied military governments and high commissions helped establish contacts and promoted participation, both abroad and among the Germans themselves, made rooms available for functions, provided

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<sup>77</sup> The creation and functioning of the AA planning staff involved talks between its leader, Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, and the leader of the US State Department planning staff, Walt Rostow. Hajo Holborn contributed by securing a promise from Rostow that US agencies would make more of their research material available to the AA planning staff (Holborn to KB, 18 December 1963, ACDP K098/1). Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder viewed the SWP as a valuable aid for the AA planning staff and the cabinet decision of 4 May 1966 was in accordance with a proposal of that planning staff. Both before and after this, the government (including the Foreign Office) developed and maintained cooperative relationships regarding foreign policy with a number of university institutes, including the "*Institut für Öffentliches Recht* in Kiel," the institutes for political science at the universities in Bonn, Kiel and Erlangen, the economic college in Mannheim, the technical college in Darmstadt, as well as the Otto-Suhr-Institute at the Free University in Berlin. As already alluded to, the German Atlanticists judged the work of these institutes, with rare exceptions, to be unsatisfactory.

<sup>78</sup> Those thus significantly involved included *Beamte* from the *Bundeskanzleramt*, *Auswärtigen Amt*, *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, and the ministries of defense (with Herbert Trebesch in the DGAP Study Group I of particular importance for Birrenbach), economics, finance, research and inner-German relations. Later successive leaders of the AA planning staff that also took part in such capacities included the Ministerial Directors Dirk Oncken, Guido Brunner and Klaus Blech. For the related encouragement and support by the federal government (AA) of a close cooperation between German Atlanticist institutions like the DGAP (including its study groups) and the SWP, as well as between them and the West German universities, see for instance the Planning Staff Note PI-18/65 of 1 February 1965, ACDP K149/1. The temporal dividing line with regard to governmental attitudes is not entirely clear-cut, as in an earlier period, even if with some hesitation, elements of the *Auswärtigen Amt* (including Walter Hallstein and Wilhelm Grewe) offered support for the establishment of the DGAP, while the concept originally envisioned later on by the AA foresaw a far less important role for the SWP than it actually attained. As of January 1964, Birrenbach was referring to the circulating, but still amorphous, idea of forming a "brain trust" for Erhard (KB to Hajo Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP K098/1).

financial support and, with the founding of institutions like *Amerika-Häuser* and German-American Clubs, even created some semblance of their own Atlanticist infrastructure in the Federal Republic.<sup>79</sup> Later, foreign counterpart institutions, especially research institutes, encouraged further infrastructural expansion and offered assistance and advice on themes ranging from particular projects and research directions to broader institutional relationships (for instance vis-à-vis government). The receptiveness of Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists was enhanced, perhaps with a dose of naivety, by the exciting developments they witnessed on the American scene, especially regarding the *Politik-Wissenschaft* link. In the United States, dominated by a belief in the instrumental nature of reason and in man as the maker of his own destiny and where a warm relationship had existed from the start between politicians and intellectuals, distinct disciplines rapidly emerged to address postwar phenomena like nuclear weapons. Most conspicuously with the accession of the Kennedy administration, academic experts enjoyed a celebrated role.<sup>80</sup> Birrenbach served as a conduit throughout this period for such prodding and assistance due to his contacts with relevant American institutions, including figures like Arleigh Burke and David Abshire at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies and Henry Kissinger at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> The first postwar German-American Clubs were opened in 1947. The educational advisor Robert Birley was among those British occupation officials from whose support the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* benefited.

<sup>80</sup> As of November 1962, Birrenbach was especially impressed by the "remarkable" and "modern" achievements and discoveries of the American *Wissenschaftler* in the "extraordinarily important" field and *Problematik* of "arms limitation and arms control" (particularly in comparison with that field's non-existence to that point in the Federal Republic) and by the fact that "[a]ll disarmament proposals that have been made in recent years are actually the result of this *Abrüstungswissenschaft*." (Birrenbach Expositions in the Press Conference of 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1<sup>st</sup> Fritz Thyssen Stiftung Activity Report, ACDP K077/1).

<sup>81</sup> Unlike their assessment of the universities in the Federal Republic, the German Atlanticists were very impressed by the research being done at these and other American universities, like MIT. Admiral Burke was the director and Abshire the executive secretary at the CSIS. Over the years, a number of Germans participated in CSIS projects and belonged to the CSIS Board (e.g. Karl Carstens) and Research Council

The Atlanticist infrastructure also benefited from the participation and even membership of prominent personalities from the major inter-governmental organizations in its institutions and activities. For instance, NATO personalities, including figures political (e.g. Secretaries-General, the NATO Council) and military (e.g. SACEUR and SACLANT), frequently gave speeches, closed briefings and receptions for the delegates at the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and other one-time conferences, while the NPC sessions and committee meetings were often held, as a courtesy, at the NATO headquarters and facilities, at the time in and around Paris. Not only did many NATO figures, among them the Belgians Paul-Henri Spaak (Secretary-General) and Ambassador André de Staercke (Chairman of NATO's Cultural and Information Committee), strongly encourage the creation of what they hoped would be a complementary Atlantic Institute, but the AI's close cooperation with international organizations, similarly as that with certain other Atlanticist institutions, was formalized by the presence of the NATO and OECD Secretaries-General as *ex officio* members of its Board of Governors. Finally, and of particular significance for Birrenbach, the AI Policy Committee eventually, beginning in the AI director-generalship of John Tuthill (which ran from 1969 through 1976), held

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(e.g. Prof. Richard Löwenthal). The CSIS Senior Staff also included a European Coordinator (for instance, Joseph Godson during the 1970s). As of early 1962, Birrenbach's advocacy for the DGAP Study Group I was fortified by the repeated complaints he had heard while in the United States about the lack of constructive West German arms control proposals. As an example of the broader activities in this regard, from 15 October-15 November 1962, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Uwe Nerlich, as well as two men of the federal defense ministry, went on a trip to the United States, during which they took up contact with thirty-five free and state [*staatlichen*] institutes and universities working especially in the areas of international relations, security and *Ostforschung*, spoke with about a hundred *Wissenschaftler* and other personalities engaged in these questions, and initiated an exchange program with respect to material and personnel (Minutes of the Meeting of the *Präsidium* of the DGAP on 19 December 1962 in Düsseldorf, ACDP K010/2).

substantive annual fall meetings in Brussels with the members of the NATO Council and the European Commission.<sup>82</sup>

Yet another vital factor was that some key German Atlanticists of the post-World War II era had already spent significant time in the United States, as well as Britain, during the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist reign. Those that had traversed the Atlantic thus formed part of a larger international flow of people between Germany and America in the twentieth century. Such extended encounters with the Anglo-Saxon world encompassed a wide range of experiences. Arnold Bergstraesser emigrated to the United States in 1937 to escape the Third Reich and lived and taught there in exile until 1954. Hans Raupach, his colleague on the AWP *Vorstand*, had studied in the US during the mid-1930s, prior to his *Habilitation*. Marion Dönhoff had travelled extensively in America, as well as Europe and Africa, while the banker Friedrich Carl von Oppenheim had undergone part of his training at the National City Bank in New York. From 1929-31, Ernst Friedlaender, then a businessman, had lived in the US as co-director of AGFA, a subsidiary of IG Farben. Meanwhile, personalities like Günter Henle, Ludwig Rosenberg, W. Alexander Menne and Eric Blumenfeld had spent considerable time in Britain, often in similar capacities. In some cases, these Atlanticists seem to have been inspired first-hand by the institutions, perspectives and practices they encountered overseas, experiences that were perhaps even essential in their efforts, upon their return, after the war in the Federal Republic. While Birrenbach himself had not spent any time in the United States prior to the 1950s and in his entire life never remained there for a

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<sup>82</sup> The Atlantic Institute meeting of 26 September 1960 was also held at NATO headquarters in Paris. The AI Policy Committee meetings in Brussels with the NATO Council were held in the space of the latter. On 4 May 1973, the Monnet Committee press conference occurred in the press hall of the EC Commission in the Berlaymont building in Brussels. The Dane Thorkil Kristensen was the OECD Secretary-General from 1960-69.

genuinely extended period, his considerable interaction with Americans in the business world, including his years abroad working in an American firm, likely rendered him more positively inclined towards American forms and approaches.<sup>83</sup>

As the German Atlanticist infrastructure expanded, its development acquired a certain dynamic of its own. The Atlanticists engaged in an informal process of inter-institutional learning and adoption, with efforts to reproduce patently successful elements or at least their essential qualities. For instance, Birrenbach largely founded his DGAP Study Group II, including its structure and methods, on the model of what he considered the fruitful Study Group I, while the joint AB-EAL conference of June 1968 was consciously patterned on the Königswinter Conferences. Even more striking was the impact of the Monnet Committee, which functioned for Birrenbach and his fellow Atlanticists as a template for subsequent action committees and even for organizations that were not action committees *per se*, among them the Atlantic Institute.<sup>84</sup>

Furthermore, something of a “snowball effect” developed as already existing organizations contributed decisively to the birth of further institutions. For instance, the

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<sup>83</sup> Bergstraesser came from a Protestant family but also had Jewish ancestry. Long before her birth, Dönhoff's father had been a diplomat, who for a period of time was stationed in Washington, DC. Menne was president of a chemical firm in London from 1929-39. After graduating from Germany's renowned Salem School on Lake Constance, Blumenfeld underwent commercial and linguistic training in England, as well as in France and Scandinavia, from 1933-35. Though certainly a different experience, Ernst Majonica and Helmut Schmidt had spells as prisoners of war of the Americans and British, respectively.

<sup>84</sup> Oppenheim pointed out that “the Atlantic Institute works on the Atlantic level in similar ways as the Monnet Committee on the European.” (Oppenheim to Rosenberg, 28 June 1963, ACDP K108/2). This was alluded to at the AI Board meeting of December 1960, with its stress on the “action-oriented” character of the institute's studies (Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Institute, 12 December 1960, ACDP K128/1), and echoed in an AI brochure of January 1972 with the assertion that “the work of the Institute is geared to action.” (AI Brochure, January 1972, ACDP K057/2). As late as July 1968, Birrenbach himself gave expression to some of the resultant ambiguity in wondering, “[i]s the purpose of the Institute a political one or is it political research?... In reality the Institute seems to me partly a political, partly a research Institution.” (KB to McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1). For the inspiration drawn by the DGAP Study Group I from the European-American disarmament and security conference held in July 1961 in Bürgenstock (Switzerland), both with respect to themes to be investigated and the type of joint functions that should be staged with foreign institutions, see the undated “Arbeitsplan der Studiengruppe der DGAP zum Thema Rüstungsbeschränkung und Rüstungskontrolle,” ACDP K007/1.

basic concept of an Atlantic Institute was explored and promoted throughout the 1950s by a number of Atlantic Community Congresses, the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, the Atlantic Treaty Association (see Chapter 7) and the signers of the first Declaration of Atlantic Unity (1954). In October 1959, it was a meeting in Brussels of a group significantly comprised of delegates from the Atlantic Congress in London that June that organized the Provisional Committee which, in turn, established a permanent Board of Governors and ultimately proved so crucial in the construction of the AI. Thus, the creation of the Atlanticist infrastructure gained momentum with each new addition.<sup>85</sup> Not surprisingly, such momentum also encouraged efforts to enhance the role, formal and informal, of existing institutions, as demonstrated, for example, by the hopes of Birrenbach and others with respect to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Other such Atlantic Community Congresses had already occurred in Copenhagen (1953) and in Bruges (1957), the latter of which was sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania along with the College of Europe (including by personalities like Robert Strausz-Hupé, Hans Kohn and Henri Brugmans). Richard Jaeger was the leader of the German delegation to the Atlantic Congress of June 1959 (approximately the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO), which made recommendations for, among other things, an Atlantic Institute, the expansion of the OEEC into a broader Atlantic organization (realized in 1961 as the OECD), and a special Atlantic Convention. Following the meeting of a preparatory committee in London in October 1961 (at the invitation of the British government), in which Count Raban Adelman and Helmut Schmidt served as the German delegates, this Atlantic Convention, modeled in at least some minds on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, was convened from 8-20 January 1962 in Paris. Among the approximately eighty participants, under the chairmanship of former US Secretary of State Christian Herter, was a ten-member German delegation led by Martin Blank (vice-president of the *Deutsch-Atlantischen-Gesellschaft*, see Chapter 7). This convention produced the Declaration of Paris, which in April 1962 appeared as the Second Declaration of Atlantic Unity, now signed by approximately 240 personalities, including Birrenbach among the nineteen from the Federal Republic. This second declaration called for the establishment of a governmental commission to draw up a charter for an Atlantic Community; the creation of a permanent Atlantic High Council at the ministerial level to determine policy by a weighted majority on definite matters of common concern; the formation of an Atlantic Economic Community; the expansion of the Atlantic Institute; the founding of an Atlantic High Court of Justice to decide specific legal controversies arising under international treaties; and the development of the NPC into a consultative Atlantic Assembly. To a certain extent, the NPC itself was the result of a similar groundswell of support from other Atlanticist institutions, for instance the powerful impetus received from the appeal of the original Declaration of Atlantic Unity, which had been signed by 244 personalities from the NATO states. As of May 1966, Dowling, the AI Director-General, was arguing in favor of strengthening the NPC Secretariat, though the AI was not directly involved in this.

<sup>86</sup> Birrenbach, as already intimated by his signing of the Second Declaration of Atlantic Unity but also spurred on for instance by what he considered a crisis in NATO as of May 1966, was among those advocating over the years the upgrading of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, as part of a broader

## I. Location

Deciding upon the proper location for institutions significantly exercised the minds of Birrenbach and other Atlanticists. A plethora of factors dictated a certain geographic diversity within Germany and western Europe for the elements of their infrastructure. Contingent necessity and advantage in finding suitable accommodations proved crucial at times, as with the dismal early postwar conditions, caused for instance by Allied bombing damage, that largely resulted in the DEG siting its conferences in Königswinter, near rather than immediately in Bonn; or the favorable opportunity that presented itself around the time of the SWP's inception to acquire the Haus Eggenberg in Ebenhausen near Munich. Symbolism or atmospherics sometimes contributed, for instance the attraction to the Atlantik-Brücke of the hospitable environment of liberal, commercial, cosmopolitan Hamburg, a Hanseatic city boasting close, centuries-old relations with the United States and Britain; or the desire to flaunt the Atlanticist banner in the heartland of Gaullism, as reflected in the presence in Paris of the headquarters of organizations like the NPC, the Monnet Committee and the AI.<sup>87</sup> More tangible considerations of financing (see Chapter 5) occasionally loomed large, whether it be the benefits the DGAP derived in Bonn from its close proximity to *Förderer* from Rhenish-Westphalian industry; or those accruing to the AI through its direct vicinity to important

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NATO reorganization, ultimately into a more powerful, though at least initially an advisory or consultative, Atlantic Assembly. Such ambitions led to proposals to strengthen and expand the body's International Secretariat and to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference changing its name in 1966 to the North Atlantic Assembly. On these aspirations, see, for example, the Proposal for the Reorganization and Strengthening of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference Secretariat, ACDP K049/2.

<sup>87</sup> Indicative of Hamburg's orientation was a number of the city's other institutions, including the *Hotel Atlantik* and the *Übersee-Club (e.V.)*. For the obstacles presented by the French government, as well as the *Institut de France*, in securing a suitable building for the Atlantic Institute in Paris, see KB to Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, Bonn, 19 December 1960, ACDP K128/1.

French funding sources. Given the intense scrutinizing of similar, already existing institutions, German but especially American, including organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations and the American Council on Germany (both in New York City) and the RAND Corporation (in Santa Monica, CA) not situated in the national capital, one can even speak with respect to bodies such as the AB and the SWP of the intentional Americanization of the geographic spread of the German Atlanticist infrastructure.<sup>88</sup>

The example of Bonn demonstrates perhaps most strikingly the extent to which spatial distance and the geographic location and characteristics of a particular Atlanticist institution or activity could uniquely affect, for better or worse, the numerical weight and structural composition of its members and participants. Beyond the process of Americanization, the Federal Republic also approximated the US insofar as it, too, lacked a genuine national capital as a focal point in the typical European sense. Like Washington, Bonn was really little more than a political hub, rather than a full-fledged, versatile metropolis, like London, Paris or Rome. While organizations and functions based in this small, beautiful city consequently found it relatively easy to attract certain groups, like ministerial civil servants, parliamentarians and others involved in politics, they found it more difficult to interest figures from other branches, such as journalism, academia and parts of the *Wirtschaft*, than might have been the case elsewhere, say in the banking and commercial center of Frankfurt. Having studied as a young man in Paris and then, during the late 1920s and 1930s, lived in Berlin, which at that time had supplanted Paris as Europe's cultural hotspot, Birrenbach moaned that he "suffered" in provincial

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<sup>88</sup> Although certain American organizations, like the Atlantic Council of the United States and the Brookings Institution, were indeed located in Washington, DC.



Bonn.<sup>89</sup> On the other hand, *Weltstadt* Berlin still held a special place in his heart many years later, so that whenever he visited, as he put it, “I can never forget... its cultural background and its political and social life which I had so enjoyed.”<sup>90</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach cited the absence of a real capital as contributing to the lack of an integrated *Gesellschaft* as a whole and even believed the contrast Bonn-Paris fed into French feelings of superiority.<sup>91</sup> That said, for all its peculiarities and apparent flaws, Bonn did exhibit certain advantages as a site, offering, probably more than any other German city, the opportunity to bring together numerous representatives of a wide variety of political and professional groupings.<sup>92</sup>

Though all these considerations were major determinants at times, probably the crucial long-term factor the German Atlanticists had to account for in locating their institutions was the relative merit of being near or far from the centers of political power, whether of a governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental nature. For some Atlanticists, a desirable geographic spread extending well beyond Bonn symbolically and substantively bolstered their independence from government as well as organizations like the respective party headquarters and “party-near” *Stiftungen*.<sup>93</sup> Such arguments were nourished by experiences under the National Socialist regime, including the

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<sup>89</sup> KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1. The original German, literally “how much I have suffered under Bonn [*unter Bonn gelitten*],” perhaps better conveys Birrenbach’s sense of oppression.

<sup>90</sup> The entire quote reads as follows: “I can never forget the slow decomposition of Berlin in the times of the National Socialist regime, its cultural background and its political and social life which I had so enjoyed before the 30<sup>th</sup> of January, 1933. You cannot imagine how deep this date has changed my whole life.” (KB to John McCloy, 26 May 1976, ACDP K210/1).

<sup>91</sup> On the latter, see KB to Hans [Speidel], 28 March 1978, ACDP K145/1.

<sup>92</sup> For the DGAP’s successful efforts to attract new members in the “*Raum Köln-Bonn*” (including a large fraction that had approached the DGAP at their own initiative) and its increased contacts with members in this area, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 27 June 1962, ACDP K009/1.

<sup>93</sup> These considerations gained even more force during the early and mid-1970s with the construction of imposing party *Zentralen* in Bonn, namely the *Konrad-Adenauer-Haus* (CDU) and the *Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus* (SPD). *Parteinähe Stiftungen* in and around Bonn included the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* (CDU), the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (SPD) and the *Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung* (FDP).

concentration and *Gleichschaltung* of foreign policy research institutions, as did exist, in Berlin.<sup>94</sup> In contrast, Birrenbach and others tended to advocate positioning infrastructure in the capital, stressing the possibilities such proximity offered for extensive influence on or cooperation with the diverse bodies and personalities there, including government, bureaucracy, *Bundestag* and embassies. While the location of the SWP was frequently criticized in these quarters, Birrenbach's primary coup in this respect only came with his successful push in the late 1970s to shift the main headquarters of the *Atlantik-Brücke* to Bonn, where it joined, among others, the DGAP and the Königswinter Conferences (actually based in that suburb).<sup>95</sup> Outside of Bonn, the lure of beneficial links with other institutions also played a role in determining the founding of the DEG in Düsseldorf, home of the British occupation government at the time; the seat of the AI in Paris, close to NATO and the OECD; and even the site of the SWP near the University of Munich.<sup>96</sup> After de Gaulle's eviction of NATO from Paris in 1966, exhaustive debates ensued into

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<sup>94</sup> This *Gleichschaltung* included the Hamburg-based *Institut für Auswärtige Politik* and the Berlin-based *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, the former of which was transferred to Berlin. The founders of these generally liberal, democratic, bourgeois, pro-Weimar institutions were nearly all forced into emigration.

<sup>95</sup> Long before this shift, consummated in 1983, the *Atlantik-Brücke* already held member assemblies in Bonn. The *Institut für Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft*, a precursor of the DGAP Research Institute founded in 1952, was initially based in Frankfurt in the erroneous belief that this city would become the future seat of government for the new state. The research institute itself of the DGAP did not complete the move from Frankfurt to Bonn until Fall 1960, a concentration of all DGAP organs in a single building offered to the *Gesellschaft* that was also intended to enhance internal performance and save on rent (Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 8 July 1959 in Bad Godesberg, ACDP K002/2). The DGAP property in Bonn was located on the *Adenauerallee*, on the same street as and close to key buildings of the federal government, including the *Bundeskanzleramt* and the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>96</sup> The DEG was actually based in Düsseldorf-Wittlaer. In a concession to federalism and localism, the DEG departed somewhat from a centralized structure through the existence of its *Landesgruppen* and *Arbeitskreise*. Along with the DEG's founding members as well as specifically co-opted members, the chairmen of these *Landesgruppen* and *Arbeitskreise* served on the DEG *Beirat*, which over the years included personalities like Wilhelm Beutler (Cologne), Christoph Freiherr von Imhoff (Cologne), Wolfgang Pohle (CSU, Düsseldorf), Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz (Bonn), Hans Stork (BDI, Frankfurt), and Friedrich Vogel (Düsseldorf).

the following Spring in Birrenbach's AI Policy Committee regarding a possible transfer of the Institute, with Brussels of course considered a potential alternative.<sup>97</sup>

With this geographic spread, Birrenbach's infrastructural activities took him far afield. Between organizational meetings, conferences and other functions, he found himself traveling about Germany (especially Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Munich and Berlin), the key capitals of Europe (especially Paris, Brussels and London), and the United States (especially Washington, DC, and New York City).<sup>98</sup> In such locales, the Atlanticists came together not only on the premises of their own institutions but also at embassies, houses of parliament, conference centers, hotels, restaurants, clubs and lounges, with the Bonn-Bad Godesberg area alone featuring the *Bundeshaus*, the Hotel Königshof, the Redoute and the Rheinhof Dreesen.<sup>99</sup> The spread of its magnet points also contributed to the infrastructure's conscious integration of Atlanticists not only from a variety of widely dispersed countries but also from the diverse regions of the

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<sup>97</sup> Amsterdam and Rome were also broached as possible locations, though the AI ultimately remained in Paris. Opponents of an AI departure in 1966-67 included the Frenchman Jacques Rueff. Factors militating against this and other such contemplated relocations included the paralysis of institutional activity for an extended period of time as well as prohibitive additional financial expenditures. On the other hand, the NPC International Secretariat did move quite rapidly from Paris to Brussels.

<sup>98</sup> From their inception through the mid-1970s, the German-American Conferences (October 1959, February 1961, November 1962, November 1964, May 1967, January 1970, November 1971 and November 1974) were held in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Berlin and Washington, DC. During the period that Birrenbach attended them, the NPCs were generally held in Paris, but also at times in Washington, DC (1959) and New York City (1965, though Birrenbach did not attend due to a board meeting). Later on, as the North Atlantic Assembly, such conferences were held in a wider variety of locations, for instance during the first half of the 1970s in Ottawa (1971), Bonn (1972, with Birrenbach as an observer), Ankara (1973), London (1974) and Copenhagen (1975). The Bilderberg Conferences did take Birrenbach to some unusual destinations, including Bürgenstock (Switzerland, 1960), Williamsburg (Virginia, 1964), Wiesbaden (West Germany, 1966), Cambridge (England, 1967), Mont Tremblant (Canada, 1968) and Knokke (Belgium, 1972). Monnet Committee meetings generally occurred in one of the major western European capitals, though the committee held its 12<sup>th</sup> meeting on 8-9 May 1965 in Berlin in the Rathaus Schöneberg, with the final gathering in the meeting hall of the *Bezirksverordnetenversammlung*.

<sup>99</sup> Other sites included parliamentary houses like the Palais du Luxembourg (Paris) and the House of Commons (London), hotels like the Hotel Mayflower (Washington, DC), the Hotel Ritz (London) and the Hotel Palais d'Orsay (Paris), restaurants and clubs like the Cercle Interallié (Paris) and assorted venues like the Bâtiment Cortenberg (Brussels). The KWCs were usually held at the Adam-Stegerwald-Haus, a conference center of the Christian trade unions that was later taken over by the CDU's social committees.

FRG itself, for instance linking the Rhenish/Ruhr-based Birrenbach with distant clusters, whether in and around Hamburg, Munich, Berlin, Frankfurt or southwest Germany.<sup>100</sup> A bevy of formal and informal activities sprang up on the periphery of the institutional framework proper, as participants and non-participants alike attended social events like meals, parties and small gatherings in private homes. Myriad factors influenced the choice of specific location for functions, from calculations of adequate space to the sheer pleasantness of the surroundings.<sup>101</sup> However, the eagerness of many German Atlanticists to site conferences in the US, especially when there was a new administration, was largely attributable to the useful opportunity afforded to engage figures of government, Congress and press in the context of these peripheral activities as well as in personal visits. For Birrenbach, conferences themselves were often of subordinate importance to the external discussions they facilitated since, “[a]s a rule, more comes of bilateral talks.”<sup>102</sup>

### J. Other Characteristics

The upshot of all this was the emergence during the 1950s and 1960s of a unique, well-developed, generally private Atlanticist infrastructure, both inside and outside the Federal Republic, in which Germans played a major role. Atlanticist-inspired institutions comprised, among others, conferences, action committees and research institutes. Through their structures, composition, practices and rhetoric, these organizations were tailored to suit the Atlanticists’ often innovative, and Americanized, ideas regarding

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<sup>100</sup> For example, important Hamburg Atlanticists with whom Birrenbach regularly interacted within the context of the infrastructure included Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Erik Blumenfeld (CDU MdB), Marion Dönhoff and Eric Warburg.

<sup>101</sup> Other considerations included suitable privacy, intimacy, accommodations, accessibility and transportation possibilities, as well as surrounding resources, such as libraries.

<sup>102</sup> KB to Kissinger, 11 July 1962, ACDP K159/2. One disadvantage of staging such conferences in the US was the frequent distraction, and even absence for long stretches, of certain American participants, for instance congressmen rushing back to Washington, DC, to tend to pressing congressional business.

scholarly knowledge, inter-disciplinarity, non-partisanship and the like. Key were the efforts, including in a socially turbulent postwar West Germany, to integrate previously disparate elements, whether professions (especially *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*), parties, religions, regions or nationalities, to mold a broadly anchored and coherent coalition of Atlanticists within and beyond the Federal Republic. With their emphasis on problem-solving through the flexible combination of elements (also including disciplines) to form new hybrids, rather than “merely” relying on those elements already at hand, the Atlanticists represented “clever” actors as described through the ages in the ultimately neutral typologies of thinkers like Aristotle, Machiavelli and Pareto. This heterogeneous infrastructure featured a largely harmonious and cooperative relationship between its components on both a domestic and international level as well as with a larger internationalist infrastructure thriving abroad. Seeking to overcome the flaws inherent in existing institutions, the German Atlanticists saw it as essential to carve out their own space distinct, though not entirely separate, from the university and the government bureaucracy. While a number of factors obstructed this endeavor, others facilitated it, including the support of foreigners (initially as occupiers), who warmly and rapidly welcomed German Atlanticist institutions into the Western international community.

True, narrower loyalties persisted within this infrastructure. Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists viewed their organizations as significantly furthering the enlightened national interest and, at times, even the aims of particular social groups, such as the *Politik* and the *Wirtschaft*. Given its difficult postwar position and specific conditions, the Federal Republic benefited mightily from the existence of a prestigious international framework in which broad trends, such as *détente*, could be accurately

gauged; knowledgeable, innovative and appropriate policies in crucial fields, like security, arms control and the *Ostpolitik*, developed; and fundamental German interests openly presented, sometimes in concert with other nations, to the Western allies, all of which helped the *Bundesrepublik* attain a more influential, less subordinate role in the alliance. As we shall see in Chapter 6, whether within the context of the Monnet Committee or elsewhere, Birrenbach strove, often in tandem with other like-minded Germans, to preserve the vital interests of the Federal Republic, at least as they interpreted them, as pertained to key issues like reunification.<sup>103</sup> However, all this acknowledged, the infrastructure at the same time also manifested an incipient pan-Atlantic identity, a newly awakened sense of simultaneously belonging to a larger order, surely of vast size and extraordinary complexity but nevertheless an intermediate attachment more tangible than that of, say, “the human race,” a civilization possessed of overarching political, economic, military, social and cultural interests, characteristics and values and, ultimately, a shared fate.

Taken as a whole, the creators and members of the various institutions of the German Atlanticist infrastructure, often with similarly disposed groups abroad, entertained numerous motives that found expression in everything from their particular events and activities to their personnel decisions. These inter-related functional objectives included the crystalization of opinion among participants; the provision of impulses to stir inherently inert governments into implementing necessary policies and undertaking crucial measures; the establishment (or, in some cases, reconstitution) and

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<sup>103</sup> National loyalty still played some role in elections within the international Atlanticist institutions, for instance the bloc-vote delivered by Birrenbach and the Germans in Fall 1967 to their candidate, Graf Adelman, for the NPC Secretary-Generalship, though Birrenbach also promised Lord Gladwyn (Britain) his subsequent support if Adelman, as expected, did not reach the second round of voting (the Italian Count Sforza was the third candidate).

nurturing of close, constant personal contacts, an increasingly thick and binding web of social tissue, with like-minded fellows outside of the *Bundesrepublik*; the opening up on multiple levels of rapid, durable, multi-directional channels of trans-Atlantic communication and osmosis; the overcoming of historical animosities and the encouragement of peaceful reconciliation and mutual understanding between peoples, including conspicuously the improving of West German relations with the Anglo-Saxon nations, first among them the United States; and the modernization of foreign policy thought and methods and the acquisition of the knowledge required to reduce or eliminate the apparently gaping deficits existing in the Federal Republic with respect to new and central fields of contemporary international relations.<sup>104</sup> Meanwhile, whatever their particular functions, the German Atlanticist institutions substantively served to promote a strengthening of the allegedly vital but seemingly chronically precarious and centrifugally troubled trans-Atlantic relationship and, specifically, the overall goal: a more outward-looking, Liberal notion of a broadly yet deeply integrated and evolving Atlantic Community transcending the inward-looking, Conservative *Abendland* perspective in the political culture of the Federal Republic.

### K. Contexts

The precise impact of the German Atlanticist infrastructure on Birrenbach's political activities will be explored in Chapter 6. For now, we can acknowledge in a

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<sup>104</sup> In November 1965, Birrenbach alluded to the crystallization of opinion when he attributed his unsurprising agreement with Erler to their repeated treatment of the relevant topics over the years within the DGAP Study Group I (Birrenbach account of his talks after his America trip of Fall 1965, ACDP K117/1). The desire for reconciliation was symbolized, for instance, at the 1962 Atlantic Convention by chairman Christian Herter placing a wreath, at German request, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier beneath the *Arc de Triomphe*. The diligent efforts of the German Atlanticists to rectify at least what they perceived as rampant ignorance manifested themselves, for example, in the distribution of the chairmanships of the DGAP Study Groups I (SPD) and II (CDU), including Birrenbach's chairmanship of the Study Group II, an arrangement intended in part to help the Union as a political party grouping to overcome its presumed shortcomings with respect to the *Ostpolitik*.

narrow sense the virtual impossibility of definitively gauging the exact role of these organizations in the individual policy decisions of states, while also admitting that particular Atlanticist recommendations were by no means immediately or even at all implemented by governments and other actors.<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, clear achievements did exist, with Birrenbach pointing, for instance, to the stimulus provided by the DGAP Study Group I to the April 1964 establishment of the office *Abriüstungsbeauftragter*, a notable expansion of the AA's capabilities. However, rather than such lone episodes, a better *prima facie* indicator of the infrastructure's often subtle effects is the strenuous engagement, in whatever capacity and for no immediate material gain, of committed individuals like Birrenbach, even when faced with busy schedules and limited time. In their ambition to exercise direct and indirect influence from the *vorpolitischen Raum* on *Willensbildung* at the highest levels, such organizations focused their efforts, for example personal interventions and the transmitting of studies, on the competent public and, at times, private figures, both German and foreign, whether in governments, bureaucracies, legislatures, parties, international bodies (e.g. NATO, OECD, EEC), businesses or trade unions. Their prescriptions thus achieved a presence in the *Bundesrepublik* in these institutions, where they were explicitly cited and discussed.<sup>106</sup> Despite certain

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<sup>105</sup> For instance, only in 1973 were the first steps taken that the Monnet Committee had already recommended in 1959 regarding the creation of a unified European currency reserves fund (the European Monetary Cooperation Fund), and even then the committee's actual influence on these measures remains ambiguous.

<sup>106</sup> For example, thanks in part to the efforts of Birrenbach and others (e.g. Rainer Barzel (CDU), Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Wolfgang Mischnick (FDP)), the *Bundestag* overwhelmingly approved on 2 April 1968 the Monnet Committee's resolutions of 15 June 1967 and a motion of all three *Fraktionen* that the government take into account the resolutions in its policies. This process also included an address by Monnet on these resolutions to a session of the *Bundestag* on 13 October 1967. The Monnet Committee resolutions of 15 June 1967 were also submitted for approval around this time to the other parliaments of each of the Six. For Birrenbach's attempts to persuade certain doubtful MdBs, in this case Siegfried Balke (CSU), who objected to several of the proposals as vague and unrealistic in the current situation of Europe and the Federal Republic, see Balke to KB, 5 February 1968, ACDP K052/2, and KB to Balke, 9 February 1968, ACDP K052/2. This overall procedure was based on the precedent of March 1956 in the Europe of the Six,



complaints, Birrenbach and other Atlanticists were generally proud of the effectiveness, quality and even international recognition attained by the infrastructure, its personnel and products.<sup>107</sup> All this suggests that the Atlanticists had forged a valuable instrument for promoting their cause, one bestowing a considerable advantage over competing conceptions of international affairs.

As already alluded to, the Atlanticist project represented an important symbiotic element in regard to a number of overarching trends in West German society and the surrounding world. It was facilitated by but also functioned as a catalyst vis-à-vis related phenomena like Americanization, Liberalization, the postwar re-construction and flowering of civil society, and the spread of *Wissenschaft* and social science as tools in the reshaping of many spheres of human life. In contrast to the Occidentalists, who saw such a citizens participation in realms like international affairs as at best undesirable and even harmful, the German Atlanticists, expressing a different form of anti-statism unique to themselves, saw their institutions existing in a mutually essential relationship with democracy. The Atlanticist infrastructure was also closely linked in the field of foreign

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when the *Bundestag* had approved the Monnet Committee's declaration of 18 January 1956 on EURATOM thanks to a joint resolution of the CDU/CSU, SPD, GB/BHE, DP and DA *Fraktionen*. Birrenbach also argued that the BKA and high-ranking personalities in the AA carefully read and discussed the studies produced by the SWP (KB to MdB Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU), 28 July 1970, ACDP K023/2). For an instance of the federal government itself acknowledging that it considered in its decision-making the work results of the DGAP Study Groups, see the Planning Staff Note PI-18/65 of 1 February 1965, ACDP K149/1.

<sup>107</sup> Birrenbach's admiration for Monnet and his action committee as of 1969 was reflected in his description of the Monnet Committee as "the political conscience of the Europe which we desire" (KB to Hellmuth Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1) and his conviction that its activity was "of great importance. It is the only recognized forum that, in the hour of confusion, holds high the flag of the sole European policy which has a prospect of pacification [*Befriedung*] of the continent." (KB to Fritz Berg, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1). To cite another example, Birrenbach considered Uwe Nerlich (SWP) "an excellent man with very much imagination and obviously a very careful analyst." (KB to Prof. Klaus Ritter, 20 August 1979, ACDP K200/2). For Henle's belief that the DGAP, though still quite distant from its institutional goals, was making encouraging progress, see the Minutes of the DGAP Member Assembly on 27 June 1962, ACDP K009/1. For the DGAP still lacking in *wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeitern* as of late 1962 but also for its confidence from an early point that its Study Group I was gradually growing into "the *Gesprächspartner*" for the American institutes, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the DGAP Präsidium on 19 December 1962, ACDP K010/2.

affairs to the popular concept of an “end of ideology,” insofar as it helped overcome notions of *Abendland*, especially in the Union, and played a substantial role in the jettisoning of the SPD’s Marxist heritage, as signified by the Godesberg Program of 1959, all in favor of something of a Liberal Atlanticist ideological consensus across parties.<sup>108</sup> Finally, there was an intimate connection with the building, in some instances rebuilding, of elite, trans-national Atlanticist networks on myriad planes and in diverse fields in an increasingly interwoven world. Indeed, the Atlanticist infrastructure existed within the context not only of numerous governmental and inter-governmental bodies in which Germans as well took part, among them the Assembly of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg), the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, but also of a multitude of other, non-governmental infrastructures and institutions, for instance the economic research institutes and the international professional organizations devoted to politicians, businessmen, trade unionists, *Wissenschaftler* and so forth.<sup>109</sup>

#### L. Conclusion

Birrenbach’s role within the German Atlanticist infrastructure was a significant and multi-faceted one. True, he was not an original institutional conceptualizer and rather embraced the visions of *Wegweisern* like Arnold Bergstraesser, Jean Monnet and

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<sup>108</sup> Even in later years, Birrenbach praised Herbert Wehner for his work in the *Bundestag* and his great services to the Federal Republic, including his contribution in bringing about the “decisive turn [*entscheidende Wende*]” leading to the Godesberg Program that henceforth formed the basis of the SPD *Politik* (KB to Wehner, 4 March 1983, ACDP K120/3).

<sup>109</sup> For a contemporary Liberal account of some of these trends, see Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: Norton, 1967). German economic research institutes included the *Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* in West Berlin, led from 1945-68 by its president, and Birrenbach’s acquaintance, Ferdinand Friedensburg. With respect to international professional organizations, one can point for instance to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Chamber of Commerce (as well as bilateral chambers of commerce), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (in addition to the DGB’s own *Hauptabteilung Ausland*) and the International Political Science Association. Birrenbach attended a conference of the IPU in Warsaw in 1959 and was a member of the Anglo-German Parliamentary Group, which was one of the groups within the IPU framework and which, among other things, held the Wilton Park Conferences several times a year at Wiston House in Britain (Steving, Sussex).

Theodor Steltzer. Nevertheless, even disregarding for the moment his indispensable financing activity (addressed in Chapter 5), Birrenbach was deeply involved “*mit Rat und Tat*” in the infrastructure’s emergence and development as a creator, organizer, officer, gatekeeper, member, participant, speaker, promoter and consultant. He repeatedly pointed to such roles, as well as his relationships with personalities like his “old friend Monnet,” as a badge of his Atlanticist credentials. With his vast experience and sterling international reputation in this regard, a willing Birrenbach was also very much sought out over the years for advice and support and as a prestigious reference by others engaged in institution-building, Atlanticist or otherwise. His extended periods in such capacities testifies to the potential, and often real, personnel continuities of such organizations, while also highlighting the possible risks posed by a deleterious uniformity and conformist “group-think.” In no small part, Birrenbach serves as an exemplary subject of inquiry insofar as he was crucial to the institutionalization of Atlanticism, in some sense a “bottom-up” phenomenon that nevertheless proved central to the integration of a German Atlanticist elite, to that elite’s integration, in turn, into a larger multi-national Atlanticist elite and to the particular form of the initially isolated Federal Republic’s far-reaching reacceptance into the Western international community. Ultimately, the Atlanticist infrastructure became a successful feature of the multi-tiered trans-Atlantic fabric, a crucial matrix within which Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists functioned and an essential element in the post-1945 evolution of German Atlanticism.

## Chapter 5: Financing the Atlanticist Infrastructure

### A. Introduction

The proper maintaining and functioning of the Atlanticist infrastructure that we have described in the previous chapter, one that essentially consisted of non-profit organizations, required a certain amount of financial wherewithal. Funding was needed to pay for expenses incurred, whether they be with respect to staff, equipment, premises, meetings, travel, administration, research or any of the other necessities and activities engaged in within the context of this infrastructure.<sup>1</sup> To some extent, such financing could be internally generated, with organizations like the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* producing a not inconsiderable share of their funds from the sale of their own publications. However, external financing always remained predominant and critical. Not surprisingly, outside West German sources played a crucial role in funding those Atlanticist institutions based in the Federal Republic. However, such German financing was also vital to those organizations located abroad in which the German Atlanticists also took part, such as the Monnet Committee, the Atlantic Institute and the NATO Parliamentarians Conference. Among those Germans heavily involved in these financing activities, Birrenbach was, without question, one of the most important. Indeed, in exploring the theme of financing in this chapter, primarily of the external kind, we are at the same time examining the sphere in which

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<sup>1</sup> Some illustrative examples: the NATO Parliamentarians Conference projected a budget for financial year 1961 of 550,000 new French francs (Draft Budget for the Financial Year 1961, ACDP 055/1). As of September 1964, the estimated minimum budget of the Atlantic Institute was about \$350,000, while actual expenditures in 1971 amounted to approximately \$500,000. The budget estimate for the Monnet Committee for the two-year period from 1966-68 came to 720,000 nfrs (KB Memorandum, 12 July 1966, ACDP 050/2).

Birrenbach arguably exercised his most indispensable function with regard to the Atlanticist infrastructure.

### B. Birrenbach and the German Sources of Financing

The German sources of financing for the Atlanticist infrastructure were numerous and varied from institution to institution. Birrenbach played his key role to a large degree as a link between the infrastructure and these sources. Such sources included the major political parties represented in the *Bundestag*. While the funds provided by any one of these political parties were rather small individually, when taken together with financing from other parties and sources, they did form a significant component of the funding for the eminent Monnet Committee.<sup>2</sup> Within this committee, Birrenbach, almost immediately upon his entry, became the unofficial contact man to the Union regarding such financial matters.<sup>3</sup> Henceforth, in what became something of an annual ritual, Birrenbach duly received the requests from Ludwig Rosenberg, the head of the Monnet Committee's administration committee, for payment from the CDU and ensured that these funds were forthcoming, an occasionally difficult process sometimes entailing delay, confusion and controversy.<sup>4</sup> Another relatively secondary German source of funding, at least when observed in the context of the overall infrastructure, were the labor unions, especially the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund*. For instance, the DGB annually made a quite modest, one is tempted to say nominal, contribution to the Atlantic Institute and, like the political parties, a rather small payment to the Monnet Committee, though,

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<sup>2</sup> The contribution of the CDU for 1967 amounted to FF 13,500 (Undated letter of Ludwig Rosenberg to KB, ACDP K052/2. Special contributions were also requested in this letter beyond the annual contribution.

<sup>3</sup> Birrenbach, almost necessarily, assumed this role during the period between Heinrich von Brentano's departure from the committee in 1961, virtually concomitant with Birrenbach's entrance, and Rainer Barzel's entry into that same body years later.

<sup>4</sup> This was the case, for example, in 1961-62 and 1968, though successfully resolved in each instance by Birrenbach.

like that provided by the political parties, one supplemented at times by additional “special” contributions and ultimately essential for the functioning of that organization. Thanks to his close contacts with Rosenberg and others in the trade union movement, Birrenbach took on the task, especially initially and successfully with respect to the Atlantic Institute, of encouraging and persuading the DGB in this regard.<sup>5</sup>

However, whatever their crucial role in financing particular institutions, the aggregate contributions made by the German political parties and labor unions to the Atlanticist infrastructure paled in comparison to those provided by several other sources. One such major source in funding German Atlanticist organizations and activities was the state. Again, the proportion of such public financing varied from institution to institution. An entity such as the Monnet Committee explicitly eschewed any government funding. At the other extreme, an institution like the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* was financed exclusively and quite substantially by the *Bund*, a mode virtually inevitable insofar as this organization worked on confidential projects primarily in the service of the federal government. Far more common, however, were instances where government provided a partial financing. For example, while primarily funded through private means, the Atlantic Institute also received a certain percentage of its budget from the various governments, including an annual contribution from the West German federal government that, during the first half of the 1960s, amounted to approximately \$5,000.<sup>6</sup> The German government also financially supported individual activities and projects such as the conferences and publications of organizations like the *Atlantik-Brücke*, the

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<sup>5</sup> Walter Stahl to KB, 30 January 1962, ACDP K007/1.

<sup>6</sup> Walter Stahl to KB, 14 May 1962, ACDP K108/2. During the 1960s, the annual contributions from all governments made up about 15% of the estimated yearly AI budgets. See, for example, the Protocol of the Atlantica e.V. Annual Assembly on 19 June 1963 in Cologne, ACDP K108/2.

*Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft* and the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*.<sup>7</sup>

In many cases (though not that of the SWP), these were seemingly modest but often essential sums, therefore ostensibly adhering to yet also somewhat undermining the claims of the Atlanticist infrastructure to be composed of strictly private organizations independent of government. To the extent that such financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure occurred during the Chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, we can even see elements of the federal government working at cross-purposes with one another.

With respect to the federal government, Birrenbach played a pivotal role in the initial securing of financial contributions to various Atlanticist organizations and projects. Thereafter, he regularly reminded and nudged the government to follow through promptly on its promised funding assistance and, at times, even to make extraordinary expenditures. The key departments that Birrenbach had to deal with in this regard were the *Auswärtige Amt*, the *Bundesfinanzministerium* and the *Bundespresseamt*, in each of which he consistently enjoyed good connections to the relevant ministers and *Beamten*. As an example of Birrenbach's numerous efforts, we can cite his part during 1960-61 in arranging the government financing for the Atlantic Institute. Here, Birrenbach contacted Finance Minister Franz Etzel and his State Secretary Karl Hettlage, who in turn approached Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, thus leading eventually to Brentano's agreement in December 1960 to a government contribution of the aforementioned \$5,000 a year for five years. In support of Lilo Milchsack (the

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<sup>7</sup> Of note here is the governmental support for the German-American Conferences (*Atlantik-Brücke*) and the Königswinter Conferences (*Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*) as well as for the publications of the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the DGAP. For instance, the *Auswärtige Amt* paid for the total expenses that had been incurred for the 1966 Königswinter Conference, which had been ultimately cancelled due to British parliamentary elections. As of October 1965, the *Atlantik-Brücke* had received DM 20,000 from the *Auswärtigen Amt*, with the approval of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, for the upcoming German-American Conference and was requesting an increase to DM 30,000. The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik* was financed by the *Bund* particularly with respect to its documentation projects.

*Geschäftsführenden Vorsitzenden* of the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft*) and in contact with officials in the *Auswärtigem Amt* (especially a Dr. Koch), Birrenbach succeeded in bringing the Foreign Office to cover the entire cost of the 1966 Königswinter Conference, which had been cancelled due to the British parliamentary elections. Earlier, in October 1964, Birrenbach was prodding Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to ensure that the federal government furnished a larger sum as its contribution to the German collection for the Kennedy Memorial Library in Boston, Massachusetts, and to dissuade the government from its plan to distribute that sum over an extended period of ten years (see Chapter 7).<sup>8</sup>

Among Birrenbach's most significant undertakings vis-à-vis the government with respect to financing, and certainly the most prolonged discrete effort, was that in support of the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. Here, securing the requisite funding entailed in part an indirect approach, as Birrenbach, in his capacity as representative of the Union *Bundestagsfraktion* on the SWP *Stiftungsrat*, lobbied that *Fraktion*, especially members of the parliamentary budget committee as well as the foreign affairs and defense committees, on behalf of the SWP and its "gravamina."<sup>9</sup> In cooperation with other SWP proponents, Birrenbach also took a more direct tact and repeatedly petitioned what appeared to him an often unsympathetic government, including at the cabinet level, in the hopes of utilizing his connections in this area to overcome the hurdles confronting the SWP, not least the bureaucratic stand-off existing between the Finance Ministry and other departments, such as the *Auswärtigen Amt*. Already by September 1962, Birrenbach had contacted Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder in this matter and, over the next years, kept him as well as Finance Minister Rolf Dählgrün, Research Minister

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<sup>8</sup> KB to Erhard, 29 October 1964, ACDP K052/1.

<sup>9</sup> In his efforts within the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Birrenbach was especially assisted by its chairman, Rainer Barzel. See, for instance, KB to Barzel, 14 September 1967, ACDP K149/2.



Gerhard Stoltenberg and several relevant *Beamte* apprised of the SWP's status, urged them to forestall budget cuts, and generally strove to combat "an overly strong *Fiskalisierung*" and "to reduce somewhat the *staatlichen* brakes that are to be imposed on this organization."<sup>10</sup> While eliciting some positive indications and responses, Birrenbach lamented in April 1966 his seemingly interminable efforts: "I must openly confess... that I recall few projects in life that have been so arduous as this. Political and *menschliche* questions appear to have played a role here. However, I would say that the bureaucratic action of the finance ministry has been and still is the largest obstacle."<sup>11</sup> The upshot was a rather extended and frustrating case, dragging on through much of the 1960s, of Birrenbach's, on the whole successful, endeavors to obtain funding from the state for the construction and functioning of Atlanticist infrastructure.

Another key German source for the financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure was the *Wirtschaft*. The centrality of funding from this sector was particularly evident with respect to organizations like the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik*, the Atlantic Institute, the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft*.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, we can assert with confidence that money flowing from the *Wirtschaft* was more crucial to more of the Atlanticist institutions under consideration here than that emanating from any other single source. Such financial support, originating from individual firms or

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<sup>10</sup> Birrenbach acted largely on the basis of information and papers provided to him by the institute's director, Dr. Klaus Ritter. On the primary threats posed by and Birrenbach's current efforts vis-à-vis the Finance Minister to defend against "an overly strong *Fiskalisierung*" and "the *staatlichen* brakes," see KB to Hajo Holborn, 3 January 1964, ACDP K098/1.

<sup>11</sup> KB to Ministerial Director Herbert Müller-Roschach, 18 April 1966, ACDP K017/1. It might also be worth revisiting the continuation of this quote, already cited in Chapter 4: "What has happened here can probably only be explained through it that, seen as a whole, the German *Politik* still has not found a correct relationship to the *Wissenschaft*. That... is however not new, rather is characteristic for the past hundred years."

<sup>12</sup> For example, the private German contribution to the Atlantic Institute as of September 1964 amounted to approximately \$26,000 per year (Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim to Dr. Wolfgang Pohle, Flick KG, Düsseldorf, 16 September 1964, ACDP K108/2).

from the *Spitzenorganisationen* of the West German *Wirtschaft*, including the Cologne-based *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*, often assumed the form of periodic donations, membership dues and special contributions for specific projects and activities. Rooted in fields like industry, banking, transportation and insurance, the firms in question tended to be internationally-minded, typically export oriented and especially interested in maintaining close international relations and a free traffic in trade and services within the trans-Atlantic realm.<sup>13</sup> In no small part due to Birrenbach's urging, the Thyssen group, which also saw itself potentially reaping considerable material benefits (including with respect to the United States) through such a program, was among the regular and substantial contributors of the *Wirtschaft* to the institutions of the Atlanticist infrastructure.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the prominent engagement of the West German *Wirtschaft* in the financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure reflected striking, broader post-World War II and Cold War trends, namely the integration of the Federal Republic into the Atlantic, and even world, economy and, within the *Wirtschaft* itself, the rejection of notions of a

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<sup>13</sup> For the *Deutsche Bank AG* (Frankfurt) making a special contribution of DM 10,000 to the *Atlantica* to help finance an Atlantic Institute study on Latin America (see Chapter 8), for the bank's expectation that this study would also be of interest to other large German firms active in the South American market, and for the bank's desire, therefore, that several of these firms also be approached to assist in funding specifically this project, see Wilfried Guth to Walter Stahl, 16 July 1971, ACDP K106/1.

<sup>14</sup> At Birrenbach's suggestion, the *August-Thyssen-Hütte AG* (Duisburg) became a member of both the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Atlantica* (intimately linked to the Atlantic Institute; see later in this chapter), to the tune of DM 5,000 annually to each. Meanwhile, the *Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG* (Düsseldorf) and the *Handelsunion AG* (Düsseldorf) annually transferred sums of up to DM 3,000 to those organizations as well. On this theme, see Dr. Horst Keller (ATH) to KB, 1 August 1966, ACDP K108/2. While the ATH was thus one of the largest contributors to the AB and the *Atlantica*, such amounts do not appear to have been far out of line with those provided by other individual firms, with members of the *Atlantik-Brücke*, for instance, usually giving from DM 3,000-5,000 per year, although financing from the BDI could, in certain instances, be considerably higher. Within the same sphere of activity, Birrenbach was also central in responding to a plea from James Huntley (then Executive Secretary of the AI Provisional Committee) in October 1960, securing \$500 from the *Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen* (Düsseldorf) to help tide the Atlantic Institute over during its provisional period, which had had to be extended due to the postponement of a major decision of the Ford Foundation.

European Third Way, including those of an *abendländischen* character, and the general acceptance of a pragmatic, pro-American, Atlanticist outlook.<sup>15</sup>

Given the dependence of many Atlanticist organizations on the *Wirtschaft* for financial support, recruiting new members and canvassing for donations from this sector, whether for the overall budget or specific projects, represented a major priority. With his knowledge of the business landscape, particularly of the Rhenish-Ruhr *Wirtschaft* and the *Montanindustrie*, Birrenbach played an essential role in identifying those firms and organizations, along with the individuals within them, to whom it was most suitable to make recruiting pitches and to request contributions, as well as in personally approaching them in these matters.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, thanks to his numerous friendships and connections abroad, Birrenbach could attract prominent international figures, including Americans, to attend recruiting functions, always a factor in impressing potential members and donors. While Birrenbach may have been especially inclined and equipped to undertake all this, he was definitely not alone, rather other Atlanticist-minded Germans like the *Klöckner* chief Günter Henle and the Cologne banker Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim also vigorously raised funds for their infrastructure.<sup>17</sup> Indispensable in helping Birrenbach collect money from the broader *Wirtschaft* were his close contacts with particular personalities working in other economic branches and geographic regions,

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<sup>15</sup> On these trends within West German business, see Volker Berghahn, *The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945-1973* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Volker Berghahn, ed., *Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1996). For the BDI's view in September 1959 that all promising endeavors aimed at the fostering ["*Förderung*"] of the idea of an Atlantic *Völkergemeinschaft* ("which should in no way only be limited to NATO members") deserved to be supported, especially at a time in which the danger was emerging in Europe of the formation of *wirtschaftspolitischen* blocs, see Dr. Beutler, BDI, the *Geschäftsführende Präsidialmitglied*, Cologne, to KB, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2.

<sup>16</sup> As an example of some aspects of this process, see Walter Stahl to KB, 19 July 1971, ACDP K106/1.

<sup>17</sup> Henle's activities focused on financing the DGAP, of which he was a co-founder and the first president (1955-73). Among his other positions, Oppenheim was chairman of the AI Finance Committee, which supervised the budget and fund-raising campaigns of the Atlantic Institute.

for example Hermann Josef Abs of the *Deutschen Bank* in Frankfurt, as well as with the economic *Spitzenorganisationen*, including key figures at the BDI such as Fritz Berg, Gustav Stein and Hellmuth Wagner.<sup>18</sup> Thus, Birrenbach molded and functioned within a financing network that itself consisted of several interlinked sub-networks. Even if all of this had been its only mode of operation, the private financing of the *Wirtschaft* would already have been an essential ingredient in the creation and survival of the infrastructure, at least as the relatively independent entity conceived of by the German Atlanticists.<sup>19</sup>

### C. The Flourishing of the Private Stiftung: Framework Conditions

However, in addition to the funds that flowed directly from individual firms and from the *Spitzenorganisationen*, the West German *Wirtschaft* also made a major contribution to the financing of the Atlanticist infrastructure and activities through an institution that experienced a sudden, rapid development in the Federal Republic: the private, philanthropic *Stiftung*. The remarkable languishing of this institution in Germany over the previous decades can be traced, to some extent, to factors specifically impacting on that nation in its recent past, especially the economic upheaval during the Weimar Republic and the coercive measures of the totalitarian National Socialist regime directed at virtually all such private initiative that might have emerged from the *Wirtschaft*, the *Wissenschaft* and, indeed, the entire *Gesellschaft* as a whole. Observing the situation from a somewhat broader temporal and spatial perspective, we can readily discern that the stagnation in the development of the German *Stiftungen* simultaneously

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<sup>18</sup> See, for instance, Walter Stahl to KB, 14 May 1962, ACDP K108/2. Fritz Berg was president of the BDI (1949-71), while Prof. Gustav Stein and Hellmuth Wagner, among their other roles, successively occupied the position of *Hauptgeschäftsführer*. For Birrenbach's reference to Wagner as the "chief whip" for industry, see KB to Wagner, 14 June 1965, ACDP K052/1.

<sup>19</sup> The significance of funding from the *Wirtschaft* is attested to, for instance, in the suddenly precarious financial situation of the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft* after the BDI in 1959 halved its previous annual support of DM 20,000, thus increasing the importance of the contribution of individual firms.

formed part of a more widespread and deep-seated weakness with respect to private initiative in the field of philanthropy that had historically characterized the European continent, certainly in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon countries. This particular quality was primarily due to, or at least complemented by, the traditionally expansive role assigned to the state over the centuries in Germany and the rest of continental Europe, where the promotion of the sciences, arts and welfare had been considered principally the responsibility of government and the churches. Consequently, even as of the mid- to late-1950s, private *Stiftungen* in the Federal Republic continued to face legal, tax-related (“*steuerpolitischen*”) and psychological obstacles, and the total financial means available from them was correspondingly limited.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, whatever the lack of historical precedents, there also existed an environment in the Federal Republic by the late 1950s that increasingly favored the founding of *Stiftungen*. During the 1950s, more and more stress was being placed by politicians and the public on the political, economic and social importance of the *Wissenschaft*, an emphasis initially connected most directly with the desire for economic recovery. However, this particular linkage found itself supplemented to great effect in the latter half of the 1950s, with the first international thaw in the East-West confrontation occurring around the middle of the decade but then especially after the “Sputnik shock” of October 1957. Henceforth, the promotion of the *Wissenschaft* also came to be seen as a vital desideratum in a situation whose upshot was now expected to be not an imminent hot war but rather a prolonged, drawn-out cold war with the Soviet Union and communism, in which technology, economy and culture would ultimately play

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<sup>20</sup> On these obstacles, see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the *Stiftung* Initiatives, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015.

a more decisive role than short-term military means. In this context, many considered the public expenditures in the Federal Republic devoted to the fostering of the *Wissenschaft* too paltry, especially in comparison to those allotted in the United States and other western industrial countries as well as in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the absolute necessity of remedying these deficits in the *Wissenschaft* and in its promotion became a commonplace in the *Bundesrepublik* during this period. Finally, the *Wirtschaftswunder* and the accompanying prosperity and wealth contributed substantially to the willingness to establish *Stiftungen* in West Germany.

During the 1950s, private philanthropy was certainly not unknown to the Thyssen firm. Indeed, the concern had been donating several hundred thousand marks each year to a variety of charitable causes and research endeavors. From within the firm, Birrenbach himself, as a man of industry well acclimated to the far-reaching benefits of technical research, advocated the support of the *Wissenschaft*, and considerable sums were transferred for such purposes to the *Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft* (which essentially functioned as the “clearing place” for the funds flowing from the private *Wirtschaft* to the *Wissenschaft*) and to the respective *Betriebsgesellschaften*.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the Thyssen concern financed its own research institutions, admittedly focused rather narrowly on the enterprise’s primary area of self-interest, namely the problems and issues confronting the coal and steel industry. Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1958, Birrenbach’s Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf), together with its sister company, the Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG (Cologne), had set up a *Stiftungs-* fund to finance research into questions regarding the law of the *Montanunion* and the

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<sup>21</sup> On the *Stifterverband*, see Winfried Schulze, *Der Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, 1920-1995* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).

European Economic Community. Thus, Birrenbach and the Thyssen firm, already by the end of the 1950s, had something of a tradition of promoting the *Wissenschaft*.<sup>22</sup>

#### D. Founding the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

It was in this gradually more hospitable and moderately encouraging environment, both on an overall societal level as well as within the Thyssen concern itself, that the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was established on 7 July 1959 with its seat in Cologne. Parallel to his other activities with respect to Thyssen donations for the benefit of the *Wissenschaft*, Birrenbach had been advocating such an ambitious undertaking from quite an early point in his Thyssen career. In fact, he had espoused the idea of founding a *Stiftung* almost immediately after taking over the management of Thyssen assets [“*Vermögen*”], indeed had openly done so in the very first meeting he had chaired of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in 1954. Birrenbach had been encouraged in these efforts by a number of factors. In harmony with the broader atmosphere in the *Bundesrepublik* that we have already discussed, he was convinced that the promotion of the *Wissenschaft* had to be granted one of the highest priorities if the Germans hoped to keep pace in this regard with the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup> Along with Robert Ellscheid, he also believed that even a private entity like the Thyssen *Vermögen* was of such a magnitude that it was virtually compelled by its nature to assume something of a public function. Particularly if such a massive fortune had been

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<sup>22</sup> According to Birrenbach, his firm in 1957, to take just one year, had transferred DM 37,000 to the *Stifterverband*, and several times this sum had been raised for the same purpose by the *Betriebsgesellschaften*, in which his company (including the August-Thyssen-Hütte, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke, Niederrheinische Hütte and Handelsunion) substantially took part (KB to Fritz Steinhoff, Minister-President (NRW), 6 February 1958, ACDP K170/1). On the necessity of a tight cooperation between *Wissenschaft*, research and industry to enable the further development of the *Sozialstaat* that had been constructed in the Federal Republic after the war, see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.

<sup>23</sup> KB to Fritz Steinhoff, Minister-President (NRW), 6 February 1958, ACDP K170/1.

simply inherited, Birrenbach considered it only correct and “decent [*anständig*]” to make a large part of it available to serve the interests of the general public, for instance through means of a private foundation. Perhaps also from a public relations standpoint, always prominent in his consciousness, Birrenbach viewed the *Thyssen Stiftung* as proof that opposition to a planned or socialist economy did not necessarily entail a fundamental denial of the obligations of the “*Großbesitz*” towards the wider society around it.<sup>24</sup>

Like the explicitly Atlanticist infrastructure that we have previously examined in Chapter 4, the founding during this period of private *Stiftungen*, including the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, and their forms owed a great deal to American (and, to a lesser extent, British) inspiration. Already since many decades, the holders of sizeable private fortunes in the United States had taken steps to make all or part of their incomes available for the benefit of the general public through the funding of the *Wissenschaft* as well as of diverse cultural and charitable endeavors. American foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, served as a stimulus and as archetypes for their soon-to-be and newly established German counterparts, a process sometimes facilitated by firsthand experience, including that of returned exiles, along with actual assistance from the American foundations themselves. For some Germans, the construction of *Stiftungen* was also seen as a means of keenly professing their support for and of arousing sympathies in the United States. Though no evidence exists that this latter consideration influenced Birrenbach, he was well aware of the lack of German *Vorbilder* and did look across the Atlantic to American foundations in

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<sup>24</sup> On the obligations of the *Großbesitz*, see KB to Dr. Friedrich Kobrak, 22 July 1960, ACDP K047/2. For Birrenbach on the potential public relations rewards of a *Stiftung*, here specifically with reference to the reputation of Krupp, see KB to *Generaldirektor* Hans L. Merkle, Robert Bosch GmbH, 6 October 1967, ACDP, K019/1. Of course, such public relations perspectives took into account the association in the public mind between firms like Thyssen and Krupp, on one hand, and militarism and National Socialism, on the other.



his search for appropriate models and in assessing the proper role and the achievements of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* and other European foundations.<sup>25</sup> It was also explicitly from American conceptions that Birrenbach derived his ideas about “*Witwenkapitalismus*” and the responsibilities and need for a legitimization of the inheritors of such immense fortunes.<sup>26</sup> While the notion of large *Stiftungen* based on the American pattern, of what was sometimes referred to as a “*Stiftungskapitalismus*,” was not universally beloved in the Federal Republic, even in industrial and banking circles, the increasing propagation of foundations like the *Thyssen Stiftung* appears to be yet another manifestation of the ongoing “Americanization of West German industry.”<sup>27</sup>

Central to Birrenbach’s understanding, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was a distinctly private undertaking, an independent institution existing alongside but separate from the traditional instruments wielded by the state in the system of *Wissenschaftsförderung* in West Germany. In guiding principle and in practice, the *Stiftung* would limit its activity insofar as it would eschew responsibilities that should be fulfilled by the state. Despite the “universal presence of public institutions” and its quantitatively superior financing resources, the state remained incapable of fostering the *Wissenschaft* alone, and therefore the private *Wirtschaft*, in this case a foundation the size of the *Thyssen Stiftung*, could

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<sup>25</sup> For Birrenbach on relevant conditions in the United States, see his address at the 10<sup>th</sup> *Ordentlichen Hauptversammlung* of the August-Thyssen-Hütte at the Mercatorhalle in Duisburg on 17 April 1964, ACDP K077/3. Supporting a proposal of the *Fondation Royaumont* (Paris), Birrenbach also argued elsewhere in favor of the establishment of a new type of foundation in Europe along the lines of (with the requisite modifications) the American Community Trusts that would enable active foundations to secure substantial financial assistance.

<sup>26</sup> Birrenbach shared his thoughts about the so-called *Witwenkapitalismus* at the first meeting he chaired of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, in 1954. On this meeting, see Birrenbach’s speech upon receiving the Harnack Medal, 26 June 1981, ACDP K141/2.

<sup>27</sup> For Birrenbach on the necessity of a close relationship between *Wissenschaft* and *Wirtschaft*, and on the especially tight bond existing between these two factors in the United States (despite the setback this linkage had suffered in the last five years, due in part to the “Vietnam trauma”), see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.

and, indeed, had to play a vital and unique role in this realm.<sup>28</sup> Here, the FTS focused on those tasks that could not be, or at least were not being, properly assumed by the state. Beyond acting as a simple stopgap regarding the deficits in state financing, the *Thyssen Stiftung* also developed and stimulated vital initiatives on its own with respect to particular research programs; encouraged the uniting of the confusing multitude of scattered individual endeavors into more coherent wholes; and even hoped, through its own initial patronage, to trigger an influx of state funding for specific long-term research projects. Birrenbach was also convinced that, thanks to their private nature, the *Thyssen Stiftung* and others like it were especially distinguished by their ability to approach particular subject areas and tasks with a greater speed, decisiveness and flexibility, free of political considerations and certain temporal, legislative and budgetary constraints, and from a more objective distance than the state. Ultimately, he saw the *Thyssen Stiftung* as functioning at most in a complementary relationship to the state, in select instances providing funds to essential projects either at the direct request of the government or as a replacement for anticipated financing lost due to government budget-cutting.<sup>29</sup>

The founding of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* required a considerable amount of time and the surmounting of formidable obstacles. In addition to Birrenbach, two other like-minded men proved key: Ellscheid, Birrenbach's partner in administering the Thyssen

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<sup>28</sup> On the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* as a pronounced but still quite rare example in the Federal Republic of "private initiative" in this field, see Birrenbach's address at the 10<sup>th</sup> *Ordentlichen Hauptversammlung* of the August Thyssen Hütte, 17 April 1964, ACDP K077/3.

<sup>29</sup> For instance, in Spring 1962, Birrenbach responded favorably to Chancellor Adenauer's request that the *Thyssen Stiftung* support the Weizmann Institute (Israel). Shortly thereafter, in July 1962, the *Kuratorium* of the *Stiftung* approved a sum for an exchange program with the United States, which had originally been foreseen in the budget of the Foreign Office but had since been removed. On the freedoms that distinguished a private *Stiftung*, see Birrenbach's Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2. On the need to maintain the principle of the self-administration of the *Wissenschaft* in the face of the demands of the *Politik* and on the *Wissenschaftsförderung* in the totalitarian states failing, therefore, "to secure the potential [*Leistungsfähigkeit*] of the *Wissenschaft* in its entire breadth and diversity [*Breite und Vielfalt*]," see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1.

*Vermögen*; and Robert Pferdmenes, who primarily functioned in an advisory capacity. Further support came from Hans-Günther Sohl and, ironically, Chancellor Adenauer. Still, the process involved almost two years of grueling negotiations with the responsible public authorities about details. It was also necessary, and quite difficult, to convince Amélie Thyssen and her daughter, Anita Gräfin Zichy-Thyssen, to give their approval for such an undertaking. Not too long after, Birrenbach deemed the success he and Ellscheid finally achieved in persuading the Thyssen women “one of the most beautiful, if not the greatest, successes of my professional career.”<sup>30</sup> Great care was taken in the construction of the foundation’s various organs, especially that of the important *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*, a process, occurring after the appointment of the *Kuratorium*, in which Birrenbach played a central role. Because there had been “attempts to defame the motives and methods of our action,” it appeared all the more essential to Birrenbach to impart to this scientific advisory council a character of absolute independence.<sup>31</sup> In part through the targeted selection of the personalities of this body, Birrenbach sought to ensure that the humanities enjoyed a high priority among the concerns of the *Stiftung*. Thanks above all to Birrenbach’s impetus and his early recognition of urgent needs, the founders, after much deliberation, bestowed upon their creation the general purpose of promoting the research of the (initially, exclusively German) *Wissenschaft*, with

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<sup>30</sup> KB to Dr. Friedrich Kobrak, Prov. Buenos Aires, 22 July 1960, ACDP K047/2. As Birrenbach, years later and well after the death of Amélie, described the attitude of the Thyssen family: “The *Gesellschafter* [of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH] are Argentinian and not interested in German problems... especially as the understanding for *Stiftungen* (confidentially spoken) is low.” [KB to Ludwig Erhard, 19 July 1974, ACDP K190/2].

<sup>31</sup> KB to NRW *Kultusminister* Werner Schütz, 7 September 1960, ACDP K004/2. Schütz would later become a member of the *Vorstand* of the *Thyssen Stiftung*. On the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat* as the “soul of this *Stiftung*,” see Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the FTS on 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.

particular consideration for the *Nachwuchs*.<sup>32</sup> For Birrenbach, the FTS would offer the opportunity to express his striving for the linkage of *Wissenschaft, Kultur, Politik* and *Wirtschaft*.

#### E. Functioning of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

All of this resolved to a satisfactory extent, the organs of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* finally began their activity in the fall of 1960. With regard to its structure, the *Thyssen Stiftung* approximated in many respects the organizations we have already encountered in Chapter 4 when evaluating the explicitly Atlanticist institutions. The FTS comprised three interacting and, usually, cooperating bodies: the *Vorstand*, in this case essentially a *Geschäftsführung* that dealt with the day-to-day administration of the *Stiftung*; the *Kuratorium*, akin to the executive steering organs of the Atlanticist organizations; and the aforementioned *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*.<sup>33</sup> Birrenbach's rise within the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was a fairly rapid one, although the distance he was required to scale to reach the peak was, admittedly, not a particularly daunting one. From

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<sup>32</sup> Here, the purpose of a broader philanthropy was considered no longer relevant to the necessities of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, having been supplanted by the social activity of *öffentlichen Rechtsträgern*, ranging from the level of the overall state down to the *Gemeinden*. With respect to the *Nachwuchs*, the FTS made available means for *Doktoranden-* and *Habilitanden-Stipendien*, aimed at strengthening the corps of budding college and university instructors; for "orientation" and research stipends; for editions of scholarly texts; and for the support of additional tasks of the *Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung*.

<sup>33</sup> Dr. Ernst Coenen functioned as the *Vorstand* of the *Stiftung* from its founding, temporarily joined for the period 1963-68 by the NRW *Kultusminister a.D.* Werner Schütz. The *Kuratorium* consisted of approximately seven figures from the *Wirtschaft*, many already directly involved with Thyssen in other capacities. In addition to Birrenbach, these figures included at times: Fritz Berg, Robert Ellscheid, Julian Freiherr von Godlewski, Harald Kühnen, Robert Pferdenges, Hans-Günther Sohl, and Nikolaus Graf Strasoldo. This organ determined the overall guidelines of the *Stiftung* within which its purposes should be achieved; rendered the final decision on individual research proposals and the awarding of funds; appointed and supervised the *Vorstand*; and appointed and dismissed its own members. The *Wissenschaftliche Beirat*, initially nineteen members strong, included personalities (largely professors) from the fields of *Wissenschaft*, research, education and *Wirtschaft*, among them over the years: Prof. Dr. Helmut Coing, the first chairman; Prof. Dr. Arnold Bergstraesser, prior to his passing away in February 1964; Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, a Nobel Prize winner in biochemistry; Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, a Thyssen family friend; Prof. Dr. Karl Hettlage; Dr. Hans Reuter from the DEMAG AG (Duisburg); Theodor Schieder, the Cologne historian; Prof. Dr. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker; and Prof. Dr. Theodor Wessels of the *Energiewirtschaftlichem Institut* at the University of Cologne.

1959 onward, therefore from the very inception, he was a member of the *Kuratorium*, the highest body of the *Stiftung*. In 1961, he became a deputy chairman of the *Kuratorium*, and following the death in September 1962 of its first chairman, Robert Pferdmenes, the *Kuratorium* decided on an arrangement whereby the two current deputy chairmen, Ellscheid and Birrenbach, would henceforth alternate over extended periods of time as chairman of that body. However, after Ellscheid had then served as chairman for about two years, Birrenbach succeeded him in July 1965 and never relinquished the position, another case of Birrenbach following in the footsteps of Pferdmenes. It was in this role as chairman of the *Kuratorium* and as one of only two members of that organ who also took part in the meetings of the scientific advisory council that Birrenbach came to be the most influential figure within the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*. Meanwhile, Birrenbach's activity at the *Stiftung*, especially as chairman of the *Kuratorium*, also considerably expanded his contacts with leading American *Wissenschaftlern*.<sup>34</sup>

Seen in a wider geographical perspective, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* might not have ranked among the largest private foundations in existence during this period. The financial means available to it in any given year were quite a bit smaller than those at the disposal of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* or the *Krupp-Stiftung*, to mention two other major foundations established in the Federal Republic during the 1960s (which we shall return to soon), or, abroad, the Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon and the big American

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<sup>34</sup> With respect to some of those American scholars possessing German backgrounds, members of the initial *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat* included Prof. Dr. Goetz Briefs, who had emigrated during the National Socialist period and continued on as a professor at Georgetown University in Washington, DC; and Prof. Dr. Hans Rothfels, who had since returned to Germany from his exile in the United States but during his time at the *Thyssen Stiftung* (which lasted until June 1965) retained his American citizenship. For Birrenbach welcoming it if Karl Brandt (another refugee from Nazi Germany) of Stanford University's Food Research Institute would speak at the next meeting of the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*, see KB to Prof. Dr. Karl Brandt, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

foundations.<sup>35</sup> Operating within these natural limits, the *Stiftung* primarily, though with exceptions, financed well-defined, medium-sized, temporally limited research projects, avoiding more general grants, for instance those aimed at the founding or expansion of institutes.<sup>36</sup> Yet while it could not be compared in size to the world's largest foundations, the FTS was still a powerful financing instrument wielding not inconsiderable funds.

Upon the founding, the *Stifterinnen*, the two Thyssen women, had endowed the FTS from their private fortunes via their *Vermögensverwaltungen* with a package of stock shares of the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG in the nominal sum of DM 100 million and a then-stock market value of DM 270 million.<sup>37</sup> Through the participation of the *Stiftung* in the capital increase of the ATH in 1969, the foundation increased its stock holding to a nominal sum of DM 105 million. It was primarily with the dividends returned on these shares and, to a much lesser extent, from the interest accrued on financial investments that the FTS went

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<sup>35</sup> Founded in 1956 through the will of the recently deceased oil magnate Calouste Gulbenkian, the private Portuguese Gulbenkian Foundation was the largest European foundation of the era.

<sup>36</sup> Such exceptions, expensive one-time or long-term actions in which the FTS financed large individual undertakings, indeed included the significant participation in the setting-up, survival, upgrading, and expansion of important institutes (e.g. the purchase of buildings), for instance with respect to the *Kunsthistorische Institut in Florenz*; the *Zoologische Station Neapel*; institutes of the *Görres-Gesellschaft* (Cologne) in Rome, Madrid and Lisbon; the *Orient-Institut* of the *Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* in Beirut; the *Deutsche Studienzentrum in Venedig*; the Nepal Research Center in Kathmandu (Nepal); the Serengeti Research Institute in the Tanzania National Parks in East Africa; and the Marine Biological Laboratory on the Gulf of Aqaba. For example, see the Expositions of Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, ACDP K077/1; and Birrenbach's Speech at the Meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.

<sup>37</sup> Birrenbach later claimed, though almost certainly referring to the time at which the *Stiftung* actually began its work, that this *Paket* of ATH *Aktien* had a stock market value of DM 350-400 million ("Förderung der Geisteswissenschaften: Aufgaben der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung," by Kurt Birrenbach, *Das Parlament*, 12 October 1968, ACDP K063/3). Initially, there existed an irrevocable *Nießbrauchrecht* (right of usufruct) granted by the Thyssen *Vermögensgesellschaften* to the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*. With the merger of the August-Thyssen-Hütte and the Phoenix-Rheinrohr in 1964 the Fritz Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung AG (Cologne) and the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen (Düsseldorf) carried out their obligations entered into upon the founding of the *Thyssen Stiftung* to transfer in this case the actual shares of stock to the FTS. Henceforth, the *Thyssen Stiftung* had fully available its own *Vermögen* of a nominal DM 100 million in August-Thyssen-Hütte shares (with a market value as of mid-April 1964 of about DM 245 million). The merger of the August-Thyssen-Hütte and the Phoenix-Rheinrohr thus belatedly cleared the way for what might be considered the final stage in the establishment of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*.

about its work.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the actual income of the *Stiftung* varied annually to some extent, creating considerable uncertainty and rendering it even more hesitant to commit to long-term projects.<sup>39</sup> During the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the FTS distributed on average about DM 10 million per year.<sup>40</sup> By October 1970, it had dispensed in all about 110 million DM in fulfillment of its statutory purpose, the promotion of the *Wissenschaft*.<sup>41</sup>

#### F. The Emergence of a German *Stiftung* System

The *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was the first large private *Einzelstiftung* set up in the Federal Republic since the end of World War II devoted to the fostering of the *Wissenschaft*. Beyond its own importance as a financing instrument in this field, the establishment of a private foundation of the magnitude of the *Thyssen Stiftung* represented a significant breakthrough at the time for the development of a private West German *Stiftung* system. As has already been alluded to, foundations, based like the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* on American models, intended to cultivate science, art, education and the like were a rather new phenomenon in German history, indeed in continental European history, during this period. At least for some time after its founding, the *Thyssen Stiftung* would remain one of the few large private West German foundations. However, the establishment of the *Stiftung* did become a source of considerable imitation

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<sup>38</sup> From 1960-69, approximately DM 94.24 million flowed to the *Thyssen Stiftung* in dividends from these shares. From 1961-69, the *Stiftung* took in approximately DM 6.12 million in interest from its financial investments. Its total income between 1960-69 came to approximately DM 100.36 million.

<sup>39</sup> During the 1960s, the percentage amount of the dividends: 1961-63=12%; 1964=10%; 1965 and 1966=11%; 1967 and 1968=8%; 1969=10%; and 1970=12%.

<sup>40</sup> As an example of the variations that existed, the *Stiftung* distributed DM 14 million in 1970.

<sup>41</sup> Corresponding to the requirements of the FTS statutes, more than DM 30 million were made available for the natural sciences, first and foremost in the area of medicine, while more than DM 70 million benefited the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*) and the promotion of the *wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs* (Birrenbach Speech at the Meeting of the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2).

and was followed by the creation of further notable private foundations in the *Bundesrepublik*, even if in many cases these institutions were not so financially powerful. On the other hand, we have already pointed to two founded in its wake that were indeed *finanzstärker*, namely the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, actually a semi-private foundation established in 1961, and the *Krupp-Stiftung*, founded in 1967.<sup>42</sup> From its very founding, the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* was the most potent *Wissenschaft*-promoting *Stiftung* in West Germany. The financial means of this *Stiftung* came from its own *Vermögen*, over a billion marks in 1965, and therefore it received no public sums nor was it dependent on the profits or losses of a business enterprise.<sup>43</sup> Not least due to the existence and activities of the *Thyssen Stiftung*, the perception of an urgent necessity for also the private sector to help support the *Wissenschaft* became significantly more prevalent during the 1960s and after than it had been at the turn of the decade, the time of its founding.

While none of the handful of important German foundations operating in the 1960s, including the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* and the *Krupp-Stiftung*, could be compared in scope with their large American counterparts, a discernible foundation system was beginning to develop within the Federal Republic. Aside from the founding of individual *Stiftungen*, the emergence of such a system manifested itself in part in the various foundation conferences, including those staged by the Frankfurt-based *Wirtschaftspolitischen Gesellschaft*.<sup>44</sup> Of course, given his prominence in the realm of

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<sup>42</sup> The *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* was set up in May 1961 by the *Bund* and the *Land of Niedersachsen* with the proceeds from the privatization of the *Volkswagenwerk*. Its *Kuratorium*, consisting of fourteen members, met for the first time in February 1962.

<sup>43</sup> On the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, see Rainer Nicolaysen, *Der lange Weg zur Volkswagenstiftung: Eine Gründungsgeschichte im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002).

<sup>44</sup> The WIPOG's attempts into at least the mid-1960s to explore and help overcome the obstacles facing private *Stiftungen* in the Federal Republic are summarized in the "Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the *Stiftungsinitiativen*," *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am*



West German *Stiftungen*, Birrenbach was regularly invited to these functions, along with other major figures from the areas of *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft* and the foundations. At the same time, Birrenbach's interactions also suggest the emergence of less formal networks and methods of consultation and advising among those involved with the *Stiftungen* regarding the full range of issues and problems that confronted them in that field, one such nexus existing, for instance, between Birrenbach and Ernst Coenen of the *Thyssen Stiftung*, on the one hand, and especially Ulrich von Pufendorf of the WIPOG, on the other.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, with the founding and evident success of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, Birrenbach himself became something of an informal consultant with respect to wider questions pertaining to foundations. Quite often this personal advisory role involved rather small *Stiftungen*, but Birrenbach also served, for instance, as a consultant

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Main, ACDP K015. The WIPOG's interest in such matters had been piqued already by the mid-1950s as a result of its own mounting difficulties in attaining sufficient financing through member contributions and donations from *Fördererkreisen* of the *Wirtschaft*, especially to carry out long-term tasks that did not hold out the promise of immediate results. Beginning in 1961, the WIPOG staged a series of annual *Arbeitstagungen* dealing with and seeking to further the discussion about the theme *Stiftungen*: in March 1961 on "New Forms of Cooperation [*Zusammenwirken*] of *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft* in Educational [*Bildungs-*] and Development Tasks"; in July 1962 on "Mobilization of the *Stiftung* Idea in Our Legal and Economic Order"; and in November 1963 on the current state of legislation and law (including tax-law) surrounding the founding and management of charitable *Stiftungen*. The organization claimed that circles of the *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft*, *Pädagogik* and *Publizistik* had all demonstrated great interest in these *Arbeitstagungen*. Such conferences were also linked with other undertakings of WIPOG personnel, for instance a trip to the United States (and subsequent report) by Dr. Gernot Gather at the end of 1960 to study the *Stiftungswesen* there, as well as the successful efforts of Dr. Rudolf Mueller to bring the annual 1962 conference of the *Deutschen Juristentag* to take up on its agenda themes and problems of *Stiftung* law. The *Juristentag* henceforth formed a standing *stiftungsrechtliche* commission, to which Gather belonged and which was closely connected with the WIPOG's third *Arbeitstagung* (November 1963). The WIPOG's *stiftungspolitische* work also consisted of scholarly analyses, for instance of the social-psychological, social-economic, legal and political preconditions for *Stiftung* initiatives. Furthermore, the WIPOG engaged in a constant *Öffentlichkeitsarbeit*, aimed at informing a broader public of its findings and, in general, at promoting the concept of the *Stiftung*. The WIPOG's conferences were covered and their results published in its own journal, *Offener Welt*. Finally, the WIPOG provided advice and materials to those broadcasters and other media putting together programs and pieces on the *Stiftungen*. Thus, in a series of in-depth articles on the topic *Stiftungen*, the weekly *Die Zeit* heavily utilized materials and referred to the works of the WIPOG.

<sup>45</sup> Pufendorf was the *Geschäftsführende Vorstandsmitglied* of the WIPOG. On the *Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft* as a source of judgment and expertise with respect to taxation measures in relation to foundations and other philanthropic institutions, see the Remark Regarding the Meeting of Representatives of Philanthropic Organizations at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 7-8 February 1973, ACDP K039/1.

at times to the eminent Berthold Beitz with respect to the founding of the *Krupp-Stiftung*.<sup>46</sup> As part of our ongoing treatment of the personal and functional relationship between the two of them, it is worth noting that here again Birrenbach in a sense followed a trail previously blazed by Robert Pferdmeniges, who had earlier assisted in smoothing the path for the creation of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*.

Another characteristic of the emerging *Stiftung* system was that, as with the explicitly Atlanticist institutions, integration and cooperation significantly defined the relationship of the FTS and its organs to major foundations and *wissenschaftlichen* organizations at home and abroad. Within the Federal Republic, close coordination of programs and the like existed, for instance, with the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, the *Robert Bosch Stiftung*, the *Krupp-Stiftung*, the *Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung*, the *Stiferverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft*, the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft*, the *Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft* and the various *Hochschulen*. Again, such collaboration was facilitated through friendly personal relations, as those between Birrenbach and other prominent figures in the system like Gotthard Gambke and Hans Merkle.<sup>47</sup> However, the connection between *Stiftungen* and *wissenschaftlichen* organizations was also cemented through personnel overlap. Within the FTS, the institutional expression, as well as a basis, of this cooperation was to be found in the

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<sup>46</sup> For Birrenbach and Beitz, see KB to *Generaldirektor* Hans L. Merkle, Robert Bosch GmbH, 6 October 1967, ACDP K019/1. Beitz became chairman of the *Kuratorium* of the *Krupp-Stiftung*. On Birrenbach's assessment of the successful work and impact of the *Thyssen Stiftung* in its first decade and the name the *Stiftung* had made for itself in the "*Welt der Stiftungen*" even beyond Europe, which he viewed as a tribute to the quality of the projects financed, see Kurt Birrenbach Speech, Meeting of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2. Broadly speaking, the role of Coenen as *Vorstand* at the FTS highlights the increasing number of salaried employees engaged in the modern philanthropic foundations, while the existence of both larger and smaller *Stiftungen* underscores the diversity of organization among such foundations during this period.

<sup>47</sup> These institutions were located throughout the *Bundesrepublik*, for example: the StVWW in Hannover; the RBS in Stuttgart; the AHS and DFG in Bonn; the *Stiferverband* and the *Krupp-Stiftung* in Essen; and the MPG in Munich. Gambke was the general secretary of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*. Merkle was head of the *Robert Bosch Stiftung*, which was founded in 1964.

composition of the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*, whose members had been consciously selected and pursued, in part by Birrenbach, not only as outstanding representatives of the *Wissenschaft* and *Wirtschaft*, but also for their links to other large *Wissenschaft*-promoting organizations. This body comprised, for instance, the leaders of both the MPG and DFG as well as personalities of the StVWW.<sup>48</sup> In addition to his own tight connections to both the MPG and DFG, Birrenbach became a member of the MPG Senate in 1964.<sup>49</sup> It was largely due to such cooperation and integration that the FTS was able to manage with a relatively small and cheap administrative apparatus, instead relying on that of organizations like the DFG and MPG or, in some cases, the *Hochschulen*.<sup>50</sup> As a whole, institutional cooperation and integration enabled the FTS to operate much more efficiently and effectively with its considerable, though far from inexhaustible, means.<sup>51</sup>

### G. Internationalization of the Stiftungen

Among the most remarkable trends that we can detect at the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, as well as at other West German foundations, during the 1960s, one that Birrenbach promoted and significantly advanced, was the internationalization of its work.

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<sup>48</sup> These figures included, at times, Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt (MPG), Prof. Dr. Gerhard Hess and Prof. Dr. Julius Speer (both DFG), and Prof. Dr. Hans Peters (University of Cologne and a member of the *Kuratorium* of the StVWW), as well as Dr. Ernst-Hellmut Vits (*Stifterverband*) and Prof. Dr. Hermann Jahrreiß (*Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz*). Birrenbach referred to Butenandt as “one of the eminent [*bedeutenden*] *Wissenschaftler* of our time” and believed there existed a “personal closeness [*Verbundenheit*]” between the two of them [KB to Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1].

<sup>49</sup> Birrenbach’s membership in the MPG Senate provided him deeper insight into the functioning of the MPG: its institutes, research activities and policies, goals, budget, and annual publications and assemblies. Birrenbach attended MPG annual member assemblies, for instance in Bremen in June 1972. The MPG was the successor organization to the *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft*.

<sup>50</sup> For instance, the money dispensed by the *Thyssen Stiftung* for the natural sciences and medicine was actually given to and, by all accounts, “*sachlich*” and reliably administered by the DFG as part of its own programs in these areas. Likewise, the stipends of the *Stiftung* for *Doktoranden* and *Habilitanden* were awarded through the *Hochschulen* and the DFG. The entire costs for the administration of the *Thyssen Stiftung* amounted to only about one percent of its total income during the period 1960-69.

<sup>51</sup> On the cooperation of the FTS with other German *Stiftungen* as a means to avoid “double work” and to enable “*Gemeinschaftsprojekte*” and thus to achieve a higher degree of efficiency, see Birrenbach’s speech at the meeting of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2. In this speech, Birrenbach also pointed to the “most valuable aid” provided to the FTS by the DFG and the MPG.

A key element of this process was the geographic expansion of the field in which the *Thyssen Stiftung* could operate. The original version of the foundation's statutes, limiting the domain of activity of the *Stiftung* to the promotion of *wissenschaftlichen* projects of the German *Hochschulen* and research centers, soon proved itself to be unsuitable in light of what was increasingly viewed as the international nature of the *Wissenschaft*. Equally conscious of the undertakings of American foundations all over the world, Birrenbach came to consider it an "*Ehrenpflicht*" that West German foundations also make a relevant contribution in this field.<sup>52</sup> Therefore, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* carried out, at Birrenbach's initiative, a fundamental revision of its statutes quite early on in its history, in 1962. As a result, the purpose of the *Stiftung* was no longer restricted to the promotion of *exclusively* the German *Wissenschaft*, but rather expanded to the fostering of the *Wissenschaft* primarily, but *not* exclusively, in Germany. Henceforth, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* became extensively engaged beyond the borders of the Federal Republic, for instance through the financing of foreign or international research projects, and thus further embraced the tradition of the large American foundations. Above all, German *Wissenschaftler*, especially the *wissenschaftliche Nachwuchs*, were hereby proffered the opportunity to conduct research abroad, but foreign *Wissenschaftler* also received considerable support from the FTS.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> On this "*Ehrenpflicht*," see Birrenbach's speech at the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* meeting of 19 July 1965, ACDP K079/1.

<sup>53</sup> For the FTS modifying its statutes, see the Expositions of Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. In these same remarks, Birrenbach cited the projects of "international importance [*Bedeutung*]" financed by the FTS, those dealing with "a series of universal [*allgemeiner*] problems which can only be seen from the international perspective [*Sicht*] and which interest all nations equally," including the significant sum provided by the *Stiftung* for the promotion of the "*übernationalen Hochschularbeit*" of the *Deutschen Rektorenkonferenz*. He also observed the impossibility, now, of solving many contemporary problems "in a national sense [*Sinne*]," meaning by the German *Wissenschaft* alone, "rather only in cooperation with the *Wissenschaftlern* of the other countries."

Another vital aspect of the internationalization process with respect to the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was the integration during the 1960s of the foundation, along with other recently created German *Stiftungen*, into a cooperative system with foreign, most importantly American, private foundations. Various obstacles hindered the conduct of joint international projects by foundations of differing nationalities, including disparities in their charters, aims, methods and languages as well as sheer geographic distance. All this contributed to a distinct tendency “to go it alone.” Yet, as Birrenbach argued, clear benefits existed in cooperation, coordination and communication among foundations on an international level. In addition to ensuring enhanced resources and avoiding wasteful duplication, such collaboration opened up the prospect of more effectively promoting common institutional interests. These included the securing of further tax privileges, the adapting of the legal frameworks in which they operated and the improving of their relationships vis-à-vis state and society, mainly to limit state supervision and assure themselves maximum independence. Along with a more fluid exchange of information, Birrenbach endorsed an expanded exchange of personnel between the foundations on an international scale. Among other things, he proposed the establishment of a small European information center that would also eventually exchange information with the Foundation Library Center in New York. He advocated as well the permanent institution of well-prepared, periodic, informal bilateral or multilateral meetings between the executives of the larger European and American foundations, seeing these as particularly

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Of course, Birrenbach also addressed in his comments the applications to the *Thyssen Stiftung* from professors at the German universities, as well as those projects financially supported by the FTS that pertained to “the *Problematik* of the inner *geistigen*, religious, political and *wirtschaftlichen* structure of our *Gesellschaft* in the Federal Republic itself.” Indicative of the internationalization process is the funding provided by the FTS to the institutes mentioned earlier in this chapter (page 186, note 36), which were located abroad, were in general of international significance in their specialized fields and functioned, at least in part, as sites bringing together not only German but also international scholars for joint work within their particular research areas.

valuable to the former. For Birrenbach, cooperation with American foundations was of crucial significance for their German and other European counterparts insofar as it allowed them to draw on the Americans' precious advice and abundant experience.<sup>54</sup>

In line with Birrenbach's wishes, a series of major international conferences were staged during the 1960s, in which key European and American foundations took part to discuss the problems confronting private foundations and to help facilitate this process of international cooperation. The first such conference was staged in November 1964 in Berlin, held at the joint initiative of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* and the Ford Foundation. Birrenbach convened this gathering in consultation with the president of the Ford Foundation, John McCloy, and the director of its international affairs program, Shepard Stone. Chaired by McCloy, the conference was attended by thirty representatives of the foremost international foundations from nine countries.<sup>55</sup> By the spring of 1969, a total of six such international foundation conferences had been held in Europe, including those following in the wake of the Berlin meeting, namely in London (September 1965), Rome (April 1966), Entstone (near Oxford, November 1966), Bad Godesberg (May 1968), and Bellaggio (May 1969), the latter considered the most important such gathering since the original conference in Berlin. Participants at various times comprised representatives of the chief European and American foundations, again among them the Ford Foundation,

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<sup>54</sup> On the cooperation of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* with foreign ("international") *Stiftungen*, especially the Ford Foundation, as a means to avoid "double work" and to make possible *Gemeinschaftsprojekte* and thus to achieve a higher degree of efficiency, see Birrenbach's speech at the meeting of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2. Much later on, Birrenbach pointed out that in its support since ["*einigen*"] years for the research program "*Koronarsklerose und Herzinfarkt*," the FTS had been "advised by an international commission of *Wissenschaftlern*." (Kurt Birrenbach, Greeting and Remarks, Symposium on the Occasion of the 25-Year Anniversary of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* in the Schnütgen Museum, Cologne, 26 March 1984, ACDP K110/2).

<sup>55</sup> On this event, see the address of the dean on the occasion of Birrenbach's reception of an honorary doctorate from the medical faculty of the University of Düsseldorf, ACDP K047/3. Stone had previously been the deputy editor-in-chief of the Sunday edition of the *New York Times* and, from 1949-52, the director of the Office of Public Affairs under McCloy, at the time the US High Commissioner for Germany.

which demonstrated a particular interest in such undertakings. German organizations participating in the series of conferences included, of course, the *Thyssen Stiftung* as well as the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, the *Robert Bosch Stiftung*, the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* and the *Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft*.<sup>56</sup>

These conferences could boast a number of significant achievements. Thanks to the discussions they enabled, considerable light was shed on the diverse roles, organization, methods, activities, legal and fiscal position, goals and problems of private foundations in their promotion of *Wissenschaft* and on the possibilities and appropriate modalities for future cooperation, including on an international scale. At the Berlin conference in 1964, a standing committee was set up to produce studies on foundation law and the current legal conditions of the foundations in the individual West European states. These studies formed the basis of a report by the committee, complete with proposals regarding the legal preconditions and legislative measures required in the various countries for the establishment of an effective and liberal foundation policy in the national and international fields and for enhanced international cooperation.<sup>57</sup> Finally, the late 1960s saw the appearance of notable publications, directly emerging from or at least partly stimulated by the conference series, on the state of the European foundations and airing ideas how best to improve their lot. In the German language from 1969 on, the *Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft* was especially active with its newly created *Schriftenreihe zum Stiftungswesen*, publishing volumes like a general index of German

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<sup>56</sup> The September 1965 and May 1968 gatherings were essentially German-British affairs. The November 1966 meeting at Entstone was staged at the invitation of the Ditchley Foundation. For further planned conferences, especially an upcoming one “of the European *Stiftungen*,” see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2.

<sup>57</sup> The study process was coordinated by Dr. Reinhard Goerdeler (Frankfurt), the youngest son of Carl Friedrich Goerdeler.

foundations, a *Vademecum* providing an international overview of the large *Stiftungen in Europa*, and the studies stemming from the 1964 standing committee.<sup>58</sup> Abroad, these latter studies were also published in English and French, while the *Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli* played a pivotal role during this time, for instance with the release of a directory of European foundations. All of this, the discussions, the studies, the reports, the publications, facilitated the flow of information and provided a basis for joint action by the foundations, including vis-à-vis the governments and parliaments in Europe.<sup>59</sup>

Indeed, cooperation did substantially intensify between the participating foundations as a result of the crucial impetus provided by these international foundation conferences and their products. Regular communication, not just at such conferences, improved significantly. Personal contacts, including of a trans-Atlantic nature, were established and expanded. There was an increased exchange of personnel, including between the large American and the West German foundations, a development that included German work visits to the United States. A greater international cooperation manifested itself with respect to joint research projects. Naturally, all this applied to the *Thyssen Stiftung*, as well as to the other major foundations in the *Bundesrepublik*. The collaborative efforts of the FTS with similar institutions on an international scale were pursued especially with the Ford Foundation, where Birrenbach, as already alluded to, enjoyed close contacts in McCloy and Stone. For instance, together with Ford, the

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<sup>58</sup> On the existence also of a newsletter on the national level in the Federal Republic focused on bringing the accomplishments of the foundations to the attention of the public, see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1.

<sup>59</sup> For a very positive assessment of the Agnelli Foundation's *Guide to European Foundations* as an exemplary effort of horizontal information (i.e. between foundations), see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1. About the comparative study on the *steuerliche* [tax-related] treatment of foundations worked out in August-September 1970 by the *Faculté Internationale pour l'Enseignement du Droit Comparé* with the support of the Agnelli Foundation, see the Remark regarding Interphil (the International Standing Conference on Philanthropy), ACDP K039/1.



*Thyssen Stiftung* established the Serengeti Research Institute in East Africa and, also with the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* and the *Krupp-Stiftung*, supported the activities, including conferences, of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (Paris).<sup>60</sup> Among European foundations, the economic and political integration of the western half of the continent ever more facilitated such collaboration. Moreover, by the early 1970s, non-governmental bodies, like Interphil and the Hague Club, and inter-governmental organizations, such as the OECD, the European Communities, the Council of Europe and UNESCO, had taken an interest in modern philanthropy and, more specifically, were contributing to the field of international cooperation among foundations through sundry meetings, studies and proposals, aiming for instance at a harmonization or at least an elucidation of certain practices (e.g. terminology) and conditions (e.g. tax-fiscal).<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> For an overview of the recent history of and suggestions for future international cooperation among the foundations, see Birrenbach's *Referat* at the *Internationalen Stiftungskonferenz*, Bellagio, 4 May 1969, ACDP K063/4.

<sup>61</sup> Created in 1969, Interphil (the International Standing Conference on Philanthropy) was an association for the officers of and sought to deal with all types of philanthropic organizations, among them the foundations, in Europe, the United States and Canada. As of March 1973, Amb. Pierre Forthomme (Belgium) was president of Interphil, which at that time was located in Brussels. On Interphil's early 1970s draft "Charter on Philanthropy" as an element of public relations work and a means to call attention to the political and social developments in Europe that it believed threatened philanthropic private initiative, see the Remark regarding Interphil, ACDP K039/1. For the potential value of an exchange of experiences and results with Interphil, in line with our earlier reference to the emergence of a foundation system equipped with consultative and advisory linkages, see again the Remark regarding Interphil, ACDP K039/1. The Hague Club, founded in 1971, comprised the executive directors (*Geschäftsführer*) of major foundations. For a restricted conference of about twenty key representatives and experts held at the Council of Europe, see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1. Among the participants in this gathering was Gotthard Gambke (General Secretary of the StVWW), who here posed the questions whether the harmonization of foundation law was feasible in Europe and whether foundations with an international scope could not have a European status. Following this conference, whose attendees also included the editor-in-chief of the *Tribune de Genève* (Geneva), the Council of Europe, which planned to examine the possibility of launching a relevant newsletter, issued a press communiqué. On the studies conducted by the Council of Europe and the OECD, including the latter's analysis of "The Research System," whose preparation had entailed contact with German, Italian and English foundations, see again the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1 and the Remark regarding Interphil, ACDP K039/1.

## H. Schwerpunkte and Atlanticism

Seeking to maximize the efficacy of its varying and finite amount of funds in carrying out its program, the *Thyssen Stiftung* devoted itself to particular *Schwerpunkte* deemed especially worthy of promotion. Not only was Birrenbach a strong proponent of this approach but, as chairman of the *Kuratorium*, he played a pivotal role in actually determining these concentrations. Ardent endorsement by Birrenbach and of marked significance for our purposes was the principal stress placed by the *Stiftung* on supporting the humanities, the result of several important considerations.<sup>62</sup> The Nazi regime had dealt a terrible blow to the formerly so internationally respected German *Wissenschaft* in the humanities, rendering it a sphere in particularly dire need of assistance.<sup>63</sup> In relation to the enormous growth of the natural sciences in the age of the egalitarian industrial society, the humanities appeared to be uniquely shortchanged in the allocation of funds. Even with its limited financial support, the FTS could achieve a major impact in this field since researchers did not require huge expenditures for apparatus. Birrenbach pointed to yet another compelling reason: devoting the *Stiftung* to the fostering of the humanities, as well as the area medicine, along with the renouncing of *unternehmensbezogenen* projects (a rather innovative development in the world of German *Stiftungen*), was also intended to stave off any charges of the Thyssen firm's direct self-interest.<sup>64</sup> Noteworthy for the

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<sup>62</sup> In addition to the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the other key overall *Schwerpunkte* (though individually of a lower priority than the humanities) were medicine and the natural sciences. For Birrenbach's advocacy of a strictly limited number of *Schwerpunkte* so as to achieve a greater effect, see Birrenbach's speech at the meeting of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2.

<sup>63</sup> Indeed the repercussions of the Third Reich, during which there had been blatant attempts to politicize the *Wissenschaft* as well as a mass exodus of eminent scholars, continued to radiate to some extent throughout the entire *Wissenschaft* in the Federal Republic, including, but not only, at the universities.

<sup>64</sup> This principle of renouncing an overarching purpose and specific research directly related to the firm's interests, in spite of the nature of its namesake and founding family and the source of its income,

Atlanticists was not only that the FTS specialized in the humanities but that this domain was broadly interpreted by the *Stiftungsgremien*, encompassing, in no small part due to Birrenbach's efforts, urgent and *aktuelle* themes of international relations, foreign policy and the social sciences within its purview.<sup>65</sup> Between 1961 and 1969, the FTS distributed roughly DM 31.8 million for research projects to this *Schwerpunkt* humanities, with a frequent emphasis on research plans of an interdisciplinary and international nature.<sup>66</sup>

While Birrenbach publicly argued that the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* necessarily had to orient itself solely towards "the quality of the supported matter [*Sache*]" and insisted that he had never contemplated carrying out a "politicization" of the *Thyssen Stiftung*, he also explicitly asserted that European foundations, especially if they cooperated with one another, could help develop the spirit of community within as well as between the European societies and nations and, furthermore, contribute to a better understanding

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differentiated the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* from earlier, otherwise comparable, organizations closely linked to the *Großunternehmen* of private German industry like the social welfare institutions of the Friedrich Krupp enterprise in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century or the *Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung*, founded in 1889 in Jena.

<sup>65</sup> While perhaps not immediately connected to the Thyssen firm's self-interest, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* did finance economics and other social science projects dealing with the contemporary *Wirtschaft*. These included a study by the *Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* (Munich) that investigated "the interaction of *öffentlicher Finanzwirtschaft* and *privater Wirtschaft*"; a research work of Prof. Goetz Briefs (Georgetown University, Washington, DC) on "Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Grenzen von pluralistischer Gesellschaft und Sozialstaat"; and a project of Prof. Wilfrid Schreiber (University of Cologne) on "Die Sozialversicherung und ihr Einbau in die Gesellschaftsordnung der sozialen Marktwirtschaft." For details on these endeavors, for the growing and "extraordinary importance" of these themes (among the "central questions of our time") and for Birrenbach's patent interest in them (in some cases already as of November 1962, based on his experiences in very recent years) as a means to underscore, for example, the dangers of inflationary forces due to wage and profit trends in pluralistic market economies and the necessary limits of the modern *Sozialstaat* and *Sozialpolitik* "in order to come to a healthy and, in the long-run, promising [*zukunftssträchtigen*] development of the [industrial] *Gesellschaft*," see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1 and Birrenbach's Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2. Such studies explored, among other themes, the changing interaction between *Staat/Politik*, *Wirtschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, including the relations between *Rechtsstaat* and *Sozialstaat* and within the context of what Birrenbach referred to as "the age of the interest *Verbände*." Finally, the studies on international relations funded by the *Thyssen Stiftung* also addressed, at times, relevant issues of economics, as well as other areas like politics and law.

<sup>66</sup> This approximately DM 31.8 million was part of the total of about DM 69.8 million expended by the FTS between 1961 and 1969 expressly on the support of research projects (i.e. also those pertaining, for example, to medicine and the natural sciences). The often interdisciplinary and international nature of such research was reflected, in part, in the backgrounds of the researchers themselves.

between Europe and the United States, including in fields other than politics.<sup>67</sup> In reality, the *Thyssen Stiftung*, as well as a number of other major German foundations, became a significant source of funding that proved crucial to sustaining and advancing the activities of the German Atlanticists. No surprise then that the more finely detailed *Schwerpunkte* of the *Thyssen Stiftung* comprised at various times the theme areas European integration, Atlantic security, and development aid.<sup>68</sup> This pronounced Atlanticist character is particularly striking in view of the fact that according to its statutes, indeed at the expressed wish of the two *Stifterinnen*, the *Thyssen Stiftung* was expected to devote itself, in addition to the promotion of the *Nachwuchs*, to the preservation of the “*christlich-abendländischen Kultur*,” suggesting at least the possibility of a dramatically divergent course for the *Stiftung* from the path actually followed. Facilitated by his own presence and contacts within so many of the key Atlanticist institutions, Birrenbach exercised a profound influence on this Atlanticist inclination of the *Thyssen Stiftung*, a tendency to which he provided both general support as well as a more targeted championing of

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<sup>67</sup> On the primacy of “the quality of the supported matter,” see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2.

<sup>68</sup> For the extraordinary interest of the FTS, “in a *historisch-soziologischen* sense,” in contributing to “the illumination [*Erhellung*] of the great problems of the present [*großen Gegenwartsprobleme*],” the many projects supported and significant sums made available along these lines, the role of the FTS as an “inspirer [*Anreger*],” also in this regard, and the resonance its “stimuli [*Anregungen*]” had found in the “*Gelehrtenwelt*,” see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. In these same remarks, Birrenbach cited the FTS financing provided for the projects, evincing considerable “international importance [*Bedeutung*],” conducted by Prof. Ferdinand Hermens (University of Cologne, *Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen*) and Prof. Goetz Briefs (Georgetown University, Washington, DC) that investigated the “Interdependenz von Verfassung und Wirtschaftsordnung in Europa,” which would be “of great importance” in judging the effects of integration in Europe, and the “Entwicklung der V. Republik Frankreichs,” a work that took into account all the salient “constitutional-political” problems that had emerged from the most recent developments in France in the course of studying the completely new phenomenon on the European continent of a “presidential state [*Präsidialstaates*].”

specific projects, including some in which he was himself deeply involved, prominent among them, as we shall see, the DGAP Study Groups.<sup>69</sup>

While a comprehensive list is not feasible nor desirable, it may be instructive to cite some examples of significant projects supported by the *Thyssen Stiftung* specifically related to the Atlanticist infrastructure that we have already delineated and in which the German Atlanticists directly participated. Beginning in the early 1960s, for instance, the FTS became prominent in the financing of the DGAP and its activities, providing vital funding for research programs, publications as well as study groups, indeed from the outset the entire financing necessary for the Study Groups I and II, amounting to DM 200,000 per year for each group from 1962 and 1966 onward, respectively.<sup>70</sup> Of the various German foundations, the FTS was the largest contributor for projects of the Atlantic Institute, for example financing an AI study, carried out under the direction of the institute's director of studies (Pierre Uri), that explored the possibilities of a new conception for the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy. In 1967, the *Thyssen Stiftung* supported the Greek-Turkish Evros-Meric project, which had been initiated by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and especially promoted by Birrenbach's contact US Senator (NY) Jacob Javits, a study (also concluded that year) intended to analyze the

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<sup>69</sup> Birrenbach's links with members and other figures of these Atlanticist institutions played a salient role in the various stages of the FTS grant process. Among other things, Birrenbach assisted these personalities in crafting their applications and also regularly intermediated on their behalf at the FTS.

<sup>70</sup> This funding also included the setting up and financing of the new *Referate* in the DGAP Research Institute needed to provide the study groups with the requisite research capacity. Birrenbach, with his contacts to the DGAP and his position in the *Thyssen Stiftung*, played a major role in securing this funding through his support of the application. On the substantial contribution from the FTS to the DGAP to lay the foundations for exploring the *Problematik* of "arms limitation and arms control," see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. For the DGAP's tackling of the far-reaching and expensive special tasks associated with the complex of arms control, arms limitation and international security, including the study group, being enabled through the considerable means made available by the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* for that purpose, and for the DGAP's gratitude, see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn, "Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder," intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.

future possibilities for economic development and cooperation in the border area between Greece and Turkey and to contribute to peaceful relations between those two quarrelsome NATO countries.<sup>71</sup> While not part of the Atlanticist infrastructure in which Birrenbach himself regularly and directly participated, the *Stiftung* also supported the seminars staged by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, headquartered in Paris and led by Birrenbach's contact Shepard Stone, formerly of the Ford Foundation.<sup>72</sup> Finally, as we shall see in Chapter 8, the *Thyssen Stiftung* became one of the most important contributors to the studies authorized by the Trilateral Commission during the 1970s.

Beyond these projects specifically related to those elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure in which Birrenbach himself was immediately involved, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* was also prominent in financing the research programs and projects of Atlanticist-minded institutions in the United States. For instance, the *Stiftung* provided funding to a German Research Program established by the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, which was designed to study and promote a better and more widespread knowledge of German problems, particularly in the fields of foreign and domestic politics and defense strategy.<sup>73</sup> Over the years, the *Thyssen Stiftung* also funded individual studies undertaken at such Atlanticist-minded institutions across the

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<sup>71</sup> The leader of this project, also referred to as the German-Greek-Turkish *Arbeitsgemeinschaft*, was Prof. Dr. Hans Wilbrandt of the University of Göttingen. The Evros-Meric endeavor was part of a larger "Greek-Turkish Cooperation Project," much of it financed by the Ford Foundation (Draft Report, NPC Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries, October 1966, ACDP K049/2). Birrenbach's knowledge of the tensions between Greece and Turkey was brought home by the situation in the Thyssen plants, where the Greek guest workers were kept separate from the Turkish workers [KB to Eugene Rostow, 22 July 1974, ACDP K211/2].

<sup>72</sup> On Shepard Stone and the International Association for Cultural Freedom, see Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shephard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>73</sup> For details on this, and on many other FTS funding efforts, see the report *Zehn Jahre Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1960-1970* (Cologne: Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1970).

ocean like the Council on Foreign Relations; Harvard's Center for International Affairs<sup>74</sup>; the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies Program<sup>75</sup>; and the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute.<sup>76</sup> The grants of the *Thyssen Stiftung* and other German foundations were welcomed by such American recipients as yet another valuable source of funding, particularly in times when such financing was difficult to come by.<sup>77</sup> As so often in other areas, the support and observation of such projects by the *Thyssen Stiftung* was facilitated by Birrenbach's numerous contacts with American *Wissenschaftlern* at these institutions, including figures like Henry Kissinger, Robert Bowie, Guido Goldman, Stanley Hoffmann (all at Harvard); Robert Owens (Brookings); Robert Strausz-Hupé, Walter Hahn and William Kintner (all at FPRI); and Goetz Briefs (Georgetown).<sup>78</sup>

As an essential component of its funding of such research projects and programs, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* also distributed considerable sums in support of various international exchange programs for individual students and scholars, particularly with

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<sup>74</sup> For instance, the *Thyssen Stiftung*, in conjunction with other foundations, financed a research project of the center during the 1970s (a study that ultimately appeared in the Fall 1975 edition of *Daedalus*) on the oil crisis, its political and economic effects and the differing positions vis-à-vis the crisis of the various regions and countries of the world (KB to Prof. Raymond Vernon, Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 10 November 1975, ACDP K155/1).

<sup>75</sup> KB to Robert Owens, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, Brookings Institution, 6 September 1976, ACDP K083/1. Thanks to Birrenbach's assistance, the *Thyssen Stiftung* also helped finance, along with American sources, a small, private conference staged by the Brookings Institution in Bellagio in March 1980 addressing new forms of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy (Gerard Smith to KB, 28 December 1979, ACDP K209/1 and Gerard Smith to KB, 29 April 1980, ACDP K209/1).

<sup>76</sup> For example, studies on "The Atlantic Community in Crisis: Toward a Redefinition of the Atlantic Partnership" (Walter Hahn to Dr. Gerd Brand and Dr. Hugbert Flitner, *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* (Cologne), 15 July 1975, ACDP K155/1 and Robert Schaetzel to KB, 29 June 1976, ACDP K083/1) and on British perspectives on Atlantic relations, the latter conducted by Prof. James Dougherty, a member of the FPRI staff (Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, to KB, 8 January 1976, ACDP K083/1).

<sup>77</sup> Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, to KB, 6 August 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>78</sup> Kissinger, Bowie, Goldman and Hoffmann were all especially involved in the German Research Program, Hoffmann (Director of the West European Studies Program at Harvard) as its leader. Birrenbach had met Hoffmann at the Bilderberg Conference held in Cambridge (England) in late March and early April 1967. Owens was formerly head of the Policy Planning Staff in the US State Department.

respect to the United States, but also in regard to other foreign universities and institutions. For instance, during the 1960s, grants and other awards [*Stipendien*] from the *Stiftung* to Harvard University's German Research Program, Stanford University's Hoover Institution and Food Research Institute and Georgetown University provided especially German students and scholars, with a typical stress on youth, the often vital opportunity to travel to the United States in order to study and research certain themes within their own special areas of interest on the spot. FTS grants to the internationally renowned Bologna Center of Baltimore's Johns Hopkins University enabled German students to participate there on work addressing the diverse problems of modern international economics and politics and, at the same time, ensured the taking on of Germans into the center's faculty. The *Stiftung* also financed trips of young *Wissenschaftlern* to international conferences so as to enable them, among other things, to establish contact with the major international *wissenschaftlichen* institutions and with other significant international bodies. These efforts of the *Thyssen Stiftung* were explicitly intended, in part, to promote international cooperation, including with Americans. Whether or not the actual research and other work conducted in their framework was of an overtly Atlanticist character, such activities ultimately furthered the causes of German Atlanticism and trans-Atlantic relations even by simply creating linkages between the protagonists involved and encouraging the relatively smooth transfer and adoption of previously unfamiliar methods and approaches.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> On such endeavors, see especially the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1 and *Zehn Jahre Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1960-1970* (Cologne: Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1970). For FTS financing enabling two German *Stipendiaten* to work at the Food Research Institute (Stanford) on the problems of South American agriculture, see again the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference



Aside from these projects that directly concerned the explicitly Atlanticist infrastructure and other Atlanticist-minded institutions and programs, the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* also funded a number of endeavors that aimed, in the spirit of the Atlanticism of this period, at expanding the horizons of the German worldview. These included projects that provided Germans with detailed information about and positive perspectives on the United States and its culture<sup>80</sup>; dealt with practical development policy in the Third World<sup>81</sup>; opened up to German scholars the chance not only to take part in international scholarly and scientific congresses but also to work within the context of international organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, and the EEC; promoted the advance of

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on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1.

<sup>80</sup> For instance, seeking to rectify the dearth of books available in German on the history of American painting, the *Stiftung* made a grant for the publication of a work on American painters of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Although *Geschichte der amerikanischen Malerei* (Munich: Prestel, 1974) did appear in Germany, this study was actually never completed in its originally intended sense due to the death in January 1973 of its author, Prof. Alfred Neumeyer, a German Catholic art historian of Jewish background who had emigrated to the United States in the mid-1930s and saw in the work an expression of gratitude to America (KB to US Amb. Martin Hillenbrand, Bad Godesberg, 7 October 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to John McCloy, 23 December 1975, ACDP K210/1).

<sup>81</sup> On the support of the FTS for the Arnold Bergstraesser project “Enzyklopädie der Weltzivilisation,” which comprised an exploration of the historical foundations of the “Weltzivilisation” as well as a comparative sociological analysis of the economic, socio-political and cultural processes in the developing countries, and on the significance of this project for the task of development aid, see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. As a complement to this undertaking, the FTS also funded the work carried out by the *Ifo-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung* (Munich) on the “Erforschung von Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsproblemen in Entwicklungsländern,” which, using “Ostafrika” (especially Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) as a model, analyzed the process of socio-economic development in and studied the effect of aid on these countries (including on growth and production). By September 1970, the results of this research were summarized in over fifty volumes, available in German and, in part, in English. On the “great importance” of this project and its themes “for the practical policy of today and tomorrow,” see the Expositions by Herr Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the First Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. For this project as “an important contribution” (including of the German *Stiftungen*) to practical German development policy and, more broadly, to Third World development itself, see Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2 and Birrenbach’s Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2. The FTS financed as well the efforts of the Research Society for the World Refugee Problem (whose German section was located in Bad Godesberg).

European unity<sup>82</sup>; and expanded the understanding of the historical evolution of Eastern Europe.<sup>83</sup> Facilitated by the linkages of personalities like Arnold Bergstraesser and Karl Hettlage (Chairman of the *Ifo-Institut*) to the FTS *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*, such endeavors offered Germans a greater knowledge and experience of a wide range of geographical regions, themes, and institutions relevant to the Atlanticist outlook. With its heavy involvement in Israel, the *Thyssen Stiftung* also played a notable role in cultivating Jewish opinion, an undertaking that was itself, in part, a central element of the Atlanticist efforts.<sup>84</sup> Such grants were not always based on strictly scholarly criteria, with Birrenbach remarking regarding one particular application that “the scientific qualification appears somewhat doubtful to us. We see in it more a political gesture and a help action for the benefit of Israel.”<sup>85</sup> In this respect, the foundation served not merely as a scientific-financial instrument but, as in many other projects and areas that we have

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<sup>82</sup> For instance, the *Stiftung* supported the setting up [“*Aufbau*”] of a research center at the University of Cologne aiming at the standardization of European law and involving three institutes for international law that had come together there for this purpose. The *Land NRW* had acknowledged these efforts by allocating the means for the construction of a common institute building [Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2].

<sup>83</sup> Here, the *Thyssen Stiftung* financed the formation and works of a commission devoted to the exploring of the intellectual-historical [“*geistesgeschichtlichen*”] development of Eastern Europe, a project that produced numerous publications [Birrenbach’s foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2].

<sup>84</sup> Over the years, the *Thyssen Stiftung* made considerable grants for specific projects to universities and institutes in Israel, including the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, the University of Tel Aviv, the Marine Biological Institute in Eilat, the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, and the Ecumenical Institute of Jerusalem for Higher Theological Studies. For example, already in 1961, the *Stiftung* was supporting the cooperation of the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft* with the Weizmann Institute. The *Thyssen Stiftung* also funded the work of the Leo Baeck Institute in London, including a project on German-Jewish relations in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the significant financial assistance provided by the FTS to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Weizmann Institute for the purpose of scientific research and development and on Birrenbach’s visits to these two institutions in his capacity as chairman of “the Thyssen Fund” on his trip to Israel in the spring of 1971, see the article “Die EEC wird vor Frankreich nicht kapitulieren,” by Dan Patir, *Davar*, 17 May 1971, ACDP K096/1.

<sup>85</sup> KB to Axel Springer, 17 December 1973, ACDP K029/1. This assessment referred to a DM 500,000 grant to the Hebrew University for a program on “The Relief of Pain.”

been describing, also as a political one. Here, the FTS functioned within the larger framework of German-Israeli economic and *wissenschaftlicher* cooperation.<sup>86</sup>

Other Atlanticist-minded German foundations aside from the *Thyssen Stiftung*, and sometimes in conjunction with it, also proved valuable in providing the necessary funding for Atlanticist institutions and activities and for further international endeavors. For instance, additional German foundations joined the *Thyssen Stiftung* in financing the Atlantic Institute's special projects. Of particular importance in this regard was the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, which was not only internationally oriented but in its grants also attached great emphasis to the necessity of promoting German-American relations. In fact, the StVWW enjoyed certain advantages over the *Thyssen Stiftung* insofar as it dwarfed the latter in size and was, therefore, more able and willing to devote money to projects beyond that of mere research, including the literal building up of infrastructure. Along with the *Thyssen Stiftung*, the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* was, for example, among the most generous of the new German foundations in funding a variety of activities and

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<sup>86</sup> On the existing economic cooperation with Israel, including trade and German private investment, that involved many sectors of the *Wirtschaft* and on the interest of the president of the Weizmann Institute in collaborating with German firms in researching the exploitation of solar energy, see the Report of the Israel Delegation of the BDI, March 1976, ACDP K096/2. On the scientific cooperation between the Federal Republic and Israel, including the personal contact especially between young *Wissenschaftlern* from both countries (e.g. the *Minerva-Stipendien* program), on the pioneering role in this cooperation of Dr. Josef Cohn, on the significant and desired impact of such cooperation (itself older than the diplomatic relations between the two countries) in the political realm, and on the salient role of a number of private and public institutions and individuals in supporting, including financially, such *wissenschaftliche* collaboration (i.e. the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*; StVWW and its then General Secretary, Gotthard Gambke; *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung*; *Bosch Stiftung*; *Bertelsmann Stiftung*; MPG; DFG; DAAD; and *Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie*), see "Die wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Israel," *Referat* of Dr. H. Lehr (BMFT) by the opening of the German-Israeli Conference on 11 November 1980 in Bonn, ACDP K094/1. According to Lehr, the *Minerva-Stipendien* program, which had been initially funded by the "*Volkswagen-Stiftung*" but whose financing had since been taken over by the BMFT, had now reached an annual volume of DM 1 million. On German institutions as major sources of funding for German-Israeli *wissenschaftliche* cooperation during the years 1976-79, see "Leistungen deutscher Institutionen für wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Israel," dated March 1980, ACDP K094/1. According to this document, institutions providing sums during this period for such projects included the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* (DM 7.71 million); the *Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung* (DM 0.6 million); the *Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft* (DM 0.7 million, including in 1979 the Martin Buber-chair at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem); and the DFG (DM 9.8 million).

needs of the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*.<sup>87</sup> Indeed, some of the Atlanticist projects that we have already mentioned with respect to the *Thyssen Stiftung* were in reality joint operations also financed at the same time by further German foundations. For example, the Evros-Meric project was actually supported by the FTS in conjunction with the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, involving a total grant from these two institutions of approximately \$100,000.<sup>88</sup> Naturally, Birrenbach's knowledge of and connections to these other *Stiftungen*, particularly *Volkswagen*, could also prove useful in acquiring essential funding for Atlanticist projects. Birrenbach not only helped direct Atlanticist proposals for research or infrastructural development to the appropriate foundations, whether to Thyssen, Volkswagen or wherever, but also offered a respected reference, sage advice and his own personal backing for many such applications.<sup>89</sup>

The upshot of the developments we have been depicting in this section was the construction of a German foundation system that was outward looking and, with respect to the individual major German *Stiftungen* and especially taken as a whole, extremely

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<sup>87</sup> The *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*'s linkage to the DGAP was given institutional expression, for instance, through the membership of DGAP President Günter Henle on the *StVWW Kuratorium*. In March 1963, the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* approved DM 300,000 for various DGAP projects over the upcoming years to 1965, including DM 210,000 for the continuation of the *Jahrbücher* (see Chapter 7). In 1965 and 1968, further considerable means were granted for the *Jahrbücher* and a large research project exploring the Federal Republic's available foreign policy options. Even more vital was the munificent support, about DM 2 million, of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* for the acquisition of the DGAP building on the *Adenauerallee* in Bonn.

<sup>88</sup> Draft Report, NPC Special Committee on Developing NATO Countries, October 1966, ACDP K049/2. Likewise, the support of the *Thyssen Stiftung* for the conferences of the International Association for Cultural Freedom was undertaken with the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* and the *Krupp Stiftung*, as well as the Ford Foundation.

<sup>89</sup> As the *Thyssen Stiftung* was unable to assist as of the spring of 1966 with respect to funding for the development of the Atlantic Institute library, Birrenbach thus pointed the AI Director of Studies at the time, Prof. Leslie Lipson (a naturalized American citizen originally from Britain), towards the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* (Lipson to KB, 6 April 1966, ACDP K107/2 and KB to Lipson, 21 April 1966, ACDP K107/2). The significance to the Atlanticist infrastructure of Birrenbach's connections to the various German foundations is demonstrated once more, again with regard to the funding of the Atlantic Institute, by the plan of Walter Dowling, the AI Director General, to approach with Birrenbach's help the Volkswagen and Thyssen foundations with an outline of a proposed study on the US-West European technological gap (Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Committee at the Atlantic Institute, 28 November 1966, ACDP K107/2). This project would indeed be realized and its results published by 1970.

valuable in helping to finance Atlanticist infrastructure and causes. Thus, citing just one case among many, West German foundations, the *Thyssen Stiftung* among them, provided approximately \$52,700 in 1971 alone solely for the abovementioned special projects of the Atlantic Institute. This overall construction process began in institutional terms with the founding of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* in the late 1950s and continued at least throughout the 1960s. Birrenbach played a major role in this phenomenon both through his work within the *Thyssen Stiftung* and through his broader efforts to impart a cosmopolitan perspective to the German foundations and to promote cooperation on an international scale. To a certain extent, as with the other Atlanticist institutions we have already discussed in the preceding chapter, the German *Stiftungen* not only promoted the cause of Atlanticism through their grants as well as their contacts and cooperation with foreign, especially American, foundations and such but also represented an element of Atlantic integration in and of themselves due to their considerably Americanized form. Like the Atlanticist advocates of the linkage between *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*, some of whom, like Birrenbach, were directly involved with the *Stiftungen*, the Atlanticist-minded foundations also strove through their grantmaking to encourage interdisciplinarity and the acquisition of distinctly practical knowledge. Whatever its other functions may have been, we can assert with conviction that the foundation system, including the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, formed a key sub-network within the overarching Atlanticist financing network of which Birrenbach was such a central part.

### I. Contexts of German Atlanticist Financing

Among the significant questions with respect to financing that confronted the German Atlanticists was the issue of taxes, a concern that had institutional consequences.

For example, and perhaps most importantly, that German foundations enjoyed special tax privileges represented one of their primary attractions and a definite stimulus to their development.<sup>90</sup> This concern with taxation was also the main motive for the founding of the *Atlantica eV* in December 1961 in Hamburg, an endeavor in which Birrenbach played a key role. This organization largely grew out of his efforts during 1961, including contacts with the Federal Finance Ministry and the NRW Finance Ministry, to secure a tax-exempt status of the private German contributions for the Atlantic Institute in the Federal Republic. The *Atlantica Vorstand*, comprising the original German members of the AI Board of Governors, Friedrich Carl von Oppenheim (Sal. Oppenheim Jr. & Cie), Fritz Berg (BDI President) and Birrenbach, was testament to the institution's essentially fundraising mission within the *Wirtschaft*.<sup>91</sup> The *Atlantica*, as noted in Chapter 4, shared its *Geschäftsführung* (essentially Walter Stahl) with the *Atlantik-Brücke*, an arrangement designed to save on costs and one in which Birrenbach also had a notable hand. The success of the *Atlantica* in attaining charitable status, rendering contributions through it to the AI tax-deductible (as was also the case in the US), facilitated the canvassing of donations and the recruiting of new members from major business firms and, further, gave the German Atlanticists a considerable advantage in fundraising vis-à-vis many of their European counterparts.<sup>92</sup> Henceforth, the *Atlantica* concentrated primarily on raising the German contribution to the AI, which entailed not only securing a sufficient

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<sup>90</sup> On *Stiftungen* as optimal financial sources for many due to their "charitable status [*Gemeinnützigkeit*]," see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the *Stiftungsinitiativen*, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015.

<sup>91</sup> Within the *Atlantica*, Oppenheim was 1<sup>st</sup> Chairman, Birrenbach 2<sup>nd</sup> Chairman, and Berg Treasurer. The Cologne-based *Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim Jr. & Cie*, with figures like Oppenheim, Robert Pferdmenges, Harald Kühnen, and Nikolaus Graf Strasoldo of special relevance in a variety of capacities to Birrenbach, was the "*Hausbank*" of the Thyssen group.

<sup>92</sup> This matter of taxation was also one of the reasons that the Europeans taken as a whole, even with the Canadians factored in on their side of the account, had so much difficulty matching the American contributions to the Atlantic Institute.

private donation, though this was its main task, but also, when necessary, prodding an occasionally delinquent *Auswärtiges Amt* to transfer its contribution, as well.<sup>93</sup>

Whatever its obvious advantages with respect to the nettlesome problem of taxation, the creation of the *Atlantica* also contributed to the multiplicity of Atlanticist institutions facing uninitiated potential German members and contributors, a situation occasionally presenting difficulties of its own regarding fundraising. Among the results of such prolific Atlanticist institution-building was the existence of so many private Atlantic organizations, often possessing such similar names (*Atlantica*, *Atlantik-Brücke*, *Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft*, Atlantic Institute, etc.), that some contributors from the *Wirtschaft*, like Wolfgang Pohle, eventually became confused and, quite bluntly, fed up. This state of affairs even led some figures and firms to offer negative responses to the approaches of the German Atlanticists, including for instance of the *Atlantica*, to recruit members and secure contributions. By the early 1960s, a quite clear sense existed in quarters of the always vital *Wirtschaft* that there were too many apparently similar Atlanticist organizations, that such a great multitude would lead to waste and, to the detriment of the contributors themselves, that there reigned in effect a “double money requirement” for what was essentially the same purpose. Therefore, demands could be heard for a more effective coordination or, better yet, a fusion. In reaction to such complaints, Birrenbach and the other members of the *Atlantica Vorstand* examined this dilemma as well as possible solutions, especially pertaining to that institution. However, they concluded that the various Atlanticist organizations, given their complementary

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<sup>93</sup> The importance of the *Atlantica*'s work in sustaining the Atlantic Institute is suggested by the fact that during the 1960s the AI was funded 85% by private contributions from the member countries (primarily individuals, business firms and foundations) and only 15% by government contributions. See, for example, the Protocol of the *Atlantica eV* Annual Assembly on 19 June 1963 in Cologne, ACDP K108/2.

natures, were simply too different to bring even just a few under a single roof. Despite plentiful attempts at explaining this, the confusion and frustration about the similar names, diverse functions and specific goals of the myriad Atlanticist organizations persisted among certain personalities of the *Wirtschaft* at least into the late 1960s.<sup>94</sup>

To now, we have focused on the German financing of the infrastructure in which the German Atlanticists directly took part. Of course, non-German financing also played an important role in maintaining some of these institutions, particularly those elements primarily international in character. For organizations such as the Atlantic Institute, the Monnet Committee and the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, German funding was just one source among many, albeit, regardless of what method was employed to determine relative shares, almost always a considerable one. Private and public contributions for this purpose were obtained from each of the participating countries, varying in their exact proportions from institution to institution.<sup>95</sup> This financing flowed from essentially the same types of sources as did the German financing, namely political parties, trade unions, businesses, foundations, a few individuals, and governments as well as, at times, from inter-governmental organizations.<sup>96</sup> In some cases, even a strictly

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<sup>94</sup> On this theme, see Walter Stahl to KB, 4 May 1962; Dr. Wolfgang Pohle, *Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Flick KG, Düsseldorf, to Oppenheim, 2 September 1964; and Oppenheim to Pohle, 16 September 1964, all contained in ACDP K108/2.

<sup>95</sup> The Atlantic Institute, for instance, was funded by the countries, nineteen members in 1961, of what was deemed the Atlantic Community, with these specific private and/or public contributions proportionately drawn according to the economic strength of those countries, naturally meaning that Birrenbach and the West Germans were charged with raising a comparatively substantial sum. Meanwhile, in the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, the relative contributions were determined by applying NATO's Civil and Military Budget Cost-Sharing Formula. As of 1961, according to this measure, West Germany's share would be 16.10% or a projected N.F. 88,550 of a total projected budget of N.F. 550,000, fourth most behind, in order, the United States, the United Kingdom and France (NPC Draft Budget for Financial Year 1961, ACDP K055/1).

<sup>96</sup> To cite just one case of governmental support and financing, the German participants in the expanded extraordinary KWC Steering Committee meeting in London in November 1966 were treated as guests of the British government, which also defrayed the travel expenses. Particular government agencies also did their part, with the US Information Agency, for instance, helping the Atlantic Institute early on by



German organization like the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* received funding for its activities from abroad, in the DGAP's case from American foundations. In fact, early American and British financing of certain German Atlanticist institutions, such as the DEG and the DGAP, during the years of the occupation and of the High Commission proved critical to their creation and survival.<sup>97</sup> Over the years, prestigious American foundations, including especially the Ford Foundation but also the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, played a particularly prominent role in financing the Atlanticist organizations. A grant from such a foundation provided not only immediate and often substantial funding but also burnished the reputation of the recipient project or institution, along with the accompanying benefits, and was therefore coveted all the more by the elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure.<sup>98</sup>

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providing \$10,000 for the institute's library (AI Progress Report on the Institute's Program, 26 April 1961, ACDP K107/1). With respect to inter-governmental organizations, we can point to occasional assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, for example to the Atlantic Institute, including a grant for the study *A Monetary Policy for Latin America*, which would be first published in 1965 (Minutes of the Meeting of the Policy Committee held at the Atlantic Institute in Paris, 5 December 1965, ACDP K107/2). Though not strictly financing, early meetings of the Atlantic Institute, including of the Board of Governors and of the Policy Committee in 1960-61, were held at the NATO and at the OECD headquarters in Paris.

<sup>97</sup> Thus, the British occupation government subsidized the early *Vorträge* of the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft*. Similarly, the American High Commission played a noteworthy role, particularly financially, in the creation (July 1952) and the future viability of Theodor Steltzer's *Institut für Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft*, the predecessor of the DGAP.

<sup>98</sup> The DGAP received financial support for its projects and activities not only from the Ford Foundation, but also from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See, for early examples, the Draft for a Budget Estimate 1956 of the DGAP eV, 16 April 1956, ACDP K213/4 and the Minutes of the *Mitgliederversammlung* of the DGAP eV on 16 July 1958 in Bad Godesberg, ACDP K118/1. For Birrenbach on a considerable portion of the expenses of the Monnet Committee being funded by the Ford Foundation ("a major American foundation"), see Birrenbach's Memorandum, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2. With regard to the Atlantic Institute, which had sought long-term financing from Ford from the very start, the Ford Foundation shouldered a sizeable burden of the budget (1969: 42.2%; projected 1973: 25.7%) (*Kurzprotokoll* of the *Atlantica* Member Assembly on 16 June 1969, ACDP K106/1). In 1965, Ford provided the Atlantic Institute with a grant of (in German terms) DM 2 million, with a chunk of this sum earmarked "for meetings of young men and women who will achieve in the coming years leadership positions within the Atlantic world" (Walter Stahl circular letter to *Atlantica* members, 25 June 1965, ACDP K108/2). Into the early 1970s, and perhaps beyond, the Bilderberg Conferences were financed, at least to some extent, by the Ford Foundation. As we shall see in Chapter 8, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (technically distinct from the Rockefeller Foundation) would play a central role in financing the Atlantic Institute's "Young Leaders" conferences, while the Rockefeller Foundation itself would assist such functions as well, for instance by making available and playing host at the facilities

In the previous chapter, we alluded to the reality that the emergence of an extensive Atlanticist infrastructure as well as its attendant networks and, at times, rhetoric, while intimating the advent of certain aspects of an incipient Atlanticist identity, did not truly indicate, at least yet, the simultaneous emergence of a full-blown, genuine, predominantly Atlanticist identity. This situation is further borne out by the competitive nature of much of the fundraising pertaining to the Atlanticist infrastructure, predicated on a desire not to be outdone by one's party-political or national counterparts, fellow Atlanticists though they may have been. Birrenbach was acutely conscious of this factor and played on such considerations in his fundraising efforts, for instance with respect to the Monnet Committee vis-à-vis his own party in 1961-62 and 1968 as well as with regard to the West German contribution for the Kennedy Memorial Library in 1964 (see Chapter 7). In the latter case, Birrenbach even utilized his contacts abroad, for instance in Washington, DC, to remain abreast of the amounts of the donations being provided from other countries and exploited such information in his appeals to ensure that greater sums were forthcoming from West German sources, among them the federal government. Here, Birrenbach urged Chancellor Erhard while explaining his fundamental logic: "Since few countries in the world are so vitally interested in a good relationship to the United States as the Federal Republic, I believe that, in view of the... given figures, a scrutinizing [*Überprüfung*] of the cabinet decision regarding this is justified."<sup>99</sup>

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of the Villa Serbelloni at Bellagio in the spring of 1966. On the substantial financing the WIPOG enjoyed in 1955 from the Ford Foundation, see the Report about the Efforts of the WIPOG for a Mobilization of the *Stiftungsinitiativen*, Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt am Main, ACDP K015. Finally, on the generous support provided since decades by the large American "*Stiftungen*" to the German *Wissenschaft*, see Birrenbach's Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2. The Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were all headquartered in New York City (Carnegie would eventually move to Washington, DC).

<sup>99</sup> KB to Erhard, 29 October 1964, ACDP K052/1. The final West German total ultimately placed second behind the British among the nations taking part in this KML donation action.

Of course, the subject of Atlanticist financing is simultaneously and intimately wrapped up with themes of influence and power. Along with financial clout and assistance also came some measure of control over Atlanticist activities. Particularly the case, since this was an Atlanticist infrastructure not blessed with an endless abundance of funds; rather, these institutions generally relied upon limited financial resources to carry out their activities and projects, leading them to treasure all the more the sources of income vital to their very existence. Therefore, it should come as no surprise, for example, that the Ford Foundation exercised considerable sway over the staging of the *Atlantik-Brücke*'s German-American Conferences, in which it regularly played such an essential role in covering the American expenses through its grants to the American Council on Germany. Such influence was exerted especially by Shepard Stone and John McCloy, along with the ACG's Christopher Emmet, on the organization, agenda and format of the conferences and on the size and composition, including age, of the American, and even to some extent German, delegations. It is also no coincidence that Birrenbach became a member of the DGAP's *Präsidium* at approximately the same time that the *Thyssen Stiftung*, thanks largely to his efforts, began providing in the early 1960s significant and crucial sums for that organization's endeavors. Indeed, no assessment of Birrenbach's influence and position within the Atlanticist infrastructure would be complete without recognizing his centrality in the realm of financing.

### J. Conclusion

The German, and in some cases non-German, financing for the Atlanticist infrastructure that we have depicted in the preceding chapter originated from a variety of sources: trade unions, political parties, certain individuals, government, and the

*Wirtschaft*. The desire to attract funds was a constant thread running through the discussions and efforts of the German Atlanticists and impacted on their organizations in myriad ways. Notably, the matter of taxation encouraged the establishment of certain new or, at least previously, rarely utilized institutions and organizational forms in the Federal Republic, including the *Atlantica* but more significantly the private *Stiftung*. Indeed, when analyzing the Atlanticist infrastructure in which Birrenbach operated, it is not sufficient to simply refer to action committees, research institutes, conferences and the like. There also existed an elaborate financing network and infrastructure providing essential funding, of which the system of major West German foundations that emerged beginning in the late 1950s functioned as an integral sub-network. As we discovered, the origins and operating of the German *Stiftungen* in close connection with the *Wirtschaft* belies general notions, propounded by some, of foundations as virtually subordinate to the state or, alternatively, as a genuinely “third sector” of public life not only divorced from the state but also somehow from the business and economic world. Like the elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure already examined in Chapter 4, the inspiration and models of the funding bodies and methods employed, most notably, but not only, of these West German *Stiftungen*, allows us to speak of an Americanization of the financing of that Atlanticist infrastructure. Naturally, financial contributions were also tantamount to power within the infrastructure, something worth keeping in mind, also when assessing the claims of many Atlanticist institutions to be completely independent of the state.

Birrenbach’s role in this financing of the German Atlanticist infrastructure was an essential one, arguably his most crucial within these organizations. Most striking was Birrenbach’s part in the creation and development of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, which, in

no small degree due to his influence, itself became a significantly Atlanticist-minded institution, as reflected in its grantmaking, and stimulated the creation of further such foundations in the *Bundesrepublik*. Furthermore, Birrenbach was a central figure in promoting the internationalization of the *Thyssen Stiftung* and of the German foundation system as a whole, thus integrating them into an even broader network that also included preeminent American foundations. Thanks largely to his outstanding contacts, which often transcended political divisions, throughout the various sectors of society, Birrenbach served, less spectacularly but no less significantly, as a link between the Atlanticist organizations and activities, on one hand, and their indispensable aforementioned financial wellsprings, on the other, perhaps most vitally, but by no means only, the *Wirtschaft* (including the foundations). Frequently acting with the encouragement of and in consultation and cooperation with the administration of the explicitly Atlanticist organizations, Birrenbach consistently demonstrated a remarkable proficiency and sure sense in his fundraising of where the necessary money could be found and precisely how to go about securing it. Without Birrenbach's strenuous work, institutions like the Atlantic Institute, the DGAP Study Groups and the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* would likely have never found a firm financial footing and rapidly crumbled. Moreover, without the efforts of Birrenbach, and others at least approximating him in some respects, the German Atlanticist infrastructure would certainly have never obtained the substantial funding vital to sustaining itself.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Though not directly addressed in this chapter, Birrenbach's financing endeavors stretched beyond those relating to strictly Atlanticist institutions and activities and included assistance in locating funding for historical collaborations, cultural conferences, publishing ventures as well as others' health and family expenses.

## **Chapter 6: Kurt Birrenbach and the Political Functioning of the Atlanticist Network**

### **A. Introduction**

Having explored the institutional elements of the German Atlanticist infrastructure, the financing of that infrastructure and Birrenbach's crucial role in both, it is now time to turn to the more strictly political activities of the trans-Atlantic network, to Birrenbach's actual political efforts within this network and to the functioning and impact of this Atlanticist network in the political realm of the Federal Republic. In the process of examining these subjects, we shall integrate and stress some of the earlier themes investigated in this study, particularly the significant role and effects of the Atlanticist infrastructure. As in previous chapters, the aim will not be to give a detailed account of Birrenbach's political activity, but rather to highlight certain aspects of it that shed light on the evolution of German Atlanticism in the *Bundesrepublik* and on the world of the West German politician of Atlanticist stripe.

### **B. Birrenbach, Atlanticism and Foreign Policy Thought**

Having referred to Birrenbach repeatedly as an Atlanticist, it is now necessary to explore in some detail his Atlanticist thought and proposals. For Birrenbach, Atlanticism comprised no vague *Tagespragmatik*, something he considered a "great temptation," but also a "dangerous" one.<sup>1</sup> Beyond his efforts for the closest possible cooperation between the United States and Western Europe, Birrenbach's Atlanticism consisted of ambitious, forward-looking constructs, such as Atlantic Community and, especially and more concretely, Atlantic Partnership. Seeking to transcend the obsolete form of a classical military alliance, these Atlanticist conceptions involved a "global" consultation and cooperation between the United States and Western Europe in a wide variety of areas,

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<sup>1</sup> KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1.

including on foreign political, security, economic, monetary, scientific, development, energy, social and cultural issues.<sup>2</sup> Related to this desire for cooperation and consultation, Birrenbach foresaw, especially with respect to the Community idea, the creation of entirely new institutions as well as the functional expansion (NATO, OECD) and upgrading (NATO Parliamentarians Conference) of existing ones.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, Birrenbach hoped that a strong, integrated Western Europe, united not just economically, in the EEC, but also politically and “speaking with one voice,” would become a real partner for the US in a close, equal, interdependent, global relationship in the conduct of world affairs.<sup>4</sup> Birrenbach’s adherence to these ambitious blueprints was consistent, even

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<sup>2</sup> For example, KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1 and the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s Trip to the United States of May 1975, ACDP K155/1. On the insufficiency of a classical alliance, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the view of those American personalities especially positively oriented towards the Federal Republic that American relations with Europe, and particularly with the Federal Republic, were more than a purely military “*Zweckbündnis*,” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.

<sup>3</sup> See Birrenbach’s book, *The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership* (New York: Praeger, 1963) or his article “Pulling Atlantica Together,” *Freedom & Union*, Vol. 16, No. 10, October 1961. As noted in Chapter 4, Birrenbach advocated the upgrading of the NPC into a legislative assembly, initially at least into an advisory body. For Birrenbach’s stress on the need for an institutionalization of US-EEC relations, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 12 November 1970, ACDP K140/2.

<sup>4</sup> On the need for European economic and monetary union and political integration, see KB to Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. On the need for supranational elements in a European political union, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2 and KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Birrenbach saw the EEC forming the basis of a future political unity, believing that an EEC that eventually reached the stage of an economic union with a common trade policy would itself represent such a far-reaching process of political integration that it would form the starting point (not automatically, but via a “*Sachzwang*”) for a further political integration, including the development of political institutions with respect to foreign and defense policy. Indeed, for Birrenbach, this represented the main goal of economic integration. Such a political unity would seek to implement common policies with respect to areas like foreign trade and arms development and production [KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1]. Birrenbach’s desire for a European political union placed significant limits, in his mind, on the prospects for expansion, for it excluded the possibility of neutrals entering as full members since they would undermine the process of *Willensbildung* in such a political unity [KB to Müller-Armack, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1]. Birrenbach’s stress on political union was also probably responsible for his insistence that the countries of Eastern Europe would have to change their political systems and take on the principles of freedom valid in the West in order to enter the EEC (Birrenbach remarks made at the June 1972 meeting in Cologne of the Conference Group on German Politics in Panel III, dealing with “Germany, Common Market, United States,” ACDP K028/1). For Birrenbach’s belief that a closely integrated Europe, speaking

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with one voice, would automatically become a partner of the United States in a way impossible for individual European nation-states the size of France, England or Germany, see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L'Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. Birrenbach viewed the desired further development towards a European unification within the context of, even encouraging or compelling, an increased and partner-like coordination of American-European interests (KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2). On West European unification, including political unity, as a precondition and largely motivated by the desire for the creation of equal relations between Europe and the United States, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2 and KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP K126/1. For the element of equality between the EC and the US in this Atlantic Partnership, with the unified Europe that Birrenbach had in mind, including Britain, not being a dependent or satellite, rather a power that would automatically be a relatively equal [*gleichwertiger*] partner of and exercise a greater independence in its relations with the US, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the economic, monetary and political union of Europe as vital to the creation of a new power center in the world that would become a real partner of the United States, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. For Birrenbach's expectation that a politically unified Europe would cooperate with and significantly ease the position of the US, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On the danger of a potential "dissolution of American-European relations into bilateral relations," see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupe, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. Birrenbach believed that an expanded, united Europe, namely one including Britain and one including the "widening and strengthening" of its institutions, even if that Europe initially only comprised economic matters and never reached the stage of a federation, would become a real foreign political "power factor," something that it still was not today, which could make itself felt in its relations to the United States, the Soviet Union and the Third World and would contribute to changing the fundamental conditions on which the East-West conflict rested (KB to Schieder, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2). For Birrenbach's hopes for progress in "the European development..., which sooner or later could lead to confederative forms" comprising a "*Konzertierung* of the foreign and defense policy," see again KB to Schieder, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. For Birrenbach on the Atlantic Partnership as the fundamental and principal goal of the Federal Republic, see KB to McCloy, 27 February 1973, ACDP K210/1. On the need for the United States government and a single European organ to work together from the perspective of common interest, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.

One prominent element of Birrenbach's ideas regarding an Atlantic Partnership among equals, in this case representing its extension into the field of nuclear defense, was that of a European nuclear option that would come into being with and was indeed one of the incentives for the creation of a future (politically) united European federation. With command and control of nuclear weapons not left entirely to the United States, this second nuclear decision center and component in the West would exist alongside but remain closely integrated with that of the US and would closely integrate its nuclear forces with the nuclear deterrent power of the US within the Atlantic alliance on the basis of common institutions in a way acceptable to the US. On these issues, see, for example, KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2; KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. Birrenbach referred to the Anglo-American cooperation during World War II as a possible model for the relationship of the United States to a European nuclear option, suggesting the possibility of the American President becoming the "executive agent" of a Western nuclear partnership [KB to Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP K117/2]. On the European nuclear component representing no genuine alternative to the American component vis-à-vis the Soviet Union ("due to the technological deficit, the enormous financial burden and the geographical disadvantages"), and therefore the need for continued full American nuclear protection in combination with the all-European nuclear component, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. Birrenbach also foresaw the future possibility of a European ABM system of purely defensive nuclear weapons, a national anti-rocket defense being technically unthinkable for a state the size of the Federal Republic (KB to Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1). For Birrenbach's argument that an integrated Atlantic collective nuclear weapon system should contain a European clause providing for the



as he found himself increasingly isolated in this regard, including even at Atlanticist gatherings.<sup>5</sup> Birrenbach realized that such elaborate conceptions could not be attained overnight, yet they also provided him in the short-term with an orientation by which to judge events and policies.<sup>6</sup> Ultimately, much of Birrenbach's political activity aimed at facilitating the emergence of these overarching Atlanticist constructs.<sup>7</sup>

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re-negotiation of the agreement as soon as a politically united Europe came into being, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1.

<sup>5</sup> On Birrenbach's laments that such ideas were, for example, either no longer mentioned (in the case of Community) or thinned out "in a dangerous way" (Partnership), see KB to William Diebold, Jr., Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 25 June 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to Christian Herter, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 3 April 1964, ACDP K155/3 (here with reference to his impressions in Washington and at the Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg in 1964); KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1; Hahn, FPRI, to KB, 5 October 1973, ACDP K184/1. Birrenbach also sensed in the United States under President Lyndon Johnson (a man under whom America "thinks more in purely American concepts") a loss of interest in Europe, not only because of Vietnam, and even suggested that "the times of the 'Grand Designs' are over" (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). Berndt von Staden, in the German embassy in the United States, agreed with Birrenbach in December 1966 that "the 'two pillars theory' of Atlantic Partnership meets with increasing skepticism" (apparently at least in the US), particularly due to European failures, and believed that "time is running out" for "the Atlantic Partnership of the Monnet stamp" (*Botschaftsrat I. Kl.* Berndt von Staden to KB, 3 December 1966, ACDP K139/2). However, for Birrenbach continuing to raise the idea of Atlantic Partnership, see for instance KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2; the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach's Trip to the United States of May 1975, ACDP K155/1; and Kurt Birrenbach, "Amerika-fühlt es sich alleingelassen?", *Die Welt*, 14 June 1975. For Birrenbach's frustration that the notion of a partnership had never been sufficiently defined, yet for his argument still in January 1974 in favor of an Atlantic Partnership with its two pillars "corresponding to the old Kennedy project," see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>6</sup> As of the early 1960s, Birrenbach anticipated a rather lengthy process of about two to three decades for the attainment of a true Atlantic Community. For Birrenbach acknowledging the obstacles still to be overcome on the way to an integrated Atlantic nuclear weapon system in which the Federal Republic could take part, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On the long process required for European political integration, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach's belief that the current time point was not ripe for a definitive political union of the Six in constitutional form given the fundamental differences between the Federal Republic and France on crucial political questions, including on NATO integration, the multilateral NATO armed force, defense policy and East Asia, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. On Birrenbach's admission that the time was still not ripe for the creation of an effective European nuclear option, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On the lacking readiness of the European nations to take measures necessary to advance European unity, see KB to Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. For Birrenbach's rejection of those statements he read coming from the United States that Europe had become a great power, for his argument that Europe was an important factor in the world in a trade and monetary sense but "anything but a world power politically and militarily," and that Europe would remain for the foreseeable time a "*Zusammenschluss* of sovereign states, still lacking a common concept and a genuine political integration," see again Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof.

Birrenbach's desire for a British entry into the EEC requires some explanation. According to Birrenbach, he had supported Britain's participation in Europe since the 1950s, at one point even dating it to Churchill's well-known speech at The Hague in May 1948.<sup>8</sup> In Birrenbach's mind, the British presence would encourage a healthy evolution of the EEC's internal structure. Britain, with its democratic tradition and pragmatic approach to institutional questions, would facilitate the community's political integration and democratization. A British presence in the EEC would also lend greater impetus to efforts to change certain "untenable policies," not only the Luxembourg Compromise but also the Common Agricultural Policy. Moreover, Birrenbach considered Britain's entry

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Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. For Birrenbach's reference to "the long process of [European] political integration," see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.

<sup>7</sup> For Birrenbach, such efforts included the further institutional strengthening and supranational integration of Europe, not just in the economic realm, but also in the political, monetary and military realms. On Birrenbach's support for an integrated, multilateral Atlantic nuclear weapon system (such as the MLF or ANF), in which the Federal Republic and other nuclear and non-nuclear powers would take part, as to some extent a means to strengthen the trans-Atlantic bonds between Europe and the United States, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach's support of improved European and trans-Atlantic consultation and coordination of foreign, military and trade (including East-West trade) policy and his proposals for mechanisms and such, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to State Secretary Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1; and Birrenbach's remarks at the June 1972 meeting in Cologne of the Conference Group on German Politics in Panel III, dealing with "Germany, Common Market, United States," ACDP K028/1. For Birrenbach's argument that, until a political integration that would make Europe into a real partner of the United States, the Americans and Europeans should create a unifying framework, including whatever special channels were necessary (such as an EDC), based on a constant high-level dialogue, flow of information and consultations between Europe and the United States, including in emergencies, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach's proposal for the creation of a political consultation mechanism, still not a political union, in the form of a transfer of the essential features of the Franco-German Treaty (January 1963) to the other EEC member states, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.

<sup>8</sup> KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1. For the reference to the Churchill speech, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1. Birrenbach expected Britain would enter the EEC while still connected to the Commonwealth.

crucial to the external relations of a united western Europe. In contrast to inward-looking France, Britain (like West Germany) was an outward-looking nation, one with great insight into world problems, that would nudge Europe in a similarly extroverted direction. Furthermore, the presence of Britain, with its military, economic and demographic strength would enable Europe to play the role assigned to it of equal partner with the United States. Without Britain, Birrenbach repeatedly insisted, a united Europe would be merely a “torso.”<sup>9</sup> However, while Birrenbach generally took a benign view of British intentions, he also denied any attributions of *Anglophilie*, insisting that such a thing “is completely far from my mind,” and was well aware of the persistent difficulties with respect to Britain. In this regard, the British economic and monetary situation, the state of affairs in Ireland and British attitudes towards Europe, including the lack of “a clear vision of the future,” were all the subject at times of considerable concern and criticism.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, securing Britain’s entrance into the EEC remained a central element of Birrenbach’s political activity until the ultimate success of 1973.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> KB to Col. William Bass, London, 11 September 1972, ACDP K068/1. For Birrenbach’s assessment that the entire European construction would be placed in question if Britain did not enter the EEC, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.

<sup>10</sup> For the *Anglophilie* quote and for an example of Birrenbach’s insistence on Britain’s benign intentions, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Also with respect to Birrenbach’s benign view of Britain, see his analysis that, especially due to the bad Anglo-French relations, Britain felt, rightly or wrongly, pushed away from the continent in KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. While there were positive factors, such as personalities like the Conservative Edward Heath, the primary villains in Birrenbach’s understanding of Britain over time were the irresponsible trade unions, an indolent population, the Labour Party and an inefficacious British government. All of this undermined Britain’s potential role as a functioning partner in the EEC (KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU *Deutschland*, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1) and even led a frustrated Birrenbach to suggest in 1964 that, with respect to European issues, “the English are the weak spot” (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2) and to proclaim that same year that “at the moment England is simply no partner” (KB to Prof. Brandt, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1). On Britain’s poor economic situation and those responsible for it, see KB to Barzel, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach’s fears of the beginning of “an English period” (actually a reference to a Barzel phrase) with respect to labor difficulties, combined with industrial crisis, in the Federal Republic, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1. On the British attitude towards Europe and lack of a clear vision of the future, see KB to Prof. Brandt, 22 July 1964,

Birrenbach's attitude towards France, for him the key continental West European nation, was less benign. More than any other country, Birrenbach saw de Gaulle's France intentionally undermining the principles and structures of European and Atlantic integration. Rather than supranational integration in Europe, France sought hegemony

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ACDP K013/1 and KB to Prof. Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. Even in 1973, Birrenbach was still wondering whether "Britain is ready to accept a curtailment of her sovereign rights, which is the indispensable precondition for a successful unification process" (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2). On Birrenbach's frustration at the repeated British failure to take the lead in Europe, for instance by renouncing its national nuclear strike force to enter a multi-lateral European atomic strike force and thus to preclude a solution of the current Brussels crisis along the lines foreseen by Birrenbach, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On Britain's desire for national nuclear forces, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Britain's "egocentric nuclear policy," see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach's complete familiarity with the British attitude regarding Europe, about which he claimed "I do not have the least illusion," on an indecisive Britain's "policy of immobility" with respect to Europe, for the French rejection as a partial explanation and excuse for the lack of positive British attitudes towards Europe, and on Birrenbach's desire to remove the question of British entrance into the EEC from the agenda for several years so as to avoid the blocking of a future larger Europe through a new, unqualified English "no," see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For Birrenbach's fears regarding the danger of a "veering off [*Ausscheren*]" of Britain with respect to Europe, namely the giving up of its intent to enter the EEC, if entrance negotiations were postponed beyond 1970, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. On Birrenbach's continued hope that British policy would finally reflect "a realistic viewing of the situation of England in the second half of the twentieth century," see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.

<sup>11</sup> For an early example, see Birrenbach's failed efforts in 1958-59 to convince the relevant German officials to bind Britain to the Federal Republic and the continent via a free-trade zone and an increased integration of armaments (KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2). On the creation of a larger Europe as a precondition for a true partnership with the United States as well as on the need to leave the door to a political union open to those states that did not currently belong to the Six (including Britain) and to offer them the chance for entrance upon acceptance of the conditions without the need for unanimity among all the participants, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. While Birrenbach embraced the entrance of Britain and seems to have agreed with the widening of the EEC in principle, there were also limits or preconditions with respect to the entrance of further states. Although we have already noted his rejection, for political reasons, of the entrance as full members of neutral states such as Austria and Portugal, he was inclined to consider an association of these states with the EEC. However, the American rejection of such association arrangements as violations of the GATT, unless such states took part in political integration, represented a serious obstacle in this regard. Furthermore, Birrenbach insisted that the EEC could be undermined if it became too large, beyond the entrance of Britain, without making the necessary internal adjustments. Even the inclusion of Denmark, Norway and Iceland would require the strengthening of the European institutions, such as a strengthening of the position of the European Commission, a reactivating of the majority rules in the Council of Ministers and a strengthened prerogative of the European Parliament (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1). Despite all of this, Birrenbach did not object to the idea of opening negotiations with other countries seeking entrance into the EEC, following the conclusion of negotiations with England (KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP K126/1). For Birrenbach, the development of Europe could still fail if the problems of vertical and horizontal expansion were not solved (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1).

over an order of loosely connected, non-integrated, sovereign national states.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, de Gaulle's Europe was not an outward looking one, rather it was a continental "European Europe" that largely excluded the Anglo-Saxons.<sup>13</sup> For

Birrenbach, such policies were not only anachronistic and impractical in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they were "incredibly dangerous" in the context of "the East-West conflict."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, despite Birrenbach's professed respect for the general's personal

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<sup>12</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. The structures being undermined by de Gaulle included the EEC and NATO. As Birrenbach put it, "[n]o country is more up in arms [*Sturm läuft*] than France against the principle of integration both in NATO as well as, unfortunately, also in the EEC" (KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1). On Birrenbach's opposition to a hegemonic order of loosely linked European nation-states, a "policy... not identical with the position of France in the great years of the development of the European institutions," see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L'Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the striving for hegemony and the harmful results "which you have observed for three years in Europe," see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach's rejection of French plans for a non-integrated NATO, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For Birrenbach's fears that de Gaulle's policies would in the long run affect the attitude of other nations as well, particularly harmful since "[a] community is only possible if all act in communitarian way," see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. Likewise, in July 1966, Birrenbach complained that "[t]his attitude of de Gaulle is beginning to become the accepted thing [*Schule machen*], and I see in that the even larger danger (KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1). For the pursuit of national interest by the French 5<sup>th</sup> Republic, see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the French (and British) desire for national nuclear forces, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For the French use of nuclear weapons only to protect their national interests, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the "egocentric nuclear policy" of France (and Britain), see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach's stress on the German desire for multilateralism in its relations (in contrast to the French desire for bilateralism), see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.

<sup>13</sup> This idea of an independent "European Europe," or of a "Third Force," stood in opposition to the notions of interdependence forming the basis of ideas such as the Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership. At one point, Birrenbach professed his desire for a "European Europe" but made the crucial qualification that this would be such "which does not treat the Atlantic relations as France does at the moment" (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).

<sup>14</sup> On the "incredibly dangerous" underestimation of the seriousness of the East-West conflict by the French, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. As Birrenbach remarked in 1966, "Nobody has thrown off the vestments [*Gewand*] of the Cold War more strongly than the French President" (KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1). Birrenbach believed that a "Europe of the states" could only form a unity if it were led in a hegemonic fashion, yet he detected a deep disinclination on the European continent against any hegemonic order and was also convinced that neither France nor Britain was powerful enough to realize such a hegemony (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). For Birrenbach's early recognition in France of what he considered a completely new and "extremely dangerous" NATO conception, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. On Birrenbach's view of de Gaulle's policies as a divergence from previous French policy of the 1950s, see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L'Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the "rigid mercantilistic attitude" exhibited by France in economic matters, see KB to State Secretary a.D., Dr. Günther Harkort,

qualities, France came to represent a significant impediment to the attainment of his goals.<sup>15</sup> While Birrenbach hoped to “survive” de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic, simply waiting would be “extremely dangerous,” and he insisted on the need not only to preserve the fundamental principles and existing institutions, but to energetically push forward

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Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2. On the fundamental nature of the attitude of de Gaulle’s France and the difficulties this presented for American-French relations, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the impracticality of de Gaulle’s policies and goals of national independence and hegemonic order in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On the conditional and limited nature [“*Bedingtheit*”] of the concept of sovereignty, especially in continental Europe, in the age of the *Großmächte* of international magnitude and the mutual dependence of all national states, see European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 26 February 1958, Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2. For integration, including within NATO, as an adequate way to overcome the specific problems of the European nation-states, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For Birrenbach, France and England were the two *klassischen* European nation-states and still formed a brake on political integration (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1). On the French rejection of British approaches towards Europe, “which will probably remain a constant under de Gaulle,” see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For de Gaulle’s demands that the Federal Republic adopt his European and World *Politik*, see KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach’s fundamental and explicit rejection of De Gaulle’s policies, which if adopted by the Federal Republic would bring its entire foreign policy into difficulties, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1 and KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.

<sup>15</sup> For Birrenbach’s reference to “the *Brillianz* of such a still outstanding [*hervorragenden*] personality,” see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On Birrenbach’s assessment of de Gaulle as a realist, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. On Birrenbach’s conviction that “de Gaulle is not Europe,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. For examples on the centrality of French attitudes to progress in Europe, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1. On the centrality of de Gaulle and France for the process of European unification, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1 and KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. Key events in Birrenbach’s narrative of de Gaulle’s destructiveness were the general’s rejection of a British entrance into the EEC in January 1963, one of his repeated such rejections and a manifestation of his attitude towards the Anglo-Saxons, and the French departure from NATO in 1965-66. For Birrenbach’s assessment that the French decision of January 1963 to reject the British effort to join the EEC rendered impossible a partnership between a united Europe (including Britain) and the United States, prevented the development of the political Europe he desired and even endangered the future of the EEC itself, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. In the same vein, Birrenbach remarked in July 1966 that “[de Gaulle] has shaken NATO in a way that makes me doubt whether the alliance will ever recover from this blow” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1). For Birrenbach’s assessment that de Gaulle was not merely a symptom but also an actor and cause, admittedly not the sole cause, in the current crisis in NATO, see again KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.

with the further construction of the Atlantic Partnership.<sup>16</sup> However, whatever his frustrations, Birrenbach continued to view France as the Federal Republic's second most important ally (after the United States) and *the* essential ally with respect to the construction of Europe. Therefore, through it all, Birrenbach encouraged cooperation and conciliation, rather than open confrontation, with France.<sup>17</sup> Despite his efforts,

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<sup>16</sup> On Birrenbach's hope "to survive" de Gaulle, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1. For the need to "survive de Gaulle and to save the institutions up to the time when he will disappear from the historical scene," see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. On Birrenbach's desire to outlast the Fifth Republic, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. About such themes, see also KB, dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1. As Birrenbach put it to Brentano in July 1964, "I would consider it wrong if we were now to slacken the reins of European development and leave Europe to its fate. If we did that, all that has been achieved in the past years could be in vain" (KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1). For one of Birrenbach's proposals to push forward the progress of the EEC and a true and full political union, see again KB to Heinrich von Brentano, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>17</sup> On the significance of Europe in West German foreign policy ("The European card, aside from the Atlantic card, is the most important one which we have in our foreign policy"), see KB, dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach's view of a future united Europe being unthinkable without France (and Britain), see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. On the Federal Republic's foreign political goal of "Europe" on the basis of a German-French understanding, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For the need to preserve European cohesion, including with France, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the necessity to "do everything conceivable to bind France to us" with the crucial exception of not destroying the foundations of the Federal Republic's policy, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach's regret about what he considered temporary differences in the Franco-German relationship regarding the construction of the future Europe and the relationship to the United States and on the need for the Federal Republic not to endanger relations to France and to seek areas of constructive cooperation, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. Expressed another way, Birrenbach insisted that the Federal Republic could not choose politically between the United States and France, rather it had to carefully maintain an equal distance to both powers (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1). On the need for the Federal Republic to avoid a choice between the two powers, this time in the context of the Franco-German Treaty, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. At the same time, Birrenbach's advocacy of a two-track policy USA/France also meant not overvaluing the French component (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). In Birrenbach's mind, the Federal Republic "steers between Scylla (USA) and Charybdis (France)," a practice that resulted in a lack of both genuine decision and clear course (KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). This was the difficult "game with several balls" with France and the United States. While there were atmospheric elements to this game, it was primarily one of practical politics in all concrete issue areas (for or against), including for example NATO integration, European integration, recognition of China, long-term credits for the East and Cuba trade, all of which could directly and vitally touch the Federal Republic's relations with those two countries (KB to Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2). On the need to conciliate France to avoid disastrous consequences for the alliance and the cohesion of the European

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powers, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. For the difficult position of the Federal Republic with respect to France (“How can we stop de Gaulle if not even the United States is able to do so?”) and for Birrenbach’s desire to avoid conflict with France “since the Federal Republic is politically highly vulnerable,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.

For Birrenbach’s professions of his continued affection and friendship towards France and his desire for a very close relationship between France and the Federal Republic, including at times with reference to his membership in the Monnet Committee as proof, see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. For Birrenbach’s view that the friendship between the German and French peoples was deeper than the political contact between the governments, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For Birrenbach’s insistence that German public opinion was clearly pro-French in spite of disputes between the governments, see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. Perhaps not surprisingly given Birrenbach’s involvement in the Atlanticist infrastructure, one of Birrenbach’s ideas to smooth out differences in the Franco-German relationship was to hold close meetings between personalities on both sides to discuss the differences “in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust and to look for areas of common action.” Unfortunately, the representatives of the UNR had been talking in Germany for years with the wrong people, not with people like Birrenbach who thought as the great majority thought (KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2). For Birrenbach’s stress that the concrete time point of the Franco-German Treaty, rather than the matter itself, was wrong, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.

Birrenbach’s efforts for conciliation and cooperation with France manifested themselves in his various proposals and initiatives. For Birrenbach on the lookout in general for diplomatic, economic and political devices to bring de Gaulle’s France to revise her decision of 29 January, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. While as of July 1964 Birrenbach disagreed with Adenauer’s attitude in the last weeks and even considered it dangerous, he did agree with the former Chancellor on the need to enter into an in-depth discussion about all aspects of foreign policy with “our French friends” (KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1). In contrast to his proposals designed to find a common denominator that could be accepted by France as well as by Italy and the Benelux countries, Birrenbach saw “the Bavarian efforts” moving in a direction that would propose a formula that would have to be rejected by Italy and the Benelux countries (KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2).

During the “preamble episode” of 1963 (see later in this chapter), Birrenbach convinced Monnet that it was better not to insist on the latter’s idea of making the Bundestag’s approval of the treaty conditional on a declaration of both governments that integrated the treaty into the existing framework of European integration and the Atlantic alliance, since Birrenbach believed that no prospect existed that the French government would make such a declaration, and he was convinced that it was not possible to reject ratification of the treaty due to the effects of such an action on Franco-German relations. As Birrenbach put it, refusing to ratify the treaty would “completely, nonsensically smash china [*unsinnigerweise Porzellan zerschlagen*].” Birrenbach also travelled to Paris to consult with personalities he knew in de Gaulle’s cabinet in an effort to determine the French attitude to a preamble, from which it emerged that the French government would not greet such a preamble but would not jeopardize the treaty over it. On this, see Kurt Birrenbach, *Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984).

For Birrenbach’s proposals and approval of efforts for the Federal Republic to conciliate France through important concessions in agrarian questions, including in the wake of the events of January 1963, with the aims of preserving the EEC and securing French support for the Kennedy Round of GATT talks, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. On the need to “do everything conceivable to bind France to us” with the crucial exception of not destroying the foundations of the Federal Republic’s policy, and on Birrenbach’s European initiatives at this time including proposals hopefully acceptable to all, including France, among which was the rapid fixing of the agrarian price, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2.



Birrenbach retrospectively remarked, “we have lost the ten years of the de Gaulle period.”<sup>18</sup> Moreover, while there were occasionally encouraging signs, Gaullism’s impact persisted well after the general’s departure from power in 1969, and in 1973, Birrenbach could still glumly note, “[i]n Paris, the 19<sup>th</sup> century is still not ended.”<sup>19</sup>

However, while Britain and France were important from Birrenbach’s perspective, the foreign nation that occupied the center of his attention was the United

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This was also the case with respect to nuclear issues. On Birrenbach’s idea in 1963 for the creation of a European multilateral atomic strike force (European atomic deterrence) open to France, which he agreed did not make any military sense, as an element of his efforts to conciliate France and to bring her to revise her decision of 29 January 1963 and thus solve the Brussels crisis, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On the importance of the United States treating France with fairness and consideration in the negotiations and making concessions to France within the context of American proposals for nuclear control and an Atlantic nuclear system (e.g. MLF), for instance limited American assistance to the French nuclear program and with respect to the current generation of weapons, in “a serious and unbiased [*unvoreingenommener*] attempt” to come to an acceptable arrangement with France, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; and KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

<sup>18</sup> KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. Birrenbach expressed these sentiments specifically with respect to European political and economic integration. For Birrenbach’s assessment that “the development of the last ten years of the de Gaulle epoch have been extremely disappointing,” here with respect to progress towards European unification, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. On Birrenbach’s doubts about whether it would be at all possible to recover from the ten “lost” years of the de Gaulle era, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to McCloy, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. For de Gaulle’s blocking of the supranational principle, his negative impact on NATO and the European institutions, including his altering of the character of the European institutions, and the danger of a relapse into an order of sovereign states under French hegemony, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.

<sup>19</sup> KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda, MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1. In this same letter, Birrenbach argued that, not least due to the continued Gaullist influence in the wake of the election, France continued to resist constructive plans for Europe. For Birrenbach in 1969 still not seeing prospects for an intensifying of European cooperation even under the new French government, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. In July 1972, Birrenbach referred to “France’s falling back into Gaullism,” something that left little scope for an *Europa-Politik* in the future (KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1). For Birrenbach’s reference to the French tendency to take decisions from a purely European (“you can also say: French”) perspective, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the continued impossibility in the foreseeable future of a “genuine unification of Europe across the board,” including a European federation, since the French insisted on a “purely French Europe,” and for Birrenbach’s conclusion that “the French have not learned enough since the start of the de Gaulle regime,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the other hand, with respect to encouraging signs regarding security questions and the possibility of a European Defense Community, see KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2 and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. For de Gaulle’s relations with Germany, see Wilfried Loth and Robert Picht, eds., *De Gaulle, Deutschland und Europa* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1991).

States. Birrenbach found a great deal to value there as well as in the larger Anglo-Saxon world. Just as Atlanticism took a broad approach to integration, Birrenbach embraced and promoted Anglo-Saxon practices as models in a variety of crucial areas. Beyond the fields of Atlanticist infrastructure and financing that we have already explored, this was particularly the case with respect to domestic politics and democracy. For example, he especially admired the Anglo-Saxon methods and traditions of political interaction both inside and outside of parliaments. Even during tough political confrontations, Birrenbach consciously adhered to these, stressing the need for purely “*sachliche*” discussion and debate and for prohibiting such confrontations from impairing the *menschlichen* relations between the participants. His “intimate knowledge” of the Anglo-Saxon world and his admiration for its two-party systems was a key element in his argument favoring a reform in this direction of the Federal Republic’s own electoral system.<sup>20</sup> Finally, he explicitly promoted respect for the opposition as a central principle of Anglo-Saxon democracy.<sup>21</sup>

Beyond such domestic practices, Birrenbach especially valued the enormous strength of the United States. As the most exposed country of western Europe, the Federal Republic relied on American power, including its enormous conventional and nuclear arsenal, and the alliance with the United States formed the “vital basis” for the security and existence of the Federal Republic and Europe.<sup>22</sup> However, Birrenbach

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<sup>20</sup> For Birrenbach’s “intimate knowledge” of the United States, see KB to Westrick, 25 May 1964, ACDP K015.

<sup>21</sup> Birrenbach was especially disturbed by what he considered the violation of this principle by the Social Democrats during the debates over the Brandt *Ostpolitik*. Birrenbach specifically cited Herbert Wehner, himself an important Atlanticist, as one who expressed his disdain for the opposition during these debates (KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>22</sup> On the support of and the alliance with the United States as “the vital basis” of the Federal Republic’s existence and the related need, therefore, to always choose the US when it came to questions of defense, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2 and KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For the United States as “the crucial pillar and guarantee of our freedom,” see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9

recognized that American strength comprised other components beyond sheer military might. In his view, the United States possessed greater “political substance” and greater financial and human resources, including a people distinguished by their vitality and

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December 1963, ACDP K014/2. On the necessity of a close American-German relationship for the maintenance of “an effective defence posture in Europe,” see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the lack of any substitute for the United States with respect to defense questions, especially the military power to offset the Soviet Union in the East-West conflict, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For the United States as the “only truly decisive military factor” and the need for the Federal Republic to take this fact into account [“*anlehnen*” but not necessarily dependent], rather than being totally independent, in making its policy, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. On the cardinal importance of a substantial presence of American troops in Europe and the need to prevent a unilateral reduction of the American military presence there, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU Deutschland, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1; and KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the necessity of the American presence in Europe for the cohesion of the alliance, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. For the presence of American conventional forces on the European continent as the triggering element of the American nuclear guarantee, without which that guarantee would be “extremely doubtful” and any reduction of which would reduce the connection of European defense with American nuclear power, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2 and Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. For the key role of nuclear weapons in the security of Europe, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. On the presence of American troops in the Federal Republic as not only an important element of military security and a symbol of the American military commitment in Europe but also as an element of the internal cohesion in the Federal Republic see KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1. On the lack of a sufficient place for the United States, as guarantor and the key to security, and the militarily predominant position accorded the USSR as a serious error in the idea of a Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” (or “from one end of Europe to the other”) and the lack of American interest in and in guaranteeing such a construct in whose creation it did not take part, see KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For Birrenbach’s argument that even the East European countries expressed a certain interest in a continued American presence in Europe, see again KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For Birrenbach’s recognition of the “extraordinarily complicated problems” with respect to the NATO guarantee in the framework of the NATO alliance, see KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, *Bundeshaus*, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1. In Birrenbach’s mind, the classical military alliance represented an obsolete and insufficient form in the nuclear age, for instance with regard to ensuring the American use of nuclear weapons in case of a conventional war (KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1). For more on Birrenbach’s belief that a “*klassische*” alliance did not sufficiently guarantee the nuclear protection of Europe, see “*Gespräch T.-B.*,” 28 September 1972, ACDP K027/1. On what Birrenbach considered the essentially false main argument of the critics of the current American presence in Europe that the American defense effort there stood in significant disproportion to the European contributions and his attempts to refute such arguments (especially with respect to the conventional military effort, less so with respect to the nuclear deterrent), see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2; KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. For the possibility of the Europeans increasing their defense efforts, including a pulling together of the European defense forces to make the European contribution more effective, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On American troops as a symbol of the American military commitment in Europe, particularly at a critical moment when the United States was involved in a major war in Southeast Asia, see KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1.

willingness to sacrifice, than any other country of the West.<sup>23</sup> Such qualities enabled the United States to execute a robust policy abroad, even as it tackled long-term challenges like the Vietnam War, the race crisis and the constitutional crisis surrounding Watergate, “which would almost overwhelm a European nation.”<sup>24</sup> Therefore, one of Birrenbach’s key short-term goals was to ensure that the United States provide strong, constructive leadership in the world and especially continue its active military, political and other engagement in Europe.<sup>25</sup> Such initiative was crucial to achieving numerous immediate aims, such as preserving close trans-Atlantic relations, warding off the Soviet threat and settling world problems potentially harmful to the West.<sup>26</sup> In the longer term, American

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<sup>23</sup> For instance, KB to Col. William Bass, London, 22 November 1974, ACDP K068/1. As an example specifically related to the situation of Israel, also referring by contrast with the United States to “the notorious European weakness” as “one of the *Charakteristika* of our time,” see KB to Israeli ambassador Eliashiv Ben-Horin, 8 November 1973, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>24</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 19 September 1968, ACDP K098/1, as well as KB to Amb. Shinar, Tel-Ganim, 21 January 1974, ACDP K096/2 and KB to George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1. For example, Birrenbach, despite his fears, was amazed that the United States had been able to operate so effectively in the Near East crisis of 1973 at the height of the Watergate constitutional crisis (KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2). On Birrenbach’s belief that the regenerative ability of the United States, with its tremendous human and economic reserves, incomparable to those of any European country, made it likely that, with the possible exception of the “race conflict,” it would successfully deal in the 1970s with the critical developments manifested in internal crisis, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. For Birrenbach’s assessment that despite the internal crisis in the United States, the democratic order, the social contract (here citing McGeorge Bundy) between society and state, and the Bill of Rights had not been placed in doubt and a political landslide or a revolution was not in the offing, see again KB to Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>25</sup> See the Protocol of the Birrenbach-Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach’s trip to the United States in May 1975, ACDP K155/1. For Birrenbach’s view that a guarantee of American protection was realizable only within the framework of the alliance and his central interest in keeping the Americans within that framework, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion* of the *Bundestag*, Bonn, *Bundeshaus*, 8 April 1968, K020/1 and KB to Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1. On Birrenbach’s rejection (in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) of collective security, particularly that potentially provided by the United Nations, as a substitute for the security of the Federal Republic, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.

<sup>26</sup> On the need for American leadership and initiative to preserve the cohesion of the alliance and close relations between Germany/Europe and the United States, to ward off the Soviet threat as well as to settle those Atlantic issues and those world problems, such as the Middle East conflict, potentially deleterious to the West, see for example KB to Mrs. Evelyn Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 8 August 1961, ACDP K076/1; KB to Richard Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1; and KB to Gerard Smith, 8 October 1979, ACDP K209/1. For Birrenbach’s stress on the importance of American leadership and initiative and his encouragement of his American contacts and

leadership and engagement were essential to the gradual construction of the Atlantic Community and Partnership.<sup>27</sup> This need for close ties with the United States spurred on a variety of Birrenbach's efforts, including those for a more generous burden-sharing on the Federal Republic's part, European (especially political) unification, the elimination of trade barriers to American goods, and his rejection of a "European Europe."<sup>28</sup>

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talk partners to exercise these with respect to issues such as nuclear control/MLF and East-West trade, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; and KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens, AA, 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach, American leadership was necessary since, speaking in this case about the MLF, "the European nations are neither united nor resolved enough to approach the United States themselves with joint concrete proposals" (KB to Carstens, 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1). On the need for American leadership, namely a proposal resting on the authority of the American President, to have any chance of bringing about a collective nuclear weapon system (including a nuclear organization in Europe and participation of non-nuclear powers in nuclear control), see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach's reference to the American President as "the responsible leader of the Western Alliance," see KB to Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On the Federal Republic's willingness to follow American leadership, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For the United States as a source of support for the Federal Republic in its negotiations with the Soviet Union, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.

<sup>27</sup> For instance, Birrenbach argued that it was up to the United States to define the structure of a real partnership with Europe: "I can't see that the Europeans on their own initiative will be able to define a real European identity including a sufficiently strong interdependent link with the US. For me Europe without the United States is not imaginable" (KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard University, West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1).

<sup>28</sup> On the connection between Birrenbach's efforts with respect to burden-sharing, European unification, and the reduction of trade barriers and his desire for a continued strong American engagement in Europe, see his Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. Burden-sharing included creating additional military units, increasing efforts regarding armaments, as well as currency and budgetary measures. The stress on the elimination of trade barriers to American goods was particularly important if European political unification did not make significant progress. On the impossibility of reconciling the French concept of and demand for a "European Europe" with the current American military presence in Europe, the alliance with the United States, and close European-American and German-American relations, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. As Birrenbach put it, "[c]omplete independence in the sense that France practices it at the moment vis-à-vis the United States can only endanger the European-American relationship in the long-run" (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). On Birrenbach's belief that a German policy independent of the United States, such as de Gaulle's, would cause the US government to reduce its engagement in Europe, see KB to *Bundesminister* aD Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For a favorable comparison of the power of the United States vis-à-vis France, see KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the inadequacy of French nuclear weapons, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the path to France being "always only a limited one" unless the Americans would come to an understanding with the Soviet Union over the head of and at the expense of the Federal Republic, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On the security provided by the Americans as a key reason for embracing an interdependent (mutually dependent) relationship with the United States and for rejecting de Gaulle's demands for a complete independence of Europe, see KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For the inability of France to serve as a

Birrenbach argued, “free peoples everywhere look to America for safety and progress. Their greatest fear is not America’s involvement in the world, but its withdrawal.”<sup>29</sup>

Atlanticist though he was, Birrenbach was no uncritical admirer of the United States and its policies. Seeming at times not very distant in this regard from a typical Occidental, he was well-aware of the differences distinguishing the United States from Western Europe with respect to culture, perceptions of history and the world, and geopolitical situation.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, the United States, inexperienced on the world stage, demonstrated what he considered disturbing tendencies in foreign affairs often harmful to the Atlanticist cause, including an imprudent belief that “everything in the world is feasible,” frequent misperceptions, including a failure to recognize the serious nature of the threat posed by the totalitarian Soviet Union, and a rashness that manifested itself in a failure to consult properly with the European allies.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, beginning especially

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substitute for the United States with respect to military-security-defense questions vis-à-vis the USSR, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. On the Federal Republic’s interest in a currency offset to forestall the Senate’s approval of a new Mansfield proposal, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1. On the need for the Europeans, especially the Germans, to free the United States from a part of its military and financial burden as a means to secure the maintenance of a substantial American military presence, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>29</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3. For Birrenbach’s description of himself as a “dedicated friend of the United States,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On German and American views of one another, see David Barclay and Elisabeth-Glaser Schmidt, eds., *Transatlantic Images and Perceptions: Germany and America since 1776* (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 1997).

<sup>30</sup> As already alluded to in Chapter 3, though he did not offer an in-depth critique of American culture, Birrenbach seems to have considered it inferior to that of Europe. Birrenbach saw the differences in the perception of history and the world rendering it very difficult, for instance, for an American, even one of German origin, to communicate with a German audience. In this regard, he referred to figures “caught between two worlds,” such as the emigrant scholars Fritz Stern and Hajo Holborn. As Birrenbach put it, “[t]he view from the ‘second world’ is no longer understood here, or in any case is no longer identified with. It is regarded as an *Aliud*” (KB to Thomas Nipperdey, *Institut für Neuere Geschichte* of the University of Munich, 2 June 1978, ACDP K158/1; also KB to Prof. Nipperdey, 18 April 1978, ACDP K158/1 and KB to Prof. Schieder, 21 July 1978, ACDP K158/1).

<sup>31</sup> On the American lack of thoughtfulness and a propensity to believe that “everything in the world is feasible [*machbar*],” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1. With respect to US rashness and failure to consult adequately with the Europeans to forge common strategies, see KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31

with the Johnson administration, the United States found itself too often distracted from Europe, failing to provide the necessary leadership there.<sup>32</sup> Birrenbach also saw certain phenomena in the United States, for instance the Goldwater candidacy in 1964 or the embracing of détente, feeding troubling trends in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in

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December 1963, ACDP K160/2. On Birrenbach stressing to the Americans in a meeting of 8 November 1965 the need for “discrete diplomatic preparation” prior to making their proposals regarding nuclear control, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

<sup>32</sup> KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. Here, Birrenbach complained to Kissinger that for years the voice of the United States had no longer been audible, that American leadership had been absent in Europe, contributing significantly to the vacuum there. On Birrenbach’s frustration in seeing the US largely pursuing a “policy of laissez-faire,” see KB to Christian Herter, 8 February 1965, ACDP K155/3. For the failure of the United States, the leading power of the Western alliance, to bring about or even to have plans for a much-needed NATO reform; for the lack of American leadership, especially under Johnson, as a root explanation for the mistakes of American policy; for the political vacuum created in Europe as a result of American attention being distracted by Vietnam; for Birrenbach’s complaint that “[w]e have not heard the voice of your President in years”; and for the “fatal consequences” that this must have, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. On Birrenbach’s acknowledgement that the reduced American interest in Europe was due in part to disappointment in the European development, but also on the role of the Vietnam War in diverting American attention from Europe and towards Southeast Asia, and on the lack of the requisite American, and British, leadership in Europe (with the British remaining instead on the periphery under the Labour government) in enabling de Gaulle to become the central figure there, see again KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On the contribution of the US feeling of being abandoned by all its allies and being morally and politically isolated and of the deep American disappointment about the European development (which was viewed in simplified form as Gaullism since the United States currently saw no other power in Europe acting on the world stage aside from Gaullist France) to what Birrenbach perceived as a significant approaching transformation [“*Wandlung*”] of American policy, “which cannot be taken seriously enough by the Federal Republic,” a historic examination and “agonizing reappraisal” of the overall American position and situation that would certainly result in a reduction of the American engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. For Birrenbach’s assessment of the Johnson years as years of disintegration for NATO that had to be reversed, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. With respect to the Johnson administration, Birrenbach also referred at times to the “unfortunate American policy of the last years.” More generally, during periods of despair when the United States seemed to be drifting aimlessly and failing to provide the necessary leadership, Birrenbach often alluded to Raymond Aron to the effect that the United States was an imperial power no more. For Birrenbach’s belief that “[i]f the United States does not again assume the leadership of the alliance, and it does not look like it will, it will one day face a bitter awakening,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. Despite his frustration with the United States, Birrenbach did argue that “[n]o extra-European power has worked more for European integration than the American one” (KB to Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1). On the desire of the Nixon administration, despite the military confrontation on the East Asian mainland as still the first concern, to assign Europe priority in its foreign policy, as in the 1950s and in contrast to the “Johnson period,” see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. For Birrenbach’s complaint that the United States was even intervening too much in the “*querelles européennes*” rather than looking on from a greater distance and employing a “tactical *Mittelform*,” see KB to West German ambassador Berndt von Staden, Washington DC, 15 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.

Europe.<sup>33</sup> Supportive in public, Birrenbach frequently criticized the United States in private on a variety of specific issues, such as nuclear strategy, détente and the Vietnam War.<sup>34</sup> Finally, while willing to compromise with the Americans, he staunchly opposed

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<sup>33</sup> Birrenbach saw political events in the United States, including the Goldwater phenomenon, contributing to the “Gaullist infection” in Germany. On the important impact of the American perception of a détente in Central Europe on the belief in détente in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1. For the difficulties of halting the dynamics of détente in the Federal Republic “when President Nixon declares again and again that now peace is settled for our time” and on the effect in Europe of the American administration’s claims of a dramatic change in the US-USSR relationship and of the President’s declarations “to have reached peace for our generation,” see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the contribution of “foreign applause” regarding the West German *Ostpolitik*, even if with reservations, to the Brandt government’s popularity and its 1972 election victory, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.

<sup>34</sup> For Birrenbach, as a result of actual American policies as well as those under consideration, warning that “the faith in the United States begins to waver,” without explicitly attributing such an attitude to himself, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach’s admission that the Americans and their policies and practices, not solely the French, deserved some blame for the current condition of the alliance, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. As an example of Birrenbach’s criticism of the American handling of the MLF, including American attitudes with respect to nuclear control, see again KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach’s displeasure with the United States playing with the idea of a large withdrawal of troops from Europe, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On Birrenbach’s judgement that it was “inexcusable” that, due to financial reasons, reductions in the vital presence of American troops were being considered, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. For the dubious détente policy of the United States, along with France and Britain, see again KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. Nevertheless, with respect to the need to publicly support the United States even when doubts existed about particular policies, Birrenbach remarked, here with regard to Vietnam, “if we depend almost exclusively on American protection in the East-West conflict, then it is a matter of fact and decency to support morally a country which is in a difficult position” (KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2). For Birrenbach explicitly contradicting Adenauer with regard to his judgement of President Kennedy and the American involvement in Vietnam and for Birrenbach’s professions regarding the support of the German government, all the parties, the press and himself for the American effort there (but also addressing his own reservations), see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1. Examples abound of other issues on which Birrenbach could be quite critical of the United States.

Consultation: For Birrenbach’s criticism of the United States with respect to American attitudes on “global political consultation in the framework of the alliance,” and specifically for not properly consulting with Europe and/or the Federal Republic with respect to the Test Ban Agreement in 1963 (resulting in a reevaluation of the GDR), the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Middle East crisis of October 1973, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2; KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. For this failure to carry out proper consultations as a failure of the United States to treat the American-European relationship as a genuine partnership, see KB to Strausz-Hupé, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. However, Birrenbach was also well aware of the difficulties created by a disunited Europe with respect to consultation. For Birrenbach’s recognition that a coordinated foreign policy and unified strategy was inhibited by the provincialism of the individual, disunited European national states and his hope that “[i]f the USA has grown into the role of a *Weltmacht*, so Europe could also do that, in case it should unite,” see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. On the difficulty of informing and consulting nine countries when a decision was urgent (as on 25 October



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1973), see KB to Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the need to bring about genuine NATO reform, including the creation of necessary structures, with respect to the coordination of foreign and military policy, see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.

Nuclear strategy: On differing geopolitical situations as a factor in disagreements on nuclear strategy, something Birrenbach acknowledged the French had correctly pointed out, see KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2. For Birrenbach's criticism of American attitudes with respect to strategy in Europe, see KB to Kissinger, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. For persistent differences between American and European concepts of nuclear strategy in Europe as the reason for his insistence on a NATO reform with regard to nuclear control and in particular for pushing for a greater voice and influence for the Federal Republic (and other European non-nuclear powers) in every stage of the nuclear planning and decision making process, thus offering the FRG a chance to inject its views from the very start, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. On the continued existence of significant differences between the United States and Europe regarding the time and circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used as a major factor in Birrenbach's stress on the need for a future European nuclear option, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's complaints about the United States considering the de-nuclearization of the continent, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach's recognition that "the large *Schlagtausch* with intercontinental weapons remains doubtful since it would result in the destruction of the territories of the two world powers," see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On European doubts during the early 1970s with respect to the American "nuclear umbrella," enormously increased by the US-USSR nuclear accord in June 1973, and Birrenbach's fears that European security would suffer due to such developments, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the seriously weakening credibility of the deterrent power of American nuclear weapons over the previous several years and the related need for a future European nuclear option (admittedly impossible at the moment but possible if one day the European states "could awake from their dreams"), see KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1; KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. Regarding Birrenbach's doubts about American nuclear strategy, especially the tendency in the US towards a greater "restraint" in the "*Verbindung*" of strategic nuclear weapons (decoupling), a sparing of the two "sanctuaries" (the United States and Soviet Union), as well as a stronger concentration on a theater nuclear war, and about its ability to guarantee "for an unlimited duration" the continued territorial existence of Europe, and on his support for a stronger American stress on a counter-force strategy that would include selective strikes of a strategic nature, see KB to Hahn, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

Non-Proliferation Treaty: Birrenbach's criticism of the NPT, which he considered an inflexible treaty of practically unlimited duration, and the American treatment of it related not only to the specific content of the treaty but also to the overall philosophy on which it was based. On the faulty American (and British) philosophy behind the NPT, namely that of a universal treaty, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2. On the crucial concessions and commitments the United States had made to the Soviet Union in the context of the NPT, see KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, K017/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On Birrenbach's belief that the NPT would block the future possibility of a European ABM system see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. For Birrenbach's view that in the fall of 1966 the Americans, as a result of their NPT interpretations (regarding the version negotiated with the Soviet Union) or changes to the original treaty (Articles I and II), had unnecessarily blocked the future possibility of an effective European nuclear force (the "European option"), see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2 and KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For Birrenbach's complaints about the United States expecting a signature of the current NPT version, see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach's criticisms of the final text of the NPT, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.

unilateral or disproportionate concessions.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, even in criticizing the United States, Birrenbach explicitly distanced himself from especially the German Gaullists, and from others he believed to be openly purveying unjustifiably harsh assessments of the US, and urged them to exercise greater circumspection in their own critiques.<sup>36</sup>

To some extent, Birrenbach attributed the American failure to provide the requisite leadership to extraordinary short-term factors and developments such as Vietnam and Watergate, but he also identified deeper-seated and more disturbing problems in the United States. Among these was the deplorable quality of the American leadership class, which during the postwar era had peaked with President Harry Truman and his advisors, especially George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, but, despite some

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Vietnam: For Birrenbach's criticism of the war in Vietnam, especially insofar as, beginning in 1965, it drew American attention almost completely away from Europe to Southeast Asia, see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On Birrenbach's fears that in the context of negotiations over Vietnam the United States might try to bring the Russians to exercise pressure on Hanoi by offering additional concessions with respect to an NPT, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For the entanglement of the United States in a "hopeless [*ausweglosen*]" land war on the Asian mainland as a contributing factor to the "agonizing reappraisal" of the American position in the world and an upcoming reduction of the American engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. For Birrenbach's later description of the Vietnam War as "pointless" and "harmful," see KB to Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3. On the other hand, for Birrenbach's somewhat more benign view that the United States was simultaneously an Atlantic and a Pacific power, able to be engaged in both oceans at the same time, and had not considerably weakened its military position on the European continent, only conducting the war in Vietnam "with the left hand," see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.

<sup>35</sup> Yet another example of Birrenbach's resistance to American proposals was his opposition to a revaluation of the West German mark as a means of helping to consolidate the American trade position. As Birrenbach put it, "I have never belonged to those Atlanticists, who were ready to accept every American idea indiscriminately [*unbesehen*]" (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). In any case, he was convinced that with unilateral concessions "one would not impress the Americans" (KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1).

<sup>36</sup> For instance, even while criticizing US policy, Birrenbach insisted that he did not identify himself with Adenauer, "who, as so often in his criticism of American policy, has far overshot the mark" (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1). For Birrenbach rejecting what he considered Guttenberg's "inaccurate" criticisms and reproaches of American attitudes and policy that had been made in an interview in the *Rheinischen Merkur* and lecturing Guttenberg on the need to exercise "particular caution" in such critiques, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach's worries about the degree and form of criticism against the United States in recent months in "a certain part of our *Fraktion*" and the alarm it caused to a number of "our best friends" in the US, see again KB to Guttenberg, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2.

apparent affection for John Foster Dulles, had never attained that level since.<sup>37</sup> Sizing up President Gerald Ford, Birrenbach moaned that “the times of the kings have passed.”<sup>38</sup> He came to doubt the very method of selecting those leaders, suggesting that while the existing system had been suitable for choosing a President (and Vice-President) for a 19<sup>th</sup>-century continental state, it was totally inadequate for a 20<sup>th</sup>-century world power. Frustrated with the unpalatable candidates and dreadful outcome of the 1976 election in the United States, Birrenbach expressed his doubts “that direct democracy offers all [the] advantages one could expect from a democratic system of representative character.”<sup>39</sup> In all of this, Birrenbach typically cited the British historian Lord Acton’s chapter on “The American Revolution” in his “Lectures on Modern History” regarding the total failure of the rules laid out in the American Constitution with respect to the selection of the President and Vice-President.<sup>40</sup>

Another fundamental element contributing to what Birrenbach judged the less than satisfactory performance of the United States on the foreign stage was the gradual shift of power away from the Northeastern elite, amongst whom Birrenbach’s own contacts were concentrated, southward and westward to other areas of the country. This

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<sup>37</sup> On this theme, see for example KB to John McCloy, 26 November 1975, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 11 August 1976, ACDP K160/2. For some evidence that Birrenbach looked favorably on the Dulles period, see his argument that the American-German relations were less close than in the past, particularly in the times of Adenauer and Dulles in KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. For President Richard Nixon’s trip to Bonn and his appearance in Berlin awakening German memories of the Dulles period, yet Birrenbach’s recognition that there could be no going back to that era, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On the need for a still not discernible “statesmanlike” and “moral leadership” (citing the Scranton Commission’s use of this latter phrase in its report about the crisis of the universities), along with references to the civil rights commission and the examples of Lincoln in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and Roosevelt in the Great Depression, to help overcome America’s internal crisis and disunity by combining legal order with reform, “to keep under control and, at the same time, to humanize those forces desiring change [*die auf Änderung gerichteten Strömungen*],” see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>38</sup> KB to John McCloy, 7 November 1975, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>39</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 5 November 1976, ACDP K211/2.

<sup>40</sup> For instance, KB to George Ball, 4 November 1976, ACDP K160/3.

geographic trend contributed to the distraction of American attention, readily discernible at the latest by the mid-1960s, away from Europe by affairs in other parts of the world, for example Vietnam, the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, and the decline in American conversance with and sympathy for Europe and its problems. Symbolic of this was Birrenbach's inability to meet with Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (admittedly, a member of the northeastern elite) in 1974 due to the latter's Middle East shuttle diplomacy. At the very least, Birrenbach was suspicious of many of the political figures emerging from these other parts of the United States, personalities like Barry Goldwater (Arizona), Mike Mansfield (Montana), J. William Fulbright (Arkansas) and Jimmy Carter (Georgia). Areas outside of the Northeast also witnessed the rise of troubling new political movements, in particular the "new American conservatism," associated with Goldwater.<sup>41</sup> Thanks in part to his business contacts and especially to his experiences in California in the fall of 1962 (see Chapter 7), Birrenbach recognized this significant "new conservative" trend earlier and more accurately than even some of his American contacts (e.g. Holborn) and perceived this "*Grundstimmung*,"

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<sup>41</sup> Birrenbach entertained serious doubts about many of Goldwater's, at least alleged, foreign and domestic policy views, was skeptical about his ability to lead the Western alliance and considered him one factor among many working against the Atlanticists. Despite all of this, Birrenbach urged his party and his friends in the West German government to act with reserve and open-mindedness vis-à-vis the development of the 1964 Republican (Goldwater) ticket. For Goldwater's relatively positive views in questions of policy with respect to Germany but also on the almost universal rejection, unprecedented in the post-World War II era, the Goldwater candidacy (rightly or wrongly) met with in Europe, on the "indigestible" nature of Goldwater's overall political program for the typical European and on the Goldwater candidacy's unfortunate aggravating of the overall international situation, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Senator Mike Mansfield was well known for his campaign to reduce the presence of American troops in Europe via his Mansfield Amendment. His retirement from the Senate in 1977 contributed greatly to a decline in this theme as a political issue. Fulbright chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959-74.

whether it pleased him or not, as a “deep [*tiefgehenden*]” current, an integral element in the US that could not be simply dismissed but had to be studied and influenced.<sup>42</sup>

Aside from his Atlanticism, several other elements of Birrenbach’s outlook deserve mention. For Birrenbach, properly understanding the policies of a foreign country as well as international affairs in general was a broad, holistic endeavor. Such a “global” approach to international, including trans-Atlantic, relations encompassed political, military-security, economic, trade, and currency issues and their inter-relationship. Birrenbach stressed that his focus on the US was never limited, for instance, to narrow political questions, rather he sought to observe the overall development of American society.<sup>43</sup> Particularly noteworthy with respect to this approach was his stress

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<sup>42</sup> KB to Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1 and KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, 11 August 1964, ACDP K187/1.

<sup>43</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. Over the years, Birrenbach dealt with a considerable number of wide-ranging issues, whether it be *Ostpolitik*, trade, the NPT or burden-sharing, to name just a few. On the need for a “global perspective” with respect to foreign policy, see KB to State Secretary a.D. Dr. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2. For the importance of European-American relations under a “global perspective,” see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. On the necessity of also including military-security, economic, trade, and currency questions as well as the relationships between them as part of such a global perspective on international relations, including those of the Atlantic alliance and partnerships, see Birrenbach’s Report of 20 February 1973, ACDP K183/2; Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. Birrenbach’s wide-ranging analysis of the NPT, including its impact in the civil, military and foreign policy realms, indicated as well his broad view of foreign affairs (KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1). On the tendency of foreign trade policy to become the means of foreign policy, yet another reason Birrenbach opposed the entrance of neutrals into the EEC, as well as for Birrenbach’s acknowledgement that economic, social and fiscal policy was also European policy (in agreement with Hallstein), along with his insistence that there remained a qualitative difference between the “*Vergemeinschaftung*” of the foreign, defense and economic policy (as demonstrated by the fate of the EDC), see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.

Birrenbach’s sophisticated, holistic analyses of the situation of the United States and of particular issues pertinent to it took account of, among other factors, the White House (including the President); Congress; the relevant governmental departments (among them those of an economic nature); the political parties, leaders and candidates; other key bodies (such as the AEC with respect to nuclear issues like the MLF and NPT); and public opinion. On the very complicated process of consensus in the United States (citing Acheson) being similar to that in an alliance in which various departments, Congress and other constitutional institutions made up the partners of that alliance, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach’s knowledge of the typical practices of American presidential candidates, see his confidential memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP K184/1. On Birrenbach’s regret regarding the “strained” and “difficult”

on the need to understand history. Birrenbach fancied himself a man “who has a sense of

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relations between the President and Senate, the dangerous possibility of Senate resolutions that would tie the President’s hands as commander-in-chief, and the administration’s need for the full trust and cooperation of Congress in its future operations in Europe and Asia, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. For the pressure being exercised by Congress on the President with respect to troops in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For Birrenbach’s knowledge and explanation of American *Staatspraxis* with respect to the ratification of international treaties, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach on the generally valid Anglo-Saxon international legal norms with respect to the relationship between the moral judgement and the recognition of foreign countries, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the danger that the pressure of public opinion in the United States in connection with certain forces in the Senate and the efforts of particular NATO partners, among them Britain, could cause the American President to go beyond the current wording of the NPT to bring the Soviet Union to accept the treaty, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On an important part of public opinion pushing the American administration towards further concessions to the Soviet Union with respect to the NPT and nuclear options, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On pressure from the Senate (Mansfield Resolution) and public opinion as likely bringing about soon an American reduction of its engagement, including its contingents, in Europe, see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. For Birrenbach’s analysis of a polarized American public opinion, including unrest at the universities and uneasiness of the liberal intellectual community on the East Coast; his assessment of its potential electoral impact; the need for the President “to bridge the gulf between the silent majority and the protesting minority” in the United States; and the protest movement in the world, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. On the necessity for an assertion of the Middle (which had spoken to some extent in the last election) to heal the disunity of the American nation between Right and Left (an element of internal crisis) and on Birrenbach’s interpretation with respect to the internal American crisis of a “tectonic quake which shakes the society” and that was symptomatic of a serious and complex social “*Krankheitsherde*,” see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.

Birrenbach’s holistic approach also encompassed the psychological realm. For instance, on the continued importance of psychological factors, even in the nuclear age, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On the psychological mistakes of the American administration (in contrast to the fundamental nature of the French position), see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the need for an especially delicate treatment of the American problem in light of the politically, militarily, economically and psychologically difficult situation of the United States, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. For the emotions evident from the American side in the past year, the emotional reaction in the United States to Kiesinger’s reference to a “North-Atlantic Imperium” in his report about the state of the nation of 11 March 1968, and the fact that any, even only apparent, identification with the policy of Gaullist France penetrated “into deep layers of the political consciousness” of the American people and triggered potentially dangerous reactions, see again KB to Kiesinger, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. On the “traumatic experience” of America in the Vietnam War prompting an imminent reconsideration of the American military engagement in the world, including Europe (Nixon Doctrine), see Birrenbach’s Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. For Birrenbach’s remark that “I have the impression since two or three years that your country the first time since decades has somewhat lost the faith in itself” and that no American President since Roosevelt was facing such enormous problems as Nixon, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. On America’s unprecedented doubt and loss of faith in itself, in the “American way of life,” in its “manifest destiny,” in the idea of progress as the law of America, and in its ability to solve all the problems that confronted it in its history, as the essential content of its internal crisis at the start of the 1970s, see KB to Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. On the deep sense of frustration and introversion Birrenbach sensed in the United States in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, see the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk on Birrenbach’s *Amerikareise* of May 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.

history and thinks in longer terms than one decade or so.” For Birrenbach, the study of history was, like that of foreign policy, a broad endeavor, comprising “not only political but also intellectual history [*Geistesgeschichte*] and social development.”<sup>44</sup> Rightly or wrongly, Birrenbach’s historical consciousness informed his judgement and understanding of a variety of themes such as isolationist trends in the United States, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, and French support for the “terrible” Brandt *Ostpolitik*.<sup>45</sup> The flip side of this holistic approach was that Birrenbach thought almost

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<sup>44</sup> KB to William Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. For Birrenbach on his “very personal relationship” with Hajo Holborn, which included talks about problems of the *Weltpolitik*, of the United States and of the German *Politik*, and for Birrenbach’s desire that the German public be made familiar with German history, especially as “seen from the perspective of a man of the *Format* and with the *Weltblick*” of Holborn, see KB to Karl Cornides, Vienna, 1 October 1970, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>45</sup> For Birrenbach having “always highly appreciated your [Kissinger’s] foreign policy, which has been executed from a historical perspective,” see KB to Henry Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3. On Birrenbach’s conviction that “historical knowledge is more necessary than ever,” here with respect to a proper judgment of the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Schieder, 21 July 1978, ACDP K158/1.

For Birrenbach’s knowledge of American history, including that between the two world wars, rendering him particularly sensitive to what he perceived to be isolationist trends in the United States, see KB to Eugene Rostow, 18 February 1976, ACDP K211/2. Birrenbach’s knowledge of 20<sup>th</sup>-century history also contributed to his understanding of the United States as simultaneously an Atlantic and Pacific power, engaged in both areas at the same time (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). On Birrenbach’s triumphalist understanding of American history as one of many historical tests passed and difficult internal and external crises overcome (most recently two world wars and the Great Depression), the mastery of much of the continent, and the building up of a world power, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. In Birrenbach’s mind, the First and Second World Wars had demonstrated that a European balance on a continental basis was no longer thinkable and the need for extra-European powers to re-establish the balance (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).

In December 1974, Birrenbach remarked “Russia has been all over the last centuries an imperialist power, and the Soviet Union is only more powerful and furthermore ideologically more aggressive than Russia has been, which thought only in the times of the czars of the extension of the Russian borders and power and did not dispose of the ideological weapon the Soviet Union is using in such an extremely adroit form. If men like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn give us the advice to insist on our policies and not to give in too quickly, we should follow their advice and not the advice of Willy Brandt” (KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 December 1974, ACDP K211/2). For Birrenbach’s insistence as of December 1974 that only self-enforcing treaties be concluded with the Soviet Union, based on his knowledge of the experiences of the United States in its negotiations with the USSR over the past twenty years, and for his negative assessment of the potential impact of economic cooperation on the policy of the USSR, an impact he believed was widely overestimated in many countries, based on Germany’s long experience over the past five decades in trade with the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. Ultimately, Birrenbach considered the effects of the Berlin Agreement, along with other products of the *Ostpolitik*, an “entirely deep cut [*Einschnitt*] in the historical development in Germany” (Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2). More broadly, Birrenbach’s skeptical, even negative, attitude towards détente and its potentially serious

exclusively in international terms, with his judgment of particular issues, personalities and policies ultimately related to and viewed through the prism of foreign affairs. For instance, looking abroad, he judged foreign leaders, regardless of their political stripe, primarily on the basis of their statesman-like ability to execute what he considered the necessary policies, in the case of American presidents, to lead both the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>46</sup> Birrenbach's extensive knowledge of foreign countries also encouraged a comparative approach in understanding the Federal Republic's condition.<sup>47</sup>

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consequences was shaped in no small part by the experiences of the late 1930s. For instance, he compared Nixon's statements regarding "peace for our generation" with Neville Chamberlain's declaration of "peace for our time" after the infamous Munich Conference (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2 and KB to Kissinger, 7 January 1977, ACDP K146/3). On the Munich myth, see Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, eds., *Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1998).

On the need for historical knowledge to truly understand the world's reaction to the West German *Ostpolitik*, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. Birrenbach's own historical knowledge was essential to his interpretation of what he considered the anti-German policies, the interest in keeping Germany down [*Kleinhalten*] that had been reawakened after Hitler and still existed, of the neighboring European nations, including with respect to the German *Ostpolitik* [KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1]. Regarding the French policy towards the Federal Republic, especially its approval of the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, Birrenbach bitterly remarked, "they are doing this since the times of Richelieu" (KB to John McCloy, 15 February 1971, ACDP K210/1). As of October 1964, Birrenbach viewed the current French desire for hegemony and a hierarchical form of European unity as part of a series of such attempts in the past (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2).

Other historically based assessments abounded. For instance, in March 1959, Birrenbach remarked that the Anglo-French relations were as bad as they had ever been since Fashoda (KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2]. Birrenbach's stress on the creation with the EEC of a "community of stability" (and his criticism of inflationary developments in the Federal Republic under Brandt) was based not least on his knowledge of how "fateful" a continuous inflation could be, not only for the well-being of the economy but also the state (KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2).

<sup>46</sup> For these criteria applied especially to candidate Jimmy Carter, see KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1. The linkage in Birrenbach's mind between domestic and foreign affairs manifested itself clearly in his analysis of the United States. As Birrenbach put it, "[w]hat happens in the United States affects everybody in the world, no country more than the Federal Republic" (KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2). On not only the tremendous costs of the Vietnam War but also enormous internal problems pushing the United States down the path of arms limitation, see Birrenbach's Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. On the "internal crisis" and the Vietnam War having brought about an unfortunate change in the American relationship to the world, in particular a reduction of the role of the United States (Nixon Doctrine), including in the next few years in Europe, and in this sense "the end of an epoch" and a "changed world constellation," see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1. For Birrenbach's prediction that the overcoming of the internal US crisis would require years and all the nation's strength, so that the clear priority of the foreign- and defense-political goal of the 1950s would not be manifest in the 1970s, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. On the connection between the internal crisis in the United States and the "*Kurswechsel*" in American foreign policy under Nixon,



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especially the reduction of the American (particularly military) engagement in the world (especially in Asia but also Europe), the setting of the American priority on Europe as an important consolation, and Birrenbach's denial that all this amounted to a neo-isolationism, like after World War I, or that the collapse of American power was imminent, see again KB to Leussink, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. On the endangered condition of the American currency, the financial and economic basis of the American *Weltmacht*, as a contributing factor to the "agonizing reappraisal" of the American position and a future reduction of the American engagement in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. On the need for Nixon to bring inflation in the United States under control, important not only from an internal perspective but also externally with respect to the American balance of payments, see KB to Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. For the contribution of the "race conflict," which touched the very foundations of the American "*Lebensordnung*" and could lead that summer to a "serious explosion" in the slums of the American cities, to the "agonizing reappraisal" of the American position and a future reduction of the American engagement in the world, see again KB to Kiesinger, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. For Birrenbach's concern regarding the "race conflict" and "wave of crime and violence" in the United States and their implicit potential impact on external affairs and international relations, see KB to Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.

Birrenbach's tendency to link domestic and foreign affairs was quite noticeable with respect to Watergate. Birrenbach especially feared that a prolongation of the constitutional crisis and the weakening of the executive vis-à-vis Congress (a crisis of authority) that he perceived would have a broad and deleterious impact on American foreign policy in a variety of areas: the undermining of Nixon's position in his negotiations with Brezhnev; the dimming of the prospects for the ideas that Kissinger had developed in his "Year of Europe" speech of 23 April 1973; and a serious weakening of the deterrence function of American nuclear weapons. Therefore, Birrenbach hoped for a "normalization" of the situation with a return to the American system of checks and balances in the constitution, but no more. "This would be in the interest of the whole world" (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2 and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2). On Watergate as a "collapse of executive authority" and a relative shift in power from "an unconstitutionally almighty presidency" to the Congress, a shift which was to some extent indispensable but which on the whole represented a "pretty dangerous" impairment of the normal functioning of American institutions, with adverse effects that were tangible all over the world, see KB to William Bundy, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*, New York City, 17 July 1974, ACDP K184/1; KB to McCloy, 23 October 1974, ACDP K210/1; KB to Kissinger, 6 May 1985, ACDP K146/3. For Watergate and the recognition in Europe, including the Federal Republic, and elsewhere of the President's loss of authority, see KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1. On the negative impact of strained relations between the President and the Senate, even prior to Watergate, on American operations in Europe and Asia, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.

<sup>47</sup> For Birrenbach's comparative international orientation, for instance with respect to determining the feasibility of an increased progressive taxation in the Federal Republic, in comparing the German tax rate to the rest of the world, and with reference to the extraordinary mobility that existed with regard to jobs in the United States, see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. For Birrenbach on the highest taxes in the world in the Federal Republic, the differences between the tax systems in the FRG and the United States, and the much more negative picture exhibited by the liabilities of the German stock corporations than those of neighboring countries and the United States, see KB to Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1. On Birrenbach's assessment that the West German steel industry paid, with Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the highest wages in the *Montanunion* and had the shortest work time, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1. On the tendency for countries governed by Socialist governments, including the Federal Republic, towards inflationary developments, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For Birrenbach placing the reaction of the SPD and FDP to the American incursion into Cambodia in the context of the depth of the reaction of the world's liberal and left-wing parties, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. For Birrenbach demonstrating his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon ideas in international law, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach elsewhere comparatively referring to the conditions in the United States, see European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 26 February 1958, Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2.

Likewise, Birrenbach viewed issues that might have seemed primarily of domestic importance to the Federal Republic through the same international prism. For example, his desire to move from the current federal structure towards a more centralized form of state was closely related to his aim of enhancing the Federal Republic's effectiveness in foreign affairs. Similarly, his support for a Grand Coalition, whatever domestic advantages he perceived in such a grouping, stemmed largely from his hope that "such a majority would neutralize the internal differences [between his party's north and south wings] as far as foreign policy is concerned" and reestablish the Federal Republic's capacity for action in international affairs that had been damaged by what he saw as the internal crisis of the late 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>48</sup> For Birrenbach, the need to accelerate the resolution of the Chancellor-succession question in the wake of the events of January 1963, including the signing of the Élysée Treaty, was also largely a question of international politics, since "[a] German-French agreement has a completely different aspect with Erhard or Schröder at the head of the German government than if Adenauer were still there."<sup>49</sup> Even as Birrenbach insisted that legal, domestic-political and moral concerns motivated him with respect to the statute of limitations on war crimes and crimes against humanity, his position in this regard was likewise primarily determined by international political considerations.<sup>50</sup> International considerations also contributed to

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<sup>48</sup> KB to Dean Acheson, 19 August 1966, ACDP K155/3. Birrenbach saw the domestic advantages of such a grouping in the strength it would provide for a long-term political and economic program and for electoral and other essential reforms.

<sup>49</sup> KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. Birrenbach suggested this to American contacts such as John McCloy and Shepard Stone in February 1963. As Birrenbach put it several months later, "by solving the problem of succession we have made quite clear to General de Gaulle that we do not want an inward-looking Europe," this being one of several steps taken to clarify their position (KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2].

<sup>50</sup> Birrenbach deemed it an "unbearable idea" that National Socialist criminals might "escape earthly justice" simply because the *Verjährungsfrist* had expired. He opposed an extension as an undesirable

determining Birrenbach's views with respect to economic policy, for instance *Mitbestimmung*, in the Federal Republic.<sup>51</sup> Finally, virtually any negative event or condition in the Federal Republic, such as what Birrenbach viewed as the decline of his party and *Staat* in the early 1960s, was cause for concern in part due to the distressing impression created among observers abroad.<sup>52</sup>

In addition to this all-encompassing, holistic approach to international affairs, Birrenbach's thought often displayed, as befitted a person trained in law, a pronounced and often excessively legalistic quality. Legal issues especially comprised a central element of his treatment of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the *Ostverträge*.<sup>53</sup> At times, this legalistic approach was linked to a strangely deferential attitude towards the Soviet Union. For instance, Birrenbach's legalistic outlook largely triggered his concerns regarding the potential impact of a Soviet interpretation of the *Ostverträge* as a final recognition of the division of Germany and his search for and insistence on a legally binding instrument that would commit the USSR to

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manipulation of the fundamental rules but favored instead a *de facto* extension through a change of the temporal starting point (KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2).

<sup>51</sup> As of October 1970, Birrenbach saw the current German *Mitbestimmung* regulation, especially that in the *Montan* industry, as having hindered the efforts for a harmonization of national company law in Europe, essential for an economic and currency union. Moreover, he believed that a far-reaching expansion of this *Mitbestimmung* would hinder further economic integration in the EEC (KB to Thomas Ruf, MdB, Chairman of the CDU Program Commission on *Mitbestimmung*, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1).

<sup>52</sup> On Birrenbach's concerns at the end of the 1950s regarding developments and foreign-policy (*Deutschland*) plans within the SPD, the possibility of "macabre scenes" in the context of resultant foreign policy debates and their impact on the international relations of the Federal Republic ("If the government alternative is not reliable and credible, this country must inevitably lose respect"), see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.

<sup>53</sup> Having discussed the possibilities of modifying or interpreting the Franco-German Treaty with Monnet beforehand, Birrenbach investigated the legal problems regarding the passage by the Bundestag of the treaty's Ratification Act and found the options limited, due to constitutional restrictions on the Bundestag's power. "For this reason there are only two ways to do what we had discussed, either by the passage of a resolution by the Bundestag or by putting a special clause into the preamble of the Ratification Act." Birrenbach rejected the first possibility because "we have abused this device in the past and nobody has trust anymore in resolutions of this kind." Therefore, Birrenbach made clear that "I prefer the second way in spite of the fact that this method, without being in contradiction to our Constitutional Law, is constitutionally unusual. The last fact does not disturb me at all." He therefore proposed to Monnet to do just that (KB to Jean Monnet, 16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1).

an interpretation of the treaties as a *modus vivendi*.<sup>54</sup> Likewise, Birrenbach's efforts to modify the NPT and to secure interpretations binding vis-à-vis the USSR rested in part on his fears that by citing certain articles of the treaty as well as by invoking a narrow interpretation of international law, the Soviet Union could transform itself into the arbiter of the future structure of the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>55</sup> Finally, Birrenbach was horrified at the

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<sup>54</sup> See KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2. For Birrenbach's judgment of the legal situation regarding the *Ostverträge*, see also KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach's proposals to Barzel from the start involving an exchange of letters or notes; his rejection of a resolution as a suitable instrument with respect to an authentic interpretation of the treaty since such a resolution (along with the government's submission process with respect to the USSR) had only minimal international legal relevance and, rather than binding, left the Soviet Union its freedom of action both politically and in an international legal sense; his assessment that certain elements within his party (including the Union's top party committee, the *Bundesvorstand*, which voted "yes" to the treaties) were overestimating the value of the resolution proposed by the government and agreed upon by all the Bundestag *Fraktionen*; and the crucial role this (including his failure to reach the goal he had strived for in this regard) all played in his refusal to approve the *Ostverträge* as the final vote in the Bundestag approached, see again KB to Barzel, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1 and KB to Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2. Incidentally, Birrenbach considered a preamble to the ratifying resolution, as had been done with the Franco-German Treaty in 1963, unacceptable since a unilateral preamble would not change the treaty, while a bilateral preamble would not have been accepted by the Russians (KB to Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2).

<sup>55</sup> With respect to the universal NPT turning the USSR into the arbiter of the future structure of the alliance (including the nuclear status of the Federal Republic), see KB to Robert Bowie, 8 September 1965, ACDP K160/2 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. Regarding Birrenbach's fears that the Soviet Union, through the NPT, would become the arbiter over the military development in Europe, to the detriment of the non-nuclear powers, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1. For the serious consequences of the NPT (draft) on the non-nuclear member states of NATO with respect to the security arrangements within NATO, especially regarding the European option and the creation of a European ABM system, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1. On Birrenbach's warnings that the NPT (especially if a European *Staatsverband* did not come about) made the Soviet Union the arbiter of a future structure of the Atlantic alliance and of a European union and perpetuated the American policy of under no circumstances relinquishing its veto with regard to the nuclear control system, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. Clearly, Birrenbach believed the NPT impacted on the possibilities for European political unification. For Birrenbach's concern regarding the NPT blocking a possible stage on the path to European unity based on his belief that the doctrine of state succession would not serve as a suitable basis for a European nuclear solution given the probable development in Europe, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2. On Birrenbach's worries that the Soviet Union might invoke the much stricter and more formal continental European version of international law, rather than the more pragmatic Anglo-Saxon version, and thus in combination with the NPT hinder the implementation of the doctrine of state succession, thereby preventing the future creation of a European nuclear force, see KB to Eugene Rostow, 5 November 1973, ACDP K211/2. For Birrenbach's criticism of the NPT as eliminating the possibility of a European nuclear option, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the need to keep open the future possibility of a European nuclear option for a European *Zusammenschluß* on the threshold of a political union on the basis of the doctrine of state succession, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP

USSR's continued insistence on its rights of intervention in the Federal Republic, bestowed on the victors of World War II and spelled out in Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, and devoted an inordinate amount of effort over the years to having these eliminated.<sup>56</sup> True, Birrenbach was not totally consumed by this mode of thought,

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K184/1. For differing interpretations of a "temporally practically unlimited" NPT as a potential threat to peace, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.

On Birrenbach's preference for an NPT among the NATO countries alone, which could then be easily modified on the basis of the self-evident *clausula rebus sic stantibus* to take account of developments such as a European unification, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1. As part of his efforts to minimize the deleterious effects of the NPT, Birrenbach sought "*verfahrensrechtlichen*" measures and changes to the procedural rules of the treaty (drafts) to which he objected, including a shortening of the "practically unlimited duration," the expanding of the right of resignation, and an increase in the frequency and a strengthening in the competencies to change the treaty of the periodic review conferences (in case the nuclear weapon states did not fulfil their obligations stemming from the treaty) (KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1). For Birrenbach's efforts to attain an improvement in the interpretation of the European option based on the doctrine of succession, see his Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1. On the need to negotiate about and settle certain points regarding and prior to the signing of the NPT, not only with the Federal Republic's Western partners (especially the United States) but also with the Soviet Union; Birrenbach's suggestion that it should be ascertained with the United States whether the Federal Republic could give its own interpretation, prior to signing the NPT, of the European option which would be based on the doctrine of state succession and would avoid unnecessary restrictions; and his suggestion that the Federal Republic should at the signing of the treaty submit a reservation with respect to the possible case of the development of purely defensive nuclear weapons that would later justify its exercise of the reservation clause, see KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach's insistence on securing the legal validity and binding nature of any interpretations and assurances, American or German, regarding the NPT (e.g. nuclear arrangements within NATO, unhindered use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes) and the often convoluted procedural issues involved (often including with respect to a USSR that might contradict them), see for instance KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 6 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>56</sup> Birrenbach explained the Federal Republic's reluctance to enter into the NPT in part through the Soviet Union's continued insistence on these "obsolete" rights (KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, K187/2). For Birrenbach's desire to secure some sort of guarantee or protection within the context of the NPT against "threat and blackmail," see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1. For Birrenbach seeking to ensure that in exchange for what he considered the extraordinary sacrifices the Federal Republic would make by accepting the NPT that the Soviet Union would renounce these intervention rights, see KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1. On Birrenbach's belief that the statements of the Soviet ambassador of 6 February 1969 did not suffice in their legal effects regarding the UN articles and that prior to the signing of the NPT the USSR would have to issue a statement that the Federal Republic enjoyed all rights from the NPT in the same way as all the other treaty states, that after the signing and ratification of the treaty by the Federal Republic the reproach that the FRG was seeking "access to nuclear weapons" would cease, that the Federal Republic enjoyed the same status as all other states, and that the Soviet Union recognized that Article 2 of the UN charter fully applied to its relations with the Federal Republic, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. Birrenbach considered it a significant achievement of his *Sondermission* to

admitting, for instance, that with respect to an Atlantic Partnership “the spirit of cooperation which will dominate this unifying framework will be still more important than its legalistic structure.”<sup>57</sup> Still, Birrenbach often exhibited an exaggerated legalistic quality, admittedly not entirely uncharacteristic of West German foreign policy as a whole in the post-1945 era.<sup>58</sup>

### C. Motivations

Having outlined Birrenbach’s pronounced Atlanticist views, it is now time to identify in an impressionistic, rather than a comprehensive, manner some of the

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the United States in September 1968 that, shortly thereafter, the American and British governments made statements declaring that a unilateral Soviet intervention would justify the *casus foederis* (the French declaration of September 1968 was somewhat vaguer). In later years, Birrenbach seems to have placed less stress on these intervention articles, not only characterizing them as “obsolete [*überholt*]” but also arguing that while the Soviet Union might refer to them as a justification, “it would convince nobody” (KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2).

<sup>57</sup> KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1. Likewise, Birrenbach at least occasionally acknowledged that with respect to the relationship between the NPT and European unification “*in extremis* this is a question of power and will depend on one side upon the situation of the Soviet Union in that moment and on the other side on the mood of countries like France and Britain” (KB to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, ACDP K160/2). Birrenbach also admitted that the resolution and procedure of submission pertaining to the *Ostverträge* were not completely irrelevant insofar as they might serve internal purposes and put the treaties into a perspective of general West German policy. On Birrenbach’s recognition of the political effect and importance of a resolution supported by all the parties and declared by the government to be the Federal Republic’s view regarding the *Ostverträge*, especially with respect to the attitude of the Western world towards the treaties and the outcome of a plebiscitary election on the *Ostpolitik*, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1. In this letter to Barzel of 14 May 1972, Birrenbach also referred to “the gray zone between *Politik* and *Recht*,” here with respect to the Moscow Treaty, and noted the difficulty of familiarizing the broader West German public with “extraordinarily complicated” international law.

<sup>58</sup> Birrenbach’s stress on legal factors was in part determined by his conviction that the Federal Republic, of all countries, had to conscientiously fulfill treaties. Furthermore, while the Federal Republic had a vital interest in reaching understandings with the Soviet Union about major questions, such as those linked to *Deutschlandpolitik*, any divergence in the interpretation of treaties involving the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic, for example those he believed existed regarding the NPT, would provide the Soviet Union with “room to maneuver (*Spielraum*)” which it would certainly exploit, thus burdening the Federal Republic’s relations to the USSR as well as its relations within the alliance, and ultimately harm the relatively weak and vulnerable Federal Republic, rather than, for instance, the more powerful United States. Therefore, Birrenbach insisted it was essential that treaties with the Soviet Union only be signed when they were precisely formulated and unanimously interpreted (KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1). For Birrenbach’s analysis of Anglo-Saxon concepts of international law with respect to *de facto* recognition, in this case vis-à-vis the GDR, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2. On legalistic tendencies in West German foreign policy, see Waldemar Besson, *Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Massstäbe* (Munich: R. Piper, 1970).

motivations that inspired him, always bearing in mind the nature of our study and sources as well as highlighting certain particularly interesting factors. Probably the most immediate impetus driving Birrenbach's Atlanticist conception was the need to ward off the threat from the East and, ultimately, to win the Cold War. Based on often faulty impressions, Birrenbach beheld the Soviet Union and its dependent empire with considerable fear and awe.<sup>59</sup> At least to some extent an extra-European power, the USSR represented an aggressive admixture of traditional centuries-old czarist imperialism, bent on the extension of borders and power, and new communist ideology.<sup>60</sup> Birrenbach was impressed by, indeed overestimated, the "tremendous" power and dynamics of the Soviet bloc, not just in military but also in political terms. He likewise exaggerated the advantages in international relations enjoyed by the USSR, and totalitarian systems in general, vis-à-vis the democracies of the West, seeing the Soviet Union as "extremely adroit" in its use of ideological weapons and untroubled by peace movements, public opinion, and parliamentary control in its foreign policy-making.<sup>61</sup> With these strengths and the very real prospect of an imbalance of military power favoring the Soviets, the

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<sup>59</sup> On the dependence relations of the Eastern bloc, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the question of misperception, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>60</sup> For Birrenbach's perception of the USSR as a not purely European power, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the "constant direct or indirect threats from the USSR" against the "vulnerable" Federal Republic, see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2.

<sup>61</sup> On these themes, see for example KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 December 1974, ACDP K211/2 and KB to Gerard Smith, 13 May 1982, ACDP K209/1. For Birrenbach on the constant underestimation of the military technology of the Soviet Union, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. With respect to the USSR's "extremely adroit" use of ideological weapons, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. In May 1980, Birrenbach remarked that "[t]he Soviet Union, as a totalitarian state without parliamentary control, is able to act deliberately wherever it can if a power vacuum is opening in one part of the world or the other" (KB to Eugene Rostow, 28 May 1980, ACDP K209/2). Likewise, Birrenbach argued that it was unwise to base policies on "the apparent intentions" of the USSR, in part because, as "a totalitarian state," it could "move from one policy to another, irrespective of the reactions of an almost not existing public opinion in that country" (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2).

danger even existed by the early 1970s, apart from any threat of outright attack, that the USSR would attain hegemony over Western Europe by means short of war.<sup>62</sup> Given these concerns and this conception of the USSR, the military balance naturally occupied a central position in Birrenbach's thought.<sup>63</sup> While not averse to negotiations and insisting

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<sup>62</sup> In June 1973, for instance, Birrenbach professed himself "deeply worried" and "afraid" about the possibility of a "Finlandization of Europe" (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2). On Birrenbach's fear that "the USSR may in a series of years (five or ten years or less), on the basis alone of its sheer predominance of power, get such an influence in Europe as is connected with the concept of Finlandization," see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. On the potential for a preponderance of Soviet military power to lead to Soviet influence on the political development of the European continent, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On the threat of growing Soviet influence on the policy of the European states as the principal danger for Europe, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach's prediction of a bandwagoning, rather than a balancing, response of the European states (equating balancing with an increase in European defense contributions and a moving together of the European states), see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. In this respect, Birrenbach was fond of quoting Dean Acheson's reference to "a mad race towards Moscow" (for instance, again Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2). On the contribution (albeit insufficient alone) of a unification of Europe "across the board" (including political and military unification) in averting such developments, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For the essential role of Atlantic Partnership and the United States in protecting Europe, along with factors like a proper defense budget and nuclear strategy, and thus preventing Europe from falling into the orbit of and reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2; KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1; and KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach's warning that if Europe got the feeling that any nuclear confrontation would be limited to European territory, something he sensed happening due to American strategy, "then a flight into accommodation with the Soviet Union is unavoidable," see KB to Hahn, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the willingness of the Soviet Union to use or threaten force in the pursuit of its interests, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.

<sup>63</sup> For Birrenbach's insistence on the maintenance of the military balance in Europe, see for instance KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. For Birrenbach's reference to the "power political European game," see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. On the worrisome threat posed by Soviet ballistic missiles, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. On Birrenbach's concerns regarding Soviet technological developments in the military realm undermining the military equilibrium and changing the whole military-strategic situation, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach on the importance of the presence in the immediate neighborhood of the nuclear superpower Russia, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. On Birrenbach's concern that the Russians had overtaken the West in almost all military areas in the last years ("in spite of détente!"), see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. On the role of the American presence in Europe in maintaining the military balance there, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. For the need to base policy towards the USSR on its power capabilities, rather than its apparent intentions, the military superiority of the USSR in many fields, Birrenbach's concerns regarding and the need to offset the conventional superiority of the USSR, and a negative view on the present state of the power equilibrium in the world, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. Indeed, Birrenbach's fear about the "precarious" military balance in Europe was a key reason for his skepticism regarding MBFR (he agreed here with the French), negotiations he believed might lead to a substantial, perhaps even unbalanced,



that “I am no ‘cold warrior’,” Birrenbach consistently urged a hard line in the face of this daunting Soviet threat, one that firmly eschewed unilateral concessions.<sup>64</sup> In his view,

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reduction of American troops (KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2). Birrenbach’s anxiety regarding the military balance led him to generally embrace American “hawks,” like Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, while dismissing “doves,” like Senator George McGovern and Paul Warncke (Birrenbach’s confidential memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP K184/1). For instance, Birrenbach opposed McGovern’s plans for major reductions in the American defense budget (Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2). On Birrenbach’s belief that a system “from the Atlantic to the Urals” or “from one end of Europe to the other,” would give to the Soviet Union such a militarily predominant position that it would be unacceptable for all the other European states except France, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. The “hardly to be redressed [*aufholbar*]” superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional arms led Birrenbach to doubt whether it was in the Federal Republic’s interest, and that of the European alliance partners, at all to have a reduction of nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT or SALT (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1). For Birrenbach on the need for the United States to not renounce a first use of nuclear weapons, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s assessment that the discrimination of the NPT was only acceptable if the nuclear weapons states also made sacrifices, especially with respect to a limitation of nuclear arms, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1. Also for Birrenbach’s recognition of the greater importance in some situations, in this case Berlin, of political means rather than force see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.

<sup>64</sup> According to Birrenbach in August 1965, he had been aware for years that the current *Deutschlandpolitik* had to be reconsidered (KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1). On the support of the whole non-Gaullist majority in West Germany for a less rigid policy in the East and the resistance to such a course by the “so-called Gaullist element,” see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. While admitting that the changes in the East bloc as of the mid-1960s were not of a fundamental nature, Birrenbach argued that change had occurred there and required a more differentiated policy than that of the 1950s (KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1). For Birrenbach’s approval, provided certain preconditions were met, of a *détente* or offensive *Ostpolitik*, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.

However, for Birrenbach’s opposition to an immediate recognition of the Oder-Neisse border without anything in return, since it would “take from us the last card in our game,” as well as to Britain’s proposal of a “thinned zone” that he saw as sacrificing “our only card” (here “the size of our army and its atomic armament”) only for the sake of *détente*, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For the willingness of Birrenbach and others, “with a certain reluctance,” to conduct a less rigid policy towards the East, but one that did not involve making concessions in advance “in vital questions of our national existence,” see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the failure of the NPT to oblige the USSR to any *quid pro quo*, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. On Birrenbach’s characterization of Nixon’s efforts to enter into negotiations with the USSR as “unavoidable”; the need for the principle of *do ut des* in negotiations with the USSR; and the necessity of combining any fundamental settlement of military questions, like disarmament and arms control, with a solution of the political problems and sources of tension in Europe, such as Berlin, see KB to Prof. Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On his opposition to greater concessions with respect to the Berlin negotiations, see KB to FRG Amb. Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1. With respect to firmness vis-à-vis the USSR regarding the carrying out of the Moscow Treaty and Birrenbach’s opposition to unilateral American withdrawals of troops from Europe, with an eye towards both the military balance in Europe and the negotiating position of the United States and the West, for instance on MBFR, see Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On Birrenbach’s criticism of the Brandt government’s serious mistakes in negotiating treaties with the USSR that were not self-enforcing; the need for firmness towards the Soviet Union, including on human rights (“If men like Sakharov and

the Soviet Union's totalitarian nature precluded a fundamental change of attitude towards the West and limited any détente to, at best, a fragile coexistence dogged by differing interpretations of its very meaning.<sup>65</sup> Such a flawed détente would merely erode the will of the European and Atlantic nations to come together and to provide for their own security.<sup>66</sup> Instead, the first priority of the United States and West Europe should be the Atlanticist goals of Community and Partnership. "This will be the best *Ostpolitik*."<sup>67</sup>

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Solzhenitsyn give us the advice to insist on our policies and not to give in too quickly, we should follow their advice and not the advice of Brandt"); an admission of the limits of such a policy; but also the Jackson Amendment as a confirmation of his views, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>65</sup> For example, the Protocol of the KB-Helmut Sonnenfeldt Talk during Birrenbach's Trip to the United States of May 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to James Schlesinger, 16 December 1975, ACDP K155/1. On doubts regarding the results of détente, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For the lack of any effective results for the foreseeable time for the Federal Republic from détente, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On Birrenbach's skepticism regarding the USSR's "all-out attempt to induce the Western world to believe she does not constitute a danger anymore for peace"; the lack of any real Soviet concessions during the process of détente; and the need to act soberly and cautiously vis-à-vis the USSR (also because of the USSR military superiority in many fields and experiences with the USSR in recent decades), see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For events like the Near East conflict in 1973 demonstrating that détente and the declared special relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union "has not yet created a new world," see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. Obviously, Birrenbach was quite wary of détente with the USSR, which to him consisted merely of a deceptive relaxation of tensions and completely differing interpretations by East and West (for the East, only peaceful coexistence). He saw the resultant deep dissensions in East-West relations and their significance being brought home to the Germans as a result of their experiences with the *Ostpolitik*. Ultimately, Birrenbach was extremely doubtful of the chances of a totalitarian state like the USSR changing its fundamental attitudes toward the West, for which his litmus test (and, for him, one of the unjustified expectations of détente) was the ending of the USSR and GDR policy of *Abgrenzung* and the opening of their frontiers to the free flow of men and ideas (for instance, as provided for in Basket 3 of the CSCE), since such a policy would endanger the regimes themselves. On these topics, see also KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1 and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>66</sup> For instance, KB to Sen. Edward Kennedy, 19 April 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach's argument that the détente policy had slowed down the trend towards Atlantic cooperation and integration, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. On the impact of the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, which would "work like an infection" on the Scandinavian nations, the Benelux states and possibly Italy; and the potentially deleterious impact of a European security conference, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For Birrenbach's stress on the military, political and economic strength of the West as the basis for every kind of détente, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>67</sup> KB to US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, 28 June 1974, ACDP K184/1 and KB to Richard Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1. On the priority of the alliance and its cohesion over efforts for a détente (such as for the NPT), see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On the need for Atlantic Partnership, including West European unity, as a precondition for building bridges to Eastern Europe, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP

While the Soviet Union may have threatened the Atlantic world as a whole and while Birrenbach might have felt some abstract attachment to that world, he remained a realist for whom international relations was based principally on national interests, in his case what he perceived to be the interests of the West German state or the German nation.<sup>68</sup> With even the other major Atlantic nations, their national traditions unbroken, still pursuing their own, sometimes anti-German, interests, it was essential that the Germans, despite their broken national tradition, continue to do this as well. Otherwise “certain [negative] developments become inevitable.”<sup>69</sup> Birrenbach’s robust defense of

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K018/2. On the need for a complete clarification of issues, in so far as possible, between the Federal Republic and its western partners prior to negotiating with the USSR or signing the NPT, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. Elsewhere in this document intended for Kiesinger, Birrenbach stressed the need to discuss and negotiate relevant questions pertaining to the NPT with the governments of the United States, Britain, the EURATOM partners (including France) and, to some extent, the Soviet Union prior to and in some questions after signing the treaty.

<sup>68</sup> One element of this realism was Birrenbach’s argument that foreign policy could not be reduced simply to morality. For Birrenbach’s views on the importance of concrete national interests in Indian foreign policy under Nehru, a policy ostensibly based on moral foundations, and for a general rejection of a foreign policy based on “*die Moral*,” see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. For Birrenbach’s stress on the need to seek practical political paths, rather than *moralische* ones, to solve the problem of the recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic, his emphasis on considerations of interest over moral claims in this regard and his argument “that the view point ‘*fiat justitia pereat mundi*’ has nothing to do with practical *Politik*,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the other hand, Birrenbach did not deny the role of morality in politics. For the considerable moral pressure the Federal Republic would be subjected to if it did not sign the NPT, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 18 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For Birrenbach’s argument that the Federal Republic’s non-recognition of Israel did not imply any moral devaluation of that state and for his rejection of the claim that “non-moral principles must govern the *Realpolitik*,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.

<sup>69</sup> KB to John McCloy, 22 January 1973, ACDP K210/1. De Gaulle’s France was certainly a focus of Birrenbach’s attention in this regard. On the harm caused to the Federal Republic by de Gaulle, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For the potentially negative impact of the “unrealistic” policies proposed by de Gaulle on the prospects for German reunification, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For Birrenbach’s rejection of the French government’s demands that the Federal Republic essentially change the fundamental basis of its policy, thus abandoning the principles of the entire policy of postwar Germany, and sacrifice its vital interests (and the interests of many other countries in Europe), see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L’Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2.

More broadly, Birrenbach was quite disturbed by the willingness among the Western Allies to engage in a strategy of détente with the Soviet Union and especially opposed the sacrifice of German interests to achieve it. For Birrenbach’s displeasure that all the NATO powers around the Federal Republic were on a détente course, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. On the British desire for détente and the deleterious potential impact of their proposals on the prospects for German reunification, here with respect to the idea of a “thinned zone,” see KB to Friedensburg, 26 March

German interests infused virtually all of his positions on the various issues of the time.<sup>70</sup>

In certain instances, these efforts led him even to cooperate with German Gaullists, such

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1959, ACDP K074/2. For Birrenbach's frustration that the majority of the NATO partners attached priority to the NPT rather than to a German *Mitspracherecht* in the framework of a nuclear organization, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On the efforts of Britain and some other NATO partners to push the American administration towards further concessions to the Soviet Union with respect to the NPT and nuclear options, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach's rejection of French advice to the Germans with respect to a less rigid policy towards the East that he considered tantamount to making advance concessions in vital questions of the German national existence, see KB to Ullmann, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On Birrenbach's concerns that French policy under de Gaulle contained a hidden threat of possibly "going over our heads," see KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. To his dismay, Birrenbach found the yielding vis-à-vis the USSR and the easing of détente at the expense of the Federal Republic being well received as to their own advantage among the states "in our neighborhood" and considerable elements in the United States (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).

Birrenbach was particularly troubled by the approval he discerned of the Brandt *Ostpolitik*. As he bitterly put it, "[t]he attitude of a series of Western partner states in the course of the negotiations has not been so as the German people could have expected after twenty years of integration" (Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2). On Birrenbach's regret about "the opinions [*Stellungnahmen*]" of a number of Western governments [but speaking to Chayes: "not the American one"] regarding the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik* and surprise that "vital German interests have been so little respected [*geachtet*] by several of our partner states," see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. For the concerns of individual personalities inside and outside of the American administration regarding the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, but also the general approval of the goal of the federal government's *Ostpolitik* (as well as that of the earlier Grand Coalition) and the American satisfaction about the federal government's clear statement that its *Ostpolitik* was firmly anchored in the European and Atlantic *Politik*, see Birrenbach's Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. Perhaps not surprisingly, Birrenbach favored a "gradual development of European political unity" because it would require "a long adaptation process in Europe," part of which would be "an organ like the Commission that would include the consideration of the vital interests of the individual states in its proposals to the European executive," for the Federal Republic to subject the question of reunification to the vote of its neighbors (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2).

<sup>70</sup> On the Federal Republic's foreign policy pursuing and seeking to reconcile the three goals of security, Europe and reunification, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. For Birrenbach's agreement with McCloy that the Federal Republic should affirm more strongly than in the past its own interests vis-à-vis France, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. On Birrenbach's concerns for the Federal Republic's vital interests, in this case with respect to the impact of the NPT, see KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2.

Security: Birrenbach's major concerns regarding the Federal Republic's security were heightened by his consciousness of its position as the most exposed country in Western Europe in the context of "the East-West conflict." For security as "our top preoccupation in the world today," see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L'Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. On the vulnerable Federal Republic (and Berlin) constantly threatened, directly or indirectly, by the USSR (and GDR), see KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2 and KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2. For the greater security vulnerability of the Federal Republic than France, Britain and Italy, as demonstrated by the Berlin crisis of 1958-62; the continuing great importance of the issue of security (admittedly less over recent years) for the Federal Republic due to the unreduced mass of Soviet troops across the border in the zone; the need to base defense policy on capabilities and not "intentions that can change daily"; and the link between the Federal Republic's foreign political goal of security and the resultant close relationship to the United States, see KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. With respect to the NPT, Birrenbach sought improvements

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that would enhance the position of the Federal Republic, and its partners in the EEC and NATO, in the civil as well as the security fields. For Birrenbach's worries regarding the potentially detrimental impact of an NPT with respect to military and security matters, including the denying to the Federal Republic of essential armaments of the future (such as small caliber atomic shells) and the obstructing of the building of ABM weapons, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1 and KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. On Birrenbach's explanation of the Federal Republic's objections to an NPT that would exclude the non-nuclear powers once and for all from the possession of nuclear weapons without guaranteeing to them as a corresponding *quid pro quo* an effective nuclear protection, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.

Reunification: For the "fundamental German interest" in maintaining the "German option," see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. On the idea of Atlantic Partnership as a precondition for bridge-building to Eastern Europe and on German reunification presupposing, somewhat abstractly, the framework of a European peace order resting on a European security system requiring the United States as guarantor and protector vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. In this letter to Grosser, Birrenbach imagined that such a reunification could only take place in the framework of a *marchandage global* on a world scale, for which the United States, rather than the continental European states, could better offer the USSR concessions. On West European unification, including political unity, as a precondition and in large part motivated by the desire for bridge-building to and cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see again KB to Grosser, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2 and KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 20 November 1969, ACDP K126/1. Birrenbach's opposition to any reevaluation of the GDR's status formed a significant aspect of his efforts for reunification. On Birrenbach's criticism of the Rapacki Plan for encouraging disarmament and disengagement while leaving unsettled the reunification of Germany and promoting the recognition of the GDR, see KB to Foreign Minister Brentano, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2. For Birrenbach's objection to a recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic and the precipitate withdrawal of German technicians working in Egypt due to his fears of a recognition of the GDR by the Arab world ("I am not ready to recognize Israel whatever the consequences may be for the Federal Republic"), see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach's efforts to prevent such a reevaluation with respect to the procedural conditions of the NPT, see KB to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1. Birrenbach was also highly critical of the Brandt *Ostpolitik* for its impact on the possibility of German reunification. For Birrenbach's criticism of the Berlin Agreement as a crucial worsening of the all-German situation and the status of Berlin and as part of the process of sanctioning the division of Germany, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.

Discrimination: Birrenbach's efforts in a variety of contexts to thwart a discrimination against and to ensure the equality of the Federal Republic vis-à-vis its Western Allies represented another element of his defense of German interests. On Birrenbach's opposition to what he considered proposals for a discriminatory regime exclusively for German troops, as proposed in an article in the well-known French publication *Politique étrangère* in Fall 1958, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. On the need to maintain the structural principle of equality, especially vis-à-vis France and England, within the future European order and the framework of the NATO alliance (including the command structure), see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach's insistence on the principle of equality in the control apparatus of a future collective nuclear force, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For the "crucial" importance of a definitive solution of the issue of nuclear control to ensure equal rights to the European states, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On Birrenbach's support for the establishment of an integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapons system in which the Federal Republic would take part with equal rights as and through which it would achieve a status of relative equality with the other larger European alliance nations (i.e. Britain and France, perhaps Italy), see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. For the discriminatory character of the NPT drafts, including the division of the world into nuclear weapon and non-nuclear states, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP

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K020/1. On Birrenbach's insistence and proposals with respect to the NPT that the Federal Republic (and other non-nuclear states) not be discriminated against or its endeavors impaired in the peaceful civilian use of nuclear energy and namely that all free Western nations, including the nuclear weapon states like the United States and Britain, subject themselves and their peaceful nuclear facilities to the same safeguards and controls, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1; and Birrenbach's Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1. For Birrenbach's hostility to the revival of the idea of a tripartite directorate (first broached by de Gaulle to the United States and Britain in September 1958), see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On Birrenbach's opposition to a special control zone with regard to MBFR in Europe, particularly in Germany, that would again split Western Europe and weaken it further, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.

Directly related to these anti-discriminatory efforts were Birrenbach's attempts to preclude a hegemony in Europe, especially on the part of France. On Birrenbach's desire for a non-hegemonic community, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. For discrimination and qualitative inequality between states within the European community, particularly with respect to nuclear power and weapons (e.g. nuclear inspections (including those related to the NPT), possession or sharing of nuclear weapons), as inevitably leading to exaggerated claims, hegemonic tendencies and hierarchical forms that would prove dangerous and destructive for European unity, especially with reference to France but also Britain; and for collective nuclear control systems, such as the MLF, the ANF and the European option, as a means of bringing France and Britain (the sole possessors of national nuclear weapons in Europe) to abandon the idea of and integrate these national nuclear forces into that collective system, thus establishing equality between the states and undermining strivings for hegemony, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2; KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 12 November 1970, ACDP K140/2; KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach's argument that "[a] divided community is no community" and his stress on equality as a major reason he objected to the French claims to privileges also in the peaceful nuclear sector, "which appears extremely unwise and not very communitarian," see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

Decision-making: Birrenbach also worked assiduously to ensure a West German participation in the larger, especially American and NATO, decision-making processes. For the idea of the coordination of foreign and arms control policy within NATO as a means by which the Federal Republic could attempt to influence (though not alone stem) from within the course of détente pursued by the other NATO powers, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. On the need for coordination of foreign policy, especially in times of crisis and in arms control questions, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. Regarding the necessity of close consultation and agreement, including with respect to American-Soviet negotiations, not least to ensure the maintenance and proper development of NATO, see KB to Prof. Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. On the desirability of information and consultations and the need for the Europeans and Americans to "create a 'unifying framework'" [an expression of the US Secretary of State] based on a constant high-level dialogue between Europe and the United States until "a political integration" transformed Europe into "a real partner of the United States," see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.

Birrenbach's efforts pertaining to decision-making were particularly intense with respect to nuclear weapons. On the Federal Republic's desire for a "right of co-determination" with regard to nuclear weapons fired from European territory, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On the interest in and need for a closely meshed coordination, consultation and direct participation of the Federal Republic in

as Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg and Franz Josef Strauß, a group with which he, however, never established much of a genuine relationship and with whom he often disagreed on

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every stage of the planning and decision-making process in NATO and the United States regarding nuclear strategy, arms control negotiations and crisis management, especially insofar as they impacted on the Federal Republic's own security, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2; KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 18 November 1965, ACDP K090/1; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to State Secretary, Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.

Birrenbach's interest in collective nuclear weapons systems was also largely dictated by this desire to attain West German influence in decision-making processes. On the need for and the right of a united Europe to have a greater say in nuclear matters vis-à-vis the United States; and on the related importance, "based on its experiences of the past," of a membership ("insider" status) for West Germany, along with other non-nuclear European countries, in a limited, integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapons system, a "hardware solution" that would involve the renunciation here of a monopolistic American nuclear veto and enable these non-nuclear powers to exercise a robust and durable control (*Mitspracherecht*) over nuclear forces, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's proposals ("an optimal solution for us") regarding and within the framework of an MLF, including the creation of a control mechanism acceptable for Europe, a reorganization of the NATO Council, an American renunciation of a unilateral veto and a greater degree of consultation and *Mitbestimmung* for the Europeans within the entire structure of the alliance, all of which would result in an incentive for the pooling of European nuclear forces in full integration and coordination with the United States, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach foreseeing the possibility that a NATO combination, without becoming a *Staatsverband*, could acquire a weighted *Stimmrecht* within a nuclear control system, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. On the MLF as a possible, though now doubtful, basis for a larger *Mitspracherecht* in NATO questions, sought by the federal government, and on the need for a clear German stress in December 1965 vis-à-vis the Americans (and British) on a German participation in the framework of an integrated nuclear organization (not least to evoke an American initiative in this field), see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For participation in a nuclear weapons system as a means to help "find an organizational basis" for a "tighter coordination of foreign policy among the more important [*bedeutenderen*] NATO states" and to prevent the United States from making overly large concessions to the Soviet Union with respect to the NPT in the future negotiations of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach on the "painful development" leading from the Norstad proposal to the decline of the MLF plan, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

Such considerations of influence also played a significant role in Birrenbach's worries about the NPT. On Birrenbach's concerns regarding the possibility of the NPT blocking his proposed solutions to enhance the Federal Republic's role in decision-making (including an integrated Atlantic nuclear weapon system) if the United States went beyond the present wording of Articles I and II in the current draft by making further concessions to the Soviet Union, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On the future nuclear arrangements in NATO and Birrenbach's (and the Federal Republic's) concerns regarding the impact of a universal NPT in effectively crowing the Soviet Union arbiter of the structure of the alliance or of a united Europe in the future, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's fears regarding the possibility of the NPT impairing the activity of the McNamara Committee, see Birrenbach's Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.

trans-Atlantic issues.<sup>71</sup> While, at times, the defense of German interests seemed to clash with larger Atlantic imperatives, Birrenbach ultimately saw the Atlanticist project meshing well with the national perspective and serving the Federal Republic's properly understood interests: "I have always supported seeing the future of Germany in the European and Atlantic integration.... Outside of this conception, the situation of the Federal Republic... is dangerously vulnerable."<sup>72</sup> While Birrenbach referred openly to his foreign contacts to "the cause of my country," this staunch defense of German interests was a delicate affair given recent history. Birrenbach pointed repeatedly to the Federal Republic's peaceful, benign intentions as well as to his own lack of nationalistic feelings and when possible, as with the NPT, attempted to cloak German interests behind those of larger groups of nations.<sup>73</sup> While Birrenbach may have cited Atlanticist or

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<sup>71</sup> On the lack of contact between Birrenbach and Strauß, see KB to Franz Josef Strauß, CSU-Landesvorsitzender, 18 July 1974, ACDP K184/1. For an example of a particular disagreement indicative of more fundamental Atlanticist-Gaullist differences, one can cite the episode surrounding the opinion of the *Fraktion's Arbeitskreis V* on nuclear non-proliferation that the AKV, on 19 April 1966, had entrusted Guttenberg, Birrenbach and Werner Marx with editing. Though Birrenbach presented the draft, agreed upon by the three participants, to the AKV on 28 June, the document had to be supplemented due to disagreements among the three over the extent to which the American draft NPT hindered a future European nuclear option, with Birrenbach arguing that it rendered it more difficult to establish and Guttenberg, along with Strauß as well as a few other members of the AK, insisting that it made it impossible. Regarding this episode, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 7 July 1966, ACDP K087/2.

<sup>72</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 19 December 1968, ACDP K146/3. On the need for a West German policy of Atlantic and European integration and the vulnerability of the Federal Republic outside integrated structures due to Germany's division and the last thirty years of its historical past, see also KB to Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. Birrenbach explicitly recognized a connection between economic and political power, including in the long-run case of a Germany operating within an integrated Europe, even more so if the "vertical proliferation" of the United States and Soviet Union in nuclear arms continued at such a rapid pace that the nuclear arsenals of a financially limited Britain and France were rendered "*weltpolitisch* irrelevant" and thus reduced the significance of their nuclear edge over the Federal Republic in Europe. On these possibilities and the English and French concerns regarding them as well as on the prospect of a widened and united Europe, even one that initially only comprised the economy, as a political factor, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.

<sup>73</sup> In this context, Birrenbach often stressed to his contacts the desire of his compatriots, and especially of his own party (or at least the majority in that party and the overwhelming majority of his colleagues in the AKV), for close relations to the United States, to toe the American line and to exist as part of the larger Atlantic Community. With respect to his own personal attitudes, Birrenbach repeatedly insisted to the



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effect that “as you know, somebody with my past has no nationalistic feelings” (KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2). In part, Birrenbach’s efforts along these lines consisted of assertions that German history was not repeating itself. For Birrenbach’s claim that the Federal Republic did not want to again become a nation-state in the proper sense of the word, including with its own army, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. On Birrenbach’s explanation, in the context of the issue of *Verjährung*, that all responsible political personalities in the Federal Republic agreed on the need for an “*innere Reinigung*” with respect to the crimes of the National Socialist regime, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Likewise, Birrenbach insisted to his American contacts that the principle of equality on which he insisted had nothing to do with a desire for prestige (KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1). For Birrenbach’s claim that the idea of a second Rapallo had not emerged in the Federal Republic and that there was a recognition there that the historical-political preconditions for such a constellation no longer existed, see his Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. On Birrenbach insisting to his talk partners that National Socialism was dead, see his Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. For Birrenbach’s view that, with the Federal Republic having tied up its sovereignty in NATO and the European Communities, the preconditions for the crimes of the “Hitler regime” or of a national-state that could dominate others no longer existed, see KB to Thomas (his son), 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For Birrenbach’s stress on the democratic and peace-loving nature of the Federal Republic, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s concerns regarding “latent, still-existing anti-Semitism in Germany” that might be “kindled again,” see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.

Another aim of Birrenbach’s efforts in this regard was to convince his contacts that West Germany had no interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. For Birrenbach’s insistence that the Federal Republic did not desire to produce, physically control or possess its own (national) nuclear weapons, at times with reference to its renunciation of the production of such weapons and of “the national option” in 1954, in connection with the Paris Agreements and the establishment of the WEU, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2; KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1; Birrenbach Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3; KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2; and KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. The desire to quell any such fears was also among the “obvious reasons” that Birrenbach was reluctant to create a multilateral atomic strike force based on surface ships with the Federal Republic as the principal nucleus, instead wishing for a larger British contribution (KB to Tyler, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2). For Birrenbach’s claim that nobody in the Federal Republic desired sole power of disposal [*Verfügung*] over nuclear weapons, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1. For the Federal Republic’s renunciation of 1954 towards its Western Allies regarding the production of ABC weapons as a model for a proper non-proliferation agreement, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On the danger that the opponents of a “hardware solution” in the American administration could get the impression that the Federal Republic was essentially out “to get a finger on the trigger of nuclear weapons” if the hardware solution was overstressed at the expense of the goals pursued via such a hardware solution, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. With respect to Birrenbach’s profession to recognize (even while he pushed for the Federal Republic to be consulted and to participate in every phase of the NATO decision-making process regarding nuclear strategy as well as arms control negotiations and crisis management and for a “hardware solution” like an integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapon system), for the time being, the American veto with respect to nuclear weapons as “a fact of life” and his assertion that the Federal Republic did not seek any kind of majority voting procedures for a collective nuclear weapon system, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2; KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach’s stress when depicting his ideas, especially to Americans, that the membership of the Federal Republic (and other non-nuclear European powers) in an integrated, collective Atlantic nuclear weapon system (a “hardware solution”) was primarily a means to a vital political and military end, namely the strengthening and making

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more durable of their participation in the nuclear decision-making process, rather than an end itself and that the ultimate decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons would remain in the hands of the American President, see for instance KB to Carstens, 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1; KB to Holifield, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1; KB to Strausz-Hupé, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1; and KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's insistence that the Federal Republic did not want to get its "finger on the trigger" of nuclear weapons or a strategic weapon system, see again KB to Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. On Birrenbach's belief that only a European nuclear option, but never a national one, would be open to the Federal Republic in the future, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1.

Many of Birrenbach's efforts along these lines also took place within the context of the NPT. For Birrenbach's emphasis over the years in his talks with the federal government, in the Bundestag's foreign affairs committee, in his *Fraktion*, and especially with his foreign contacts that all responsible figures in the Federal Republic fully agreed with the basic principle underlying the NPT, whatever their criticisms and proposals for improvement of its details, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. For the Federal Republic's agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons to many other individual nations could have disastrous consequences, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2.

Finally, Birrenbach regularly sought to demonstrate the coincidence of the Federal Republic's own interests with those of other nations. For his insistence that the importance of the European continent for the United States, not least in the context of the East-West conflict, justified an Atlantic priority for the United States, rather than a Pacific one, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. With respect to certain measures that would not be in the interest of Europe and the Federal Republic nor in that of the United States; the deleterious impact on the possibility of a "global defense of the West" of a potential major reduction in the American defense budget; a potential preponderance of Soviet military power that would alone suffice to allow the USSR "to influence the political development on the European continent in a sense also detrimental for the United States"; and Birrenbach's view that many critics in the US overlooked the fact that "the United States also defended itself in Europe [its "European *Vorfeld*"], not only the European states," against the Soviet Union, see Birrenbach's Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On the danger that without the United States the Europeans would eventually fall into the orbit of the Soviet Union, thus reducing or eliminating the American influence in its forward strategic area in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. Such an approach was also typical with regard to Birrenbach's treatment of the NPT. On his and the Federal Republic's "serious objections," "together with many other states," with respect to the NPT and their efforts to make the NPT "universally acceptable" or "acceptable worldwide," see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. In attempting to modify the NPT, Birrenbach recommended the *Bundesrepublik* join similar efforts of other non-nuclear powers like Japan, India, Sweden and Brazil because "[i]n this way we would find cover behind the screen of other powers with our reserve vis-à-vis the *Atomsperrvertrag*" (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). With respect to the advice Birrenbach received from his American talk partners that the Federal Republic should remain reserved in at least certain criticisms of the NPT and allow other powers to go first in that regard, see Birrenbach's America Report, "Vor einem Wandel der amerikanischen Politik?", 17 May 1967, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's argument that his reluctance to support a recognition of Israel by the Federal Republic was "in the well-understood higher interests of the state of Israel" since any gains Israel might enjoy through a diplomatic recognition by the FRG would be far outweighed, if this led to the Arab League's recognition of the GDR, by the consequent repercussions in the *Bundesrepublik* detrimental to the cause of Israel, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.

In such contexts, Birrenbach often utilized the rhetoric of "the West." On such rhetoric, see Wilfried Mausbach, "Erdachte Welten: Deutschland und der Westen in den 1950er Jahren," in Manfred Berg and Philipp Gassert, eds., *Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Detlef Junker* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 2004), pp. 423-448. For the

European concerns, this did not indicate a deep evolution in identity. Whatever affinities he may have had with the Anglo-Saxons or the broader Atlantic world, his German identity motivated him in his endeavors far more than any abstract Atlantic identity.

In assessing Birrenbach's motivations, we must also consider his position in the *Wirtschaft*. While he would not have disputed the influence of the concept of national interest in his thinking, Birrenbach positively bristled at the notion that he was a "captain of industry" working politically for narrow economic interests, something he considered beneath his dignity.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, several episodes do seem to underscore a certain narrowly defined independence from the *Wirtschaft*, particularly when larger Atlanticist interests were at stake. Probably the best example is his behavior during the pipeline embargo controversy of 1962-63. In the interest of alliance solidarity, particularly against the backdrop of the events of early 1963, Birrenbach supported the American efforts aiming, at least ostensibly, to deny the Soviet Union critical strategic-military goods. This was especially noteworthy as the embargo triggered widespread opposition in the Federal Republic, including that of important industrial interests (not least within the CDU), and most directly affected steel firms, such as Phoenix-Rheinrohr, Mannesmann and Hoesch, seeking to expand their exports to the East. Birrenbach's "*Gewissensentscheidung*" triggered intense and widespread criticism from his colleagues in industry.<sup>75</sup> Another

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tendency to conflate German interests with those of larger entities, see Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993).

<sup>74</sup> The expression "captain of industry" headlined, for instance, an article on Birrenbach written by Walter Henkels, "Ein Industriekapitän von Rhein und Ruhr," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 March 1963. For Birrenbach's displeasure with certain elements of this article, see Walther Hensel to KB, 1 April 1963, ACDP K010/2; KB to Walter Henkels, 3 April 1963, ACDP K010/2; Walter Henkels to KB, 17 November 1965, ACDP K016/2; and KB to Walter Henkels, 22 November 1965, ACDP K016/2. In many other contexts, Birrenbach repeatedly stressed that, despite his position by the Thyssen concern, his political interest did not lie in *wirtschaftspolitischen* questions but rather in the realm of foreign policy.

<sup>75</sup> On the pipeline embargo, see Bruce Gentles, *Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Robert Mark Spaulding, *Osthandel and*

example of Birrenbach's measured independence from the *Wirtschaft* was his early and sustained support for exploring the possibility of a temporary Grand Coalition, an idea he began entertaining and propounding around the turn of the year 1961-62 and especially after the Spiegel Affair (1962), therefore a time when this notion was still taboo. As with the embargo, the opposition of many colleagues in the *Wirtschaft* to whom he advocated such a solution contributed to making this decision "extremely painful."<sup>76</sup> Given these positions, taken in the face of considerable criticism, Birrenbach cannot be viewed as *primarily* a narrow lobbyist for the immediate short-term interests of the *Wirtschaft*.

However, it would be foolish to believe that Birrenbach's activities contained absolutely no element of patent lobbying in favor of the direct interests of the *Wirtschaft* or, more specifically, the immediate interests of the steel industry and the Thyssen group in particular. Indeed, one of the striking features of his role in the European Parliament from 1957-61 was his fierce opposition to measures that required the approval of the ECSC High Authority to carry out mergers and concentration in heavy industry.

Birrenbach's efforts in this regard were undertaken at a time when the Thyssen conglomerate was engaged in just such a process.<sup>77</sup> At home, Birrenbach intervened in

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*Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer* (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997); and Angela Stent, *From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955-1980* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For Birrenbach's later objections with respect to the "race to Moscow" and his long-held belief that trade policy with the East had to be clearly coordinated and not carried out according to purely private interests, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.

<sup>76</sup> As we have already noted, this apparently domestic political position was taken in no small part due to Atlanticist foreign policy concerns. With respect to Birrenbach's arguments in favor of a Grand Coalition, see for instance the *Fraktion* debate of 3 December 1962, in which he cited a combination of "*Staat*" and foreign policy motivations.

<sup>77</sup> See, for instance, European Coal and Steel Community, Common Assembly, Meeting on Wednesday, 26 February 1958, Proceedings/Speeches, KB versus Debré, ACDP K075/2. This debate was primarily stimulated by the processes of concentration and reconcentration, cartelization and re-cartelization in the Ruhr, including the activities revolving around the new formation of the Thyssen group. In his speech here, Birrenbach denied the need for High Authority approval to carry out mergers and concentration, insisting that such undertakings should be determined by the initiative of firms and *Unternehmer*

the *Vorstand* of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion* and with the chairman of the CDU Program Commission with respect to the issue of *Mitbestimmung* in an effort to influence the party on that theme.<sup>78</sup> Finally, during difficult economic times, Birrenbach readily exploited

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themselves and be based on the often changing and dynamic economic, technological and competitive conditions of the market economy, not just in Europe but also in the world markets, where they faced competition from countries like the United States, England and the USSR. At the same time, he downplayed any political threat posed by such concentration in the iron and steel industries, particularly in an age of rockets and the like, and especially disputed the authority of the High Authority and the Assembly to deal with such an issue, placing such authority instead with the national governments and parliaments. In addition to defending horizontal mergers in the steel industry, Birrenbach also argued against restrictions on vertical mergers between coal and steel. In early 1959, despite his poor health at the time, Birrenbach took part in the most significant committee meetings in the European Parliament, including in some committees in which he was not even a member (e.g. the market committee), since important questions regarding key issues like concentration, French steel prices, the application of Article 58 MUV and the free-trade zone were addressed (KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2). On the significance to the West German steel industry of the ECSC, for instance with respect to crafting a common import policy regarding coal (the prospects for which Birrenbach doubted in the short term), and the High Authority in Luxembourg, for instance with respect to the possibility of creating a European coal fund in part to assist financially the German *Bergbau* (a solution that Birrenbach considered extremely uncertain), see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1. For Birrenbach's talks with the *Gesandten* Leduc and Ambassador Seydoux on the question of sales conditions and German-French steel prices (it is unclear whether on the periphery of the committee meetings of the European Parliament or at the annual French-German Conference in 1959), see again KB to Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2.

<sup>78</sup> In the fall of 1970, Birrenbach spoke at a meeting of the *Vorstand* of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion* on the potentially harmful impact of an expanded *Mitbestimmung* on the position of the West German *Wirtschaft* at a time of strong international competition and increasing international integration [*Verflechtung*]. Expressing similar ideas, Birrenbach also intervened around the same time with Thomas Ruf, the chairman of the CDU's Program Commission on *Mitbestimmung*, in order to raise objections to a particular draft, to influence the future decisions of the commission and, ultimately, to avoid undesirable and detrimental elements in the new CDU party program. Birrenbach argued that already the *Mitbestimmung* regulations for firms in the Federal Republic had no comparable parallel in other EEC partner states and in other Western industrial states in general. The proposals of the commission that he had seen would further increase these existing differences or those that would exist with respect to a future unified European law. In particular, Birrenbach urged a European reservation clause that would replace the *Mitbestimmung* in the Federal Republic with the European *Mitbestimmung* regulation as soon as this came into being (KB to Thomas Ruf, MdB, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1). On Birrenbach's criticism of a *paritätischen Mitbestimmung*, especially the fact that it "does not work," see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For Birrenbach's intervention with the MdB Fritz Burgbacher (CDU) with respect to the worrying decisions of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*'s sub-committee "Eigentum" on 30-31 January 1959 with respect to the question of an *Aktienrechtsreform*, especially the promotion through tax measures of the issuing of *Belegschaftsaktien* (Birrenbach had learned about these decisions from a protocol), and his objections to the foreseen new arrangement, see KB, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher, Cologne, 9 March 1959, ACDP K001/2. On Birrenbach contacting Pferdenges to explain his objections and so that those two and "our friends" could prevent this particular arrangement from coming into being, see KB to Robert Pferdenges, Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie, 5 March 1959, cc: Henkel and Dr. Wecker [both of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen], ACDP K002/1. For Birrenbach repeatedly pointing out in meetings of his *Fraktion*'s AKV that the *Wirtschaft* would definitely be ready to "woo away [*abwerben*]" German technicians in Egypt for activities in the Federal Republic, see KB to Prof. Helmut Gollwitzer, Berlin, 14 December 1964, ACDP K014/2.

his connections with the Chancellor and other prominent officials to alert them to the plight of the steel industry and the measures he believed necessary to return it to prosperity.<sup>79</sup> These examples represent some of Birrenbach's cruder efforts to lobby on behalf of the *Wirtschaft*, especially his own branches.

More importantly, Birrenbach's connections with the *Wirtschaft*, obviously including his position with Thyssen, subtly yet substantially influenced his Atlanticist perspectives. We have already briefly discussed the interest of the *Wirtschaft*, in contrast at least sometimes to agriculture, in promoting the tenets of Atlanticism. Particularly

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<sup>79</sup> According to Birrenbach, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, for instance, consulted him not only on a variety of foreign policy questions but also on issues regarding the shaping of the economic and social order. For Birrenbach's report on the Federal Republic's *Konjunkturpolitik*, assigned to him by the economic committee of the European Parliament, presented in January 1960 and evidence of his interest in analyzing broad economic matters and disseminating his views on such, see "Die Konjunkturpolitik der Bundesrepublik," ACDP K002/2. Though he was obviously overwhelmingly active in the steel industry, Birrenbach provided Federal President Lübke, at the latter's request, with an account of the attitude of the mineral oil industry on *Energiapolitik*, including some relevant documents and his own personal views on questions of energy policy (KB to *Bundespräsident* Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 1963, ACDP K011/1). For Birrenbach describing to Barzel in March 1966 the "difficult" situation of a West German steel industry that was "extraordinarily *krisenanfällig*," debt-ridden and capital-poor; paid high wages and social expenditures; had short working hours; suffered from high energy costs (since the federal government's coal policy forced it to use overpriced German coal and thus "subsidize" the German *Bergbau* while preventing it from exploiting world market conditions by importing cheap coal from the United States); and was burdened with distorted tax disadvantages; also explaining the fundamental burdens this situation created for the German steel industry in the context of its international competition, including with others, mainly France, in the *Montanunion*; but at the same time proposing courses of action to overcome these problems, including a subsidy (optimally from those countries, apparently in the *Montanunion*, importing American coal) to the German *Bergbau* to enable it to offer coal to the German steel industry at American prices, a federal law to rectify the tax system (including the increase of the offset tax rates at the *Steuergrenzen* until these *Grenzen* were definitively reduced or eliminated), and the rapid passage of the value-added tax currently being discussed in the finance committee; as well as offering to bring Barzel into contact with *Generaldirektor* Sohl, Chairman of the *Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie*, for further information on and depictions of the plight of this economic branch, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1. On Birrenbach's later defense to Barzel of the policies (e.g. wages, prices, dividends) of a steel industry he portrayed as still struggling to recover from a years-long crisis (here in 1967-68); plagued by labor conflict, including wild strikes and violence, low prices (still below those of 1960) vis-à-vis rising costs of living, high and rising wages, rising coal prices and low (or even non-existent) profits, and unjustified criticism at the hands of the press and political opposition (especially the SPD *Bundesminister* Georg Leber); and his concerns regarding a "very serious" development at the moment insofar as the trade unions had lost control over a part of the workers and the quick giving-in of individual firms like Hoesch had impacted on other firms "like an infection," see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1. This same letter to Barzel also makes reference to the telex Birrenbach had sent in that month (September 1969) to the Chancellor regarding the problem of violence that had emerged within the framework of the labor struggles in the steel industry.

with the loss of the German East, steel firms like Thyssen were especially interested in creating a world open to the free movement of goods and capital, facilitating the export not only of their own products but also of those that utilized their steel and enabling foreign investment. Furthermore, Birrenbach was convinced of the general vulnerability of the overall West German economy and strikingly sensitive to that economy's reliance on foreign markets and trade and its susceptibility to an ebbing of the export boom.<sup>80</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach even saw the outward-looking qualities of a country like the Federal Republic as well as the inward-looking characteristics of one like France as being largely determined by their trading patterns, in this case with respect to the EEC.<sup>81</sup> Therefore,

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<sup>80</sup> Regarding vulnerability with respect to foreign trade, Birrenbach was very aware as of January 1963 of the high share of exports in the Federal Republic's GNP (about 24% at this time) and of the importance foreign trade consequently played for the *Wirtschaft* as a whole as well as of the need for German industry to maintain its competitiveness in international markets. Energy costs played a significant role in this, with German industry requiring an economical and secure energy supply to avoid facing disadvantages vis-à-vis other countries with lower energy costs (KB to *Bundespräsident* Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 1963, ACDP K011/1). For Birrenbach's concerns about the impact on West German industry of revaluations of the currency (including repeated revaluations between 1969 and 1972), particularly the competitive disadvantages thus brought about vis-à-vis France, Britain and the United States, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. With respect to a more general vulnerability, Birrenbach pointed to the Federal Republic's "unconsolidated" economy, characterized by cost inflation, high wages, short working hours, high taxes, a lack of reserves (exhausted in two world wars and two inflations) and the liabilities of German stock corporations, and consequently to the susceptibility of German industry, including the steel industry, in a crisis (KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1). For Birrenbach on the Ruhr area as not only the industrial heart of the Federal Republic but also a social-politically extremely sensitive organism, see KB to *Bundespräsident* Heinrich Lübke, Bonn, 25 January 1963, ACDP K011/1. For Birrenbach on the economic situation as one of the grave problems of the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. For Birrenbach on the Federal Republic having the highest wage costs per product unit, the extraordinary difference between wage increase and productivity, and his concerns regarding the strains being placed on the economy ["*Belastbarkeit*"], see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. With respect to European vulnerability due to its far greater dependence, compared to that of the United States, on Middle Eastern oil supplies, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. Indeed, by December 1974, Birrenbach saw an undermining of European strength due to the problems of energy and inflation (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1).

<sup>81</sup> Birrenbach also explained Britain's outward-looking qualities in a similar fashion. For Birrenbach's hopes regarding the imminent entry of Britain into the Common Market, including "the great insight of your country into the worldwide problems" as "a very important contribution to the evolution of a united Europe," see KB to William Bass, 19 July 1972, ACDP K068/1. However, in this letter, Birrenbach also expressed "great concern" regarding the British economic situation, which threatened its role as "an effective partner in an economic and monetary union." Likewise, on the need for Britain to "get... under control" its economic problems, about which Birrenbach was "alarmed," if it was to exercise "great" influence in Europe, see KB to Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1.

Birrenbach's opposition to revaluations of the D-Mark and his support for free trade, the European Economic Community, close cooperation with the United States (including in the economic realm), the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, the peaceful development and use of nuclear energy and the export of nuclear equipment on the world market (related to the NPT) all corresponded to his view of the enlightened self-interest of the *Wirtschaft*.<sup>82</sup>

Given the professional environment in which he operated, Birrenbach's notion of the national interest did not stand in contradiction to these private economic interests, rather it was informed and infused by them. As a whole, Birrenbach's perception of the

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<sup>82</sup> For Birrenbach's support of the Atlanticist tenet of "liberal trade" (including the Kennedy Round of GATT talks), see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On Birrenbach's fears of an American protectionism, which might have harmful consequences to the world economic development, if American concerns about obstacles and discrimination against American goods in Europe (especially those not connected with European political unity) were not properly addressed, see Birrenbach Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. On Birrenbach's assessment that the Federal Republic, "as a labor-oriented industrial state interwoven into the international division of labor," could not afford a level of energy prices above that of the other comparable countries with which it stood in competition; on the possibility of worsening the situation of the West German *Bergbau* by importing large amounts of American coal for the West German steel industry (and the need, instead, for subsidies to the *Bergbau*); and on the desired reduction or elimination of the existing *Steuergrenzen* within the framework of European unification (desirable for the West German steel industry's ability to resist crises and its competitiveness, particularly vis-à-vis France) having "noticeably slowed," see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1. On Birrenbach's fears of the NPT's deleterious impact in the civilian sector, see his Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach on and his objections to the "extremely serious" civilian and military-security consequences of the NPT drafts for the Federal Republic, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1. On Birrenbach's concerns regarding the NPT and "the peaceful use of nuclear energy" with respect to the supply monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon states (especially the United States) in fissionable materials and the future delivery of those materials to EURATOM (including the Federal Republic), for instance in case of a failure of the IAEA-EURATOM negotiations with respect to nuclear controls, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach's proposal that this problem could also be dealt with through the building up of one's own stocks and through the creation of one's own enrichment capacity (an endeavor that could be prepared in negotiations with the United States), see KB to Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. On Birrenbach's insistence with respect to the NPT that private West German firms have access to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes at the same conditions and costs as American firms, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach's argument that one could not deny to the Federal Republic, "as one of the great industrial states of the world," a share in the development and production of armaments (linking this to burden-sharing) or "an unrestricted research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1 and Birrenbach's Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1.



national interest, influenced by his conception of the Soviet Union and the interests of the *Wirtschaft*, is essential to fully understanding his Atlanticist outlook.

Aside from material incentives such as national and economic interest, some less obvious mental and intellectual factors seem to have significantly motivated Birrenbach. While it may fall short of a true motivation, Birrenbach's affinity for Atlanticist ideas and his lack of interest in notions of *Abendland* can be explained in part by the fact that, while disturbed by the decline of religious faith in general, Birrenbach assigned a less prominent role to religion in the political realm, including his own Catholicism, compared to those who subscribed to *Abendland*. While recognizing and understanding the strong role of Catholicism in Germany prior to World War I and even in Weimar, he argued that times had changed and that now "while the religious element is important in politics, even paramount, it is not the all-dominating one."<sup>83</sup> Rather than being underpinned by his Catholicism, Birrenbach explicitly conceived of his activities as resting on inter-confessional, liberal-conservative views. In fact, Birrenbach was consistently skeptical of those who assigned a large role to religion in public affairs. Naturally, this was the case with the promoters of the *Abendland* concept circulating in the Federal Republic. Related to this was his suspicion with respect to "the fascination with the Christian statesman à la Salazar."<sup>84</sup> However, this skeptical outlook stretched well beyond the borders of the Federal Republic. Looking, for instance, to the Middle East, Birrenbach saw aggressive Zionism, personified in figures like Begin and Sharon,

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<sup>83</sup> KB to NRW *Kultusminister* Werner Schütz, 7 September 1960, ACDP K004/2. For Birrenbach's analysis of the SPD-FDP election success in 1972 through the prism of religious groupings, including the coalition's penetration, to a certain extent, into Catholic areas and the strong support enjoyed by the coalition among Protestants and the entire Protestant Church, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.

<sup>84</sup> KB to Dr. Karl Brandt, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1. Birrenbach may also have been giving expression to this skepticism when he referred at times to Adenauer as "*die Stimme vom Himmel*" (KB to Erich Straetling, West German embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 1962, ACDP K157/1).

and the “renaissance of Islam” threatening disaster for the West in the region.<sup>85</sup>

Unfortunately, disturbing religious elements also existed in American political life, manifested for instance in the rise of Jimmy Carter, a man with a “religiously founded belief in himself.”<sup>86</sup> For Birrenbach, such religious elements often represented a disruptive factor in politics and hindered a reasoned understanding and practice of foreign policy.

Birrenbach’s intense, only briefly dispelled, pessimism was probably more of a genuine motivating factor.<sup>87</sup> This pessimism permeated his mental worldview on a variety of levels. On a short-term, “day-to-day” level, he was consistently pessimistic and critical about individual leaders and personalities, policies and events (e.g. failed summit meetings) and his outlook was dominated by unceasing worries and concerns (e.g. the state of German/European-American relations), frustration at the lack of progress towards his desired goals, a stress on the risks of particular situations and policies (e.g. détente), and a perpetual sense of crisis.<sup>88</sup> In part, this pessimism can be

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<sup>85</sup> For instance, KB to Robert Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2; KB to Israeli ambassador Eliashiv Ben-Horin, 8 November 1973, ACDP K096/2; and KB to Bernhard Plettner, 12 August 1975, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>86</sup> KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>87</sup> For examples of rare bouts of selective optimism, see KB to Minister E. M. Rose, British embassy, Bonn, 17 November 1960, ACDP K076/1; KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2; and KB to Siegmund Warburg, 30 December 1974, ACDP K068/1.

<sup>88</sup> For examples of such pessimism, see KB to Amb. Shinar, Tel-Ganim, 21 January 1974, ACDP K096/2 and KB to George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the Federal Republic’s endangered position in all fields, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For Birrenbach’s references in the wake of the events of January 1963 to the “Brussels crisis” and the “present dangerous crisis of the free West” as well as his proposals (such as a nuclear EDC) to solve them, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. For Birrenbach’s assessment of the worsening domestic and foreign political situation of the Federal Republic and his overall assessment that “I have not been so pessimistic in more than a decade than I am now,” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. On Birrenbach’s belief that recent experiences had demonstrated that the European nations were not ready to take certain necessary measures towards European unification, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. For the “terrible” current situation and prospects as well as Birrenbach’s statement that “I have never been so worried as now,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn,

attributed to a quest for decisive solutions, rather than an acceptance of the need to sometimes muddle along in the midst of a typically complicated and often messy reality.<sup>89</sup> While at times Birrenbach did display a certain optimism about what had been and what could still be accomplished, this short-term pessimism also stretched temporally into the longer-term, leading him to muse repeatedly, for instance, about the possibility of an end to NATO and even to question the likelihood of a genuine construction of the Atlantic Partnership or Community.<sup>90</sup>

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Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the risks the United States was running in the SALT negotiations, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>89</sup> For instance, Birrenbach doubted, on the basis of what had been published as of early December 1974, that the recent Vladivostok arms control agreement was a real “breakthrough” since “the arms race will go on” (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1).

<sup>90</sup> For Birrenbach “full of doubts at least today” about “any real prospects” in this regard, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1. On Birrenbach’s at least occasional doubts regarding the feasibility of some of his own proposals for progress towards European economic and political unity (a key element of Atlantic Partnership), see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For Birrenbach admitting that “the hope of some fathers of NATO, in no way of all, that from NATO a type of Atlantic Community would develop has not been fulfilled” and that success had not been achieved in institutionalizing the entire foreign policy, economic, currency and development cooperation and integration (citing NATO Article 2), see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. For Birrenbach’s pessimistic assessment of the prospects within the foreseeable future for a European (political) unification, see his Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. On Birrenbach’s skepticism and doubt regarding the possibilities and substance of an Atlantic Partnership offered by the United States (most recently in Kissinger’s speech of 23 April 1973) in light of alleged dramatic changes and developments in American-Soviet relations (including the nuclear accord of June 1973), which indicated that the United States now had “two priorities” (NATO and the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union); and on Birrenbach’s fears that the American bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, which was “more dangerous” to the United States and able to “speak with one voice,” would be a far more influential and significant priority in American policy in the long-term, also with respect to the possibility of Atlantic Partnership, than the relationship with a Europe that, despite Nixon’s statements, was “not a fifth world power,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For Birrenbach’s negative assessment of “how far we are from a federal state” in Europe; that Europe did not exist economically in the extent he hoped for; and that the chances for an economic, monetary and real political union were “perhaps today somewhat better, but not good at all, at least for the time being,” due to a number of obstacles, including the still very powerful idea of sovereignty in some European countries, see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.

For Birrenbach’s musings on a possible end of NATO, see for instance KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2; and KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach on the “serious situation” in which NATO found itself, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach’s assessment that “if nothing crucial changes in the coming year, I consider the disintegration of NATO unstoppable,” see KB to Robert

However, Birrenbach's psyche was also plagued by a deeper, even cultural, pessimism that colored his view of the state of the Western world. This perspective identified a myriad of ills undermining the vitality and strength of the West, including in the realm of world affairs. Among these was the "rebirth of the idea of the nation-state," especially in France (also after de Gaulle's departure) but even in Great Britain, a

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Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach on "the process of disintegration in NATO," especially worrying since France left the NATO organization, see KB to Sen. Robert Kennedy, 8 November 1966, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach's doubts whether NATO was "fully reparable," see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach wondering what would happen if NATO did not survive the 70s and 80s, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. For Birrenbach on the need for precautions in case of a "premature ending" of the NATO treaty (in the context of the NPT), see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. Moreover, Birrenbach was convinced, and had it confirmed by prominent American personalities, that the United States would not assume a guarantee for Europe outside of an alliance structure (KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2). This fear of the end of the alliance made Birrenbach even more skeptical of an NPT "of unlimited duration," since Europe, especially the Federal Republic, could not defend itself without American nuclear support (KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1; KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2). For the connection between Birrenbach's concerns regarding a "termination of NATO" and of the American guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic and his interest in a European nuclear option, since "a European defense system would be the only conceivable way out for Europe," see Birrenbach's Memorandum to Gerard Smith, 24 February 1969, ACDP K209/1.

On the other hand, for Birrenbach's cautiously optimistic assessment of at least the chance "to survive the period of the renaissance of the nation state in Europe" and on the possibility that the EEC had reached "the point of no return" (once the problems of the CAP and the Kennedy Round were solved), see KB to Marc Ullmann, *L'Express*, Paris, 4 February 1966, ACDP K107/2. For Birrenbach's belief that a European *Staatsverband* was still imaginable, "if England and France accept reason," see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach's assessment (the "only ray of hope" in an overall pessimistic analysis) that the EEC "as a pure economic organization" appeared to have reached "the point of no return," see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, University of Pennsylvania, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. On Birrenbach's cautiously positive evaluation of the common interests and interdependence as well as important progress (especially in comparison to the prewar time) in cooperation, integration and the development of an Atlantic network of bilateral and multilateral relations that existed between the NATO states (including of course the United States and the European states) in the foreign policy (e.g. Harmel exercise in détente, disarmament and arms control policy), economic (OECD, GATT), currency-political (Club of Ten, IMF) and development-political areas (Development Assistance Committee of the OECD), thanks largely to the existence of the principally military NATO alliance itself, and his belief even in a "certain compulsion [*Zwang*] to cooperation," see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. For Birrenbach seeing "starting points [*Ansatzpunkte*]" with the new French government for progress with respect to European development and unification, provided that the European states (among them the French) reached constructive agreements and solutions about extremely difficult problems like the revision of the entire agrarian policy, including the possibility that the French would recognize and behave in a manner commensurate with "the proportions of their true power" and would no longer reject entrance negotiations with Britain, see again KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.

psychological persistence of the “illusion of sovereignty” entertained by these medium-sized nations that was potentially “fatal” for Europe and the Atlantic Community.<sup>91</sup>

Related to this was the nature of the modern Western welfare state, which merely lived from day to day or, more accurately, from election to election and, unable to operate in long-term perspectives, was incapable of solving the potentially disastrous problems relating to issues such as defense, energy and investment.<sup>92</sup> A disequilibria existed in which each individual asserted his own rights and claims vis-à-vis state and society while feeling no obligation towards the general well-being.<sup>93</sup> The *Staatsgefühl* was in decline, leading Birrenbach to remark that “if the well-being of the individual and the interests of the *Gesellschaft* stand before those of the state, then it becomes very difficult to make

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<sup>91</sup> For examples, see especially KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Policy Planning Council, State Department, Washington DC, 31 July 1967, ACDP K146/1 and KB to Eugene Rostow, 20 May 1975, ACDP K211/2; as well as KB to E.W. Mommson, 13 September 1971, ACDP K158/1; KB to Joseph Kaskell, 27 April 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to Col. William Bass, 24 April 1974, ACDP K068/1; KB to John McCloy, 30 May 1974, ACDP K210/1; and KB to Eugene Rostow, 18 February 1976, ACDP K211/2. On the “age of increased national interests,” see KB to State Secretary a.D. Dr. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2.

<sup>92</sup> Especially KB to Prof. Edward Teller, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California, 27 November 1975, ACDP K155/1. On Birrenbach’s concern regarding the difficulty of transforming “national ambitions into communitarian ones,” rendered obvious by the energy crisis (in connection with the Middle East crisis) and also the product of the “exaggerated welfare state system in all European states,” see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the harmful consequences for European defense efforts of “the welfare thinking,” see KB to John McCloy, 23 July 1975, ACDP K210/1. Birrenbach viewed the approval by the West of a policy of giving in to the USSR and the facilitating of *détente* at the expense of the Federal Republic as being closely linked to the welfare state (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1). For Birrenbach attributing German mistakes to a lack of political leadership and financial (budget) and currency weaknesses (offset agreement), with the latter two deriving from a lack of clear political priorities, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. On the need for the Federal Republic “to cut social and other expenditures,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1. For “the present deplorable situation in Europe” and Birrenbach’s fears that the “military efforts of the European NATO partners will be reduced,” see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 19 December 1974, ACDP K068/1. For a Britain plagued by financial crisis, inflation, trade unions and lack of investment potentially hindering it from becoming “an effective partner in an economic and monetary union,” see KB to William Bass, 19 July 1972, ACDP K068/1. For Birrenbach’s worries about internal problems, including a people not “really ready to face the fact of becoming a member,” potentially rendering Britain “a difficult partner” in a united European Community, see KB to Col. William Bass, London, 11 September 1972, ACDP K068/1. Most likely, Birrenbach’s perception of a West unable to think in long-term perspectives also encouraged him in his efforts with respect to research institutions like the DGAP, SWP and AI.

<sup>93</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.

power-political predictions in our favor.”<sup>94</sup> A rampant permissiveness manifested itself in widespread violence and the lack of a proper respect for authority.<sup>95</sup> Western societies had been lulled into a complacency and indiscipline by détente and *Ostpolitik*, which, far from ending the threat from the East, had merely rendered it more subtle.<sup>96</sup> Simply put, the West was losing its *Substanz*, and Birrenbach regularly used expressions like “in decline [*Zerfall*]” to describe the state of the West and its various components and institutions.<sup>97</sup> This pessimism was differentiated to some extent, with the United States included but emerging better in Birrenbach’s analysis than Western Europe, which by the mid-1970s at the latest exhibited “serious symptoms of disintegration.”<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.

<sup>95</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>96</sup> For example, KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP K068/1; KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1; and KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1. For the detrimental impact on European defense efforts of “the euphoria created by an unrealistic *Ostpolitik* in most European countries,” see KB to John McCloy, 23 July 1975, ACDP K210/1. On the unpopularity of “large-scale defense spending” at the moment, with every nation in Europe, including the Federal Republic, feeling that “it must first solve more urgent tasks,” see KB to John McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1. On the relationship between security and détente, see Helga Haftendorn, *Security and Detente: Conflicting Priorities in German Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985). For Birrenbach criticizing the ongoing negotiations surrounding and the expected shape of the still not concluded Berlin Agreement, see KB to John McCloy, 9 July 1971, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>97</sup> On this theme, see for instance KB to Prof. Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 31 December 1963, ACDP K160/2; KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard University, West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1; and KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1. Other expressions Birrenbach used in this context, in these and further documents, included “*Verfallserscheinungen*”, “*schrecklich*”, “deplorable”, “in the process of erosion”, and “malaise.”

<sup>98</sup> On Western Europe and “serious symptoms of disintegration,” see especially KB to Richard Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1. As of January 1974, Birrenbach asserted that “[t]he situation in Europe is worse than it has been in the last twenty years. The *Auflösungserscheinungen* have entirely serious character” (KB to Joseph Kaskell, New York City, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1). On the “current total European *Misere*” that made “a European option” appear “unrealistic” at the moment as well as on the currently low prospects in Europe for all “communitarian” relations, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. For the Americans “facing very serious problems” but nevertheless Birrenbach’s belief that “the situation in the United States is in a limited way better than that of the European nations,” see KB to Col. William Bass, London, 22 November 1974, ACDP K068/1. On Europe as the site of the West’s basic weakness, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach’s criticism of the trends in Italy, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia towards weak leadership, destabilization, delusional euphorias and an ignorance or dismissal of military facts, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. However, for an example of Birrenbach including the United States in such pessimistic assessments, see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 21 September 1972, ACDP

Of course, the Federal Republic was also part and parcel of this pessimistic critique of the West. For instance, by the early 1960s, Birrenbach had already diagnosed there not just the decline of his own party but also of the state and bemoaned the lack of a sufficient *Staatsgefühl*, a condition that had existed and not considerably improved since the founding of the *Bundesrepublik* and which contributed significantly to the crisis being experienced in that period.<sup>99</sup> At the same time, Birrenbach's assessment also displayed some unique elements with respect to his own country. In the Federal Republic, the Atlantic and European ideas enjoyed greater support than in some other areas of the West while the national idea was less convincing since "our national tradition was broken in the times of national-socialism and went up in flames in the nights of the bomb attacks on our cities."<sup>100</sup> However, this process had perhaps gone too far as "the understanding of '*raison d'état*' is underdeveloped," and the "feeling for the nation" was "in decline."<sup>101</sup>

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K068/1. On disturbing phenomena in "the entire Western world" and a "situation in the United States," including "the wave of violence," that "gives rise to many worries," see KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. For Birrenbach on "symptoms of fatigue" (here with regard to the Near East conflict) in France, Britain, the United States and other countries in the West, symptoms "typical for the attitude of the Western nations in which nowadays welfare is the top priority," see KB to George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1. On the West's "low" readiness to act, see KB to McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For "the weakening of the Western world" ("that goes also for the United States") gradually assuming proportions that were "alarming [*besorgniserregend*]," see KB to Israeli ambassador Eliashiv Ben-Horin, Brussels, 9 January 1976, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>99</sup> For instance, KB to Paul Lücke, 10 December 1962, ACDP K011/1. For more from Birrenbach on the "deeper critical elements" in the Federal Republic, including "the further erosion of state loyalty... and of authority," with the latter affecting "the whole structure of society," see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. Birrenbach's concern about the "decline of the *Staatsgefühl*" is somewhat ironic for a man who, as we have seen, worked in a variety of ways to strengthen the private elements vis-à-vis the state.

<sup>100</sup> KB to Mrs. Evelyn Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 8 August 1961, ACDP K076/1.

<sup>101</sup> KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. For Birrenbach on the further erosion of the feeling of national identity as a "deeper critical" element in the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. Birrenbach believed the *Grundvertrag* and the recognition of the division of Germany would have been completely unthinkable for the major Western democracies if they had been in the same situation as the Federal Republic (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1). On the other hand, for Birrenbach conjuring up fears of a European and German nationalism, in this case if the Americans came to an understanding with the Soviet Union over the heads and at the expense of the Europeans and Germans, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. Likewise, on the role of French policy in summoning a new German nationalism, "extremely dangerous in a divided country," see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. In such contexts,

As a man convinced of the importance of history, Birrenbach was also appalled by “the almost completely lost historical consciousness” among the Germans.<sup>102</sup> Particularly galling to him in this respect was the rejection or ignorance of the great history, traditions and virtues of now-vanished Prussia, a striking contrast to the anti-Prussian attitudes of the *Abendländler*. On the other hand, Birrenbach seems ironically to have embraced a cultural pessimism not so different from that of many *Abendländler*.<sup>103</sup> At times, this negative outlook assumed proportions that clouded his analytic capabilities and became the subject of admonishment by his contacts. However, while such pessimism regarding the West occasionally evoked sadness and despair, it was not necessarily final, and

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Birrenbach also often conjured up the specter of the Weimar Republic. With reference to his own personal experience, Birrenbach warned the Federal Republic’s allies against treating the situation that had emerged as a result of the Brandt *Ostpolitik* as definitive, for this would encourage a development such as that which had occurred with respect to the decline of Weimar as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and would thus undermine Western unity (Birrenbach’s Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2). For Birrenbach’s concerns regarding the developments and foreign-policy (*Deutschland-*) plans in the SPD and the possibility of them having “incalculable consequences for the entire democratic life in Germany” and even indicating a potential return to Weimar (“With that, we will land again in Weimar with unpredictable long-term consequences on the foreign political situation”), see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. On the similarities between the “bitter experience in the Hitler time” with respect to the German universities and current developments at these universities, which Birrenbach now experienced “with bitter feelings for the second time,” see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For a contemporary study of national consciousness, see Gebhard Schweigler, *Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und der DDR* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann, 1973), along with Harold James, *A German Identity, 1770-1990* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

<sup>102</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>103</sup> For Birrenbach explaining the ability of the SPD-FDP coalition “to awaken a euphoria of peace” in the West German population in part due to the erosion of national feeling, *Staatsgefühl*, historical consciousness, the understanding of the limits and possibilities of freedom, and authority, an erosion that existed in the Federal Republic to a greater extent than in the other major Western democracies, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. In this letter to his son, Birrenbach also cited examples of these same “symptoms” of decadence in other major Western democracies, albeit in a much weaker form than in the Federal Republic, in particular in the United States during the Vietnam conflict from 1964-70, in the unrest in France in 1968, and currently in England (“decline of loyalty to the state”); criticized the manipulation of public institutions; and condemned the trends towards insatiable expectations in the economic-political, social-political and similar realms, including “unlimited” wage demands, *Mitbestimmung* in all areas (especially *paritätische*), the “catastrophe” of the universities, reductions in work time, a stress on “better quality of life,” (his quotation marks here) the decriminalization (*Strafschutz*) of abortion, the relaxation of the prosecution and punishment of crime, and the elimination of restrictions (*Freigabe*) on pornography. Birrenbach’s musings that “unfortunately developments today go quicker than usual” (KB to Amb. Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 10 December 1973, ACDP K068/1) and “perhaps people today are no longer like me” (KB to Heinz Barth, Washington DC, 14 January 1974, ACDP K184/1) suggest a personal alienation from and pessimism towards the contemporary world in general.



therefore this very pessimism, with rays of hope, also drove Birrenbach, a great believer in the power of the will, onward in his efforts to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations.<sup>104</sup>

Finally, Birrenbach's workaholic nature was yet another important factor impelling him onward in his activities. William Bundy, for one, described him as a man of "volcanic energy."<sup>105</sup> The multiple professions Birrenbach engaged in entailed a hefty workload and a considerable amount of travel.<sup>106</sup> Periods of intense political activity, for instance the debates in the first half of the 1970s regarding the *Ostpolitik* and the NPT, were especially stressful for him.<sup>107</sup> With respect to his activities regarding the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, Birrenbach remarked wearily, "I am astonished that I survived this hell."<sup>108</sup> At times, Birrenbach's massive work load over weeks and months brought him all the way "to the limits of my strength."<sup>109</sup> Even while on much-needed vacations (which he did without for extended periods) or from his hospital sickbed, Birrenbach continued to write and dictate letters, talk on the phone, read over papers and other materials and

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<sup>104</sup> For Birrenbach working "with all my strength" so that "the trans-Atlantic relations remain intact" in a time of "crisis," see KB to Joseph Kaskell, 27 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. On the even greater significance of Birrenbach's efforts with respect to the American foreign, economic and defense policy given the "desolate" situation in Europe, see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU Germany, Minister-President of Rheinland-Pfalz, confidential, 29 May 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach's argument that in light of the terrible state of the West, American leadership was "more important than ever" (but also less likely: "Does it still exist?"), see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1. As of April 1976, Birrenbach moaned "I have the impression that the ideals for which we have fought the last decades are now to a certain degree in danger. The realization of this possibility makes me very sad" (KB to John McCloy, 15 April 1976, ACDP K210/1). For overwhelming pessimism slightly tempered by elements of hope, see KB to Hahn, 19 December 1975, ACDP K155/1 and KB to Richard Ullman, Director, Council on Foreign Relations Inc., New York City, 8 September 1976, ACDP K083/1.

<sup>105</sup> William Bundy, *Foreign Affairs*, to KB, 29 June 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach's remark that "[m]y motor is stronger than my chassis," see KB to John McCloy, 11 February 1980, ACDP K178/2. For Birrenbach's general contempt for "fatigue," see KB to George McGhee, 7 March 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>106</sup> On Birrenbach's business efforts in the framework of the Thyssen firm and his need to "get a bit of air," see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>107</sup> On Birrenbach's "enormous work load [*Beanspruchung*] of almost up to twelve hours daily" and on "stress" in recent months "which I in this form still never have experienced," especially in connection with the *Ostverträgen*, see KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1. For Birrenbach tied-up over extended periods in Bonn working on the theme NPT, see KB to Staden, 11 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>108</sup> KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1.

<sup>109</sup> KB to Diest, 1 December 1970, ACDP K158/1.

engage in a variety of other work. As Birrenbach described it during an extended illness keeping him away from Bonn, “my impatience is worse than my illness.”<sup>110</sup> Assessing the source of Birrenbach’s workaholism is a difficult task given the relatively crude sources available and the complexities of the human mind, but one significant factor appears to have been his remarkable perfectionism. As he once explained, “I hesitate to submit a report which is not really perfect. I am not accustomed and I do not like to do things which are not very well prepared.”<sup>111</sup> However, an even deeper source seems to have been Birrenbach’s terrible insecurity. While fruitless to speculate on the origins of this insecurity, it was constantly present and manifested itself in many of his letters. Birrenbach’s workaholic nature served in some ways as an element of strength, perhaps even an essential ingredient in his efforts to advance his career and master his fields of endeavor.

However, at the risk of venturing into the realm of psychobabble, this compulsion was also a self-destructive element in Birrenbach’s personality. While he often pointed fatalistically to “bad luck,” the health problems Birrenbach labored under, including frequent relapses, were at the very least aggravated, and often caused, by the manic, workaholic nature of his existence. Birrenbach was plagued throughout his career in the Federal Republic with an ill-health consisting of a rather wide variety of ailments. Many of these were admittedly of a non-threatening or at least short-term kind.<sup>112</sup> However,

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<sup>110</sup> KB to Robert Bowie, 8 April 1970, ACDP K160/2.

<sup>111</sup> KB to Javits, 7 October 1963, ACDP K157/1. Also see, for instance, KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU Germany, Minister-President of Rheinland-Pfalz, confidential, 29 May 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>112</sup> At different times, for instance, Birrenbach suffered from fevers, sinusitis, bronchitis, laryngitis (not all that surprising for somebody who spoke and gave dictation so much), the flu, and inflammation of the liver and gall bladder. For an example of Birrenbach enduring a constant fever, in this case in July 1964, see KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For an example of Birrenbach suffering a collapse, in April 1973, see KB to Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1.

Birrenbach also suffered very serious longer term difficulties, such as recurring back and heart problems, including multiple heart attacks.<sup>113</sup> A debilitating, chronic insomnia, limiting sleep to at best a few hours a night and often none at all, further exacerbated his other ailments. All efforts to overcome this insomnia, including hypnosis, drugs (barbiturates) and even acupuncture proved to be in vain. Of course, these health problems, aside from their human impact, were not just aggravated by but also created a serious impediment to Birrenbach's activities. He frequently required medical treatment and attention, whether in the form of medication, cures or operations. He underwent numerous compulsory vacations and stays at medical clinics, hospitals, sanatoriums and healing spas.<sup>114</sup> He was forced, sometimes for weeks or even months at a time, to stay away from the office and to limit his work, although this was a relative concept.<sup>115</sup> Correspondence and other communication was inhibited, participation in various meetings, Atlanticist and otherwise, was cancelled, important speeches had to be read by colleagues, trips to the United States were interrupted, truncated, postponed and even cancelled.<sup>116</sup> However, even as Birrenbach recognized the link between his overwork and health difficulties, he refused to heed the pleading of his doctors or of his body.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> These began at the latest by 1964.

<sup>114</sup> For example, as of June 1973, Birrenbach had just finished up a six-week hospital stay. For another instance of a lengthy hospital visit for Birrenbach, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2. Some of Birrenbach's stays were in the United States, for instance at the Mayo Clinic.

<sup>115</sup> See, for instance, KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. In addition to Birrenbach's health problems themselves, such difficulties, particularly extended ones, were followed by "catching-up" periods of transition back into work. For instance, after being sick for (and largely losing) virtually the first half of 1970, Birrenbach spent the period from mid-June into September reacquainting himself with business and political matters (Birrenbach returned from Munich to Düsseldorf in early June 1970). See, for example, Birrenbach's reference to the amount of mail that awaited him when he returned to his office in KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.

<sup>116</sup> Thus, Birrenbach's America trips of Fall 1964 and 1970 were truncated or interrupted due to illness. For an example of a 1964 trip to the United States postponed due to health reasons, see KB to Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. Indeed, a long sickness in 1964 rendered Birrenbach incapable of action for weeks. Later, Birrenbach's short stay in New York in 1970 was strongly hindered by illness. In 1973, Birrenbach had to leave an Amsterdam

#### D. Sources of Birrenbach's Foreign Policy Influence

Naturally, embracing Atlanticist ideas and harboring an extraordinary compulsion to toil assiduously for them is not the equivalent of possessing genuine influence. To acquire this, it was necessary for Birrenbach to attain a political position of some prominence to promote his Atlanticist ideas effectively. Of course, this position was that of a member of the *Bundestag* and the subsidiary roles that accompanied it. Within the Union, Birrenbach served as one of the party's premier foreign policy experts, indeed *the de facto* expert with regard to that all-important ally, the United States.<sup>118</sup> From his entrance into the *Bundestag* in 1957, he served as a member of that body's Foreign Affairs Committee and of his *Fraktion's Arbeitskreis V*, which focused on foreign policy and security issues.<sup>119</sup> In 1965, Birrenbach became a member of the *Vorstand* of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*. Aside from these long-term positions, he also occupied a number of more transitory ones over the years pertaining to particular issue areas. For instance, Birrenbach served as his *Fraktion's* main reporter on issues such as the EEC-Free Trade

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conference because certain heart troubles he had been suffering from since the start of January had become more acute. Even after six weeks of vacation he had not yet fully recovered (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2). In 1974, a Birrenbach speech in the *Bundestag* on the NPT had to be read by Alois Mertes. During Birrenbach's illness of the first half of 1970, he read and answered only very urgent letters (KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2). For Birrenbach as of late January 1974 having been sick since the middle of December and having had to limit himself "to a minimum in the sending of Christmas wishes," see KB to Joseph Kaskell, New York City, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>117</sup> For Birrenbach having recently had to cancel a trip to the United States due to circulation difficulties he attributed to "an enormous work overburden" during the last month, including that connected to his NPT activities, along with a parallel, weeks-long viral flu, against which he had fought "*arbeitenderweise*"; and for his being "still not 100% again in order" and requiring a "medical examination" in a week but, nevertheless, already going "a few hours per day into the office," see KB to Staden, 28 February 1974, ACDP K184/1. On Birrenbach's recognition of the linkage between poor health and overwork, here that undertaken with respect to the Brandt *Ostpolitik* ("After my long illness two years ago, I am astonished that I survived this hell"), see also KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1.

<sup>118</sup> For much of what this entailed already by 1962, specifically here to be "responsible" for United States matters in the *Fraktion*, see KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1.

<sup>119</sup> Birrenbach also participated in the working groups of the AKV, including the group on "All-German Questions" in 1966, where he dealt especially with the theme "The Political Aspects of the Germany Question within the Alliance and the Relationship Washington-Moscow." The chairman of the AKV from 1960-69 was the Atlanticist Ernst Majonica.

Zone (May 1960), the Atlantic Convention (1962), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the UN Convention on the Statute of Limitations with Respect to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.<sup>120</sup> Birrenbach also served on a number of the *Fraktion's* commissions, including those pertaining to the NPT (as chairman) and the *Ostpolitik* (*Ostkommission*).<sup>121</sup> With the approach of the final vote in the *Bundestag* on the *Ostverträge* in May 1972, it was Birrenbach who was selected to examine the negotiation records for the Union to help the party arrive at a better judgment.<sup>122</sup> Finally, Birrenbach

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<sup>120</sup> For Birrenbach on the “passionate debate” within “my party” on what was to be done about the NPT, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. As *Berichterstatter* for the NPT, Birrenbach attempted to bring the diverging opinions to a common denominator while leading his *Fraktion* in the direction he desired. He succeeded only partially in this effort due to the wide range of opinions that existed, stretching from Strauß to Brandt (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2). According to Birrenbach, it was on the basis of his report that the majority of the *Fraktion* approved the NPT, but only by a small majority (113:90 votes) (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 6 March 1974, ACDP K184/1).

<sup>121</sup> On this, see for example KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2. The NPT committee (*Arbeitsgruppe* NPT) was set up in early 1967 by Rainer Barzel (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*) to examine and deal with the treaty for the *Fraktion*. In addition to Birrenbach as chairman, the committee also comprised the chairmen of the foreign affairs and defense committees, a representative of the CSU and a German representative from the WEU parliament (Birrenbach Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2). For an example of Birrenbach reporting to Barzel on the opinions of the NPT group (and of the AK) on the treaty, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1.

<sup>122</sup> On 5 May 1972, Birrenbach received the assignment from Barzel to examine the records of the Moscow negotiations. At 5 PM that day, he met with State Secretary (AA) Paul Frank and began a process that continued for many hours over several days until 7 May. Rather than being allowed to read the files himself, the texts/protocols of the negotiations conducted by Foreign Minister Scheel and State Secretaries Frank and Egon Bahr (BKA) were read aloud to Birrenbach by the responsible state secretary while Birrenbach asked questions. According to Birrenbach, “[t]he process was extraordinarily strenuous.” Moreover, Birrenbach was far from satisfied with this process. Despite his desire for insight into all the files, not just excerpts, and the fact that he received far more information than that provided to the *Bundesrat*, Birrenbach still only received insight into a fraction of the protocols (and no position papers) due to the shortness of the available time with the final vote on the treaties fast approaching. On top of this, Birrenbach restricted himself to several hours per day as a result of the limited “*Aufnahmefähigkeit*” by such an oral process. It was impossible for him to ascertain what remained unread and even whether the files were complete or whether there had been any secret agreements. Birrenbach remained in contact with and depicted his impressions to Barzel during the days of this process, while Barzel then reported to the *Fraktion* in Birrenbach’s name. Birrenbach himself finally reported back to the *Fraktion* in its meeting of Tuesday 16 May about his “examination” of the protocols for the *Ostverträge*. Birrenbach admitted that since he only had access to a fraction of the negotiations, leaving his knowledge of them fragmentary and “full of gaps [*lückenhaft*],” the process had not shed much light on said negotiations and that “[a] conclusive objective judgment was not possible.” Ultimately, Birrenbach’s previous judgment had not changed as a result of his exposure to and knowledge of the protocols. He continued to believe that “a deep divergence” existed between the Soviet Union and the statements of the *Bundesregierung* with respect to the treaties. Birrenbach’s judgment of the Moscow negotiations and the treaties, especially the Moscow

represented his party or *Fraktion* abroad at a number of conferences and functions, for instance the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon Powers in Geneva in 1968 and the announcement of the German Marshall Fund in Boston in June 1972. However, while these positions were both a manifestation and an element of Birrenbach's influence, they were not its ultimate source.

Nor can Birrenbach's influence be attributed to a powerful party *Macht* standing behind him, for one of the defining aspects of his political activity was the lack of just such a basis of support. In his view, this deficiency was due to his independence and lack of full engagement for the party. Even had Birrenbach coveted the role of "party man," it would have been virtually impossible for him to fulfill due to his overburdened schedule, one that included not just his political work but also his activities in the *Wirtschaft* and the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, his "two and a half professions" as he often put it (sometimes referring to three such full professions!). More importantly, Birrenbach simply lacked the desire and interest to become such a party man. For one thing, he was not especially fond of or adept at public speaking, avoiding it as much as possible, and he was generally appalled by electioneering and campaigning. When he did take active part in such campaigns, as in 1969, he found himself speaking for weeks on end "evening after evening in smoke-filled rooms in various parts of Germany and hav[ing] to go about my

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Treaty, remained negative, and he proposed to the *Fraktion* the rejection of the treaty unless it proved possible to achieve binding interpretations addressing its political concerns via the federal government with the Soviet Union. Birrenbach's judgment following his fragmentary examination of the protocols was one factor in the ultimate refusal of the Union to approve the *Ostverträge* as a whole (Birrenbach Report, 19 May 1972, ACDP K133/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2). For a description of this episode, including Birrenbach's intense anger about not being allowed to look at the files himself, see Arnulf Baring, *Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982). Also see Christian Hacke, *Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik von Nottbeck, 1975). This all was part of Birrenbach's important role in the final *Ostpolitik* debate and in the negotiations with the government.

professional activity during the day.”<sup>123</sup> Entering and remaining in the *Bundestag* exclusively through the lists, Birrenbach did not need to campaign nearly as intensely as if he had been contesting a particular geographical area. However, the lack of his own *Wahlkreis* constituted a significant component of Birrenbach’s lack of party *Macht*.<sup>124</sup> Nevertheless, this personal political situation resulted from more than a simple dearth of time and a dislike of campaigning.<sup>125</sup>

Odd as it may be to say of a parliamentarian, Birrenbach was largely apolitical or even anti-political. In general, he considered mere political calculations beneath him, and he evinced a fundamental contempt for those characterless politicians, even those of

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<sup>123</sup> KB to Louise Holborn, Watertown (Massachusetts), 18 September 1969, ACDP K098/1. On the burdens of the election campaign of 1969, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. For Birrenbach being “unfortunately... very much occupied in the election campaign,” see KB to Robert Bowie, 20 August 1969, ACDP K160/2. Birrenbach was also involved in the election campaign in 1965.

<sup>124</sup> Birrenbach did attend *Parteilage*, for instance in 1971 in Wiesbaden, where he saw Gerhard Schröder (Chairman of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee), and in 1972 in Saarbrücken, where he talked with Rainer Barzel (Chairman of the CDU). When it served to enhance his real or apparent influence and prestige, Birrenbach was also quick to note his role in the Union, for instance stressing to US Rep. Chet Holifield at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in 1966 that the CDU/CSU that he represented in the *Bundestag* was the largest party in West Germany. On the recognition by the majority of his party of United States support as the essential basis of the Federal Republic’s existence, see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. For Birrenbach’s emphasis that no criticism of the American incursion into Cambodia had emerged from “my party,” while noting the condemnation of this operation at the SPD and FDP national conventions, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2.

<sup>125</sup> None of this is to suggest that Birrenbach was “party blind” or “party neutral.” For Birrenbach’s criticism of the “catastrophic” new *Deutschland*-plan of the SPD, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For Birrenbach’s contention that the statements of the opposition, especially of *Bundesminister* Georg Leber, on the situation and problems of the steel industry were almost all wrong, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1. On the inability of the Social Democratic government to overcome the current crisis in the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. For Birrenbach’s fears with respect to the SPD-FDP government of not merely a cabinet change but rather a “*Regimewechsel*”; and his criticism of the “flood of expectations” set in course by the SPD-FDP government in the economic-political, social-political and similar areas, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. Also, Birrenbach’s trip of 27 May-9 June 1962 in the US, for one, was taken in agreement with the Chancellor and the chairman of “our *Fraktion*.” For Birrenbach having gone to the US to inquire and get an impression for “my party” what American policy would be after Saigon’s fall, see KB to Harry Bergold (Jr.), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 24 June 1975, ACDP K155/1. It is a bit ironic, of course, that a man who considered himself so independent of his party should have sat in so many Atlanticist bodies at least ostensibly representing that party.

*Format*, who engaged in them.<sup>126</sup> He was repeatedly dismayed by the flawed policies and positions adopted by ignorant or unprincipled politicians, both German and American, largely focused on domestic political or electoral calculations. With respect to policy-making, Birrenbach believed that “[e]lection campaign managers are bad advisors.”<sup>127</sup> While he recognized the need in a democracy for a leader to be able to communicate effectively with the masses, he disliked the politician who “is not experienced in any field, but knows principally to move the hearts of his audiences.”<sup>128</sup> Those in power, especially neophytes in international affairs like a Helmut Kohl or a Jimmy Carter, should appoint to advisory positions and accept the counsel of the most

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<sup>126</sup> Touching on some of this, see KB to H. Kullak-Ublick, West German Embassy, London, 28 October 1974, ACDP K127/1.

<sup>127</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 December 1975, ACDP K211/2. For another example of Birrenbach’s criticism of short-sighted, “*wahltechnischen*” motives, see KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach’s assessment of the difficulties of a coordination of Western policy as a result of the “unavoidable power vacuum” at the top that would exist in the United States until new presidential elections, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For the impact of an election year on the “agonizing reappraisal” of the American position in the world, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. On the election year as one reason that the ratification of the *Ostverträge* was a pleasant fact for the American government insofar as it “eased the bilateral American-Soviet efforts for détente,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1. For many mistakes of American policy (e.g. the “hurrying up” of the SALT I negotiations; the “*Übersteigerung*” of the US-USSR relationship) being traceable to President Nixon’s domestic political calculations (“Peace for the next generation (that means for the next election)”), see KB to Heinz Barth, Washington DC, 14 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. In this letter to Barth, Birrenbach also cited the role of the “Watergate scandal, which should be covered up through peace,” and attributed the “quick settlement of the Vietnam question after the mining of the Haiphong harbor” to “electoral reasons.” For further criticism along these lines of Nixon and his détente policies (including the SALT negotiations), see KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 December 1975, ACDP K211/2. Birrenbach could also be disparaging of West German politicians on the same score, for instance Franz Josef Strauß in 1980 with respect to the issue of nuclear power. Whatever his dislike of the distortions in policy-making introduced by electoral considerations, Birrenbach was not averse to following German elections or offering election analysis. See, for instance, KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1, in which Birrenbach attributed the Union’s election loss, in part, to the lack of a strong, authoritative leader, ruing that “[o]ne does not always have such men.”

<sup>128</sup> KB to William Bass, 19 July 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to John McCloy, 8 October 1976, ACDP K210/1. Birrenbach made this particular remark with respect to Helmut Kohl (and Jimmy Carter) as part of an effort to analyze the Union’s election defeat in 1976. About Brandt’s election victory in 1972 and Birrenbach’s conviction that this did not prove Brandt right, rather Birrenbach remained convinced Brandt was wrong, Birrenbach remarked “[m]ajorities prove nothing about the correctness of a solution. I have seen that again and again in the last fifty years to the point of exhaustion” (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1).



experienced, capable and independent men in the field of foreign policy, in other words men like Birrenbach.<sup>129</sup> For Birrenbach, parliamentary tactics and party-political expediency were of subordinate importance to his own considered views. At times, he simply refused to fall into line to suit the parliamentary tactics as determined by the party's parliamentary leaders.<sup>130</sup> Not surprisingly, Birrenbach found parliamentary activity by its very nature less enjoyable than his executive activity in other areas. This is ironic insofar as he was vigorously working through various avenues, as we shall continue to discover, to reduce or impinge upon the power of the government executive, time-consuming efforts that, as noted, were a fundamental reason for his own lack of party *Macht*. Birrenbach's quite apolitical outlook may also contribute to explaining his stark pessimism about and occasional incomprehension of political affairs.

Rather than being rooted in his political position, whether it be his offices or his party *Macht*, Birrenbach's influence can be traced back ultimately to another source: his expertise. The notion of Birrenbach as an expert was based on the idea that he uniquely (or among a select few) possessed valuable, specialized knowledge, in this case related to foreign affairs and, even more specifically, to trans-Atlantic relations. Birrenbach clearly embraced and promoted this personal role of expert. In the early 1960s, he reproached his party for its dilettantism, which he attributed to deficiencies in the leadership and the *Fraktion's* personnel composition. Birrenbach regularly dismissed those who entertained

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<sup>129</sup> In this regard, Birrenbach saw Harry Truman as a model. For Birrenbach's disappointment, based on relative experience, with the selection of William Rogers as Secretary of State under Nixon over personalities like Nelson Rockefeller, Douglas Dillon and William Scranton, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2.

<sup>130</sup> For instance, during the debates over the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, Birrenbach outright refused to alter a speech to suit the needs of parliamentary tactics, as determined by the CSU's Richard Stücklen (Deputy Chairman of the *Fraktion*), preferring instead to give the speech later. On this episode, see KB to West German Ambassador Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1 and KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2.

views on particular issues that diverged from his own as lacking his knowledge and overview of the facts.<sup>131</sup> Even in the face of occasional complaints regarding the length of his reports, Birrenbach stubbornly insisted that the wealth and complexity of the topics he addressed demanded an in-depth, differentiated and extensive treatment. Likewise, the concept of “objectivity” was a key element in his thinking, and he regularly questioned the objectivity of those whose accounts, interpretations and judgments of international affairs did not jibe with his own.<sup>132</sup> In addition to largely explaining his legalistic tendencies, Birrenbach’s legal training, in the German positivist tradition, probably also contributed to this stress on objectivity.<sup>133</sup> Given its centrality to

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<sup>131</sup> For an example of Birrenbach dismissing those who disagreed with him, here with respect to the Brandt *Ostpolitik*, because they were not as familiar as he was with the *Gesamtproblematik*, thus rendering their views untenable, see KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1. On Birrenbach’s proposal for the creation of a European community consultation organ consisting of several select political personalities who would make proposals with respect to unity from a community perspective, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.

<sup>132</sup> For instance, KB to Berend von Nottbeck, 1 October 1970, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>133</sup> For Birrenbach’s efforts to obtain an “objective picture” of the situation, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. One manifestation of Birrenbach’s emphasis on objectivity was a stress on the “facts” and a proper knowledge of them as a means of understanding texts, treaties, events and the like as well as being the ultimate and sufficient tool of persuasion. With respect to this stress, in various guises, see for example KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1; KB to Brentano, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; and KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. A corollary of Birrenbach’s accent on objectivity and facts was the recurring notion of the sheer lack of objectivity, the ignorance and the irrationality of those who disagreed with him on virtually any of a multiplicity of issues. On the mistaken perceptions of the “*eindeutig gefühlsbetonten Kleineuropäer* in our ranks” with respect to the French and on the “rudimentary” knowledge of Birrenbach’s French Gaullist talk partners so that a deeper discussion, at least on particular issues, proved to be out of the question, see KB to Finance Minister Franz Etsel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2. For Birrenbach enlightening Guttenberg on the true meaning of the concept “*Absicht*,” a knowledge of which he attributed to his training as a *Jurist*, see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach’s belief that he had a particularly good understanding and knowledge of the United States but also that few of his compatriots really understood the US, see for instance KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. With respect to German sympathizers with France, Birrenbach described how “a more emotional-feeling part of the German *Politik* presses on the side of France” (KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). On Birrenbach detecting a German “*Egozentrik*” or “*Provinzialität*” resting on the Federal Republic’s vulnerability and division, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the underestimation in Germany of the domestic political importance of Franklin D. Roosevelt, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. Based on his personal experience of the last fifty years and referring to experts in

Birrenbach's influence, it is worthwhile outlining in general terms the factors that contributed to the attainment of this expertise.

Prosaic as it may sound, Birrenbach's extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, and of the United States in particular, derived in no small part from the mass media, a resource also readily available to the general public. Television and radio provided not just news but also coverage of debates, press conferences and interviews at home and abroad.<sup>134</sup> Birrenbach also accumulated a considerable number of press releases and communiqués issued by various conferences and organizations dealing with foreign affairs, as well as copies of important speeches and interviews.<sup>135</sup> Birrenbach read widely in the press, including many of the most prominent newspapers and newsmagazines in West Germany (e.g. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; *Die Welt*; *Der Spiegel*; *Die Zeit*; *Handelsblatt*; *Das Parlament*), as well as abroad (e.g. the *International*

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psychology for confirmation of his views, Birrenbach criticized the German people as being and always having been "emotional and rarely rational. It tends to extremes, in whatever direction, in its *Emotionalität*" (KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1). Likewise, on the irrational attitudes of the Americans, see KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2. Finally, related to all this, Birrenbach saw himself as a practical man opposed to dogma even, or perhaps especially, on matters dear to his heart. For instance, regarding his doubts about Hallstein's "dogmatic maximal thought" on European political coordination, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.

<sup>134</sup> For Birrenbach, radio included the broadcasts of the BBC and of Paris radio. For Birrenbach hearing parts of a de Gaulle press conference over the latter, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>135</sup> Birrenbach kept an eye on interviews, proceedings, hearings, press conferences, debates, speeches, reports and statements at, in or emerging from a wide array of venues, among them: the United States Congress, including the Senate and its pertinent committees (especially the foreign relations committee); the Supreme Soviet; institutions and gatherings in Brussels and Geneva (NPT, Disarmament Conference); NATO and IMF meetings; the European Parliament; the WEU Assembly; the United Nations; diverse conferences (like the MBFR talks in Vienna, the 6<sup>th</sup> International Arms Control Symposium in 1973, and the February 1974 Washington International Energy Conference); Atlanticist organizations; various institutes; and the American universities. Key American figures of interest in this respect included the President (as well as the White House spokesperson), vital cabinet secretaries (State, Defense, Treasury), the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, influential Senators, top military personalities, and certain lower level bureaucrats. Within the Federal Republic, Birrenbach was attentive in this regard to the relevant ministers as well as foreign (including the American and Soviet) ambassadors and, elsewhere in Western Europe, to crucial leaders (such as de Gaulle) and ministers (e.g. foreign and defense), especially from Britain and France, along with personalities like the NATO and OECD Secretaries-General.

*Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Neue Züricher Zeitung, Financial Times, The Times* (London), and the *Economist*).<sup>136</sup> Meanwhile, from the American press, he read publications such as *Time, Newsweek, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal*.<sup>137</sup> Among the publicists with whom he was familiar, Birrenbach especially admired the Frenchman Raymond Aron (*Le Figaro* and then later *L'Express*).

Particularly noteworthy from our perspective in regard to the valuable reading material that crossed Birrenbach's desk and certainly more specialized than these aforementioned mainstream publications were the materials that he received from or that were generated by the various Atlanticist institutions, many of which we have already

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<sup>136</sup> For Birrenbach's references to articles he had read in the English press ("the independent and liberal press"), including *The Times, the Economist, the Observer* and the *Manchester Guardian*, see KB to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2. On Birrenbach reading excerpts of a de Gaulle press conference in the German press, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For Birrenbach's reference to part of an interview given by Edward Heath to *Le Figaro*, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. In later years at least, Birrenbach described the FAZ as "the best German newspaper" (KB to Henry Kissinger, 31 May 1983, ACDP K146/3). Birrenbach also received, and quoted from, the *Economist's* confidential "Foreign Report."

<sup>137</sup> See, for instance, KB to John McCloy, 26 November 1975, ACDP K210/1. The press played an important role in helping Birrenbach gauge the atmosphere and opinion abroad and was thus significant in his activities as revealed by his regular references to it. For example, Birrenbach was dismayed with respect to the commentary of certain streams in the English press, particularly within "the independent and liberal press," that "had attracted my attention now for months" favoring the second version of the Rapacki Plan as a starting point for future disarmament negotiations, which "would make a disengagement possible to some extent" but without settling "the political problem of German reunification," and moving closer towards a "recognition of the GDR" (KB to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2). On Birrenbach later also being disturbed to find the American press "strongly interested" in an NPT, "skeptical" vis-à-vis the MLF, and generally misjudging the relationship of the NPT to the cohesion of NATO, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. In the summer of 1966, Birrenbach believed that the press on both sides of the Atlantic reflected such a nervous atmosphere that it was high time to solve the offset problem in a manner acceptable to the United States and the Federal Republic (KB to McCloy, 12 August 1966, ACDP K117/1). For Birrenbach's distress with respect to what he considered the inappropriate reaction of the American press to a declaration of Chancellor Kiesinger in July 1968, see KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2. Birrenbach used a Chalmers Roberts article in the IHT on a meeting of McCloy, Acheson, Clay and Dewey with President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger as the point of departure for his *Bundestag* speech of 29 January 1971. On alarming reports in the press (including in the Agence France Presse and a Jan Reifenberg article in the FAZ) about alleged statements of Walter Stoessel (US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) in a "briefing" before a selected circle of foreign correspondents, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1. The *Nachrichtenspiegel* provided Birrenbach with further press reports from outlets like the AP, ddp, dpa, and AFP/dtsch.

encountered.<sup>138</sup> These materials included products of foreign or international Atlanticist and Atlanticist-inclined institutions, such as the Atlantic Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations (Birrenbach subscribed to the CFR's journal, *Foreign Affairs*), the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Hudson Institute and the Brookings Institution, as well as from specifically German Atlanticist organizations, such as the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* and the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, with their German-Atlanticist perspectives on the most significant of themes.<sup>139</sup> These materials, comprising books, journal articles, studies, reports, papers (including those presented at conferences), as well as other varied pieces authored or published by Atlanticist-minded individuals and think tanks (see Chapter 7), proved essential to Birrenbach's understanding of the complex political, strategic, and technical issues at stake in foreign affairs, for instance troop offset, nuclear power and international currency issues.<sup>140</sup> Beyond this, Birrenbach also read a considerable number of books in general on foreign relations, literature invaluable in shaping his ideas.<sup>141</sup> Thus, in many cases, the organizations that Birrenbach

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<sup>138</sup> See, for example, KB to Gerard Smith, 22 May 1974, ACDP K209/1.

<sup>139</sup> To this list can be added the Monnet Committee, insofar as expert reports were generated within its framework by personalities like Guido Carli (Governor of the Bank of Italy) and Robert Triffin (Yale University) (KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1).

<sup>140</sup> For example, from the SWP Research Institute, Birrenbach had among his reading material reports and *Lagenotizen* regarding themes such as nuclear power, troop offset, and the domestic political reasons and economic-political consequences of the French departure from the EC currency bloc (this last one: SWP *Lagenotiz*, February 1974, ACDP K194/2). On Birrenbach's inquiry by Hahn whether "the Brookings Institution's version" had some substance with regard to reductions of warheads on the European continent, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>141</sup> On Birrenbach's praise of and having "learned much" from Kissinger's *The Troubled Partnership* (1965), particularly with respect to its ideas regarding a structure for the coordination of military and foreign policy, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. Birrenbach was also familiar with Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957). For Birrenbach's knowledge of a number of books about NATO and his request for literature and publication references that would enable him to write a speech "with substance" on the topic of "Integration in NATO or Classical Alliance," see again KB to Kissinger, 30 August 1965, ACDP

helped found and maintain provided him, in turn, with information crucial to his political activity.<sup>142</sup>

In addition to the information gleaned from the mass media and more specialized books, reports and studies, Birrenbach also garnered useful information from his extensive contact with his compatriots located both within the Federal Republic as well as abroad. These contacts spanned the spectrum of the West German elite: the governmental bureaucracy (*Bundeskanzleramt*, *Bundespresseamt* and the various ministries), including the ministers and state secretaries themselves<sup>143</sup>; representatives of

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K017/1. Birrenbach was frustrated at this time since he could not find an in-depth treatment of “the problem of integration, which specifically interests Germany.” For Alfred Grosser sending Birrenbach a copy of his book *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland-Bilanz einer Entwicklung*, which contained many ideas that had been presented in Grosser’s “outstanding” *Referat* in the early summer of 1967 in Düsseldorf, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2.

<sup>142</sup> Birrenbach also received a variety of helpful information, reports, recommendations and resolutions pertaining in some way to international, principally Atlantic, affairs from a number of other reliably, often or at least sometimes Atlanticist-minded organizations that we have not addressed in much detail. These included the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*, which for example produced and supplied four papers intended for the joint meeting of the American and German *Beratergruppe* for the NATO Parliamentarians Conference Economic Committee: “Zusammenarbeit in Südamerika” (Dr. Li/Gör, 11 September 1961, ACDP K007/1), “Die Rolle der Privatwirtschaft” (Dr. Li/Gör, 11 September 1961, ACDP K007/1), “Die Politik der beiden Regierungen” (Dr. Li/Gör, 7 September 1961, ACDP K007/1), and “Lindsey-Plan: Neue Wege der Entwicklungshilfe” (Dr. Li/Gör, 7 September 1961, ACDP K007/1). From CEPES, for instance, Birrenbach received works, sent to the members of the German CEPES group, on the “Auslandshilfeprogramm der Regierung Kennedy” (dated 19 March 1962, signed by Joachim Willmann, *Europäische Vereinigung für Wirtschaftliche und Soziale Entwicklung* (CEPES), *Deutsche Gruppe e.V.*, ACDP K007/1) and “Possibilities and Problems of the Atlantic Economic Community” (dated 28 February 1962, signed by Bernhard von Loeffelholz, CEPES, *Deutsche Gruppe e.V.*, ACDP K007/1) as well as confidential (not for publication) statistical tables on “Die Exporte der Vereinigten Staaten und der erweiterten Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (bisherige EWG-Länder und Grossbritannien im Jahre 1960 im Verhältnis zum Netto-Weltexport und der gemeinsame Aussentarif der EWG)” (ACDP K007/1), with the products listed here including iron and steel. Finally, the *Deutsche Rat der Europäischen Bewegung* provided Birrenbach with, among other things, unpublished drafts of its resolutions (DREB, dated 8 February 1962, Bonn, ACDP K007/1). Of course, Birrenbach was also buffeted with information from any number of lobbying organizations (e.g. the *Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V.*, ACDP K198/2).

<sup>143</sup> For Birrenbach receiving useful information on the situation from Heinrich Krone on the basis of the latter’s participation in a recent cabinet meeting, see KB to *Minister a.D.* Josef-Hermann Dufhues, 13 December 1963, personal, confidential, private letter, ACDP K011/2. On the assistance Birrenbach received in carrying out his Israel mission in 1965 from the government bureaucracy, including help in preparing his negotiations from *Ministerdirigent* Prof. Meyer-Lindenberg, during the negotiations in Israel from State Secretary Karl Carstens, and in being allowed to take along the files of the BKA to aid him, see KB to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 March 1966, regarding German-Israeli negotiations about economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, confidential, cc Amb. Pauls, 7 March 1966, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach gathering from State Secretary Werner Knieper (BKA) that

the Federal Republic at the various international organizations, such as NATO and the European Communities (e.g. Wilhelm Haferkamp, Vice President of the European Commission (Brussels); Helmuth Cammann of the ECSC Delegation of the High Authority in England (London))<sup>144</sup>; the ambassadors and other personnel at the West German embassies and consulates abroad, especially in Washington DC, New York City (including the West German mission at the UN) and London, who tended to share, at least generally, Birrenbach's Atlanticist goals<sup>145</sup>; correspondents for German newspapers in the United States, such as the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*<sup>146</sup>; and figures from the *Wirtschaft*, at home and abroad, including Günther Drechsler of the Thyssen office in New York City.<sup>147</sup> Such contacts were important in procuring and providing Birrenbach with valuable materials, books and information and in enabling him to stay apprised of the current world situation in their respective spheres

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Chancellor Kiesinger had decided, against Birrenbach's advice, to operate in a very reserved fashion with respect to the question of community solutions (NPT), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. Prior to his *Sondermission* to the United States in September 1968, in addition to his conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger, Birrenbach was given detailed briefings by the *Bundeskanzleramt*, the Foreign Office and the Defense Ministry about the situation and concerns stemming from the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

<sup>144</sup> On Cammann providing Birrenbach with a copy of a report dealing with negotiations for British entrance into the EEC, see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High Authority in the United Kingdom, London, to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2. For Birrenbach being in contact with Ralf Dahrendorf (European Commission) before and during the former's stay in the United States in questions of American foreign policy, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>145</sup> See, for example, KB to West German Ambassador Herwarth (London), 31 July 1961, ACDP K076/1 and Ambassador Herwarth, Embassy of the Federal Republic, London, to KB, 4 August 1961, ACDP K076/1. On Staden (in the Washington embassy) sending Birrenbach a speech of Sen. Frank Church on non-proliferation, see *Botschaftsrat I. Kl.* Berndt von Staden to KB, 3 December 1966, ACDP K139/2. In the United States, such personalities also included, for instance, the Ambassador Rolf Pauls (1968-73).

<sup>146</sup> On Jan Reifenberg (FAZ) informing Birrenbach about his impressions regarding statements of Walter Stoessel (US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) in a briefing before foreign correspondents, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>147</sup> For an example of Birrenbach's contacts in the *Wirtschaft* helping him size up world affairs, particularly in regard to economic issues, see KB to H. Kullak-Ublick, West German Embassy, London, 25 November 1974, ACDP K068/1.

of competence.<sup>148</sup> To a certain extent, Birrenbach received his information, including from some of the aforementioned sources, through the positions he occupied.<sup>149</sup>

Additionally, Birrenbach had access to a number of West German contacts that provided valuable assistance to him in complex technical questions. To a certain extent, these were also located in the governmental bureaucracy (often the ministers or state secretaries) or the German embassies abroad (particularly the specialized attachés and *Gesandte*).<sup>150</sup> Having already mentioned the legalistic quality of Birrenbach's thought, it is not surprising that he frequently sought necessary legal advice. For instance, to establish the legal consequences of a possible preamble to the Élysée Treaty of 1963,

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<sup>148</sup> To cite just a few more examples of these particular contacts in action: for Birrenbach obtaining a better understanding of the situation (e.g. agricultural questions and the Kennedy Round) through his having gotten in touch with two state secretaries (Lahr and Carstens), the agriculture ministry, the European Commission and a series of other experts of the material, see KB to *Minister a.D.* Josef-Hermann Dufhues, 13 December 1963, personal, confidential, private letter, ACDP K011/2. On Birrenbach's contacts with multiple members of the cabinet, the *Geschäftsführenden* Chairman of the CDU and the leaders of the most important *Referate* in the *Auswärtigem Amt*, from whom he received valuable information, for instance regarding the content of meetings between Chancellor Erhard and de Gaulle, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>149</sup> For the in-depth reports to the AKV (including Birrenbach) about the state of the disarmament negotiations in Geneva by the West German observer at the conference, Amb. Swidbert Schnippenkötter, on 15 February and 19 April 1966, see KB to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 7 July 1966, ACDP K087/2. On the informative, but to Birrenbach not always convincing, presentations and answering of questions by Foreign Minister Brandt in the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee on the state of the NPT, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2 and KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Barzel (Chairman of the *Fraktion*) making available to Birrenbach (as Chairman of the *Fraktion's Arbeitsgruppe* NPT) the cabinet submission [*Vorlage*] of Foreign Minister Brandt about the NPT, for *Bundesminister* Gerhard Stoltenberg giving Birrenbach access to his cabinet *Vorlage* regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and for Birrenbach's judgment on these *Vorlagen*, at Barzel's request, to the Chancellor, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. On Foreign Minister Scheel's confidential informing of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee on 13 November 1969 of the American interpretation (NPT) presented to the NATO Council, see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. For the talk of the Soviet minister Samjatin with colleagues of the Union *Bundestag Fraktion* and Samjatin's negative remarks [*Ostverträge*] on the question of the binding nature of West German resolutions, on possible [border] revisions and on self-determination, in some cases to Birrenbach's own questions, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1. On a three-hour meeting in Bonn in February 1973 between some members of the Union *Fraktion* (Birrenbach, Erhard, Narjes, Bismarck, Blumenfeld and Sprung) and the former American Secretary of Commerce and current Special Ambassador Peter Peterson, along with the Americans Amb. Malmgreen (the President's Deputy Representative for trade questions in the White House), Amb. Hillenbrand and "Gesandter" Wootton, see KB Report, 20 February 1973, ACDP K183/2.

<sup>150</sup> See, for instance, the note for Birrenbach regarding MRCA from the *Luftwaffe* attaché at the German Embassy in London, signed Schroth, *Oberst i.G.*, 12 December 1968, ACDP K189/3.



Birrenbach contacted the head of the Foreign Office's Legal Department, *Botschafter* Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg.<sup>151</sup> Birrenbach's own personal assistants, such as Dr. Alfons Titzrath, could be useful in offering him analysis of economic and other matters.<sup>152</sup> On technical economic and monetary issues, such as those related to the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, he was assisted by a number of bankers at the *Bundesbank* (including Otmar Emminger and Karl Blessing) and the *Deutschen Bank* (Wilfried Guth and Franz-Josef Trouvain); the large economic organizations, such as the BDI (especially Fritz Berg and Hellmuth Wagner) and the DIHT (President Prof. Ernst Schneider); his own assistants; as well as his contacts in the *Wirtschaft* at home and abroad.<sup>153</sup> With this bevy of contacts to consult on technical issues, Birrenbach was in a

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<sup>151</sup> Birrenbach was also assisted with suggestions and arguments on legal issues by Prof. Dr. Hermann Mosler (as well as Prof. Karl Carstens), for instance with respect to the binding nature of the *Bundestag* resolution in connection with the Moscow Treaty (KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 14 May 1972, ACDP K026/1).

<sup>152</sup> Titzrath authored memos for Birrenbach on subjects such as the treatment of dumping in the GATT, the OECD, the EEC and the United States (including criticisms and a reference to an "Atlantic trade partnership" and the realization of the Trade Expansion Act); the situation after the breaking off of the Brussels negotiations in 1963; and possible transition solutions up to a British entrance into the EEC (*Vermerke* of 28 January 1963, 1 February 1963 and 11 February 1963, all by Titzrath, Düsseldorf, ACDP K064/2). Dr. Klaus Mangold, another of Birrenbach's assistants, was valuable for instance in drawing up papers and proposals on the energy situation as of the mid-1970s based on a wide variety of German and foreign government, business, institute, and press sources, including: information in the federal government's energy program and from the Economics Ministry; Otmar Emminger (Vice President of the *Bundesbank*); plans of the French government; a statement of President Ford in presenting his energy program; proposals of Secretary of State Kissinger on the occasion of an International Energy Agency conference; US Treasury estimates; references of US Treasury Secretary William Simon; estimates of the US Deputy Treasury Secretary (Gerald Parsky); the US Federal Energy Administration (information drawn from *Newsweek*); the American embassy in the Federal Republic (letter of Mr. Winder); studies of the US State Department and the World Bank; estimates of the EC Commission; the OECD; a *Vortrag* by Wilfried Guth (*Deutsche Bank*) on "The International Financial Scene One Year After the Oil Crisis"; ESSO AG (Hamburg); Shell (statement of Gerrit Wagner, Chairman of the Royal Dutch Shell Company; and letter from J.H. Loudon of 3 January 1975); a new study of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Corporation (an American bank); a paper of the Trilateral Commission; the *Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft*; information of the *Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft*; the Institute of Development Studies; an item from the *Neuer Zürcher Zeitung* (itself based on information of The Conference Board, an American research organization); *Die Zeit*; an analysis of the *Handelsblatt* that rested primarily on surveys of firms and on VDMA documents; the "respected" French business newspaper *Les Échos*; *Time* magazine; *Petroleum Economist*; and the Petroleum Press Service (see ACDP K198/2).

<sup>153</sup> For instance, KB to Director Dr. Otmar Emminger, *Deutsche Bundesbank*, 17 July 1961, ACDP K051/1. Later, Emminger provided useful information on the absorption of the flow of petrodollars and the views,

considerably better position to master the complexities of a variety of political, economic, military, legal, scientific and other subjects. To the extent that Birrenbach modified his own expressed views and incorporated the views of these technical advisors, including those of government officials, into his own reports, speeches and publications (even while presenting them as his own personal views), which was quite often, he became an important route through which outside ideas penetrated and possibly indirectly influenced the activities of the Atlanticists and their organizations.<sup>154</sup>

Perhaps most interesting in regard to the subject of outside technical assistance is the rather extensive network of advisors that Birrenbach utilized with respect to the issue of nuclear energy, which played a prominent role in the international relations of this period. This was particularly the case with regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Birrenbach's efforts to assess its potential impact on the peaceful civilian use of atomic energy in the Federal Republic. As a result, he was in touch with a number of scientists and institutes, located both in the Federal Republic and in the United States. Such Americans included personalities like Paul Doty of the Chemistry Department at Harvard University and Edward Teller at the University of California's Livermore Lab.<sup>155</sup> Meanwhile, these Germans included Carl Roland Rabl (*Max-Planck-Institut für*

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plans and activities of central banks and governments (including, but not only, the *Bundesbank* and the *Bundesregierung*) in this respect (ACDP K198/2). In February 1975, the ESSO AG, Hamburg (Herr Elfert), provided information on the energy situation, particularly mineral oil dependencies (ACDP K198/2). At Birrenbach's request by phone, John Loudon (Shell), based in London, provided him in early 1975 with useful estimates of crude oil imports for 1974 (ACDP K198/2). On 22 March 1974, Birrenbach had a phone talk with Trouvain about the working paper by Prof. Robert Triffin on "Erdöl, der Währungswirrwarr und die Europäische Gemeinschaft" (ACDP K198/2).

<sup>154</sup> While admittedly no technical wizard himself, Birrenbach was well-aware of the role of technology and technical innovation in international relations, for instance with respect to accelerating the rapid nuclear arms race between the superpowers (KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2) and the possibilities for a technological breakthrough that might permit an ABM system for Europe in the next ten or twenty years (KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1).

<sup>155</sup> For Birrenbach turning to Teller about the NPT and future technological developments in nuclear weapons, see KB to Prof. Edward Teller, University of California, Davis, 16 August 1965, ACDP K187/1.

*Physikalische Chemie*, Göttingen); Dr. Klaus Ritter (*Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*); Prof. Dr. Heinrich Mandel (*Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG*, Essen); Prof. Dr. Karl Heinz Beckurts (Chairman of the Board of the *Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*); Prof. Dr. Wolf Häfele (*Kernforschungszentrum*, Karlsruhe); Helmuth Burckhardt (*Eschweiler Bergwerksverein*, Aachen); Prof. Dr. Fritz Burgbacher (MdB); and of course, indirectly, their own contacts.<sup>156</sup> From these personalities, Birrenbach received valuable, sometimes confidential, information and reports originating from these men themselves, as well as studies produced by institutions like the SWP and the RAND Corporation.<sup>157</sup> All of this highlights the key phenomenon of the existence of other networks operating simultaneously and sometimes overlapping or linked with the Atlanticist network. In the case of the “nuclear energy” network just touched upon, two networks with trans-Atlantic ties interacted with and influenced one another, at least temporarily, for their mutual benefit. Birrenbach was among those individuals serving as a vital link between the Atlanticist and other such networks (here, nuclear energy).<sup>158</sup>

However, while factors such as mass media, specialized books and materials and widespread West German contacts all contributed significantly to Birrenbach’s expertise, there was yet another, even more crucial, element. Essential to understanding

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<sup>156</sup> Birrenbach’s friend Edmund Stinnes, who had spent years as an émigré in the United States, also dealt with the question of nuclear power and was in contact with Heinrich Mandel (RWE), AMF Atomic (Washington DC), and American & Foreign Enterprises (Stinnes to KB, 6 September 1957, ACDP K170/1 and Stinnes to Mandel, 17 December 1957, ACDP K170/1). For Birrenbach having a long discussion in January 1967 regarding the effects of the NPT on the civilian sector with the leader of the *Kernforschungsinstitut* in Karlsruhe, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. Häfele was also involved in the NPT negotiations. On Birrenbach trying to arrange a meeting for Beckurts with Gerard Smith in Washington DC (Beckurts ultimately met with Smith’s associate Philip Farley), see KB to Gerard Smith, 26 June 1978, ACDP K209/1.

<sup>157</sup> See, for example, KB to Prof. Edward Teller, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California, 27 November 1975, ACDP K155/1.

<sup>158</sup> The partial value to Birrenbach of such linkages emerges from his admission, here with respect to his lacking the technical knowledge to judge certain SALT matters, that “I belong still to the generation that understands nothing of technology” (KB to Hubert Feigl, SWP, 21 August 1979, cc Ritter, ACDP K200/2).

Birrenbach's significance and that of the Atlanticist infrastructure is the extensive array of regular foreign contacts he enjoyed. Given his own political predilections, it is not surprising that his closest such contacts tended to be of a generally Atlanticist bent. These were plentiful in Western Europe, where the key contact was without question the Frenchman Jean Monnet, along with his Dutch assistant, Max Kohnstamm. Others were to be found also in France (Zbigniew Rapacki, Raymond Aron, Alfred Grosser) as well as Belgium (Paul van Zeeland) and especially in Great Britain (Lord Gladwyn, Siegmund Warburg, William Bass).<sup>159</sup> He also enjoyed solid links with the leadership of the most important international organizations, especially NATO (Secretaries General Dirk Stikker, Manlio Brosio and Joseph Luns) and the European Communities. Furthermore, Birrenbach also maintained steady contact with the personnel of the key Western embassies in Bonn.<sup>160</sup>

However, Birrenbach's regular contacts were especially concentrated in the United States, where, as he often said, he had more friends, "in the highest positions," than in any other foreign country.<sup>161</sup> Here, the key man was John McCloy, the still-

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<sup>159</sup> On Monnet, see Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978). While not necessarily full-fledged contacts, Birrenbach also enjoyed extensive access to foreign government officials from an early date. For instance, during his stay in London in November 1958, Birrenbach spoke with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Defence Minister Duncan Sandys and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling.

<sup>160</sup> Thus, Birrenbach directly obtained from the embassies of the Western nations in Bonn useful information and materials on those specific countries as well as on international affairs in general, for instance acquiring from the American and French embassies the records of the proceedings of the US Senate along with information about energy consumption and dependence. For Birrenbach rejecting the notion that he viewed himself as an "English advocate [*Anwalt*]" by stressing his good contact with the official French side in Bonn, especially the fact that, as of early March 1959, he had been invited five times to the French embassy in the previous three weeks, see KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2. Among other things, Birrenbach was invited to evening receptions at these various Western embassies, including those of France, Britain and the United States.

<sup>161</sup> For instance, KB to Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador, Bad Godesberg, 11 January 1977, ACDP K100/1; KB to Mr. and Mrs. Thro, 30 March 1978, ACDP K100/2; and KB to Shepard Stone, 24 May 1976, ACDP K191/2.

influential former US High Commissioner for Germany.<sup>162</sup> Within the field of government and politics, aside from McCloy, these regular contacts included: Secretaries of State (Dean Acheson, Christian Herter, Henry Kissinger, later Alexander Haig, and to some extent Dean Rusk); Secretaries of Defense (James Schlesinger); National Security Advisors (McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski); the successive chairmen of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (William Foster, Gerard Smith)<sup>163</sup>; key figures in the State Department (Eugene Rostow, George Ball, William Tyler, John Leddy, Henry Owen) and the Defense Department (Paul Nitze); prominent military figures (Lucius Clay, the SACEURs Gen. Lauris Norstad and Gen. Alexander Haig); influential members of Congress (Representative Paul Findley, Senators Jacob Javits, John Cooper, Henry Jackson, Thomas Dodd, Robert Kennedy)<sup>164</sup>; and, as already alluded to, the crucial representatives in the American embassy and consulates in the Federal Republic, including the ambassadors (James Conant, George McGhee, Henry Cabot Lodge) and general consuls (especially in Düsseldorf (Edmund Kellogg)), as well as to international organizations like the European Communities (J. Robert Schaezel)

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<sup>162</sup> Birrenbach considered McCloy “one of the greatest and at the same time most powerful friends of the Federal Republic in the United States” (KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 13 January 1967, ACDP K117/2). On McCloy, see for instance Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy & The Making of the American Establishment* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Thomas Schwartz, *America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

<sup>163</sup> By this point, Acheson was, of course, a former Secretary of State. On Acheson, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969). McCloy drafted the bill in 1961 leading to the creation that year of the ACDA and then chaired the ACDA’s General Advisory Committee on Disarmament well into the Nixon White House.

<sup>164</sup> Dodd was particularly valuable as the sharpest of the critics of the NPT in the Senate and also provided Birrenbach with his correspondence with the disarmament agency in this respect.

and NATO (Harlan Cleveland).<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach also took up contact with major American political candidates and their relevant advisors.<sup>166</sup>

However, Birrenbach's political contacts in the United States were imparted particular depth by the plethora of personalities beyond the realm of government and

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<sup>165</sup> For Birrenbach's opportunity to speak with an American delegation at a reception held by US Ambassador Walter Dowling, see KB to Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 1962, ACDP K157/1. On Birrenbach giving US General Consul Edmund Kellogg (General Consulate, Düsseldorf) his opinion and proposals regarding the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, see Kellogg to KB, 14 March 1963, ACDP K157/1. On 28 May 1965, Birrenbach attended a dinner given by Ambassador George McGhee for John McNaughton (Paul Nitze's successor as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), in which Martin Hillenbrand (the American "*Geschäftsträger*" at the time) and SPD Senator Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg) also took part. For the points discussed that evening, including the solution of the problem of the non-nuclear powers in NATO, see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Birrenbach being in contact with US Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand, as well as personalities like Peter Peterson, Harald Malmgren, Peter Flanigan, Lawrence Fox and Paul Volcker, see KB to *Staatssekretär a.D.* Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2. On Birrenbach's constant contact with the American embassy with respect to the NPT, at least as of late 1973, see KB to Robert Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2. On Birrenbach checking with Amb. Hillenbrand before publishing a piece on the United States to make sure he agreed with its contents, see KB to John McCloy, 16 June 1975, ACDP K210/1. On McGhee, see George McGhee, *At the Creation of a New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).

<sup>166</sup> For instance, prior to the American presidential election of 1968, Birrenbach had spoken with those he considered the likely candidates for the post of Secretary of State in a future Nixon administration: Nelson Rockefeller, Douglas Dillon and William Scranton (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2). For Birrenbach on his talk in early 1972 with Paul Warncke, the former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and one of Sen. Edmund Muskie's foreign policy advisors (at a time when Muskie was still the leading Democratic presidential candidate), about the future policy of a possible Democratic administration, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU *Deutschland*, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. Within several months later during the campaign, in his capacity as Chairman of the Democratic Party's Military-Political Commission, Warncke would become one of the two relevant advisors to the actual Democratic presidential nominee Sen. George McGovern (the other being Prof. Abram Chayes). On Birrenbach's in-depth talks (about one-and-a-half hours) with McGovern's foreign policy advisor Prof. Abram Chayes (Chairman of the Democratic Party's Foreign Policy Commission) on 6 September 1972 in Bonn about the current situation and future American policy, see KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. Chayes, impressed by the talk, asked Birrenbach to send him an exposé depicting what he had just told him (expositions and figures) so that he could pass it on to McGovern (KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2 and KB to Barzel, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1). According to Birrenbach, this talk with Chayes had been proposed "by the American side" (KB to Barzel, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1). According to Birrenbach in September 1972 (in connection with his Chayes talk), however the 1972 election turned out, the Democrats (who had been the majority party in the United States for decades) would, according to the current opinion polls, certainly get 40% of the vote, meaning that it was in "our interest" [that of the Union] to strive to influence also the part of the population that would vote Democratic (KB to Barzel, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1). On Birrenbach's talks with Sen. Ted Kennedy, a potential American presidential candidate on a trip to Europe, at a meal given to Kennedy by the American ambassador, then alone in a private conversation, and finally during a meal at the Hotel Königshof (Kennedy had asked Birrenbach to arrange for him a dinner and a speech in Bonn), see KB Confidential Memo of 30 April 1974, ACDP K184/1.

politics, at least narrowly defined, with whom he spoke and corresponded about political matters. These included prominent, usually policy-oriented, academics and international affairs research institutes, such as Harvard's Center for International Affairs (Robert Bowie, Henry Kissinger, Guido Goldman), the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute (Robert Strausz-Hupé, William Kintner, Walter Hahn), Yale University (Hajo Holborn, Eugene Rostow), the Brookings Institution (Henry Owen), Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (David Abshire, Arleigh Burke), the Institute for Advanced Study (Karl Kaysen), Columbia University (Zbigniew Brzezinski), Stanford University (Karl Brandt), and MIT (William E. Griffith).<sup>167</sup> They also comprised political contacts at many of the Atlanticist organizations we have already encountered: the Council on Foreign Relations (William Diebold, William Bundy), the American Council on Germany (Chris Emmet) and the Declaration of Atlantic Unity. Birrenbach also engaged politically with important figures in the American foundation system (Shephard Stone). Finally, Birrenbach discussed political issues with friends and business contacts abroad.<sup>168</sup> Of course, Birrenbach interacted, at one time or another, with a large number of prominent personalities, especially when one considers the various functions and conferences in which he participated. Rather than listing all of Birrenbach's German and foreign contacts, the aim

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<sup>167</sup> Among his numerous roles at the university, Goldman was part of Harvard's Center for European Studies. Likewise, Karl Brandt was part of Stanford's Hoover Institution and Food Research Institute. As earlier suggested, Birrenbach also read various books, papers, publications and studies produced or published by individuals and think tanks like FPRI, the Brookings Institution, or the Hudson Institute, in part due to his contacts who sent him such works, among them Hahn and Owen.

<sup>168</sup> These included Dimitri Mica in Athens (Greece) and Edmund Stinnes, based in Ascona (Switzerland), but not averse to travelling. Stinnes, who emigrated to the United States during the National Socialist period, was also a member of the Lametal-Union *Direktorium* (KB, Buenos Aires, to Franz von Papen Jr., Düsseldorf, 4 June 1951, ACDP K207/4).

here is simply to delineate the network of his most intense and fruitful contacts.<sup>169</sup> Their central personal significance in Birrenbach's life can be gauged by his repeated assertion that "[t]he most beautiful experience of my life has been the contact with outstanding men in many countries in politics, economy and science."<sup>170</sup>

The construction of Birrenbach's tight-knit Atlanticist political network required some time and effort. What was earlier generally stated regarding the significant impact of Atlanticist institutions in facilitating the establishment of linkages can now be stated more specifically with regard to Birrenbach. Namely, that Birrenbach's participation in the various international Atlanticist institutions previously described, including the international conferences, action committees and research institutes (especially the Atlantic Institute), proved essential in developing and maintaining his wide range of contacts. The relationships forged in these settings were of a variable nature. On the one hand, Birrenbach established numerous relatively transitory contacts through these channels. One such instance involved the US Representative Chet Holifield (CA), co-chairman of the Congress' Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a valuable contact with significant influence in the United States on nuclear issues and therefore of considerable importance to Birrenbach in his efforts specifically pertaining to both the MLF and the NPT. As part of a conscious effort, Birrenbach first established contact and spoke extensively with Holifield at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in late March 1966. On the other hand, many of the relationships Birrenbach established in these

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<sup>169</sup> Among Birrenbach's passing contacts in France, for instance, were Michel Salomon and Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, in French, to Michel Salomon, Ville d'Avray, France, 4 June 1969, ACDP K023/2 and (with respect to correspondence with Servan-Schreiber) KB, MdB, dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1).

<sup>170</sup> KB to Robert Bowie, 18 July 1977, ACDP K160/2.



settings turned out to be of a more permanent nature. For instance, Birrenbach first met Henry Kissinger, who remained a key contact over the years, at the German-American Conference staged by the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the American Council on Germany in early October 1959 in Bonn. Similarly, Birrenbach's mutual participation in the Atlantic Institute with the American Gen. Lauris Norstad was essential to the forging of their own long-term link.<sup>171</sup>

Just like the construction of the Atlanticist infrastructure we have explored in Chapter 4, Birrenbach's networking exhibited something of a snowball effect, as contacts begot more contacts. For example, at the Bilderberg Conference in Wiesbaden in early spring 1966, Robert Bowie and John McCloy not only urged Birrenbach to speak to Rep. Chet Holifield about the West German nuclear *Mitspracherecht*, they were also both essential to actually arranging Birrenbach's important meeting and talks there with that influential congressman.<sup>172</sup> Likewise, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Chris Emmet facilitated

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<sup>171</sup> With respect to the maintenance of contacts, for instance, Birrenbach periodically saw and was able to exchange views with John McCloy in Paris at meetings of the Atlantic Institute and, likewise, had the opportunity to express his concerns to McCloy in Amsterdam at the European-American Conference in March 1973 (KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2). On Birrenbach's discussion about a series of important questions with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns (Netherlands) in Paris at a meeting of the Atlantic Institute Board of Governors and at a following meal given for Luns and the Secretary General of the OECD, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1. In this July 1972 letter to Barzel, Birrenbach also explained that, as the Chairman of the Atlantic Institute's Foreign Policy Committee, he would have the chance on the coming Wednesday to speak in Brussels about European-American relations before and with the members of the European Commission and the ambassadors there of the United States, Britain and Canada on the occasion of a meal to be given for this purpose by Comte Boël in the Château Chenoy.

<sup>172</sup> Such a meeting appeared "all the more useful" as Holifield had asked a number of "concrete questions" and propounded what Birrenbach considered "a very narrow interpretation" of the relevant American laws in the discussion at the Bilderberg Conference in response to statements by Birrenbach and Fritz Erler. Indeed, Birrenbach's "American friends" even considered Holifield and his Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, aside from "the still undecided attitude" of President Johnson, to be "the main obstacle to the setting through of our plans." In addition to this meeting at Bilderberg, Birrenbach arranged with Holifield to depict to him in writing "the German standpoint" so that the latter could discuss it with his colleagues in the committee and then reply to Birrenbach in writing. On all of this, see KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1.

Birrenbach's contact with Senator Christopher Dodd's office in November 1965.<sup>173</sup>

During Birrenbach's London stay in November 1958, it was his "English friends" who provided him the opportunity to talk with two British ministers, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling.<sup>174</sup> Likewise, it was Henry Kissinger who promised "dead or alive" to bring Birrenbach together with National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy on his trip to the United States in May 1962.<sup>175</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach's experience indicates that even outside of the various Atlanticist institutions and functions themselves, membership or participation in such served as an entrance pass, virtually sufficient in itself to secure meetings with other members and participants, even if the individuals in question had hitherto not been particularly close.<sup>176</sup>

While high-level Atlanticist affairs obviously stood at the heart of many of Birrenbach's contacts, such relationships sometimes acquired further dimensions beyond their strictly Atlanticist elements. Business dealings, for one, occasionally added another such dimension to the links that existed between Birrenbach and those Americans and other Atlanticists involved in the business world. While business and economic matters could occasionally be a source of dissension between, for instance, Americans and Germans, even those of an Atlanticist stripe, the relationships that existed between

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<sup>173</sup> Strausz-Hupé and Emmet asked Birrenbach to see Dodd during his stay in Washington DC in November 1965 (*Sondermission*), but Dodd was out of town. Instead, Birrenbach spoke twice on the phone with a Mr. Martin, who sent him some of Dodd's speeches, including in the Senate and on East-West trade, as well as Dodd's correspondence with Adrian Fisher (Deputy Director of the ACDA).

<sup>174</sup> KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2.

<sup>175</sup> KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1. To cite yet another example, on his 1963 trip to the United States, Birrenbach had a breakfast at the invitation of Sigismund Freiherr von Braun (the FRG's Standing Representative at the United Nations in New York) with the UN mission chiefs.

<sup>176</sup> Some examples: Birrenbach's link to Gen. Lauris Norstad (US) was primarily due initially to their mutual participation in the Atlantic Institute, so that the mention of this institution was central to Birrenbach in obtaining a meeting between the two of them on his trip to the United States in 1963 (KB telex to Drechsler, 23 September 1963, ACDP K210/1). On his *Sondermission* of 1971-72, Birrenbach was able to see a considerable number of prominent foreign political luminaries, in large part due to his participation in the Atlanticist organizations, especially the Monnet Committee.

Birrenbach and other Atlanticist-minded businessmen were at the very least fleshed out, perhaps even strengthened, at times by the business ties and activities existing between them and their firms. Thanks to his position in the *Wirtschaft* and his contacts within the Thyssen firm, elsewhere in the *Wirtschaft* (including the major economic organizations) and with the government, Birrenbach was frequently able to offer his foreign contacts valuable assistance and advice regarding the conduct of business in West Germany.<sup>177</sup>

In addition to the serious policy matters at the center of Birrenbach's activities and contacts within the Atlanticist network, there also existed at times an element of personal affection and friendship. In Birrenbach's eyes, mutual frankness was a precondition for true friendship, whether it involved individuals or nations. Friendship did not consist of simply telling somebody what they wanted to hear, as Birrenbach put it, "I have never thought much of this type of friendship."<sup>178</sup> However, whatever their occasional disagreements on policy, Birrenbach genuinely liked, even admired, many of his contacts, especially Jean Monnet and John McCloy. For instance, he considered Monnet a "fatherlike friend.... This man was unique, very modest, full of energies, a great idealist and a man with an enormous power to absorb all set-backs.... [A] great

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<sup>177</sup> For examples of the business dimension among Atlanticists, see for instance KB telegram to John McCloy, 15 March 1971, ACDP K210/1; John Diebold, The Diebold Group Inc, Management Consultants, to KB, 20 June 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to John McCloy, 23 July 1979, ACDP K210/1. On discussions between Hans-Günther Sohl, George Ball and a Mr. MacGregor on, among other things, an ongoing Australian steel mill deal/project, with which Birrenbach was "generally familiar"; "some interesting developments" in this regard involving "the play of political forces" becoming clearer in Australia (rivalry of the separate states in a federal system in Western Australia); as well as Birrenbach "clarifying" the Moscow negotiations for Ball and MacGregor, see George Ball, Lehman Brothers, to KB, 19 August 1970, ACDP K160/3. For helpful advice and assistance regarding potential contacts in the Federal Republic (all in Frankfurt) from the DIHT to Birrenbach, intended for the latter's American "visitors"; potential avenues for cooperation but also existing competition between particular US and German firms; as well as concerns regarding the "active" promotion and favoring of the "unilateral interests" of American companies, see Dr. Meyer (DIHT) to KB, 18 March 1971, ACDP K210/1. For an example of Birrenbach's German political contacts being supplemented by economic interests, see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High Authority in the United Kingdom, London, to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2. Cammann expected to see Birrenbach at the annual assembly of the WVES on 15 May 1959 in Düsseldorf.

<sup>178</sup> KB to *Botschaftsrätin* Hava Bitan, Israeli Embassy, Bonn, 15 October 1973, ACDP K096/2.

friend.”<sup>179</sup> Birrenbach even adorned his personal library with photos of some of his eminent and admired contacts.<sup>180</sup> His correspondence is sprinkled with birthday wishes, gift-giving (often books), congratulations on special occasions, get-well wishes and the like.<sup>181</sup> This personal aspect of the Atlanticist network was promoted by the fact that, while I have to this point stressed formal institutions and functions, there was also a somewhat more casual and social side to its activities. In addition to conferences, study groups and the like, there were meetings of individuals or small groups in private homes, exclusive clubs, offices and hotels, sometimes on the periphery of conferences and other functions.<sup>182</sup> While Atlanticist policy and issues could hardly *not* be discussed amongst such individuals, it could be done in a different, more private setting where there was also a chance to eat a meal, chat and generally socialize. Birrenbach’s Düsseldorf home, to take just one example, was a place where visitors were able to not just discuss “business” but also to relax to a certain extent, perhaps out in the beautiful garden.<sup>183</sup>

In such an environment, it is not too surprising that occasionally these contacts and friendships and even Atlanticism in general became family affairs. Birrenbach’s own family was involved in this to only a limited extent. Thanks in part to the less formal aspects of some Atlanticist functions or meetings in which they were included, Ida

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<sup>179</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP K212/1. This was following Monnet’s death. In this same letter to Rostow, Birrenbach also mourned with respect to Monnet: “I lost a great friend.”

<sup>180</sup> KB to Alice Acheson, Washington DC, 14 November 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>181</sup> For Birrenbach thanking Müller-Armack for his successful efforts to obtain an honorary doctorate for Monnet from the University of Cologne, see KB to Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, *Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik* at the University of Cologne, 6 August 1969, ACDP K023/1.

<sup>182</sup> For instance, on the last evening of the *Atlantik-Brücke* conference in 1959, Birrenbach invited and gave a dinner “to” Henry Kissinger, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Gen. André Beaufre (France) in the Hotel Petersberg (KB to Kissinger, 28 May 1983, ACDP K146/3). In this same letter to Kissinger, Birrenbach pointed out that the hotel “since more than ten years cannot be financed by the federal government.”

<sup>183</sup> On the lunch to which George Ball invited Birrenbach on 9 November 1965 and the private discussion they had there on the side regarding the previous day’s meeting and so forth, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

Birrenbach, along with other wives, became a peripheral social element of the network. At least sometimes, Ida accompanied her husband on his trips to the United States.<sup>184</sup> Birrenbach's children were internationally minded, with his daughter, Irene, living for at least a time in England (near Marlow) with her husband and children, and his son, Thomas, living at times in New York City and Tehran, which he left around the time of the Iranian revolution in 1979, and marrying a Persian woman.<sup>185</sup> However, Thomas and Irene never became part of the German Atlanticist network in any notable, substantive way.<sup>186</sup> Meanwhile, other families became more involved. In some instances, Atlanticism became a multi-generational affair, as the children of Atlanticists, including of Germans such as Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen and Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim, joined and participated in the Atlanticist organizations and functions.<sup>187</sup>

For Birrenbach, operating within the Atlanticist network also meant interacting and dealing with the relatives of his American (and other foreign) contacts. As an example, he occasionally corresponded on a social level with the spouses of such contacts.<sup>188</sup> He assisted their children with their ventures in the Federal Republic, whether they involved business undertakings (John McCloy Jr.) or academic research (Eugene Rostow's son). Birrenbach also did his best to help his Atlanticist colleagues when they or their family members became ill. To cite probably the most notable example, during the long deterioration of Hajo Holborn's health, Birrenbach arranged for a financial support of DM 20,000 from the federal government for Holborn and his

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<sup>184</sup> This was the case, for instance, in 1974.

<sup>185</sup> KB to Ludwig Erhard, 19 July 1974, ACDP K190/2; KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP K212/1. As indicated, Birrenbach also became a grandfather. In December 1968, his daughter had her second baby (KB to Rodolfo Griesshaber, 10 March 1969, ACDP K048/2).

<sup>186</sup> About the most that can be said is that Birrenbach's daughter and son-in-law met socially with Bill Bass, one of Birrenbach's contacts and frequent correspondents, in England.

<sup>187</sup> For example, this was true of Falkenhausen's son, who followed his father into the *Atlantik-Brücke*.

<sup>188</sup> Including with the wives of Acheson, McCloy, Herter and especially Holborn (also the latter's sister).

family and attempted to facilitate the publication of Holborn's works in the Federal Republic.<sup>189</sup> Within the context of his Atlanticist activities, Birrenbach also encountered the children of his contacts within the Atlanticist organizations, for instance Christian Herter Jr. in the Atlantic Institute in the late 1960s, as well as in other settings, as when Holborn's son, a member of President Kennedy's White House staff, proved useful on Birrenbach's trips to the United States, for example in setting up meetings, and was eventually involved in the Kennedy Memorial Library project (see Chapter 7).

Having identified the major sources of Birrenbach's knowledge and expertise, it must be noted, however, that for someone considered an expert on the United States, his direct experiences with that country were remarkably narrow. Birrenbach never lived in the United States, indeed never visited it until he had reached quite an advanced age. At no point did he vacation in the United States, though, in addition to the Federal Republic, he did elsewhere abroad in Europe, including Britain. During his visits to the United States, never lasting more than two weeks at a time, he moved in rarefied circles, amongst the elite layers of society, staying at elite hotels, eating at elite establishments, and so on.<sup>190</sup> Many aspects of his trips, for instance the booking of hotel rooms, were arranged by his logistical support in the United States, whether it be the *Stahlunion* representation in New York City or the West German embassy in Washington DC. In other words, it does not seem that Birrenbach had very much to do with typical

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<sup>189</sup> See KB to Hajo Holborn, 21 November 1968, ACDP K098/1; KB to Fred Holborn, Washington DC, 24 October 1969, ACDP K098/1; KB to Dresdner Bank AG, 10 June 1980, ACDP K158/1; and KB to Karl Cornides, Vienna, 1 October 1970, ACDP K158/1. The DM 20,000 was paid into a *Treuhandkonto*. By all appearances, this sum came from the federal government though those responsible wished to remain nameless.

<sup>190</sup> While in Washington DC, Birrenbach often stayed at the Shoreham Hotel, the Watergate Hotel, the Statler Hilton Hotel, as well as at the Hotel Manger Hay or the Hotel Madison, in New York City for instance at the Waldorf-Astoria, the St. Regis or the Pierre Hotel. On his various trips, Birrenbach appears to have flown commercially, on such airlines as PanAm and Lufthansa. Birrenbach also stayed in elite lodgings and resorts on his vacations to Britain.

Americans. In spite of his own admonitions that to understand the foreign policy of a nation one had to take a holistic approach, it also appears that his attention and reading focused largely and specifically on that contemporary foreign policy, perhaps along with contemporary history to a certain extent. It does not appear, for instance, that he engaged with American popular culture or read much in the way of contemporary American literature. Similar observations can be made, sometimes even more emphatically, with regard to other regions of the world in which Birrenbach claimed expertise. These included the Middle East, where his knowledge was based on several brief trips, some reading and a limited number of contacts, and Latin America and the developing world in general, where it was based on his having lived “in countries like that” for “more than ten years,” but not on any significant, recent, in-depth, first-hand experience.<sup>191</sup>

Furthermore, in addition to being temporally, socially and intellectually rather limited, Birrenbach’s direct experience with the United States was also quite narrowly circumscribed geographically. His visits to the United States focused largely on two cities, New York and especially Washington. His American contacts remained concentrated amongst the traditional Northeastern elite. Like some of the Northeastern elites themselves, Birrenbach was alienated from and perhaps a bit contemptuous of that rather large part of the United States not located along the Northeastern seaboard.<sup>192</sup>

Some sense of this contempt can be gleaned from his remark in the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee in November 1976 regarding the origins of Jimmy Carter and

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<sup>191</sup> KB to Henry Owen, Deputy Counsellor and Chairman, Policy Planning Council, State Department, Washington DC, 31 October 1963, ACDP K157/1.

<sup>192</sup> For the culture shock experienced by some of these elites when they moved outside of the Northeast, see for instance Annemarie Holborn to KB, 25 May 1972, ACDP K158/1. Here, Hajo Holborn’s widow explained her troubles adjusting to the “Middle West,” where she found that people “consciously” distanced themselves from “the East” and considered it “strange” that she still read the *New York Times*.

Georgia: “That is really *Hinterpommern*. Nothing against Pomerania. I think very highly for instance of Fontane.”<sup>193</sup> Likewise, this contempt revealed itself when he compared the Midwest unfavorably to the “*geistig lebendigen* atmosphere” in New Haven (Yale) and equated living there with his own life in Argentina, as we have seen not a very flattering comparison.<sup>194</sup> While such limitations may not be especially surprising given the burden of his work and while they may not have been unusual even amongst foreign policy experts, they do raise the question of the extent to which Birrenbach truly understood, and sought to understand, the nature and “soul” of the United States.

While Birrenbach’s expertise served as the basis of his influence, his reliance on this foundation also evinced some major drawbacks for the expert himself. Birrenbach repeatedly professed a dislike for those who placed career considerations over an interest in the cause at stake and for the “politically very ambitious man who is just interested in the next higher post.”<sup>195</sup> Nevertheless, Birrenbach harbored some quite lofty career ambitions of his own, and it was due to his very lack of “party *Macht*” that the final hurdle in this regard remained insurmountable. This ultimate career prize that remained out of reach was the position to which Birrenbach had aspired from practically the very start: the post of Foreign Minister. He seems to have come tantalizingly close to achieving this goal on at least two occasions. Given their later stormy history, it is rather amazing that one such occasion was in 1962 with Adenauer still at the helm. Opposed to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder’s Atlanticist outlook and with a Grand Coalition

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<sup>193</sup> Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 9 November 1976, ACDP K135/3.

<sup>194</sup> KB to Mrs. Hajo Holborn, 6 June 1972, ACDP K158/1.

<sup>195</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 December 1975, ACDP K211/2. In this letter to Rostow, Birrenbach compared Donald Rumsfeld, the new US Secretary of Defense, unfavorably with his predecessor, the more knowledgeable and expert James Schlesinger. In such contexts, Birrenbach sometimes substituted the expression “ambitious politician.”



seeming to be a real possibility at the time, Adenauer may have been attracted by Birrenbach's relatively good relations to the Social Democrats and his reputation as a supporter of a non-partisan foreign policy. Meanwhile, Birrenbach's own strong Atlanticist views were clearly overlooked or not very well known yet, at least to the Chancellor. Several years later, Chancellor Erhard also considered appointing Birrenbach Foreign Minister, indeed Birrenbach believed that on the eve before the 1965 election it was practically a done deal. However, those "party people," various elements within the party, opposed to his appointment mustered strong resistance. In this instance, Birrenbach's lack of party *Macht*, his lack of contact with the party apparatus, for the diverse reasons already described, formed an insuperable obstacle to his ambitions. Like each of his predecessors though perhaps not as seriously, Chancellor Kiesinger would also consider, but ultimately decide against, naming Birrenbach Foreign Minister.<sup>196</sup>

#### E. The Domestic Framework for Birrenbach's Political Activities

While Birrenbach's expertise formed the basis of his influence, the framework in which he sought to exercise that influence evolved considerably over the years. One such element of this framework was the state of his relationships with those in power. Particularly significant in this regard were Birrenbach's relationships with the various Chancellors (and the key members of the *Bundeskanzleramt*). During the early 1960s, Birrenbach's relationship to Konrad Adenauer seems to have been reasonably solid. It was Adenauer who gave Birrenbach his first "special mission" to the United States in 1961 and, as we have noted, even considered appointing Birrenbach Foreign Minister. Birrenbach enjoyed at least some access to the Chancellor during this period. Following

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<sup>196</sup> On the Adenauer episode, see Daniel Koerfer, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987).

his trips abroad, for instance to Britain in 1960, he had “long and interesting” talks with Adenauer about the impressions he had gathered.<sup>197</sup> Especially the Adenauer friend and advisor Robert Pferdmenges, also to some extent personalities like Kai-Uwe von Hassel (CDU Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein), greatly assisted Birrenbach in gaining the ear of and establishing a positive relationship with the Chancellor.<sup>198</sup> That said, Birrenbach’s connection with Adenauer, even during the early 1960s, was not very close, and in no real sense did he serve as a regular advisor to the Chancellor.

However, this period of relative warmth would not last. The events surrounding the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963, an Élysée Treaty that Birrenbach perceived as having a disturbingly adverse potential given its apparently single-minded focus on continental Western Europe and especially on bilateral Franco-German consultation and collaboration, were the proximate occasion for the virtually complete collapse of Birrenbach’s relationship with Adenauer, though well before then fundamental differences over West German foreign policy had, of course, existed between the dedicated Atlanticist and the devoted *Abendländler*. Birrenbach and Adenauer now engaged in intense confrontations in the meetings of the *Unionsfraktion*, and by the meeting of 5 February 1963, Birrenbach was leading an Atlanticist-minded “*Fronde*” within the *Fraktion*.<sup>199</sup> By the time of the meeting at Adenauer’s vacation spot of

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<sup>197</sup> KB to E. Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 11 July 1960, ACDP K076/1.

<sup>198</sup> It was via Pferdmenges that Birrenbach asked Adenauer for a talk [*Besprechung*] in early 1959, an idea with which both Brentano and Erhard as well as Müller-Armack were in agreement (KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2). For Birrenbach and Pferdmenges together with Adenauer in Rhöndorf on the past Sunday in early July 1960, see KB to Brentano, 9 July 1960, ACDP K076/1 and KB to Erhard, Economics Minister, Vice Chancellor, 9 July 1960, ACDP K076/1. After their London trip in July 1960, Hassel encouraged Adenauer (who had already made an appointment with Birrenbach) and Hallstein (President of the EEC Commission) to talk with Birrenbach about his impressions from the trip (Hassel to KB, 8 July 1960, ACDP K076/1).

<sup>199</sup> For Birrenbach leading the “*Fronde*,” see KB to Albrecht Pickert, Chairman of the *Vorstand* of Hein, Lehmann and Co. AG, 11 February 1963, ACDP K011/1 and KB to Strausz-Hupé, 11 February 1963,

Cadenabbia (Italy), where the final version of an Atlanticist-oriented preamble was agreed upon on 4 April 1963, Birrenbach's relationship with Adenauer was "beyond miserable." Birrenbach did not even attend, since, as he put it, "I did not want to unnecessarily provoke the Chancellor by my presence."<sup>200</sup> In the wake of the preamble episode, Birrenbach would have no communication with Adenauer for several years until something of a thaw set in between the two in the twilight of the *Altkanzler's* life.<sup>201</sup>

Particularly in comparison to the final months of the Adenauer chancellorship, Birrenbach enjoyed considerably better relations with the two succeeding heads of government, the Chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger. In each case, Birrenbach functioned as something of an informal advisor on a wide variety of foreign policy issues, though whether the respective Chancellors could or even desired always to

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ACDP K011/1. The Atlanticists appear to have been clearly numerically superior within the *Fraktion* at this time. Nevertheless, Birrenbach initially stood virtually alone in January 1963 as the sharpest critic of the Élysée Treaty in its original form in the intra-Union debates, at first finding few open supporters (Erhard was also an opponent of the treaty), and he betrayed some bitterness about what he considered the timidity of many *Fraktion* members vis-à-vis Adenauer. For Birrenbach complaining that "[u]nfortunately, civil courage is not writ-large by us," see again KB to Strausz-Hupé, 11 February 1963, ACDP K011/1.

<sup>200</sup> Günther Patz, *Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik: Fallstudien zur politischen Bedeutung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976). In part, Birrenbach's decision not to go to Cadenabbia was based on his belief that since the *Fraktion* was already now in favor of the preamble and the text already stood firm, the most essential matters had already been dealt with. Nevertheless, a number of important Union and FDP deputies were present at Cadenabbia, and naturally SPD members of the *Bundestag*, along and largely in cooperation with their Union and FDP counterparts, also played a role in the emergence and triumph of the preamble. This preamble reaffirmed the Federal Republic's commitment to Atlantic cooperation, thus in some sense neutralizing the treaty, soothing the fears of the Americans and the *Bundestag* and setting narrow limits to de Gaulle's ambitions. The Élysée Treaty was ratified almost unanimously by the *Bundestag* on 16 May 1963. Ultimately, the CDU Atlanticists around Birrenbach, and also including personalities like Erhard, Brentano and Hermann Kopf, successfully asserted their ideas and conceptions and, in the process, also changed the SPD's mind regarding its original demand that the *Bundestag's* reservations have international legal effectiveness.

<sup>201</sup> For instance, on 7 February 1967, Birrenbach got a "surprising" call from Adenauer, who had heard that Birrenbach was responsible in the *Fraktion* for the "problems" of the NPT. At Adenauer's invitation, the two met the following day in Adenauer's office in the *Bundeshaus* so that Birrenbach, in a one-and-a-half hour talk, could present Adenauer with the difficulties and objectionable elements of the treaty (the Federal President had also spoken to Adenauer about such themes). While according to Birrenbach the former Chancellor "fully" agreed with him, Adenauer also hoped for support from the French side, which Birrenbach explained he himself did not expect (KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2).

translate his advice into action was another question altogether.<sup>202</sup> As already noted, Birrenbach undertook two “special missions” for and with the support of Erhard, one to Israel in March-April 1965 and the other to the United States in November 1965 (regarding the MLF and nuclear control), the latter in advance of and aiming to lay the groundwork for Erhard’s own trip in December.<sup>203</sup> While Birrenbach offered advice to Kiesinger on a broad range of foreign policy matters, the most distinctive element of this period was his prominent role with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.<sup>204</sup> With the Chancellor’s approval, Birrenbach advised and closely consulted with Kiesinger on the NPT, passed on information to the Chancellor with respect to the treaty and suggested possible courses of action to mold the treaty to suit the interests of the Federal Republic as he understood them.<sup>205</sup>

Other relationships that shaped Birrenbach’s influence and the framework in which he operated also experienced significant change over time. With regard to his valuable links to the government bureaucracy, the most important shift occurred in 1966. For Birrenbach, a Grand Coalition, which he had for some time considered “unavoidable” and, as earlier noted, had openly supported, came at an “enormous” price, including a turnover of personnel in the government bureaucracy that stretched well beyond the

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<sup>202</sup> For an example of Chancellor Kiesinger rejecting Birrenbach’s advice, here Birrenbach’s efforts (at McCloy’s request) and failure to convince Kiesinger to come to a “unified statement” with respect to community options (in the context of the NPT), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.

<sup>203</sup> Birrenbach’s *Sondermission* of November 1965 emerged from Chancellor Erhard contacting the US ambassador, George McGhee, with the request regarding Birrenbach’s desire for a meeting with the American administration and government departments regarding the MLF, a request then passed on by McGhee.

<sup>204</sup> On Birrenbach also advising Kiesinger about the harmonization of détente policy, in particular of arms control and disarmament policy, see KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 16 May 1967, ACDP K139/2.

<sup>205</sup> For instance, KB, MdB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, NPT, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach’s advising of and for one of Birrenbach’s discussions with Kiesinger regarding the NPT, which in this case lasted fifty minutes during a walk in the park of the Palais Schaumburg, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2.

cabinet level.<sup>206</sup> With the installation of the Grand Coalition imminent, Birrenbach accurately predicted that the *Auswärtige Amt*, to take one pivotal example, would undergo a “profound change.” Personalities like State Secretary Karl Carstens, whom Birrenbach especially liked and valued, would have to depart: “I think with horror of the people who will replace figures of his rank.” While Birrenbach acknowledged that the Union was in a sorry condition and that he himself had endorsed the idea of a Grand Coalition, he also complained that “the situation does not justify, in my opinion, giving the SPD the entire foreign, *Deutschland*, European and development policy.”<sup>207</sup> The impact of such developments within the ministries on Birrenbach’s activities should not be exaggerated. Regarding the NPT, for instance, Birrenbach maintained contact during the Grand Coalition not just with Kiesinger but also with Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder and Research Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, passing on information, pointing out problems, and offering advice and suggestions. Nevertheless, aside from the reassuring presence of Kiesinger as Chancellor, Birrenbach was essentially accurate in his assessment that he henceforth found himself with no true *Gesprächspartnern* in the government, a new and “painful” situation after years of intensive cooperation with particular individuals in the various ministries.<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> KB to Edith Willick, c/o West German Embassy, Pretoria, South African Republic, 12 December 1966, ACDP K047/3.

<sup>207</sup> KB to Hajo Holborn, 2 December 1966, ACDP K098/1.

<sup>208</sup> KB to Edith Willick, c/o West German Embassy, Pretoria, South African Republic, 12 December 1966, ACDP K047/3. Regarding Birrenbach’s talks with Foreign Minister Brandt and *Wissenschaftsminister* Stoltenberg, to whom he presented problems regarding the NPT (with Stoltenberg demonstrating his understanding), see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. On the essential coincidence of Birrenbach’s views with those of Minister Stoltenberg with respect to the “peaceful use of nuclear energy” (NPT) but also for Birrenbach’s criticisms of the “not acceptable” cabinet submission [*Vorlage*] of Foreign Minister Brandt regarding the NPT, see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 June 1969, ACDP K023/1. On Birrenbach’s disappointment at Foreign Minister Brandt’s failure to press hard enough for improvements to the NPT, something that he believed undermined the German position, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. For Birrenbach being in contact with the responsible *Referat* in the AA with respect to American

On top of this, the accession to power of the Social-Liberal government coalition under Willy Brandt in 1969 radically altered Birrenbach's relationship to the Chancellery and, consequently, the framework of his activities. Despite the fact that Brandt was a fellow Atlanticist, as was his successor Helmut Schmidt, Birrenbach's advice would never again be as welcome in the Chancellery as it had been under Erhard and Kiesinger.<sup>209</sup> Unlike his idol John McCloy, Birrenbach never truly succeeded in becoming a "Wise Man" whose counsel was valued throughout the political spectrum. Largely due to this change in governing coalition, Birrenbach's political influence within the executive declined precipitously from the late 1960s onward. Birrenbach found himself invited less and less to the state receptions for heads of government and other prominent foreign figures, a fact not merely symbolic but also substantive and about which he complained as hindering his ability to obtain an accurate impression of such visitors.<sup>210</sup> Beyond Birrenbach's weak personal relations with the SPD Chancelleries, the Union's overall loss of power in 1969 dealt a significant blow to his influence and left him with a new sense of impotence. Birrenbach seethed as the government, presenting

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foreign policy prior to his trip to Washington, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1. On Birrenbach receiving insight in December 1965 from Richard Balken (AA), thanks to Foreign Minister Schroeder, into the memo that the *Auswärtige Amt* had prepared on the control of nuclear weapons for the Chancellor's upcoming visit to Washington in that month (Birrenbach read the paper in Balken's presence) and offering advice on that memo, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach giving advice, based on the experiences of his last trip to the United States in this context, to Carstens regarding the content of the aide-mémoire prepared by the AA for Erhard's visit of December 1965 for the American President (MLF), see again KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1.

<sup>209</sup> For Birrenbach's earlier assessment of Brandt as one of the members of the moderate wing of the SPD, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2.

<sup>210</sup> On Birrenbach having been invited at times to Chancellor Adenauer's functions, which often enabled him to meet with foreign visitors, for instance an American delegation at an Adenauer meal in June 1962, see KB to Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 June 1962, ACDP K157/1. Likewise, with Kiesinger in power, Birrenbach was also invited to important functions, for instance to an intimate dinner given for President Nixon (on a trip to the Federal Republic, including Bonn and Berlin) in Bonn in the *Bundeskanzleramt* in February 1969 in which only ten German and eight American personalities took part (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2).

itself as the monolithic voice of a secure majority in the Federal Republic (particularly with respect to the *Ostverträge*), prematurely signed and ratified unsatisfactory treaties (*Ostverträge* and NPT) while ignoring his and his party's efforts to improve them by clearing up open points and securing reasonable interpretations. As Birrenbach put it to some of his American contacts, "since we are only the opposition and in a minority, we cannot force the government to do what they do not want to do."<sup>211</sup> Therefore, 1969 marked a key date in Birrenbach's political career, with the election defeat of 1972 only confirming this particular aspect of his declining influence that had first emerged three years earlier.

However, Birrenbach's declining influence can be traced not only to shifts in his relationship with the country's executive or to his party's exile from power but also to an important change in another element of the framework in which he operated: his relations with his own party and *Fraktion*. The straining of Birrenbach's relationships with the

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<sup>211</sup> For this quote, expressed specifically with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see KB to Robert Bowie, 10 December 1973, ACDP K160/2. On all this, including Birrenbach's outsider criticism of the Brandt government with respect to its treatment of the NPT and the *Ostpolitik*, see KB to Prof. Eugene Rostow, Vice Chairman, The Atlantic Council of the United States of America, Washington DC, 14 September 1973, ACDP K211/2. For Birrenbach depicting his concerns to Brandt in November 1969 regarding the NPT, see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. On the Brandt government's success in having "shammed" [*vorgespiegelt*] the world into believing it had a secure domestic majority with regard to its *Ostpolitik*, see KB to Herbert Sulzbach, 10 April 1972, ACDP K068/1. On Birrenbach's frustration regarding the government's failure to inform or consult the opposition about the details and the government's actions with respect to the ongoing negotiations about a Berlin Agreement, see KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2 and KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach's efforts to explain in his September 1972 talk with Chayes the *Ostpolitik* of a future CDU government, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1. On Birrenbach's efforts to call the attention of "Mr. K." and "Mr. S." in the White House (probably Kissinger and James Sutterlin) and several officials in the State Department to the fact that the federal government since the spring of 1972 disposed of no majority in the *Bundestag* and, following the dissolution of the *Bundestag*, was merely a "geschäftsführende government" and to the undemocratic way ("contradicting all democratic principles") in which an incoming government would be prejudiced by the current government's "completely irresponsible" conclusion of international treaties, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.

leaders of the party and *Fraktion* and the concomitant rapid decline of his influence within the party became most noticeable in the wake of the debates surrounding the *Ostpolitik* in the spring of 1972. Indeed his central role in the ultimately successful efforts during these debates to bring the party to abstain from voting on, rather than approving, the *Ostverträge* proved to be pivotal in hastening this process and determining his fate within the party. Fearing an irreversible split of the party into two parts, a disaster that would render it impotent as a political force in the future, Birrenbach, working together with Walter Hallstein and Werner Marx, saw to it at the crucial moment that the party largely abstained. As he proudly put it, “I am one of the three fathers of this idea.”<sup>212</sup>

Whatever Birrenbach’s satisfaction in achieving this end, his relationship with the leaders in the *Unionsfraktion* took a turn for the worse in the wake of these events. Prior to this, Rainer Barzel, chairman of the *Fraktion*, had asked Birrenbach for his opinions on various matters, though Birrenbach also complained that he had not usually acted on them.<sup>213</sup> Now, Birrenbach’s relations with Barzel, who had been pushing in spring 1972

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<sup>212</sup> KB to Lord Gladwyn, 20 May 1972, ACDP K068/1. Birrenbach based his assessment on the situation within the Union, including its party *Gremien* and the parliamentary group. Birrenbach’s own rejection of the *Ostverträge* was based on his assessment that certain elements within the party were overestimating the value of the resolution proposed by the SPD-FDP government (including the Union’s top party committee, the *Bundsvorstand*, which voted “yes” to the treaties). Birrenbach had a distinct tendency to detect, perhaps to overestimate, the likelihood of party divisions. For Birrenbach’s concern on an earlier occasion about the party’s unity, this time with respect to European issues such as integration, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>213</sup> For instance, earlier on, Birrenbach had provided Barzel with his judgment of successive NPT drafts (including those of 24 August 1967 and 18 January 1968), noting improvements but also continuing to harbor serious objections and seeking further improvements through changes to the draft itself or through supplementary measures, regulations and interpretations. Birrenbach’s continuing to wield some measure of influence within the party during the early 1970s is evidenced, for instance, by his “special missions” abroad in 1971-72, his regular participation in the *Ostkommision* and his prominent role in the debates regarding the *Ostpolitik* and the NPT. On Barzel specifically asking Birrenbach for his opinion at times on certain matters, including in connection with speeches, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Bonn, 15 October 1971, ACDP K024/1. For Barzel’s request that Birrenbach dictate several sentences for a press conference intended for the Western allies, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Weidmannsruh, Braunlage/Harz, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU and



with apparently considerable success for the party to approve the *Ostverträge*, lay in ruins.<sup>214</sup> As one of the architects of the policy of abstention and always bereft of a party *Macht*, Birrenbach's influence declined even further than hitherto as the Union's election defeat later in November 1972 was blamed by many on the party's failure to take a stand, for or against, on the *Ostverträge*. Although Barzel soon departed, Birrenbach found that his successors Karl Carstens (Chairman of the *Fraktion*) and Helmut Kohl (Chairman of the CDU) barely had any time for him and were not particularly interested in his opinions on the issues of the day, whether foreign policy or matters like *Mitbestimmung*.<sup>215</sup> With respect to the latter issue, Birrenbach, who given his role in the *Wirtschaft* considered himself the most experienced person in this regard in the *Fraktion*, felt particularly slighted that he was not placed on any of the relevant commissions addressing that issue at the time.<sup>216</sup> During this period and beyond, Birrenbach, feeling increasingly powerless, stooped to painfully undignified depths to explicitly remind others of his still extant connections in the United States, while unintentionally serving primarily to reveal

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Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 22 March 1972, ACDP K026/1. Finally, for Barzel still asking Birrenbach for his assessment of a paper by Heinrich Böx (CDU) about the relationship of the CDU to the political groupings in France, see KB, MdB, dictated by phone from Oberstdorf, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 22 August 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>214</sup> In spring 1972, prior to the intervention of Birrenbach, Marx and Hallstein and with the final vote fast approaching, Barzel had even achieved that the Union's top party committee, the *Bundesvorstand*, voted to approve the treaties thanks to the resolution proposed by the government.

<sup>215</sup> Birrenbach welcomed the change in the party leadership, for although Carstens was "harder" than Barzel, "a more constructive rethinking [*Neuüberdenkung*] of our position" in the changed situation would be possible while avoiding the "progressivism [*Progressivität*] of certain people" like Walther Leisler Kiep (KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD, USA, 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1).

<sup>216</sup> For Birrenbach's earlier complaints that the circle within the CDU dealing with *Mitbestimmung* had not been hitherto large enough, all the more galling to him as he had long ("concrete", "not theoretical") experiences, "stretching over almost two decades," in *mitbestimmten* firms, see KB, MdB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Thomas Ruf, MdB, Chairman of the Program Commission of the CDU on the *Mitbestimmung* Question, 8 October 1970, ACDP K025/1.

his despair about his current plight.<sup>217</sup> While Birrenbach remained in the *Bundestag* until 1976, his role on the West German political stage was not a major one after 1972.

#### F. Distinctive Elements of Birrenbach's Political Activity

Birrenbach's busy everyday existence was largely occupied with fulfilling his duties in his various professions. At the Thyssen firm and the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, his activity consisted primarily of intermittent meetings and the necessary, often intense, preparation for them.<sup>218</sup> In addition to his house and his business office, both located in Düsseldorf, Birrenbach maintained a political office in the *Bundeshaus* in Bonn, where he generally dealt with his political affairs. Birrenbach traveled between the two cities by car, a journey eased somewhat by the services of a driver. In the *Bundestag*, Birrenbach participated in many of the standard elements of parliamentary life: committee and plenary meetings, reports and speeches, discussions and debates, question periods, resolutions, votes and the like.<sup>219</sup> However, aside from these typical affairs, Birrenbach also engaged in a number of distinctive political activities that ultimately formed key elements of and lent a particular character to his political existence. One such activity was his regular communication with his contacts both at home and abroad. Especially noteworthy in this regard was his prolific writing of letters, each of which was dispatched

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<sup>217</sup> For Birrenbach reminding others of the alleged state of his contacts in the US, see for instance KB to Dr. Dieter Spethmann, Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the ATH AG, Düsseldorf, August Thyssen Straße 1, personal-confidential, 1 July 1974, ACDP K184/1. For Birrenbach passing on to German personalities simple "thank you" letters and letters expressing a desire to see him from his American contacts, see for example Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, to Kurt, 28 July 1975, KB cc Carstens, Marx and Trebesch, ACDP K155/1.

<sup>218</sup> On Birrenbach's professional burdens and on November as a particularly difficult month due to *Aufsichtsrat* meetings and member assemblies at home and abroad, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2.

<sup>219</sup> Birrenbach's key *Bundestag* speeches included those of 12 November 1969 (in the name of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion in the NPT debate) and of 29 January 1971 (on the attitude of the West towards the *Ostpolitik*). For an example of interpellations [*Anfragen*] composed by Birrenbach, here about the *Ostpolitik*, see KB to West German Ambassador Horst Osterheld, Santiago, Chile, 3 November 1970, ACDP K025/1.

to one or more contacts. Usually dictated by Birrenbach and typed up by a secretary, these missives, aside from a few polite niceties, generally avoided “fluff,” instead coming to the point and, often rather dryly, addressing the major issues at hand.<sup>220</sup> In this correspondence, Birrenbach aimed to strike a balance between frankness and sincerity, while remaining tactful and not offending the national feelings of others.<sup>221</sup>

Birrenbach’s trips abroad, particularly to the United States, represented another extraordinary element of his political activity. These trips included the five *Sondermissionen* that he carried out from 1961 to 1972, primarily to the United States (October 1961, November 1965, September 1968, Fall 1971-Spring 1972) but also to Israel (three separate trips, March-April 1965) and in Western Europe (Fall 1971-Spring 1972).<sup>222</sup> These missions were undertaken, at least ostensibly, at the behest of the

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<sup>220</sup> It appears these letters were dictated by Birrenbach in German, and, if necessary, translated by an assistant into the necessary foreign language, usually English, sometimes French. In general this process seems to have worked quite well, although there were consistent, sometimes substantive, errors in translation, for instance the repeated rendering of the German “sensibel” into the English “sensible,” rather than its proper translation as “sensitive,” as well as the use of “interfere” instead of “intervene.”

<sup>221</sup> However, Birrenbach could indeed be blunt and tactless at times in his letters. See, for instance, KB to Frau Prof. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. On Birrenbach’s efforts to demonstrate understanding for American policies, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. For Birrenbach’s professed, though certainly not always practiced, belief that, as a foreigner, he did not have the right to pass judgement on personalities and events in the United States, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. For Birrenbach’s stress on the need to express criticism or objections in “polite form” when dealing with talk partners so as to maintain good links (here on his September 1972 talk with the American Chayes), see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>222</sup> Birrenbach’s *Ostpolitik* mission of 1971-72 involved visits to no less than eight Western capitals. His earlier mission to Israel encompassed meetings in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv and involved negotiations with the Israeli government, including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister Golda Meir. After the carrying out of this Israel mission, Birrenbach maintained contacts with leading Israeli personalities, according to him at least up to, but seemingly beyond, the middle of the 1970s (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1). Following his Israel mission, Birrenbach also served at times as an advisor for the BDI (Cologne) on Israel. For example, in 1971, Birrenbach produced a report for the BDI on foreign investment in Israel, in which he concluded that Israel enjoyed the suitable preconditions for foreign investment and that, on the basis of the advantages offered by that country, the West German side should find ways and means to promote Israeli exports (KB Report, “Zur Förderung ausländischer Investitionen in Israel,” 1 July 1971, ACDP K096/1). In March 1976, Birrenbach accompanied a delegation of the BDI led by its president (and Thyssen giant), Hans-Günther Sohl, on a one-week stay in Israel at the invitation of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and with the support of the West

government and with the approval of the respective Chancellors, with the exception of the mission of 1971-72, which was embarked upon in the name of Birrenbach's party and with Barzel's approval.<sup>223</sup> On these *Sondermissionen*, Birrenbach met principally with key personalities in government, the governmental bureaucracy and the major political parties in the particular countries.<sup>224</sup> Contrary to some misconceptions, these missions usually did not entail negotiations *per se* rather were intended to ascertain foreign views

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German government (the first visit of an expert group of the BDI had occurred in 1966). This trip took place against the backdrop of closer Israeli ties to the EEC, including the conclusion of an EEC-Israeli free trade agreement. The delegation met with personalities of the Israeli government and "*Wirtschaft*" on themes such as the current situation and development of the Israeli economy, Israeli proposals for future cooperation, the Israeli desire for a contribution of West German industry to the restructuring of the country's economy, and the Israeli interest in increased direct investment in industry and tourism on the part of the German *Wirtschaft*. The delegation conducted its talks in close coordination with the West German embassy. Talk partners of the delegation primarily included Prime Minister Rabin and a number of other relevant government ministers and officials; the presidents of the major Israeli economic organizations; individuals from the chemical, aircraft and "*Gewerkschaftsunternehmen*" branches; and the president of the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Aside from the plenary meetings, some individual members of the delegation also held separate meetings on the branch or firm level. Not least due to the customs preferences granted to Israel for the American market and the free trade agreement with the EEC, both sides claimed to see the future possibility for expanded German-Israeli trade and for production within Israel (Report of the Israel Delegation of the BDI, March 1976, ACDP K096/2).

<sup>223</sup> While Birrenbach accurately stressed that these missions were undertaken at the behest of (or, alternatively, were for or ultimately given by; "*im Auftrag von*") the respective Chancellors (Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger) or party leaders (Barzel in the case of the *Ostpolitik* mission of 1971-2), in fact it was often Birrenbach himself who provided the initiative, who first suggested and promoted the utility of such undertakings, for instance to Foreign Minister Brentano in 1961, and occasionally even prodded these leaders, particularly Barzel in 1971-72, into giving him their blessing for such endeavors.

<sup>224</sup> The reference here to the governmental bureaucracy includes, for instance, the US State Department. Birrenbach's November 1965 and September 1968 missions were to Washington DC. On his mission to the United States of November 1965, Birrenbach had talks (the key one on Monday, 8 November) with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy (the leader of the European Section in the State Department). During this mission, he also saw Paul Nitze (Secretary of the Navy) and John McNaughton (Nitze's successor as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) as well as his most important colleagues. On Birrenbach's September 1968 mission to the United States, he spoke with Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Ambassador to the UN George Ball, the heads of the State Department, even with President Johnson. Later, on his visit to Paris as part of his extended *Ostpolitik* mission of 1971-72, Birrenbach conducted talks with significant personalities from a variety of French political groupings: Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann (UDR); Jean Lecanuet (President of the CD and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee) and his key colleagues (including some in the parliament), with some of whom Birrenbach was in correspondence; General Secretary Jean Poudevigne (PDM); General Secretary Michel Poniatoski (RI) (Birrenbach had an invitation to see Giscard d'Estaing but could not accept since he had to leave Paris, the talk with Poniatoski serving as something of a substitute); and General Secretary René Tomasini (UDR). Birrenbach found the UDR, the group of the Rue de Lille, "difficult."

on particularly urgent international issues and situations while expressing German views and concerns on the same. The central matters addressed included: the Berlin Wall (October 1961); nuclear issues and control, primarily in the context of the MLF (November 1965); the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (September 1968); and the Brandt *Ostpolitik* (Spring 1971-Fall 1972).<sup>225</sup> Again, the lone exception to this characterization was Birrenbach's mission to Israel, in which he actually negotiated, within strict limits imposed on him by the government, and thus helped pave the way for the establishment of West German-Israeli diplomatic relations and the simultaneous replacement of German weapons supplies by other forms of aid.<sup>226</sup> While not always

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<sup>225</sup> The occasional misconceptions regarding the nature of these missions among some observers in the Anglo-Saxon world was perhaps due to the ambiguity of the German word *Verhandlungen* when translated into English. On his mission of November 1965, Birrenbach consulted with members of the American administration and State Department to sound out the remaining solutions with respect to nuclear questions (Birrenbach arguing, for instance, in favor of the Federal Republic's participation in all phases of the nuclear decision making process) and thus to lay the groundwork for progress in this area in advance of Chancellor Erhard's trip in December. For Birrenbach himself actually focusing during his stay in Washington DC in November 1965 not on the MLF nor the ANF but rather on "a different type of weapon system that already existed," see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. Birrenbach's September 1968 mission stemmed from the Warsaw Pact intervention in Prague and aimed at a discussion with "the responsible American statesmen" about a number of "widespread" fears. In particular, there was concern that the Warsaw Pact could again carry out a similar operation from a standstill in a conflict over Berlin or in order to solve domestic political tensions within the East Bloc through a "blitz attack" on the northern flank of NATO and the Federal Republic. Also, there were concerns that the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia might elsewhere trigger "an explosive development à la Hungary," for instance in Poland, which could lead to a situation that was "unpredictable [*unübersehbar*]" (KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2). Repeatedly, Birrenbach used these special missions to prod the Americans towards firm action and an increased engagement in Europe, especially on behalf of the Federal Republic, and to facilitate what he considered progress in German-American relations. On the issue of nuclear control, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) and Helga Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-67* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>226</sup> On Birrenbach having received instructions regarding the Israel negotiations from the AA in Bonn (State Secretary Rolf Lahr) and having also telegraphed detailed reports (with the accompanying Rolf Pauls of the AA) back to Bonn, see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 March 1966, regarding German-Israeli negotiations about economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, confidential (cc: Amb. Pauls), 7 March 1966, ACDP K017/1. For an example of Birrenbach's inability to make personal commitments in the context of his Israel negotiations and his need therefore to interrupt the negotiations to return to the Federal Republic, see KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1. Even prior to his Israel mission, Birrenbach believed that the Federal Republic should carry out an equal policy, namely not to supply weapons or similar aid at all, with respect to the entire area in the Middle East that found itself at war, including Israel (KB to Prof D. Helmut Gollwitzer, DD, Berlin, 14 December 1964,

pleased with his findings or the ultimate outcomes, Birrenbach was undeniably effective in these *Sondermissionen*.<sup>227</sup> Of all his activities, these episodes garnered him the most public attention during his career, and their centrality in his own mind is reflected in that his detailed accounts of them formed the core of his later memoirs.<sup>228</sup>

More frequent, though less celebrated, were Birrenbach's regular trips to the United States, another key element of his political activity. Birrenbach undertook his

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ACDP K014/2). On German-Jewish relations, see Michael Wolffsohn, *Eternal Guilt? Forty Years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Inge Deutschkron, *Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition* (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1970); and Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

<sup>227</sup> For instance, Birrenbach was ultimately disappointed with the results of Chancellor Erhard's visit to President Johnson in December 1965. Ignoring his advice, the German government had insisted on a pure "Eigentum solution," something that appeared unrealistic to Birrenbach. At least in part an effort to satisfy the Federal Republic after the failure of an MLF, the Nuclear Planning Group, while "significant [beachtlich] and interesting," was less than that for which Birrenbach had hoped (KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Associate Director of Research, FPRI, 29 January 1974, ACP K184/1). Birrenbach was also dismayed, though not surprised, with his findings in Fall 1971-Spring 1972 regarding the attitudes of the Western nations towards the *Ostpolitik*. For Birrenbach already in December 1970 having expressed "our deep disappointment at the attitude of the West, particularly in Europe, vis-à-vis the policy [Ostpolitik] of the Federal Republic," see KB to Dean Acheson, 17 February 1971, ACDP K155/3. In the wake of Birrenbach's negotiations in Israel, discrepancies emerged between the Israeli and Birrenbach accounts of what exactly had been agreed upon in certain instances, particularly what aid Birrenbach had or had not promised Israel. These discrepancies, which created some confusion in the *Auswärtigen Amt*, revolved around the disputed authenticity of protocols presented by the Israelis which they, including Amb. Asher Ben-Natan, insisted were accurate but which Birrenbach had hitherto neither seen nor initialled and claimed gave a false or inaccurate account of his statements. According to Birrenbach, his account had been confirmed over the phone by Amb. Rolf Pauls, who had accompanied him on his mission (KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, 24 March 1966, regarding German-Israeli negotiations about economic aid, ACDP K017/1 and KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to State Secretary Rolf Lahr, AA, Bonn, confidential, (cc Amb. Pauls), 7 March 1966, ACDP K017/1). On Birrenbach's assessment of his Israel mission as a success, citing in particular the treaty between the Federal Republic and Israel later in 1965 that contained his proposal to the Israelis during his mission of a replacement of weapon supplies by economic aid and the assumption by the American government, two months after the conclusion of his negotiations, of the weapons supplies to Israel (without Birrenbach's name being mentioned), see KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1. When Birrenbach had first arrived in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Foreign Minister Golda Meir had insisted on the carrying out of the weapons payments by the Federal Republic. However, in the end, Eshkol and Meir thanked Birrenbach for his conduct of the negotiations by giving him a clay jug from the Valley of the Kings dating from the 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C. For private positive assessments of Birrenbach's key meeting (8 November 1965) and of Birrenbach's effective performance in presenting the West German standpoint in that meeting on his *Sondermission* of November 1965 from Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Undersecretary of State George Ball, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On Birrenbach's satisfaction with his contribution to developments through his *Sondermission* of September 1968, see KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2.

<sup>228</sup> Kurt Birrenbach, *Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984).

first such trip in 1959, and throughout the 1960s and well into the 1970s these visits, each lasting usually one to two weeks, were scheduled for once or twice a year. Given the difficulty of squeezing such a stay into his crowded schedule, Birrenbach often combined them with his participation in various Atlanticist functions, for instance undertaking his initial 1959 trip in conjunction with his attendance at that year's NATO Parliamentarians Conference in Washington.<sup>229</sup> While on these trips, Birrenbach met for talks with crucial high-level American personalities influential in the pressing issues of European-American relations: figures in the White House (including the President on several occasions); cabinet; government bureaucracy; Congress; non-governmental foreign policy institutions (e.g. Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings Institution); press; and a number of "independent" personalities.<sup>230</sup> Birrenbach also met with West German representatives located in the United States, including the personnel at the German

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<sup>229</sup> On the difficulty of fitting such a trip into his schedule, see KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1. Other examples of Birrenbach combining attendance at Atlanticist functions with his America trips and political talks include his attendance at the Bilderberg Conference in Williamsburg in 1964; his participation in the German-American Conference in the United States in Spring 1967; and his "*Blitzreise*" of several days (planned for a total of three days) to the United States in connection with the Trilateral Commission ExComm meeting of December 1974 in Washington DC.

<sup>230</sup> As an example of talks with the US President, Birrenbach had a meeting with Nixon on his *Blitzreise* to Washington in the first week of February 1969. This trip, with which Birrenbach pronounced himself "very satisfied," came about as a result of a rather lengthy memo he had sent to soon-to-be National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in the middle of December 1968 (KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, Philadelphia, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2). Within the government bureaucracy, Birrenbach especially took up contact with personalities in the State Department. Birrenbach's trip to the United States of Spring 1967 provides a list of conversation partners (among others) typical for Birrenbach on such visits: Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow; National Security Advisor Walt Rostow; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy; Deputy Director of the US ACDA Adrian Fischer (representing the absent director, William Foster); Samuel De Palma (Foster's closest colleague in the ACDA); Prof. Robert Bowie (serving as a consultant at the time in the State Department); Alfred Puhon (Director of the State Department's Office of German Affairs); Henry Owen (Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council); Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; John McNaughton (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs); and Francis Bator (Deputy National Security Advisor, "White House Europe-Referent"). For Birrenbach discussing current American foreign policy in Washington with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter Stoessel (Martin Hillenbrand's successor); and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Russell Fessenden, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.

embassy (Washington) and consulate (New York, UN), as well as with those Germans representing international organizations, such as the deputy chief of the delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Washington, Curt Heidenreich.<sup>231</sup> Many of the Americans and Germans that Birrenbach held talks with were already regular contacts, which naturally facilitated the entire process. As already noted, these trips centered on Washington and New York City. Symbolic of the private element in German-American relations, the latter was a valuable destination not only because of the location of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany and the West German consulate but also the presence of so many “inners and outers” currently working in the private sector.<sup>232</sup>

To carry out these regular trips to the United States, Birrenbach usually relied on considerable organizational and logistical assistance. To some extent, this support was provided by private sources. In particular, president Günther Drechsler and the other personnel of the Thyssen/Stahlunion office, located in the Empire State Building, considerably aided Birrenbach, particularly with respect to his time in New York City.<sup>233</sup> However, Birrenbach also received significant organizational and logistical assistance from a number of governmental sources. These included the personnel of the West German embassy in Washington DC and the West German government in Bonn, among them important figures in the *Auswärtigen Amt* and other relevant ministries.<sup>234</sup> In

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<sup>231</sup> The West German representatives he met with included the Ambassador and the *Gesandten* for particular questions at the United Nations.

<sup>232</sup> Even when technically out of government, figures like John McCloy remained in contact with and influential in Washington.

<sup>233</sup> See, for instance, KB to LR Erich Straetling, West German Embassy, Washington DC, 22 October 1963, ACDP K157/1. Thyssen Inc. in New York City was the subsidiary [*Tochtergesellschaft*] of the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG.

<sup>234</sup> Birrenbach also received organizational and logistical assistance from the West German embassy in London with respect to his trips to Britain, though he of course made significantly less intense use of that



addition to these German sources, a number of American sources provided Birrenbach with valuable logistical and organizational support, including the State Department in Washington DC and the American embassy in Bonn. Thanks to this organizational network, both German and American, private and public, Birrenbach received essential assistance and advice in regards to his trips, his typically intensive preparation for them, determining the most auspicious timing for such ventures, briefings about the current situation, selecting and booking lodgings, identifying suitable and available talk partners in the variety of relevant governmental and non-governmental fields, actually arranging appointments with key personalities, carrying out necessary communications (for instance via telex), and the payment of debts and expenses incurred.<sup>235</sup> Without such logistical support, Birrenbach's trips to the United States would have been considerably

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embassy in this regard than the American one. Birrenbach notified the German embassies about his trips and informed them about the talks he carried out on them. This was, for instance, the case with regard to Ambassador von Herwarth and Birrenbach's trip to London in November 1958, during which he talked with British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Defence Minister Duncan Sandys and Paymaster General Reginald Maudling (KB, Düsseldorf, to Economics Minister Erhard, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2 and KB, Düsseldorf, to Foreign Minister Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2).<sup>235</sup> For *Legationsrat* Erich Straetling among the embassy personnel in Washington DC that worked in conjunction with Birrenbach to prepare his trips, see KB to Straetling, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1. On Birrenbach postponing his trip to the start of 1965, in part so that he could get an overview of how the new administration would look, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 12 October 1964, ACDP K014/2. For Birrenbach being received on 8 November 1965 in the presence of Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knappstein by Secretary of State Dean Rusk for a joint talk with the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, in which on the American side Under Secretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy also took part, see Telegram of the German Embassy in Washington DC (sent by Knappstein and Birrenbach) of 9 November 1965 to the Foreign Minister (with the request it be presented also to the Chancellor and Defense Minister von Hassel), ACDP K090/1. On the energetic support Birrenbach received with respect to his *Sondermission* to the United States of November 1965, especially in his preparation for the visit, from Ambassador Knappstein and *Botschaftsrat* von Staden and on their accompanying him to his key talk of 8 November 1965, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For Birrenbach sending his reports (both dated 9 November 1965) of the content of his key talk (on Monday, 8 November) during his November 1965 *Sondermission* via the German embassy in Washington to Chancellor Erhard, see again KB to Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. The German embassy also made a secret report regarding Birrenbach's special mission in Washington DC in November 1965. For an example of the State Department helping to arrange appointments, see KB to Scott George, Director, Office of Central European Affairs, Washington DC, 22 February 1974, ACDP K184/1. With respect to assistance from the London embassy regarding trips to Britain, see KB to West German Ambassador Karl-Günther von Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1.

more difficult, perhaps even impossible, to orchestrate in the form in which they were actually undertaken.

A number of other factors enabled Birrenbach to carry out his Atlanticist political activities in the manner he did. One of these was the rapid advance in technology, particularly in the realms of transportation and communication. With regard to the former, especially the progress achieved in air transport rendered it increasingly possible for somebody like Birrenbach to travel rapidly, safely and relatively cheaply back and forth across the Atlantic, as well as within Europe. With respect to communications, the telephone enabled him to stay in close touch with his various contacts, particularly those currently in Europe, but also those in the United States when he was himself there on a visit. On some particularly urgent occasions, Birrenbach made trans-Atlantic phone calls to his contacts in the United States.<sup>236</sup> For the transmission of vital information and requests in either direction across the Atlantic, the telex machine (telegraph/cable) was also extremely useful. As we have already noted, radio and television provided Birrenbach with access to speeches and news from around the globe almost

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<sup>236</sup> For trans-Atlantic phone calls both ways between Birrenbach and McCloy, the latter in Connecticut, regarding urgent NPT matters, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. Likewise, Birrenbach also called McCloy in New York City in 1966 with respect to the NPT. On Birrenbach calling the White House in the first week of May 1972 at Barzel's request to inform Kissinger of the West German opposition's efforts, together with the government, to find a solution to the *Ostpolitik* issue "in view of the existing stalemate" and "our" intention of rejecting the treaties if the USSR would not agree to a binding treaty interpretation in the desired sense (the message was passed on to Kissinger since he was in meetings of the Security Council about the "Vietnam crisis"), see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1. For an example of Birrenbach speaking with "people" in the United States via phone during a "crisis" situation, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2. With respect to phone conversations within the United States, Birrenbach might, and did, for instance call at times from New York to Robert Strausz-Hupé in Philadelphia. Within Europe, Birrenbach spoke by phone with his West German contacts and with Europeans like Monnet as well as with American contacts currently visiting or located in Europe. For an example of such intra-European communication, see KB Phone Conversation with Wilhelm Haferkamp (Brussels), 29 April 1974, ACDP K184/1.

instantaneously.<sup>237</sup> Even a seemingly prosaic development like the increase in the speed and reliability of the postal service proved of great importance to Birrenbach. Without the rapid pace of “technological progress,” Birrenbach’s political activities would have been impossible in the form they actually assumed.

However, beyond such external factors as logistical support and technology, a number of Birrenbach’s own internal characteristics also facilitated his political activities. For example, his proficiency with foreign languages, especially English but also French, proved to be of central importance to the construction of and interaction with his international network of contacts. This was particularly the case given the astonishing lack of language skills exhibited by many of the internationally minded Americans/Anglo-Saxons, including with respect to the German language.<sup>238</sup>

Birrenbach’s English was not perfect, and he admitted he could better articulate himself in German.<sup>239</sup> Furthermore, he was not the only German with some aptitude for English. Indeed, if the members of the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* and the *Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft* (see Chapter 7) are any indication, most Germans seriously interested in foreign affairs could at least understand and even speak the language to some extent.<sup>240</sup> However, the lack of real English language proficiency remained a major factor in limiting the pool of Germans, at least in the *Bundestag*, who could effectively engage in Atlanticist activities and serve as contacts with the Anglo-Saxons. Birrenbach’s foreign language proficiency and fluency in English was clearly at

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<sup>237</sup> For an example of Birrenbach hearing parts of a de Gaulle press conference over the Paris radio, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>238</sup> This was true even of those who dealt with Germany to a significant extent, such as Christian Herter, Eugene Rostow, John McCloy, Robert Bowie, Henry Owen and George Ball.

<sup>239</sup> KB to John Eidenow, Producer, Further Education, BBC, London, 30 May 1974, ACDP K068/1.

<sup>240</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 11 September 1974, ACDP K211/2.

a level that distinguished him from even many Germans interested in international relations and represented a valuable asset in his political efforts. In fact, it was among those qualities that led others to consider him particularly desirable as an interlocutor with the Anglo-Saxons, for instance with American visitors to the Federal Republic. Beyond his mechanical aptitude with the English language and based on his long experience, Birrenbach also believed he possessed a particular faculty for expressing himself in a manner understood and appreciated by foreigners, particularly Americans, one that eschewed generalities in favor of concrete, *sachlichen*, knowledgeable discussion and criticism about particular problems and issues.<sup>241</sup>

Another significant asset in Birrenbach's efforts to construct and utilize his international network of contacts, a virtue he repeatedly and explicitly stressed, was his vaunted discretion. These contacts, American and otherwise, could be confident that the information and opinions they provided him would be treated and utilized, in whatever form, in a proper and effective manner. This entailed a number of standard practices on Birrenbach's part. For instance, he passed on the information from his contacts in only limited quantities and dealt very circumspectly with direct quotations from these sources, in fact rarely quoting them at all. If he did quote a contact, he either did not cite the specific source, or, if explicitly authorized, did so in the most restrictive fashion possible. Birrenbach's treatment of his confidential reports about his *Amerikareisen* was marked by the same discretion. As we shall see, these reports, like his letters, received only

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<sup>241</sup> As Birrenbach put it, "[y]ou don't get anywhere speaking with the Americans or French about 'generalities.' However, if you speak about particular problems and understand something about them, then you immediately awaken interest... I know the Americans now for thirty years and believe to be able to handle them" (KB to State Secretary a.D. Günther Harkort, Bonn, 28 February 1973, ACDP K028/2). On the United States' ability to bear and indeed its demand for a "*sachliche Kritik*," see KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2.

limited distribution.<sup>242</sup> Sensitive information was often omitted, even more so in the versions presented for discussion to the *Fraktion*, the AKV and other party institutions.<sup>243</sup> As some compensation, Birrenbach supplemented his reports with oral commentaries to an even smaller circle of select individuals, in part to convey the information he deemed too sensitive for a broader audience or even for print.<sup>244</sup> Birrenbach's emphasis on discretion extended to a broader effort to ensure that confidential matters of which he had particular knowledge, such as details of his Israel mission, remained secret.<sup>245</sup> This emphasis on discretion might have annoyed some, probably mitigated at times the impact of the information he offered and certainly made him a less fruitful source for journalists and others inquiring about his endeavors, recent or long ago, but in the overall context of his activities, it had definite benefits, marking him out to his contacts as a man who could

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<sup>242</sup> Birrenbach also openly insisted that certain of his letters or particular information contained in them be treated confidentially by their recipients, on some occasions even that especially frank letters be destroyed. On Birrenbach's unwillingness to put down on paper the content of a secret message, regarding the future English attitude on nuclear questions, given to him in a private talk by Secretary of State Dean Rusk intended for Chancellor Erhard "because of its great confidentiality," see KB to Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

<sup>243</sup> For Birrenbach drawing up a detailed report, including at the behest of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, on German-American relations following a trip to the United States and to be discussed "in our parliamentary group and other party institutions," see KB to Jacob Javits, 7 October 1963, ACDP K157/1.

<sup>244</sup> Similarly, Birrenbach also supplemented some of his letters with oral commentaries to convey sensitive information to the recipients. For Birrenbach even preferring to call Bowie in Boston in the fall, when he hoped to visit the US, rather than commit delicate information and thoughts to a letter, see KB to Robert Bowie, 29 July 1970, ACDP K160/2.

<sup>245</sup> Long after the fact, Birrenbach refused to divulge information pertaining to the issue of weapons supplies to Israel or the crucial connection between his Israel mission and his immediately preceding trip to the United States (KB to Berend von Nottbeck, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 17 November 1970, ACDP K096/2; KB to Amb. Felix Elieser Shinnar, Tel-Ganim, 20 November 1970, ACDP K096/2; Shinnar to KB, 30 November 1970, ACDP K096/2; and KB to Inge Deutschkron, *Maariv-Zeitung*, Tel-Aviv, 4 June 1975, ACDP K096/2. For Birrenbach declining to relay in detail in a written report the information of a "secret nature" that he had gathered from having the protocols of the *Ostverträge*-negotiations read aloud to him in May 1972, see KB Report, 19 May 1972, ACDP K133/1.

be trusted.<sup>246</sup> This perception of Birrenbach contributed enormously to the construction and functioning of his international Atlanticist network of political contacts.<sup>247</sup>

### G. New Channels of Communication

Birrenbach's network of international political contacts represented new and significant channels of communication. While face-to-face meetings and telephone conversations played a vital role in this, Birrenbach also stood with many of his contacts in an extensive correspondence consisting of a steady stream of letters as well as speeches, studies, publications and other materials.<sup>248</sup> The upshot was a constant

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<sup>246</sup> For a journalist's frustration, see KB to Inge Deutschkron, *Maariv-Zeitung*, Tel-Aviv, 4 June 1975, ACDP K096/2 and KB to Amb. Felix Elieser Shinnar, Tel-Ganim, 20 November 1970, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>247</sup> For an example of Birrenbach's much lauded discretion, see his important *Bundestag* speech of 29 January 1971 on the attitude of the West towards the *Ostpolitik*. This speech included uncited critical quotations from prominent political personalities in the United States (including John McCloy and Dean Acheson), France, Britain, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

<sup>248</sup> The materials comprising this correspondence consisted of not only often detailed letters, but also exposés, memos, speeches, diverse publications (e.g. books, newspaper and journal articles), studies, reports, papers, and key (at times confidential) documents, in many cases actually written by the corresponding personalities themselves. Those materials that Birrenbach thus acquired and pored over also included the products generated by individuals based at or published by think tanks like the Hudson Institute, FPRI or the Brookings Institution, thanks in part to his American contacts like Walter Hahn and Henry Owen who provided them. Also while at the State Department (until the late 1960s), Owen was among those passing on information and material to Birrenbach such as relevant articles and speeches. For Birrenbach receiving from Rep. Chet Holifield the record of the hearings about "The Agreement for Cooperation with NATO for Mutual Defense Purposes," which Birrenbach "studied with great interest," see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. On Birrenbach's reference to the proceedings of "the *Achtzehner-Konferenz*" (the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament) in Geneva based on the US ACDA document "International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," see KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. Meanwhile, Birrenbach also received copies of speeches by prominent American personalities via the publications of the United States Information Service and the US embassy like the "Wireless Bulletin from Washington" and the "Amerika-Dienst," for instance a speech of 19 November 1962 of J. William Fulbright (Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) on "The Atlantic Partnership and its Responsibility in the World" (Amerika-Dienst, 23 November 1962, ACDP K011/1). For Birrenbach receiving a newspaper article from the American Curtis Hoxter, see the undated and otherwise unidentified "German Gaullists Flexing Muscles," by Seymour Freiden, marked "Curtis Hoxter Inc.," ACDP K014/2. Curtis Hoxter Inc., located in New York City, also sent Birrenbach weekly "confidential reports" on international economic and financial developments. Naturally, given the already cited language barriers confronting the Anglo-Saxon side, Birrenbach preferred to send his materials already translated into English.

Face-to-face meetings of Birrenbach with his American and other contacts occurred in a variety of frameworks, whether during his trips to and meetings in the United States or in diverse settings in the Federal Republic and elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Brussels, Paris), including in the context of the various Atlanticist functions. In addition to promoting actual network expansion, the Atlanticist institutions also

exchange of valuable (often “inside”) information, views, opinions, predictions, concerns, criticisms, complaints, objections, warnings, questions, answers, ideas, explanations, descriptions, proposals, advice (including with respect to potential West German actions as well as Birrenbach’s own efforts at home and abroad) and requests for assistance, action and the exercise of influence, all on a wide range of themes and issue areas and broadly in support of the Atlanticist cause.<sup>249</sup> To lend them added weight, Birrenbach

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formed an essential basis of these ready channels of communication, through which flowed such valuable information, simply by their facilitating such face-to-face meetings. For instance, Birrenbach’s concerns regarding the British Labour Party under Harold Wilson (in 1963 after the rejection of a British entrance, Birrenbach worried Wilson might steer a course that would reduce the enthusiasm in Germany for bringing Britain into the EEC) were due in part to his “enormous difficulties” with a series of Labour deputies in the committee “Common Market and Atlantic Affairs” in the Königswinter Conference (KB to Amb. Hasso von Etzdorf, London, 28 April 1963, ACDP K181/1). For Birrenbach’s discussions at the Bilderberg Conference of 25-27 March 1966 in Wiesbaden with a number of important personalities (among others the Americans John McCloy, George Ball, Robert Bowie and Arthur Dean, as well as the NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio) on the question of the Federal Republic’s nuclear *Mitspracherecht* in NATO, see KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1. Likewise, in Spring 1967, Birrenbach saw Eugene Rostow at the Bilderberg Conference in Cambridge (UK). On Birrenbach’s discussions about burning issues with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns in Paris at a meeting of the Atlantic Institute Board of Governors and a following meal given for Luns and the OECD Secretary General, see KB to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach on David Packard’s declarations at the European-American Conference of March 1973 in Amsterdam on “the use of nuclear weapons *in extremis*,” see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach’s astonishment that at the last German-American Conference (in Bonn, 17-19 November), some American experts, particularly Marshall Shulman, had claimed that economic cooperation would be a significant lever to influence the Soviet Union, a view Birrenbach disagreed with, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. For the role of the American embassy in informing Birrenbach when it was possible to meet American visitors (e.g. William Tyler), see KB to Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.

Birrenbach also met French contacts at the annual German-French Conferences. For Birrenbach’s interaction, including in private meetings, with French personalities, such as members of the UNR (the largest government party as of March 1959) and the “Independents,” including a number of Gaullist deputies, Christian de La Malène (a colleague of Michel Debré), and Henri Rocherau (Chairman of the European Parliament’s “Trade-Political [*Handelspolitischen*] Committee”), as well as Ambassador François Seydoux and the *Gesandte* Leduc along with prominent personalities of the Fourth Republic (e.g. René Pleven and Maurice Faure) in the framework of these German-French Conferences (here, 1959 in Bad Godesberg) and on the periphery of the committee meetings of the European Parliament, see KB to Finance Minister Franz Etzel, 4 March 1959, ACDP K001/2.

<sup>249</sup> Among other things, such exchanges enabled the participants to clarify, for instance, the undertakings (and sometimes admit the mistakes) of their own governments and, for Birrenbach, to depict and explain the internal and external situation of the Federal Republic, current events within West Germany, as well as the West German attitude, difficulties and problems in general and with respect to particular matters. While there was plenty of accord in these interactions, occasional arguments and disagreements also existed among the Atlanticists on certain issues, sometimes leading to efforts to “correct” one another’s views. On the need to exert influence on the United States early on, well before the “final” decisions were

often presented his perspectives, even when strictly personal, as not merely his own but as those of his party or, even more encompassing, as “the German view.”<sup>250</sup> Given the quality of his contacts, Birrenbach could be reasonably confident that his views would get a proper hearing in the American government’s key decision-making centers, whether directly through the arranging of meetings for him or indirectly through the relaying of

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made, since “[o]nce a consensus has been established among the different departments” it was difficult if not impossible to have one’s arguments considered and to change such a decision “from outside,” see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1 and KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach’s proposals on how best to respond to the Élysée Treaty and the events of January 1963, see Edmund Kellogg, US General Consul, to KB, 14 March 1963, ACDP K157/1; KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1; and Birrenbach, *Meine Sondermissionen*, pp. 170-72. On Birrenbach’s belief that as important as the German position in the United States was, “I have no illusions that, seen in the long view, it will equal that of France,” see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 23 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For McCloy’s tactical advice on Birrenbach’s presentation of German aims with respect to a physical participation in an integrated nuclear weapon system (hardware solution), advice Birrenbach followed on his November 1965 *Sondermission* in Washington and passed on to the *Auswärtigen Amt*, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach on the Federal Republic’s essential powerlessness to resist and its need to take part in even faulty policies like a dubious détente and a universal NPT when especially promoted by the United States (as well as other Western powers), see KB to Henry Kissinger, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2; KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2; and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2. For Birrenbach’s “American talk partners” especially entrusting to him during Kiesinger’s chancellorship the exploration of the possibilities of “a European Caucus” within NATO and for Birrenbach having discussed this question in Brussels and in London with Denis Healy (the “English Defense Minister”) and Lord Chalfont (the “*Europa-Minister*”) (Birrenbach could not keep the appointment proposed by the British Foreign Minister and planned to make this up at the start of February), see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 December 1968, ACDP K021/1. On Birrenbach’s apologies for the “deplorable” European attitude in the Near East conflict, about which he felt “ashamed,” and for the reaction of the federal government in the “affair of Bremerhaven,” which would have been “unthinkable a few years ago,” see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the occasionally useful role of embassies, both German and American, in seeing that Birrenbach’s letters reached his contacts “directly,” see Walther Stützle, *Persönlicher Referent*, Federal Minister of Defense and Leader of the Minister’s Office, to *Flotillenadmiral* Kurt Seizinger, the Defense Attaché at the West German Embassy, Washington DC, 17 December 1975, ACDP K155/1.

<sup>250</sup> For Birrenbach presenting “the German standpoint” in his key *Sondermission* talk of 8 November 1965, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On Birrenbach’s view being “on the whole also the opinion of my country,” see KB to Prof. Guido Goldman, Executive Director, Harvard University, West European Studies, 19 March 1974, ACDP K184/1. For effectively similar formulations, see KB to Sen. Thomas Dodd, 30 November 1965, ACDP K117/1. On another Birrenbach effort to buttress his views by pointing to the larger support they enjoyed, in this case in Europe, see KB to Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, confidential, 7 March 1969, ACDP K021/2. For Birrenbach’s efforts to make clear “the attitude of my political friends,” see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the other hand, for an instance of Birrenbach claiming to be able to speak only for himself (expressing personal opinions), not in the name of his party, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 8 September 1972, ACDP K026/1 and KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2.



these views, sometimes of his actual correspondence.<sup>251</sup> Meanwhile, this process contributed crucially to his understanding and knowledge of foreign countries (especially the United States), personalities, policies, attitudes, events, trends and trans-Atlantic relations in general.<sup>252</sup> An actual penetration of foreign perspectives into the Federal

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<sup>251</sup> Birrenbach's contacts abroad existed at or near the highest levels of power and inhabited each issue area in which he dealt. Naturally, he attempted to make full use of these transnational connections. For instance, individuals like John McCloy and Chris Emmet (American Council on Germany) were very helpful in passing on Birrenbach's views, letters and reports to the relevant personalities in the key decision-making centers. For Birrenbach, such key centers included the executive branch (especially, of course, the President) and the legislative branch (Congress) of government. In some instances, one can even detect the emergence of a transnational network specifically with respect to particular issues, for instance of Americans (with important roles played by Emmet and McCloy) and Germans (like Birrenbach) to oppose the NPT or at least to secure modifications. With regard to Birrenbach's concerns about the NPT drafts (and his own), McCloy spoke at various times with, for example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and US ACDA Director William Foster. For McCloy's advice to Birrenbach (and thus to the West German government) and efforts to ensure that German views and, especially, objections regarding the NPT received a hearing from the American government, see KB Memorandum, 10 February 1967, ACDP K117/2. For McCloy urging, in his words, "our people" not to pressure the Federal Republic to sign the NPT, see McCloy to KB, 8 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. On Birrenbach's expression of desires regarding the NPT, see KB to McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. With respect to arranging meetings, Birrenbach's American contacts helped him secure the agreement of the American administration and the relevant government departments to the MLF *Sondermission* meeting of November 1965. This was likewise the case when Kissinger promised to bring Birrenbach and McGeorge Bundy together on his May 1962 trip to the United States (KB to Erich Straetling, Washington DC, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1). On the impact of the advice of personalities like Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and George Ball with respect to the decision of President Johnson, the crucial decision-making element, regarding the American position on the issue of nuclear control, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On one occasion, during Birrenbach's trip to Washington of February 1969, after he had depicted the "German standpoint" regarding the NPT, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger even called for the Soviet Ambassador and then presented and supported this standpoint (KB to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1). For Birrenbach on the "extremely difficult" task of exercising influence on the decision-making process of another world power, in this case with respect to the Soviet Union and his opposition towards a policy aimed at dividing the Politburo, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1.

<sup>252</sup> Indispensable to his Atlanticist political activities, Birrenbach's constant interaction with his contacts abroad and the flow of information it facilitated significantly shaped his perspective on the personalities, thoughts and views, present and future policies and plans (for instance regarding changes to the American NPT draft), mood and tenor, problems and overall situation, political and otherwise, existing especially in the United States (though also in other foreign countries), not just with respect to international but also domestic affairs, and helped him to assess potential implications for trans-Atlantic and German-American relations and to identify the most advisable West German and personal courses forward. Thus, with respect to his November 1965 *Sondermission*, Birrenbach's numerous preliminary conversations with contacts in New York and Washington enabled him to "survey the terrain" and to garner some preliminary reactions to and suggestions regarding his upcoming proposals. For instance, Birrenbach first attempted in lengthy talks with Dean Acheson, John McCloy, Lauris Norstad and Robert Bowie to ascertain the current constellation in American politics with respect to the questions he wished to address. For Birrenbach's American contacts, such as George Ball and Dean Acheson, offering him insights into the attitudes, arguments and probable actions of key American personalities, including Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For Birrenbach on the

Republic is testified to by Birrenbach's embrace of a number of American concepts, most significantly those of Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership.<sup>253</sup> Finally,

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views with regard to this November 1965 *Sondermission* of American figures like John McCloy, Dean Acheson, George Ball, J. Robert Schaetzel, Robert Bowie, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, John Leddy (successor of William Tyler as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), Walt Rostow (Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff), John McNaughton (successor of Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), William Foster (Director of the ACDA), Arthur Goldberg (US Ambassador to the UN), Paul Nitze (Secretary of the Navy), and Senators Robert Kennedy and Jacob Javits, see again KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For Birrenbach keeping well "up-to-date" about the United States through "a very interesting correspondence about all questions" with figures like John McCloy, Dean Acheson, James Conant, Christian Herter, William Tyler and Henry Kissinger, see KB to *Legationsrat* Erich Straetling, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. For Birrenbach's information "from the mouth of one of the highest officials in the State Department," that the ACDA was considering a unilateral, asymmetrical withdrawal of a certain part of the American troops stationed on the continent, despite denials to Birrenbach by other American officials (McNaughton), see KB to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. For advice from American contacts regarding German actions, see KB to State Secretary Prof. Karl Carstens (AA), 11 December 1965, ACDP K117/1. Among the information and materials pertaining to international affairs that Birrenbach received directly from the embassies of the Western nations in Bonn were the proceedings of the US Senate, provided by the American embassy, another aspect of his efforts to keep an eye on developments in the Congress and its various committees, including through sources like the Congressional Record, especially on particular issues.

<sup>253</sup> Those American elements forming a part of or with access to the transnational Atlanticist political network could consistently ensure a hearing for their views. It was not least in this sense that the Federal Republic represented what some political scientists have called a "penetrated system." Ambitious designs of Atlantic Community and Atlantic Partnership, concepts which came to play a central role in Birrenbach's thought, were essentially foreign imports, having originated particularly in the United States and perhaps to some lesser extent with a personality like Monnet. The notion of Atlantic Community had especially been taken up and given credence by the Eisenhower administration, including by individuals like Birrenbach's close contact Secretary of State Christian Herter. The somewhat more concrete idea of Atlantic Partnership was presented by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy in a speech in Chicago in December 1961 and later proposed by President Kennedy in Philadelphia on 4 July 1962, thus making it the official policy of the United States. For Sen. William Fulbright's address on "The Atlantic Partnership and its Responsibility in the World" of 19 November 1962 in the assembly hall of the University of Bonn, including a reference to Kennedy's desire for an "Atlantic Declaration of Interdependence," see that speech of William Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Political Committee of the US Senate, given on 19 November 1962, in the *Amerika Dienst* of 23 November 1962, ACDP K011/1. According to Birrenbach's memo of 19 July 1962, the idea of partnership had also been suggested in the President's name by government officials like George Ball, McGeorge Bundy and Paul Nitze (ACDP K051/1). On the "offer of partnership" between the United States and Europe, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. For Birrenbach's reference to President Kennedy's speech in Frankfurt in which he offered a partnership in which a united Europe would form a second pillar to that of the United States, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1. On the view of the Nixon administration that American-European relations should develop on the basis of Partnership (the administration's motto) and the American interest in a related European unification (including Britain and political unity) that would secure its strategic "Vorfeld," see KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. On the stress of the Nixon administration on the exclusively European matter of the organization of European unity, in contrast to the practice of the Kennedy administration, see again KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. For the United States again offering an Atlantic Partnership to the European states, just as at first in the 1960s, in Kissinger's speech of 23 April 1973, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the role of Birrenbach's American contacts in confirming his conviction in his "fundamental conception," see KB

Birrenbach's conversance with the attitudes of prominent Americans, and those of other foreigners, enhanced his influence and was especially relevant in the Federal Republic, where such attitudes were considered of vital importance and at times even became the subject of dispute.<sup>254</sup>

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to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. For Birrenbach's reference to the "vital importance" in the long view of the Monnet line with respect to the development of a European Community that could negotiate ["*verhandeln*"] with the United States on the basis of equality, see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. Birrenbach also embraced other American ideas like the MLF, which he saw as "the only constructive solution of the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe." On George Ball, J. Robert Schaetzel and Robert Bowie as supporters of the Kennedy "Grand Design," of the MLF project and also as supporters of a West German *Mitspracherecht* in the framework of a nuclear organization for reasons of the strengthening of the alliance in general and of the connection of the United States to Europe in particular, see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

<sup>254</sup> A knowledge of the attitudes of prominent foreign, especially American, personalities was an especially effective political tool for Birrenbach and others in the Federal Republic in foreign policy debates with respect to issues such as the *Neue Ostpolitik*. For the Brandt government's method of repeatedly presenting foreign declarations, including those of the Western allies, to the German electorate as evidence of their approval of the content and form of the *Ostpolitik*, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1. On the "consent" given to the Brandt *Ostpolitik* by the various Western countries, "for different motives," as one of the reasons for the SPD electoral victory in 1972 and the Union's loss of its status as the largest party, see KB to William Bass, 20 November 1972, ACDP K068/1. For Chancellor Brandt's desire to have John McCloy on the same podium when he spoke at the American Council on Germany meeting in June 1971 on Unity Day as a means to encourage the idea that McCloy supported the Chancellor's policies, including the new *Ostpolitik*, see McCloy to KB, 17 May 1971, ACDP K210/1. Citing eminent figures such as Dean Acheson, John McCloy and Henry Kissinger, Birrenbach repeatedly attempted in the context of the debates over the *Neue Ostpolitik* to dispel the notion that the Americans wholeheartedly approved the Brandt *Ostpolitik* and that a rejection of this policy would have dire consequences for German-American relations. For Birrenbach's insistence, based on his talks with prominent representatives of the Republican administration, including Henry Kissinger in November 1971, that despite some assertions to the contrary (e.g. Amb. Rolf Pauls' "alarming" letter to Birrenbach of 1 February 1972) the American government remained "neutral" with respect to the ratification of the *Ostverträge* and that a non-ratification of the treaties would not fundamentally harm German-American relations, which rested on "deeper foundations" that could not be shaken by "a difference over such a question," see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1. On Birrenbach's efforts to inject Acheson's attitudes towards the Brandt *Ostpolitik* into the debate, see KB to Dean Acheson, 17 February 1971, ACDP K155/3. For Birrenbach's swift, direct, and, at least to him, successful contradiction of Brandt's claims in the Foreign Affairs Committee in June 1971 that McCloy and President Nixon supported his *Ostpolitik* (Brandt cited private conversations among other things) in which Birrenbach could refer not only to Nixon's World Message of 28 February but also, in the case of McCloy, to remarks made in their meeting that same month and, with McCloy's explicit authorization, remarks made in a phone conversation two days earlier (Birrenbach had contacted McCloy in part with the intent of refuting Brandt's repeated claims) and a letter of 2 March from McCloy to Brandt, see McCloy to KB, 17 May 1971, ACDP K210/1 and KB to McCloy, 28 June 1971, ACDP K210/1. While Brandt disagreed, his refraining in at least the immediate future from mentioning Nixon or McCloy in this context led Birrenbach to conclude that "my remarks have had a positive result" (KB to McCloy, 28 June 1971, ACDP K210/1).

Birrenbach worked actively to facilitate this process of penetration among his compatriots and thus to accelerate the diffusion of his own impressions from abroad as well as of especially American, and other foreign, concepts and ideas. Birrenbach's efforts in this regard never really flagged, but they were especially intense upon his return from trips to the United States.<sup>255</sup> Following such visits, Birrenbach laid out his experiences in extensive, printed, confidential reports and supplementary oral commentaries.<sup>256</sup> Efforts to inform and influence his German contacts, as well as a larger audience, also occurred within the framework of private meetings and conversations, letters, conferences, speeches, parliamentary reports and, as we shall see in Chapter 7, articles and interviews.<sup>257</sup> Thus, Birrenbach strove diligently over the years and with

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<sup>255</sup> This was also true to some extent, like much of what we say here about his trips to the United States, upon his return from other destinations abroad, for instance Britain (e.g. in 1960 and as part of his Fall 1971-Spring 1972 *Ostpolitik* special mission).

<sup>256</sup> For a sample, see ACDP K090/2. Birrenbach dictated these reports, which were not intended for the general public but which received a limited distribution to a multi-/non-partisan circle of prominent elite contacts and friends (not limited to members of or sympathizers with the Union), supplemented by the even more exclusive aforementioned oral commentary. Therefore, recipients of Birrenbach's multiple US reports included not only Union personalities, such as Chancellor Kiesinger, Rainer Barzel (as Chairman of the CDU and of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion) and Gerhard Schröder (as Chairman of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee), but also SPD and SPD-inclined personalities like *Botschaftsrat I. Kl.* Berndt von Staden. Among Union recipients of Birrenbach's US reports in some form or other were also Gaullist-minded figures like Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg (unclear whether he received the written version or perhaps an oral version in the Foreign Affairs Committee) (KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee, to Guttenberg, MdB, Bonn, 9 December 1963, ACDP K014/2). At times, such reports were even drawn up at the explicit request of a superior, for instance the Foreign Minister. For requests for Birrenbach's views on the situation in the United States based on his *Amerikareisen* and his extensive response, see KB to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. Birrenbach also produced similar reports about certain other major trips abroad, for instance Britain in 1960 and his *Ostpolitik* special mission of 1971-72. In his reports about this *Sondermission*, comprising separate trips to the US and the major Western European capitals (France, Netherlands, Italy, Britain, Belgium and Luxembourg) during the time from November 1971-April 1972, as well as in his letters of this period (e.g. KB to Barzel, 1 May 1972, ACDP K026/1), Birrenbach described the attitude of the Western world with respect to the *Ostverträge* (these *Ostpolitik* reports are contained in ACDP K172/1). In all such reports, Birrenbach aspired to depict the situation of the country in question as he saw it in depth.

<sup>257</sup> For Birrenbach employing the advice and information he received from his American contacts in formal debates, here in the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee, see KB to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, ACDP K160/2. Also among those items Birrenbach passed around, including to German contacts, were the studies of the various Atlanticist institutions. On Birrenbach encountering some of his German contacts in the course of his normal parliamentary and party activities, here speaking with Foreign Minister Brentano in the Foreign Affairs Committee, see KB to Brentano, Bonn, 22 November 1958, ACDP K001/2.

respect to a wide range of themes to keep his German contacts apprised about the content of his contacts with Americans, to analyze the internal and external situation and difficulties of the United States, and to make American policy intelligible. In the process, Birrenbach naturally injected his own ideas, perspectives, views, analysis, warnings, predictions, proposals and advice, including with respect to the best courses of action for the Federal Republic. The general tenor of Birrenbach's discourse here was marked by understanding and sympathy for the United States, its policies and goals. He constantly stressed the desirability of close trans-Atlantic relations, the need to actively support the United States and promptly address its concerns, if necessary by major sacrifices, and encouraged a fundamental trust in the American engagement in Europe.<sup>258</sup> Birrenbach's audience in this respect included a dizzying and multi-partisan (or non-partisan) array of influential figures especially in politics and government but also in the *Wirtschaft*, the

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<sup>258</sup> Birrenbach's stress on closer trans-Atlantic links naturally comprised the notion of partnership and the necessity in this context for European unification. On the interests of the United States in a political consolidation of Western Europe and the need for the Federal Republic, in its own interest, to take such considerations into account, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, Palais Schaumburg, 11 December 1967, ACDP K019/1. One example of Birrenbach's push for greater German efforts and sacrifices to help bring about healthier European-American relations was his emphasis on the achievement of a proper offset agreement and burden-sharing as a means of encouraging the maintenance of the currently substantial levels of American troops in Europe and Germany. On the important role of the Federal Republic's policy in influencing whether and to what extent the certain reduction in the American engagement in the world would impact on Europe and thus detrimentally impact on the Federal Republic, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. For Birrenbach's assessment that "the physical contact [*Tuchfühlung*] with the United States cannot be close enough in this critical time" (a time when the United States was undergoing an "agonizing reappraisal" of its policy that would lead to a reduction of its role in the world), see again KB to Chancellor Kiesinger, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1. On Birrenbach encouraging his German contacts to take into account American concerns regarding obstacles to trade in Europe and to explore American proposals (for instance in the next GATT round) to avoid negative reactions on the part of the Americans, see KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3. For Birrenbach's efforts in the wake of his November 1965 *Sondermission* to convince his German contacts of the need for the German delegation to the United States (December 1965) to be as clear as had been proposed by Bowie, see KB to Robert Bowie, 16 November 1965, ACDP K160/2.

media, the judiciary, the military, academia, the Atlanticist organizations, as well as other leading personalities in public life.<sup>259</sup>

Aside from the often subtle influx of American ideas and perspectives into the West German policy-making process, the valuable information Birrenbach received from his foreign contacts, information not otherwise readily available even to a German parliamentarian, is crucial in explaining the triggering and the course of a variety of his striking initiatives. For instance, indications from his contacts abroad, as well as at home, that the Brussels negotiations were on the verge of failure, contrary to optimistic press reports, alarmed Birrenbach in December 1962 and spurred on his ultimately futile efforts to encourage the crucial political figures, including Adenauer, to promote a British entrance into the EEC and to warn them of the consequences of breaking off the

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<sup>259</sup> Birrenbach's audience in this respect included in Government and Politics: the successive Chancellors (Adenauer, Erhard, Kiesinger) and Federal Presidents (Lübke); the relevant cabinet ministers (e.g. Foreign Ministers Brentano, Schröder, Brandt and Scheel and Defense Minister Schröder; *Bundesminister* Krone; Economics Minister Erhard; Finance Minister Etzel; Agriculture Minister Ertl (at least in 1973)); the governmental bureaucracy (Ministerial Directors and State Secretaries, e.g. Westrick (BKA under Erhard); Kneiper (BKA under Kiesinger); Carstens (AA)); Ambassadors and General Consuls in the United States and Britain and their subordinates (e.g. Ambassadors Grewe, Pauls; *Legationsrat I.Kl.* Borchardt); competent German personalities at the international organizations, such as NATO and the EEC/European Commission (Hallstein); prominent officers and figures in the political parties, especially the Union (including Barzel (Chairman of the *Fraktion* and also, later on, Chairman of the CDU) and Kohl) but, at least sometimes, also the opposition (Erlar, the parliamentary leader of the SPD); interested and influential members of the *Bundestag*, including within his own *Fraktion* (Friedensburg), the AKV, other party institutions, and the *Bundestag*'s Foreign Affairs Committee (Schröder, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee); and interested Minister-Presidents and MdL's in the *Ländern*. Wirtschaft: Within the Thyssen firm, Birrenbach had co-workers with ties to the United States and to prominent Americans, including E.W. Mommsen (brother of Theodor). Also significant as we have and shall continue to see were Birrenbach's ties to the BDI. For instance, Birrenbach critiqued and made new proposals for a *Vermerk* of the BDI on the NPT sent to him by Wagner and which the BDI planned to present to the BKA (KB to President Fritz Berg, BDI, Cologne, 8 July 1968, ACDP K020/1). At least once, Birrenbach received assistance in distributing his US trip report from Wagner (BDI *Hauptgeschäftsführer*) (Helmuth Wagner to KB, 21 October 1963, ACDP K157/1). Media: particularly members located or interested in the United States (e.g. Dr. Jan G. Reiffenberg (FAZ), Bethesda, MD). Atlanticist Organizations: for example the DGAP. Birrenbach's audience also included (dizzying, as said) prominent foreign contacts and, as explained in the next chapter, a wider public opinion. For a contemporary work on the BDI, see Gerard Braunthal, *The Federation of German Industry in Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1965).

negotiations.<sup>260</sup> With respect to the Israel *Sondermission* of March-April 1965, Birrenbach's preferred "middle solution" and his confidence in its efficacy was based not least on his experiences on his preceding trip to the United States, where George Ball and other representatives of the American government had also indicated to him that the United States would, as Birrenbach suggested, be willing to replace the weapons shortfall that might come about.<sup>261</sup> Birrenbach's *Sondermission* in November 1965 to the United States was based on his discussions that summer with several contacts, including Lauris Norstad, Dirk Stikker and Robert Bowie, who expressed doubts regarding the feasibility of an MLF, in light of increasing international resistance and consequently increasing objections in the United States, and called for a re-thinking of nuclear deterrence and of

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<sup>260</sup> Birrenbach's impressions included what he had gathered in Paris while attending the meetings of the Monnet Committee that month (December 1962). Sometimes with his encouragement, Birrenbach's contacts in the Federal Republic, elsewhere in Western Europe (including Jean Monnet) and the United States (including Dean Acheson and John McCloy) also took part in these efforts. The figures addressed included key members of the West German government (including Chancellor Adenauer), the party, the *Fraktion*, and the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee. This activity occurred not only in the months prior to but also in the period after de Gaulle's rejection of the British entrance in January 1963. These efforts ultimately proved to be in vain insofar as Adenauer, the key figure, remained unmoved. On the other hand, Birrenbach and his friends could claim some credit for the fact that the majority of the *Fraktion* opposed Adenauer on this question and, at least Birrenbach believed, that a clear majority existed in his party for the original European concept and the idea of Atlantic Partnership.

<sup>261</sup> As already indicated, the United States did indeed step in to replace the resulting weapons shortfall at the end of April 1965. As Birrenbach remarked in the midst of the negotiating process: "Without my visit in America, my mission would have been hopeless" (KB to Erich Straetling, *Botschaftsrat*, 12 March 1965, ACDP K187/1). A bit later, Birrenbach remarked with respect to his Israel mission, "Mr. Ball's promise to help us has been my trump card in these negotiations" (KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State, 31 March 1965, ACDP K187/1). With respect to the significant influence of Birrenbach's contacts in the United States on his Israel mission, one can point as well to the fact that Chancellor Erhard's choice of Birrenbach on 23 February 1965 to represent the Federal Republic, a rare occasion when the government appointed somebody other than a career diplomat to negotiate in its name, rested in no small part on the latter's access to such American contacts. However, Birrenbach's trip to the United States prior to embarking on his Israel mission was (according to Birrenbach) decided upon "exclusively" by himself, "without informing the German government of it," with the intention of speaking "privately" with the American government about the key question of weapon supplies to Israel and to bring the American government to "discretely assume these payments" (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, ACDP K094/1). Also, with respect to the emergence of Birrenbach's own preferred "middle solution," the Americans had stressed to him not only the need for German-Israeli reconciliation but also for the maintenance of German influence in the Near East, since the Federal Republic was the only Western power that could still exercise influence in the region. At the beginning of 1965, Chancellor Erhard had indicated that negotiations with Israel could only be conducted if Israel recognized that the Federal Republic would not continue to supply weapons into "areas of tension" since otherwise the Arab governments might break off their relations with the Federal Republic and recognize the DDR.

the participation of the European states in the nuclear process in some form.<sup>262</sup> Later, the information Birrenbach received from American contacts regarding the NPT and *Ostpolitik* negotiations proved essential for his efforts in these areas as well.<sup>263</sup>

Furthermore, Birrenbach represented a channel for the application of foreign pressure within the Federal Republic and its politics. Naturally, given the existing power imbalance especially with respect to the United States, such pressure was omnipresent, but certain examples are particularly striking. For instance, despite his continued reservations, Birrenbach ultimately counseled acceptance of the NPT in part because his conversations with contacts in the United States, as well as Britain and France, had convinced him that the treaty's rejection would entail serious international consequences for the Federal Republic. To take an earlier case, American pressure and urging was also a significant reason that by 1963 Birrenbach, along with other Germans, considered

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<sup>262</sup> In Summer 1965, Birrenbach had spoken in Paris with Stikker (former Secretary General of NATO) and Norstad (former SACEUR, essentially NATO high commander) (like Birrenbach, both Norstad and Stikker were members of the AI Policy Committee) and in Düsseldorf with Bowie (current “*Beaufragter*” of the State Department for NATO questions; professor at Harvard University; former Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff). All three of these foreign contacts were prominent supporters of a multilateral nuclear solution but expressed to Birrenbach their doubts regarding the feasibility of the MLF for the reasons cited above. Birrenbach described these talks as the “starting point” and “the occasion” for his November 1965 *Sondermission* (KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1 and KB to Monica Forbes, 9 December 1977, ACDP K185/2). For Birrenbach acquiring inside information from one of his contacts (from Washington by phone to the Federal Republic) on the course of American discussions regarding nuclear control issues, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. On Birrenbach’s recognition even prior to his November 1965 special mission, in contrast to a part of the German government, that the MLF was dead, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, FPRI, 29 July 1966, ACDP K117/1.

<sup>263</sup> Thanks to these contacts, Birrenbach received vital information about the NPT, including the current state of the negotiations, relevant American tendencies, confidential American drafts and other pertinent documents as well as behind-the-scenes American proposals and interpretations and was, furthermore, able to pass on his objections to various American NPT draft proposals. For Birrenbach receiving information from McCloy about the possibilities, in this case the lack of possibilities, of substantial changes to the text of the NPT draft treaty, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. On Birrenbach requesting information and analysis from Bowie regarding the impact of the NPT on prospects for European political unification and a possible future European nuclear force (the “European option”), see KB to Robert Bowie, 4 October 1973, ACDP K160/2. On the other hand, for Birrenbach’s dismay during the preceding currency “crisis” that the Americans with whom he spoke over the phone had “no solution” and upon hearing from members of the European Commission that the Americans had also not proposed a solution in Brussels in the meeting of the Club of Ten, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 23 March 1973, ACDP K140/2.



action for the solution of the chancellor-succession problem “extraordinarily important.”<sup>264</sup> However, the most celebrated example of this phenomenon was probably the preamble episode which transpired that same year.<sup>265</sup> Birrenbach’s intense initial opposition to the Élysée Treaty, even prior to its actual coming into being, and then his insistence on and key role in the inception and success of a preamble to place the agreement within an Atlanticist framework is largely explicable in terms of Western, particularly American, pressure transmitted via his contacts abroad. Not only was he thus suitably warned about the treaty’s potential impact on the Atlanticist project, but personalities like McCloy, Acheson, Herter and Conant even proposed specific amelioratory measures such as postponing the treaty’s ratification or attaching to it Atlanticist-minded amendments or resolutions.<sup>266</sup> It was largely in response to such

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<sup>264</sup> In a letter to Shepard Stone, Birrenbach, with allusion to an alarmed “attitude in the States” that appeared “meanwhile to have calmed down a bit,” remarked “[t]hat the problems still are unsolved, I know of course. My friends and I are absolutely [*durchaus*] conscious of the seriousness of the situation. You can be reassured in this regard. Therefore, we consider also the solution of the successor-problem extraordinarily important” (KB to Shepard Stone, 15 March 1963, ACDP K186/2). On the succession question, see Daniel Koerfer, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1987).

<sup>265</sup> For “fundamental differences” on key political issues with the current French government as the root of Birrenbach’s criticism of especially the timing and lack of functioning of the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 as well as the heart of his rejection of any closer “excessive” institutionalization and formalization of the Franco-German relationship and of de Gaulle’s stress on the notion of such an institutionalized *Zweier-Union* as an alternative to the European idea, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Prof. Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 22 July 1964, ACDP K013/1; and KB to *Bundesminister für besondere Aufgaben* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, personal, 13 August 1964, ACDP K014/2. On Birrenbach’s pertinent maxim that the relations between people and nations should not be “excessively” formalized and institutionalized “as long as fundamental political differences still exist” between them, see KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. For Birrenbach on “a certain interested side” in the Federal Republic that repeatedly declared the *Zweier-Union* “the path to Europe” as striving “not at all for Europe but rather for the *Zweier-Bund*” itself and a number of German personalities (“you know whom I mean”) whose fundamental motivation was not that of Birrenbach (or Brentano), see again KB to *Bundesminister a.D.* Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1.

<sup>266</sup> McCloy and Conant both suggested it would be best if the ratification of the treaty were postponed, while Acheson and Herter proposed amendments, reservations or resolutions that would stress Atlanticist goals (John McCloy to KB, 8 February 1963, ACDP K186/2; James Conant to KB, 6 February 1963, ACDP K186/2; Dean Acheson to KB, 19 February 1963, ACDP K186/2; Christian Herter to KB, 19 March 1963, ACDP K186/2). At the very least, Birrenbach’s connections abroad, including also those with Jean Monnet, decisively reinforced his concerns regarding the potential impact of the Élysée Treaty on the

warnings and proposals that Birrenbach insisted, including vis-à-vis Brentano (Chairman of the *Fraktion*), on the need to somehow address the misgivings of the United States, Britain and the EEC member states. Years later, Birrenbach acknowledged the “pressure of our Western friends” in explaining the efforts to dispel the concerns surrounding the Élysée Treaty.<sup>267</sup>

Essential to fully understanding the significance of Birrenbach’s political activities is the recognition that he was not alone. Other German Atlanticists were also attending conferences and other functions, corresponding with American contacts and embarking on trips to the United States.<sup>268</sup> Indeed, the *Amerikareise* became a fruitful

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European Community and the Atlantic Alliance and possibly even alerted him altogether. On Siegmund Warburg referring to “a strong impression of German two-facedness [*Doppelzüngigkeit*]” that had “spread in the Western world,” see Siegmund Warburg to KB, 15 February 1963, ACDP K064/2. For Birrenbach proposing a number of steps to William Tyler in a letter of 16 February 1963 which seemed indispensable to clarify “our” position, including the attachment of a preamble to neutralize the Élysée Treaty, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 16 February 1963, ACDP K186/2 and KB to Tyler, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.

<sup>267</sup> For a political science account of the preamble episode, see Günther Patz, *Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik: Fallstudien zur politischen Bedeutung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976). For a more recent, historical account, see Matthias Schulz, “Die Politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet-Kurt Birrenbach, Die Einheit des Westens und die ‘Präambel’ zum Elysée-Vertrag von 1963,” in *Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Andreas Wilkens, ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999). The strong reaction to the Franco-German Treaty, encompassing mounting criticism from abroad but also an American government offering carrots in the form of an MLF, must also be seen in the light of the French veto, issued by de Gaulle in a Paris press conference on 14 January 1963, of the British application to join the EEC and the consequent indefinite adjournment of the entrance negotiations in Brussels on 28 January 1963.

<sup>268</sup> On Birrenbach wanting to hear what impressions Friedensburg brought back from the United States, see KB, Munich, to Prof. Friedensburg, MdB, Berlin, 26 March 1959, ACDP K074/2. For Brentano’s trip to the United States in March 1963 where he became more aware about American consternation regarding the Élysée Treaty, see Patz, *Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976). For Birrenbach’s discussions with Kai-Uwe von Hassel and Heinrich Krone, regarding steps for the clarification of the West German position after the Franco-German Treaty, following their return from the United States, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. For Chancellor Brandt’s speech before the DGAP in June 1971 on his experiences during his trip to the United States, see KB to John McCloy, 28 June 1971, ACDP K210/1. On Barzel’s trip to the United States, including Washington DC, where he learned about the potential impact, or lack of impact, of a non-ratification of the *Ostverträge* on German-American relations, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Bonn, confidential, 14 June 1972, ACDP K026/1. For Birrenbach’s suggestion that Barzel write to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, see KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1. For examples of the correspondence between Casimir Prinz Wittgenstein

activity of a considerable number of prominent Germans with an interest in the United States, among them politicians, civil servants and businessmen, with the stream of visitors particularly pronounced during international conferences and other functions in North America.<sup>269</sup> While such flows presented Birrenbach with difficulties in scheduling his own trips and appointments, he also played a role in helping others prepare for such undertakings.<sup>270</sup> Many, probably most, of these trips could not match the level of those

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(Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt; Chairman of the *Atlantik-Brücke*) and John McCloy, see KB to McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. After travelling to Britain in 1960 with Birrenbach, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, like Birrenbach, returned to convey his impressions of the trip, including to the CDU-*Bundesvorstand* (Kai-Uwe von Hassel, Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, to KB, 8 July 1960, ACDP K076/1 and, for purposes of comparison, KB to E. Emmet, MP, House of Commons, 11 July 1960, ACDP K076/1). For Barzel about to take a trip to Brussels and London, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 10 July 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>269</sup> The politicians mentioned here included chancellors, ministers, parliamentarians and party luminaries. For the report of Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) about his stay in Washington and New York from 17-23 May 1970, during which time he took part in the 1970 Washington Investment Seminar staged by the Council of the United States Investment Community Inc. (Washington DC), which included eighty-five guests from overseas (among them representatives of almost all the leading private German banks, but no American guests), and also visited a number of firms, see Lambsdorff's *Aktennotiz*, 29 May 1970, ACDP K037/1. For the talk of Alois Mertes with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger (whom he had known well since his year at Harvard in 1968-69 and with whom he stood in personal contact) on foreign policy issues (also on Barzel's trip to Moscow), which occurred in a Washington DC club in the context of a small meal hosted by David Rockefeller (Chase Manhattan Bank, NY) (including, among others, Antoine Pinay, former French Prime, Foreign and Finance Minister; a former Lebanese Finance Minister; and the Chairman of the Christian Democratic *Fraktion* in the Swiss National Council and *Ständerat*), see Alois Mertes, Personal *Vermerk* (which he distributed), 3 December 1971, ACDP K025/1. On the *Amerikareise* of Prof. Karl Carstens (CDU MdB) of 7-14 April 1973, during which he stayed three days in Washington DC and two days in New York City, gathered general impressions and conducted numerous talks, including on a variety of trans-Atlantic and other foreign affairs issues, with members of the government and administration (Secretary of Defense Richardson; Deputy Secretary of State Rush; National Security Advisor Kissinger; Sonnenfeldt; Stoessel; Tarr; Sutterlin; as well as nine further members of the State Department's European Department), members of Congress (u.a. Sen. Fulbright), a representative of the trade unions (Mr. Lovestone); the German *Geschäftsträger* in Washington (Herr Noebel) and further members of the embassy; several German correspondents; the German UN Mission (Amb. Gehloff); two under-general secretaries of the UN (Morese and Guyer); and five ambassadors accredited by the UN, including the future president of the General Assembly from Ecuador, see Carstens, confidential report on USA trip, 7-14 April 1973, dated 15 April 1973, ACDP K028/2. On his January-February 1974 trip to the United States, *Bundesminister* Egon Bahr had lunch with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and conducted talks in Washington about US policy in which he presented official Bonn views.

<sup>270</sup> For instance, Chancellor Schmidt's trip to the US in December 1974, shortly before Birrenbach's own *Blitzreise*, led Birrenbach to decide against requesting a meeting at about the same time with the Secretary of Defense. The West German embassy (in coordination with the US State Department and the Bonn AA), responsible for looking after visitors at least in Washington, attempted to coordinate such trips for Birrenbach and other visitors (Staden fs to KB (from Washington DC to Bonn AA), 18 March 1974, ACDP K184/1 and Staden fs (Washington DC) to Bonn AA, 23 April 1975, ACDP K155/1). For the

conducted by Birrenbach with respect to temporal length, thematic breadth and quality and sheer quantity of talk partners, yet the phenomenon testifies to the fact that, like Birrenbach, other prominent Germans were seeking to gain first-hand impressions and experiences in the United States, meeting with key American political personalities and giving talks in venues like the Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>271</sup> The preamble episode of 1963 highlights the breadth and complexity of the existing web, with MdB Herbert Wehner (SPD), along with Birrenbach, functioning as a central figure in the preamble's inception and parliamentary history and with foreign influence being exercised not only on Birrenbach but also on figures such as Majonica, Erhard, Carstens, Erler and Falkenhausen. What had emerged was an effective transnational political network,

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“uninterrupted stream of visitors” from the Federal Republic at the moment in Washington DC, “not least as a result of the NATO conference in Ottawa,” that the German embassy had to “look after [*betreuen*],” see Robert Borchardt, West German Embassy (Washington DC), to KB, 12 June 1963, ACDP K157/1. For the efforts of the West German embassy in Washington DC to schedule and prepare Birrenbach's visit (already postponed once) and appointments against the backdrop of upcoming visits by Minister Ehmke (with a delegation), Minister-President Kohl and MdB Leisler-Kiep and the expectation that “also the following weeks and months would be similarly booked [*besetzt*],” see Amb. Berndt von Staden to KB, 24 January 1974, ACDP K184/1. Although he made significantly less use of it than the Washington DC embassy, the West German embassy in London also helped Birrenbach with the logistics of trips to Britain, including advice on timing, setting up appointments and coordinating such trips with those of other prominent German visitors, such as that of Gerhard Schröder (CDU) in 1972 (KB to West German Ambassador Hase, London, 2 March 1972, ACDP K068/1). For Birrenbach providing Leussink, the *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* (in response to a request and following a talk Birrenbach had a few days earlier in that ministry), the names of personalities in the United States whom he advised Leussink to see in Washington besides the official contacts he would have anyway in his capacity as minister (Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Edward David, the President's Scientific Advisor; and John Forster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Pentagon) and Birrenbach's offering to answer any further questions prior to Leussink's trip to the United States, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1.

<sup>271</sup> In certain instances, these other West German visitors met with some of the same American figures as Birrenbach on such trips, with for instance those operating in the political realm arranging talks with many of the most prominent personalities in this field, whether Vice Presidents (e.g. Gerald Ford), Secretaries of State (e.g. Henry Kissinger), Secretaries of Defense or key Senators (e.g. Symington, Nunn, Kennedy). Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU, gave a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations in 1974. On his trip to the United States in April 1973, Karl Carstens (CDU MdB) gave addresses in Washington DC at the Mid-Atlantic Club (see Chapter 8) and the Washington Institute for Foreign Affairs and took part in three functions of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Georgetown University) as well as a function of the American Council on Germany in New York City (Carstens, confidential report on his USA trip, 7-14 April 1973, dated 15 April 1973, ACDP K028/2).

including and maintained by Birrenbach and a significant number of other German Atlanticists, working to implement broadly Atlanticist goals, even if they occasionally differed on details.<sup>272</sup> A sense of the importance of this Atlanticist political network is vital to understanding political life and development in the Federal Republic.<sup>273</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> Birrenbach, Wehner, Jean Monnet and Max Kohnstamm, the four central figures in the preamble's inception, were the participants in the key meeting on 26-27 February 1963 at the Hotel Königshof in Bonn. For Birrenbach, this meeting was the "crucial hour," when he and Wehner (likewise a member of the Monnet Committee), in agreement with Monnet and Kohnstamm, had "given birth to this idea" of the preamble (KB to Jürgen Bellers, Munich, 26 July 1978, ACDP K185/2 and KB to Wehner, MdB, Chairman of the SPD, 10 July 1978, ACDP K185/2). On Birrenbach as "one of the two German authors at that time of this preamble," see KB to Robert Bowie, 14 June 1972, ACDP K160/2. Ultimately, it was Birrenbach and Wehner who introduced the initiative for the preamble into their Union and SPD *Fractionen*, respectively. Henceforth, they also took part in the crucial parliamentary work and negotiations (admittedly not our central interest here and not them alone) to secure the preamble's attachment by the *Bundestag* to the Élysée Treaty. For Guttenberg's later remark that "without Birrenbach there probably would not have been a preamble at all," see Patz, *Parlamentarische Kontrolle der Außenpolitik* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976). However, at least as significant from the historical standpoint as exactly identifying Birrenbach's (and particular others') central role as one of the authors and key figures in the preamble episode is the extent to which this preamble emerged and triumphed in the context and through the efforts of a larger, thickly interwoven, transnational Atlanticist coalition, located both within and outside of the Federal Republic and characterized by constant consultations and a variety of ideas and proposals (here including, for instance, the general concept of interpretive parliamentary declarations) transferred around through its multiplicity of channels. For Shepard Stone having had "long talks" in New York with Brentano, Krone, Erler, Freiherr von Falkenhausen, "and others," his belief that "all of us are gradually coming to a common point of view," and his desire to see Birrenbach on an upcoming trip to the Federal Republic (Bonn and Berlin), see Stone to KB, 10 May 1963, ACDP K157/1. For foreign pressure and influence, beyond mere public expressions of displeasure, being exercised broadly by their contacts, especially from the United States, among them from the Kennedy administration, and also the other Western allies, with respect to the Élysée Treaty and the preamble not only on Birrenbach but further on German politicians and figures also including Majonica, Erhard and Carstens, see Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, *Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 1945-1966* (Düsseldorf, Droste, 1983). The preamble episode also highlights the value of Birrenbach's excellent relations with leading like-minded Social Democrats, here Wehner but especially personalities like Fritz Erler, that helped secure widespread agreement to the preamble. Broadly speaking, the episode reflected inter-party cooperation between Union, SPD and FDP members of the *Bundestag*, especially within the Foreign Affairs Committee. However, differences on other particular issues with fellow SPD Atlanticists did exist. For Birrenbach's openly expressed differences with Helmut Schmidt regarding the solution of the problem of the non-nuclear powers in NATO, see KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to *Bundesminister* Heinrich Krone, Bonn, 2 June 1965, ACDP K017/1. For Erler's opinions on the MLF that deviated slightly from Birrenbach's, see KB to Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder, 4 April 1966, ACDP K117/1.

<sup>273</sup> Among the prominent Atlanticist-minded German political personalities with whom Birrenbach interacted, and in some cases had excellent relations, in the CDU were Ludwig Erhard (Chancellor and Economics Minister), Gerhard Schröder (Foreign and Defense Minister and, from 1969, Chairman of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee), Kai-Uwe von Hassel (Defence Minister, 1963-66), Heinrich von Brentano (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, 1961-64; former member of the Monnet Committee; yet probably somewhat ambivalent), Hermann Kopf (Chairman of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee, 1960-69), Ernst Majonica (Chairman of the AKV, 1960-69); in the SPD Fritz Erler, Herbert Wehner and Helmut Schmidt. As demonstrated with regard to Birrenbach himself, the existence of the myriad channels provided by the Atlanticist network and the political activities of other German

In particular, German Atlanticism and the Atlanticist political network played an important role in undermining the system of *Kanzlerdemokratie* dominant in the Federal Republic, particularly under Adenauer. This *Kanzlerdemokratie* was characterized most obviously by the authoritarian and secretive governing style of “*dem Alten*.” Especially with regard to foreign policy, the decision-making process centered on Adenauer and his small inner circle based in the Chancellery.<sup>274</sup> Not only the opposition, but also coalition partners, party colleagues in cabinet and *Bundestag* and, at times, even the foreign policy bureaucracy were largely excluded.<sup>275</sup> Adenauer harbored a deep pessimism about both the human condition in general and the political immaturity of the German people in particular, potentially devastating for the vulnerable and mistrusted Federal Republic. Therefore, he considered it necessary to skirt democratic niceties, to ignore various practical, constitutional and legislative objections and to manipulate his colleagues and the structures of the infant Federal Republic to shape effective policy. The *Kanzlerdemokratie* enjoyed a number of vital personal, institutional, structural and historical foundations: Adenauer’s prestige and the notion of his infallible success at

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Atlanticists facilitated the penetration of especially American, but also other foreign, outlooks and ideas on foreign policy into the West German political system. For the immediate impact of trips to the United States on West German travelers with respect to their perceptions and ideas on the US and foreign policy, in this case that Brentano belatedly realized, “in particular on the basis of his America trip,” that “the 14 January [de Gaulle press conference] has been a fatal blow for us all,” but “many others still not,” see KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. Such relatively uninterrupted flows of political personalities and communication represented one of the most salient, and probably salubrious, elements in German-American relations since World War II. As with Birrenbach, these elite-level contacts and activities of certain other West Germans with and with regard to Americans and the United States further contributed in the Federal Republic to a better understanding of American perspectives and the general situation of and in the United States. On transnational relations, in addition to those works cited in Chapter 1 (page 4, note 7), see Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London: Verso, 1984).

<sup>274</sup> For instance, Hans Globke and Heinrich Krone, as well as Walter Hallstein and Josef Jansen.

<sup>275</sup> With respect to the *Bundestag*, this also applied to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Foreign policy bureaucracy is here to be understood as the *Auswärtige Amt* and the embassies abroad. For instance, the AA (under Schröder) was barely initiated into the negotiations regarding the Élysée Treaty and itself depicted the treaty as a type of “*Romanze*” between two old men. On this situation, see for instance Ronald Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).

home and abroad; the Chancellor's independence and broad powers, ascribed to him in the *Grundgesetz*, to determine policy vis-à-vis cabinet and *Bundestag*; continuities in tradition and mentality, especially those noted in Chapter 3 with respect to *Abendland*, as well as the political socialization of most Germans under authoritarian forms of rule and politics; and the typical dominance of the executive in foreign policy-making, a dominance reinforced by the early history of the Federal Republic.<sup>276</sup> The decline of this authoritarian-democratic form of government in foreign policy, signs of which were discernable at the latest by the end of the 1950s, can be traced to a number of electoral, institutional and generational developments.<sup>277</sup>

However, in addition to such developments, the phenomenon of German Atlanticism also helped undermine the foundations of the *Kanzlerdemokratie* and significantly contributed to its decline. The preamble episode of 1963, in which Birrenbach and the Atlanticist network played such a crucial role, represented a milestone in this process. A key factor here was the access to and control of knowledge and information. With its new channels of communication, especially provided by contacts abroad, and its extensive knowledge-creating and -dispensing infrastructure, the Atlanticist network helped break down the ability of Adenauer and future Chancellors to

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<sup>276</sup> Initially, the Chancellery had handled all foreign relations (through the High Commission). Furthermore, Adenauer had become the first Foreign Minister upon the reestablishment of a Foreign Ministry in 1951. Of course, the general air of secrecy surrounding foreign policy-making also lends itself well to executive management.

<sup>277</sup> The decline was identifiable at the latest by the "presidential crisis" in 1959. Contributing developments included: Adenauer's reduced effectiveness as an electoral motor (evident with the outcome of the September 1961 elections); the creation and fortifying during the 1950s by the respective *Bundestagsfraktionen* of their own *Arbeitskreise* (e.g. the Union's AKV established in 1953) to facilitate debate, including on foreign policy and security affairs; and, finally, the generational shift in German politics which saw the rise within the Union of a younger (born in the 20<sup>th</sup> century) and more independent leadership cadre during the 1950s.

maintain a far-reaching secrecy beyond the Chancellery with respect to foreign affairs.<sup>278</sup>

Birrenbach himself explicitly argued that far-reaching foreign policy decisions, specifically those impacting Atlanticist affairs, could not be taken by tiny circles without input from the *Bundestagsfraktion*. His efforts do not seem to have been motivated by opposition to authoritarian principles *per se*, rather they stemmed at this time almost entirely from his opposition to Adenauer's particular policies.<sup>279</sup> Thanks in no small part

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<sup>278</sup> The ability of the German Atlanticists to challenge some of the most fundamental bases of the *Kanzlerdemokratie* was founded to a great extent on their being part of something larger, namely on their links with the broader Atlanticist network that made it increasingly possible for Birrenbach and others to follow, for instance, international negotiations or to register the decline in Chancellor Adenauer's international prestige and the consternation his policies were sowing abroad, including among the Americans and British. The Anglo-Saxon desire to have Adenauer replaced by a suitable successor, for example by Erhard, was also transmitted through this network. Later on, the state of the Soviet-American negotiations with respect to the NPT was a regular subject of Birrenbach's talks with his American contacts. For John McCloy (ACDA) informing Birrenbach that the American government was not pressing Bonn to sign the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Bonn, 26 November 1969, ACDP K022/1. On Birrenbach learning "from the American side" that the Italian ambassador had presented a standpoint on "the European option" (NPT) a few days ago in the State Department equivalent to "the German view," see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 16 May 1967, ACDP K139/2. For Birrenbach learning in Washington DC, "and not from the German side," that the American administration had been told that the *Grundvertrag* (*Ostpolitik*) would be initialed and perhaps signed very soon (i.e. still before the approaching elections) as well as more information on this theme and for Birrenbach learning in the United States of the Berlin Senate's efforts in Washington to secure an unlimited right to vote for all Berlin *Abgeordnete*, see KB to Gerhard Schröder, Chairman of the [*Bundestag*] Foreign Affairs Committee, *Bundesminister a.D.*, Bonn, 11 October 1972, ACDP K027/1 and KB, dictated by phone, Hotel Nassauer Hof, Wiesbaden, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 10 October 1972, ACDP K026/1.

<sup>279</sup> Birrenbach's political activities themselves, undertaken not from an executive position but from that of a member of the *Bundestag*, heralded and offer an overview of some of the efforts towards the increasing autonomy of the *Unionsfraktion*, part and parcel of the decline of the *Kanzlerdemokratie*. Thanks in part to the Atlanticist network, the *Bundestag* as a body became a more active participant in international affairs during this period. This can be seen, for instance, in the preamble episode surrounding the Élysée Treaty. Even in the lead-up to the conclusion of that treaty, Birrenbach, along with other members of the *Unionsfraktion*, were endorsing the accession of Britain into the EEC as well as insisting on a government declaration before the *Bundestag* and a plenary debate to address the speculation surrounding the government's foreign policy, the role of Britain in Europe and the Franco-German Treaty. Ultimately, as described, Adenauer was effectively compelled by the *Bundestag*, including members from the SPD, FDP and many within the Union and especially from within the Foreign Affairs Committee, to accept the preamble before that entity would ratify the treaty. In general, Birrenbach did consistently push to expand the circle of foreign policy decision-makers. In explaining the "sharpness" with which he had intervened against Adenauer in the meeting of the *Fraktion* of 5 February 1963, Birrenbach criticized Adenauer's "irresponsible" account of ["does not correspond to the facts"] and the Chancellor's "own, not low, share" in the "crisis." As he put it, "I am of the opinion that this type of depiction does not correspond to the importance of the *Fraktion*" (KB to Brentano, 7 February 1963, ACDP K010/1). As of July 1964, an "extremely concerned [*beunruhigt*]" Birrenbach pushed, even against former Chancellor Adenauer and the CSU's Franz Josef Strauss, for the expansion of foreign policy discussions, arguing that major foreign



to the activities and institutions of the German Atlanticists and the larger Atlanticist network, there appeared in the society of the Federal Republic a group of individuals, including but not limited to parliamentarians, that was not only opposed to notions of *Abendland* and relatively trusting of their Western, particularly Anglo-Saxon, allies but also increasingly better informed about, experienced and confident in foreign affairs and, consequently, more willing to challenge Adenauer and other authority figures in this field. Looking beyond the domain of foreign policy-making, one can even argue that, in the process, the Atlanticist network played a significant role in transforming the CDU away from a subordinate party dominated by strong executive leadership and in strengthening West German democracy as a whole.<sup>280</sup>

#### H. Conclusion

During the 1960s and well into the 1970s, Kurt Birrenbach actively engaged in an intensive Atlanticist political activity, consisting not only of strictly parliamentary work but also of regular exploratory trips and special missions abroad and the maintenance of

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policy proposals and decisions that would influence “the fate of the European idea, the entire German foreign policy, our relationship to the United States as well as... the unity and future of the party” could not be taken by the party presidium or the *Fraktionsvorstand* alone. Rather the *Fraktion*, “on the basis of a clear and comprehensive declaration of the Chancellor and Foreign Minister,” had to be heard and “faits accomplis” prevented, with such a gathering preceded by “meetings in small circles of those who can make a contribution to the matter from knowledge and experience” (KB to Barzel, 10 July 1964, ACDP K013/1). For Birrenbach on the rapidly approaching need for the *Fraktion*, at first in the smallest of circles, to discuss and decide what position to take on the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1 and KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, Bonn, Bundeshaus, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1).

<sup>280</sup> This was true, for instance, insofar as some saw the weight of the office of Chancellor as a weakness in the young democracy. It should also be noted that in the struggle over Adenauer’s successor, the members of the Chancellor’s own party frequently disobeyed his wishes. Ultimately, the Atlanticist network played a significant role in this overall waning of Adenauer’s power and authority, including within the Union, and the strengthened opposition he faced, also internally, in the later years. On the history of the Union, see Arnold Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU: The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960); Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945-1976* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1977); Hans-Otto Kleinmann, *Geschichte der CDU, 1945-1982* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993); and Jürgen Domes, *Mehrheitsfraktion und Bundesregierung: Aspekte des Verhältnisses der Fraktion der CDU/CSU im 2. and 3. Deutschen Bundestag zum Kabinett Adenauer* (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964).

an extensive international political network of prominent contacts. While encompassing much of the Western world, such activities focused primarily on the United States. Birrenbach's efforts were carried out within and significantly impacted by an evolving domestic political framework, determined by a number of factors including the changing governmental coalitions. However, as already pointed out, Birrenbach, while interesting in his own right, primarily serves us, given his key role, as a window into the larger German Atlanticist world, here its specifically political activities. In particular, Birrenbach's activities highlight the extent to which a trans-Atlantic, transnational political network, the construction and maintenance of which was facilitated by technological advances and the Atlanticist infrastructure, had emerged in the post-1945 period. In its promotion of Atlanticist goals, this network functioned primarily to open up new channels of communication between nations, in this case particularly the United States and the Federal Republic, through which knowledge, information, encouragement and support flowed, influence and pressure were exercised and a process of mutual "penetration" occurred. Major effects within the Federal Republic included not only the strengthening of the German Atlanticism and the weakening of *Abendland* perspectives but also the related undermining of the executive authority, especially Adenauer's *Kanzlerdemokratie*, and an expanding of the role of non-executive actors in the policy-making process. Finally, Birrenbach presents us with an image of the German Atlanticist politician as one engaging in extensive foreign travel, enjoying wide-ranging foreign contacts and relying on the scholarly output of the Atlanticist infrastructure, all of which enabled him, even if not occupying the highest state offices or regularly appearing at the center of high-level political events, to become a factor in West German politics.

## **Chapter 7: Reaching a Broader Audience - Atlanticist Publications and Public Relations Actions**

### **A. Introduction**

Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists faced a difficult task in their battle with Occidentalism in the key area of publications and public relations. In Chapter Two, we briefly touched on the considerable efforts of the *Abendland* proponents to propagate their worldview. In Chapter 4, we pointed out the essentially elite nature of the Atlanticist infrastructure and its related network. However, to operate effectively in the Western world of the post-World War II era, German Atlanticism simply could not confine its focus to a relatively small, avid Atlanticist elite at home and abroad. To influence policies within and relations between modern democracies, constant propaganda efforts had to be aimed at a more widespread audience, encompassing at least, and perhaps especially, educated opinion and, at times, to look even beyond that stratum to include genuinely mass opinion. The audience of the German Atlanticists in this sense stretched well beyond the borders of the Federal Republic to encompass nations on both sides of the Atlantic, in both Europe and North America, and included especially the population of the United States. In this context, the Atlanticists consciously functioned within a framework consisting of relatively open societies, with their at least ostensibly great freedoms (“the Free World”) and lack of overt government intervention, thus facilitating propaganda work and the unhindered circulation of information while also serving as the precondition for a critical “battle of the minds.”

Activities related to public relations became an important element of German Atlanticist endeavours and part of a larger effort being undertaken simultaneously by their fellow Atlanticists in other Western countries. In some ways, the emphasis on

sound public relations and the crucial political force of public opinion was larger than simply the cause of Atlanticism. As with many of their other activities, the German Atlanticists saw their public relations actions as a vital support for the Federal Republic, for they were convinced that democracies required a solid foundation of a well-informed (and supportive) public opinion. On the whole, however, whatever their pretensions to simply presenting and contributing to necessary, objective knowledge and enlightenment, the German Atlanticists worked assiduously to ensure that it was their own cause, its worldview, conceptions, tenets, interests and goals, rather than some “balanced” assessment, that was effectively and convincingly propagated and promoted in the consciousness among the general public at home and abroad via the full range of modern media, including speeches, television, radio and print. As usual, Birrenbach’s own extensive activities, not surprising given his earlier journalistic endeavors, offer a pretty good idea of what the important German Atlanticist undertakings in this field entailed.

### *B. Influencing the Educated West German Public*

One way to promulgate the Atlanticist worldview amongst an interested and educated public was through the staging of relatively small functions, including conferences, colloquia, seminars, and *Vorträge*, specifically designed for that purpose. Such functions could influence a broader audience than would otherwise have been involved in the Atlanticist world, whether as members of Atlanticist organizations or participants in the various Atlanticist activities described in previous chapters. As one example of this, we can point to the numerous *Vorträge* staged by the *Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft* (e.V.), usually in the larger German cities, intended to support that organization’s main purpose, the promoting of the NATO idea. Likewise, the

*Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* carried out a program of regular *Vorträge* by prominent British and German experts, including politicians, *Wirtschaftler*, journalists and academics (among them historians and sociologists). These speakers dealt with issues of political, economic, scientific and cultural interest in talks explicitly designed to make a broader West German public aware of British issues and problems. In both cases, the DAatG and the DEG were aided by their somewhat decentralized structure in that their local branches played a significant role in staging these functions. Moreover, the series of evening speech functions at the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* offered prominent invited personalities, both German and foreign (including many Anglo-Saxons), the chance to address openly on an acutely important theme of their choice an assembly of the members and guests of the DGAP in Bonn, therefore a German audience particularly interested in foreign policy, and to answer questions in the following discussion.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> American speakers before the DGAP included: George Ball (April 1962 as Under Secretary of State on “The Developing Atlantic Partnership” and February 1973 on “An American View of Europe”); SACEUR Andrew Goodpaster (October 1970 on “The Defense of Western Europe in the 70s”); SACEUR Gen. Alexander Haig (October 1975); Amb. Martin Hillenbrand (US Ambassador in Bonn); Sen. Edward Kennedy; US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (“The New Frontier and the New Europe”); Gen. Lauris Norstad (October 1973 on “The New Strategic Conception for the Defense of the Free World”); and Eugene Rostow. British speakers before the DGAP included Alistair Buchan; Roy Jenkins (including as President of the EC Commission in December 1977 on “The Integration of the Community in the Face of Enlargement”); Reginald Maudling; Lord Soames; Wyndham White; and Kenneth Younger. German speakers before the DGAP included Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf (January 1977 on “The British Question: Transitional Problems or *Dauerkrise*?”, in the Hotel Königshof, Bonn); Prof. Wilhelm Grewe (Ambassador to NATO, January 1967 on “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons on the *Politik*”); Wilhelm Haferkamp (Vice President of the EC Commission, February 1978 on “The Role of the EC in International Relations”); Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy Agency in the framework of the OECD in Paris); Major General Ulrich de Maizière (“The Federal Republic in the Strategic World Situation”); Gen. Gerd Schmückle (Director of the International Military Staff (NATO, Brussels), November 1977 on “*Rüstungsdynamik* and Arms Control”); and Dr. Immo Stabreit (Member of the International Energy Agency in Paris, March 1978 on “Securing of the Energy Supply: International Cooperation or Distribution Struggle?”). Other personalities speaking before the DGAP included: Giovanni Agnelli (President of FIAT, May 1977 on “Europe as Task and Challenge for Italy”); Manlio Brosio; Amb. Valentin Falin (USSR Ambassador to the Federal Republic, October 1977 on “Economic and Political Aspects of the *Entspannungspolitik* in the Relations between the Soviet Union and Federal Republic of Germany”); Per Federspiel (President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, “The Influence of the

Meanwhile, in 1964, the DGAP Research Institute began staging conferences, colloquia and seminars specifically designed to spread to a broader public the results of the study groups and related activities. Here, members of the study groups as well as other prominent experts and *Wissenschaftler*, German and foreign, made presentations to gatherings of German civil servants, military officers, *Wissenschaftlern* and journalists.<sup>2</sup> Birrenbach himself spoke at various relatively small functions in places like Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Munich and Münster, including in a diversity of venues such as the *Übersee-Tag* (Hamburg), the *Amerika-Häuser*, as well as university and business settings, on a diversity of foreign policy themes, always attempting to spread the Atlanticist message and ideas.<sup>3</sup>

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European Parliamentary Assemblies on the Political Development in Europe”); Nahum Goldman (“Israel and the Near East”); Spanish Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Prof. Fraga Iribarne (March 1976 on “Spain at the Crossroads”); Petrus Lardinois (Member of the European Commission in Brussels for questions of agricultural policy, December 1975); OECD Secretary General Jonkheer Emile van Lennep; Joseph Luns (Netherlands); Giovanni Malagodi (leader of the Italian Liberal Party and former Italian Minister of Finance); Amb. Pietro Quaroni (Italy); Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoep (February 1976 on “Dutch Foreign Policy: Positive Partnership”); Amb. Byron Theodoropoulos (General Secretary in the Greek Foreign Ministry, April 1978 on “Current Problems of Greek Foreign Policy”); Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (May 1976 on “Europe after the Summit Meeting in Luxembourg”); and French Amb. Olivier Wormser (March 1975 on “The Change in World Economic Relations in the Past Twenty-Five Years”). For the Tindemans speech, the ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of the EC member states were invited to and took part in the function. The speeches of Haferkamp and Amb. Theodoropoulos were staged together with the Press and Information Office of the Commission of the European Communities in Bonn. For *Vorträge*, with themes intended to be of particular “*Aktualität*” and including those of a political or economic-political nature, as an important field of activity for the DGAP, see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. Members of the DGAP received invitations to its *Vorträge*-functions and later, as far as possible, the texts of the *Vorträge* themselves so that those members not present could also familiarize themselves with the content.

<sup>2</sup> About forty individuals were invited to each of these DGAP functions.

<sup>3</sup> Some examples: On 7 May 1963 (a Tuesday), Birrenbach gave a speech about “Ideas on the Overcoming of the Brussels Crisis” in the Hamburg *Rathaus* at the annual *Übersee-Tag* of the *Übersee-Club* (Hamburg). This and the other speeches from that occasion were reprinted in a booklet (*Reden am Übersee-Tag 1963*, ACDP K077/2). On 11 October 1965, Birrenbach gave the *Festvortrag* for Columbus Day on “The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: Unsolved Problems of an Alliance” in the *Amerika-Haus* in Munich on the occasion of his receiving the Columbus Medal. On 15 February 1966, Birrenbach spoke at the University of Bonn on “The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic in the Changed World” at a function staged by the *Europäisch-Föderalistischen Studentenverband*. In May 1966, Birrenbach spoke in the “Mittwochgespräch,” giving a talk in the auditorium of the *Stephanienschule* in Düsseldorf on, again, “German Foreign Policy in a Changed World.” Also in May 1966, this time on a

As was the case with their counterparts abroad, the German Atlanticists and the overarching milieu of their infrastructure generated an impressive quantity and variety of publications. Comprising one key segment of these products were the high-quality, scholarly works, including books, pamphlets and journal articles. These were primarily targeted at a specialized audience including scholars, practitioners and a relatively narrow public with a keen interest in international, especially trans-Atlantic, relations.

Birrenbach, while not a scholar himself, contributed as an author to this high-quality literature of the Atlanticist movement, in large part through his copious articles on questions of international politics that appeared in the Federal Republic especially in the journals *Europa-Archiv* and *Außenpolitik*.<sup>4</sup> Founded in the postwar period, in 1950, the latter was a very respected quarterly journal marked by a distinctly Atlanticist bent. In October 1965, Birrenbach accepted an invitation to become an advisory editor (*Mitherausgeber*) of *Außenpolitik*, thus supporting the journal “*mit Rat und Tat*” and especially taking part in annual meetings with fellow *Herausgebern* and the managing editor, Prof. Heinrich Bechtoldt (a political scientist), to examine the journal’s general conception and to offer new reflections. However, it was the former that was the most significant high-quality journal to emerge after 1945 from the world of German

Atlanticism. A prestigious, internationally respected journal of foreign affairs, the

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Saturday afternoon, Birrenbach gave a *Referat*, once more on the theme “The Federal Republic and the United States: Problems of an Alliance,” at a discussion led by the president of the *Deutsch-Amerikanischen Gesellschaft* (Cologne), Alfred Neven DuMont, in the *Amerika-Haus* in Cologne in the presence of the mayor and the American consul. In February 1967, Birrenbach gave a *Vortrag* in Münster about the theme “Europe and the German Question.” On 10 July 1967, Birrenbach delivered a talk before about 130 listeners of the CDU-*Wirtschaftsrat* in the Great Hall at the *Industrie-Club* in Düsseldorf on “The Near East Crisis in World-Political View.” Finally, Birrenbach was also invited by the *Vorstand* of the Deutschen Bank AG Düsseldorf and scheduled to attend a *Kundenfrühstück* on 2 June 1975 where he would speak “before a circle of befriended *Herren*” on the foreign political situation, specifically on his own chosen theme “The Change of the World Constellation.” Likewise, as of May 1982, Karl Carstens had given a speech recently at the *Übersee-Tag* in Hamburg on “The Importance of Common Values and Interests with America.”

<sup>4</sup> For a not entirely complete but still extensive list of Birrenbach’s publications, see file ACDP K205/8.

*Europa-Archiv* was founded in 1946 (initially in Frankfurt) by Wilhelm Cornides and was published as a *Halbmonatsschrift* (twice a month) by the *Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* as its own organ. In addition to myriad essays like those produced by Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, this publication also contained reprints of speeches, copies of important documents and a timeline of significant events in contemporary international affairs.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Birrenbach's articles published in the *Europa-Archiv* included: "Großbritannien und die Montanunion" (3/1963, on the question of Britain's entrance into the *Montanunion*); "Die Erhaltung der Dynamik der EEC: Deutsche Gedanken zur Überwindung der Brüsseler Krise" (11/1963); "Partnerschaft und Konsultation in der NATO: Grundsatzfragen und aktuelle Probleme der amerikanisch-europäischen Partnerschaft" (23/1963); "Aktuelle Fragen der Deutschland-Politik" (8/1967, on the problem of Europe and the German Question); "Partner oder Rivalen? Das Verhältnis zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Westeuropa" (3/1973); and "Der europäisch-amerikanische Dialog" (20/1973). A version of "Großbritannien und die Montanunion" was also published under the title "Nach der Debatte" on 11 February 1963 in the *Europa-Union Dienst* (Bonn, Press Information and Commentary, published by the *Europa-Union Deutschland*, ACDP K077/2) and as "Nach der Bündnis-Debatte im Bundestag" in the *Argentinian Freien Presse* of 19 February 1963 (Buenos Aires, *Verlagsleitung*: Walter Linne). "Aktuelle Fragen der Deutschland-Politik" later appeared in *The German Tribune* (Hamburg) as "Current Aspects of the German Question" (9 September 1967). Other authors of articles published in the *Europa-Archiv* (foreign scholars among them), included, for instance, Karl Birnbaum ("Eine Politik der Bündnisfreiheit"); François Bondy (Zurich, 1977), Dieter Braun (SWP, 1974); Heinrich von Brentano ("Kontinuität und Dissonanzen der deutschen Politik"); Richard Butwell ("Wandlungen und Kontinuität im sozialistischen Birma"); Wilhelm Cornides ("Die vermauerte Wilhelmstraße"); Fritz Erler ("Die deutsche Außenpolitik nach dem Abkommen von Nassau"); Dr. Yair Evron (Hebrew University Jerusalem (subject area International Relations), 1975 on Israeli foreign policy after the Yom Kippur War); Dr. Hubert Feigl (SWP, 1973), Karl Kaiser, Klaus Ritter (SWP, 1970, "European Peace Order as a Development Problem of World-Political Infrastructure"), Ulrich Scheuner (numerous), Helmut Schmidt (1985), Marshall Shulman (1969, "Soviet Proposals for a European Security Conference (1966-69)"); Hans-Peter Schwarz (University of Hamburg, 1972, "Security Conference and Western Security Community"), Ian Smart (1975), and Wolfgang Wagner (1968). Though not a government publication, the EA did publish articles by personalities in the governmental bureaucracy, including *Ministerialdirektor* Klaus Blech (leader of the West German delegation during the Geneva negotiations phase of the CSCE, 1975) and *Ministerialdirektor* Günther van Well (head of the AA's political section as well as representative of the federal government in the EC Political Committee, 1976 on "The Development of a Common Near East Policy of the Nine"). Authors of contributions and reports to the *Europa-Archiv*, as well as translators for the EA and *Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik*, received *Honorare*, with especially qualified authors receiving larger sums. On the rise in personnel costs and technical production costs leading to an expected increase in the overall production costs of the *Europa-Archiv* for 1965, see Draft *Wirtschaftsplan* 1965 for the *Europa-Archiv*, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2. On the subscription price of the *Europa-Archiv* rising, beginning on 1 January 1963, from the hitherto DM 56 to DM 65, see Economic Plan 1963 of the Department *Europa-Archiv* in the Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH, ACDP K010/2. However, members of the DGAP regularly received the *Europa-Archiv* free through the mail. The full title of the EA was *Europa-Archiv: Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik*. For this subtitle of the *Europa-Archiv* underscoring a widened theme circle, an element of the journal's continued expansion ["*Ausbau*"] (including, from 1961 to 1962, more pages of text and a greater number of contributions while reducing the number of pages devoted to documentation), see Report about the *Europa-Archiv* and the *Jahrbücher für Internationale*



The Atlanticist organizations, particularly the research institutes, in which Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists participated also generated a considerable number of high-quality books and pamphlets. One sub-genre here comprised those publications that essentially represented verbatim reports and records of the Atlanticist activities and functions. For instance, a substantial amount of the high-quality publications originating with the German Atlanticists, whether in the form of books or journal contributions, consisted of collections of reports, papers and speeches from the public sessions and the panels of the various regular and one-time Atlanticist conferences, symposiums and seminars we have touched on in Chapter 4. As an example, the public proceedings of the German-American, Königswinter and NATO Parliamentarians Conferences were all regularly published in book form in the wake of

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*Politik*, on Point 1 of the *Präsidialsitzung*, undated but apparently from mid-1963, ACDP K014/2. For the importance of the *Europa-Archiv* among the activities of the DGAP, see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, "Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder," intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.

Birrenbach's articles published in *Außenpolitik* included: "Deutschland-Amerika: Probleme einer Allianz" (2/1966); "Deutscher Erdgas-Röhren-Kontrakt mit Moskau" (written under the pseudonym Karl Wangemann, 5/1970); and "Europas Sicherheit in der veränderten Welt" (3/73). Other pieces published in *Außenpolitik* included Ernst Schneider's "Kennedy-Runde und Welthandelskonferenz" (1964); Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz's "Ohne England kein Großmarkt Europa" (1967); and Gerhard Wettig's "Funktionen eines Sperrvertrages in der sowjetischen Politik" (1968). *Außenpolitik* was subtitled a *Zeitschrift für Internationale Fragen*. For Birrenbach's assessment of *Außenpolitik* as "an outstanding journal," see KB to Zbigniew Rapacki, 19 December 1975, ACDP K070/1.

Although not regular outlets, Birrenbach published an article entitled "Die NATO und die Sicherheit Europas" in *Wehrkunde* (2/1970, Munich, founded in 1952) as well as one entitled "Mit der Nixon-Doktrin leben-aber wie?" in *Europa Union* (December 1970). *Wehrkunde* was the organ of the *Gesellschaft für Wehrkunde* and billed itself as a "Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen." Other articles and essays by Birrenbach were published as parts of larger books, including "Kulturpolitik im Rahmen der deutschen Außenpolitik" (*Jahrbuch der ausländischen Kulturbeziehungen*, 4/1967); "NATO-Politik der Ära Nixon" (in *Außenpolitik nach der Wahl des 6. Bundestages*, Leske-Verlag, October 1969); and "Politik und Modell" (forward to *Europas Zukunft-Europas Alternativen*, Leske-Verlag, 1969). *Außenpolitik nach der Wahl des 6. Bundestages* included contributions from eight prominent politicians, *Wissenschaftler*, *Wirtschaftler* and publicists (besides Birrenbach, also Albrecht Düren, Otmar Emminger, Hartmut Jäckel, Ulrich Scheuner, Klaus Schütz, Theo Sommer and Gilbert Ziebur) analyzing the problems that would confront West German foreign policy in the 1970s, including the future of Europe, NATO, the *Ostpolitik*, the inner-German relations and the role of the German mark in the international currency system.

the conferences themselves.<sup>6</sup> Certain one-time functions received similar treatment. In this regard, we can point for instance to the book containing the presentations made at the November 1963 conference devoted to the theme “Europe and America in the World of Tomorrow,” which Birrenbach had both organized and taken part in.<sup>7</sup> Besides such verbatim reports, the Atlantic Institute, the DGAP Research Institute and even the more secretive *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* issued a number of sophisticated scholarly works, at least sometimes grouped into thematic series, for instance the DGAP series pertaining to issues of security policy.<sup>8</sup> Along the same lines, in 1958, the DGAP Research Institute began issuing its series of *Jahrbücher*, edited by Arnold Bergstraesser

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<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, the published book based on the third German-American Conference of November 1962 in Bad Godesberg and Berlin, including a Birrenbach speech, *East-West Tensions III: The US and Germany in the Atlantic Alliance* (Freiburg: Verlag Rombach, 1963).

<sup>7</sup> Birrenbach also wrote the afterword, which naturally expressed his concerns, for this published collection of speeches that appeared in 1964.

<sup>8</sup> As part of its efforts in the field of arms control and international security, of which the creation of the related study group was a part, the DGAP Research Institute produced a series of publications, at first principally in the form of translations and documentations. These included the document volume *Die Genfer Abrüstungskonferenz* (1961) and the volume *Strategie der Abrüstung* (1962), the latter an expanded German edition (co-edited by the DGAP Research Institute) of a special 1960 edition of *Daedalus* comprising a collection of problem analyses by eminent American experts in this area, among them a considerable number of advisors from the staff of President Kennedy. For the hope that the activities of the DGAP Research Institute, including these publications as well as the relevant study group, would ultimately contribute to the development of a German position, derived from the Federal Republic’s “specific conditions and needs,” on this “important question complex,” see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. As of this point, it was planned that still more foreign-political monographs and document volumes from the DGAP Research Institute would be published in 1962, including Per Fischer, *Europarat und parlamentarische Außenpolitik*; Rudolf Schuster, *Die Staatlichkeit Deutschlands*; Boris Meissner, *Russland zwischen Utopie und Wirklichkeit*; Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, *Weltpolitische Aspekte des chinesischen Bürgerkrieges*; *Europa-Dokumente zur Frage der europäischen Einigung* (in three volumes); and *Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage* (2<sup>nd</sup> expanded and revised edition). Members of the DGAP could purchase DGAP publications (such as books) at a reduced price through the offices of the DGAP. For the work of the Research Institute, along with the foreign-political book publications and documentations that emerged from it, as an important “activity field” and “the wissenschaftliche heart” of the DGAP, though less well known to its members than the *Vorträge*-functions and the publishing [*Herausgabe*] of the *Europa-Archiv*, see again Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. Among the Atlantic Institute studies published as books during the mid- to late-1960s were *A Monetary Policy for Latin America* (Pierre Uri) and *Trans-Atlantic Investments* (Christopher Layton, London), while the 1970s saw, for instance the publication of *Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations* (Prof. Benjamin Cohen, advisor to OECD Secretary General Emiel van Lennep addressing such problems of reform, 1977).

and Wilhelm Cornides.<sup>9</sup> The Atlantic Institute also was responsible for a long-running series of shorter studies released, beginning in 1965, under the rubric of the “Atlantic

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<sup>9</sup> The DGAP Research Institute’s series of *Jahrbücher* went under the overarching title *Die Internationale Politik*. The first such yearbook, *Die Internationale Politik, 1955: Eine Einführung in das Geschehen der Gegenwart*, appeared in 1958; the second, *Die Internationale Politik, 1956-57: Die Begegnung mit dem Atomzeitalter*, appeared in 1961. In contrast to the first three, lengthy, “Grundlagenbänden” covering the period 1955-60 (more than a thousand pages each, including extensive source references), the yearbook covering 1961 was the first of the henceforth normal “annual volumes,” considerably shorter at about five hundred pages with a much simplified scholarly apparatus. The DGAP Research Institute yearbooks aspired to be more than simply a chronicle of events, rather each stressed certain themes, with the first two providing comprehensive accounts, analysis and insight into the “world-political events” and situation of the years covered as well as the present, while the third traced “the development of the *Weltpolitik*,” with particular attention to “the entrance of the now independent developing countries into the modern world and the reactions of the great powers to these events” (*Die Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, ACDP K007/1). For the first yearbook exploring “world politics” and, notably, expressing its trust openly in “the still not exhausted formative abilities of man,” see the announcement in ACDP K118/1. The multiple chapters comprising the DGAP Research Institute yearbooks were the product of numerous authors and contributors. The first volume was edited by Arnold Bergstraesser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute and Professor at the University of Freiburg) and Wilhelm Cornides (Editor of the *Europa-Archiv*, Frankfurt) with the assistance of Walther Hofer (Leader of the Department *Außenpolitik* at the *Deutschen Hochschule für Politik* in Berlin) and Hans Rothfels. The editor of the second such yearbook was Wilhelm Cornides, with the assistance of Bergstraesser, Hofer and Rothfels. The teams of *Wissenschaftlern* collaborating on the first three yearbooks included: Dagmar Gräfin Bernstorff, Hans-Christoph Bömers, Dr. Curt Gasteyer, Prof. Herzfeld, Konrad Huber, Prof. Miguel Jorin (Director of the School of Inter-American Affairs, Albuquerque, New Mexico), Dr. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Hans Wolfgang Kuhn, Dr. Walter Lipgens, Prof. Loewenthal, Hermann Meyer-Lindenberg, Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Oxford), Prof. Dr. Emanuel Sarkisyanz, Dr. Willy Schulz-Weidner, Fritz Steppat, Joachim Willmann (Frankfurt), Dr. Wülker, and Prof. Ziebur. Many of these were *Referente* in the DGAP Research Institute (e.g. Gasteyer, Huber, Kindermann, Kuhn, Lipgens, Sarkisyanz, Schulz-Weidner). Along with his teaching activity in the United States, Prof. Sarkisyanz worked as a guest professor in the Federal Republic, for instance at the universities of Freiburg (im Breisgau) and Kiel. For the third yearbook being worked on by a team of twenty-five *Wissenschaftlern*, see the Report about the *Europa-Archiv* and the *Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik*, on Point 1 of the *Präsidialsitzung*, undated but apparently from mid-1963, ACDP K014/2. On the yearbooks as the result of extensive preliminary work and studies of the DGAP Research Institute and its German and foreign *Mitarbeiter*, see *Die Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*, ACDP K007/1. From the start, the DGAP Research Institute yearbooks were widely available in bookstores, with the cloth versions of the first two costing DM 64 and DM 96, respectively. However, DGAP members received a substantial discount on the *Jahrbücher* when they ordered through the DGAP *Geschäftsstelle*. On the *Präsidium*, from the DGAP’s very founding, having given the series of yearbooks priority in the Research Institute’s publication program, see Günter Henle, DGAP e.V., President, Bonn, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. The DGAP Research Institute yearbooks were promoted as useful to the politician, the historian and to all who desired an analysis of current political events and an understanding of the political “*Kräfte*.” On the yearbooks together with the respective bound volumes of the *Europa-Archiv* and the latter’s contributions, overviews and documents forming “a mutually complementary work for the foreign political instruction [*Unterrichtung*] lacking to now in the German literature,” and on the desire of the DGAP *Präsidium* that the Research Institute’s *Jahrbücher* be suitable to “transcend [*sprengen*] the circle of the experts [*Fachleute*],” thus bestowing “a higher degree of level-headedness [*Besonnenheit*] and steadiness [*Stetigkeit*]” on “the political thought and political reacting [*reagieren*] in the Federal Republic” in the face of current events, see again Henle, “Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder,” 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1.

Papers.”<sup>10</sup> Naturally, such publications were preceded and supported by intensive scholarly research and analysis, as organizations like the AI, SWP and DGAP at times simply transformed their earlier work in this regard, the ideas generated in projects, studies, papers, conferences, discussions, working groups and workshops, into significant, though condensed, pamphlets and impact statements as well as more expansive and deeper books.

While we have already mentioned the various articles Birrenbach wrote for the Atlanticist-minded journals, his most noteworthy contribution to the high-quality Atlanticist output was probably his short book *Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft: Europäisch-Amerikanische Partnerschaft*, which both was completed and made its appearance in the Federal Republic in the spring of 1962. Birrenbach’s work was just one of many to appear during this period treating the “hot” themes of European unification and Atlantic Community.<sup>11</sup> This book was based on an important memo he

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<sup>10</sup> Atlantic Papers issued and published by the Atlantic Institute, typically six a year, included, for instance, Walter Schütze, “European Defense Cooperation and NATO” (1969); Alastair Buchan, “Europe and America: From Alliance to Coalition” (1973); Lothar Rühl, “The Nine and NATO” (1974); Fabio Basagni, “Employee Participation and Company Reform” (1976); and Dr. Gardiner Tucker (just retired as NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support), “Towards Rationalization of Alliance Weapons Production” (1976). Curt Gasteyer (Switzerland, previously of the DGAP Research Institute and the London IISS) edited the Atlantic Papers while he was at the AI in the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s and remained editor for some time even after leaving and functioning merely as a consultant to the institute. Though he did not contribute any Atlantic Papers, Birrenbach penned the forward, as he did for certain Atlanticist books, to Amb. John Tuthill’s work “The Decisive Years Ahead” (The Atlantic Papers 4, 1972).

<sup>11</sup> Robert Borchardt, West German Embassy, Washington DC, to KB, 12 June 1963, ACDP K157/1. Other books appearing around the same time as Birrenbach’s and dealing with similar themes, among them European unity and the future of the Western world, included: Charles Cerami’s *Alliance Born of Danger: America, the Common Market, and the Atlantic Partnership* (Harcourt, Brace & World); Christian Herter’s *Toward an Atlantic Community* (Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 107 pages), in which Herter took up the subject from a very similar viewpoint to that of Birrenbach and explicitly promoted the declaration and resolutions of the Atlantic Convention of January 1962 in Paris; Prof. Neil Chamberlain’s more provocative and unconventional *The West in a World without War* (McGraw Hill, 85 pages); Hans A. Schmitt’s *The Path to European Union* (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge); Don Humphrey’s *The United States and the Common Market*, (Praeger); and Walter Hallstein’s *United Europe, Challenge and Opportunity* (the William L. Clayton Lectures at the Fletcher School, Harvard University Press), in which Hallstein also explored the economic and political implications of the emerging Europe for the rest of the world, particularly for the United States and the Atlantic Partnership. On these books, see *The Wall*

had presented to the Atlantic Institute staff and Policy Committee in April 1961 as part of that institute's very first study, also focusing on "The Future of the Atlantic Community." As such, it represented another example of the synergy that existed between the activities of the Atlanticist infrastructure and the publications to emerge from the world of German Atlanticism.<sup>12</sup> It should come as no surprise that Birrenbach's book, which presented a fundamental account and overview of his thinking, analysis and proposals on trans-Atlantic relations and depicted what he considered the best long-run solution and one superior to the alternative offered by de Gaulle, would not be entirely welcomed by the members of the Adenauer cabinet, nor that he should receive, as he put it, "very positive commentaries from a whole series of first-class people" in the United States upon the publication of his work there.<sup>13</sup> However, the book also garnered at least solid, and often positive, reviews from a series of respected German and American sources: among others, the *Foreign Service Journal*, the *Saturday Review*, *Freedom & Union*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Das Parlament*, and the *Zeitschrift für Politik*. Excerpts, essentially articles culled from his book, also appeared in *Orbis* and the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*.<sup>14</sup>

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*Street Journal*, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1 and "Toward an Atlantic Community," *Foreign Service Journal*, September 1963, The Bookshelf, ACDP K181/1.

<sup>12</sup> Birrenbach's AI memo was dated 15 April 1961. As we have pointed out in other contexts, this synergy was a relatively common phenomenon as the various activities of the Atlanticist infrastructure regularly stimulated and fed into the production of a body of high-quality literature. To cite another example, the experiences in the Atlantic Institute's diverse international conferences, meetings and round table discussions with prominent experts exercised significant influence on that organization's scholarly publications. Likewise, the activities of the DGAP Study Groups played a key role in the studies and publications of the DGAP Research Institute.

<sup>13</sup> KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. For Birrenbach having received a number of "very beautiful letters" upon the publication of his book in the US, see KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. See also KB to LR I. Kl. Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1. Birrenbach's *Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft* had an appendix in which was printed the Paris Declaration of the Atlantic Convention of the NATO States of January 1962.

<sup>14</sup> See, for instance, KB to Erich Straetling, 12 July 1963, ACDP K157/1. For a positive review of *Der Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft*, including praise of Birrenbach's realism with respect to the

Actually getting a study manuscript published was often an arduous task for Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists. In the course of his activities within the Atlanticist-minded organizations, particularly as a member of the Atlantic Institute and Atlantica (but also as part of the DGAP and FTS), Birrenbach, along with personalities like Oppenheim and Stahl, was quite involved in many aspects of the publication process of works of the AI in the Federal Republic as well as in that of other works he deemed of considerable importance. Such trying issues in this process for Birrenbach were matters of translation, locating a suitable publisher and negotiating the final terms of publication. This latter aspect, involving contract agreements, contributions to the publisher, profit margins and costs of production, was particularly tricky given that, in spite of their rather impressive quality, blockbuster sales and commercial success generally eluded such Atlanticist publications.<sup>15</sup> One common practice, and a typical subject and facilitator of

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analysis in his book (“in contrast to some other conceptions of this type,” including those that saw Europe as a “Third Force”), see Helmut Klocke (Munich), *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Cologne, 2/1963, ACDP K181/1. Klocke saw Birrenbach’s book offering the reader a general yet concentrated “programmatic foundation for discussion.” Klocke also stressed the need for further studies about the Western defense conception, about the coordination of economic policy (“above all agrarian policy”), about the possibility of a balancing [“*Ausgleich*”] of the various national conceptions of policy towards the developing countries, about disarmament policy and about policy vis-à-vis the East, which not only contributed to “opinion formation” but also to the “active shaping [*Mitgestaltung*] of the overall political conception [*Gesamtkonzeption*].” Klocke acknowledged that “such works are currently underway in international institutes” (as emerged from the “informative” overview “Research Reports on the Theme: EEC, NATO, Atlantic Community” in the *Offenen Welt*, Nr 79, March 1963). For a very positive review of ZAG, including acclaim for Birrenbach’s drafting of “a fascinating picture” of a future Atlantic Community that would “enthuse” readers and “fill them with confidence,” see Werner Bögl, Schriftenreihe “Politik”, *Das Parlament*, Nr 31, 1 August 1962, ACDP K181/1. For a very positive review of Birrenbach’s *Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership* (“[a]n excellent and persuasive plea for European and American partnership in an Atlantic Community”), see “Toward an Atlantic Community,” *Foreign Service Journal*, September 1963, The Bookshelf, ACDP K181/1. For another positive review of Birrenbach’s *FAC*, see *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1. The WSJ believed that Birrenbach’s work was “reasonably up-to-date and filled with instructive general ideas on the relationship between the US and Europe”, “well versed in international relations”, and presented “the complex underlying issues” of its subject “in terms that are understandable to the lay reader.” On the “hundreds of speeches and magazine articles on both sides of the Atlantic every year” that expressed ideas similar to Birrenbach’s, see again *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1.

<sup>15</sup> For Birrenbach on the German market for “books of this kind” being “smaller than one thinks,” see KB to Lord Gladwyn, 27 January 1966, ACDP K064/2. While earning some income from the sale of their publications, the later experiences of the Atlanticist Institute suggest that Atlanticist organizations

negotiations with potential publishers, was the securing of a guaranteed purchase of a large number of copies at a suitable, ideally reduced, price (otherwise potentially too expensive), for instance by the Atlanticist organizations themselves, usually to distribute to members and friends of those organizations.<sup>16</sup> This practice assured at least a certain amount of sales, while the Atlanticist institutions and their members also represented a ready-made market, ideally at special rates, for such works. Despite these efforts by Birrenbach and others, some glaring weaknesses in the Atlanticist publication program persisted. For instance, although the Atlantic Institute sought to release its publications in several languages, its Atlantic Papers appeared in English and French, but not in German until 1975. Not until that year did the Atlantica, the *Europa-Union Verlag*, the *Institut für Europäische Politik* and the DAatG inaugurate a series that annually published four of the Atlantic Papers of interest to German readers.

Whatever difficulties they may have encountered, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists could at least rest assured that there existed a certain number of publishers who were typically willing to publish Atlanticist works and whose interest in such products seemed to transcend simple business calculations of financial success and

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essentially lost money on them overall as a result of the costs of production and distribution. Thus, for 1977, the AI expected FF 295,000 in expenditures for its publications and only FF 40,000 in resources from their sale. A bit earlier, one projection for 1976 claimed that an elimination of the French-language edition of the publications (apparently referring to the Atlantic Papers) would save FF 145,000. Another projection for 1976 estimated that the direct additional cost of a French-language edition of the Atlantic Papers would be FF 135,000 less the probable subscription, meaning a total direct additional cost of FF 125,000 (Budget-1976, ACDP K058). Among the expenses for the Atlantic Papers were honoraria for the writers. Likewise, during the first half of the 1960s, a period when the expenditures and income with respect to the *Europa-Archiv* appear to have been essentially stable, the DGAP had to subsidize the *Verlagshaus* in question for the costs of the *Europa-Archiv*, for instance to the tune of an estimated DM 101,100 for the upcoming year 1965 (Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the *Europa-Archiv*, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2).

<sup>16</sup> This was the case, for instance, when Birrenbach significantly helped bring about the publication by the Econ Verlag (Düsseldorf) in 1969 of *Der Krise um den Beitritt Englands*, edited by Heinz Kuby, by arranging for the Atlantica to acquire two hundred and fifty copies for its members and friends (and also to distribute, for example, to relevant newspapers, journals and research and university institutes) (Walter Stahl to the Members of Atlantica, 15 July 1969, ACDP K106/1).

turning a profit. For starters, a number of Atlanticist-minded organizations maintained their own in-house publishing operations, such as those of the Atlantic Institute and the *Europa-Union Verlag*.<sup>17</sup> However, there were also those publishing houses that, while institutionally independent, maintained close ties to the Atlanticists. In this respect, Birrenbach enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the *Verlag Rombach*, based in Freiburg and associated with the prominent Atlanticist Prof. Arnold Bergstraesser. This was the house that, at the arrangement of Walter Stahl and the Atlantica, published Birrenbach's work *Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft* (1962), as well as a summary of the conference he had organized on "Europe and America in the World of Tomorrow" (1964).<sup>18</sup> Another such Atlanticist-minded *Verlag* was that of Kiepenheuer & Witsch, based in Cologne. This house cooperated particularly closely with the Atlantic Institute and Atlantica, a relationship solidified by the membership of Dr. Joseph Witsch

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<sup>17</sup> At least in the first half of the 1960s, during his period as Vice-President of the *Europa-Union Deutschland* (1957-65), Birrenbach served on the *Beirat* (chaired by Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim) of the *Europa-Union Verlag GmbH* (Bonn). Katharina Focke and Gerhard Eickhorn were central figures over the years in the active management of this *Verlag*, which published, among other things, EUD documents and reports as well as the EUD's *Europäische Zeitung* (run in cooperation with Europa (Bern), New Europe (London), Europa in Bewegung (The Hague), and Unita Europa (Milan)).

<sup>18</sup> At Birrenbach's request, Bergstraesser wrote a brief introduction for *Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft: Europäisch-Amerikanische Partnerschaft* (Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, 1962, 95 pages, DM 7,80), possibly based on a draft provided by Birrenbach. This work then appeared as part of the *Verlag Rombach's* new *Schriftenreihe* "Politik," edited by Bergstraesser and devoted to both "fundamental and contemporary" political questions and explicitly seeking to promote the cooperation of *Politik* and *Wissenschaft*. This series was also an expression of Bergstraesser's prominent efforts for a broader and deeper political and civic *Bildung*. Here, Bergstraesser aimed at diverse analyses and interpretations that brought together the study of political reality with fundamental questions while stimulating discussion through the originality and personal coloring of the accounts. Earlier volumes in the series "Politik" included "Das Atlantische Bündnis" (1960), based on the International Seminar that had been staged in April of that year at the University of Freiburg; *Führung in der modernen Welt*, by Arnold Bergstraesser (1961, 56 pages), dealing with issues of leadership and elite formation; *Der Christ in der politischen Verantwortung*, by Hans Asmussen (1961, 61 pages); and *Die Geistigen und Sozialen Wandlungen im Nahen Osten*, by Muhsin Mahdi (1961, 103 pages). Other volumes appearing in the *Rombach Verlag* included *Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung* (1961), a collection of Bergstraesser writings and speeches. A contribution from this work entitled "Erwachsenenbildung als politische Aufgabe" was also reprinted as a supplement of *Dem Parlament* (Nr 44/1961). Taking over in January 1966 from the *Deutschen Verlags-Anstalt* (Stuttgart), the *Verlag Rombach* published the journal *Außenpolitik* for a time during the second half of the 1960s until the *Übersee-Verlag GmbH* (Hamburg; publisher: Harald Boeckmann) assumed this role. By August 1962, Birrenbach's *Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft* was easily accessible as a paperback book.



in the latter organization. Although their political inclinations might not have been quite so clear, a number of other publishing houses also served as important outlets for the works of German Atlanticism. For instance, the DGAP Research Institute maintained a long-term relationship with the venerable *Oldenbourg Verlag* (Munich), the publisher from the start of its *Jahrbüchern*. It was probably no coincidence that Dr. Thomas Cornides, brother of the DGAP's Wilhelm and therefore one of Birrenbach's contacts in the publishing world, played a prominent role in, ultimately as leader of, this *Verlag*.<sup>19</sup>

Finally, in addition to their participation in various aspects of the publication process, Birrenbach, other German Atlanticists and at least some of their institutions were involved in the targeted distribution to an intended audience, not just to the general public, of their high-quality literature in an effort to enhance its effectiveness. As far as Birrenbach was concerned, this was especially, though not exclusively, the case with regard to the Atlantic Institute, thus keeping in line with its aspirations of functioning as something of an Atlantic Monnet Committee.<sup>20</sup> Birrenbach often carried out such undertakings with respect to works he deemed especially important through the *Atlantica*,

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<sup>19</sup> Other works of the DGAP Research Institute published by the *Oldenbourg Verlag* included, for example, *Südostasien seit 1945* by Emanuel Sarkisyanz (1961). Thomas Cornides and the *Oldenbourg Verlag* were also involved in printing *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* volumes, for instance from the series "Nineteenth Century." Other houses that published Atlanticist works included the *Alfred Metzner Verlag* (Frankfurt-Berlin), the *C. Bertelsmann Verlag* (Gütersloh) and the *C.W. Leske Verlag* (Opladen) (all three of which published works of the DGAP Research Institute) as well as the *Econ-Verlag* (Düsseldorf). At least during the first half of the 1960s, the DGAP dealt with the *Abteilung Europa-Archiv* in the *Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH* (Frankfurt) with regard to publishing, selling and distributing the *Europa-Archiv*.

<sup>20</sup> Naturally, Birrenbach was not the only figure involved in such efforts at the AI, rather other members of its board also took part. These practices were also evident, for example, at the *Atlantik-Brücke*. For Birrenbach's belief that "on the basis of sound research," the Atlantic Institute should "make practical recommendations for action by governments, by the OECD and NATO" and his hope that "the Atlantic Institute might do work somewhat similar to that of the Monnet Committee, within an Atlantic framework," see the Confidential Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, 6 May 1961, 3 PM, Château de la Muette, ACDP K105/2. On at least the possibility of conceiving of the Atlantic Institute as "a Monnet Committee of Action in the Atlantic realm," the need to convert the results of AI activities into "political action," and the necessity of thinking in terms of a cost-benefit ("cost effectiveness") analysis, see KB to John McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1. For Birrenbach placing the Atlantic Institute alongside the "European Action Committee of Jean Monnet" as "an independent international committee," see Protocol of the *Atlantica* Member Assembly, 16 June 1969, ACDP K106/1.

particularly Stahl, in cooperation with the various publishing houses in question, himself determining the most appropriate recipients, chiefly but not only in the political world. Indeed, potential recipients of high-quality Atlanticist literature via this method of targeted distribution included prominent figures in a broad range of fields: government and politics, including cabinet ministers, chairmen of the *Fraktionen* and other parliamentarians, as well as the relevant ministerial bureaucracy (e.g. state secretaries, ambassadors); international organizations, including personalities based in Brussels at institutions like the European Communities (e.g. Walter Hallstein); the *Wirtschaft* and banking, including the *Bundesbank*; the *Wissenschaft*, among them individuals in academia, the universities and the research institutes; the media and other opinion makers, including newspapers and specialized journals; as well as members, participants and friends of the private Atlanticist infrastructure itself.<sup>21</sup> Birrenbach also contributed to the distribution of his own *Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft* simply by giving copies, via the *Rombach Verlag*, as gifts.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> On every Atlantic Institute project being “concluded by recommendations that are communicated to governments, international organizations and leaders in the political, economic and social fields,” see AI Brochure, January 1972, ACDP K057/2. For Birrenbach’s assessment that the significance of the Atlantic Institute existed in part in its investigation of international problems and the development of pertinent “solution proposals and initiatives” and thus its ability “to provide decision aid” for Western governments, see Protocol of the *Atlantica* Member Assembly, 16 June 1969, ACDP K106/1. Among those recommended to receive Atlantic Institute reports were, for instance, members of the AI Board of Governors; the general secretariat of NATO, which would itself determine distribution within NATO; the ambassadors of the national delegations to NATO; the ministers of foreign affairs of the NATO members; within the OECD, the secretary general and the heads of the national delegations; the president of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference; the secretary general of the Atlantic Treaty Association; as well as other personalities indicated by the AI Policy Committee or AI Director-General as vital recipients by reason of their position in the Atlantic Community (G.L. Bassani to KB, 7 March 1961, ACDP K128/1).

<sup>22</sup> For instance, in addition to particular individuals, also to the always financially strapped *Jungen Europäischen Föderalisten Deutschland* (Bonn), a sub-organization of the *Europa-Union Deutschland*. Furthermore, Birrenbach (and the *Rombach Verlag*) sent copies to members of the press. Meanwhile, copies of Birrenbach’s book were ordered and paid for by the *Atlantica* (Hamburg), the *Europa-Union Deutschland* (Bonn) and the *Deutschen Atlantischen Gesellschaft* (Bonn), arranged largely through Stahl, who played a major role in the distribution. The *Bundestag* (at least the *Unionsfraktion*) and the *Bundesbank* also acquired several hundred copies total (the latter apparently due to Vice President Heinrich Troeger). The books were then passed on throughout these organizations. On all this, see ACDP K151/1.

### C. Influencing the Broader West German Masses

These aforementioned publications and functions helped spread the Atlanticist worldview to a specialized, sophisticated and interested public and may eventually have even filtered down to a much larger audience. However, the German Atlanticists ultimately strived to extend their worldview not only indirectly but also directly to the broader West German public. Although not actually determined by the Atlanticists themselves, the extraordinary visits to the Federal Republic by prominent foreign leaders from the Anglo-Saxon world played an important role in this process. Trips by President Kennedy (1963) and Queen Elizabeth II (1965) were spectacles that dazzled the public, including the media, and gave courage and impetus to the German Atlanticists.

Birrenbach was perfectly well aware of the significance of a trip like Kennedy's, noting with satisfaction that "the echo was far greater than that of the September [1962] trip of the General [de Gaulle] to Germany.... I believe that this immunizing injection came at the right time."<sup>23</sup> However, Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists could not rely solely on such rare and fortuitous occasions bestowed on them by foreign dignitaries. It

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<sup>23</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 8 July 1963, ACDP K146/3. For Birrenbach being "very happy about the echo in Germany to the visit of the American President Kennedy," see KB to Jean Monnet, 4 July 1963, ACDP K050/2. For Birrenbach's participation in the events related to Kennedy's "great visit," including the Chancellor's evening function, the evening "by" the American ambassador, the *Feier* in the *Paulskirche* in Frankfurt, and the function in Wiesbaden, see KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1. As of June 1965, Birrenbach was informing his British contacts that the queen's visit had been an "outstanding success" and hoped for a noticeable impact on Anglo-German relations, KB to Baroness Emmet of Amberley, House of Lords, London, 9 June 1965, ACDP K064/2. Though it had a much different character, the earlier visit of US Vice President Lyndon Johnson to West Berlin in August 1961, along with the arrival of 1,500 American soldiers, was also enthusiastically welcomed and the continuation of such gestures was considered important. On de Gaulle's trip "through" the Federal Republic in the "fall" of 1962; his apparently successful efforts on that visit to influence the West German population as a whole in a Gaullist direction through his speeches in German as well as to court particular segments of that population, including the youth (speech in Ludwigsburg), the *Arbeitschaft* (speech in the August-Thyssen-Hütte) and the industrialists (the *Rheinfahrt* from Düsseldorf to Duisburg); his plans for his next visit next summer, combined with an even stronger continuation of such efforts; the astonishingly favorable attitude towards de Gaulle of many Germans occupying high positions in their professions; and fears of de Gaulle's influence on the German youth, see "De Gaulle, We and the Western World: Short Overview about the Foreign Political Situation on the Basis of the Double 'No' in the Well-Known Speech of de Gaulle," 26 February 1963, unknown author (not by KB), ACDP K011/1.

was also necessary for them to undertake their own efforts. Among the instruments they employed from time to time for reaching a larger audience was the mass pro-American rally. Probably the most salient example of this in Birrenbach's career occurred in the wake of the assassination of President Kennedy, when Birrenbach, along with the members of the *Steuben-Schurz-Gesellschaft* in Düsseldorf (of which Birrenbach was chairman), took part in arranging a *Gedenkfeier* of "our *Amerika Gesellschaften*" for Kennedy in Düsseldorf's Robert Schumann Hall. According to Birrenbach, more than two thousand people attended this assembly on 1 December 1963, with "hundreds outside the doors," to hear the speeches from Birrenbach and others, a rather impressive showing considering the somewhat "improvised" nature of the event.<sup>24</sup>

Perhaps even more effective, and certainly more constant and capable of reaching a broad mass audience were the channels provided by the modern mass media.

Birrenbach, a man acutely aware of the power of this mass media in politics and public life, offers an example of how one particular German Atlanticist attempted to take advantage of the opportunities it presented.<sup>25</sup> For one thing, Birrenbach appeared from

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<sup>24</sup> KB to AW Schmidt, Pittsburgh PA (USA), 16 December 1963, ACDP K157/1. On "our *Amerika Gesellschaften*," see KB to Hans Bolewski, 10 December 1963, ACDP K015. This *Gedenkfeier* for Kennedy was jointly staged by the *Steuben-Schurz-Gesellschaft e.V.* (Düsseldorf) along with, at least ostensibly, the *Deutsch-Amerikanischen Gesellschaft e.V.* (Frankfurt) and the *Atlantik-Brücke e.V.* (Hamburg) and occurred without the benefit of advertising on the radio or even posters. For Birrenbach's speech on this occasion, see ACDP K077/2. Other speakers included US ambassador George McGhee.

<sup>25</sup> Thus, Birrenbach attributed the ability of the Brandt government to "sell" its *Ostpolitik* to the West German population to what he considered its almost total control over this mass media. On the major role of the "mass media," its pro-government presentation of issues like the *Grundvertrag* (which also fell just prior to the election), the European summit conference and the Olympic Games and the consequent deception of "the German public," in the "negative election result" (coalition victory) in November 1972; on the role in the coalition's election success of the unprecedented speaking of ministers "in the most important large *Betrieben*" in helping generate a "total mobilization of the *Betriebe*"; and on the general power of a "government apparatus" in generating an "overwhelming" publicity in favor of incumbents (in the Federal Republic but also in the United States, where the sitting American President "as good as never" lost the election) that was virtually impossible for an opposition to counter, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. Though acknowledging that the election result was not alone Barzel's fault (rather there were "deeper reasons"), Birrenbach also pointed out here to Thomas the more favorable

time to time on television, for instance on the various interview programs or on programs dealing with contemporary history.<sup>26</sup> At times, his numerous speeches were occasionally reprinted, either in whole or in part, in the mass press. Perhaps the most striking example of this was his *Bundestag* speech of 29 January 1971, dealing with the attitudes of the West and the German *Ostpolitik*, which appeared in its entirety in *Der Welt*.<sup>27</sup> Beyond this, Birrenbach also wrote a considerable number of articles for the prominent organs of the mass quality press in the Federal Republic over the years, including a variety of leading dailies and weeklies: the *Deutsche Zeitung/Christ und Welt*, *Handelsblatt*, *Industriekurier*, the *Rheinische Merkur*, the *Rheinische Post*, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Spiegel*, *Die Welt* and *Die Zeit*.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, his articles also appeared

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public image of Brandt vis-à-vis that of Barzel, especially vital in a “*personalbezogenen*” election as “shrewdly” orchestrated by the SPD in 1972.

<sup>26</sup> For instance, as part of his efforts to combat anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic during the late 1960s, Birrenbach appeared and expressed his opinions, along with the historian Günter Moltmann and the journalist Theo Sommer, on an NDR documentary program by Wolfgang Rieger of 1 March 1969 (“Ami go home, Spielarten und Wandlungen des Anti-Amerikanismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”). For Birrenbach presenting his views on television, here explaining the United States “perspective” on European-American relations, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2.

<sup>27</sup> This turned out to be the only speech from this particular *Bundestag* debate, aside from the state of the union speech, that was reprinted in its entirety in one of the major national West German newspapers. Birrenbach’s speech of 29 January 1971 also appeared as an enclosure with the DATG eV Information Letter of 26 February 1971 (Nr. 54, Bonn).

<sup>28</sup> Birrenbach’s articles in the *Industriekurier* included: “US-Zahlungsbilanz und atlantische Partnerschaft” (5 June 1962). In the *Rheinischen Merkur*: “Amerika wird in Europa bleiben” (8 March 1974). In *Dem Spiegel*: “Für Europa ein Primus?” (18 August 1965), which was a favorable review of the work of Birrenbach’s fellow Atlanticist Ernst Majonica, which Birrenbach undertook on the advice of the American embassy. In *Handelsblatt*: “Die Freihandelskrise birgt ernste Gefahren” (22 April 1959, on the “crisis” surrounding the free-trade zone); “Der Weg zu einem größeren Europa” (June 1961); and “Atlantische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-eine Illusion?” (23-24 February 1962). In the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: “Die deutsch-englische Verstimmung” (18 April 1959). In *Der Welt*: “Integration und Wiedervereinigung?” (11 August 1962); “Der Kanal ist keine Grenze” (WamS, “Man schreibt uns,” 27 January 1963, a comment on the Franco-German Treaty and Atlantic Partnership); “Was die Verbündeten wirklich denken...” (5 February 1971); “Die USA und Westeuropa: Partner oder Rivalen?” (17 February 1973, excerpted from an *Europa-Archiv* article); “Amerika-fühlt es sich alleingelassen?” (14 June 1975, on the US-European relationship and US attitude towards its NATO allies after the collapse of South Vietnam); “Carter zwischen Ideal und harter Realität” (30 December 1976); and “Der neue Mann setzt auf Kontinuität” (31 December 1976), the last two a two-part article on Carter’s future foreign policy at the invitation of *Der Welt*). In the *Deutschen Zeitung/Christ und Welt*: “Partnerschaft bleibt das Ziel” (31 December 1963; “Die Wirtschaft an der Jahreswende”); “Moskauer Vertrag-Fragen an Willy Brandts Regierung” (4 September 1970, questions for the foreign minister on the interpretation of the Moscow

from time to time in party-oriented journals, such as *Die Politische Meinung* and the *Politische-Soziale Korrespondenz*.<sup>29</sup> The possibilities for such mass propaganda were enhanced by the fact that the Atlanticists enjoyed powerful allies among newspaper publishers like Gerd Bucorius and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (both *Die Zeit*) and Axel Springer (*Die Welt*).

In a larger sense, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists cultivated the members of the mass media, and well beyond just these major publishing figures, as a valuable outlet to a mass audience. Influential German media figures were invited to become members of the Atlanticist organizations and to attend various Atlanticist functions, either in their capacity as members, active participants or guests and were, furthermore, encouraged to report to the public via their respective media on their experiences.<sup>30</sup> International conferences specifically among journalists were staged, including a German-American journalists meeting in June 1971 in Gummersbach on the

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Treaty); "Ist Bonn skeptischer geworden? Ein Gespräch mit dem CDU-Abgeordneten Kurt Birrenbach nach seiner Rückkehr aus Washington" (2 July 1971, "Deutschlandpolitik"); "Die Schatten der Vergangenheit: Der Staat der Juden besteht 25 Jahre" (4 May 1973); and "Kann Amerika die Sowjets noch bremsen?" (18 April 1975). In *Der Zeit*: "Lockt der rote Handel?" (27 November 1964); and "Wiedervereinigung-reicht unser Atem?" (28 April 1967, about Europe and the German question, a shortened version of an *Europa-Archiv* article). For Birrenbach as the only MdB in the public discussion working for an improvement in German-British relations and for a rapid solution of the free-trade zone question (with reference to Birrenbach's April 1959 articles in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Handelsblatt*), see H. Cammann, ECSC, Delegation of the High Authority in the United Kingdom, London, to KB, Düsseldorf, 27 April 1959, ACDP K001/2.

<sup>29</sup> Essays Birrenbach wrote and then published in *Der Politischen Meinung* (*Zweimonatshefte für Fragen der Zeit*) included: "Der dritte Partner: Wann kommt die deutsch-englische Verständigung?" (November 1959); "Was will Kennedy? Der amerikanisch-sowjetische Dialog" (November 1963); "Kennedy und Johnson: Kontinuität in der Demokratie" (December 1963, "Zeitkritik"); "Westliche Allianz" (March 1964, "Briefe an die Redaktion," dated 6 February 1964, Düsseldorf); "Deutsche Aufgaben heute: Die außenpolitische Lage nach dem 21. August" (Heft 126, 1969); "Die Zukunft unserer Sicherheit: Risiken und Notwendigkeiten einer Konferenz" (Heft 130, 1970); "Kritik aus dem Westen" ("Acht Einwände von draußen"; Heft 135, 1971, based on his 29 January *Bundestag* speech); and "Grenzen der Entspannungspolitik: Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa" (November/December 1973). Birrenbach's articles in the *Politisch-Sozialen Korrespondenz* included "Die amerikanische Berlin-Politik" (Spring 1961).

<sup>30</sup> For instance, it was not least for this reason that members of the media, like the WDR's Klaus von Bismarck, were included in the German *Kuratorium* for the Kennedy Memorial Library (see later in this chapter), which helped in securing press coverage.

rather generic overall topic “Germany and the United States in 1971.”<sup>31</sup> By 1969-70, the Atlantic Institute was holding press seminars in Paris that brought together prominent experts with interested journalists from respected publications to assess, debate and discuss particular crucial international relations themes and mutual problems currently facing the nations of the Atlantic world.<sup>32</sup> By December 1976, the AI had created an

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<sup>31</sup> On this German-American journalists meeting in June 1971 as well as an American-French journalists meeting in Bellaggio in May 1970, see the Report of the German General Consulate in New York, 5 October 1972, ACDP K183/2. According to this report, Robert Kleiman of the New York Times had been impressed by what he considered the success of these gatherings and was convinced it would be useful to stage a European-American journalists conference in New York in 1973. In this proposed undertaking, Kleiman enjoyed a warm offer of support from the head of the German Information Center (Hoffmann). Kleiman was significantly motivated by his belief in the not inconsiderable role played by the leading European and American journalists in identifying, thinking through and tackling the problems of European-American relations. With respect to his proposed conference, Kleiman stressed his desire to attain “independence” by obtaining funding from foundations and other “independent institutions,” rather than relying on “*staatliche Gelder*.”

<sup>32</sup> The first such press seminars were held jointly with the International Press Institute (Zurich), with the first one (March 1969) being staged, exceptionally, in Brussels. As of 1976 and 1977, there were about six AI Press Seminars per year. Themes included: “The Atlantic Alliance and the Seventies” (March 1969); “Economic Problems of the Atlantic Community” (January 1970); “The Future of the Dollar” (28 February 1978); “The Economic and Political Problems Faced by Advanced Countries in Developing Nuclear Energy” (3 April 1978); “The European Parliament: Symbol or Substance?” (14 February 1979); “Can the Industrial Powers Cope with the Oil Predicament?” (5 July 1979); and “Collapse of a Planned Economy: Consequences of the Polish Crisis for East and West” (11 February 1982). Planned AI Press Seminars also included those on “Managing the Float” (end of March 1976); nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation (16 December 1976); Eastern European borrowing in international financial markets (January or February 1977); and “The Future of the World Trade System” (24 June 1982). Such meetings involved opening remarks from the AI Director-General (who chaired the press seminars), statements and presentations by the expert panelists, questions from the journalists and, of course, discussion. Journalists, including Americans, present at the press seminars hailed from important German, American, British, French, Italian, Swiss, Dutch and Spanish publications including *Die Zeit*; *Die Welt*; the *New York Times*; *Time Magazine*; *The Los Angeles Times*; *The Wall Street Journal*; *Business Week*; *The Observer* (London); the *Financial Times*; the French Press Agency; *Le Monde*; *Les Échos* (Mr. Tristan Doelnitz); *France Culture*; the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*; *Financieele Dagblad* (Amsterdam); *N.R.C. Handelsblad* (Rotterdam); and *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona). The first two press seminars (March 1969 and January 1970) were attended by about forty journalists each. Sixteen journalists were present at the conference of 3 April 1978 (on nuclear energy), among them several well-known scientific editors, some economics editors, and chief Paris correspondents of such publications. German journalists taking part in AI Press Seminars included Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (*Die Zeit*) and August Graf von Kageneck (*Die Welt*). Expert panelists participating in the meetings included Germans like Dr. Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy Agency); Dr. Hanns Maull (former European Secretary of the Trilateral Commission and author of the report on energy published by that body); and Jochen van Aerssen (CDU MdB and MdEP, Vice-President of the *Europa-Union*); as well as non-German figures like Prof. Charles Kindleberger (Prof. Emeritus of Economics, MIT); Dr. Octave du Temple (Executive Director of the American Nuclear Society); Ian Smart (an independent energy consultant and former Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs); Alan Lee Williams (Labour Member of the British Parliament, Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Treasurer of the Labour Committee for European Affairs, Deputy Director of the European Movement); Dr. Norman Lawrence Franklin (a nuclear industrialist who

editorial advisory committee of distinguished editors from the United States and Europe, which met twice a year to provide guidance to this program (for example, recommendations on topics and participation), with Gräfin Dönhoff as one of this group's key members. Seeking to reach a larger audience, the German members of the Atlanticist organizations staged press conferences, for instance to present recent resolutions or publications emerging from their institutions.<sup>33</sup>

Birrenbach played a role in all of this and, moreover, utilized his numerous close contacts with influential German (and American) journalists and media figures to ensure that important Atlanticist resolutions, declarations, meetings, activities, speeches and other news relating to organizations like the Monnet Committee or the DGAP received due publicity in the Federal Republic.<sup>34</sup> Birrenbach nurtured and enjoyed prominent

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was Chairman and Managing Director of the Nuclear Power Company, England); Amb. Olivier Wormser (former governor of the Banque de France and former ambassador to the Federal Republic); Chafic Akhras (President of the AI Saudi Bank in Paris); Jean Saint-Geours (President-Director General, SEMA; member of the Club of Rome; member of the Commission de l'Énergie au Plan; and President of the Groupe pour la Croissance Économe de l'Énergie (EEC)); François Bujon de l'Estang (Director for International Relations of the French Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique); Jean-Pierre Cot (Member of the French National Assembly and of the European Parliament, Member of the Executive Office of the Socialist Party, National Delegate for European Questions); Michel Habib-Deloncle (former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, former Vice-President of the European Parliament); Dr. Marcello Colitti (Director of Planning, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi); Hon. Altiero Spinelli (Independent Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and of the European Parliament, Former Commissioner of the European Community for Industrial Policy and Technology); Manlio Brosio (Secretary General of NATO); Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer (SACEUR); and Prof. Alexandre Lamfalussy (Head of the Monetary and Economic Department, Bank of International Settlements). For example, the panel at the seminar of 14 February 1979 was composed of four parliamentarians and one former minister. Special lunch guests at such press seminars included: Mr. Lisle Wideman (Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary Affairs of the United States Treasury), who gave a detailed account of the American government's present thinking during the luncheon; and Amb. Herbert Salzman (United States Representative to the OECD). It appears Birrenbach was never invited to take part in AI Press Seminars. For summaries, see Press Seminar on "The Future of the Dollar," Paris, 28 February 1978, ACDP K058; Report on AIIA Press Seminar, 3 April 1978, ACDP K129/1; and AI Press Seminar on "The European Parliament," 14 February 1979, ACDP K104/2. Personalities at the AI managing the series of press seminars included Dr. Gregory Flynn (US) and, then, beginning in January 1977 Mlle Françoise Gondrée.

<sup>33</sup> More broadly, the Atlantic Institute, for example, held press conferences to announce the release of its publications, including Atlantic Papers.

<sup>34</sup> For example, Birrenbach endeavored so that speeches given at the DGAP received press coverage and publicity, even if this entailed their burdensome translation from English into German (see, for instance, KB to Sen. Edward Kennedy, 19 April 1974, ACDP K184/1). For a press release of 17 July 1961 from the



Atlanticist-minded contacts and allies, in some cases of international rank, in the West German media and press landscape, whom he also kept informed of his own activities, with whom he engaged in extensive idea exchanges, and to whom he distributed his own articles, speeches and “America-reports,” not least in an effort to exert some measure of influence or even to encourage their publication, thus further enhancing their spread. Such contacts and allies included figures like Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (*Die Zeit*), Theo Sommer (*Die Zeit*), Jürgen Tern (FAZ), Günther Gillessen (FAZ), Jan G. Reifenberg (FAZ), Alfred Rapp (FAZ), Axel Springer (*Die Welt*), Ernst Cramer (*Die Welt*), Herbert Kremp (*Rheinische Post/Die Welt*), Georg Schröder (*Die Welt*), Hans Hellwig (*Deutsche Zeitung*), Anton Böhm (*Rheinischer Merkur*), and Klaus von Bismarck (*Westdeutscher Rundfunk*).<sup>35</sup> It seems that these efforts, along with those of his fellow Atlanticists, were

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*Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung*, the *Europa-Union Deutschland* and the *Jungen Europäischen Föderalisten Deutschland* (Bonn) and related attachments (the European Parliament’s “Resolution about the Political Cooperation between the Member States of the European Communities” of 29 June 1961 and the “Political Resolution accepted by the Congress of the European Movement” on 17 June 1961), see ACDP K007/1. From 1960-62, Hans Furler was President of the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

<sup>35</sup> These personalities comprised a wide array of publishers, editors-in-chief, editors, *Intendanten* and correspondents. With respect to *Die Zeit*, personalities like Dönhoff, Sommer and Gerd Bucerius, among certain other prominent figures of the West German press, were all active members of and participants in the German Atlanticist organizations. Also, in 1983, Helmut Schmidt would become a co-publisher of *Der Zeit*. Birrenbach was in contact with the FAZ’s Reifenberg especially during the latter’s stints as a correspondent in Washington DC, to a lesser extent while the latter was in Paris. *Die Welt* and *Die Zeit* (as well as *Der Spiegel*) were based in Hamburg, while the WDR was based in Cologne. *Die Welt* was part of the Springer publishing concern, which in 1966 erected its own main headquarters in West Berlin near the Wall. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, among the major West German newspapers, Birrenbach really had no substantial contact with the *Süddeutschen Zeitung*, situated in Munich. Beginning from the group’s inception in 1964 and well into the 1970s (still as of 1975), Birrenbach, having been initially approached by Gustav Stein (BDI, Cologne), was at least a nominal member of a small *Handelsblatt* advisory circle, though he appears to have rarely, if ever, been able to actually accept the invitations to attend the meetings held once or twice a year. Such sessions, including dinners together afterwards, aimed at an open discussion and exchange of opinions on pressing contemporary economic themes and problems between, on the one hand, the publishers and leading editors at the *Handelsblatt* (Düsseldorf), among them Friedrich Vogel (publisher) and Klaus Bernhardt and Karl Heinrich Herchenröder (editors-in-chief), and, on the other hand, some of the most important personalities of the West German *Wirtschaft* (including in the fields of industry, banking and insurance). Most significantly, they provided the figures of the *Wirtschaft* the opportunity to express their opinions, viewpoints, criticisms, wishes and experiences to the journalists, in the expectation they would be reflected in the content of the prominent West German business newspaper. Even with Birrenbach typically absent, Thyssen was well represented over the years among the participants (who were necessarily approved by the other members), including by Ernst Wolf

well rewarded in that the key West German (and international) media, press and journalistic elite reported quite extensively on Atlanticist undertakings and appears to have been generally pro-Atlanticist in its broader articles and overall reporting in these principal media outlets.<sup>36</sup>

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Mommsen (Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG); Dieter Spethmann (August-Thyssen-Hütte AG); and Egon Overbeck (Mannesmann AG). Meetings were often held at the Industrie-Club in Düsseldorf but also in major cities throughout the Federal Republic, as well as at the headquarters of these Thyssen figures, such as the *Thyssen Hochhaus* in Düsseldorf.

<sup>36</sup> The Atlanticist institutions, functions and declarations received extensive coverage in the West German and broader international press (including the printing of entire texts). Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe enjoyed particular notice for its meetings and resolutions, with newspapers, including West German ones, regularly reporting on its gatherings. For the Monnet Committee meetings receiving "attention" in the six countries of the European Community, Britain and the USA, see Jacques Van Helmont to KB, 26 May 1965, ACDP K050/2. Such later examples include newspaper articles in the FAZ of 13 March 1969 ("Monnet Committee Deploys Itself for EEC-Entrance of England"); *The Times* (London) of 12 March 1969 ("Five Experts Plot Europe's Course"); *The Guardian* of 12 March 1969; *Le Monde* of 13 March 1969; and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of 8 March 1969. Indeed, the FAZ typically printed the full texts of the Monnet Committee declarations on its "documentation" page. Likewise, in December 1962, the resolutions of the Monnet Committee were reprinted in *The Times*. As of 27 June 1962, the *Deutsche Zeitung* had printed a full page about the Monnet Committee, which had just released a joint declaration the previous day (Hellwig, DZ editor-in-chief, telex to KB, 27 June 1962, ACDP K051/1). Also, for the Declaration of Atlantic Unity being covered in November 1962 by the *Nachrichtenspiegel*, see the attachment to the *Nachrichtenspiegel I* of 13 November 1962, ACDP K152/2. On the NATO Parliamentarians Conference of November 1962, including speeches of prominent personalities, receiving coverage in the *New York Times* and *Combat* (France), see the main news items in the NATO Press Service, 13 November 1962, ACDP K152/2. Hosting such well-known speakers certainly helped attract attention to Atlanticist gatherings, as further evidenced by the noteworthy reporting in the newspapers about Birrenbach's own *Übersee-Tag* speech in May 1963. For the foreign press also devoting extensive attention to Atlanticist undertakings, here especially the wide coverage of the principal speeches given at the opening session of the NPC in November 1963 in the British, American and French press, see Press Review, NATO Press Service, 5 November 1963, ACDP K154/1. As of November 1964, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and the *Evening Star* had all run editorials on the NPC-related ADELA (development projects for Latin America, see Chapter 8). For the German press, here the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, reporting on proposals made by German participants at the annual conference of the North Atlantic Assembly, see "NATO soll Mitgliedsstaaten helfen: NAA fordert 'Marshall Plan' für Südeuropa," SDZ (Munich), 18 November 1974, *Bundestag* Press Documentation, London (dpa), ACDP K213/2. For an apparently Atlanticist-minded FAZ allocating front-page space to describe the nature of the *Atlantik-Brücke* and its activities, here in a by and large positive assessment of the AB and the American Council on Germany, particularly of the 1977 German-American Conference, and more broadly of the meetings and other endeavors of such private organizations in general, see "Transatlantische Eilsache," by Robert Held, FAZ, 16 March 1977, p. 1, ACDP K134/2. On Birrenbach's pleasure about the German press (including the FAZ and *Die Welt*) publishing articles on 5 May 1980 reporting on the ceremony in Karlsruhe in which John McCloy had been awarded the Lucius D. Clay Medal, see KB to John McCloy, 5 May 1980, ACDP K178/2. Such press outlets also covered other Atlanticist functions like the Königswinter Conferences. Of course, the Atlanticists were not alone in employing media to their advantage, as strikingly demonstrated by de Gaulle's famous press conferences. On the efforts of the *Bundeskorrespondenz- und Verlag GmbH* (Frankfurt), closely aligned with the federal government, to spread doubts about British firmness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (highlighting an alleged tendency to compromise) and therefore about the desirability of a British entrance into the EEC that might bring unwanted consequences, as well as a defense of the attitudes

At the same time, it was believed that secrecy retained its virtues in certain instances, where publicity could be a double-edged sword and, on balance, more could be accomplished if the press were kept at a distance. Such a circumstance could simply be the result of the peculiar function of a particular organization. Most obvious in this regard was the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, whose studies were generally confidential and not intended for public consumption. In other instances, a measure of secrecy facilitated the carrying out of certain functions and enhanced the value of particular activities. For instance, the confidentiality imposed on the proceedings of the meetings of the Monnet Committee, the functions and study groups of the DGAP, certain elements of the NPC sessions (e.g. committee meetings), and the panel sessions of the AB's German-American Conferences encouraged participants to speak frankly, without the fear, for instance, that their remarks might be exploited by their political opposition.<sup>37</sup> In another sense, Birrenbach preserved secrecy in expressing his ideas, views and judgments in various public forums and public relations actions not only by avoiding the revelation of secret information in his possession but also by rather impressionistically making points in a "discrete," "decent" and "cautious" manner. In part, this entailed scaling back, for instance, his criticisms of the United States, whether of its Presidents

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of Adenauer and de Gaulle in this question, for instance in a lead article "British Escapades," by Martin Vogel (currently in London), circulated through its *Sonderdienst*, see "Copy" of 12 February 1963, ACDP K011/1.

<sup>37</sup> However, this secrecy could be a fragile thing. Such was particularly the case when journalists were present in an Atlanticist context, whether as members or participants. In these instances, they could be, and at least sometimes were, pressured by their editors or other superiors to report about "off-limits" details of specific functions, an act that patently threatened to cast doubt on the so vital confidentiality. See, for instance, the examples with respect to DGAP functions provided in Daniel Eisermann, *Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1955 bis 1972* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999). While Birrenbach obviously understood the value of publicity in some respects, he also recognized the worth of subtle and private diplomacy. For Birrenbach's insistence in his key *Sondermission* meeting with the Americans (Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Bundy, and Leddy) of 8 November 1965 in the State Department that an American proposal regarding nuclear issues, here those of an MLF and nuclear control, must be presented by the US President "to the most important powers" and "in a small circle without publicity," see KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1.

and administrations, its foreign policy, or of particular experiences there, and his depictions at times of what he considered an abhorrent mood in Europe. Thus, relative to his private correspondence and interactions, Birrenbach publicly adopted a more abstract, milder, “insinuating” approach, sometimes omitting “certain doubts,” suppressing less flattering thoughts and often revealing “only the tip of the iceberg.” Moreover, regarding secrecy, he made it a point to protect the identity of his (typically American) “friends” who provided him with information and opinions on diverse and delicate matters, even if this occasionally led to a lack of expressed precision and clarity regarding the ascertained “American attitude,” all in the interests of averting any “*Vertrauensbruch*.”<sup>38</sup>

Birrenbach was also constantly on the look-out for and enthusiastically sought to have abundant honors bestowed upon his foreign contacts, particularly Monnet, for their achievements but well aware, too, of the resultant attention and public relations benefits.<sup>39</sup> Birrenbach’s greatest failure in this regard was undoubtedly the drive he spearheaded in early 1971 (January-February) to propose Monnet for and hopefully secure him the Nobel Peace Prize for his contribution to “peace and understanding among the peoples,” an undertaking that received further impetus from his desire to deny the honor to Chancellor Willy Brandt.<sup>40</sup> Birrenbach played a central role in this endeavor through his initiative in hatching the idea, in securing the support of the German members of the Monnet Committee and then, with their help, the approval of the members from other countries, and finally in putting together, along with Katharina

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<sup>38</sup> For Birrenbach’s newspaper articles, here in the Federal Republic, revealing “only the tip of the iceberg,” see for instance KB to Hermann J. Abs, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 21 October 1977, ACDP K151/2.

<sup>39</sup> In 1959, the West German President had already granted Monnet the highest relevant German *Ordensstufe* (the *Großkreuz*). Otherwise, it seems certain that Birrenbach would have pushed for that award in June 1968 as Monnet approached his 80<sup>th</sup> birthday.

<sup>40</sup> On Monnet’s “extraordinarily important contribution” to “peace and understanding among the peoples,” see KB telex to Rainer Barzel, 12 January 1971, ACDP K140/2.

Focke (SPD) and based on a draft of Francois Deshormes, the definitive proposal in the name of the members of the action committee to the Nobel Prize Committee in Oslo.<sup>41</sup>

Writing to Monnet in October 1971 after learning of the “regrettable” decision of the Storting’s Nobel Committee to grant Brandt the prize, Birrenbach remarked:

This is without any doubt a party decision since the majority of the Storting is social-democratic or socialist.... If the Storting would have granted the Nobel Prize to you [Monnet] this would have given a new lift to the European idea in a moment when Europe and the world need this lift more than ever. This would have made historical sense. On the other side, granting the Prize to Brandt now is equivalent to an interference in the process of forming a definite public opinion in Germany. Nobody has ever had the idea to grant the Nobel Prize to Adenauer. But after two years of unfinished work a social-democratic influenced Committee grants it to Brandt. I can only say in this painful moment that I regret this decision deeply for you and our common cause. It will help the Russians. Will it contribute to peace? I do not know.<sup>42</sup>

Birrenbach had greater success in some other similar efforts, having arranged that Monnet be granted an honorary doctorate from the University of Cologne, definitively decided on in October 1968, and that Hajo Holborn be granted the first Inter Nationes Prize at a ceremony in Bonn-Bad Godesberg on 19 June 1969 (in which Birrenbach gave the *Laudatio*), in recognition of his work for German-American understanding and of his “*gegenwartsbezogenen*” interpretation of German history.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> The proposal was signed by the Monnet Committee members of the parliaments and governments (only they were qualified to make such a proposal) of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The German signers were Walter Arendt, Rainer Barzel, Birrenbach, Brandt, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner. Walter Scheel did not sign, doubting that it was a good idea that an organization nominated its own president, something that “could lead to misunderstandings” that did not do justice to the matter at hand nor to the personalities involved. Therefore, he opposed at least this procedure (Scheel telex to KB, 13 January 1971, ACDP K140/2). At the time, MdB Focke, daughter of Ernst Friedlaender, was actually the Parliamentary State Secretary in Willy Brandt’s *Bundeskanzleramt*.

<sup>42</sup> KB to Jean Monnet, 20 October 1971, ACDP K140/2.

<sup>43</sup> Regarding Monnet’s honorary doctorate, Birrenbach appears to have been in contact at the University of Cologne with both Prof. Theodor Wessels (*Institut für Energiewirtschaft*), in whose faculty the degree was granted and who seems to have been particularly instrumental in securing the honor, and State Secretary a.D. Prof. Dr. Alfred Müller-Armack (*Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik*). As of June 1969, there had still been no related ceremony at the University of Cologne, apparently due to Monnet’s repeated postponements, nor any other official presentation of the honor, and it is not clear when or even if the honorary doctorate was

#### D. Influencing the American Public

However, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists were not solely interested in molding public opinion in the Federal Republic, rather they also devoted considerable energy to influencing such opinion abroad, particularly in the United States. As already alluded to, Gaullists in the Federal Republic regularly attacked Atlanticist policies and personalities in books, the mainstream and Gaullist press and via other publications and public relations actions, while de Gaulle's own press conferences and foreign trips resonated extraordinarily abroad.<sup>44</sup> Among the further complicating factors these

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ever physically transferred to Monnet. Birrenbach's earlier efforts (June-July 1968) to secure an honorary doctorate for Monnet from the University of Bonn via Prof. Ulrich Scheuner (*Institut für Völkerrecht*) failed due to a lack of unified opinion, especially the opposition of a key faculty member (an economist) who was a proponent of the Erhard course and had clashed repeatedly with Monnet in the first years of the *Montanunion*. Holborn was given the Inter Nationes Prize, only a few hours before his death, by State Secretary Günter Diehl (Chairman of the *Verwaltungsrat of Inter Nationes eV*), in the quarters of that organization. An Inter Nationes *Festschrift* devoted to Holborn also emerged in both German and English in 1969, containing essays by Holborn on contemporary history, the commemorative speeches (*Gedenkreden*) of the US *Gesandten* Russell Fessenden, AA State Secretary Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz and Prof. Max Braubach (representing the *Wissenschaft*), as well as Birrenbach's *Laudatio*, which focused on Holborn's political activity. For Birrenbach's claim that this *Laudatio* had "often been quoted," see KB to Hanna Holborn Gray, c/o Prof. Eugene Rostow, Yale Law School, 21 December 1979, ACDP K158/1. However, Birrenbach also suffered further disappointments along these lines. As of December 1969, his efforts vis-à-vis a sympathetic Mayor Hermann Heusch (CDU) to have the Monnet Committee awarded the International Charlemagne Prize of the City of Aachen (*Karlspreis*) had failed since Monnet himself had already won the prize in 1953. Likewise, Birrenbach's efforts in September 1972 to have the *Stiftung FVS* in Hamburg, through a similarly understanding Alfred Toepfer (*Vorstand* of the *Stiftung*), grant Monnet an award came to naught due to the foundation's statutes, which stipulated that the granting of such a prize was only possible for historical achievements within the previous two years, and due to the fact that Monnet had already been granted the foundation's first *Robert-Schuman-Preis* in 1966, bestowed on personalities promoting European unity in exemplary fashion. At Monnet's wish, Birrenbach had been invited to the celebration at the *Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität* in Bonn upon the granting of this first Schuman Prize. Finally, Birrenbach's effort initiated in June 1972 vis-à-vis a sympathetic federal government, particularly Foreign Minister Scheel, to have former Israeli Ambassador Felix Elieser Shinnar granted a high German decoration (presumably an award of the *Verdienstorden* from the Federal President) for his contribution to German-Israeli relations, an effort aiming to draw attention to the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the September 1952 restitution agreement in whose negotiation Shinnar had played an important role, ultimately floundered on the Israeli government's refusal to allow Shinnar to receive such a medal, perhaps the result of the rules regarding *Beamte*, and his subsequent rejection of such an honor (KB to Scheel, 28 June 1972, ACDP K096/1).

<sup>44</sup> For Gladwyn's complaint regarding "to what lengths Gaullist propagandists will go in their efforts," here with respect to the treatment by the West German monthly *Dem Profil* (Munich) of his article "Britain in Europe," which appeared only in crucially truncated form and countered by "A Gaullist Answer to Great Britain," by the French journalist Georges Broussine, see Lord Gladwyn to Dr. Hans Werner Gille, Editor-in-Chief, *Das Profil*, Munich, 10 April 1968, ACDP K066/1. Though in many aspects admiring of the

concerned Atlanticists generally confronted in this realm was the incessant and massive communist propaganda emanating from the USSR and the East Bloc states, among them the GDR. This propaganda was aimed in part at the Western publics, namely American, West German and West European (including British) opinion, but also at other foreign populations all over the world, such as those of friendly Pacific countries like Japan, Australia and New Zealand as well as the developing Third World. A rather crude form of ideological warfare, this often blatantly false and misleading, yet difficult to ignore, disinformation assailed the West, sought to conjure up fears of war, linked to an escalating arms race, and functioned overall to potentially undermine Atlanticist goals. Such propaganda from the East was even explicitly directed at times at the Atlanticists themselves, their institutions, activities and networks.<sup>45</sup> While among individual countries the US bore much of the brunt, this propaganda also demonstrated a distinctly anti-West German character and strove to incite anti-German feelings. The Federal Republic was distorted and defamed as a country of a revived National Socialism, neo-Fascism, anti-Semitism, militarism, aggression and revanchism. Thrust into the role of *Schreckgespenst* and *Störenfried*, the Federal Republic was lambasted not only for its Nazi past and its supposed failure to prosecute war criminals but also for central elements

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American Way, the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's international best-selling book *The American Challenge* (1967), with its startling title and notion of a (peaceful) European-American "confrontation of civilizations," not only astounded the European scene but also fed into certain Gaullist or other anti-Atlanticist tendencies.

<sup>45</sup> For example, on 15 March 1961, *Pravda* ran an article on the KWC entitled (here in German) "Die deutsch-englischen Gespräche in Königswinter - bittere Pillen für viele Bonner Politiker" (contained in the BPA Ostinformation, ACDP K076/1). Meanwhile, *Neues Deutschland* and *Radio Ostberlin* also reported propagandistically on the 1961 KWC (the latter recorded in the *Nachrichtenspiegel/Ostteil* of the Federal Government's Press and Information Office, 14 March 1961, ACDP K076/1).

of its foreign policy, most notably its stress on reunification as well as its hesitation in signing and ratifying the NPT, that allegedly precluded an international détente.<sup>46</sup>

In their own efforts abroad, the German Atlanticists were confronted with some particularly thorny, even unique problems. Germany's terrible recent history, including its role in two world wars (i.e. also encompassing the figure of Kaiser Wilhelm II and the imposition of occupations) but especially Hitler and the crimes of National Socialism (i.e. also genocide), cast a dark shadow on its image in foreign popular opinion. Moreover, this horrific past repeatedly came to the forefront in this period. During the 1950s and 60s, evidence emerged at times of certain radical right-wing tendencies in the Federal Republic: the ominous electoral successes of extremist parties in the 1950s but especially later on in the mid- and late-1960s with the rise of the neo-Nazi NPD; the content and rising circulation of publications like the *National- und Soldatenzeitung*; and a number of anti-Semitic incidents, including the defacing of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries.<sup>47</sup> Historical works, whether the widely viewed broadcast of the play *Judgment at Nuremberg* (1959, *Playhouse 90* in the US); the American journalist William Shirer's popular book *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (1960); or the influential studies of specific German and foreign professional historians, including AJP Taylor and Fritz Fischer, depicting the Germans in an unflattering light, revived and perpetuated harsh

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<sup>46</sup> For instance, the *Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag* (Cologne), financed by the GDR, published a multitude of polemical works, including its ongoing *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* as well as books like Eberhard Czichon's *Der Bankier und die Macht* (1970). This work, part of the long-term campaign against the West German *Wirtschaft*, took Hermann Josef Abs and the *Deutsche Bank* to task for their at least controversial activities and relationship to the regime during the Third Reich and not only brought the *Verlag* and Czichon further attention but also a trial in Stuttgart ultimately won by Abs and the *Deutschen Bank*. For a *Druckerei Wetzel* near Baden-Baden that was said to have itself been funded with money from the DDR and which produced many of the titles of the *Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag*, see Rolf Vogel to KB, 14 October 1975, ACDP K096/2.

<sup>47</sup> On the wave of anti-Semitic and Nazi-themed incidents in the Federal Republic (including Cologne) in 1959-60 which abroad received extensive coverage and attention in press and public, see the AA Report to All Diplomatic and Professional Consular Representations Abroad, 10 March 1960, ACDP K126/2.



memories.<sup>48</sup> Extraordinary events like Adolf Eichmann's abduction in Buenos Aires (1960) and subsequent trial in Jerusalem (beginning in 1961) and even the Spiegel Affair (1962) stirred reflection abroad on the German past, and future. Finally, the emergence of issues such as the *Verjährung* of war crimes and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons also played a noteworthy role.<sup>49</sup> The latent burdens, resentments and mistrust thus generated and sustained in much of the world, including the United States, Britain and elsewhere in the West, was both reflected in and stoked by, for instance, the Anglo-Saxon and wider foreign press and media.<sup>50</sup>

Such phenomena and events not only fuelled fears abroad of a revival of National Socialism and of nationalism in general in the new Germany but also, in turn, fed into perceptions, sometimes resentful, in the Federal Republic of an hysterical anti-German wave in American public opinion. The reputation of contemporary West Germany and of the Germans themselves in the United States appeared to be tarnished by the persistence of deep-rooted yet obsolete clichés and misconceptions; the often distorted and exaggerated reporting of the American news media on German affairs; as well as a plethora of frankly unambitious but nevertheless (and therefore?) popular "anti-German"

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<sup>48</sup> Shirer's book presented the Germans and their history as leading logically to Hitler and National Socialism, with all the implicit connotations for the future. In contrast to even British historians like Alan Bullock and Correlli Barnett, Fischer suggested that Germany deserved sole responsibility for the outbreak of World War I. For Birrenbach not knowing Fischer's work personally, but nevertheless claiming that his *Krieg der Illusionen* (1969), the recent English translation of which had just been approvingly reviewed in *The Spectator* (27 June 1975) under the headline "German Guilt," was "awful [*schrecklich*]," see KB to Herbert Sulzbach, West German Embassy, London, 25 July 1975, ACDP K068/2.

<sup>49</sup> Hence Birrenbach's stress to his American contacts on the "peaceful use of nuclear energy."

<sup>50</sup> On the recent anti-German attacks in books, newspaper articles, letters to the editor and public statements in the United States, characterized by "emotionalism," "sweeping generalizations" and "wholesale condemnations," complete with charges of a re-Nazification of the Federal Republic as manifested, for example, in the occupation of "almost all leading positions" in public life (e.g. administration, bureaucracy) and business by "ex-Nazis," see *The Bridge*, published by the *Atlantik-Brücke*, Hamburg, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1. On the role in Britain of "some newspapers and a flood of 'war movies' and books" in fostering "the average man's ingrained suspicion and dislike of Germans," see again *The Bridge*, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1.

films and television broadcasts/series produced by the American mass entertainment industry dealing with the National Socialist and World War II period. Within such frameworks, virtually all Germans seemed to be presented as stereotypical “bad guys.” Dismayingly, this all appeared to be the case even with the considerable passage of time and its anticipated positive effects on both American attitudes towards the Germans and the desire for a greater measure of historical truth; the presence and enduring influence in the United States of the German immigrants of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries; as well as what was considered by most Germans to be the rather exemplary behavior of the Federal Republic after the Second World War, including the provision of generous reparations and restitution, genuine efforts to pursue National Socialist crimes and perpetrators and a peaceful and stable posture within the context of the Atlantic alliance that was also loyally supportive of the American foreign policy approach. True, some German voices at times painted a different picture of reality, one of at least a heterogeneous, even friendly, American perspective on West Germany and the Germans.<sup>51</sup>

However, despite such alternative assessments, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists, taken as a whole, were not only acutely interested in but even quite sensitive and rather excitable regarding potentially negative effects on the *Deutschlandbild* in the

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<sup>51</sup> For such a relatively optimistic assessment, see “Das Deutschlandbild der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit,” *Referat* of the Washington DC Embassy *Pressereferenten*, an Excerpt from the Protocol of the Consular Conference in Washington DC from 1-3 April 1968, ACDP K131/2. Here, it was argued that, at least as of 1968, the “extent and quality” of the reporting about contemporary Germany in the “American mass media” was generally acceptable. A “controversial and biased” CBS report on “The Germans” served as an exception, but even this had evoked a “negative” response among both the American public and the CBS producership, leading to the recall of the responsible CBS Germany correspondent (Hughes Rudd). Indeed, the demand for and “extensive output of scholarly and popular-scholarly literature” about Germany and the Germans as well as the panel discussions, interviews, commentary and documentary broadcasts on American radio and television (e.g. National Educational Television), including relatively “objective” documentaries about the Germany of the 1930s and 40s, indicated the fascination of the “intellectual elite” and “educated [*gebildeten*]” Americans with “Germany and its social and political development.” Moreover, this *Referat* argued that there was no single, homogenous, “*demoskopisch*” ascertainable American *Deutschlandbild*, rather a variety of simultaneously existing “group pictures [*Gruppenbilder*]” of the German people conditioned by numerous regional, ethnic, professional, educational and social factors.

United States. Among those experiences permanently stamping Birrenbach's outlook with respect to the existence of "*deutschfeindlichen*" sentiments in the US and the need for a proper, calm and "*maßvolle*" response to them, were his, at least by his own account, triumphant exchanges with the "clearly anti-German" John Kenneth Galbraith at a dinner organized for Birrenbach in New York, while on his *Sondermission* in Fall 1961 during the Berlin crisis, by the American corporate lawyer George Baker, one of the leading representatives of the Democratic Party in New York. This meeting was intended to allow Birrenbach to describe and initiate a discussion about the Berlin situation and the consequences of the construction of the Wall in this American circle of approximately twenty to thirty invited guests that also included Theodore White (author of the recent Kennedy book *The Making of the President*) and Charles Collingwood (responsible for the foreign political broadcasts of CBS).<sup>52</sup> The German Atlanticist concern with public relations in the United States manifested itself, for instance, in the regular inclusion of American media figures in Atlanticist conferences and the like, as well as in the various personalities with whom Birrenbach himself was connected abroad, among them molders of American opinion, links that were established also through meetings like the just

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<sup>52</sup> Galbraith was a Harvard professor of economics and, at the time, American ambassador to India. As of April 1985, Birrenbach still remembered this occasion in which Galbraith had asserted that the Germans intended to "drag" the US into a nuclear war against the Soviet Union as well as his own effective rebuttal of Galbraith's arguments, all of which led Baker to tell Galbraith that "I must say to you, Kenneth, either you shut up or you get out." In Birrenbach's account, that was also the general reaction prevailing in the meeting, and Galbraith left silently (KB to Helmut Schmidt, 30 April 1985, ACDP K033/3). For Galbraith expressing himself in a "tone of distanced arrogance which one finds here and there in the American universities of the Ivory League [*sic*] on the East Coast, however which I had still never encountered in such penetrating form," see Birrenbach's report about his discussions in Washington DC and New York during his trip to the United States from 18 October-1 November 1961, dated 3 November 1961, ACDP K159/1. Here, Birrenbach remained unclear to what extent Galbraith's views were characteristic of "part of the Intellectual Community of the East Coast" but "[a]t any rate the attitude of such a man, who is certainly not isolated, is symptomatic that also in the United States memories of the prewar time [prewar?] are still alive [*wach geblieben*]." For Birrenbach's somewhat watered-down account of this episode, see *Meine Sondermissionen: Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik* (Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1984), pp. 60-63.

described October 1961 gathering and, more generally, during trips to the US.<sup>53</sup> Within the unique environment of the United States, the German Atlanticists sought to improve the *Deutschlandbild* there and to fortify the trust and respect of the American public.

Despite the singular context of the United States, there existed considerable similarities between the German Atlanticists' publication and public relations efforts directed principally towards their compatriots and those directed primarily towards Americans (and other foreigners). These similarities extended to the forms employed and the general nature of the intended audiences. Indeed, in certain instances, it is difficult to even draw such stark distinctions since some of those activities primarily directed at either a German or American audience were simultaneously aimed, at least to some extent, at the other nation's public as well. Once again, now with respect to an American audience, we can see a distinct effort on the part of the German Atlanticists to influence the opinion of a relatively specialized public. As part of his larger international engagement, Birrenbach often gave speeches in the United States, for instance at the Council on Foreign Relations, but also including the undertaking of an extensive lecture tour in the fall of 1962 that included talks at many colleges and universities at which he had contacts (e.g. in Stanford).<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach, for one, saw to it that at least

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<sup>53</sup> Among foreign journalists outside of the United States, as we have already noted, Birrenbach was a long-term contact and great admirer of the Frenchman Raymond Aron, whose articles he read in *Le Figaro* and, later, *L'Express* and with whose ideas he generally found himself in agreement. For Birrenbach, as of June 1981, having had contacts with Aron for twenty years [one of Birrenbach's standard long-term estimations around this time, rather than a necessarily precise dating of the inception of their relationship], see KB to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 9 June 1981, ACDP K092/3. Aron's books, including *The Century of Total War* (1954), appeared in English translation in the United States. Among Aron's other works were *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (1962) and *Le Grand Débat: Initiation à la stratégie atomique* (1963), the latter exploring and assessing for non-American audiences the work of the leading American nuclear strategists in the immediately preceding years.

<sup>54</sup> To cite a later example, Birrenbach gave such a *Vortrag* before the CFR in May 1975. Aside from the US, Birrenbach also embarked on trips, at least in part, to give speeches within Europe (including Britain) and in Canada. Thus, on 4 February 1960, Birrenbach gave a talk before Chatham House in London, which dealt at least to a significant extent with the theme "Europe and Great Britain" (EEC/EFTA). Likewise, on

some of his articles and writings, though certainly to a lesser extent than in the Federal Republic, appeared in a number of foreign affairs journals abroad. Thus, his pieces could be found in outlets like the Canadian-based *International Journal* (Toronto); the Italian journal *Affari Esteri* (Rome), the latter published by the former ambassador to the Federal Republic Pietro Quaroni; and even once again the Argentinian newspaper the *Freien Presse*.<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, the focus of Birrenbach's attention in this regard was clearly on the United States. Here, Birrenbach's work appeared in Atlanticist-minded journals such as the *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, founded in 1963 as the organ of the Atlantic Council of the United States, and *Freedom & Union*, the Washington-based magazine of Clarence Streit's Federal Union Inc. and International Movement for Atlantic Union.<sup>56</sup> Just as important as Atlanticist-minded forums for the publication of his works, at least measured by the sheer quantity of his articles, were the English-language version of *Außenpolitik*, which first appeared in 1970 and for the establishment of which Birrenbach himself had worked, and the quarterly journal *Orbis*, produced since 1957 by the Foreign

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22 February 1963, Birrenbach gave a *Vortrag* on "The Federal Republic after the Brussels Decision" at an anniversary rally of the European Movement in the *Ridderzaal* (Binnenhof) in The Hague. As with so many of his other activities, Birrenbach was especially intensive but not entirely unique in this respect, for example insofar as some other German Atlanticists also embarked on lecture tours in the US.

<sup>55</sup> These included Birrenbach's articles "Europe, the European Economic Community and the Outer Seven" (*International Journal*, Winter 1959/60); "Europäisch-amerikanische Beziehungen, ihre Problematik und ihre Zukunft" (*Affari Esteri*, Nr. 4, October 1969), an article that also existed in the German language as a *Sonderdruck*; and "Nach der Bündnis-Debatte im Bundestag" (*Freie Presse*, 19 February 1963, Buenos Aires, *Verlagsleitung*: Walter Linne), as already noted a version of a recent *Europa-Archiv* article.

<sup>56</sup> Birrenbach's articles in *Freedom & Union* included "Atlantic Union and Germany" (November 1960, dealing with "the problem" of the relationship between the Federal Republic and the other nations of the Atlantic Community) and "Pulling Atlantica Together: A German Survey" (October 1961, heavily based on his April 1961 Atlantic Institute memo on "The Future of the Atlantic Community"). Birrenbach's articles in *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* included "Europe and America: Partners in Atlantic Community" (Summer 1963, Vol. 1, No. 2, reprinted from his book the *Future of the Atlantic Community*); "Partnership and Consultation in NATO" (Spring 1964); and "The West and German Ostpolitik: The German Opposition View" (Summer 1971, Vol. 9, No. 2). Though not a regular outlet, Birrenbach also published in May 1968 "Germany Re-enters the Arena" in *The Reporter* ("The Magazine of Facts and Ideas," Vol. 38, No. 10, 16 May 1968), the influential but soon-to-be defunct Cold War Liberal biweekly edited and published out of New York City by Max Ascoli.

Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia (an institute to which Birrenbach was particularly close).<sup>57</sup> On at least some occasions, Birrenbach's articles and papers also appeared as a part of larger collections, for instance the working paper he had prepared

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<sup>57</sup> Birrenbach's articles published in *Orbis* ("A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs") included "The Reorganization of NATO" (Summer 1962, Vol. 6, No. 2); "The United States and Western Europe: Partners or Rivals?" (Summer 1973, Vol. 17, No. 2, previously published in the *Europa-Archiv*); and "European Security: NATO, SALT and Equilibrium" (Summer 1978, "The Many Faces of Nuclear Policy," Vol. 22, No. 2). Birrenbach's articles appearing in the English-language edition of *Außenpolitik* included his 1970 "Erdgas" piece, written under the pseudonym Karl Wangemann, as well as "Europe's Security in the Changed World" (Vol. 24, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, 1973). For Birrenbach's efforts in support of an English-language edition of *Außenpolitik*, see Bechtoldt, *Außenpolitik*, to KB, 26 January 1970, ACDP K022/1.

Although never publishing in it, Birrenbach did subscribe to the short-lived journal *Western World* (1957-60). Seeking a scale encompassing the whole of the Western world, this innovative "Western" monthly was launched simultaneously in all the principal countries of that "world" in identical English- and French-language editions (the latter more ambiguously entitled *Occident*) and aspired to promote a "free discussion among the Atlantic nations" of the American and European continents; a better understanding of the Atlantic Community, in part by providing information regarding its political and economic problems; the overcoming of differences of opinion within the Atlantic Community; and the development of a united Atlantic Community into an "increasingly alive reality." The journal's sponsor was a charitable organization, whose board of directors was headed by the Dutchman Paul Rykens (former chairman of the board of Unilever Ltd.) and whose managing director was the Belgian parliamentarian Lucien Radoux. The journal's officers and contributors came from many nations, among them the United States, Canada, Britain, the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe (including Switzerland and Denmark). The journal's Executive Board consisted of Jacques de Bourbon-Busset (former director of cultural relations for the French foreign office); René Dabernat (*Paris-Presse l'Intransigent*); Edgar Ansel Mowrer (American political columnist); and Lucien Radoux (identified here as the "Director of the European center in Brussels for International Relations"). Though no Germans were among the editors, the International Editorial Advisory Board, comprising personalities from the field of newspapers and journalism, included Ernst Friedlaender ("German 'Columnist'") and Friedrich Wesemann ("Hannover Press"). Those West Germans signing an inaugural declaration supporting *Western World* were Hermann Josef Abs; Otto Wolff von Amerongen; Fritz Berg (President of the BDI); Heinrich von Brentano (Foreign Minister); Walter Freitag (presumably the trade unionist but identified here as the "President of German Industrial Association"); Dr. Jost Henkel; and Helmut Wohlthat. The head office of *Western World* was located in Brussels, with editorial offices elsewhere in Europe (Paris) and in the United States (Washington DC). For more on all this, see the undated information letter from the editors of *Western World*, ACDP K078/2. On the efforts of *Western World*, which already enjoyed the "support [*Förderung*]" of "the *Wirtschaft*" in "most West European countries" and with the assistance of the BDI, to gain the support of the West German *Wirtschaft* through speech-meal functions, including at the Ritz Hotel for the representatives of the German *Wirtschaft* at the Atlantic Congress in London in June 1959 and at the Hotel Breidenbacher Hof (Düsseldorf) for representatives of German industry in October 1959, see the invitation letter from Dr. Beutler, BDI, *Das Geschäftsführende Präsidialmitglied*, Cologne, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2. For the BDI looking positively on *Western World* as a "promising" endeavor to foster "the idea of an Atlantic *Völkergemeinschaft*" and for the involvement of the BDI already several times at the wish of *Western World* in the treatment of contemporary economic-political questions, see again Beutler, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2. Finally, on the "very strong echo in the press" enjoyed by the occasional discussion functions staged by the organization "standing behind" *Western World*, so far in Paris, Rome and London, at which "leading European and American personalities" were present, see yet again Beutler, 26 September 1959, ACDP K002/2. Ultimately, *Western World* turned out to be commercially unviable, by its own account not least due to a "rather severe lay out and limited circulation" that "did not prove sufficiently attractive to advertisers" (Notice of May 1960, ACDP K004/2).

on “Political Sovereignty, Leadership and Cooperation” for a May 1964 conference on NATO reform and reorganization staged by Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC (which he had planned to but ultimately was unable to attend) would appear as a contribution, along with ten to twelve other such works, in Fall 1964 in a volume, *NATO: Problems and Prospects*, published by the CSIS in the United States. Over the years, the publication of Birrenbach’s pieces in journals like *Europa-Archiv* and ORBIS, as well as his recommendations in favor of specific articles submitted by others (including his foreign contacts), were facilitated by his tight, friendly relations with some of the crucial figures engaged in the publishing and editing of such Atlanticist-oriented organs, personalities like Wilhelm Cornides, Wolfgang Wagner, Hermann Volle, and Robert Strausz-Hupé.<sup>58</sup>

Likewise, the publication of English-language translations of books originally appearing in German also played a role in the German Atlanticist effort to influence a specialized foreign audience. For instance, Birrenbach’s *The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership*, complete with a glowing introduction by former Secretary of State Christian Herter, appeared in the United States in the spring of 1963 and was available in Britain that same year.<sup>59</sup> Regarding the latter,

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<sup>58</sup> Successive editors of *Orbis* included Robert Strausz-Hupé (1957-69), William Kintner (1969-73) and Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (1973-76). As of the Winter 1974 edition, the Associate Editor was James Dougherty. Over the years, the Editorial Board included personalities like Walter Hahn and Don Humphrey. For Birrenbach’s inquiry regarding news about Strausz-Hupé’s planned publication of a part of Birrenbach’s “report” about the Atlantic Community, see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, Hotel Europäischer Hof, Heidelberg, 12 September 1961, ACDP K008/1. Strausz-Hupé continued to be pivotal in helping Birrenbach get his articles published in ORBIS even after he had officially departed as editor. Wilhelm Cornides, founder of the *Europa-Archiv*, remained its publisher until his death in 1966. He was succeeded in this role until 1994 by the journalist Wolfgang Wagner. Meanwhile, Hermann Volle remained editor-in-chief of the EA essentially throughout until 1986.

<sup>59</sup> The appearance of Birrenbach’s book in the United States was delayed more than three months by a printers strike in New York. Birrenbach considered Herter’s forward “a great honor” and was very grateful to him (KB to Herter, 6 September 1962, ACDP K151/1). Chris Emmet appears to have been among those instrumental in arranging for Herter to undertake this.

the *Atlantica* subsidized advertisements for the book, themselves public relations actions of a sort, in prominent British journals such as *The New Statesman*.<sup>60</sup> With the assistance of the West German embassies in Washington and London, Birrenbach saw to it that a significant number of copies were distributed in each country to key figures and institutions in government and politics, the *Wirtschaft*, the *Wissenschaft* and the media.<sup>61</sup> Birrenbach and other German Atlanticist authors were aided by the fact that, just as in the Federal Republic, various pro-Atlanticist publishers also existed abroad. For instance, *The Future of the Atlantic Community* was published and sold in the Anglo-Saxon countries by two such houses, Pall Mall (London) in Britain and Frederick Praeger Inc. (New York) in the United States, the latter being the German Atlanticists' most important such ally in the Anglo-Saxon world.<sup>62</sup> Birrenbach applauded and wished success on

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<sup>60</sup> This was carried out by Walter Stahl, the *Geschäftsführer* of the *Atlantica* and underscores the Atlanticists' aspiration to ensure an effective advertising of their publications in the press, including abroad and in this case in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

<sup>61</sup> Within government, this also included the governmental bureaucracy. Among the parliamentarians were the members of the Anglo-German parliamentary group. Beyond this, Birrenbach believed that the participants in the Königswinter meetings, the universities, members of the media, the German embassies and consulates, trade organizations and other associations might also be interested. For Birrenbach planning to send Erich Straetling, based at the West German embassy in Washington DC, a copy, see KB to Straetling, 8 May 1962, ACDP K157/1. For the English-language edition of Birrenbach's book having been recently sent to William Tyler at the State Department, see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, Department of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2.

<sup>62</sup> Indeed, at least around this time, Praeger was the largest English-language publisher of books on world affairs, international relations and contemporary history. The head of the firm, Frederick Praeger, was an immigrant from Austria (after the *Anschluss*) who participated in a number of Atlanticist functions including the aforementioned NATO conference held by the CSIS in Washington DC in May 1964 and, as of February 1968, a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group on "Germany as a Focus for East-West Relations." The Praeger edition of Birrenbach's *The Future of the Atlantic Community: Toward European-American Partnership* was 94 pages long and cost \$3.50 ("Toward an Atlantic Community," *Foreign Service Journal*, September 1963, "The Bookshelf," ACDP K181/1). Frederick A. Praeger published a number of works emerging from the Atlantic Institute and the *Atlantik-Brücke*, for instance the former's *Problems of Aid to Education in Developing Countries* (1965) and *A Monetary Policy for Latin America* (1968) as well as the latter's *Education for Democracy in West Germany: Achievements-Shortcomings-Prospects* (1961) and *The Politics of Postwar Germany* (1963). In 1977, Praeger also published (in cooperation with the European Community Institute for University Studies) the English-language edition of *Decision Making in the European Community*, which had been financed by the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* and edited by Max Kohnstamm. The Pall Mall Press had been founded by John MacCallum Scott, a staunch promoter of European integration. In 1970, Pall Mall also published *German Constitutional Documents since 1871*.



Frederick Praeger's attempt, via his firm's offerings, "to carry out a political action in a definite [*bestimmten*] direction."<sup>63</sup> Praeger's efforts to implement its own "Atlanticist" policy manifested themselves not just in its publication program, but also in its business policies.<sup>64</sup> Birrenbach's close connections with the firm, including with Frederick Praeger himself, served not only his own publication efforts but also those of his fellow Atlanticists, playing for instance a key role in securing publication of Ernst Majonica's work (*East-West Relations: A German View*) in the US in 1969 by this house.<sup>65</sup>

Aside from such high-quality publications, "information trips" to the Federal Republic could also prove useful in influencing a foreign public, even well beyond the strictly limited number of foreign elites that directly participated in such undertakings. These trips were carried out by a number of German Atlanticist organizations, including the *Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft* and the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* (the latter

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<sup>63</sup> KB to Frederick Praeger, New York, 29 October 1962, ACDP K151/1.

<sup>64</sup> Here, it actively sought to cooperate with and to acquire other publishers in Europe, with the explicit aim, in part, of increasing "communication" and the international "exchange of information and ideas" among the "scholarly, governmental and library communities." It was this policy that led to Praeger's acquisition in 1963 of a controlling interest in Pall Mall, a move facilitated by the "similarity of viewpoint" in the publishing programs of the two firms in the fields of politics and world affairs. On all this, see the Frederick A. Praeger News Release, New York, 1 August 1963, ACDP K151/1.

<sup>65</sup> This was the English-language version of Majonica's *Deutsche Außenpolitik: Probleme und Entscheidungen* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), which had appeared in a second edition in 1966. Likewise, for Rainer Barzel thanking Birrenbach for his "letter to Herr Praeger in New York," see Barzel to KB, 1 July 1968, ACDP K052/2. Frederick Praeger also sent Birrenbach published volumes that might be of interest to Birrenbach as well as publication programs whose works Birrenbach found "well-rounded [*vielseitig*]" and "interesting" (KB to Frederick A. Praeger, 1 October 1971, ACDP K038/2). As of October 1971, Frederick Praeger was involved with a new *Verlag*, the *Edition Praeger GmbH* (Munich), which had just published its first volume. His publishing house having been taken over by another firm, Praeger nevertheless appears to have remained engaged for some time thereafter with his former *Verlag* but also founded Westview Press in 1975 in Boulder (Colorado). Then as well, Frederick Praeger continued to be interested in, actively pursue and apply for the publishing of Atlanticist works, which created at least further possibilities for Birrenbach during this period regarding the appearance of such works in the US, for instance with respect to his *Festschrift* (see Chapter 9). In 1985, the Westview Press would publish the European Security Study *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985). The American publisher DC Heath (Lexington, MA) played a significant role in the publishing of Atlantic Institute works during at least the early and mid-1970s, including the Atlantic Papers. For AI payments to DC Heath for the Atlantic Papers (including back-payment of FF 140,000 for Atlantic Papers of the period 1972-74), see AI Expenditures 1975, 12 February 1976, ACDP K058 and expenditure details attached to the AI Budget 1976, ACDP K058. In 1973, DC Heath also published Dr. Gerhard Mally's *The European Community in Perspective* for the Atlantic Council of the United States.

for British guests), particularly by their local branches.<sup>66</sup> Such visits enabled foreign guests to meet and interact with prominent West German personalities from the worlds of politics, *Wirtschaft*, press and culture. In addition to maintaining its own visitor service, the *Atlantik-Brücke* also occasionally organized rather elaborate information visits for Americans. One such endeavor in which Birrenbach played some role was a two-week trip through the Federal Republic in January-February 1967 for a number of important American publicists and writers, some of whom had evinced quite negative opinions of Germany and who were deemed especially influential in shaping educated public opinion in the United States.<sup>67</sup> During this trip, organized in conjunction with the Ford Foundation, the Americans were familiarized with contemporary Germany, experiencing especially its cultural achievements and meeting “creative personalities” in politics, academia and the arts and sciences, including through gatherings in private houses as well as smaller official receptions.<sup>68</sup> Birrenbach not only took part in the discussion and approval of this particular trip program in the AB *Vorstand* but also served as one of the *Atlantik-Brücke* members who met with the visitors during their stay in Bonn.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> The DATG trips were also intended and carried out for West German participants (“*inländische* guests”).

<sup>67</sup> Participants included George Elliott (critic and novelist); Stanley Kauffmann (co-editor, *New Republic*); Irving Kristol (vice president of Basic Books Inc., former editor of *Encounter*); Dwight MacDonal (writer, *The New Yorker*); Robert Manning (editor, *The Atlantic Monthly*); Danial Moynihan (Director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at MIT and Harvard University); Norman Podhoretz (editor, *Commentary* magazine); Richard Rovere (writer, *The New Yorker*); Harvey Swados (novelist); Lionel Trilling (critic and professor of English literature, Columbia University); and Diana Trilling. The trip consisted of longer stays in three of the most important centers of the Federal Republic (Hamburg, Berlin and Munich), a visit to the capital and a side trip to the Ruhr.

<sup>68</sup> In preparing and carrying out this program, the *Atlantik-Brücke* was aided by leading experts in these fields, among them representatives and responsible authorities of the various cities in question.

<sup>69</sup> Including, among others, Economics Minister Karl Schiller (SPD). The inviting of foreign personalities of the *Publizistik* to the Federal Republic was considered particularly effective since such guests functioned as *Multiplikatoren* upon their return to their homelands. Likewise, on 18 September 1962, Birrenbach gave a talk to and answered the questions of a party of about twenty, primarily students, from Britain’s Imperial Defense College, visiting the Federal Republic for five days, in the *Bundeshaus*. On Berlin as the highpoint for most foreigners invited by the government to the Federal Republic and consequently the establishment of a visitor office there, see the Report presented by *Ministerialdirigent* Krueger of the Press

Of course, not all American or Anglo-Saxon elites could be brought over to the Federal Republic for these sorts of information visits. Therefore, to keep such a, often specialist, audience accurately informed about events and trends in contemporary West Germany, the Atlanticist organizations, especially the *Atlantik-Brücke*, produced a number of relevant publications. In particular, as of 1962, the AB was issuing a monthly *Newsletter* circulated among a select group of Americans in leading positions in government, education and information media. By July 1973, *Report from Germany*, a brief newsletter published by the *Brücke* at irregular intervals, but approximately quarterly, was being sent to a particularly interested circle of Americans and other English-speaking foreigners occupying “key positions” (including outside the public sector, for instance in the business world), as of the mid-1970s numbering about 450. This report offered analysis and an “inside view” of the current situation, developments, issues and problems in West German foreign and domestic affairs (including political affairs and German positions and policies on central questions) and sought to further awaken interest in and promote an understanding of the Federal Republic.<sup>70</sup>

Through their publications, the German Atlanticist organizations also attempted to reach a larger foreign audience, not necessarily located amongst the societal elites, but one nevertheless especially interested in the Federal Republic. This audience could include businesspeople, students, vacationers, or simply curious individuals, not inevitably specialists on the Federal Republic but still in need of a solid overview. For

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and Information Office of the Federal Government before the *Bundestag* Committee for Foreign Affairs on 21 January 1960 about “Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit im Ausland,” ACDP K004/2.

<sup>70</sup> On the monthly *Newsletter* as well as a sample article by Walter Stahl, see *The Bridge*, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1. This newsletter appears to have also been distributed to the AB’s own members. On the *Report from Germany*, see the write-up on “*Atlantik-Brücke* Publications” in ACDP K104/2. As of the early 1980s, the *Report from Germany* was being sent several times a year to about seven hundred Americans in such “key positions” (AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).

example, the *Atlantik-Brücke* published the booklet *These Strange German Ways*, which first appeared in 1963 and was intended to familiarize English-speaking foreigners with German customs and manners and in general to provide an introduction to the German way of life. As of the early 1970s, this publication was being increasingly used in foreign schools and colleges in the context of German instruction. Another *Atlantik-Brücke* publication intended for a similarly somewhat broader audience was the bi-annual *Meet Germany*, which first appeared in 1953. This publication covered the most significant political, economic, cultural and social issues pertaining to the Federal Republic. Each of these publications went through multiple updated editions, thus vitally enabling them to take recent developments into account.<sup>71</sup>

#### E. Influencing the American Masses

Seeking to move beyond this still small group to influence an even broader, though still educated, public opinion, the German Atlanticists also relied to a certain

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<sup>71</sup> By 1982-83, *These Strange German Ways* had gone through fourteen editions with a total circulation of 368,600 copies. By 1982, *Meet Germany* had appeared in eighteen editions, with this 18<sup>th</sup> edition consisting of a total of 47,070 copies and the entire circulation since 1953 consisting of over 600,000 copies. This new edition had been enabled by a large order of the *Bundespresseamt* of 40,000 copies, of which 38,800 were sent to German foreign representations, including 18,300 to the German Information Center in New York City. Later similar publications from the *Atlantik-Brücke* included *German Holidays and Folk Customs* (which first appeared in 1972 and by 1982 had gone through six editions with a total circulation of 41,500 copies); *Meeting German Business* (first appeared in 1973 and by 1982 had gone through three editions with a total circulation of 26,000); *A Short History of German Place Names* (first appeared in 1974 and by 1982 had gone through three editions with a total circulation of 17,700); and *Civil Liberties and the Defense of Democracy against Extremists and Terrorists* (first appeared in 1980 in a first edition with a total circulation of 3,000 by 1982). Thanks to sizeable orders of the *Bundespresseamt* for the German foreign representations, it was possible to have, especially for *Meet Germany* and *These Strange German Ways*, a large number of copies at cost, a favorable situation. The books of the *Atlantik-Brücke* also went regularly to American and German book dealers, universities, and firms, as well as to many individuals. On all of this, see the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1 and Walter Stahl to Members of the AB, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. As of 1972-73, the *Bundespresseamt* and *Inter Nationes* in Bonn were the largest purchasers of the *Atlantik-Brücke* publications. *Inter Nationes* operated in the cultural-political field and itself received funding from the BPA. For the suggestion of Dr. Schmidt-Schlegel (German General Consulate in New York) that Robert Kleiman's trip to the Federal Republic in connection with his possible carrying out of the American Council on Germany's proposed research study on "the situation at the German universities and the possible consequences for the domestic political development of the Federal Republic" could be "technically [*technisch*]" prepared by *Inter Nationes*, a suggestion in which Kleiman was very interested, see the Report of the German General Consulate in New York, 5 October 1972, ACDP K183/2.

extent on the reach of the American mass media. The upshot, in Birrenbach's case, was a series of extraordinary one-time initiatives during the 1960s. One such effort was the Atlanticist "open letter" published in several American and other foreign press outlets in March 1963. This letter represented a response to events earlier that year, namely the Franco-German Treaty and de Gaulle's veto of a British entrance into the EEC, and sought to clarify the West German attitude, especially to counteract the impression of many Americans that the Germans endorsed the Gaullist concept of an inward-looking Europe. As Birrenbach put it, "[t]he roundabout [*gewundenen*] declarations of certain personalities in Germany... have awakened the impression of a certain ambiguity."<sup>72</sup> Therefore, the letter endorsed the idea of a growing Atlantic Community and Partnership, expressed German appreciation for past and present American assistance, and reaffirmed the centrality of the alliance and connection with the United States for the Federal Republic and its citizens.<sup>73</sup> This effort was undertaken at the initiative of and sponsored by the *Atlantik-Brücke*, in whose *Vorstand* the idea had been hatched, and ultimately came to fruition thanks especially to the work of the *Vorstand* members Birrenbach, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff and Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen.<sup>74</sup> Birrenbach was particularly valuable in the preparation and execution in drawing up a well-rounded list of potential signers and ultimately securing the signatures of eighteen prominent Germans, each with considerable name recognition in the US and encompassing a wide spectrum from the worlds of politics, *Wirtschaft*, trade unions, and *Wissenschaft*.<sup>75</sup> The

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<sup>72</sup> KB to Siegfried Balke, 5 March 1963, ACDP K186/2.

<sup>73</sup> In this context, the notion of British entrance into the EEC was also explicitly endorsed in this letter.

<sup>74</sup> The idea was also approved, more widely, by the AB annual assembly on 20 February 1963 in Bonn (Short Protocol, ACDP K010/1).

<sup>75</sup> For Birrenbach's successful efforts, see KB to Jean Monnet, Paris, 16 March 1963, ACDP K051/1. The signers included leaders in parliament of all four German political parties present there; the mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt; the former federal president Theodor Heuss; the chairman of the DGB, Ludwig

declaration appeared in the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Washington Post* and the European edition of the *New York Herald Tribune* on 20-21 March 1963.<sup>76</sup> Thanks to Birrenbach's contacts in the German press, it also appeared, at least in excerpt, in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Der Welt*, and the *Deutschen Zeitung*.<sup>77</sup>

Another example of an effort involving Birrenbach to place a piece in the American media occurred in 1964 during the lead-up to the Kennedy Round of the GATT talks. Seeking to promote a successful outcome to these approaching negotiations, Birrenbach, supported by Fritz Berg (President of the BDI) and the economic *Verbänden*, became something of a driving force in encouraging Chancellor Erhard to do an exclusive interview in Bonn with the editors of the American newsweekly *US News & World Report*. In choosing such an outlet for publication of the interview, Birrenbach and the other Atlanticist-minded participants in this initiative (along with Robert Borchardt in the AA), primarily took into account the need to inform not just the American public in general, but especially to reach broadly those sectors of American society that shaped opinion and those circles exercising influence on the upcoming Senate hearings about the trade talks, including the leading figures of the American *Wirtschaft*.<sup>78</sup> Birrenbach's ultimately successful efforts with respect to the Erhard interview were part of and consciously coordinated with a larger publicity effort

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Rosenberg; the president of the BDI, Fritz Berg; leaders of the banking/finance community; and eminent educators and scientists.

<sup>76</sup> *Christian Science Monitor* (20 March), the *Washington Post* (21 March), and the European edition of the *New York Herald Tribune* (21 March). See, for instance, "German Views Expressed," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 March 1963, ACDP K186/2. Publication was delayed by a strike that crippled the major New York newspapers and then plagued and, ultimately, limited by mix-ups and snafus on the American end.

<sup>77</sup> Dönhoff also notified the dpa with similar results.

<sup>78</sup> On this endeavor, see Dr. Joseph J. Thomas, Director of the German Information Center, to KB, 15 October 1963, ACDP K187/1; LR I Robert Borchardt, AA, to KB, 21 October 1963, ACDP K157/1; Hans Dichgans to KB (and Sohl, Wagner, Köhler and Vosen), regarding *Aufklärungsarbeit* in the USA, 5 February 1964, ACDP K187/1; KB to Erhard, 24 February 1964, ACDP K187/1; and Berg to Erhard, 27 February 1964, ACDP K187/1.

undertaken by the German economic organizations, including the German-American Chamber of Commerce, the BDI (Berg and Hellmuth Wagner) and the WVES (Hans Dichgans), comprising speeches as well as ads in other major American publications, such as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Herald Tribune* and *Business Week*.<sup>79</sup>

On other occasions, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists placed less reliance on the insertion of specific pieces into the American mass media and more on general initiatives that it was hoped would generate their own media attention. One example of this was the effort undertaken by the German *Kuratorium* for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, to be located at Harvard University. In 1964, Birrenbach was asked by the Kennedy family, through George McGhee (the American ambassador to the Federal Republic), to constitute and chair this *Kuratorium*, which was to raise money, technically collected by the *Atlantica*, for the KML. Under Birrenbach's guidance, this *Kuratorium* ultimately came to include about sixty figures from politics, *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft*, the churches, *Bundeswehr* and the press. With particular assistance from Hellmuth Wagner (BDI) as treasurer and Walter Stahl (*Atlantica*, *Atlantik-Brücke*) as *Geschäftsführer* of the *Kuratorium*, the fundraising campaign for the library went on from late 1964 until early June 1965 and ended up collecting approximately DM 3.2 million, including DM 1.2 million from the private sector and the other DM 2 million

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<sup>79</sup> For the Erhard interview, see the *US News & World Report* of 8 June 1964. For Birrenbach's later calling of attention to and concerns regarding the "misinterpretation" of Kiesinger's reference to "a North-Atlantic Imperium" in the Chancellor's "state of the nation" report of 11 March 1968 and his suggestion that Kiesinger, at the appropriate time, in an interview with the *New York Times* clear up the "misunderstandings" and characterize the relationship of the Federal Republic to the United States in a way that "accommodates the current American psychological attitude [*Einstellung*]," see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, Bonn, 18 March 1968, ACDP K021/1.

from the federal government.<sup>80</sup> Birrenbach presented the check for the private contribution to McGhee on 7 July 1965 and the government contribution to Robert Kennedy in October 1965. The fundraising campaign itself, the presentation of these contributions and the large KML assembly in Boston, in which the *Atlantica* cooperated, all generated a certain amount of publicity for these German Atlanticist efforts in the American as well as the West German press.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> The private contributions came from public collections (DM 400,000, the lion's share from Berlin), donations from the cities of Bonn, Frankfurt and Cologne (DM 65,000), industry and banks (DM 473,000), and the DGB and its connected unions (DM 300,000). The federal government's contribution to the *Kuratorium* was one of two contributions it made around this time to Kennedy projects, the other one being to the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington DC.

<sup>81</sup> The German efforts for the Kennedy Memorial Library were not solely a public relations endeavor, and Birrenbach's involvement with the KML did not end there. Thanks to Birrenbach (and in light of "the will of the donors [*Stifter*]"), it was arranged that the majority of the German money, especially the private portion, went to the funding of fellowships to enable Germans to study at Harvard and its various specialized institutes (Kennedy School of Government, Institute of Politics, Center for International Affairs, Institute for West European Studies, and eventually the KML itself). In September 1967, Birrenbach met in Bonn with Prof. Adam Yarmolinsky, chairman of the Harvard Committee for German Kennedy Memorial Fellowships, and together they agreed that not less than 70% of the fellowship allocations, therefore "the overwhelming part," be reserved for "long-term scholars" ("post-docs") working in areas related to the study of politics and public policy and the rest for intense, short-term visits at the invitation of Harvard University of practitioners or observers of politics and public policy "of outstanding ability and promise" (primarily politicians, political office holders, public servants, journalists and *Wissenschaftler*, with a stress placed on "professional, political, and geographic diversity"). Thus, the concept of "student" was applied here in the wider American sense. This program was administered in the following years by the Harvard Committee on German Kennedy Memorial Fellowships, which as of 1975 consisted of the *Wissenschaftlern* Prof. Karl Deutsch, Prof. Franklin Ford, Dean Richard Hunt, Prof. Reginald Phelps and Dr. Guido Goldman. This committee was assisted in the Federal Republic, for instance in administration and locating and screening potential candidates, by both the DAAD and by an informal network of individuals prominent in the relevant fields, many of them pronounced Atlanticists (as of 1967 this network consisted of seven "talent scouts" (Professors and/or Doctors): Klaus Ritter, Theo Sommer, Wolfgang Wagner, Waldemar Besson, Horst Ehmke, Richard Löwenthal, and Ulrich Scheuner) (Adam Yarmolinsky, Professor of Law, Chairman, Harvard Committee, German Kennedy Memorial Fellowships, to KB, 28 November 1967, ACDP K150/1 and Franz Eschbach, DAAD, *Stipendienabteilung*, to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP K150/1). On the Kennedy Fellows being enrolled at the Kennedy School of Government, with the Institute for West European Studies serving as the host institution, and on the pre-selection committee in the Federal Republic consisting of Prof. Karl Kaiser (University of Cologne, DGAP); Dr. Ulrich Littmann (General Secretary of the Fulbright Commission); Dr. Heinrich Pfeiffer (General Secretary of the *Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung*); and Dr. Hans-Jürgen Puhle (*Historisches Institut*, University of Münster, former Kennedy Fellow), see Eschbach to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP K150/1. However, no German authority ["*Stelle*"] took part in the nomination or selection for the short-term "invite program." Harvard University brought the German donation ["*Stiftung*"] into the Harvard Trust Company and used the interest thus accrued for the JFK Memorial Fellowship Program. As of October 1975, Goldman claimed that about \$40,000 was available per year, which could provide for up to three *Kennedy-Jahresstipendien* (Eschbach to KB, 9 October 1975, ACDP K150/1). On the mutual value



Finally, the activity of Birrenbach's Twenty Years Marshall Plan *Kuratorium*, a "national" West German committee, was yet another one-time Atlanticist initiative largely intended to generate positive publicity and goodwill among a mass American public, here by demonstrating the FRG's appreciation of the US and the Marshall Plan. This body was already in existence when Birrenbach assumed its chairmanship in 1966, however his stewardship, especially with respect to the composition and activities of the *Kuratorium*, lent the initially floundering project much-needed prestige and credibility and contributed significantly to its achievements.<sup>82</sup> Essentially, the *Kuratorium* and its members worked to stimulate and assist in the various commemorations of the twentieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan in the Federal Republic. In these endeavors, it cooperated particularly closely with the *Deutschen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung*, of

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of the exposure of German Kennedy Memorial Fellows to Harvard University and to the "Cambridge intellectual community," and vice-versa, see Yarmolinsky to KB, 28 November 1967, ACDP K150/1.

While the ultimate effect of the activities of the German *Kuratorium* for the Kennedy Memorial Library was intended to be on an American public, there also existed an element of public relations directed at the German public as well. Appeals were made on the federal and regional levels to the Chancellor and to the *Ländern* (to secure the generous participation of *Bund* and *Ländern*), to the *Wirtschaft*, and via television, radio and press also to the German public to secure small donations at a broad level. In November 1964, a related traveling exhibit made stops in several German cities, including Frankfurt, Bonn and Berlin, in coordination with and with the assistance of the *Amerika-Häusern* and State Secretary Karl-Günther von Hase of the Federal Government's Press and Information Office. Birrenbach himself proposed during the fundraising campaign a Kennedy-*Feierstunde* in Bonn, in which President Heinrich Lübke, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, State Secretary Ludger Westrick (BKA), Prof. Carlo Schmid (SPD) and State Secretary Hase (BPA), among others, took part in December 1964. The German youth *Spitzenverbände* also held functions connected with collections, particularly at the universities, climaxing on the approximate anniversary of President Kennedy's death with a meeting staged by the *Deutschen Bundesjugendring* in Cologne on 27 November 1964 (including a Birrenbach speech in remembrance of Kennedy), under the honorary chairmanship of President Lübke. As already pointed out in Chapter 5, the fundraising process for the KML vividly demonstrates that, at least for Birrenbach and probably for other Atlanticists as well, public relations actions, also and perhaps especially those vis-à-vis the United States, often exhibited a competitive aspect between the Federal Republic and other European countries involved.<sup>82</sup> The project had originally been under the leadership of Dr. Rudolf Binapfl (a Frankfurt-based industrial consultant and member of the DREB). For Binapfl's earlier, rather overambitious plans, see the pertinent documents in ACDP K148/2. Under and largely thanks to Birrenbach, the composition of the TYMP *Kuratorium* was dramatically improved and came to encompass an impressive list of eminent personalities, broadly representative of virtually all walks of German life, including all the political parties in the *Bundestag*. For instance, Hermann Josef Abs (Deutsche Bank AG), who had previously declined to join, now entered the *Kuratorium*, while President Lübke and US Amb. McGhee assumed honorary positions, the former the *Schirmherrschaft*.

which Birrenbach was a member of the *Vorstand* and which functioned as the *Geschäftsführung* of the *Kuratorium*, as well as with the responsible federal authorities, especially the Treasury Ministry and the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*.<sup>83</sup> The efforts assumed diverse forms: articles and inserts stressing the Marshall Plan's past and current significance were produced and appeared in newspapers<sup>84</sup>; political, economic and educational organizations were contacted and encouraged, with considerable success, to explicitly commemorate the anniversary<sup>85</sup>; information materials regarding the plan were supplied, including to the Atlantic and European organizations (with which the *Kuratorium* stood in contact), to aid in commemorative speeches, declarations and articles. Abroad, the European institutions as well as organizations and individuals in other European countries were likewise encouraged to openly commemorate the anniversary. On 2 June 1967, the climax was reached as the federal government staged a *Festfunktion* in Bonn's Beethovenhalle on approximately the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the plan's announcement, attended by about eight hundred invited guests, at which Birrenbach was among the speakers in his capacity as chairman of the *Kuratorium*.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Given the temporary nature of the *Kuratorium* and of the entire initiative, it was decided to take this course rather than to create an entirely separate organization to carry out the *Geschäftsführung*.

<sup>84</sup> These included an illustrated insert for *Lesemappen*, an installment of the *Zeitbild* for use in schools, an insert for the newspaper *Das Parlament*, an installment of the *Europa-Bildzeitung*, and the making available of a *Maternseite* for daily newspapers. See, for instance, the "Textbeilage zur Europabildzeitung," *Folge* 162, ACDP K148/2. Such commemorations of the Marshall Plan stressed the plan's effect on West German (and European) economic recovery and on European unification as well as its continued relevance for foreign aid, for instance to the developing countries.

<sup>85</sup> Organizations thus contacted included the major German economic organizations (among them the BDI, BDA, DIHT, DGB and DAG), a plethora of smaller such *Verbänden*, the political parties and educational (*Bildungs-*) institutions. The commemoration of the anniversary by such bodies comprised, for example, pertinent references in their publications or in other forums.

<sup>86</sup> In his speech of 2 June 1967, Birrenbach stressed the economic impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany and Europe and its continued significance, with its principles of aid and self-help, as the "starting point" for all major economic assistance efforts aimed at building up the economies in the less developed (but developing) countries. As Birrenbach put it, the Marshall Plan also enjoyed historical significance as the "beginning of the construction of a united Europe." Here, Birrenbach also praised the "genius" of Jean Monnet and the "staatsmännische Weitsicht" of Robert Schuman. Birrenbach further expressed thanks on

The efforts of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists to present a positive image of the Federal Republic to the world, especially to the United States, also included attempts to exert influence on what appeared in West German media and publications. For example, during the early 1970s, a period when the *Atlantik-Brücke*, with the aid of its influential members, was striving to counter considerable anti-American sentiment in the Federal Republic, including in the media, its chairman, Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, wrote to the executive vice president of the NDR in Hamburg with respect to a report of the well-known “left-wing” commentator Peter Merseburger regarding an Allied parade in West Berlin in June 1970, an apparently successful intervention that seemed to temper Merseburger’s subsequent reporting.<sup>87</sup> In 1965-66, Birrenbach and Dönhoff collaborated in vain to prevent the publication of the French writer Roger Peyrefitte’s *Les Juifs* in German translation in the Federal Republic by the *Stahlberg Verlag* (Karlsruhe), fearing the uproar and its potential consequences that would surround what they deemed this anti-Semitic work, but did succeed, mainly via Birrenbach’s contact with and the consequent intervention vis-à-vis the publisher by the Karlsruhe MdB Max Güde, in securing desired modifications.<sup>88</sup>

Already in Chapter Four, we touched on the public relations elements contained in the mere forms of the Atlanticist institutions and activities, and it should come as no

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behalf of the “*Gemeinschaftsausschusses der deutschen Wirtschaft*,” which comprised all the industrial/commercial *Spitzenverbände* and which had asked him to speak in its name. Birrenbach’s “Die historische Bedeutung des Marshall-Plans” was then published in the *Bulletin* (Nr. 61, 13 June 1967, p. 520, ACDP K114/1). The other speakers at this function were Paul Hoffman (the first administrator of the Marshall Plan), Chancellor Kiesinger, *Bundesschatzminister* Kurt Schmücker (CDU), and *Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit* Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski (SPD; representing the *Wirtschaftsminister*). Marshall had announced the plan that would become associated with his name in a speech at Harvard on 5 June 1947.

<sup>87</sup> Walter Stahl to Chris Emmet, American Council on Germany, confidential, 13 July 1970, ACDP K112/1.

<sup>88</sup> For Birrenbach’s satisfaction that “I believe we have done well to halt the wheel of fate [*dem Schicksal in die Speichen zu greifen*],” see KB to Güde, 7 March 1966, ACDP K016/2.

surprise that the forms assumed by the specifically public relations actions discussed in this chapter, particularly those directed primarily at an American audience, in many cases also contained in and of themselves an element of public relations. In numerous instances, there was a conscious effort to demonstrate to such an audience that a broad Atlanticist, generally pro-American consensus indeed existed within virtually all significant branches of German society and amongst the German people as a whole. Similar to what we have observed with respect to the Atlanticist institutions, such efforts manifested themselves, for instance, in the wide-ranging composition of bodies such as the German *Kuratorien* for the Kennedy Memorial Library and the Twenty Years Marshall Plan as well as the group that signed the *Atlantik-Brücke*'s open letter of March 1963. Given his extraordinary contacts, Birrenbach was instrumental in each of these cases in putting together such groups consisting of "first-class" personalities representative of effectively all sectors of German life. Likewise, the private character of these undertakings was particularly significant insofar as it allegedly demonstrated that such Atlanticist perspectives were dominant throughout the population, rather than being limited to, say, members of the federal government or to other German authorities.<sup>89</sup> As Birrenbach put it with respect to the Twenty Years Marshall Plan project, such private initiatives were especially important since "it has a far greater impact in the United States

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<sup>89</sup> For instance, the goal of the German *Kuratorium* of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan was to demonstrate to the German and American publics that the German government, parliament, *Wirtschaft* (including finance), *Wissenschaft* and broad public opinion as a whole were conscious and appreciative of the statesmanlike act that was the Marshall Plan. To this end, the *Kuratorium*, under the *Schirmherrschaft* of the Federal President, comprised prominent representatives of all areas of public life in the Federal Republic and of all the parties in the *Bundestag*.

if the *Gesellschaft* as such expresses its thanks of its own free will to the American nation than if the state does this *ex officio*.”<sup>90</sup>

#### F. Unique Elements of German Atlanticist Efforts to Influence the American Public

Whatever the similarities and overlap, the efforts of Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists to influence their own compatriots exhibited some significant differences from those efforts aimed at a foreign, principally American, public. We have already mentioned the burden of recent German history and the challenges it presented abroad. Another important difference lay in the identity of some of those particular groups targeted with propaganda. For instance, the German Atlanticists, especially through the activities of their organizations, undertook an extensive public relations effort consciously aimed at the American troops, families and support personnel temporarily based in the Federal Republic.<sup>91</sup> In this sense, whatever frictions existed between the German population and US military personnel, such Americans who would eventually return home represented not just protectors but also a potentially invaluable conduit through which to influence American public opinion positively towards the Federal Republic.<sup>92</sup> One significant aspect of this campaign was the publication and distribution of books and periodicals intended to inform such Americans about the Federal Republic. The *Atlantica* and *Atlantik-Brücke* both carried out such activities, with the latter, for

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<sup>90</sup> KB to *Bundesschatzminister* Kurt Schmücker, 3 May 1967, cc to Koppe and State Secretary Langer, ACDP K148/2. At least in this instance, the *Auswärtige Amt* thought along the same lines.

<sup>91</sup> Over the years, millions of US soldiers were stationed at one time or another on West German soil, including West Berlin, as well as smaller numbers of other foreign allied troops (e.g. British and Belgian). As of the early 1980s, the American citizens in the Federal Republic, essentially members of the armed forces and their family members, amounted to about 8-900,000 and were viewed by the Atlanticists as “a great reservoir of potential ‘ambassadors of good will’” for the Federal Republic provided they could be brought out of their “isolation” with German help (something of a parallel process to what was occurring on the level of “high politics”) (AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).

<sup>92</sup> Regarding frictions, at least certain Atlanticists were concerned that, in their view, many Germans confused the sorry conduct of some US military personnel with the “American way of life” in general.

instance, publishing *The Bridge*, a short illustrated monthly intended for Americans living in West Germany.<sup>93</sup> Another prominent aspect of these endeavors was the staging of educational seminars. For example, the *Brücke*, in cooperation over the years with *Haus Rissen* (Hamburg), the *Akademie für Politische Bildung* (Tutzing) and the *Europäischen Akademie Bayern* (Munich), annually conducted several multi-day information seminars on Germany for American officers as well as separate seminars for American, and a lesser number of Canadian, teachers based in the Federal Republic.<sup>94</sup> At

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<sup>93</sup> As of December 1965, *The Bridge* enjoyed a circulation of about 76,000 (Walter Stahl to Dr. Hans Schmidt, Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the Handelsunion AG, 1 December 1965, ACDP K112/1). For a sample issue of *The Bridge*, including what was billed as a timely and important article on “The Young Germans and the Old Nazis” written by Walter Stahl (reprinted from the current monthly *Newsletter*) and arguing that “powerful trends in the modern world” (among them “internationalizing, Europeanizing and Americanizing” ones), particularly but not only impacting on the youth (therefore also encompassing generational change), as well as educational efforts were encouraging in the Federal Republic a “democratic development” and a tendency in favor of “integration in the Western World” while undermining nationalism, right-wing radicalism, extremism and “dreams of omnipotence” (including National Socialism), see *The Bridge*, Hamburg, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1962, ACDP K007/1. This issue of *The Bridge* also contained notices of upcoming events (exhibits, music, theater, folk festivals, social events, sports); a thanks to “our American friends” in the US armed forces for their hurricane and flood relief (British armed forces had also helped) and for the assistance at the Saarland mine disaster in February 1962 and “in any number of disasters in the past,” all of which had “won the Americans many friends in Germany”; a “Trip Tip”; a “These Strange German Ways” section on “The Ins and Outs of Telling Time”; and an article from *Introducing Germany* by Michael Winch (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London) on Bamberg. Naturally, *These Strange German Ways*, as an introduction into the “German way of life,” also functioned as part of the *Brücke*’s efforts to “tend to” the American soldiers stationed in the Federal Republic. Indeed, as of the early 1980s, the main outlets for *These Strange German Ways*, *German Holidays and Folk Customs* and *A Short History of German Place Names* were the Stars & Stripes bookstores in the American garrisons in the Federal Republic (AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1).

<sup>94</sup> As of December 1965, the American presence and audience in the Federal Republic included the approximately one hundred and fifty schools with over three thousand teachers maintained by the American forces (Walter Stahl to Dr. Hans Schmidt, Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the Handelsunion AG, 1 December 1965, ACDP K112/1). On the role of American teachers in American schools in West Germany, often arriving with little preparation at their posts and “minimal” knowledge of the Federal Republic, as among the most important “Multiplikatoren” in the realm of German-American cultural relations with their impact not only on the millions of American children they ultimately instructed over the years (children who were themselves a potential audience to be brought into a “genuine contact with Germany” and for the transmission of “well-founded knowledge” about the Federal Republic that would eventually be taken with them) but also indirectly on the families of those children (thus, children as a channel), see AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1. As of the early 1980s, five-day seminars were being held for American officers (including generals) six times a year with about forty officers taking part in each seminar. The main share of the costs for these officer seminars was borne by the United States armed forces, with the annual related expenses of the *Atlantik-Brücke* amounting to about DM 20,000 at that time. Meanwhile, five-day seminars for teachers were being held three times a year, with approximately thirty American and five Canadian teachers taking part in each case. The expenses of the *Atlantik-Brücke* for the teachers seminars

times, further efforts were undertaken by the German Atlanticists and their organizations, again especially the *Atlantik-Brücke*, to “look after” the US soldiers and to enhance their impressions and experiences in the Federal Republic, for instance to reduce the discrimination endured by troops, particularly blacks and Latinos, in matters such as housing.<sup>95</sup> Given the relative youth of the target audience, namely the American troops in Germany and their support personnel and dependents, such public relations actions promised long-term benefits to German-American relations and the Atlanticist cause.<sup>96</sup>

Another key foreign group for the German Atlanticists in their public relations actions was the Jewish community, particularly that in the United States. Here, the Atlanticists faced the daunting task of securing the reconciliation of these Jews with the Federal Republic in spite of the horrific events of the recent past. Whatever elements of genuine moral concern may have played a role in motivating these efforts, there was also quite a bit of hard-headed self-interest involved. German Atlanticists were fully aware of and explicitly acted on the fact that, particularly given the relatively small numerical size of their population, the Jews were a remarkably influential group in the United States and played an important role in virtually all significant fields of endeavor, including the making of foreign policy. True, certain experiences somewhat improved the

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amounted at this time only to about DM 10,000 annually. On all of this, see especially the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1 as well as the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1.

<sup>95</sup> Especially Walter Stahl (AB) to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K132/1 as well as Stahl to the AB *Vorstand* Members (regarding discrimination against black American soldiers in the Federal Republic), 10 January 1972, ACDP K132/1. For the *Atlantik-Brücke* letter action “Schwarze Amerikaner” directed at the “editors-in-chief of the most important German daily newspapers, journals, and broadcasters,” here referring to the many blacks among the approximately 400,000 American citizens currently living in the Federal Republic and promoting the use of the expression “black Americans” in the German mass media rather than “*farbig*” or “*Neger*” so as to introduce it into everyday German language, see Stahl to AB Members, 15 October 1975, ACDP K132/1 and Stahl to Dietrich Schwarzkopf, *Stellvertretender Intendant*, Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, 28 October 1975, ACDP K132/1.

<sup>96</sup> In addition to these specific efforts, there also existed generally friendly relations between Atlanticist organizations like the *Atlantica* and *Atlantik-Brücke*, on the one hand, and these Americans based in the Federal Republic, on the other, with the *Atlantik-Brücke*, for one, tracing its own such cooperative contacts all the way back to the mid-1950s.

*Deutschlandbild* of Jewish-Americans, including the German-Israeli reparations agreement of September 1952, the taking up of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965 and the apparently pro-Israel attitude of a large part of the German public during the 1967 Near East conflict. However, the public relations efforts of the German Atlanticists in regard to American Jews took on an added urgency in light of the aforementioned right-wing and anti-Semitic phenomena of the 1950s and 60s in West Germany, as well as in light of, for example, the ending of the weapons agreement with Israel in 1965 and the events at the Olympics in Munich in 1972, in which memories of the Holocaust and overt, strong anti-German sentiments, concerns and emotions were intensified or revived, with negative impact also on the Israeli public and on German-Israeli relations. Nevertheless, the critical but intensive interest in Germany of Jewish-Americans, many of whom themselves were emigrants from Germany, also raised the possibility of a better informing about and understanding of the Federal Republic than their compatriots. We have already touched on some of the ways in which Birrenbach and the other German Atlanticists sought to improve German-Jewish relations, for instance through the grantmaking practices of foundations like the *Thyssen Stiftung*. Extensive political consultations with Jewish leaders in the US were also at the core of such efforts.<sup>97</sup>

However, another significant element of the public relations efforts of the German Atlanticists vis-à-vis American Jews that we have not yet pointed out were the attempts to inform them, and especially their leaders and elites, about the true state of the new, democratic Federal Republic. While the large American-Jewish organizations had, by the early 1960s, adopted generous attitudes toward the Federal Republic, the rank-and-

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<sup>97</sup> It was precisely to help arrange meetings with American Jewish personalities that Dr. Josef Cohn, the European representative of the Weizmann Institute (Jerusalem), accompanied Birrenbach, at Chancellor Adenauer's behest, on his "Berlin Wall"-*Sondermission* to the United States in Fall 1961.



file of these groups seemed less well-informed than its leaders and, therefore, more suspicious about and hostile towards the postwar German democracy. To confront this situation, the German Atlanticists considered it essential to equip Jewish leaders with the latest and most responsible information. Most striking in this regard were the efforts of the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the American Council on Germany within the framework of their German-American Conferences. With respect to these gatherings, there existed an unwritten policy of inviting Jewish leaders to attend, especially those whose organizations were deemed most in need, with an eye towards providing them with the necessary factual information.<sup>98</sup> As a concomitant to these efforts, certain participants on the German side were explicitly included in these conferences based largely on their distinct suitability for enlightening Jewish leaders.<sup>99</sup> At times, experiments were undertaken with the structure of the German-American Conferences with such considerations in mind. For instance, in 1962, the conference added to the standard political and economic committees a third, “cultural,” committee. This body focused on the development of German democratic institutions and was seen to be of particular importance and interest for the Jewish delegates.<sup>100</sup> Though not explicitly presented as

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<sup>98</sup> In 1962, for instance, the American Jewish Congress, an organization affiliated with the World Jewish Congress, was considered in particular need, and therefore its president, Rabbi Dr. Joachim Prinz (himself an emigrant from Nazi Germany), was invited to the *Atlantik-Brücke* conference. For Birrenbach explaining to Sen. Jacob Javits (NY) the efforts of the Federal Republic to make an acceptable restitution for the victims of National Socialism, see KB to Javits, 14 March 1966, ACDP K090/1.

<sup>99</sup> Thus, personalities like the Director of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* (Munich), Helmut Krausnick.

<sup>100</sup> While this experiment was dropped at the request of the ACG from the fourth conference, held in Berlin in November 1964, the overall thrust remains clear. Indeed, much of the impetus for such efforts can be traced back to the ACG and especially Chris Emmet, a Catholic who had been involved with pro-Jewish Christian organizations, including the Volunteer Christian Committee to Boycott Nazi Germany, during the 1930s.

such, the already mentioned publicist trip staged by the *Atlantik-Brücke* in 1967 was also largely directed at prominent Jewish figures in the world of American journalism.<sup>101</sup>

German Atlanticist propaganda efforts undertaken abroad were also distinguished from those carried out in the Federal Republic by the uncertainties and unknowns of such an endeavor, whether a concerted public relations campaign or even a one-time initiative, in a relatively unfamiliar foreign nation like the United States. Fortunately for Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists, they and their institutions were able to rely on a number of valuable partners and advisors, Germans as well as non-Germans, to assist them in such undertakings. As for the Germans, these included the West German embassies and consulates abroad, particularly in the United States and Britain<sup>102</sup>; the German Information Center in New York City, which was subordinate to the embassy in Washington and responsible for “political publicity work” in the United States; Günther Drechsler and the Stahlunion Office in New York City; and the governmental bureaucracy located in the Federal Republic, including the *Bundespresseamt* (the federal government’s Press and Information Office) and the *Auswärtige Amt*.<sup>103</sup> As for the Americans, such assistants and advisors included the American embassy in Bonn and the American consulate<sup>104</sup>; the American Council on Germany (New York City)<sup>105</sup>; various other pro-Atlanticist organizations, such as the FPRI/ORBIS and the Council on Foreign

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<sup>101</sup> Moreover, on the great support enjoyed by Israel in American public opinion, see KB Memorandum, 9 March 1970, ACDP K139/3.

<sup>102</sup> This personnel included Joseph Thomas, Erich Straetling, and Robert Borchardt (the latter as press attaché) at the embassy in Washington DC as well as Amb. Hasso von Etdorf, Amb. Herbert Blankenhorn, and Herbert Sulzbach at the embassy in London.

<sup>103</sup> Of particular importance in the *Bundespresseamt* was the *Abteilung Ausland*, including its leader *Ministerialdirektor* Dr. Joseph Thomas (also previously as head of the German Information Center) as well as Reinhard Schlagintweit. Helpful in this regard at the AA was the *Informationsreferat Ausland*, including its leader LR Robert Borchardt.

<sup>104</sup> Among them the American consulate in Hamburg, conveniently the home as well of the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Atlantica*.

<sup>105</sup> Especially figures like Chris Emmet and Joseph Kaskell.

Relations<sup>106</sup>; Atlanticist-minded publishers, such as Frederick Praeger; and a bevy of public relations experts.<sup>107</sup> These partners and advisors, both German and American, constituted a valuable support sub-network for Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists and were, at least at times, even in contact and cooperating with one another.

Taken as a whole, the elements of this sub-network provided crucial assistance in a variety of ways to Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists in their foreign public relations endeavors. On one level, this assistance came in the form of advice and information to the German Atlanticists. Such might call attention to disturbing releases and phenomena (along with, for instance, the passing on of an egregious article) or pertain to the current tenor of American public opinion, the nature of particular American media outlets, their own prior experiences with respect to propaganda actions, the prospects and likely effects of propaganda initiatives proposed by the German Atlanticists, or the impact of those initiatives actually undertaken.<sup>108</sup> Occasionally, elements of this sub-network even suggested and stimulated particular public relations initiatives on the part of the German Atlanticists.<sup>109</sup> As a whole, such advice and information was precious for determining the best approaches and occasions for carrying out publicity and publishing actions in and/or regarding the United States. Furthermore, the elements of this sub-network actually assisted in arranging and carrying out the propaganda activities of the German Atlanticists, at times even lending their own prestige

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<sup>106</sup> And, of course, the individuals associated with them, such as William Diebold (CFR).

<sup>107</sup> Chris Emmet of the ACG was himself one of these experts in the field of public relations and had received the Federal Republic's Grand Cross of Merit as part of the government's efforts to encourage pro-German voices in the United States.

<sup>108</sup> For instance, advice with respect to the size and characteristics of the likely audience or readership as well as the nature, attitudes and pliability of key media figures, bodies (e.g. editorial boards) and outlets. For such analysis regarding *US News & World Report* (the potential Erhard interview), see LR I Robert Borchardt (AA) to KB, 21 October 1963, ACDP K157/1.

<sup>109</sup> Thus, it was Chris Emmet (ACG) who urged the Germans to dispel American concerns through clear, pro-Atlantic statements and, so, greatly helped trigger the AB press release ("open letter") of March 1963.

and name recognition among American audiences to the effort. Such aid included translating materials into English; facilitating contacts with important American journalists; stimulating publicity in the American press for German Atlanticist causes; identifying suitable recipients for particular Atlanticist materials and assisting in their targeted circulation; and supporting the publication, sale and distribution of German Atlanticist works (and in some cases their own) in influential outlets in the United States (and Britain).<sup>110</sup> In spite of such assistants and advisors, and sometimes because of them, the public relations and publication activities of the German Atlanticists did not always run smoothly.<sup>111</sup> However, as a whole, it can be said that thanks to this sub-network

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<sup>110</sup> Of course, aside from other German Atlanticists and their works, all this often benefited Birrenbach with respect to his own book (*The Future of the Atlantic Community*) and multiple articles, the public declarations with which he was involved, as well as his contacts with significant American journalists. For instance, the American Council on Germany was quite helpful with regard to the *Atlantik-Brücke* press release of March 1963, with Chris Emmet making the necessary arrangements in the United States and the declaration being released to the American press by Gen. Lucius Clay (honorary president of the ACG) along with his own introduction so as to further increase the publicity garnered. Emmet also sent two hundred copies of this “open letter” directly to various influential and interested American personalities. Likewise, Emmet negotiated with publishers on behalf of Birrenbach with respect to the American edition of *The Future of the Atlantic Community* and also promoted its sale to diverse organizations, in part to reduce the price of the publisher, Frederick Praeger. Furthermore, Emmet and the ACG took on over 1,200 copies of Birrenbach’s book for further sale or distribution, apparently far too many since as of late July 1963, only 500 had been so disposed [*“abgesetzt”*] and Emmet was still sitting rather hopelessly on 700 of them (available for free as of August 1963). On this, see KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1 and KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 12 August 1963, ACDP K157/1. Regarding the distribution of the English-language (American) edition of Birrenbach’s *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, see again KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 12 August 1963, ACDP K157/1. On Birrenbach’s book receiving energetic support from this sub-network (here the Washington embassy), including with respect to “publication,” see for instance KB to LR Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 4 April 1963, ACDP K157/1 and KB to Borchardt and Straetling, Washington DC Embassy, 22 March 1963, ACDP K157/1. For analysis, including with regard to the possible Erhard interview, but also potential related assistance with respect to contacts and arrangements, see Dr. Joseph Thomas, Director of the German Information Center, to KB, 15 October 1963, ACDP K187/1. Finally, the fundraising campaign of the German *Kuratorium* for the Kennedy Memorial Library enjoyed support in both the German and American press from American Ambassador George McGhee and the US embassy in Bonn.

<sup>111</sup> Any number of such snafus over the years pertained, for instance, to the processes of translation and publication. For example, Chris Emmet (ACG) fumbled the coordination of the publication of the *Atlantik-Brücke* press release of March 1963, resulting in the refusal of many newspapers to publish it after it had already appeared in some others and was therefore no longer considered “real news” (KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1). Perhaps a more systematic problem with this approach was that the stress placed by the German Atlanticists (as well as by other branches of West German society, such as industry and government) on the salience of public relations and

Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists received invaluable, even essential, assistance in their public relations endeavors abroad, particularly in the United States.

G. Motives and Assumptions

As with virtually all of their efforts, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists saw publication and public relations actions as potentially exercising a considerable and salutary influence on the achievement of their overarching Atlanticist goals and on the Federal Republic's bilateral relations with the Anglo-Saxon nations, especially the United States.<sup>112</sup> Birrenbach may have seemed in some ways an unlikely candidate for such activities. In general, he consistently emphasized the need for a delicate, quiet, discrete even rather secretive diplomacy that involved only a small number of actors and that eschewed publicity. Though Birrenbach seems to have considered himself a skilled persuader and sought to express himself in terms interesting and comprehensible to the general public, he was also given to a quite sober, technical, analytical and detailed manner of speaking and writing and often struggled to limit the extent of his effusions. Moreover, as mentioned, Birrenbach felt himself constrained with respect to content in his public expressions and taking of positions on the complex problems of the hour. In later questioning President Jimmy Carter's "open" foreign policy, Birrenbach stressed,

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American public opinion left them potentially vulnerable to the self-interested schemes of certain American public relations experts to shamelessly drum up business for themselves by constantly exaggerating the allegedly anti-German mood in the United States. Regarding such "experts" in contact with Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, this was unfortunately the case with characters like Curtis Hoxter (New York City) and, probably even more blatantly, Gen. Julius Klein (Chicago), "the busy Public Relations General" (Amb. Rolf Pauls to KB, 24 April 1969, ACDP K169/2). To Birrenbach's credit, he seems to have been quite wary about closer ties to Klein, who also warned about the image of the CDU in the United States and the consequent need to undertake public relations actions there. For an example of these unscrupulous but not atypical tactics, see Curtis Hoxter to KB, 18 September 1963, ACDP K157/1.

<sup>112</sup> Such propaganda undertakings offered the prospects of helping create the necessary mutual understanding between nations. For instance, regarding the publication in Britain of Birrenbach's *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, Walter Stahl wrote Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim on 7 March 1963, "I believe that the publication of this writing in England, just at the current point in time, will be a valuable contribution to German-English understanding in the framework of the common Atlantic goals [*Zielsetzung*]" (ACDP K108/2).

“[t]he great statesmen in the past knew why they preferred to keep silence about their final intentions in a diplomatic operation until they put all their cards in the right moment on the conference table.”<sup>113</sup> At the same time, Birrenbach was often critical of the German and foreign mass media (including the press), its presence so incessant in the Atlantic world, seeing it riddled with errors, falsehoods, distortions, inaccuracies and broadly characterized by superficiality, sensationalism and a lack of objectivity, not least with respect to its reports and information on his own activities. Furthermore, the contemporary prerequisite “to have a special appeal in television and radio performances” brought forth a downright harmful “type of leader.”<sup>114</sup> Indeed, the mass media was a major factor contributing to the daunting problems constituting the “dangerous situation” in which they found themselves.<sup>115</sup>

On the other hand, certain factors render Birrenbach’s intense interest in publication and public relations actions considerably less surprising. For one, he emerged from and always retained one foot in a business world where considerations like image and publicity were naturally of central concern to firms like Thyssen. As we have seen, Birrenbach exhibited, already from youth, certain *publizistische* elements in his background. Such endeavors also meshed well with the Atlanticist stress on private and

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<sup>113</sup> KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, Washington DC, 17 August 1977, ACDP K115/2. On Birrenbach criticizing the Jackson Amendment “with all its publicity” and the publication of the letters that followed the internal arrangements between the US administration and the Soviet embassy, see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 8 March 1976, ACDP K146/1. For Birrenbach’s reference to the “scandalous” publication by the *Washington Post* about the financial support to King Hussein, see KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, Washington DC, 24 February 1977, ACDP K100/1.

<sup>114</sup> KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, ACDP K146/1. Though not depicted in such terms, Birrenbach appears to have been implicitly referring to the shift in the Atlantic countries from the dominance of sequential, logical media towards a more sensory media, in part a modern technological revolution transforming thought, perceptions and ways of life.

<sup>115</sup> On this “dangerous situation,” with particular stress on the conditions within the West European democracies and somewhat less on those within the United States, see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, ACDP K146/1.

non-governmental undertakings. Moreover, like his fellow Atlanticists in general, Birrenbach was simply a strong believer in the practical efficacy and influence of speeches, appeals, publications and the like, indeed of the whole range of Atlanticist public relations efforts so far discussed, seeing in them a particular type of constructive “political action.”<sup>116</sup> Perhaps the primary basis of this outlook was his appreciation of what he called the, admittedly difficult to calculate, “psychological aspect” and “moral effects” of international relations and policies, particularly in the German/European-American relationship.<sup>117</sup> As with so many of the other undertakings we have already described in Chapter 4, a significant manifestation of Birrenbach’s ambitious goals for Atlanticist publications and public relations actions, even with respect to rather esoteric projects such as his own book, was his sensitivity to the overall context in which they were carried out. Birrenbach’s role in such endeavors was marked by close attention not only to public opinion itself but also to the broader situation and most recent events, particularly in the political realm, as well as by a zeal with regard to speed and timeliness, all of which was directed at ensuring the current, topical nature of and attaining the maximum impact and interest for these Atlanticist efforts.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> On such forms of “political action,” see KB to Amb. Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe, Representation of the Federal Republic to NATO, 20 February 1967, ACDP K125/2.

<sup>117</sup> For the continued importance of “psychological factors,” even in “the nuclear age,” see KB to William Tyler, Assistant Secretary in Charge of European Affairs, State Department, Washington DC, 21 May 1963, ACDP K186/2. On the treatment of France as an “extraordinarily complex” psychological problem for German foreign policy, see KB to *Bundesminister aD* Dr. Heinrich von Brentano, Darmstadt, 16 July 1964, ACDP K013/1. Birrenbach was also very aware of the psychological element present as well in broader political life. On the “deeper,” “psychological foundation” of the SPD-FDP election victory of 1972, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1.

<sup>118</sup> Through his correspondence, one can sense the frustration, even anguish and torment, endured by Birrenbach at delays in the publishing process (e.g. due to translation, printer strikes, publishers’ lockouts, changes in the *Redaktion* as well as sheer confusion, mistakes and oversights of the *Redaktion*) that plagued actions such as the publication of his book and the “open letter” of March 1963. This concern with *Aktualität* led Birrenbach to sometimes opt for an article in a daily newspaper rather than in a periodical. Birrenbach worked diligently to ensure that his publications were brought up-to-date upon release, including numerous versions and last-minute additions, all seeking to account for the latest events and other

Naturally, the precise goals of the diverse German Atlanticist propaganda endeavors might differ from case to case, depending on the circumstances. Such initiatives directed towards their German compatriots evinced a number of possible motives of varying degrees of generality and specificity. On at least a certain level, the German Atlanticist infrastructure sought to keep an audience apprised of its own

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changes as well as to avoid repeating what others had said in the meantime. Along these same lines, Birrenbach also urged, even pressured, editors to publish his pieces as soon as possible. Thus, Birrenbach wrote an afterword for the English-language edition of *The Future of the Atlantic Community* so as to update the book. On the “reasonably up-to-date” yet “slightly dated” nature of Birrenbach’s *Future of the Atlantic Community* since it was composed before de Gaulle “slammed shut the European Economic Community door” on Britain, see *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 May 1963, ACDP K181/1. For Birrenbach’s acknowledgement as of May 1963 that the “friendly treatment” of the French President had somewhat diminished the “currency” of his book but also his belief as of April 1963 that the book was still of “interest,” see KB to Sir Frank Roberts, Ambassador of the UK, 9 May 1963, ACDP K064/2 and KB to Mr. John Midgley, *The Economist*, London, 26 April 1963, ACDP K064/2. On the appearance of Kissinger’s *The Troubled Partnership* (1965) at “the right moment,” given the recent events at the Geneva conference, see KB to Prof. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 August 1965, ACDP K017/1. For a later example of a Birrenbach decision to undertake a propaganda action directly in light of the larger context, see KB to Harry Bergold Jr, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Department of Defence, Washington DC, 24 June 1975, ACDP K155/1. In this case, in view of the “feeling of uncertainty” that Birrenbach “found in some places” in 1975, he decided, in contrast to his “attitude in the past,” to publish a summary of his *Amerika*-report in the press (14 June 1975 in *Der Welt*), albeit in a “much shorter” and “less differentiated” form.

Birrenbach’s convictions regarding the effectiveness of propaganda were reflected in his constant fears about such Soviet efforts. On the role of the Soviet Union in stirring unfounded fears that the European “non-nuclear powers” sought “to get the finger on the trigger” of a strategic weapon system, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. For Birrenbach’s anxiety that the Federal Republic’s “moral position [*moralische Position*]” might be undermined by Soviet and East Bloc propaganda portraying it as a “disturber of the peace [*Störenfried*],” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. On the need for “nuclear weapon states” to agree on a “*Wohlverhaltensregelung*,” most appropriately in the framework of the NPT, which would protect “non-nuclear powers” who had signed the treaty against being “defamed,” see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 23 February 1968, ACDP K020/1. For relentless Soviet propaganda against any kind of German “access” to nuclear weapons raising problems in the long-run of the compatibility of the McNamara Committee with the NPT, see KB to John McCloy, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. On Brezhnev’s “charm offensive” in Bonn that had also “not *unbedenklich gestimmt*” some personalities in the leadership group of the West German government (though not the “actual leadership” itself), see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, Bethesda MD (USA), 12 June 1973, ACDP K028/1. For the Soviet Union’s “all-out attempt” to convince “the Western world” that she no longer constituted a “danger” to “peace,” including Brezhnev’s visit in Washington and Bonn, see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. However, on Birrenbach’s disproportionate concern with Soviet propaganda vis-à-vis the Federal Republic and on the views of the Federal Republic’s allies being of greater importance, see McCloy to KB, 8 March 1968, ACDP K109/1.



activities and to promote itself.<sup>119</sup> Though it does not appear to have played a prominent role in Birrenbach's own thinking, there was on a general level a conscious desire among certain Atlanticists, such as Arnold Bergstraesser, to promote through their activities the political and *staatsbürgerliche Bildung* of the German people. More specifically, and more in line with Birrenbach's own thinking, Atlanticist publications and public relations actions were aimed in part at keeping the German public, especially that element interested in international affairs and particularly German-American relations, apprised of the state of Atlantic affairs and the crucial issues at stake, as well as at promoting possible courses of action and solutions to existing or potential problems. However, Birrenbach, and presumably other German Atlanticists, entertained even more ambitious goals, whether explicit or left implicit, with respect to at least some of his propaganda activities. Essentially, this was to overcome what he perceived to be the still existing widespread misunderstanding of the idea of Atlantic Community in the Federal Republic and the sharpening of the consciousness there of such a community. The effort in this

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<sup>119</sup> Thus, the Atlantic Institute issued updated brochures and a semi-annual *Newsletter*, all of which summarized AI activities and aimed to promote interest in the AI, to encourage authors and others to participate in its work as well as, later on, to obtain Participating Members (see Chapter 8). As of 1975, such AI institutional public relations work also included "In Progress," published in Washington DC. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Assembly published an information bulletin aptly entitled "News of the North Atlantic Assembly." Broadly speaking, foundations also confronted such challenges. On the lack of press coverage of foundations and their "customers," the neglect by the "introspective" foundations of their "public image" and, therefore, the public's "ignorance" and incomprehension of the "beneficial work" engaged in by foundations as well as the need to improve "external information" (i.e. between foundations and public) so as to clarify the "image" of the foundations, see the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1. In contrast, "internal information" consisted of horizontal information (i.e. between foundations) and vertical information (the flow between the foundation and its beneficiaries). Likewise, on the need to "preserve and improve the philanthropic climate," on a tendency in some quarters to "wrongly" believe that the state will "do it all," and on "those forces" that denied "the real need for philanthropy," see again the Report on the Meeting on Foundations and other Philanthropic Bodies, 7-8 February 1973, Strasbourg, ACDP K039/1. However, for Birrenbach, along with Prof. Ellscheid and Prof. Coing, laying out the central interests and tasks of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* in a press conference of 2 November 1962 on the occasion of the publication of the first FTS activity report, see the Expositions by Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, on 2 November 1962, ACDP K077/1. In addition to such activity reports and press conferences, a volume published in 1970 celebrated the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the taking up of the activity of the *Thyssen Stiftung*.

direction was most clearly visible in Birrenbach's hopes for his book *Die Zukunft der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft*, through which he aspired "to fill with life this concept [the Atlantic Community], which has been to now somewhat bloodless [*blutleer*] for German readers."<sup>120</sup>

Those publication and public relations activities directed at an Anglo-Saxon, and especially American (but also British and even sometimes other foreign), audience also exhibited a variety of motives, in some regards differing from or perhaps supplementing those characteristic of such initiatives directed principally towards a German audience. In Birrenbach's case, the stress on and motives driving such propaganda endeavors in the United States were influenced by his assumptions and perspectives regarding the unique and persistent elements of the cherished identity of the United States and the American audience and their impact on its foreign affairs and policy, which he believed often went unrecognized in Europe. Birrenbach viewed Americans and American public opinion as being characterized by an "extraordinarily wide-spread ignorance" with regard to the Federal Republic, the European Economic Community and the issues concerning them. Therefore, like his German compatriots, though in differing respects, they too were in

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<sup>120</sup> KB to Bergstraesser, 28 February 1962, ACDP K151/1. For the purpose of Birrenbach's book being "to work out the real political content of the concept of the Atlantic Community and especially to free it from all utopian interpretations," see KB to Konrad Adenauer, *Bundeskanzleramt*, 14 May 1962, ACDP K181/1. In this particular work, Birrenbach hoped to explain the concept of an Atlantic Community, including America and a united Europe, to which he subscribed and, rather than focusing on "the individual difficulties of today," to present proposals with respect to such a community that could be realized in the long or even medium term (about ten years). For Birrenbach's remark to Abs that "your talk with the Chancellor [Adenauer] will have shown to you how much educational work still needs to be done in this direction in Germany," see KB to Josef Hermann Abs, Chairman of the *Vorstand*, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 26 May 1962, ACDP K181/1. On the secondary importance in "public opinion" of the question of the Atlantic Community in comparison to that of European integration and, therefore, the usefulness of Birrenbach's book as a reminder of the Atlantic Community, see Werner Bögl, Schriftenreihe "Politik," *Das Parlament*, Nr. 31, 1 August 1962, ACDP K181/1.

need of enlightenment via Atlanticist initiatives.<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach saw Americans and their foreign policy as being driven by something other than the dictates of the rational balance of power. Instead, other factors were at work, including considerations of morality and demonstrations of friendship, thus rendering propaganda actions all the more essential in relations with the United States. As Birrenbach put it, “[t]he United States is no imperial power like England before, which is indifferent to the internal attitude [*Einstellung*] of other countries and which essentially focuses on power [*im wesentlichen auf Macht setzt*]. The United States is, on the contrary, extremely sensitive [*empfindlich*] in regard to approval [*Zustimmung*] and increased support.”<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> KB to Chancellor Erhard, 24 February 1964, cc Seibt, Hohmann, Dr. Wagner, Dichgans, Borchardt, ACDP K187/1. On the false equation of “Gaullism with Europe” by American “public opinion,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 29 March 1968, ACDP K109/1. Admittedly, Birrenbach could at times be doubtful of the knowledge of general public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. For the ignorance of his own compatriots regarding the United States, for instance that it was simultaneously “an Atlantic and Pacific power,” see KB to Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 30 January 1967, ACDP K117/2. Birrenbach was also typically dubious of the ability of the press to properly assess matters. On the misjudgment of the American press of the relationship of the NPT (which it “strongly” supported while being “skeptical” towards an MLF) to the cohesion of NATO, see KB to Chancellor Erhard, 16 November 1965, ACDP K090/1. For the role of “part” of the American press in stirring up unfounded fears that the European “non-nuclear powers” wanted “to get the finger on the trigger” of a strategic weapon system, see KB to Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, US House of Representatives, 10 May 1966, ACDP K117/1. On Birrenbach’s surprise about the reaction of the American press to Chancellor Kiesinger’s recent declaration in July 1968, see KB to Sen. Henry Jackson, 13 July 1968, ACDP K187/2 and KB to Sen. John Cooper, 22 July 1968, ACDP K109/2. For the faulty assessment by the German press of the situation and problems of the steel industry, see KB to Dr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1. Therefore, on the need for the American government to lead and influence with the proper arguments the opinions of the population, rather than to be led by the variations of that opinion, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Fraktion*, ACDP K026/1 and KB Report on a Talk with Prof. Abram Chayes on 6 September 1972, ACDP K188/2. As already alluded to, given Germany’s history, it was considered imperative to explain to the Americans, especially but not only to American Jews, the true situation in the Federal Republic, namely the reality of a stable, democratic, humane and peaceful Germany. Birrenbach himself was very conscious of the Federal Republic’s image in the world, for instance with respect to the German past and the fears of a revived National Socialism (e.g. neo-Nazism in the form of the NPD), and of the practical importance of such perceptions for West Germany.

<sup>122</sup> KB to *Bundespräsident* Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, ACDP K033/1. Whatever understanding Birrenbach feigned for President Jimmy Carter’s “Wilsonian style” of policy (e.g. human rights) was based on his recognition that “the balance of power cannot be alone a goal which in the long run could motivate the American nation” (KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia University, Research Institute on International Change, 8 July 1976, ACDP K146/1). As of November 1984, Birrenbach traced the “faith” of the US in its “moral mission [*Sendung*]” back to the American Revolution

This perception played an essential role in the efforts of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists, through their propaganda initiatives, to convince the Americans especially of German loyalty, friendship and appreciation for the United States, its people and its policies, both past and present. Such was a common theme for Birrenbach, whether it be with respect to his book, the activities of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan *Kuratorium* or the fund-raising efforts for the Kennedy Memorial Library.<sup>123</sup>

Ascertaining the effectiveness of the public relations and publication activities of the German Atlanticists with any degree of precision is virtually impossible. In many respects, such endeavors primarily consisted of a one-way communication rather than an on-going dialogue. It is difficult to draw any direct correlations between the endeavours outlined in this chapter and the prevailing trends of public opinion or to measure their immediate impact on foreign policy and international relations during this period. No doubt helpful in some sense was the existence alongside the Atlanticist publications with which Birrenbach was closely involved of other, complementary Atlanticist-minded organs, for instance those culturally oriented magazines published since the 1950s under the auspices of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (e.g. *Der Monat*, *Encounter*, *Preuves*).<sup>124</sup> National states and governments along with their leaders in the West,

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in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and claimed “I know none of the great nations in the world that is so sensitive in the preservation [*Wahrung*] of its identity as the United States” (KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 12 November 1984, ACDP K029/2).

<sup>123</sup> For instance, Birrenbach’s *The Future of the Atlantic Community* was explicitly intended, in no small part, to encourage and reassure the Americans in their current course and policies, in particular their project of European-American partnership and Western unity. To take another example, the broad construction of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan *Kuratorium* was intended to demonstrate the broad appreciation of the West German public for the American assistance provided under that plan. Indeed, Birrenbach conceived of the activities of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan *Kuratorium* as representing much more than simply a commemoration of the Marshall Plan, rather they and other such endeavors served as an expression of the German people’s affection for the American nation. Along these lines, see for instance KB to *Bundesschatzminister* Kurt Schmücker, 3 May 1967, ACDP K148/2.

<sup>124</sup> For Birrenbach on how “excellent” *Der Monat* had been in the past when Lasky was editor; his having subscribed for years to *Encounter* and having always read it “with great interest”; his having “abandoned”

whether in the United States, Britain, the Federal Republic or elsewhere in Western Europe (e.g. de Gaulle), as well as international and intergovernmental organizations (e.g. NATO, European Communities, OECD) disposed of enormous resources, instruments and powers and enjoyed tremendous access to the potent domestic and foreign mass media as means to generate propaganda, control communications and influence the public opinion and worldview on a national and international scale.<sup>125</sup> While sometimes

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his *Encounter* subscription “two or three years ago” (therefore not too long after the revelations of CIA funding) since a lack of time dictated that he could not afford to read more than what he “professionally” needed to read; and his now subscribing to *Encounter* again, for a year, after briefly seeing Lasky at the recent Königswinter Conference and then receiving from him in the mail a friendly but slightly desperate subscription request, see KB to Melvin J. Lasky, *Encounter*, London, 4 May 1971, ACDP K066/2.

<sup>125</sup> For Birrenbach pointing to the advantage of the greater “publicity” that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had garnered in the US as a result of “his position” in comparison to Franz Josef Strauss on their recent respective trips there, see KB to FJ Strauss, Minister President of Bavaria, Munich, confidential, 26 March 1980, ACDP K034/1. The public relations and publication products issued by governments and international organizations also served as potential sources of information for Birrenbach. As of 1963, the NATO Information Service generated detailed reports that were read and discussed by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference’s Information and Cultural Affairs Committee. Among American agencies active in the propaganda field was the USIA/USIS, with its *Amerika-Häusern*, among other activities, purchasing relevant books to stock their libraries in West Germany.

On the key role of “political *Öffentlichkeitsarbeit*” in a successful contemporary foreign policy and, more specifically, on such work abroad of the West German federal government, carried out by the Press and Information Office (BPA) and the *Auswärtigen Amt* (sometimes in cooperation with other departments), that aimed “to familiarize the leading bearers [*maßgeblichen Träger*] of public opinion in the entire world with our standpoint,” see the Report presented by *Ministerialdirigent* Krueger of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government before the *Bundestag* Committee for Foreign Affairs on 21 January 1960 about “Politische Öffentlichkeitsarbeit im Ausland,” ACDP K004/2. In carrying out these activities, the federal government created and relied on an organization and instruments located both at home and abroad, including the West German missions (often equipped with press attachés or press offices), to win over foreign public opinion. The government’s political *Öffentlichkeitsarbeit* directed abroad included the areas: 1) Visitors: the invitation to the Federal Republic and “looking after” of foreign guests (with the most effective being those from the *Publizistik*); 2) Film and Television (including invitations to television teams from various countries who, with the government’s support, reported from the Federal Republic); 3) Radio (including the invitation of radio reporters and the provision of aid by their work); 4) *Vortragsreisen* of German personalities abroad; 5) Press; 6) Printed Materials and Publications (including targeted distribution by missions); 7) Exhibitions; and 8) Public Relations Offices. As of the late 1950s and early 1960s a total of about DM 16.6 million per year was budgeted to the BPA for such political public relations work abroad (again Krueger’s Report on 21 January 1960, ACDP K004/2). On the need for “German *Stellen*” to “look after” American citizens in the Federal Republic and to bring them out of their “isolation,” especially the *Kreise* and *Kommunen* in which American troops were stationed, with “corresponding impulses” emerging from *Bund* and *Ländern* also desirable, see the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1.

Related to such public relations work were the cultural efforts of the Federal Republic abroad, with the AA housing a cultural department, West German foreign representations outfitted with cultural attachés, and the federal government (and *Länder*) providing financial assistance to the network (“*Stellen*”) of German cultural institutes, sites of cultural encounter [“*Begegnung*”], cultural associations and schools

fostering trans-Atlantic understanding, such entities also acted at times, in Birrenbach's eyes, to hinder such objectives and thus, instead, to deceive their own (and other) populations. In any case, the engagement of these other actors in such propaganda activities renders an assessment of the specific impact of the German Atlanticist endeavors examined here even more difficult.<sup>126</sup>

However, there exists substantial evidence that Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists themselves considered their activities in this realm not only crucial but, moreover, quite successful. For one thing, they consistently summoned up the necessary wherewithal, determination and energy to engage in and even aspire to the intensifying and expansion of these public relations and publication initiatives over an extended period of time at a not inconsiderable expense in terms of money, time and effort. They saw their publications, along with other activities, as being of outstanding quality, a judgment reinforced by certain feedback.<sup>127</sup> They also appear to have been rather

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located abroad (including the Goethe Institutes) as well as to cultural exchanges (e.g. guest programs and trips), the UNESCO, and various performances and exhibitions abroad, the totality of which encompassed areas like *Geistesleben*, *Wissenschaft*, literature, language, theater, music, art and film.

<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, the German Atlanticist publication and public relations efforts took place within the wider context of foreign policy-related public relations work being simultaneously undertaken by not only, for instance, the West German government but also by other, non-governmental organizations. On the action "Macht das Tor auf!" carried out by the *Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland* in numerous West German cities and consisting of the sale of Brandenburg Gate badges by young people and "nameless citizens" as well as by "the leading personalities" of society, including from fields like politics, administration, *Wirtschaft*, religion, art, education and sports, as a means of providing the endeavor with vital "energy [*Nachdruck*] and attractive power"; on this action being intended as an expression of "solidarity" with Berlin as well as "Central and East Germany" and as a testimony of a "powerful German public opinion" to a foreign audience; and on the KUD claim that this operation had thus far enjoyed "a strong echo" and "triggered a good *staatsbürgerliche* effect," see the *Unteilbares Deutschland* letter of 5 February 1959, ACDP K002/1.

<sup>127</sup> We have already referenced positive German and American reviews of Birrenbach's *Die Zukunft der atlantischen Gemeinschaft*. For positive reviews and opinions of *Die Internationale Politik, 1955* (the first DGAP Research Institute yearbook), including those from Geoffrey Barraclough (in *International Affairs* (London)); Heinrich Benedikt (in the *Wiener Zeitung*); *Politique Étrangère* (Paris); Rudolf von Albertini (in the *Schweizer Monatshefte*); and Hans Herzfeld (in the *Historischen Zeitschrift* (Munich)), see "Die Internationale Politik: Jahrbücher des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik," ACDP K007/1. For positive reviews of the DGAP Research Institute's *Jahrbüchern* as a whole, including from Ernst Ulrich Fromm in *Der Welt*, see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn,

satisfied with the interest demonstrated in their publications and other activities.<sup>128</sup>

Furthermore, the general tenor of the assessments by Birrenbach, other German Atlanticists and Birrenbach's German propaganda contacts regarding the effectiveness of such undertakings suggests that they believed these endeavors were enjoying considerable influence at home and abroad. This generally positive tone is especially worth noting in Birrenbach's case insofar as it strikingly contrasts with so much else in

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"Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder," intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. On the "all-around [*vielseitige*]" approval enjoyed by the *Europa-Archiv* essay of Dr. Mende on "Die nicht bewältigte Vergangenheit des ersten Weltkrieges," and on the gratifying number of reprints from the *Europa-Archiv* that had appeared in foreign-language *Zeitschriften*, such as *Jeune Afrique* (August 1962), *Ministere des Armees* (March 1963), *Documents* (March 1963), *Survival* (March 1963), and the *Informationsschriften* of the *Svenska Institutet för Kulturellt Utbyte med Utlandet* (June 1963), see the Report about the *Europa-Archiv* and the *Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik*, on point 1 of the *Präsidialsitzung* (apparently from mid-1963), ACDP K014/2.

<sup>128</sup> On the number of *Europa-Archiv* subscriptions (besides the members of the DGAP) amounting to about 1,500 in both 1962 and 1963 (in spite of an increase in the sale price for 1963 from DM 56 to DM 65, necessary due to increases in production costs and salary rates), which represented a growth of about 22% in comparison to 1957 (1,171); and on 1,553 *Inlandsabonnenten* (including 779 members) compared to 1,029 *Auslandsabonnenten* (including 97 members) as of June 1963, with the sales abroad likewise remaining constant at about a third of the entire circulation [*Gesamtauflage*], see the Report about the *Europa-Archiv* and the *Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik*, on point 1 of the *Präsidialsitzung* (apparently from mid-1963), ACDP K014/2. For increases in subscriptions for the *Europa-Archiv* and increases in copies for the members of the DGAP, see the Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the *Europa-Archiv*, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2. Technical production costs for the EA for 1965 were estimated for 24 issues at an average of 78 pages in a print run [*Auflage*] of 3,100 copies including the index (Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the *Europa-Archiv*, 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2). On plans for a new edition of the *Grundlagenbänden* of the DGAP Research Institute yearbooks, with the first two (covering 1955 and 1956-57) almost unavailable [*vergriffen*], see the Report about the *Europa-Archiv* and the *Jahrbücher für Internationale Politik*, on point 1 of the *Präsidialsitzung* (apparently from mid-1963), ACDP K014/2. On the contractually agreed deliveries (from the Department *Europa-Archiv*) of the *Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik* to the *Auswärtigen Amt* amounting in 1962 to 1,100 copies at DM 84.50, for a total return of DM 92,950, see the Economic Plan 1963 of the Department *Europa-Archiv*, in the Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH, ACDP K010/2. For the contractually arranged deliveries of the *Dokumente zur Auswärtigen Politik* to the *Auswärtigen Amt* amounting to 1,000 subscriptions, each with 24 deliveries, at a price of DM 100.50, with returns thus coming to DM 100,500, see the Draft Economic Plan 1965 for the *Europa-Archiv*, "Herstellung und Vertrieb im Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am Main GmbH," 24 November 1964, ACDP K014/2. As of 1975-76, a typical run of the Atlantic Papers in English consisted of 2,500 copies and, apparently, in French of 1,500 copies. On the growing interest in and strong popularity of the DGAP *Vorträgen*, including more than six hundred members, guests and press representatives attending that of the US Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, see Günter Henle, DGAP eV, President, Bonn, "Mitteilungen für die Mitglieder," intended as personal information, 26 March 1962, ACDP K007/1. As of 1976, a very large audience for a DGAP *Vortrag* numbered almost five hundred people and, as of 1978, all such *Vorträge* were considered well attended. On the remarkably high "demand" (even a press run of 4,000 not enough) for the English-language edition of *Außenpolitik* as "proof of the respect" enjoyed by the journal, see Bechtoldt, *Außenpolitik*, to KB, 26 January 1970, ACDP K022/1. For the English-language edition of *Außenpolitik* having brought the journal "great reach [*Reichweite*]," see Bechtoldt to KB, 31 October 1974, ACDP K173/2.

his outlook, which, as we have seen in Chapter 6, distinctly tended towards the pessimistic. We can also point to the enthusiastic response of Birrenbach's contacts among the American elite regarding the German Atlanticist efforts in the public relations field. For instance, Birrenbach was clearly pleased by the praise heaped by these contacts on the American edition of his book *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, as well as by the response emerging from the United States to his university lecture tour in the fall of 1962.<sup>129</sup> Though certainly not conclusive, all of this at least indicates that Birrenbach, the German Atlanticists and their institutions enjoyed notable achievements at home and abroad in their publication and public relations actions.<sup>130</sup>

#### H. Conclusion

The upshot of the efforts of Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists in the field of publications and public relations to bring about a favorable Atlanticist climate, a component of which would be a strong pro-Atlanticist public consensus, was a series of ongoing and one-time ventures designed to promulgate the Atlanticist worldview to an audience extending far beyond the members of the Atlanticist infrastructure, the direct

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<sup>129</sup> For Birrenbach claiming, with respect to his book, that "I hear again and again that the people [on the American side], even after the concept has been temporarily shattered [*zerschlagen*] by de Gaulle, are pleased that a German voice is so near to the American concept"; his having recently received from J. Robert Schaetzel in this regard an "especially nice, appreciative letter"; and his satisfaction about the "long, very positive" related article that would appear in the July/August edition of *Freedom & Union*, see KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1. On Birrenbach having received a number of "very beautiful" letters in response to the publication of his book in the US, see KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1. With regard to his lecture tour of Fall 1962, Birrenbach already as of April 1963 had new invitations to universities in the United States (again KB to Erich Straetling, 26 April 1963, ACDP K157/1). Such *Vorträge* abroad were considered particularly effective when the names of those German personalities involved were already well known. Birrenbach also deemed the *Atlantik-Brücke* "open letter" (press release) of March 1963 a success and believed that Chris Emmet's sending of two hundred copies of that declaration to "prominent personalities" in the US had also contributed to its having had its "effect" (KB to LR I. Kl. Robert Borchardt, Washington DC Embassy, 25 July 1963, ACDP K157/1).

<sup>130</sup> For a later assessment citing the "proven" *Atlantik-Brücke* seminar program for American officers and teachers stationed in the Federal Republic, see the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1. For a reference to the "convincing cost-benefit relationship" of the officer seminars staged by the *Atlantik-Brücke*, see the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1.



participants in explicitly Atlanticist activities and even beyond the relatively small elite layers located at the peak of the social structure, including within government. There existed a distinct attempt to educate a broader public on the need for Atlantic Partnership and to contribute to the feeling and consciousness of belonging to an Atlantic Community, not least via symbolic appeals and actions. These efforts manifested themselves in the journals, books, articles, speeches, mass rallies, television interviews, fund-raising campaigns and the like that characterized the German Atlanticist movement. Such initiatives were intended to impact ultimately not only within the Federal Republic but also abroad, especially in the United States, a desire that introduced unique elements into such undertakings. An examination of the German Atlanticist propaganda endeavors also highlights an important aspect of the modern relations between, at the time especially Western democratic, nations.<sup>131</sup> It sheds light as well on the perceptions entertained by Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists of not only the German people but also of the unique nature of the United States and the American people and the extraordinary imperatives to be derived from these recognitions in interacting with such an entity. Within this overall context, Birrenbach found ample space in a variety of publication and public relations outlets to promote his specific views, analyses and proposals and especially his fundamental Atlanticist outlook.

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<sup>131</sup> As previously indicated, the stress on public relations was not unique to the German Atlanticists, rather it was a significant and increasingly salient element of the overall German-American (and German-British) relationship and, more widely, even of international relations in general. For instance, see the memo of the West German embassy in the United States on the "Information and Public Relations Work of Foreign Governments and German Institutions in the USA," 12 August 1958, ACDP, K040/1 and the memo about the "Extension [*Ausbau*] of the German Information Work Abroad," March 1959, ACDP K040/1. However, genuinely widespread public relations work was at the time really worthwhile only in countries like those of the West that boasted a strong and well-organized public opinion, in contrast to most of the developing world where public life consisted merely of a thin upper layer that could realistically be targeted by such initiatives.

While we have outlined in Chapter 4 the construction and consolidation of an overarching Atlanticist infrastructure, in Chapter 5 the creation of a related financing infrastructure, and in Chapter 6 the development and functioning of an Atlanticist political network, Birrenbach's experiences suggest that we can also speak of the emergence in this period of an Atlanticist propaganda infrastructure and network, essential to the largely private, non-governmental efforts of the German Atlanticists in the realm of publications and public relations. This propaganda infrastructure and network consisted not only of the Atlanticist organizations we have already encountered in previous chapters but also certain government departments, a number of Atlanticist-minded journals and newspapers, West German and foreign publishers and publishing houses, as well as prominent journalists and other media figures. In carrying out their propaganda initiatives abroad, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists could also rely for assistance on a sub-network of various American and German advisors and experts, both official and non-official, on the United States. Ultimately, as Birrenbach well recognized, the Atlanticist publications and public relations actions formed a vital, and apparently successful, aspect of the overall Atlanticist effort, not least to confront familiar *Abendland* perspectives as well as later blossoming forms of, what at least they considered to be, overt anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic that we shall encounter in the coming chapters. The efforts of the German Atlanticists to spread their ideas to and impact on a broader public, both in the Federal Republic and abroad (particularly in the United States), and the concomitant emergence of this propaganda infrastructure and network represented key developments in the evolution of German Atlanticism in the post-World War II era.

**Chapter 8: Thematic and Geographic Development of German Atlanticism - The Development of the Atlanticist Infrastructure and Network from the Late 1960s Onward**

**A. Introduction**

Naturally, the Atlanticist infrastructure and network continued to evolve from the late 1960s onward. Many of the institutions described in previous chapters continued to function in much the same way as before, conducting conferences, undertaking research, generating publications and so on. However, the changing environment in which the infrastructure and the German Atlanticists themselves existed impacted considerably on this infrastructure and network and presented novel challenges. Particularly during the first half of the 1970s, new institutions, some of them fleeting, others of a more permanent nature, were created in an attempt to overcome these challenges. Birrenbach remained located at the heart of many of these developments throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. Once again, therefore, an examination of his activities during this period offers illuminating insights into the evolution of the German Atlanticism of the time. As we shall see, with respect to infrastructure, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists were ultimately engaged in two overarching projects during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The first was essentially a continuation of the direct effort to reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship both by strengthening existing institutions as well as by founding new ones. The second major project was the attempt to fortify the trans-Atlantic connection by enlarging the very thematic and geographic scope of Atlanticism, and especially to establish an organization designed in large part to expand their already extensive private, non-governmental infrastructure and network, however now beyond

the Atlantic world itself. Related to all of this, significant innovations were also occurring in the Atlanticist sphere at the same time in the field of financing.

*B. Framework Conditions: Economic Downturn and the Atlanticist Infrastructure*

Beginning in the mid-1960s, a significant decline in economic growth, even periods of recession, in the Federal Republic formed one of the most important structural conditions in which Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists operated their institutions. True, these Atlanticists had experienced relatively brief “dry spells” in raising funds for their infrastructure in the past. For instance, election years tended to be particularly difficult times as potential contributors, among them business firms and political parties, directed their limited available funds elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> However, never before in their endeavors had the German Atlanticists confronted anything of this magnitude over such a prolonged period. Interwoven as the Atlanticist infrastructure and network was with such broader economic developments, this larger slowdown could not but have a significant impact. Just as the economic boom times hitherto had contributed to their ability to finance their infrastructure and activities, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists now found themselves facing considerable obstacles in this regard. While the West German economy would not find itself mired in permanent recession, it would never again experience anything like the continuously high growth rates characteristic of the *Wirtschaftswunder* and, from the mid-1960s onward, economic troubles, including those

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, during the 1957 election campaign for instance, Birrenbach himself, in consultation with Robert Pferdenges, had arranged for the transfer of Thyssen money, DM 250,000 from the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen in addition to “considerable sums” from those works connected to it, into CDU coffers via the *Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung 1954 eV* (KB to Fritz Berg, BDI President, 2 May 1957, ACDP K001/1).

in the steel industry, were common enough that Birrenbach regularly alluded to them in bemoaning the difficulty of raising funds in the Federal Republic.<sup>2</sup>

Simply put, the German sources of financing for the Atlanticist infrastructure and activities were not as able nor as willing to part with money during tough economic times as they were during periods of general prosperity. The federal government certainly felt the pinch and adjusted its funding practices to suit the financial situation of the *Bund*. The components of the *Wirtschaft* also took account of the new economic realities. In many cases, the *Stiftungen* found themselves considerably more restricted in their financing of Atlanticist projects. The situation of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* is instructive in this regard. Due to the very nature of its means, the *Stiftung* found its ability to finance projects seriously hampered during times of economic difficulty for the Thyssen firm. By June 1967, the foundation's income had declined by more than 30% in the past year

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<sup>2</sup> For such complaints from Birrenbach, see for example KB to Karl Hohmann, 4 November 1976, ACDP K190/2. Henceforth, Birrenbach offered warnings and concerned accounts of the “severe” difficulties within the national and international framework, unknown in earlier years, at least threatening to undermine the prosperity and successful development of the West German *Wirtschaft* as a whole, including the weakening of and uncertainty surrounding the domestic *Konjunktur* and economic growth; an ongoing collapse of profits due to both rising costs and declining revenues; and a waning readiness among the *Unternehmen* to sustain the rates of investment necessary for increased productivity. According to Birrenbach, this state of affairs had resulted in a decline in the growth of steel consumption in the Federal Republic and led to the serious situation of a struggling, “extraordinarily crisis-prone” German steel industry (enduring a multi-year crisis, including in 1967-68) that was, furthermore, debt ridden and capital poor; at the mercy of high and rising expenses (e.g. wages, social expenditures, energy/coal costs), low prices (relative to rising costs of living), short working hours, as well as declining returns and low or even non-existent profits; plagued by labor conflict (including wild strikes and violence); burdened with distorted tax disadvantages; and pummeled with unjustified criticism, to boot, at the hands of the press and political opposition (e.g. in 1969 by the SPD *Bundesminister* Georg Leber). On all of this from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, along with the extraordinary problems of “far-reaching importance [*einschneidender Bedeutung*]” specifically confronting the August-Thyssen-Hütte, see the Expositions of the *Aufsichtsrat*-Chairman Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, 12<sup>th</sup> ordentliche Hauptversammlung of the ATH AG, 15 April 1966, ACDP K079/2; Expositions of Kurt Birrenbach, 17<sup>th</sup> ordentliche Hauptversammlung of the ATH AG, 27 April 1971, ACDP K065/3; KB, Düsseldorf, Königsallee 74, to Dr. Rainer Barzel, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, Bonn, 24 March 1966, ACDP K016/1; and KB to Dr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1. For Birrenbach arguing that the steel industry had in no way exceeded its capacity [“*überspannt den Bogen*”] in its dividend payments and that the dividends of the steel industry were among the lowest in the Federal Republic, see again KB to Barzel, 15 September 1969, ACDP K023/1.

due to the crisis in the German steel industry, and by 1973, the dividends of the August-Thyssen-Hütte had been cut in half, which prevented the *Stiftung* from doing much more than continuing to finance ongoing projects.<sup>3</sup> During such a trying time, even the influential Birrenbach had to accept rejections from the organs of the *Stiftung* or at least issue cautions to those requesting funds for Atlanticist projects that he and the foundation would have supported wholeheartedly in financially healthier times. The *Thyssen Stiftung* was not alone in this regard. For instance, other foundations largely reliant on the steel industry, such as the *Krupp-Stiftung*, also suffered as a result of the struggles experienced in that sector.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, not all the major German foundations suffered equally. The *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, for example, was significantly less affected by the economic climate due to its greater means and the fact that the earning power (*Ertragskraft*) of the Volkswagen works, though diminished, remained unbroken. That said, the impact of the economic downturn on the German *Stiftungen* exercised a markedly deleterious effect on Atlanticist fundraising efforts in the Federal Republic.

Firms, themselves, were also less willing to contribute to the Atlanticist cause from the mid-1960s onward. In some cases, this was due not only to the economic downturn *per se* but also in part to the frustration experienced by certain German firms with American competition on the German market during this period. Thyssen offers one not atypical example of a firm's response to the economic difficulties of the time. Here, as a result of the economic troubles confronting the steel industry, the Thyssen *Vorstand* instituted a series of general savings measures, including an attitude of strict reserve with

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<sup>3</sup> KB to JE Slater, Ford Foundation, 26 June 1967, ACDP K139/2. The amount of the dividends for the *Thyssen Stiftung* varied during the 1960s: 1961-63=12%, 1964=10%, 1965 and 1966=11%, 1967 and 1968=8%, 1969=10% and 1970=12% (*Die Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, 1960-70*, Tübingen: JCB Mohr, 1971, p. 3).

<sup>4</sup> This was the case in the early 1970s, for example, at the *Krupp-Stiftung*.

respect to donations and memberships.<sup>5</sup> Birrenbach was consulted in ticklish cases regarding the donations of the August-Thyssen-Hütte to the Atlanticist organizations, and he was sometimes able to at least secure delays in the implementation of the specifically proposed savings measures. However, despite Birrenbach's presence and, often effective, lobbying, even Thyssen was not exempt from slashing its contributions to the Atlanticist infrastructure in such economically troubled times. For instance, during the mid- to late-1960s, the firm reduced its *Spenden* to the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft*, the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the *Atlantica*.<sup>6</sup> It should also be noted that, in some cases, even when firms did not curtail the nominal value of their contributions, inflationary trends gradually reduced their real value over time.

The reduction in funding from the mid-1960s onward brought about by the economic difficulties in the Federal Republic affected the Atlanticist organizations and projects virtually across the board. Institutions like the *Atlantik-Brücke*, the *Atlantica*, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik* and the *Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft* all suffered painful losses in member contributions from the *Wirtschaft* beginning with the recession of 1966-67. Especially after 1969, the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* saw its anticipated expansion, in the sense of personnel, thematics and infrastructure, seriously hampered by the financial shackles imposed by government and *Bundestag*. The *Atlantik-Brücke* saw a reduction in the purchase of its publications by the *Bund*, which it considered, for example, the primary cause of its relatively high deficit in 1972-73. Such

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<sup>5</sup> For references by Birrenbach to the "serious crisis" in the coal and steel industries in NRW, see for instance KB to Dean Acheson, Washington DC, 19 August 1966, ACDP K155/3.

<sup>6</sup> Due to the economic situation, the ATH reduced its donations to the DEG during the mid-1960s and cut its contribution to the *Atlantik-Brücke* from 1967-69 to DM 3,000 from the previous DM 5,000. Thanks to Birrenbach's lobbying of Sohl, the firm increased its contributions to the previous level in 1970 with the temporary abating of the steel crisis.

financial strictures were especially serious for an organization like the *Atlantica* at a time when the German Atlanticists, along with their European counterparts, were being urged by figures like John McCloy and Walter Dowling to increase their support for the Atlantic Institute or face the possibility of a significant reduction of the crucial American support that constituted more than half the budget of that organization.<sup>7</sup>

The response of the German Atlanticists and their institutions to this tighter financial situation varied. On the one hand, such organizations made efforts to reduce or limit their expenses and to operate more efficiently. This was the case, for instance, with the *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. From the mid-1970s onward, the Königswinter Conferences were staged alternately in Britain and the Federal Republic in order to ease the workload and financial burden on the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft* of staging these gatherings. As his appeals in July 1968 with respect to the Atlantic Institute demonstrate, Birrenbach, with his keen awareness of financing issues in general and of the acute difficulties thereof in this period in particular, was a firm advocate of efforts to analyze the activities and expenditures of the Atlanticist institutions so as to determine where money could be saved and spent more effectively.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, intensified and often creative efforts were also undertaken to locate financing necessary for the continued development of the Atlanticist infrastructure.

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<sup>7</sup> On, as of July 1973, the European-North American Committee (EURNAC, see later in this chapter) “skating on thin financial ice,” see the Proposal for a New Transatlantic Foundation, Draft No. 1, 24 July 1973, by James Huntley, ACDP K130/1. For business corporations, usually American, having been among the few sources willing to help EURNAC with funding as of March 1973, see the Summary of Discussions, Meeting of Atlantic Organizations, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Lake Como, Italy, 16-20 March 1973, by James R. Huntley, Secretary to the Conference, issued by the Secretary, Guildford, Surrey, England, ACDP K068/1. Jacques Pomonti (France) was convinced that “[w]e’ve got good people and good ideas; our only problem is more gas to put in the motor!” (Newsletter of Atlantic Organizations, Nr. 2, July 1973, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>8</sup> KB to John McCloy, 8 July 1968, ACDP K210/1. For a later example, in 1978, the Atlantic Institute planned to hold only one meeting of Participating Members (see later in this chapter) (AIIA Budget 1978, Expenditures, 16 December 1977, ACDP K058).



Birrenbach played an important role in increased efforts to approach firms for donations and to recruit new members. Sometimes, these attempts sought to broaden the base of support in the *Wirtschaft*. Thus, in the late 1960s, in the wake of the recession, Birrenbach took part in the expanded efforts of the *Atlantica* to attract “*mittlere Unternehmer.*”<sup>9</sup> In 1969, the *Freunde der deutsch-englischen Gespräche in Königswinter e.V.* was founded to facilitate the raising of the contributions chiefly from the *Wirtschaft* for the DEG.<sup>10</sup> In some cases, new programs were created to tap funding sources. To expand its range of financing and contacts with various sectors of society, the AI initiated in November 1970 a Participating Members program, modeled on the corporate service of the Council on Foreign Relations and benefiting from the CFR’s advice initially. The AI governors helped in the arduous process, requiring considerable travel and contact work, of enrolling firms, trade associations, newspapers and similar private organizations, with the August-Thyssen-Hütte among the German PMs. For an annual fee, PM representatives attended semi-annual meetings, often in Paris, that enabled the AI to expose them to its relevant especially economic and financial research, to clarify in which directions further work needed to be done and to incorporate views and information gleaned from PMs into studies underway.<sup>11</sup> Other Atlanticist institutions

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<sup>9</sup> Walter Stahl to KB, 3 April 1968, ACDP K106/1.

<sup>10</sup> As of 1969, the member contributions and contributions from the *Wirtschaft* covered more than two-thirds of the annual expenses of the DEG. The remainder was made up through donations and through sums from the government (explicitly comprising only a very low share of the DEG budget).

<sup>11</sup> Chairmen of Participating Members meetings included, for example, the Hon. Nathaniel Samuels (US; chairman of the Louis Dreyfus Holding Company and chairman of the board of advisory directors of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.) on 16 December 1977. The Participating Members meetings were also addressed by prominent guest speakers from the academic world, international organizations, governments and the private sector, among them Germans such as Otto Wolff von Amerongen (president of the DIHT, 4 June 1973), Jürgen Ponto (Dresdner Bank, 11 November 1974), and Dr. Günter Geisseler (former legal director, Mannesmann AG, 7 November 1975), as well as figures like Manlio Brosio (Secretary-General of NATO), William Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation), Bruno Kreisky (Chancellor of Austria), Janez Stanovnik (Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva), Samuel Pizar, Yves Laulan (Director of Economic Affairs, NATO), Louis Kawan (EEC Commission), H. Exc. Pierre Werner

expanded their scope of funding source-types. For example, beginning in the late 1960s, the DGAP, previously focused on financing from industry, sought larger contributions

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(Prime Minister of Luxembourg), Henry Fowler (former US Treasury Secretary), Jean Rey (former president of the EEC), J. Robert Schaetzel (former US ambassador to the EEC), Edward Fried (Brookings Institution), François Duchêne (IISS), Emile van Lennep (OECD Secretary-General), Joseph Luns (NATO Secretary-General), Robert Rossa (former United States undersecretary of the Treasury), Prof. BC Roberts (London School of Economics), François Lagrange (Rapporteur-General of the Sudreau Commission), NH Petersen (*Chef de Cabinet* of Mr. FO Gundelach, European Commissioner), the Rt. Hon. Lord Roll of Ipsden (KCMG, CB, chairman of SG Warburg & Co. Ltd., London), M. André de Lattre (Chairman of Crédit National, Paris), Baron Edmond de Rothschild (Chairman of Compagnie Financière Holding, Paris), and Geoffrey Chandler (CBE, Director, Shell International Petroleum Co., London). Other participants in PM meetings included Germans like Hermann J. Abs, Dr. Walter Damm, Dr. Gerd Tacke, and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, along with Jonkheer John Loudon, Aurelio Peccei, Count René Boël, Sir Richard Powell, Robert Belgrave, Amb. Egidio Ortona, IPH Skeet, and Amb. Martin Hillenbrand. “Respondents” to the PM meeting of 7 November 1975 included, among others, Rudolf Vollmer (Labour Attaché, German Embassy in London), along with Roy Grantham (General Secretary, Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical & Computer Staff (APEX), UK); Mr. Janurus (Labour Attaché, Swedish Embassy in London); and Harry Pollak (Labour Attaché, United States Embassy in London) (Labour-Management Study, Draft Project Description, 25 February 1976 and related Draft Budget, 15 April 1976, ACDP K058). Participating Members meetings covered topics such as “East-West Economic Relations” (4 June 1973); “The Upcoming West-West Negotiations” (on forthcoming monetary, trade and defense talks, 13 November 1973); “Inflation, Deflation and Continuing Monetary Disorder?” (11 November 1974); “The Reform of European Company Laws: The Issues for Labour and Management” (7 November 1975); and “The Problems Caused in Business by Growing Government Intervention” (16 December 1977). Though many PM meetings occurred in Paris (e.g. 4 June 1973 at the Hotel Méridien; 13 November 1973 at OECD headquarters), some were held elsewhere (London, 7 November 1975; Brussels, 3 December 1976). On 11 November 1974, the AI Participating Members gathered in Munich, the first PM meeting staged in the Federal Republic and one presented as a reflection of the importance of the German cooperation in the AI (Protocol of the *Atlantica* Member Assembly, 17 June 1974, ACDP K104/2). Initially set at FF 5,000, the annual fee for Participating Members was increased in 1974 to FF 6,500 (along with the new possibility of signing up for 3-5 years at a rate of FF 6,000) and in 1976 to FF 7,500 (or FF 7,000 for a longer commitment). As of August 1976, recommendations existed that Participating Members be asked to pay FF 8,500 for 1977 (Memo on finances from John Tuthill, AIIA Director-General, Paris, to all members and ex-officio members of the Steering Committee, 26 August 1976, ACDP K058). In general, the Participating Members program was considered well-organized and expanding, with the first list of PMs consisting of more than one hundred such members (Report about the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, ACDP K104/2). In 1973, the AI Board, believing increased American participation would be “useful,” agreed to begin a “low-key, selective” effort to obtain more major US firms, concentrating on those with “substantial trading or financial” interests and operations in Europe and Japan, as Participating Members. This campaign, which progressed “well,” was expected to add by the end of 1973 about fifteen to twenty more US Participating Members to what had been initially less than a dozen, an increase from somewhere less than 12% to about 20% of the total (Report about the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, ACDP K104/2). In the course of 1973, twenty-four new PMs joined the AI (none German, but one each from Finland (Finnish Sugar Co. Ltd.) and Sweden (Salenrederierna) along with diverse US and West European ones (including several from France and one each from Spain (Banco Hispano Americano) and Luxembourg)) (AI Activity Report 1973, ACDP K104/2). As of 1977, there was a new, hopeful, vigorous “drive” for additional AI Participating Members “in various countries” (including the US and Europe) but also a cautionary tone since, “in certain cases, even hanging on to what we have got is proving difficult enough” (Memorandum from Martin Hillenbrand to members and ex-officio members of the Steering Committee regarding the financial report, 12 April 1977, ACDP K058). Nevertheless, for the director-general’s assessment of the previous day’s “very successful” PM meeting (10 June 1977), see the Minutes of the Meeting of the AI Board of Governors on 11 June 1977, ACDP K058.

from the *Bund*, even as it attempted to maintain its “independence.” The SWP turned to financing outside the public sector for certain projects, including to the *Thyssen Stiftung*.

While, as a leading member of these organizations, Birrenbach obviously had a hand in such efforts, perhaps his most striking undertaking during this period with respect to increasing the financial means for the existing Atlanticist infrastructure were his efforts on behalf of the Monnet Committee. By the mid to late 1960s, this organ found itself in a difficult financial situation with an annual income (about FF 125,000) amounting to approximately half its annual expenses (about FF 250,000).<sup>12</sup> These difficulties could be traced to a number of causes but were primarily attributable to the fact that the committee had seen itself compelled to refrain from the considerable financial support it had been receiving from American foundations, especially the Ford Foundation, due to “the current political situation in France.”<sup>13</sup> By the late 1960s, therefore, ideas were floating around about how the long-term financing of the Monnet Committee could be placed on a firmer basis. With respect to this issue, Birrenbach functioned as someone who could expertly explore the possibilities of such an undertaking in the Federal Republic. One such possibility entertained by Monnet was that of a European foundation whose *raison d’être* would be the realization of European unity through the promotion of the European idea and the support of the organizations acting in this sense, an explicit purpose believed to be conspicuously lacking among the few European foundations enjoying significant

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<sup>12</sup> Of this annual income of approximately FF 125,000 in this period, FF 50,000 came from the political parties and FF 75,000 from the trade unions.

<sup>13</sup> Birrenbach Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2. In 1966, while searching for funds for the committee from private West German sources (essentially the *Wirtschaft*), Birrenbach also mentioned the committee’s desire, “in the current phase of European unification, . . . to strengthen [*verstärken*] its political activity” both within the Community as well as beyond it, “especially in Great Britain and in the United States” (KB Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2). These financial difficulties of the Monnet Committee were, in part, due as well to the “special expenditures” in at least 1969 brought on by “the England entrance” (Max Kohnstamm to KB, confidential, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1).

means. To this end, Monnet set his sights on the soon to be founded *Krupp-Stiftung*.<sup>14</sup> Despite Birrenbach's support of such ideas vis-à-vis Krupp's Berthold Beitz, Monnet's proposals regarding the purposes of the *Krupp-Stiftung* were rejected in early October 1967 since the purposes of this *Stiftung* had already been set down in the testament of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach.<sup>15</sup> Another idea along similar lines, entertained especially by the DGB's Ludwig Rosenberg and Monnet and about whose feasibility and potentialities in the Federal Republic Birrenbach was consulted, was the founding of a European Foundation whose financial means would be raised through contributions.<sup>16</sup>

The solution ultimately arrived at took a somewhat different approach, one that involved the *Wirtschaft* but not in the form of a *Stiftung*. The possibility of securing financing for the committee from industry was a topic of discussion during the mid- and late-1960s and, having promised Monnet he would make just such an effort, Birrenbach played a central role in obtaining the support of the German *Wirtschaft* for this entity. In his direct contacts with the BDI, Birrenbach repeatedly sang the praises of the Monnet Committee, referring to it as "the political conscience of the Europe which we desire,"

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<sup>14</sup> As he put it in September 1967, "I believe that it is a plan that can be very important for Germany and for Europe if the object of the future foundation is well chosen. In my view, the Krupp Foundation could not have a more useful function than to aid in the construction of Europe" (Monnet to KB, 5 September 1967, ACDP K052/2). An attached memo, apparently written by Monnet assistant Jacques van Helmont, further proposed that the "*direction*" of the *Stiftung* be composed of German members as well as members of other European nationalities, a "significant innovation" since the American foundations that "generously" aided foreign activities had a *direction* composed only of Americans. Such a step would not only benefit European unification but also the image of the Krupp firm and of the Federal Republic, thus continuing the efforts to prove they were today of a "peaceful" nature (Memorandum, VH/cm, 5 September 1967, ACDP K048/2).

<sup>15</sup> Berthold Beitz to KB, 2 October 1967, ACDP K048/2.

<sup>16</sup> Rosenberg apparently responded to Monnet's inquiries regarding the long-term financing of the committee with the proposal of the construction of such a foundation. Birrenbach was consulted about the idea and potential tasks of this foundation and the conditions under which it could be recognized in the Federal Republic as charitable (Dr. Otto Kunze, DGB *Bundesvorstand*, to KB, 24 April 1968, ACDP K052/2).

and attempted to soothe concerns regarding the influence of the labor unions in the committee and the exclusion of the employers organizations:

as far as the participation of the unions, these have, to this point, never attempted to cause the committee to propose negative measures in relation to the *Unternehmern*. The presence of the Christian-social, conservative and liberal parties in the committee have provided a sufficient security for it.<sup>17</sup>

Birrenbach was also instrumental in encouraging, facilitating and arranging contacts and meetings, in which he himself took part, that brought West German industrialists, especially the leading members of the BDI (including Berg and Wagner), into connection with the Monnet Committee (Monnet and Kohnstamm) and foreign, especially French and Italian, industrialists (e.g. Wilfrid Baumgartner, Giovanni Agnelli, Giuseppe Petrilli, also within the context of meetings of the presidents of UNICE) to impart impetus to the process and ultimately to plan and coordinate their contributions. Birrenbach continued to prod things along, also approaching industrialists himself, and kept Monnet apprised of the situation in the Federal Republic. Finally, in support of future fund-raising, Birrenbach devised and arranged a way, via the *Europa-Union* and with the agreement of its president, Baron von Oppenheim, for firms donating to the Monnet Committee to enjoy a tax deduction on that contribution.<sup>18</sup> Once again, as we have seen with respect to the *Atlantica* and the *Stiftungen*, Birrenbach's skill in matters of taxation, and more specifically the evasion thereof, thus proved an important asset in his fund-raising efforts.

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<sup>17</sup> KB to Hellmuth Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1 and KB to Fritz Berg (cc: Wagner), 17 March 1969, ACDP K126/1. Despite such criticism at times for the exclusion of the employers organizations, Monnet had believed in forming his committee that “[o]nly the political parties and the trade unions had both the strength and the element of disinterest that were needed for the building of Europe” [Jean Monnet, *Memoirs* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978), p. 406].

<sup>18</sup> Oppenheim agreed to have the *Europa-Union* issue *Spendenquittungen* provided that the letter of the donor made clear that the contribution did not come at the expense of the contributions of these firms to the *Europa-Union* itself (KB to Wagner, 6 June 1969, ACDP K126/1). The funds were then transferred through the *Europa-Union* to the Monnet Committee's Swiss bank account.

However, the entire process was a rather slow and prolonged affair with the exchanges of letters and the various meetings dragging on for several years following Birrenbach's initial approach to Berg in this matter in July 1966, therefore well into the late 1960s. This was in spite of an initially encouraging response from Berg in a meeting in Bonn in 1967 with Monnet, Kohnstamm, Wagner and Birrenbach. In Birrenbach's mind initially, a contribution from German industry represented something of a catalyst for contributions from the industries of other countries in the Common Market.<sup>19</sup> However, by March 1969, with still no contribution from German industry, the Monnet Committee was already or soon would be receiving significant sums of money from the French (anonymously), the British, the Dutch and the Belgians, as well as from the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*.<sup>20</sup> The lackluster progress, on the German side at least, had something to do in part with the already mentioned questions being raised among industrialists about the influence of the trade unions in the committee and the exclusion of the employers organizations.<sup>21</sup> Finally, years after the initial approaches, with other countries donating money while "the strongest economic country of Europe, the Federal Republic, about which everyone asks, pays nothing," Birrenbach released his frustrations to Wagner in a letter of 2 April 1969 regarding his inability to elicit a definitive answer from the German businessmen:

Today-almost two years later [after the initially encouraging meeting]- we are still not a step further.... I now need an answer from you. If you say "no," I would respect this answer, even if I consider it wrong, especially as the coming twelve

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<sup>19</sup> KB Memo, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2.

<sup>20</sup> For "several personalities" in France paying "under the table," see KB to Hellmuth Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1 as well as KB to Wagner, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1. As of 2 April 1969 the British sum amounted to 100,000 to 200,000 DM, the Dutch 60,000 DM, and the Belgian 40,000 DM (KB to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1).

<sup>21</sup> In explaining the slow German progress, Birrenbach alluded to unspecified reasons both inside and outside of the Federal Republic (KB to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1).

months will be of decisive importance for the European development.... But what I cannot do is sit back and watch as nothing happens on the part of the Federal Republic in this question. I would simply not be able to come to terms with it [*abfinden*].... Give me an answer: yes or no, but do not make me wait any longer. Please, have understanding for my impatience, but two years is a long time.<sup>22</sup>

Spurred on by this plea and aided by Birrenbach's solution of the taxation issue, Berg and Wagner finally seem to have gotten down to the business of securing financial support from the *Unternehmern* for the Monnet Committee. Meanwhile, the industrialists attempted to coordinate their contributions within their own industries. By 11 July 1969, the donations for the first two years to the Monnet Committee amounted to DM 71,500 and DM 61,000, respectively, sums within the range of Birrenbach's recent expectations and considerably exceeding those of his earlier projections.<sup>23</sup> Naturally, Birrenbach was also in contact with Sohl and saw to it that the Thyssen group provided a substantial DM 10,000 contribution for at least each of the first two years, equal to the most of any firm.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, the upshot of such financing, including that from the German *Wirtschaft*, was the placing of the Monnet Committee on a firmer financial footing and the enhancement of its ability to expand its activities. The contributions raised from European business for the committee served a variety of purposes, depending on the source. The Dutch, Belgian, English and (in part) German contributions went towards

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<sup>22</sup> KB to Wagner, 2 April 1969, ACDP K126/1.

<sup>23</sup> This surpassed Birrenbach's original suggestion to Berg in July 1966 of an annual sum of DM 50,000 as a reasonable target and was within the range of his later suggestion to Berg and Wagner of March 1969 of DM 50,000-100,000 for an initial period of two years (KB to Fritz Berg, President of the BDI, 12 July 1966, ACDP K050/2 and KB to Berg (cc: Wagner), 17 March 1969, ACDP K126/1). In August 1969, Birrenbach expressed his confidence that the contributions for the second year would eventually match those for the first (KB to Winrich Behr, 8 August 1969, ACDP K126/1). In a letter of 9 September 1969, Gerhard Eickhorn, the General Secretary of the *Europa-Union Deutschland*, enclosed a table of the promised and the thus far received contributions for the committee of DM 69,000 and DM 66,000, respectively (Eickhorn to KB, 9 September 1969, ACDP K126/1).

<sup>24</sup> Eickhorn to KB, 9 September 1969, ACDP K126/1; KB to Kohnstamm, 11 July 1969, ACDP K126/1; and Sohl to Berg, 11 June 1969, ACDP K126/1.

the committee's special British program, resolved at its London meeting of 11 March 1969. This program aimed to promote British entrance into the European Economic Community by arranging for a group of experts to investigate the problems the French government was then depicting as insurmountable and included, among other things, the financing of four reports as well as special meetings of the committee on this theme.<sup>25</sup> However, at the agreement of Birrenbach, Monnet and Kohnstamm, the German funds also went towards a somewhat broader purpose, financing not only the "Britain project" but also the committee's normal expenditures and also compensating Monnet for his own personal contributions to the committee's expenses.<sup>26</sup> It is not clear exactly what influence the contributions of the industrialists provided them in the committee, though it seems and stands to reason that they enjoyed at least some. Monnet, henceforth, expanded his regular contacts with the governments, political parties and labor unions to include the BDI and the corresponding employers organizations in the other donor countries. Meanwhile, Birrenbach passed on draft declarations to Berg and Wagner of the BDI so that they could make suggestions to Monnet. However, a formal widening of the committee to include explicit representatives of industry was rejected so as to prevent an unwieldy swelling that would render the committee's work impossible. Therefore, added to Birrenbach's task of acting as the go-between for the committee and the CDU

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<sup>25</sup> The British had entered the Monnet Committee during the late 1960s, therefore even prior to the entrance of Britain into the EEC.

<sup>26</sup> For instance, over an eighteen-month period in the late 1960s, Monnet himself gave "new advances" of approximately DM 150,000 to the committee (Kohnstamm to KB, confidential, 13 March 1969, ACDP K126/1).



was that of serving as the liaison between the committee and German industry (also via the *Europa-Union* and the BDI) including with respect to funding issues.<sup>27</sup>

### C. Framework Conditions: Atlantic Drift

In addition to the economic difficulties confronting Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists, another key element in the framework in which they and their institutions operated during the late 1960s and early 1970s was at least the sense that the United States and Western Europe, including the Federal Republic, were gradually drifting apart from one another. This typically manifested itself in American-European discord in a variety of security, political and economic areas (e.g. *détente*, trade and monetary issues, burden-sharing) and a general deterioration in mutual comprehension and in the belief in interdependence. In fact, the West German *Ostpolitik* and the disagreements surrounding it was among the chief causes in the late 1960s and early 1970s of a phenomenon that dismayed Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists. This was, namely, the appearance during this period of fissures within the Atlanticist network, in both an international as well as an intra-German sense. Other previous and current disputes about particular issues and methods, perhaps most importantly with respect to nuclear affairs (especially the MLF) were relatively minor in comparison to the emotions that flared up regarding the *Ostpolitik*.<sup>28</sup> As a result, Birrenbach's relations with foreign personalities like Frank

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<sup>27</sup> Similar to before, whenever funds were lacking from the party or from industry, Birrenbach was contacted, usually by Ludwig Rosenberg, and requested to deal with the matter. For Birrenbach's sarcastic elation ("Wonders never cease [*Es geschehen noch Zeichen und Wunder*]") at the belated transfer of the CDU contribution via the "Staatsbürgerliche Gesellschaft" (Cologne; probably referring to the *Staatsbürgerliche Vereinigung 1954 eV*), see KB to Barzel, 9 August 1968, ACDP K052/2.

<sup>28</sup> The differences existing even among the Atlanticists themselves during this period are symbolized in the difficulties the Atlantic Institute's Policy Committee, chaired by Birrenbach, experienced in obtaining signatures from prominent members of all the democratic parties of the European member states of NATO for an Atlantic Declaration to be transmitted to the new US President, Richard Nixon, in 1969. While signatures were secured from parliamentarians of a number of such states, including the Federal Republic, those of other nationalities refused to sign or only signed the text in modified form. Given this mixed

Roberts, George Ball, Max Kohnstamm and even Jean Monnet himself were all strained to at least some degree during this period, a condition aggravated by the exploitation by both the West German government and opposition of the views of such foreign luminaries in the *Ostpolitik* debates.<sup>29</sup> However, the *Neue Ostpolitik* of the Brandt government and the opposition to that policy also resulted in considerable rifts within the ranks of the German Atlanticists themselves. In Birrenbach's case, this was especially noticeable with respect to his strained relations with many of the Hamburg Atlanticists centered around *Die Zeit*, particularly Theo Sommer and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, as well as with figures like Willy Brandt himself and, eventually, even Rainer Barzel (CDU).<sup>30</sup>

In institutional terms, the clashes among the Atlanticists regarding the *Ostpolitik* were probably reflected most intensely in Birrenbach's experiences within the Monnet Committee, a body in which not only were discussions held but resolutions actually

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response, the Policy Committee at first hesitated but eventually decided that Birrenbach should indeed send the declaration in 1969 to Nixon, signed by twenty-three prominent parliamentarians from nine European member states of NATO, "as a gesture of goodwill and solidarity towards the government and people of the United States" (KB to Henry Kissinger [US National Security Advisor], 20 February 1969, ACDP K146/3). On the MLF, see Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). At least in 1964, Monnet had great difficulty in obtaining a consensus on his committee's MLF proposals (which Birrenbach himself supported), due to the German members' espousal of the MLF possibility. This dissension within the action committee forced Monnet and others to seek large majorities, rather than unanimous approval (Monnet to KB, 26 May 1964, ACDP K050/2).

<sup>29</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach professed himself to be "deeply upset" and "astonished" by some of Ball's views on the *Ostpolitik*, for example when Ball had told Birrenbach in a phone conversation that "this treaty [the Moscow Treaty] is not particularly disagreeable for the Federal Republic of Germany" (KB to John McCloy, 15 February 1971, ACDP K210/1 and KB to George Ball, 20 October 1972, ACDP K160/3). By the early 1970s, Kohnstamm's and Birrenbach's opinions also diverged regarding the *Ostpolitik*, and Monnet was also generally a supporter of Brandt's policy. For Birrenbach learning from the German press that Herbert Wehner (SPD) had referred to Monnet and his moral authority as the "principal witness [*Kronzeugen*]" for the Moscow Treaty, see KB to Barzel, 21 September 1970, ACDP K024/1. A February 1971 article by Roberts, former British ambassador to the Federal Republic, in the Italian journal *Affari Esteri* was used "quite extensively" by the SPD in support of the Brandt government's position on the *Ostpolitik*. On the other hand, John McCloy's name was meanwhile being "bandied about in anti-Brandt circles" (John McCloy to KB, 1 March 1971, ACDP K210/1).

<sup>30</sup> For example, Birrenbach's relations with long-time contact and fellow Atlanticist Theo Sommer, who had generally agreed with Birrenbach on foreign policy issues but differed significantly with him about the *Ostpolitik*, withered and they barely spoke to one another in private for at least several years, although they continued to interact at the various conferences. By the latest in Spring 1972, Barzel was avoiding discussion with Birrenbach and relying more on other colleagues in the *Fraktion*.

approved and then promoted.<sup>31</sup> At the latest by 1967, the question of *détente* and *Ostpolitik* had become a source of divisiveness in that body and a major concern for Birrenbach.<sup>32</sup> Acting in conjunction at times with other *Union* members of the committee (Barzel and, later on, Kiesinger) and in consultation with *Union* MdBs and the federal government, Birrenbach focused on a primary goal of precluding the appearance of objectionable passages in the committee's resolutions, namely those passages that he believed endorsed the present division of Germany.<sup>33</sup> In practice, these efforts included not only discussions with the other members of the committee in meetings of that body but also private talks with Monnet and Kohnstamm (along with Barzel) about the proper treatment of sensitive issues.<sup>34</sup> In this, Birrenbach and other *Union* committee members confronted not only foreign but also SPD members of the committee. These

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<sup>31</sup> Monnet made strenuous efforts, usually commencing months prior to a committee meeting, to achieve unanimity on the committee's common declarations. As we have seen and shall see with respect to certain issues, particularly the Multilateral Force and the German *Ostpolitik*, this sometimes proved impossible.

<sup>32</sup> The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of rumblings within the committee regarding the German *Ostpolitik*. Ironically, it had been Birrenbach himself who in these mid-1960s had suggested to Monnet that the committee "discuss" and "occupy itself" with "[t]he relations between Europe and the People's Democracies in East Europe" since they were becoming "more and more important" and the subject of "a great debate" in the Federal Republic, although he also cautioned that it might still be too soon to treat such "problems" in a resolution since "the differences between the European nations are still too great" (KB to Monnet, 21 March 1966, ACDP K050/2). On the German *Ostpolitik*, see for instance Christian Hacke, *Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik von Nottbeck, 1975); William Griffith, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978); Clay Clemens, *Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik, 1969-1982* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); and Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993).

<sup>33</sup> See, for instance, KB to Monnet, 2 May 1967, ACDP K052/2. For Birrenbach undertaking these efforts in consultation also with members of the *Bundestag*, such as Hermann Kopf (CDU), Siegfried Balke (CSU) and Richard Stücklen (CSU), as well as the federal government, see for example Kopf to KB, 29 May 1967, accompanied by a memo on the proposals of the Monnet Committee, dated 10 April 1967, ACDP K052/2; and KB to Stücklen, 12 June 1967, accompanied by a Birrenbach memo dated 7 June 1967 (which had also been presented by Birrenbach to the *Kanzleramt*), ACDP K052/2.

<sup>34</sup> According to Birrenbach's memo of 7 June 1967 (ACDP K052/2), a discussion had occurred between Barzel, Monnet, Kohnstamm and Birrenbach a number of weeks ago regarding the draft of a resolution and again in the past week between Barzel, Kohnstamm and Birrenbach, with the goal of removing from the draft resolution the passages that appeared to be "unacceptable from the standpoint of the federal government." With respect to this question, Monnet had contacted "the delegations of the other five partners," so it was to be "assumed" that in the next meeting of the committee, in Brussels on 15 June, their proposals would "meet the approval of the other delegations."

disagreements placed strains on the Monnet Committee, including on the relationship between Monnet and Kohnstamm, on the one hand, and Birrenbach and the members of what was by then the German opposition, on the other, with Birrenbach even making thinly veiled threats to Monnet about the possible termination of the CDU/CSU participation in case the committee's line on the *Ostpolitik* was not to these parties' satisfaction.<sup>35</sup> On the whole, Birrenbach appears to have been quite successful in these efforts to prevent undesirable resolutions from emerging out of the Monnet Committee.<sup>36</sup>

However, if the disagreements surrounding the German *Ostpolitik*, as well as other issues, were played out in part within the Atlanticist institutions themselves, such discord and its potential impact on German-American and broader trans-Atlantic relations

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<sup>35</sup> As explained in the previous chapter, the entire theme and course of the *Ostpolitik* was rendered even more frustrating for Birrenbach through the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Brandt in October 1971, which Birrenbach viewed as a "very regrettable" decision and "an interference" by "a social-democratic influenced" *Storting* committee in the West German *Ostpolitik* debate. The final choice, as well as the three finalists, were "characteristic for the political composition of the Oslo group" and "the trend of our time" (KB to John McCloy, 25 October 1971, ACDP K210/1). Of course, this was all the more "painful" since it was at Birrenbach's initiative that the qualified German members of the Monnet Committee had nominated Monnet vis-à-vis the Nobel Committee (they were joined in this by the qualified members of the committee from the other countries, including Britain). For Birrenbach, the granting of the Nobel Prize to Monnet "would have given a new lift to the European idea in a moment when Europe and the world need this lift more than ever" (KB to Monnet, 20 October 1971, ACDP K140/2). Monnet graciously responded to Birrenbach's letter the following day, assuring him that the Norwegian Nobel Committee of the *Storting* had made "the right decision" ("under the circumstances, a good one") and enclosing a copy of a congratulatory telegram he had sent to Brandt as well as the text of a statement ("special comment") he had made at the prompting of the DPA in Paris that was likewise complimentary to Brandt (Monnet to KB, 21 October 1971, ACDP K140/2). Such starkly divergent reactions to this episode suggest quite well the disagreements that existed between Monnet and Birrenbach about the Brandt *Ostpolitik*. With respect to subtle threats, Birrenbach reminded Monnet of the obligation of the three Western powers, assumed in the Paris Treaty of 1954, "to recognize the Federal Republic as the only legitimate state of the German nation and to support our efforts for reunification in peace and freedom. A voiding [*Aufhebung*] of this obligation, which binds both sides, is out of the question. All the more so, we believe that in order to guarantee the close connection of the CDU/CSU party to the Monnet Committee, also in the future, we have to discuss this question of such cardinal importance for Germany in the circle of the CDU members of the Monnet Committee with you and *Herrn Kohnstamm*. Your understanding for the German people and the Federal Republic is known to all of us. From it emerges also the high degree of unanimity that has distinguished the cooperation of the CDU/CSU party with the Monnet Committee from the beginning. In the European interest, we should not endanger this and should therefore seek means and ways to remove [*beheben*] the first differences of opinion between our party and you since the formation of the committee" (Draft to Monnet, "verbally expressed [*mündlich vorgetr.*]" on 6 October 1970, ACDP K140/2).

<sup>36</sup> For Birrenbach's successes in this regard, see for example KB to Karl Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, Parliamentary State Secretary in the *Kanzleramt*, 22 June 1967, ACDP K052/2.

were also among the chief motivations for the German Atlanticists to seek to strengthen their private infrastructure. Particularly with the onset of the *Neuen Ostpolitik* of the Brandt-Scheel government, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists considered it all the more necessary to carry out a further integration of the Federal Republic into the West, including on the level of the Atlanticist infrastructure and networks. For instance, in October 1970, Walter Stahl, seeking to gain new members for the *Atlantica*, argued:

After our *Ostpolitik* has come in motion to such an extent, it has become even more important, in our view, to strengthen the firm anchoring of the Federal Republic in the Western world wherever it is possible and appears appropriate [*angezeigt*]. This is also, as is known [*ja*], again and again emphasized by the federal government and demanded by the opposition. Also for this reason, it would therefore be very good if the *Atlantica* could intensify its participation [*Mitarbeit*] in the Atlantic Institute and the latter's support [*Förderung*].<sup>37</sup>

In explaining in August 1972 the impetus behind the creation of the Mid-Atlantic Clubs (see later in this chapter), the American James Huntley also cited concerns regarding “the deterioration (and the potential for further deterioration) of European-American relations.”<sup>38</sup> At the same time that they faced trying economic circumstances, the private Atlanticist organizations, therefore, seemed to be particularly necessary.

In seeking to implement, at least in part, institutional remedies to help overcome this Atlantic drift, Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists identified and attempted to counter disturbing trends in the United States and the Federal Republic that presaged serious dangers for the future of the German-American relationship. One such structural transformation that greatly troubled them was the phenomenon of generational change occurring in the United States and Europe, of the latter especially that in the Federal

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<sup>37</sup> Walter Stahl to Will Marx, banker, Frankfurt, 5 October 1970, ACDP K106/1.

<sup>38</sup> Memorandum on the Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. Huntley, Secretary of the Network of MACs, 30 August 1972, ACDP K068/1. In this memo, Huntley also pointed to existing “concern... for the state of the EC and of EC-US relations.”

Republic. An Atlanticist interest in and concern with younger generations was not unique to the late 1960s, with certain efforts and activities being directed towards “youth” well before then, not least with an eye towards democratic stability. Nevertheless, the sense that these pools of future leaders on both sides of the Atlantic no longer attached the same primary value to the trans-Atlantic connection nor appreciated the vital Atlanticist ties that had been forged was particularly strong by the late 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>39</sup> With respect to the United States, the Atlanticists could point to a number of symptoms reinforcing such fears at this time, including for instance a lagging interest in the German language.<sup>40</sup> Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic, the belief that a Liberal age of *Entideologisierung* had dawned proved by the late 1960s to be an illusion. True, from the middle of the 1960s, the *Abendland* concept disappeared almost entirely from at least the public discourse. However, Marxist interpretations, themselves containing characteristics of a secular religion, experienced a revival during the latter half of the 1960s, lending credence to the notion of a continuity of anti-Liberal thought after 1945 in the Federal Republic.<sup>41</sup> Such Marxist perspectives, often bearing an anti-American stamp, enjoyed considerable currency among significant parts of the West German

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<sup>39</sup> For still later trepidation in this regard, see Shepard Stone bemoaning that “when I look upon [*betrachte*] the current situation, there are unfortunately no more young Birrenbachs and McCloys” (Stone to KB, 1 February 1979, ACDP K130/2).

<sup>40</sup> On the “majority” of American participants in the Second German-American Youth Conference (see later in this chapter) unable to speak “very good German” (with several exceptions) and on it being “unrealistic” to expect them to speak fluent German in the future, see the *Atlantik-Brücke* Report about the Second German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1. Therefore, Burmeister stressed the need to “insist” that German participants in these youth conferences speak “fluent English,” despite the increased difficulty this meant “for us” in finding suitable candidates and the “handicap” imposed on the German side in conducting discussions in a foreign language, due to the loss of “verbal precision.” However, she also pointed to the reasonable expectation that young Germans “seriously interested” in international politics or in a career in the *Wirtschaft* would have a “good knowledge of English” (which quite a few did, including often as a result of having already stayed in an English-speaking country like the United States).

<sup>41</sup> On *Entideologisierung*, see the work of Daniel Bell, of course from an American perspective.

student movement of the late 1960s.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, especially by the late 1960s and early 1970s, there seemed to exist a pressing need to encourage and even to engineer an Atlanticist “passing of the torch” from generation to succeeding generation.

Birrenbach demonstrated a marked sensitivity in general to the question of generational change and especially with respect to its potential impact on relations in the Atlantic world. Broadly speaking, the idea of generational succession played a major role in Birrenbach’s overall political thought, for instance regarding potential developments in the Soviet Union.<sup>43</sup> At the latest by the early 1970s, Birrenbach was distraught in many respects, as part of his overarching pessimism, about the condition of the young generation in the Federal Republic.<sup>44</sup> Birrenbach’s great worries here included

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<sup>42</sup> On these themes, see Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1999).

<sup>43</sup> By the early 1950s, Birrenbach perceived a generational change underway in Russia comprising the rise, including into the “key positions” of party and state leadership (as personified by the “functionary,” “technocrat,” and “engineer” Georgy Malenkov), of younger age groups who dated their “crucial life experiences” to after the end of the October Revolution, rather than sharing those of the “professional revolutionaries” of the Lenin-Stalin generation, and who were less inclined to a “pure *Doktrinarismus*,” thinking more “empirically” and not exclusively in terms of “the theory and dialectic of Marx and Lenin.” True, this “new” generation exhibited more “gradual,” rather than “essential,” differences in thought vis-à-vis Stalin, yet Birrenbach suggested that such generational succession, along with the “reorganization [*Umbau*]” of Soviet society as characterized by the “formation [*Bildung*] of new classes,” might gradually result over the long-run in a “considerable waning [*Nachlassen*]” of the Bolshevik “world-revolutionary” ideas and tendencies as well as of the “*weltanschaulich* doctrinaire fanaticism.” Indeed, he claimed to already detect such a process underway with Stalin’s theory of “socialism in one country,” the “development” during the first phase of the “Great Patriotic [*vaterländischen*] War,” and the “visible weakening [*Abschwächung*]” of the “ideological fundamental attitude [*Grundeinstellung*]” in the period preceding “the new change of government.” On all of this, see “Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins,” by KB, Düsseldorf, 10 September 1953, ACDP K001/1.

<sup>44</sup> For Birrenbach mourning that in the Federal Republic “[t]he generation gap goes very deep. It is deeper than I ever experienced it in my life,” see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. In this letter to McCloy, Birrenbach complained that “[a] great part of the young generation” in the Federal Republic “does not believe anymore in the values of the fifties and the early sixties,” among them the “Christian values” that were “in erosion” and lacked the earlier “importance” they had enjoyed “in the times of the founding fathers of the CDU/CSU.” This West German youth did not exhibit the “loyalty to the state” or “feeling for the importance of the nation” characteristic of Birrenbach’s generation; harbored “deep doubts” regarding the “liberal market economy (*Soziale Marktwirtschaft*)”; demonstrated “no understanding for power and power politics”; possessed “a very limited inclination to accept authority”; did not recognize “the necessary limits of liberty”; and “articulated” a considerable “anti-Americanism.” For Birrenbach’s assessment that it was the “youth” (along with the “*Arbeiterschaft*” in some respects, such as *Sozialpolitik*) that “wants to hear as little as possible about authority and all the more of unlimited freedom” and that was most receptive to a policy characterized, among other things, by

the state of the German universities and students, as manifested for instance in his membership in the *Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft*, founded in November 1970 in response to the student movement.<sup>45</sup> Linked to this was Birrenbach's concern with "*Geschichtsbewusstsein*," here particularly the lack of interest in history among the German youth, one of the motivating factors in his efforts, described in Chapter 6, to promote the publication and spread of Hajo Holborn's works in the Federal Republic.<sup>46</sup> Even worse, Birrenbach detected such deficiencies in the younger generation finding

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outlandish "expectations" in the "economic-political, social-political and similar areas," including "almost unlimited wage demands"; "*Mitbestimmung* in all areas"; reductions in work time; a stress on "better quality of life" (his quotation marks here); the decriminalization [*"Strafschutz"*] of abortion; a reduction in the prosecution of crimes [*"Strafverfolgung"*]; the relaxing [*"Lockerung"*] of the conditions of the general criminal code [*"allgemeinen Strafordnungsbestimmungen"*]; and the elimination of restrictions [*"Freigabe"*] on pornography," see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. On parts of the "young generation" rejecting certain ideas that Birrenbach espoused such as the "system" of the *Marktwirtschaft* and the *Leistungsprinzip*, see KB to Frau Prof. Dr. Helge Pross, Biebertal, Ortsteil Königsberg, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. The National Socialist past contributed to the especially pronounced rift between young and old in the Federal Republic.

<sup>45</sup> For Birrenbach citing "the disaster in the German universities" among the "grave problems" facing the Federal Republic, see KB to Chris Emmet, 29 June 1970, ACDP K138/2. In this letter to Emmet, Birrenbach depicted the student movement, with "Cambodia or Vietnam... only one of the catalyst elements," as being fundamentally "directed against the free society in the Federal Republic," the demonstrations in Berlin serving as "only one of the many pathological symptoms" of that movement in this city. While by November 1972, Birrenbach saw fewer demonstrations at universities like Berlin, Heidelberg, Bremen and Münster, he believed that these and other universities were still "practically controlled [*beherrscht*] by radical students" grouped together in the "Spartacus" or the *Sozialistischen Hochschulbund*, with a further "influx [*Zuzug*] from the third of the *Assistenten* who show solidarity with them" and (unfortunately "as always") from "progressive" professors who "lack the character to say no." This situation (most explicitly the role of the professors but apparently other elements as well) reminded Birrenbach of his "bitter experience in the Hitler-time" under National Socialism and was something that he now had to endure "with bitter feelings the second time." He believed that "sooner or later" such "emotional states of consciousness [*Bewußtseinslagen*] will have terrible consequences [*sich... fürchterlich rächen*]." On all of this, including "the catastrophe of the universities," and for Birrenbach's criticism of the manipulation of public institutions, universities and schools, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. For Birrenbach's 1974 membership card for the *Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft* (dated 29 October 1974), see ACDP K206/2. At this point, Hartmut Hentschel was the organization's *Bundesgeschäftsführer*.

<sup>46</sup> For Birrenbach's concerns regarding a West German youth that had "almost no conscience [consciousness] of history" and his belief that "[t]he erosion of the values of the last two decades and the fact that the experiences of this time are about to be forgotten make it difficult to give..., particularly to the young generation, a realistic picture of the world," see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 27 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. Despite Birrenbach's efforts, as of September 1970, the German edition of Volume I of Holborn's *History of Modern Germany* (Verlag Kohlhammer) had experienced "catastrophic sales," with the largest part of the edition "already by an antiquarian bookshop [*Antiquariat*] to be sold off cheaply [*zum Verramschen*]" (Karl Cornides, Oldenbourg Verlag, to KB, 25 September 1970, ACDP K158/1). On Kohlhammer having "condemned" Holborn's *Deutsche Geschichte* to "failure," see Diest to KB, 3 June 1971, ACDP K158/1.



expression in German politics and foreign policy.<sup>47</sup> However, Birrenbach's concerns extended beyond the German youth to encompass to some extent their American counterparts as well.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, in each of his capacities, including that of a parliamentarian, Birrenbach was a strong proponent of youth and academic exchange programs, seeing these as an important element in the development of "good" international relations, including at the level of the "people," and more specifically of an Atlantic Partnership.<sup>49</sup> Meanwhile, Birrenbach also sought personally to "educate" newcomers to the field of German-American relations by advising them as well as by bringing them into contact with what he considered the appropriate Americans, thus functioning yet again in the role of gatekeeper. One striking example of this was his intensive preparation of the "young" Helmut Kohl's trip to the United States in 1974, for which he served as something of a consultant and assistant.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> For Birrenbach venting his bitterness that two-thirds of the "youth" had supported the government coalition in the November 1972 elections, see KB to Thomas Birrenbach, 23 November 1972, ACDP K039/1. With respect to the potential impact of generational change on the issue of the recognition of Germany's eastern borders [*Ostgrenzen*], see for instance KB to Rodolfo Griesshaber, Argentina, 10 March 1969, ACDP K048/2.

<sup>48</sup> For Birrenbach's assessment that segments of the American youth were among those "parts of the American nation" (another being sections of its "intellectual community") that were "no longer sure [*sicher*] that America, with its gifts [*Gaben*], riches [*Reichtümern*] and its national genius, can master all troubles [*Übel*]," see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to *Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft* Prof. H. Leussink, Bonn, 15 February 1971, ACDP K025/1. As of July 1972, Birrenbach saw a "youth" (not entirely clear whether American, German or both) that he characterized as "immoderate [*einer die Mitte verloren habenden Jugend*]," manifested for instance in its participation in the reproaches (triggered in the US at least by the "Vietnam trauma") "from undiscerning [*uneinsichtiger*] side" directed at the *Wissenschaft*, which had allegedly "collaborated [*zusammengewirkt*]" with the arms industry ("Whoever is familiar with the feelings of men like Einstein, Fermi, Frank and Oppenheimer can always only shake one's head at such global misrepresentations [*Unterstellungen*]") (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 27 July 1972, ACDP K080/1).

<sup>49</sup> On Birrenbach's promotion of German-British youth exchange, including both of a public and private nature, see the AKI Draft *Antrag* of the *Fraktionen* on this theme of 6 May 1969, signed by Birrenbach among others, ACDP K103/2.

<sup>50</sup> Born in 1930, Kohl had become party chairman of the CDU the previous year (1973). To help groom Kohl for his visit, Birrenbach drew up a memo dealing with German/European-American "problems." He saw to it that Americans like Robert Murphy, George Ball, Peter Peterson, William Bundy and Zbigniew Brzezinski were invited to attend Kohl's luncheon at the West German consulate-general in New York and also encouraged them to attend. Finally, Birrenbach suggested Kohl invite the leadership of the American Council on Germany, including the new president, Dean Richard Hunt (Harvard); the vice president, John

However, as with so much else, the concern of the German Atlanticists with respect to generational change found its manifestation not only in the thoughts and actions of Birrenbach and other individuals but increasingly in the characteristics and activities of their institutions as well. By the early 1970s, Atlanticist organizations like the *Atlantik-Brücke*, the Atlantic Institute and the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle were engaging in efforts to encourage a more youthful membership and participation.<sup>51</sup> At the insistence of the Ford Foundation, the German-American Conferences began in 1969 to place a greater emphasis on recruiting younger delegations.<sup>52</sup> Such efforts at rejuvenation also had implications for the leadership of these organizations, contributing largely for example to Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen's resignation in 1971 as chairman of the *Atlantik-Brücke*. In line with its general purposes, the grants of the *Thyssen Stiftung* often supported Atlanticist projects carried out by young German and foreign *Wissenschaftlern*.<sup>53</sup> In some instances, existing Atlanticist organizations

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Diebold; and the "very seriously ill" executive vice president, Chris Emmet. On all this, see for example KB to Kohl, 1 February 1974, ACDP K184/1. Kohl also gave a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations during this visit. Already at a much earlier time, in 1962, Birrenbach had likewise spoken several times with Walter Scheel (FDP) about a potential trip to the United States. On other occasions, Birrenbach was similarly able to help Germans he deemed worthy gain access to prominent Americans in the United States. Thus, in 1969, Birrenbach could recommend and introduce Dr. Rolf Pauls, the new West German ambassador in Washington DC, to his contacts such as John McCloy and Henry Kissinger (KB to McCloy, 16 January 1969, ACDP K210/1 and KB to Kissinger, 16 January 1969, ACDP K146/3).

<sup>51</sup> Such efforts began around 1970 in the Atlantic Institute and were fully underway by 1971 in the *Atlantik-Brücke*. As we shall see, the striving for a younger membership represented part of the attempt to revitalize the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle in the early 1970s.

<sup>52</sup> For instance, on the Ford Foundation's desire for "young blood," see Chris Emmet to Walter Stahl, 14 July 1969, ACDP K138/2.

<sup>53</sup> On the growing possibilities and urgent need, indeed the "genuine socio-political obligation [*gesellschaftspolitische Verpflichtung*]," for the *Thyssen Stiftung* (and other German *Stiftungen*), "in the midst of the crisis of the German universities," to make a significant contribution by directing its means toward gaps that had appeared in the financing of research as a result of "the *kritischen* development of our days," see Birrenbach's speech at the meeting of the FTS on 17 October 1970, ACDP K065/2. For similar ideas, see Birrenbach's foreword, dated 17 September 1970, for the FTS 10-year anniversary volume, ACDP K065/2 and Birrenbach's Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, Düsseldorf, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2. On the FTS funding a study (now approaching its conclusion) about the "talent and educational reserves [*Begabungs- und Bildungsreserven*]" in the Federal Republic and financing the *Dokumentation* of

responded by developing related institutions. Thus, in 1967, the *Vorstände* of the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft* and of its *Landesgruppe Berlin* established the *Deutsch-Britischen Jugendaustausch e.V.* especially to stage “Young Königswinter Conferences” and other youth meetings in West Berlin.<sup>54</sup> In 1973, the *Atlantik-Brücke e.V.* and the American Council on Germany Inc. began jointly sponsoring and staging German-American Young Leaders Conferences, which took place every other year alternately in the Federal Republic and the United States.<sup>55</sup> Already in Spring 1966, the AI had held *its*

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the *Westdeutschen Rektorenkonferenz* about the *Hochschulrecht* and the *Studienreform* (characterized as “zeitnah”), see again Birrenbach’s Text for the *ATH-Werkszeitung*, 1 December 1970, ACDP K065/2.

<sup>54</sup> Patterned on the Königswinter Conferences themselves, the Young Königswinter Conferences, held at least at times in the Robert-Tillmanns-Haus, brought together a total of about 50-80 “future leaders” in public life for open exchanges about relevant current issues. Usually between 18-30 years old, the participants were for the most part selected at the proposal of KWC participants and DEG-*Beirat* members. In general, the DEG considered the Young Königswinter Conferences a success, with participants highly interested and engaged in lively talks. The post-1967 Young Königswinter Conferences built on the annual *Deutsch-Englischen Jugendgespräche* initiated already in 1962 and staged in West Berlin by the DEG’s *Landesgruppe Berlin* (these earlier gatherings apparently involving only British and Berlin youths). Also beginning in 1967, a Young Königswinter Conference was carried out in London by the Educational Interchange Council (London) with the means provided by the British Foreign Office for the support of the British-German youth exchange. At least in 1967, this London-based conference comprised about twenty British and thirty West German participants, among them ten Berliners, who had all either taken part in the Berlin youth conferences or been recommended by participants in the big Königswinter Conferences. Of course, the hosts compiled a program also giving the German visitors good insight into British political life.

<sup>55</sup> For the idea of a bilateral German-American Youth Conference being originally conceived by ACG vice president John Diebold, who proposed it to a meeting of the ACG Board on 5 May 1972, see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. The first such conference occurred, at the suggestion of the *Atlantik-Brücke*, at *Haus Rissen* in Hamburg from 27-30 June 1973 (Wednesday-Saturday). The second was held, at the proposal of the ACG, at Wingspread in Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975. The third was staged at the *Schloßhotel Gehrhus* in West Berlin-Grünwald on 14-18 August 1977 (Sunday-Thursday).

These German-American Young Leaders Conferences usually brought together about 15-25 “future leaders” each from both countries between the ages of 20-35 (raised from an initial 30 to secure a better circle of participants), encompassing men and women studying, training or already professionally active in the fields of politics, government, *Wirtschaft*, law, trade unions, the military, *Wissenschaft* and media. The AB and ACG each sought delegations with a broad and balanced diversity of backgrounds and interests (e.g. fields of endeavor, political attitudes, age, gender, race, geographic origin). At first glance, the German delegations appear to have represented a wide range of party and political affiliations and sympathies (CDU/CSU; SPD, among them center-left *Reformsozialisten* from Berlin’s Otto Suhr Institute; FDP; independent). However, for Richard Hunt’s complaints about the absence of Jusos at the first conference, see again his Report of 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. Likewise, for some American participants at the sixth conference (August 1982) criticizing the lack of representatives of the Greens and the Left, while the young *Gewerkschafter* and the SPD MdBs spoke so little English that their arguments carried little weight even when they did engage in the discussion, see the Lindemann Report on a USA trip of August 1982, dated 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. With respect to race, efforts were made to attract minority groups, especially some American blacks, though no blacks were present at the second

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conference. Women were a distinct minority in the German and American delegations (20% for the Germans at the first two conferences, just slightly more numerous among the Americans). The American delegations included a New York State assemblyman (Charles E. Schumer), a West Point cadet, an employee of the RAND Corporation, an analyst at FPRI, the current chief speechwriter of President Carter and the current planning chief in the Treasury Department. Though new delegates appear to have been a large majority in each case, efforts were made by both sides to ensure a certain continuity of participation by also including a fraction of delegates who had already taken part in previous such conferences.

The German-American Young Leaders Conferences were in many ways modelled on other Atlanticist functions, most obviously their “parent” German-American Conferences (e.g. with regard to format). They, too, aimed to enable open discussion and debate; to facilitate a real exchange of information and opinions; to deepen the interest in, feeling for and understanding of the bilateral and broader trans-Atlantic relations; to identify differences and common interests; to promote mutual sympathy for one another’s countries; and to establish firm, lasting personal contacts and friendships. The themes addressed at the youth conferences were also similar in many respects to those dealt with at the traditional German-American Conferences, involving the most important issues and problems currently on the international agenda, especially those of relevance to German/European-American relations, with several additional topics of special interest to the young generation. However, beyond all this, the youth conferences functioned as well to enable the AB and ACG to identify particularly good delegates; to inform them about the work of these institutions; and thus, hopefully, to attract younger members; to gradually build up over the years on both sides of the Atlantic a reservoir of future policy-makers and opinion-shapers that would remain connected to the AB and the ACG as well as to one another; and, so, to contribute to the development of a cohesive trans-Atlantic network among the up-and-coming generation. Along these lines, especially qualified German participants in the German-American Youth Conferences were then invited to the main German-American Conferences. For the AB-*Vorstand* deciding at its meeting of 22 September 1982 to co-opt the best German participants in the August 1982 Young Leaders Conference, see the Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* meeting in Bonn on 22 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.

The officers of the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the American Council on Germany also sought to ensure that the participants themselves, especially via Steering Committees consisting of several delegates from each side, enjoyed some influence in organizing and running the German-American Youth Conferences (e.g. format, agenda, themes, procedures, delegate selection). At the third such conference, National Socialism was one of the topics discussed, spontaneously suggested by especially the German participants from Berlin and prompted by the echo of Joachim Fest’s film *Hitler-Eine Karriere* (1977) and numerous recent books on Hitler. The views and preferences of the delegates were also solicited before and after the conferences. For Hunt characterizing this as “group democracy” or “genuinely participatory democracy,” see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. However, whatever such consultation existed, all major decisions (including their own side’s delegate selection) appear to have been essentially made or strictly circumscribed by the sponsoring organizations, particularly their officers, which were assisted in identifying suitable conferees by nominations emerging from, sometimes narrower circles of, their own members as well as friendly personalities, contacts and institutions, for the AB including bodies in the Federal Republic and the United States like the DAAD and the German American Chambers of Commerce.

Outside what was considered the relaxed and warm atmosphere of the formal gathering, these German-American Young Leaders Conferences featured the extracurricular activities, arranged by the staggers, typical of an Atlanticist function. In part, these offered participants the chance to personally acquaint themselves with other delegates but also promoted among the visitors an understanding of life in the host country. Aside from simple pauses, these included meals (also comprising coffee receptions and dinner parties), interaction in the shared accommodations (e.g. the very good hotel “Holiday Inn” in Racine), and tours and excursions in the host city that highlighted unique attractions (e.g. restaurants). At the first conference, Walter Stahl and Eric Warburg hosted parties for the delegates in their private homes. In the US, German delegates stayed as guests of American families, with seven German delegates to the second conference, thanks to arrangements made by the Johnson Foundation, spending the following Labor Day weekend with families in Racine (usually of leading *Angestellten* of the Johnson Corporation). For the Germans familiarizing the American delegates with the problem of Berlin and the situation of divided Germany, including through a tour of West Berlin and the Wall, as well as a trip to the Axel Springer

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Verlag that enabled a view from the Axel Springer Haus beyond the *Todesstreifen* into East Berlin, see the Summary AB Report on the Third German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, ACDP K134/2.

The German-American Youth Conferences also received diverse support from a number of prominent outside personalities and organizations, whether functioning as hosts, guest speakers or simply meeting and talking with the participants about a wide range of issues. These included Peter Schulz (Lord Mayor of Hamburg), who gave a reception at the *Rathaus*; John Brogan III (the American consul general in Hamburg), who held an evening reception in the courtyard of the *Amerika-Haus* to which a number of Americans living in Hamburg as well as German friends of the *Atlantik-Brücke* were invited; Dr. Dietrich Kebschull (*Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung*, Hamburg), who spoke to the plenary session on “Partners or Rivals: The Economic Relations between the United States and the European Community”; Dr. Gerhard Merzyn (*Haus Rissen*), who spoke to the plenary session on “US-European Relations at the Crossroads,” gave a coffee reception at his residence and hosted a dinner party in his private home for the delegates; Hans-Viktor Schierwater (*Haus Rissen*), who served as an observer from the *Atlantik-Brücke* at the second conference; Horst Elfe (President of the *Berlin Industrie- und Handelskammer*), who gave a dinner in the Hotel Gehrhus and spoke on the situation of the Berlin *Wirtschaft*; Dr. Peter Pechel (Editor-in-Chief of the *Sender Freies Berlin*), who explained the German radio and TV system; the Axel Springer Verlag, which invited the participants to a “Berliner Buffet” at which Ernst Cramer (in place of Springer himself) spoke briefly and a leading *Morgenpost* editor was available for discussion; the Berlin Senate which invited the participants on a steamship outing with a cold buffet as well as to a dinner; *Gesandter* Scott George (head of the US Mission in Berlin), who explained the political problems the situation of Berlin posed to the US; and Dietrich Stobbe (*Regierender Bürgermeister* of Berlin), who engaged in an extensive discussion.

Expenses for the German-American Youth Conferences included airfares, housing, meals and meeting rooms. The sponsoring AB and ACG split the costs for at least the first three conferences, along with the Johnson Foundation for the second thanks to the efforts of the ACG and especially the recommendation of Prof. Marshall Shulman who was closely involved with the foundation. The Johnson Foundation was linked to the Johnson Wax Corporation and was located, along with its conference center, at Wingspread. Total expenses for the first conference amounted to about \$13,000. In part to avoid high trans-Atlantic flight costs (also language considerations and an understanding of mentalities), both the AB and the ACG sought to identify some suitable delegates already staying temporarily for study, training or professional purposes in the United States or Europe (depending on the conference location), with almost half the German participants recruited for the second conference already currently in the US, thanks to assistance provided by the DAAD, the *Carl Duisberg-Gesellschaft für Nachwuchsförderung* (which sustained a management trainee program in the US) and the German American Chambers of Commerce in New York and Chicago (AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA), 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1).

The German-American Young Leaders Conferences also reflected the Atlanticists’ interest in public relations. On the ACG efforts to select some delegates active in publishing, see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. For a half-hour radio interview with two German participants entitled “The New Generation of Germans” (part of a series “Conversations from Wingspread”), with the Johnson Foundation sending the tape recording to the *Atlantik-Brücke*, see the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1. For coverage (and positive judgments) in press and broadcasting [“*Rundfunk*”], including in *Der Welt* (“Blitzgescheites Symposium über politische Gegenwartsfragen,” 16 August 1977) and *Dem Abend* (“Hochkarätige ‘Brücke,’” 18 August 1977), see the Summary AB Report on the 3<sup>rd</sup> German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, ACDP K134/2.

Internal assessments of the German-American Youth Conferences were generally positive. Thus, on the first three, see for instance the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1; the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1; and the Summary AB Report on the 3<sup>rd</sup> German-American Youth Conference, Rüdiger Löwe, ACDP K134/2. For the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference as “extremely concentrated” and “very fruitful [*ergiebig*]” and being characterized as “especially rewarding and gratifying” by all the delegates and observers, see the AB Activity Report drawn up for the AB MV on 19 February 1976, ACDP K132/1. On the “very successful” staging of the Young Leaders Conference in 1977, see the Protocol of the AB MV of 9 March 1978 in Bonn, ACDP K134/2. Elsewhere, it was believed that both German and American conferees considered the 3<sup>rd</sup> Young Leaders Conference an “overwhelming success.” Discordant tones did

first Young Leaders Conference in Villa Serbelloni (Bellagio) and, henceforth, staged such gatherings two or more times a year in diverse locations.<sup>56</sup> Of course, Birrenbach the gatekeeper himself took part in the process of nominating and screening the young candidates for such activities.<sup>57</sup> In other cases, it was believed that the most effective route towards rejuvenation and overcoming the generation gap was instead to found entirely new institutions, such as Mid-Atlantic Clubs (see later in this chapter) or the

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exist. On it becoming “alarmingly [*erschreckend*] clear” how few German participants in past Young Leaders Conferences had actually risen to become young leaders of the present (though the ACG had been more successful in this respect), see the Lindemann Report on a USA trip of August 1982, dated 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. As of September 1982, the ACG had raised the question whether the Young Leaders Conferences could really make a constructive contribution to the improvement of German-American relations that would justify the hefty work and costs entailed (Lindemann Report on USA trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1). However, on the realistic expectation that young Germans “seriously interested” in international politics or a career in the *Wirtschaft* had a “familiarity” with the American mentality, including quite a few not only from having stayed in the United States but also often from having taken part in such German-American Youth Conferences, see the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1. For the expressed belief of the AB-Vorstand, with Birrenbach at least present, that the German-American Youth Conferences were “at least as important” as the large German-American Conferences, see the Protocol of the AB-Vorstand Meeting on 7 November 1975 in Bonn, ACDP K132/1. On the *Atlantik-Brücke* desire to turn the Young Leaders Conferences into annual functions being thwarted by the lack of necessary financial means, see the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1.

<sup>56</sup> Participants in the AI Young Leaders Conferences were a “carefully selected group” of around 25-30 politicians, journalists, businessmen, scholars and trade unionists under 40 years of age (generally late 20s and 30s) from throughout the Atlantic Community. These meetings of the AI Young Leaders Program aimed at promoting genuine debate and new ideas on key issues often closely linked with specific AI study projects. On a part of the Ford Foundation’s DM 2 million grant to the Atlantic Institute in 1965 being intended for that organization’s series of Young Leaders Conferences (“meetings of young men and women who will achieve in the coming years leadership positions within the Atlantic world”), see Walter Stahl’s circular letter to *Atlantica* members of 25 June 1965, ACDP K108/2. For the Gulbenkian Foundation contributing \$10,000 to the AI in 1969 for the Young Leaders, see Annex III, 1962-1977, Contributions from European Foundations, ACDP K058. For the Rockefeller Brothers Fund financing about half the cost of the AI Young Leaders Conferences through a \$10,000 annual grant, see the write-up on the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, undated but apparently 1973, ACDP K104/2. For the invitees to these conferences taking part “very actively” in the discussions, see again this AIIA write-up, ACDP K104/2.

<sup>57</sup> On Birrenbach recommending Löwe for the upcoming AB German-American Young Leaders Conference, see KB to Rüdiger Löwe, 3 March 1980, ACDP K034/2. On Birrenbach providing his opinion on a list of proposed German participants for the AI Young Leaders Conferences, see KB to Dr. Jan G. Reifenberg, FAZ, 6 May 1966, ACDP K017/2. For members of the AI Policy Committee, including Birrenbach, being asked to submit names of candidates from their respective countries for the AI Young Leaders Conferences, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the Policy Committee at the Atlantic Institute, Paris, on 13 March 1966, ACDP K107/2. For AI governors, upon request, proposing names from their particular countries for the AI Young Leaders Conferences, see the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board at the Atlantic Institute on 18 June 1966, ACDP K107/2.

European-North American Committee (EURNAC), both of which aspired to bring promising younger people into the Atlanticist network.<sup>58</sup>

Aside from the relative economic downturn and generational change, the other salient structural trend in trans-Atlantic relations that troubled Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists during this period was the shift in power, especially political power, in the United States away from the Northeast of the country and towards the west and south. Indeed, the discovery of this crucial, new political and demographic process and a hint at what it might bode for the future comprised Birrenbach's key experience, rather

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<sup>58</sup> The American James Huntley was among those Atlanticists particularly concerned with the issue of generational change and a strong advocate of creating new institutions and channels of communication, rather than solely trying to work through, but also hopefully to stimulate a rejuvenation among, what he considered often sclerotic, age-encrusted older structures (Personal Note for KB from Huntley, 13 February 1971, ACDP K130/1). For an outlook that may likewise have implicitly promoted the construction of such new organizations, see the pessimistic assessment of the "inadequate" "grassroots" effects of existing Atlanticist organizations contained in the remarks of the Czech-British Prof. Otto Pick (and of some others) in the Summary of Discussions, Meeting of Atlantic Organizations, 16-20 March 1973, ACDP K068/1. While both Huntley and Pick (Director of the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, London) were referring to Atlanticist organizations throughout the Western world, rather than solely the more German-oriented institutions in which Birrenbach was involved, their concerns are still instructive in this context. The Paris-based EURNAC, which Huntley served as an informal advisor, consisted of a group of about 100 young "leading" men and women from Western Europe, the United States and Canada around the average age of thirty, with the Frenchman Jacques Pomonti (an engineering consultant and the former secretary of the Club Jean Moulin in Paris) as chairman, the American James Fowler as secretary, and Horst Jobkes and Peter Corterier among Fowler's German collaborators. EURNAC engaged in meetings (apparently the first with sixty-five attendees in March 1970 in Grottaferrata, Italy), international task forces, studies, reports, policy proposals and civic action with respect to key trans-Atlantic problems, including social, economic and political (also foreign policy) issues. Though Birrenbach never played a major role in the organization, Huntley did hope that he (and Stahl) would look into whether the *Atlantica* could proffer future support to EURNAC and asked Birrenbach to provide advice to Fowler on obtaining support for EURNAC elsewhere in the Federal Republic (Huntley to KB, 7 May 1971, ACDP K066/2 and Huntley to KB, 17 February 1971, ACDP K066/2).

In general, these and other youth institutions offered the Atlanticists and their organizations the potential for fruitful interaction with controlled groups of active young elites, enabling them to disseminate substantive studies and reports to youth constituencies as well as to become better informed on the needs, views, desires and frequently fresh insights of younger people. Thus, among the topics discussed at the first German-American Youth Conference were Cultural and Political Radicalism (especially in the universities) and Academic Reform in Germany and the United States. Of course, the efforts of the German Atlanticists with respect to the generational question took place within a larger youth context. This broader environment included flows, outside the framework of the Atlanticist institutions, amounting annually to millions of young people for diverse reasons between the Federal Republic and the Anglo-Saxon nations, where the Atlanticists hoped they garnered experiences encouraging warm feelings towards their destination countries. Other factors comprised, for instance, the government's *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, whose activities encompassed the distribution of relevant books and other materials to schools and teachers. Generational change and the passage of time may also have contributed to reducing negative feelings among the young towards one another's countries due to dark history (e.g. world wars).

than any individual speeches or high-level consultations, during his early Fall 1962 lecture tour that took him for the first time to the midwestern and western United States. Especially in California, he had sensed a “conservative” trend:

My stay on the West Coast, as interesting as it was, virtually stood under the depressing impression of the extraordinary spread of this [conservative] element. The prominent people virtually apologized to me for the existence of Kennedy and his administration. They saw in him a “New Dealer” of the worst kind, a friend of the communists and who knows what else [*was weiß ich noch*]. I have also met representatives of this type in Stanford, which really amazed me. That is also America, and the East Coast is no longer alone. Precisely the latter point impressed itself upon me profoundly on my trip of 1962 from coast to coast.<sup>59</sup>

Over the years, this realization would be reflected in Birrenbach’s activities. For instance, his future endeavors in the realm of public relations would take into account the imperative of reaching a larger geographic section of the United States, beyond “the East Coast.”<sup>60</sup> Birrenbach took the opportunity as well to speak occasionally before groups of Americans visiting the Federal Republic from the West Coast.<sup>61</sup> On the level of elites, Birrenbach also attempted to expand his contacts with personalities from the West Coast,

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<sup>59</sup> KB to Hajo Holborn, 30 July 1964, ACDP K098/1. In addition to the San Francisco Committee on Foreign Relations and its sister institution the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, the principal stops on Birrenbach’s lecture tour to the United States in Fall 1962 were several elite colleges and universities, including Stanford, Northwestern, Georgetown, Penn, Haverford, Harvard and Yale, where he spoke on topics like “Germany and the Atlantic Community.” Conducted by plane and train, this tour was only made possible through essential organizational assistance from his American contacts, among them those based at these “institutions of higher learning.”

<sup>60</sup> The publicity efforts in 1964 surrounding the upcoming Kennedy Round of trade talks (see Chapter 7) demonstrated the newfound recognition by Birrenbach and other Atlanticist-minded Germans of the shifts in political gravity within the United States. In insisting that Erhard conduct an interview with the American weekly *US News & World Report*, Birrenbach was motivated not only by the fact that this magazine boasted a high circulation and was considered influential among those circles impacting on the pertinent Senate hearings, but also by the fact that, in contrast to even the *New York Times* and other undeniably important publications, it reached an audience far beyond the East Coast (KB to Chancellor Ludwig Erhard, cc Seibt, Hohmann, Dr. Wagner, Dichgans, Borchardt, 24 February 1964, ACDP K187/1).

<sup>61</sup> For instance, at the encouragement of Weldon Gibson (Executive Vice President, Stanford Research Institute) and Edmund Kellogg (US General Consul, Düsseldorf), Birrenbach spoke in July 1963 and July 1965 at luncheons in the Düsseldorf *Industrie Club* to American graduate business students (and some deans and financial editors of major newspapers) from West Coast schools (including Stanford) who were on study trips in Europe as part of “Journey for Perspective” seminars (William J. Bird, President, Journey for Perspective Foundation, San Francisco (CA), to KB, 4 March 1966, ACDP K090/1; Kellogg to KB, 6 July 1965, ACDP K187/1; Kellogg to KB, 14 March 1963, ACDP K157/1; and Gibson to KB, 13 March 1963, ACDP K157/1). Birrenbach had seen Gibson earlier at Stanford in Fall 1962 on his lecture tour.



not least through organizations in which they enjoyed a large representation, such as the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars founded in 1968.<sup>62</sup> Despite some sporadic contacts along such lines, for instance at Stanford, these particular efforts came to little.<sup>63</sup> Birrenbach's American contacts (and travels) remained concentrated on the East Coast, more specifically in the Northeast, the customary stomping grounds of the American Atlanticists, and for Birrenbach the pejorative "West Coast" would forever be synonymous with those personalities lacking a sufficient knowledge of Europe and thus contributing significantly to difficulties in European-American relations.<sup>64</sup>

As with respect to generational change, the efforts of the German Atlanticists to establish closer contact to and to impact on regions of the United States beyond the Northeast exhibited themselves institutionally in a variety of ways, particularly in the endeavors of the *Atlantik-Brücke* during the 1970s and 80s. One such manifestation was the marked desire to stage Atlanticist functions in regions well removed from the East Coast. This was perhaps most evident in the locating of those German-American Young Leaders Conferences staged in the United States in places like Racine (1975), Dallas

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<sup>62</sup> KB to Helmut Kohl, 10 November 1981, ACDP K132/2.

<sup>63</sup> For examples of Birrenbach's intensified contacts with advisors of Republican presidential nominee Sen. Barry Goldwater (Arizona), see KB to Karl Brandt, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 4 August 1964, ACDP K013/1; KB to Prof. Dr. Edward Teller, University of California, 11 August 1964, ACDP K187/1; and KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 6 August 1964, ACDP K015.

<sup>64</sup> In November 1981, Birrenbach wrote Helmut Kohl: "As you know, a great part of the difficulties which have developed today in the American-European relationship come from personalities of the West Coast who do not sufficiently grasp [*übersehen*] the European problems" (KB to Kohl, 10 November 1981, ACDP K132/2). Whatever anti-German sentiments may have existed on the East Coast among certain business leaders, press outlets and minority groups (i.e. blacks), the Northeastern Establishment, including its political and intellectual elite, had traditionally exhibited a pronounced specialization in and experience with European affairs and history, as reflected in the postwar focus of American foreign policy on US-European relations. The steady, long-term weakening and even displacement of this leadership by a more heterogeneous one encompassing also the southern and western regions of the US led to a corresponding relative increase in attention to and interest in relations with the Hispanic world and the Pacific sphere.

(1978) and San Francisco (1982).<sup>65</sup> Beginning in May 1982, the AB, in conjunction with the *Auswärtigen Amt* and the German Information Center (New York City) and with funding from the *Körper-Stiftung* (Hamburg), helped carry out an extensive program of *Vortragsreisen* of up to three weeks duration of prominent Germans to the United States, with an emphasis on targeting the most important areas beyond the Northeast and East Coast.<sup>66</sup> Of course, such geographically ambitious undertakings presented logistical and

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<sup>65</sup> As already noted, the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference occurred from 26-29 August 1975 at Wingspread, the Johnson Foundation conference center in Racine near Milwaukee (WI). The 4<sup>th</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference was staged in Dallas (TX) from 15-18 August 1978 so as to avoid falling in the same year (1979) as the larger, biennial German-American Conference. The 6<sup>th</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference was held from 3-7 August 1982 on the Lone Mountain Campus of the University of San Francisco. This August 1982 gathering featured numerous guest speakers, notably including some from the Reagan administration. Meanwhile, German participants were invited to private homes and country clubs, thus affording them a taste of what was deemed the “American way of life” and the opportunity to meet a number of influential Americans of the West Coast (Walter Stahl to Members of the *Atlantik-Brücke*, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1 and the Beate Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1). Lindemann related here that this German Young Leaders delegation had also enjoyed two “glorious” vacation days [*Ferientage*] together in California.

As with earlier German-American Young Leaders Conferences, assessments of these later youth meetings appear to have been quite favorable. On the “highly qualified” German delegation to be dispatched by the *Atlantik-Brücke* to the 4<sup>th</sup> such conference, see Walter Stahl, AB, Hamburg, to the AB Members (“Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren!”), 15 June 1978, ACDP K134/2. On the “very successful,” “open,” “cooperative,” and “imaginative” 6<sup>th</sup> conference, see Lindemann’s Report of 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. Here, Lindemann pointed to the improved quality of the participants and discussions at the conference, offering a positive judgment of the German and American delegations, especially a German group whose composition was “more well rounded [*vielseitiger*] and interesting” than that of its American counterpart. On the “particularly good” German-American Young Leaders Conference of August 1982, “especially regarding the quality of the German delegation,” see the Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* Meeting in Bonn on 22 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. On the “highly qualified” US and German delegations to the 6<sup>th</sup> conference, see Stahl to the Members of the AB, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1. For the “successful” and “lively” 6<sup>th</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference, see the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1. On the Young Leaders Conference in August 1982 as “very gratifying [*erfreulich*],” see the Protocol of the AB Member Assembly on 6 June 1983 in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, ACDP K144/1. For Peter Weitz (German Marshall Fund, see later in this chapter) displaying “a positive attitude” towards the 6<sup>th</sup> conference and towards the German-American Young Leaders Conferences in general, see again Lindemann’s Report of 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1.

Incidentally, after the 1<sup>st</sup> German-American Youth Conference was held at *Haus Rissen (Institut für Politik und Wirtschaft)* in Hamburg from 27-30 June 1973 and the 3<sup>rd</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference was carried out in West Berlin from 14-17 August 1977, the 5<sup>th</sup> such meeting was then staged at the *Akademie für Politische Bildung* in Tutzing (Bavaria) in August 1980 and the 7<sup>th</sup> would be held once more at *Haus Rissen* in Hamburg in 1984 (AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1). Such conferences enjoyed the support of the *Leitungen* of the hosting institute or academy.

<sup>66</sup> At the suggestion of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the *Körper-Stiftung* (Kurt Körper) had made DM 200,000 available in Spring 1982 since the *Auswärtige Amt*, which had initiated and maintained overall control of the program, lacked sufficient funds due to cost-cutting measures. Speakers included politicians, scholars, journalists and possibly *Wirtschaftler*, for instance Peter Corterier (formerly of the AA, now of

financial challenges for the *Atlantik-Brücke* and other Atlanticist institutions.<sup>67</sup>

Nevertheless, there existed a further desire among German Atlanticists to ensure that Americans from regions outside the northeastern United States took part in specific Atlanticist activities. Thus, during the early 1980s, the *Atlantik-Brücke* helped organize and stage two-week information trips to the Federal Republic, the first in June-July 1983, for annually up to fifteen promising, younger American international affairs journalists of key newspapers and radio and TV stations, especially those from outside the major media outlets of the American Northeast.<sup>68</sup> In each of these undertakings, the German

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the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* in Washington DC); Günter Diehl (President of the DGAP); and Dr. Christoph Bertram (*Die Zeit*). Such trips occurred during the spring and fall, with for instance seven being organized in Fall 1982, five in Spring 1983 and six or seven planned for Fall 1983. In choosing locations, the desire was to cover as much geographic area as possible. While venues also encompassed larger metropolises like Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta and Miami, particular value was assigned to smaller cities and universities like Greensboro (NC), Birmingham (AL), Columbia (MO), Grand Rapids (MI), and Fargo (ND), sites that generally featured a much more appreciative [*“dankbareres”*] audience, were otherwise mostly ignored by prominent Germans, and therefore held out the promise of greater effect. Settings spanned a wide gamut from gatherings of the World Affairs Council in San Francisco and the Gulf Coast Council on Foreign Affairs in Houston, through diverse seminars and university functions, all the way to unusual events like a “Heritage Ball” in Ann Arbor (MI) on the occasion of a “tricentennial” celebration, with the number of listeners varying from more than a hundred to as few as approximately a dozen. Particular stress was placed on addressing opinion-shaping groups possessed of a “multiplier effect” (Stahl to AB Members, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1). Therefore, speakers also met with media in the respective locations for interviews and the like. As of 1983, the resonance surrounding this program led State Secretary Berndt von Staden (the AA’s Coordinator for German-American Relations) to encourage Körber to continue its financing from 1984 on. However, while the participation of the *Atlantik-Brücke* in this project went on at least through 1983, it was apparently not expected in 1984 (Oskar Bezold, “Report 1983” on the *Vortragsprogramm* USA for the AA/Körber-Stiftung, ACDP K144/1; Stahl to AB Members, 30 September 1982, ACDP K144/1; and the Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* meeting in Bonn on 22 September 1982, ACDP K144/1). Bezold, a journalist who had previously worked in an expert capacity with the GIC in New York, assisted in the preparation, especially in the United States, of these trips.

<sup>67</sup> For example, in the case of the just discussed *Vortragsreisen*, the web of West German diplomatic representations, including general consulates and honorary consuls, proved essential for tackling diverse tasks, whether securing the talk functions with the various host entities in question, setting up interviews with newspapers and radio and television stations or organizing social events, in the enormous expanses of the United States (Oskar Bezold, “Report 1983” on the *Vortragsprogramm* USA, ACDP K144/1). On the ACG proposal of Dallas as the site for the next big German-American Conference being judged too expensive and impractical by the AB-*Vorstand*, as was any site other than New York and Washington DC, see the Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* meeting on 12 December 1983, ACDP K144/1.

<sup>68</sup> This effort to encourage more intensive as well as more accurate reporting about German affairs was directed at American journalists, “the coming Walter Lippmanns and Walter Cronkites,” in the age group 30-45, the so-called Successor Generation. Nominations were accepted from a number of American sources, among them journalism schools and organizations as well as prominent individuals in the journalistic field. The engagement of a private entity like the *Brücke* was especially valuable in this

Atlanticists and, more particularly, their institutions sought to enlighten and influence personalities hailing from geographic areas of the United States that seemed to know and care less about the Federal Republic than those Americans rooted in the Northeast and whose information about and perceptions of West Germany were considered seriously distorted, as well as to enhance their own knowledge of these unfamiliar regions.<sup>69</sup>

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endeavor since many American editors and publishers in principle would not accept invitations from and trips financed by foreign governments. The *Brücke* cooperated in this undertaking with the *Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft* (Cologne/New York, a private organization with a much-esteemed reputation in sponsoring exchange programs), the BPA (which had been successfully carrying out, here essentially complementary, Germany visits for American journalists), and Inter Nationes. These trips featured especially time in the Bonn-Cologne-Ruhr area, along with Heidelberg-Frankfurt-Mannheim, Munich, of course Berlin (West and East) and Hamburg. On their travels, the Americans met with high-ranking politicians, members of the business and banking community, representatives of the mass media, US and German military officers and the like, such personal contacts facilitating their gathering of information and forming of impressions. *Atlantik-Brücke* members in the various German cities in question also further participated in this project, for instance as contact persons and in general in the “*Betreuung*” of the visiting journalists. On all this, see the Protocol of the AB Member Assembly on 6 May 1982 in Bonn, ACDP K144/1; the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1; the AB Application for a Grant, 21 March 1983, ACDP K144/1; and the AB Activity Report, 16 May 1983, ACDP K144/1. For a decidedly positive initial assessment, see Peter Pechel to Dr. Karl Klasen, *Bundesbank-Präsident i.R.*, Deutsche Bank AG, Hamburg, 8 July 1983, ACDP K144/1.<sup>69</sup> See, for instance, the Protocol of the *Atlantik-Brücke* Member Assembly on 6 May 1982 in Bonn, ACDP K144/1 and the AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1. On ACG efforts to select American participants for the German-American Youth Conferences who contributed to a broad geographical representation and that came from universities other than Harvard, Princeton and Yale, see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. However, for the American delegation to the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference exhibiting an *Übergewicht* of Harvard graduates (eight), see the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1. For the already mentioned half-hour radio interview with two German participants in the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference entitled “The New Generation of Germans” (part of a series “Conversations from Wingspread”) being afterwards broadcast in the course of September 1975 by over 85 stations in the entire United States, see again the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.

As of 1982, the *Atlantik-Brücke* was contemplating, conditional on the securing of the necessary means (possibly including public funds), the creation of some discrete German-American institutional framework, for instance workshops or seminars comprising at most ten invitees on each side, to properly address the “Successor Generation,” the “*Kronprinzen-Generation*” standing before the “final hurdles on the path to leadership positions” but simultaneously a “*Zwischengruppe*” that from 35 to about 45 years of age was no longer engaged by the German-American Young Leaders Conferences (though encompassing former Young Leaders) yet still not involved with the big German-American Conferences (AB *Arbeitsplan* 1982/83, ACDP K144/1). Especially relevant here was the proposal that in conducting such Successor Generation projects the AB should have “a free hand” in the changing selection of partner institutions (i.e. not exclusively the ACG). This would enable the AB to cooperate with large, active, private organizations and institutes in all parts of the US (e.g. the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in the Midwest and the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco on the West Coast) and, above all, with those close to the respective administrations in Washington DC, thus facilitating the recruitment of influential Americans as participants and increasing the likelihood that the discussions staged would impact on the *Willensbildung* and decision-making processes in the US on vital questions of German-American relations (Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).

#### D. Constructing New Institutions

Especially the first half of the 1970s saw the appearance of new Atlanticist institutions, intended to strengthen what was perceived to be the fraying trans-Atlantic relationship. However, before we address this phenomenon and Birrenbach's role in it, we should first point out that this period also saw the elimination of certain institutions utilized by the German Atlanticists in pursuit of their aims. Despite the efforts to revitalize it that were carried out from late 1971 onward, the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle was disbanded in 1973.<sup>70</sup> More significant in the overall scheme of things, and less the direct result of Birrenbach's own decisions, was the disbanding of the Monnet Committee in 1975 at the behest of Monnet himself. At least on the face of it, there does not appear to have been a common thread in the separate decisions to close down these two

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For John Loudon, J. Robert Schaezel and John Tuthill soon meeting with prospective AI Participating Members in Minneapolis and Chicago as part of an enhanced effort to raise funds in the US, see Tuthill, AIIA, Director-General, Paris, to Baron von Oppenheim, 9 July 1976, ACDP K058.

Evidence of a wider interest in such geographically expansive approaches includes the November 1982 European-American "Successor Generation" conference in Santa Monica (CA) on the future role of NATO in which thirty Europeans (two from each of the fifteen NATO countries) and ten Americans took part. This conference had been originally proposed by the NATO Information Service (Brussels) and also involved RAND (but apparently not the AB or ACG), with the further financing sources being the US State Department, the *Volkswagenstiftung*, the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* and the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (Lindemann Report on a USA-Trip of August 1982, 27 September 1982, ACDP K144/1).

Furthermore, on Hunt regarding the need for a better geographic representation in the *German* delegations to the German-American Youth Conferences, namely his complaint that the group at the first such meeting lacked participants from South Germany, see the Report of Richard Hunt, President, ACG, 8 August 1973, ACDP K132/1. For the subsequent *Atlantik-Brücke* efforts to select a German group that also displayed as much balance as possible with respect to geographic origin, see the AB Report about the 2<sup>nd</sup> German-American Youth Conference in Wingspread/Racine, Wisconsin (USA) from 26-29 August 1975, by Irmgard Burmeister, ACDP K132/1.

<sup>70</sup> Beginning in late 1971, Birrenbach, along with Hans von der Groeben and Hellmuth Wagner, had undertaken a number of measures to revive and revitalize their circle. These included efforts to make the circle and its discussions more thematically concentrated, deeper and better prepared; to have the circle come to more concrete conclusions to be passed on to the leadership of the party and the *Unionsfraktion*; to better connect the circle with the leadership of the party and *Fraktion*, for instance by occasionally inviting the chairmen to meetings; to improve the group's personnel composition, including through a *Verjüngung* of the membership, especially from the *Fraktion*, and through the inclusion of those political *Beamten* who had been in leading positions in the "*Unionskabinetten*," all the while maintaining the group's professional balance. The new members that were co-opted included Konrad Kraske, the CDU General-Secretary; Franz Heubl, the representative of Bavaria by the *Bund*; Albert Schnez, until recently Inspector General of the Army; and Karl-Heinz Narjes, Economics Minister of Schleswig-Holstein. Despite these efforts, by mid-June 1973, less than two years after it had been initiated, the revitalization attempt had clearly failed.

institutions. Indeed, the Monnet Committee disbanded in part due to Monnet's declining health along with his sense that this particular action committee had become, so to speak, a victim of its own success, the latter as evidenced by the implementation of many of its proposals by the responsible decision-makers, and was therefore of diminishing utility. Most significantly in this regard, the meeting of the heads of government of the nine European Community countries on 10 December 1974 in Paris had created a dramatically new situation, in so far as it established the intergovernmental machinery that had been previously proposed by the Monnet Committee and that would enable the continued building of Europe. Given that the resources of the Monnet Committee were considered to be of no match compared to those at the disposal of the European governments, the effective space of this action committee suddenly seemed to be, thus, greatly reduced.<sup>71</sup>

Meanwhile, the difficulties of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle and the decision to disband, undertaken largely at Birrenbach's advice and impetus with the agreement of the other participants, can be traced to a number of different factors. By November 1972, Birrenbach, never one to welcome *too* diverse or divergent opinions into a group, considered the earlier "cohesion" of the circle to have been undermined to an intolerable extent, especially since he judged several of its members to be partly responsible ("*mitschuldig*") for the "development of recent months" (presumably referring to the

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<sup>71</sup> In particular, the heads of government had agreed that there would be frequent Councils of the heads of state and government, that unanimity would no longer be required on all questions in the Council, and that the European Parliament would hold general elections from 1978 onward. As Monnet put it, "[t]he strivings which the parties and unions united in our committee undertake for almost twenty years, in order to make a contribution to the realization of European unity, must be adapted henceforth to the new conditions" (Jean Monnet to KB, 20 December 1974, ACDP K158/2). The members of the committee, including Birrenbach, agreed at least ostensibly with Monnet's assessment and with the decision to close down the committee but also hoped that the networks constructed in the course of its existence could be maintained. Birrenbach, for one, remained in contact with Monnet after the dissolution of the committee, until the Frenchman's death in 1979.

*Ostpolitik* and probably the just-occurred federal elections).<sup>72</sup> Membership and attendance were in steady decline, particularly with regard to figures currently active in politics but also those from the economic realm. Perhaps most important in explaining this flagging interest was the fact that, with the initial change in and subsequent confirmation of ruling coalition (1969 and 1972, respectively) that saw an SPD-FDP government firmly in power and the *Union* relegated to the status of a long-term opposition party, there now existed little genuine opportunity for such a partisan circle to influence policy, especially a circle that furthermore found itself cut off from its previous governmental sources of information. Of course, politicians and businessmen were overburdened already, the latter even more so in light of the increased number of meetings within their firms due to the economic troubles characteristic of the time.<sup>73</sup> Finally, during the period of revitalization efforts and perhaps motivated by some of the other factors we have already cited, the BDI ceased to finance the group, at least to the same extent as hitherto, leaving it to the members themselves to help cover the costs.<sup>74</sup> All of this contributed to the end of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle.

However, despite these two cases in which Birrenbach was directly involved, the trend during the early 1970s actually appears to have been one of efforts to construct new

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<sup>72</sup> For Birrenbach, cohesion was essential since the group was not intended to be some sort of intellectual circle focused on debating dramatically contrary viewpoints. Therefore, at the “reactivation” meeting of 3 December 1971, Birrenbach opposed an “engagement” with “*Andersdenkenden*” from the three parties, something which, indeed, did not come about. However, the lack of cohesion [which had been utterly “destroyed”] that Birrenbach recognized by November 1972 confronted him with “extraordinarily serious” problems with respect to the circle (KB to Dr. Ernst Schneider, 24 November 1972, ACDP K156/1).

<sup>73</sup> Due to their new offices, figures like Gerhard Stoltenberg (Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein), Karl Carstens (Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*), and Ernst Benda (President of the *Bundesverfassungsgerichts*) found themselves unable to take part in the meetings, yet another major blow to the circle.

<sup>74</sup> Despite the disbanding of the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle, the desirability of such undertakings in principle was not placed in doubt. Birrenbach, Groeben and Wagner (i.e. the initiators of the circle) all recommended that the younger members eventually refound such a circle, albeit with an altered composition especially including younger men who were more active in events.

institutions. As with the earlier waves of institution-building, these were private, non-governmental bodies, based on the premise that governments alone were incapable of surmounting the current crisis in American-European relations, fueled by recent political and economic troubles, and constructing a viable Atlantic Community. At least in general terms, these institutions were of similar types to what had come before, among them action committees, conferences, funding entities, and publications. Not all of these institutions survived, but the efforts undertaken during this period, including by Birrenbach and other German Atlanticists, indicate an unbowed will to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations.

*E. New Financing Instruments: The German Marshall Fund of the United States*

Given the economically grueling environment in which the German Atlanticists functioned during this period, one of the most significant Atlanticist-minded institutions to appear during the early 1970s was undoubtedly the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The establishment of this fund, a West German initiative, was publicly announced by Chancellor Brandt on 5 June 1972 at Harvard University, where twenty-five years earlier Secretary of State George Marshall had introduced the plan bearing his name. Serving as the representative of his party (*Union*), Birrenbach flew to Boston with the Chancellor to take part, along with other German guests, in this special convocation, the fund's trustees and honorary trustees also among those in attendance. Conceived of as a memorial gift to demonstrate the appreciation of the Federal Republic and the German people for the Marshall Plan assistance, the unveiling of the GMF enjoyed a positive reception in the United States.<sup>75</sup> The GMF was a private, philanthropic

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<sup>75</sup> On this "generosity" being "a very constructive step" that garnered "a very good press" and that was "well received generally," see Robert Bowie, Harvard University, Director, Center for International Affairs,



American foundation based in Washington (DC) whose capital of DM 150 million was provided by the West German federal government in fifteen annual installments of DM 10 million each beginning in June 1972. These resources were devoted to supporting a mutual transnational learning process through the creation and maintenance of working relationships leading to a sustained and systematic exchange of practical knowledge, approaches and experiences. Intended to be a perpetual institution and symbol, the GMF not only dispersed funds from its capital and income but also accumulated a sizeable endowment.<sup>76</sup> The GMF was created by the West German government in conjunction with an American Planning Group, the main responsibility for the negotiations in 1971-72 resting with MdB Prof. Dr. Alex Möller and Harvard's Dr. Guido Goldman and the funds approved by unanimous vote in 1972 by all four parties in the *Bundestag*.<sup>77</sup>

Initially, Birrenbach was quite pleased with the founding of the German Marshall Fund. After all, here was an organization acknowledging an increasing international “interdependence” and, in this context, placing its highest priority on the “trans-Atlantic dimension”; promoting an institution-building that facilitated international coordination on multiple levels, not least between the policy-oriented American and West European *Wissenschaft*; advocating private initiatives, public-private cooperation, and a related

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to KB, 8 June 1972, ACDP K160/2. For the reputation of the GMF having “really grown” in the US as of the mid-1980s and the fund having even found “universal recognition [*allgemeine Anerkennung*],” as expressed for example by Berndt von Staden a bit earlier during his time as the AA's Coordinator for German-American Cooperation, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3.

<sup>76</sup> To build up assets that would ensure the GMF's permanent activity beyond fifteen years, a portion of the annual installments were set aside and invested. The fund's budget authorized the commitment of 30% of the second DM 10 million installment during the installment year itself (1 June 1973-31 May 1974); 50% of the 1974-75 installment; 75% of the 1975-76 installment; and 100% of all subsequent installments. The residual fund was expected to amount to \$10-25 million by mid-1988 (GMF Status Report on Fund Theme, Programs, Projects and Resource Decisions, 10 May 1974, ACDP K114/1).

<sup>77</sup> Möller, the federal government's official representative in this matter, was a former finance minister (1969-71). Goldman, chairman of the American Planning Group, was Executive Director of Harvard's Center for European Studies.

collaboration between expert scholars and responsible decision-makers; stressing social scientific, interdisciplinary and managerial approaches (e.g. with respect to “human resources” and family welfare); all in its quest to encourage innovative solutions to complex contemporary and emerging problems.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, the GMF also demonstrated in its practices many similarities with the Atlanticist-minded *Stiftungen* already discussed in Chapter 5.<sup>79</sup> Therefore, it was able to integrate itself rather well into the existing foundation system, funding projects jointly with institutions in the Federal Republic like Birrenbach’s *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* and the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*; in the United States the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation; and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation among those located elsewhere abroad.<sup>80</sup> Finally, in a more personal vein, Birrenbach even enjoyed a number of contacts within the GMF’s boards of trustees.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> All projects funded by the GMF were international in nature and were required to feature at least both American and European (West or East) elements, whether through the direct participation of appropriate persons and institutions or through consideration as thematic subjects.

<sup>79</sup> Thus, seeking to limit costs, the GMF eschewed an elaborate administrative structure, maintaining only a small staff, and instead relied on the assistance in certain capacities of friendly but independent consultants, among them members of the planning staffs of several foreign ministries, leading young scholars, and other outside experts. These included, for instance, Peter Rothhammer (German Institute for Urban Studies, Berlin) with respect to a specific project feasibility study. Already from early on in the planning phase, the GMF benefited at least initially from sharing office space and facilities and from close working relations with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington (DC). Cementing this linkage, Thomas Hughes, president of the Carnegie Endowment, was among the founding members and charter trustees of the GMF, while Milton Katz, chairman of the CEIP’s Board of Trustees, was a GMF honorary trustee. Emphasizing speed and flexibility, the GMF boasted quick administrative processes, including with regard to decisions on applications, and constantly re-examined and revised its program goals, areas and priorities so as to adjust rapidly to address new issues. Rather than simply reacting to unsolicited submitted proposals, the GMF displayed considerable assertiveness in selecting the particular problems to be tackled and, therefore, in shaping the development of its overall program, as well as in actively molding those projects actually supported. In choosing its target areas, the GMF sought to ensure that its relatively modest means produced a significant and lasting impact, focusing on the financing of so-called high-leverage projects and activities that fulfilled urgent needs and promised to generate multiplier effects, all the while identifying gaps in, supplementing, and avoiding duplication of the efforts of various state, international and private institutions (e.g. other foundations in the United States and Europe), many of which wielded greater resources.

<sup>80</sup> Indeed, the GMF cooperated with a number of other private and public entities through the joint funding of projects. Among the foundations not mentioned above in the text, these included, in the United States, the Mellon Foundation (New York City), the Kettering Foundation (Dayton, OH) and the Cleveland Foundation (Cleveland, OH) as well as, abroad, the Adriano Olivetti Foundation (Rome) and the *Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones* of the *Banco Urquijo* (Madrid). Meanwhile, the GMF also co-sponsored

However, with the announcement of the GMF's initial programs and projects by the trustees on 11 January 1974, Birrenbach soon found himself disappointed. In particular, he was convinced that the research and activities being supported by the fund were hardly conducive to the practical and immediate improvement of European (especially German)-American relations, above all with respect to effectively filling a certain "communication gap... particularly on the political level," and to the promotion of "a really functioning Atlantic Partnership." In reality, the fund did tend to ignore the traditional, allegedly pressing, security and diplomatic concerns that were especially the focus of Birrenbach's attention throughout the 1970s and beyond, instead stressing the "Common Problems of Industrial Societies," namely domestic, comparative and, though only to a much lesser extent, international economic, social, cultural and political

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projects with bodies such as the EC Commission, the UK Home Office, the French Ministry of Justice, the West German *Bundesjustizministerium*, the US Department of Labor, and trade unions like the UAW.

<sup>81</sup> Birrenbach's contacts among GMF trustees included Richard N. Cooper (Provost and Professor of International Economics, Yale University); Guido Goldman (Executive Director of the Center for European Studies and Lecturer on Government at Harvard University); and Carl Kaysen (Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton NJ; later, Vice Chairman and Director of Research, Sloan Commission on Government and Higher Education, Cambridge MA). Among the honorary trustees, they included John McCloy, James Conant and David Rockefeller. Chaired by C. Douglas Dillon, the Honorary Committee advised, initially, the Planning Group and, then, the Board of Trustees. In administering the GMF, this Board of Trustees made a variety of personnel and policy decisions, among them setting the budget plan; determining goals, guidelines and program (including priority areas); and approving particular projects and actions. During the 1970s, the chairmen of the Board of Trustees included Harvey Brooks (Professor of Technology and Public Policy, Harvard University) and, later, William M. Roth (Regent, University of California, San Francisco). In addition to the prominent role of Roth, the growing influence in the US of regions outside the Northeast was reflected in the presence within the Board of Trustees of personalities like John Seigenthaler (Publisher, *The Tennessean*, Nashville); Irving Bluestone (Vice President, UAW, Detroit); John Kilgore, Jr. (Chairman, Cambridge Royalty Co., Houston); Howard Swearer (President, Carleton College, Minnesota); Moon Landrieu (New Orleans); and John Cowles, Jr. (Chairman, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.). Likewise, the importance of generational questions was manifested by the presence among the GMF honorary trustees of James Perkins (Chairman, International Council for Educational Development, New York City). Other figures of note on the GMF Board of Trustees included Thomas Hughes (President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC); Eugene Skolnikoff (Director, Center for International Studies, MIT, Cambridge MA); Robert Ellsworth (Treasurer from 1972-74); and William Donaldson (Ellsworth's successor as Treasurer; founder of Donaldson, Lufkin, Jenrette, Inc., New York City; Dean, School of Organization and Management, Yale University).

issues.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, as stipulated in the initial agreements, there was not even any special preference for the financing of specifically bilateral American-German projects, rather (consciously like the Marshall Plan itself) a stress on multilateral endeavors pertaining to several countries. This frustration led Birrenbach in 1974 to attempt to indirectly exercise influence via several similarly dismayed honorary trustees with whom he was in contact, most notably John McCloy, but also to intervene directly vis-à-vis GMF president Prof. Benjamin Read in an effort to alter the fund's focus towards what he considered more fruitful avenues.<sup>83</sup> This action, ultimately futile it appears, was at the very least a violation of the spirit of the fund, which as a gift was explicitly intended to be independent and free from all influence of German authorities (including members of the

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<sup>82</sup> Among these issues were, for example, unemployment; inflation; environmental pollution; the work sphere (including women); education; transportation; the criminal justice system; the family; local government; urban affairs, planning and development (e.g. land use, *Raumordnung*); trade and monetary affairs; as well as resources and resource shortages (e.g. energy, food, seabed minerals, population).

<sup>83</sup> For Birrenbach's complaints, including his proposal that the GMF finance, for instance, meetings between members of the US Congress and the European parliaments "in order to improve the understanding of the legislative branches about the problems which have to be solved," see KB to Read, 5 August 1974, ACDP K114/1, as well as KB to Read, 4 March 1974, ACDP K114/1 and KB to Read, 26 June 1974, ACDP K114/1. On Birrenbach attributing the "not outstanding" experiences with the GMF in part, but not exclusively, to the formulation of the institution's founding documents, see KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, Washington DC, 22 October 1975, ACDP K150/1. For Read's responses, see Read to KB, 11 March 1974, ACDP K114/1; Read to KB, 18 July 1974, ACDP K114/1; and Read to KB, 13 August 1974, ACDP K114/1. For McCloy sharing Birrenbach's sentiments, "only more emphatically," and his grouching that the thematic approach of the GMF "really drives me 'up the wall,' as today's jargon has it," see McCloy to KB, 12 March 1974, ACDP K114/1. On a "shocked" Lucius Clay's disappointment with the GMF's initial awards, see Clay to KB, 21 March 1974, ACDP K114/1. For "outstanding [*hochverdiente*] American friends" finding Birrenbach's letters to Read "good," see KB to *Ministerialdirigenten* Dr. Joseph Thomas, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 23 July 1974, ACDP K114/1. For "a series of prominent American personalities" sharing "fully" Birrenbach's "objections [*Bedenken*]" in regard to the GMF program, see KB to Amb. Staden, 11 September 1974, ACDP K114/1. On Birrenbach's belief that many GMF projects, "especially environmental protection projects [*Umweltschutzprojekte*]," were "unworthy [*unwürdig*]" of the fund, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3. The successive presidents of the GMF were Guido Goldman (Acting President, 1972-73); Benjamin Read (1973-77; previously Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington DC), Smithsonian Institution, 1969-73; and Executive Secretary of Dean Rusk at the State Department, 1963-69); and Robert Gerald Livingston (starting in November 1977; GMF Vice President, 1974-77; Visiting Fellow at the CFR, 1970-71). These presidents functioned as the principal executive officers, heading the GMF office whose staff included Marianne Santone (Administrative Officer/Executive Assistant; Ford Foundation, 1969-72; BA Mainz University, Germany, 1960); Denie Weil (Program Officer); Christina Graf (Assistant Program Officer); and Peter Weitz (Research Consultant and Program Coordinator).

federal government and the *Bundestag*), and also serves as a vivid demonstration of Birrenbach's often unappealing pushiness in such matters.<sup>84</sup>

That said and despite the fact that Birrenbach played no direct role in its creation and functioning, the German Marshall Fund did become a major source of financing for Atlanticist projects, including a number of organizations and activities in which he was involved. The *Atlantik-Brücke* would be a particular beneficiary of GMF money, which for example helped fund its major German-American Conferences.<sup>85</sup> The GMF also provided the *Brücke* with crucial financing for its short-term program of small Joint Working Groups organized with the American Council on Germany during the first half of the 1980s.<sup>86</sup> Necessary means for the already discussed AB trips to the Federal

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<sup>84</sup> For Birrenbach's gripe that "the conditions have been fixed [*festgelegt*] extremely one-sidedly [*einseitig*] in favor of America," a fundamental misunderstanding, or perhaps blithe dismissal, of the nature of the GMF, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3. A mainstay of this independent status existed in that the crucial GMF Board of Trustees was exclusively composed of and selected by Americans. A lone exception to this independent condition was the agreement of the GMF Planning Group to the West German government's proposal to divert from the first annual installment (1972) a one-time sum of DM 3 million to Harvard University's Institute for West European Studies (chaired by Stanley Hoffmann) for the establishment of a "German Marshall Memorial Endowment" to sponsor study projects focusing on Europe. Though the GMF maintained representatives in Europe, as of 1977 Ms. Marion Bieber (4 Rue de Chevreuse, Paris) and Mr. Gebhard Schweigler (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), there does seem to have been a certain disconnect vis-à-vis the Europeans. As of the end of 1978, only 43 of the total 184 projects the GMF had supported to this point had come about on the basis of an initiative from Europe. This appears to have been due in part to the GMF's location in the United States, to its form as a foundation, and to its particular methods and ways of thought, all of which rendered it, despite the inroads that had already been made by Americanization, still not quite as familiar an institution to Europeans as to Americans.

<sup>85</sup> Thus, the GMF helped the American Council on Germany sponsor the 9<sup>th</sup> Biennial German-American Conference (March 1977) with a \$10,000 grant.

<sup>86</sup> The implementation of the JWG (a.k.a. Core Group) concept was encouraged by the perceived upshot of two previous "ad hoc" meetings staged by the AB and ACG, one from 16-18 June 1978 in Kronberg (near Frankfurt), just prior to the Bonn G7 economic summit of July 1978, and another from 25-27 April 1980 at Wye (near Washington DC), several months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the assertion that the results of these earlier ad hoc consultations had been received and utilized as "valuable" and "beneficial" contributions by the American and West German governments, see the AB Activity Report for 12 June 1980-25 May 1981, ACDP K114/2. For an assessment of these earlier ad hoc meetings as "successful and worthwhile," see the Application by Dr. Peter Pechel, Deputy Chairman of the AB, to Frank Loy, President of the GMF, ACDP K114/2. Originally expected to function over a period of one to one and a half years, the JWGs ultimately emerged from the gathering of a small steering committee, consisting of about ten representatives from each the AB and the ACG, from 14-16 May 1982 in Washington DC. The outcome was the formation of three joint working groups meeting in Germany (e.g. JWG 1 in Frankfurt; JWG 2 on 28 June 1983 in Ebenhausen by Munich) and the US (e.g. Washington DC)

Republic for American journalists from outside the northeastern US were granted at various times by the GMF as well as the *Robert Bosch Stiftung* and the BPA.<sup>87</sup>

Meanwhile, the GMF assisted in financing the ACG's John J. McCloy Fund to enable American-German youth exchanges.<sup>88</sup> Likewise, the Atlantic Institute received GMF funding for its series of press seminars and for particular studies, with the Trilateral Commission (see later in this chapter) similarly awarded study financing.<sup>89</sup> The GMF

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and comprising members of both organizations (four to seven from each per group). The entire project was co-chaired, on the West German side, by Amb. (a.D.) Rolf Pauls and, on the American side, by Robert Ellsworth. Co-chairmen for the individual groups included Germans such as Dr. Manfred Meier-Preschany (East-West), Prof. Karl Kaiser (Security), and Erik Blumenfeld (West-West Relations) and Americans such as Joseph Nye, Dr. Fritz Ermarth, and Fred Bergsten. The JWGs aimed to generate proposals that could influence practical Western (especially US and West German) policy and help prevent, resolve or reduce differences at a time when intractable problems and an increasing potential for "conflict" allegedly burdened the intergovernmental German/European-American relationship and endangered the cohesion of the alliance. As of November 1983, the remaining JWG means amounted to about \$13,000 (Considerations on the JWG Project of the AB and ACG by Dr. Beate Lindemann, November 1983, ACDP K144/1).

<sup>87</sup> The GMF was also engaged in financing the first German-American conference for young journalists, involving twelve Americans and thirteen Germans of the "successor generation" (ages 25-45), that would take place from 10-13 July 1983 in the *Amerika-Haus* in West Berlin. The *Atlantik-Brücke*, the United States Information Service, the American Council of Young Political Leaders, and the Berlin Senate were all involved, as well, in organizing and financing this conference, which emerged in the larger framework of an intensified exchange of American and West German "opinion leaders," initiated by their two countries' respective Coordinators for German-American Relations, and the agreement reached by the participants at the G7 summit in Versailles in June 1982 on youth exchange. After the conference, each of the German participants would invite an American counterpart home for several days, during which the Americans would spend time with their German hosts in the *Redaktionen* of newspapers or radio and TV stations to gain insight into "the German system." If this conference proved a success, another one would be held in one or two years. For Karl Klase, Chairman of the *Atlantik-Brücke*, having by the mid-1980s "at least toned down [*zurückgestellt*]" his skepticism regarding the activities of the GMF, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3.

<sup>88</sup> For example, the GMF awarded a grant of \$18,000 to the McCloy Fund for the American-German visits of young trade union officials in the second half of 1977.

<sup>89</sup> The GMF, itself a public expression of gratitude, reflected the general Atlanticist concern with public relations. Thus, it maintained a substantial Communications/Media program area through which it funded a variety of television, radio and press projects. It was as part of these activities that the GMF financed the Atlantic Institute press seminars (e.g. 1976-78: \$96,000). Furthermore, the fund encouraged the wide dissemination of project reports and conclusions and was noticeably pleased that the results of many endeavors it supported were available in the form of publications (sometimes in non-English languages, even Portuguese). Moreover, the GMF saw to it that journalists and other media figures were among the participants in the diverse undertakings it funded. Finally, the GMF planned to begin in Summer 1979 the publication of a journal appearing at irregular intervals that would discuss the selected problem areas the foundation focused on in its financing. These public relations efforts also encompassed the distribution of information about the organization itself, with a variety of published material, for example brochures and reports (including some available in German and French), explaining the fund's background, goals, and operations. Regarding studies, the GMF funded, for instance, a joint Atlantic Institute-Trilateral Commission work on "Collective Bargaining and Employee Participation in Western Europe, North

supplied some financing as well for the Mid-Atlantic Clubs and the Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, the GMF aided in funding Atlanticist-minded institutions with which Birrenbach maintained a certain contact, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (again, see later in this chapter).<sup>91</sup> More broadly, the Federal Republic, its persons and institutions figured significantly in GMF-supported projects whether as direct participants or as themes.<sup>92</sup> Finally, a number of GMF-funded endeavors did deal in a trans-Atlantic and European

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America, and Japan (1977: \$81,500), dealing with labor-management-government relations. The stress on broad public opinion manifested itself, as well, in the presence on the GMF Board of Trustees of personalities engaged in newspaper publishing and the like, among them figures such as Elizabeth Midgley (Producer, CBS News, Washington DC) and Max Frankel (Sunday Editor, *New York Times*).

<sup>90</sup> As of 10 May 1974, the GMF would assist the Mid-Atlantic Clubs (again, see later in this chapter) in New York, Paris, Washington, Brussels, London and San Francisco, with others to be formed in West Germany, during the next three years (1974-77) with a grant totaling \$15,000 (administered by the AI) to support a modest central MAC secretariat in Europe to improve communication between the clubs (e.g. coordination of the speaker programs). Formed at the Rockefeller Center in Bellagio (Italy) in March 1973, the SCAO was an informal umbrella group of about two dozen private American- and European-based Atlanticist organizations that sought to coordinate, rationalize and assist in their work. Its officers, with James Huntley as first secretary, were charged with representing the Atlanticist organizations as a whole to large foundations, governments and bodies such as NATO. Among its other aspirations, the group hoped to stimulate funding in the face of the disturbing trends of this period, with the effort for the creation of a Transatlantic Foundation one of its most cherished ventures. As of 10 May 1974, the SCAO was expected to receive \$30,000 total (administered by the AI) from the GMF to help support the publishing of a bi-monthly newsletter and other activities over the next three years (1974-76) (GMF Status Report on Fund Theme, Programs, Projects and Resource Decisions, 10 May 1974, ACDP K114/1).

<sup>91</sup> Likewise, GMF support also benefited the activities of organizations like the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London); the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washington DC); the Brookings Institution (DC); the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Georgetown University's School of the Foreign Service (DC). Although we have not yet discussed Birrenbach's dealings with the George C. Marshall Research Foundation (Lexington VA), the GMF granted a special award of \$205,000 over six years (1974-80) to the GCMRF to assist Dr. Forrest Pogue in the research and preparation of the portions of his official Marshall biography covering Marshall's role in post-World War II European development and the origins and operations of the Marshall Plan. Finally, the GMF also made a grant of \$1,500 to the Foundation Center (New York City).

<sup>92</sup> Thus, as of 31 December 1978, the Federal Republic ranked second after the United States by this measure of involvement (US: all 184 projects; FRG: 111; Britain: 103; France: 96). Among the Germans benefiting from GMF funding, either directly or by taking part in GMF-supported activities, were Kurt Leonberger (*Auswärtiges Amt*) as well as a number of personalities Birrenbach would have been familiar with through institutions like the DGAP (Bonn) and the Trilateral Commission, including Karl Kaiser, Wolfgang Hager, Gebhard Schweigler and Hanns Maull. German organizations engaged in Atlanticist activities that benefited from GMF funding included the *Institut für Weltwirtschaft* (University of Kiel); the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (Bonn); the *Deutsche Institut für Urbanistik* (Berlin); and the *IG Druck und Papier*; as well as the Independent Commission for International Development Issues (Geneva), this latter not a German institution *per se* but chaired by former chancellor Willy Brandt.

(EC) context with international and foreign political, economic, trade, monetary, business, energy and development topics probably of interest to Birrenbach.<sup>93</sup>

Though of less significance than the German Marshall Fund, the establishment of the London-based Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society in March 1973 through the intergovernmental Brandt-Heath Agreement represented another in a string of extraordinary West German institutional initiatives in the field of non-governmental trans-Atlantic relations in the early 1970s. With its stated aims of promoting the study and deepening the understanding of the changing modern industrial society, fostering relevant education and advancing the knowledge of the British and German people about that society, exploring ways and means of resolving the problems that arose in it, and stimulating the development of industrial society in a manner most beneficial to the community, this foundation bore many similarities to the GMF, though it focused much more strictly (e.g. thematically) on the Federal Republic and United Kingdom. Incorporated in the latter by a royal charter granted in December 1973 and with the West German federal government providing its initial capitalization at a rate of DM 3 million per year for five years as a token of friendship, the AGF furthered its goals

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<sup>93</sup> For Birrenbach's assertion that the "most important achievement [*bedeutendste Leistung*]" of the GMF was its having assisted in the founding (in 1981) and initial sustaining of the Institute for International Economics (Washington DC), which was directed by Fred Bergsten and addressed European-American economic problems, see KB to Hermann J. Abs, Honorary Chairman, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, 23 February 1984, ACDP K062/3. By the end of 1978, the GMF had funded a total of 184 projects to the tune of just over \$11.4 million (it had by this point received \$27 million through its first seven annual installments from 1972-78 with the remainder going, for instance, towards administration, program/project development and, most significantly, investments), with total grants for budget year 1978-79 anticipated to be \$3.055 million. On not all the expectations of the GMF having been fulfilled in its first years but future prospects being better today than several years ago, see the report on "Die Deutsche Marshall Stiftung, 1972-1979," ACDP K078/1. For further information on the activities of the GMF during the 1970s, see the report on The German Marshall Fund of the United States (1972-75), ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, May 1975, ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, February 1976, ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, May 1976, ACDP K078/1; the GMF Report on Current Activities, November 1976, ACDP K078/1; and the GMF Report on Current Activities, September 1977, ACDP K078/1.



by initiating, encouraging and financing pertinent projects within and between the two countries, including research and the resulting publications; professorships, bursaries and other awards; mutual visits and exchange programs; as well as lectures, courses of study, exhibitions and meetings. In the process, the AGF played a vital role, at times jointly with the GMF, in funding Atlanticist activities like the Königswinter Conferences.<sup>94</sup> For all of Birrenbach's criticism, especially of the GMF, such new financing institutions possessed some clearly positive features for him and undeniable significance for German Atlanticism as a whole, not least in so far as they promoted an intensified and broader form of that phenomenon, as amply reflected in personnel, perspectives and themes.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> As of April 1975, the foundation's patrons were Prince Philip (United Kingdom) and *Bundespräsident* Walter Scheel (Federal Republic). The British Trustees were Sir Roger William Jackling (Chairman); Sir David Haven Barran (Vice Chairman); Lady Gaitskell; Dr. Francis Edgar Jones (FRS); Rt. Hon. Lord Feather; and Prof. William Grigor McClelland. The Secretary-General was Peter McGregor. The AGF took a particular interest in the fields of economics, commerce, science, technology, sociology and the arts. Among the themes addressed were the working conditions of those engaged in industry (e.g. safety, health, welfare); labor-management relations; work satisfaction; as well as pollution and other hazards associated with industry. See, for example, Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society, Proposed Programme, Fourth Edition, April 1975, ACDP K103/2. On the AGF providing key funding for the 1977 Königswinter Conference, see the Memorandum about the Annual DEG Member Assembly of 19 April 1978, Malkasten, Düsseldorf, ACDP K105/1.

<sup>95</sup> Thus, the broader Atlanticism (and referring here not only to its German version) advanced by the GMF often dealt with hitherto unexplored subjects and also engaged in some capacity, for instance, officials and civil servants of the national states as well as of international organizations like the European Communities (e.g. the EC Commission) or the OECD (e.g. the OECD's "Interfutures" research group) rooted in departments focusing on areas like anti-trust, revenue-sharing, energy, and myriad fields typically considered domestic in nature (e.g. Dietrich Sperling, the parliamentary state secretary in Bonn's *Bundesministerium für Raumordnung, Bauwesen und Städtebau*); leading personalities from state and local levels of politics, government and administration (e.g. Manfred Rommel, mayor of Stuttgart); as well as environmentalists, urban planners, and other previously non-existent or neglected experts. Such breadth also manifested itself in the variety of institutions involved in GMF funding activities, in many cases far transcending Birrenbach's immediate circle, among them city associations (e.g. the US-European International Urban Technology Exchange Program); universities (e.g. the Stanford University Graduate School of Business); scholarly associations (e.g. the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education); labor unions (the Swedish Trade Union Organization); research centers (e.g. the Institute for Environmental Action (NY); the Vera Institute of Justice (New York City)); public interest groups (e.g. the National Center for Resource Recovery (Washington DC)); and media outlets (e.g. "Bill Moyers' Journal: International Report"; the "Atlantic Dateline" radio program; and the International Writers Service). The expanding scope of Atlanticism was further reflected in the presence on the GMF Board of Trustees of figures like Russell Train (President, World Wildlife Fund (US), Washington DC); Marian Wright Edelman (Director, Children's Defense Fund, Washington DC); Bernard Gifford (as of 1975: Deputy Chancellor, New York City Board of Education; as of 1979: Resident Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation, New York City); and personalities experienced in activities like city administration.

### F. New Publications: *Interplay*

The difficult economic situation manifested itself with respect to the fate of a significant publication effort in which Birrenbach was involved, namely the founding of an Atlanticist intellectual journal bearing the rather unfortunate name *Interplay*.<sup>96</sup> The international monthly, which was “wholly owned and supported by a small group of distinguished and liberal-minded (and wealthy) individual Americans” and whose first regular issue appeared in June 1967, was aimed at a relatively narrow circle of educated, affluent readers.<sup>97</sup> *Interplay* was published by Birrenbach’s contact Gerard Smith until he became head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1969. Its editor-in-chief, operating out of Manhattan, was the influential, British-born journalist Anthony Hartley, previously of *The Economist*, *Encounter*, and *The Spectator*.<sup>98</sup> Another regular Birrenbach contact, François Duchêne (UK), also formerly of *The Economist*, was the European Editorial Representative. From the start, Birrenbach served on the multi-

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The German Marshall Fund and the Anglo-German Foundation were among several measures undertaken by the Federal Republic around this time intended to contribute during the 1970s and 80s to strengthening trans-Atlantic relations, including “the understanding between the partners” on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, to enhance the effectiveness of the German-American Fulbright “scholarly” exchange program, the federal government increased its share in the financing from DM 2 million to DM 3.5 million per year. To reinforce the cooperation between American and German research institutes, the government decided to annually contribute DM 5 million for an exchange program of “highly qualified” American and German natural scientists. Meanwhile, the *Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft* pledged to supplement the government contribution by DM 2.5 million annually, with the additional means being used for the exchange of representatives of the humanities. On all this, see the Bulletin of 7 June 1972, Nr. 83, p. 1141, ACDP K114/1.

<sup>96</sup> To Birrenbach’s credit, he (along with some others) disliked the title of the journal and preferred the earlier name, *Intercontinental Review*.

<sup>97</sup> See the unidentified article on *Interplay* in ACDP K209/1. *Interplay* actually appeared ten times a year.

<sup>98</sup> Hartley had been a contributing editor at *Encounter* and deputy editor at *The Spectator*.

national Editorial Advisory Board, a body naturally stacked with other Atlanticists.<sup>99</sup> *Interplay* was a journal of news and informed opinion from around the world that embraced the general Atlanticist thesis of “interdependence.” At least initially, it focused on trans-Atlantic affairs, including international but also relevant domestic issues. The articles dealt with a wide variety of subjects within this extensive field and featured authors from a broad national range, for instance Germans such as Golo Mann and Theo Sommer.<sup>100</sup> For those involved in or simply observing the venture, *Interplay* seemed a valuable instrument to influence international opinion and, especially, to encourage closer, more cooperative trans-Atlantic relations at a time when those relations seemed to be deteriorating.<sup>101</sup> To Birrenbach, *Interplay* represented a “bridge between Europe and the United States” and a worthwhile aid to their overarching “common cause.”<sup>102</sup>

Birrenbach assisted the journal in a number of ways in his capacity as a member of the Editorial Advisory Board. His Atlanticist-oriented expertise in European-American relations was important to a periodical devoted, at least at first, to this subject, enabling him to submit useful comments and ideas on authors and content. Functioning in one of his typical roles as a gatekeeper, Birrenbach helped recruit other Germans to join the magazine in various capacities, for instance Marion Gräfin Dönhoff as a member

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<sup>99</sup> The German members of the editorial board included Birrenbach, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff and Helmut Schmidt. Among the participants from other countries were George Ball and Christian Herter Jr. (United States); Max Kohnstamm (Netherlands); Kenneth Younger (Britain); and Marc Ullmann (France). The first meeting of the Editorial Advisory Board occurred in Washington (DC) in January 1968, with a few people from the government and press also invited.

<sup>100</sup> Golo Mann published an article on Adenauer in the first regular issue. Sommer was among those providing reports from the major capitals in Europe, in his case Bonn. Some editions of the journal focused on particular themes, for example “the multinational corporation.”

<sup>101</sup> This was, for instance, Smith’s own conception of the endeavor.

<sup>102</sup> KB to Gerard Smith, “personal and private,” 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1.

of the EAB and Theo Sommer as a regular writer.<sup>103</sup> He was also able to pass judgment and offer suggestions on other prospective writers and EAB members, for instance approving of Helmut Schmidt's joining the EAB, though not having actually had a hand in recruiting him. Birrenbach was well positioned to give advice, or at least to locate experts who could provide such advice, regarding the peculiarities of the marketing and sale of the journal in the Federal Republic.<sup>104</sup> His wide network of contacts enabled him to bring *Interplay* to the attention of influential individuals and publications in West Germany that would be particularly interested in such an organ. Birrenbach supplied the journal with the membership lists (including contact information) of certain Atlanticist organizations to assist in direct mail solicitations for subscribers in the Federal Republic and himself worked to find such subscribers.<sup>105</sup> Thus, Birrenbach played a significant role in establishing a "fire base" for *Interplay* in West Germany, a central country of concern for the journal both thematically and in business terms. However, perhaps most vitally, Birrenbach was expected to, and did, employ his knowledge of and connections in the *Wirtschaft* (especially industry) to aid in securing funding, chiefly corporate support via advertising. Indeed, it was hoped that, above all multinational, corporations would view such backing of *Interplay* as being in their own enlightened self-interest.

Despite some episodic successes, the existence of *Interplay* was generally a financially troubled one.<sup>106</sup> During its start-up period, the journal struggled with limited

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<sup>103</sup> A duly compensated Sommer wrote short pieces four or five times a year aiming to give readers a sense of "the outlook" from Bonn (the same was done from France, Britain and Italy by other suitable authors).

<sup>104</sup> Such marketing issues included advertising, appearance, pricing, circulation and subscriptions, with a stress on identifying how these aspects differed in the Federal Republic from the United States.

<sup>105</sup> For instance, at Smith's request, Birrenbach provided the names and addresses of the members of the DGAP. In general, businesspeople, rather than, say, intellectuals, were particularly coveted as subscribers due to the interest they generated amongst major advertisers.

<sup>106</sup> A specific episode deemed a success was the ordering by the West German embassy in the United States of two thousand copies of "the Gittler piece" that had appeared in the third issue, along with the cover of

subscription income and the difficulties of attracting advertising for such a new and still small-circulation review. Therefore, the journal operated during this time at a very large deficit, only part of which was covered by Smith and his financial partners.<sup>107</sup> In December 1968, in a desperate effort to attract a wider readership and more advertising, *Interplay* even modified its scope and subtitle, with Birrenbach's approval, from "The Magazine of European/American Affairs," to "The Magazine of International Affairs" even as it continued to dedicate much attention to trans-Atlantic relations. Unfortunately for the magazine, Birrenbach found it significantly more difficult than he had expected to locate funding for this venture. Taken as a whole, his approaches in this matter to West German industry, including but not limited to the steel industry, as well as to the foundations, especially the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, resulted in failure.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, with his party out of government from October 1969 on, it became considerably more difficult for Birrenbach to obtain funding for an undertaking like *Interplay* through approaches to the *Bundespresseamt*. Doubting the journal's financial viability in its current format but offering a positive assessment of its content and mission, Birrenbach proposed, at various points in time, turning *Interplay* into a quarterly or linking it to an American non-profit organization.<sup>109</sup> Finally, in 1971, *Interplay*, as a result of its dire

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the magazine and subscription blanks, for mailing to various people it believed would be interested (Gerard Smith to KB, 6 November 1967, ACDP K209/1).

<sup>107</sup> Subscribers were primarily located in the United States (10% in Europe as of September 1967, aiming for 30%). The target was 50,000 overall subscribers by 1971-72. For these and additional figures, see the Memorandum for the Advisory Board, Progress Report on INTERPLAY Magazine, from Gerard Smith, 20 September 1967, ACDP K209/1 and Gerard Smith to KB, 31 January 1968, ACDP K209/1.

<sup>108</sup> Birrenbach pointed out that the steel industry rarely, if ever, advertised in the press and especially not in such a "sophisticated" magazine (KB to Gerard Smith, 21 March 1968, ACDP K209/1). The allure of the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* here was that its by-laws were "somewhat more flexible" than those of the *Thyssen Stiftung* (KB to Gerard Smith, "personal and private," 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1).

<sup>109</sup> For example, KB to Gerard Smith, "personal and private," 6 October 1969, ACDP K209/1 and KB to Gerard Smith, 13 March 1969, ACDP K209/1.

financial straits which a frustrated Birrenbach found himself unable to contribute sufficiently to overcoming, was forced to merge with another magazine.<sup>110</sup>

G. New Meeting Places: The German-American Parliamentary Group

In addition to new financing instruments and publications, the world of German Atlanticism also saw efforts during the early 1970s to establish new institutions designed to bring Atlanticist-minded individuals together and to create lasting contacts between them. One such effort, albeit abortive, in which Birrenbach was centrally engaged during this time was that with regard to the construction of a German-American parliamentary group. In the fall of 1970, Birrenbach had been placed in charge of conducting the “negotiations” pertaining to the formation of such institutional contacts by *Bundestag* President Kai-Uwe von Hassel, with whom the idea had originated. The aim of this undertaking was to create a permanent contact between the members of the *Bundestag* and the Congress in the hopes of thus contributing to the closing of postulated “communication holes” in the German-American relationship. A particular sense of urgency was imparted to the project as a result of the perceived need to balance in this fashion the extension of parliamentary contacts eastward that also occurred in the early 1970s. The Federal Republic maintained such parliamentarian groups for almost all of its “partners” in NATO and the EEC, and Birrenbach for one, therefore, considered it “unnatural” if such an all-party group were not formed vis-à-vis its “principal ally,” the United States.<sup>111</sup> The thorny aspect of this endeavor and the main topic of discussion was the founding of the American counterpart group, for official American parliamentary groups, resting on an Act of Congress, existed for only the neighboring states of Canada

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<sup>110</sup> KB to Gerard Smith, 16 February 1971, ACDP K209/1.

<sup>111</sup> KB to Wayne Hays, House of Representatives, cc: Sparkman and *Botschaftsrat* Wolff, 30 March 1971, ACDP K142/2.

and Mexico. While Birrenbach did not expect an Act of Congress, he insisted that an American group had to be at least somewhat equivalent to its German complement, evincing a certain level of organization encompassing at minimum a chairman and secretariat. As he put it, he had no desire for a purely “Neckermann-*Unternehmen*.”<sup>112</sup>

Birrenbach’s efforts in this direction dragged on for several years. During that period, his key contacts in this matter consisted of the German embassy in the United States, including Amb. Rolf Pauls; David Abshire, formerly of the CSIS and now the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; and leading members of both houses of Congress, including Wayne Hays and John Sparkman.<sup>113</sup> Birrenbach did not believe that the responsibility for the prolonged nature of this process necessarily was to be placed at the doorstep of the German side. While he immediately received a positive response in the House, this was from the undesired “Neckermann perspective,” and while by November 1972 there was a readiness in principle in the Senate, here the question of financing remained unclear. With respect to this issue of funding, Birrenbach rejected multiple requests for financing from a German *Stiftung*, seeing this not only as a violation of their statutes but also as harmful to the spirit of the group. Over the course of these years, Birrenbach repeatedly expressed his pessimism regarding the project, particularly with respect to the founding of the American counterpart group.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach’s contacts with members of the Senate and with Abshire imparted to him the distinct impression that the members of the Congress preferred a relatively loose link, looser than

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<sup>112</sup> KB to *Konteradmiral* Herbert Trebesch, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 16 November 1972, ACDP K027/1. As of this point (November 1972), an American-British group had been formed several years ago, financed by one of the “great” American foundations but limiting itself only to visits and a single annual meeting, while an American-Japanese group later came into being on a similar basis after Birrenbach had initiated his own efforts. Ultimately, Birrenbach hoped for something more from a German-American group.

<sup>113</sup> Hays was a Democratic Representative from Ohio. Sparkman was a Democratic Senator from Alabama.

<sup>114</sup> Rolf Pauls, the West German ambassador in the United States at the time, shared this outlook.

he desired at any rate, between a German group in the *Bundestag* and the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two houses of the Congress. By March 1972, sensing that his earlier doubts would prove justified but prior to the ultimate failure of his efforts, Birrenbach consoled himself with the thought that they had lived without such a group “not too badly” for twenty years thanks to existing institutions like the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.<sup>115</sup> Birrenbach’s endeavors in this matter appear to have eventually simply dissipated without an explicit, definitive rejection from either side.

#### H. New Meeting Places: Mid-Atlantic Clubs

A new Atlanticist institution that did appear during the first half of the 1970s, albeit only briefly in the Federal Republic, was the network of Mid-Atlantic Clubs. The concept of these small, private, experimental, peculiarly Anglo-Saxon entities and the impetus for their establishment came from James Huntley, who had also played a driving role in the creation of the Atlantic Institute. The first MAC, inaugurated in London in October 1970, was followed in succeeding years by clubs in other key cities of the “Atlantic region.” These staged periodic meetings on a diversity of trans-Atlantic issues, usually comprising informal, off-the-record discussions among the members, preceded by short speeches of prominent “experts.”<sup>116</sup> Drawing from the cities in which they were

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<sup>115</sup> This quote is actually contained already in KB to David Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, Washington DC, 15 March 1971, ACDP K142/2.

<sup>116</sup> Attendance at MAC meetings seems to have ranged from around twenty-five to somewhat more than fifty. Such gatherings were typically held at a variety of sites, among them hotels. For the London MAC staging its meetings in a private room at the Royal Automobile Club, see Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1. On the Brussels MAC conducting its first meeting at the *Société Royale Belge des Ingénieurs et Industriels*, see the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1. Club meetings ideally consisted of simple, pleasant, sociable, relatively unstructured study-luncheons (often with drinks beforehand) in which members and, at least sometimes, guests confronted timely current or emerging themes and problems of a security, political, economic or social nature (for instance, Eurodollars and other monetary matters, the “energy squeeze,” the environment, and the “fair society”). By providing for regular and frequent contact (the London MAC about 7-9 times a year, basically monthly with some breaks), the clubs enabled participants to explore such



located, each MAC boasted a “high-quality,” international membership from a wide array of professions, backgrounds and experiences, aspiring in this regard to be a microcosm of the Atlantic Community itself.<sup>117</sup> Such a composition encouraged a range of perspectives and enabled a broader dissemination of the thoughts expressed. As groups, the members did not arrive at unified positions on the topics addressed, nor did they explicitly seek to influence government policies.<sup>118</sup> While politicians were among the members, the clubs

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subjects at a suitably elevated level of sophistication and depth. The closed nature of the functions, with remarks not intended for attribution or publication, facilitated frank discussion. Speakers (some of whom were members, others outside guests) at the London MAC included J. Robert Schaezel (US Ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels) on 29 October 1970 about “The Implications for the Trans-Atlantic Relationship of the Enlargement of the European Communities”; Max Kohnstamm (Deputy Chairman of the Monnet Committee; Director of the EC Institute for University Studies, Brussels) on 19 October 1971 about “The Crisis in European-American Relations”; Albert Weitnauer (the Swiss Ambassador) on 1 February 1972 about “The Role of the EFTA Countries in European Integration”; and Sir Reay Geddes (Chairman of Dunlop-Pirelli) on 24 July 1972 about “Business in the Atlantic Society.” The interest in American voices rooted outside the US Northeast is intimated, for example, by William Pearce (Vice President of Cargill Inc. (Minneapolis, MN); Member of President Nixon’s Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy) speaking on 19 February 1971 at the London MAC about “American Agriculture and the Enlargement of the Common Market.”

<sup>117</sup> Given the pool of qualified potential participants, the membership of each club tended to exhibit at least a large plurality of, and in some cases was dominated by, figures from the country in which it was based. Swiss and Swedes were also to be found among the European members. Chosen by the MACs themselves, the members of these institutions were trumpeted as leading, “responsible” individuals of “goodwill” with a keen interest in trans-Atlantic affairs, comprising a multi-professional public and private cross-section that included government officials, civil servants and diplomats; parliamentarians and other politicians; industrialists, bankers and assorted businessmen; lawyers; journalists and further mass media personalities; scholars and educators; figures involved in the many associations and research institutes; and even some artists (e.g. Yehudi Menuhin in London). Among the vital criteria in assessing the feasibility of a MAC in a specific city was the existence of a sustainable enthusiasm among a sufficient number of suitable people there, especially a willingness to attend gatherings and to perform the organizing and administrative work.

<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, members might do so in an individual capacity. As groups, the MACs hoped to exhibit a tangible impact by constructively molding perceptions among leadership groups and thus indirectly strengthening the crucial, mutually beneficial trans-Atlantic bonds and cooperation. For the MACs being firmly based on the belief that consequential decisions and actions in international affairs were taken not only at the governmental level but also at many other levels, including those of businesses, universities and further “private bodies,” see Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1. For the MACs striving for the development of a “fellowship based on the gradual growth of a sense of common purpose, a broad consensus about the nature of the transatlantic tie and its importance,” see James Huntley to KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2. On the formation of the MACs being rooted in the conviction that “a working consensus across borders, among those who shape and make important decisions” was necessary to ensure the cohesion and functioning of “the maturing transatlantic economy-society-polity,” see The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1.

were intended to be non-partisan.<sup>119</sup> Despite the distances involved, the MACs aimed to maintain close communication and cooperation with one another, thus promoting a larger dialogue.<sup>120</sup> Exceedingly “lean” institutions, the MACs were directly linked with, even reliant on, other Atlanticist organizational elements, both in terms of personnel and infrastructure.<sup>121</sup> Financing for the clubs was quite modest, ultimately coming, to some

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<sup>119</sup> The origins of at least the London and New York MACs demonstrate a distinct absence of political parties in the process of their creation. The London MAC was started by a self-constituted executive committee of three Americans, including James Huntley, a diplomat (Stanley Cleveland), and a businessman, and four Britons, among them the head of the National Coal Board (Derek Ezra), a businessman, and a banker (RJ Clark) (The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2). As of November 1970, the London MAC executive committee also included François Duchêne (The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1). As of July 1971, the planning in New York City was thus far being spearheaded by two Standard Oil executives, who might also associate with them an Italian currently working for the Ford Foundation, Alfred Neal (Committee on Economic Development), and one or two European businessmen living at the time in New York (James Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).

<sup>120</sup> Therefore, even with all their considerable autonomy, the MACs exhibited some patently centralizing features, as well. In addition to being loosely connected by a common organizational and procedural concept, there existed a correspondence between the chairmen and secretaries of the various MACs, an exchange of discussion summaries and a degree of programmatic and thematic coordination. In May 1973, the London, Paris and New York MACs held special, separate meetings to discuss US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s “Atlantic Charter” speech of 23 April 1973. The MACs also staged certain “All-Club Events,” for instance the first meeting of officers representing all the MACs on 27 March 1973 in Amsterdam, which included reports from each club and a discussion on general club policies. Moreover, Huntley hoped that sometime in late Spring 1974 each MAC could dispatch two or more representatives to a two-day meeting to discuss the MAC network and its future, program cooperation, as well as one or two current substantive topics, and to elect a network chairman, vice chairman and secretary (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972–November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1). Also as of November 1973, there were plans for a modest central office and central fund to facilitate the imperative coordination and development of the MAC network for at least a three-year period (1974–76). Largely in his post of MAC Network Secretary, Huntley fostered virtually all of these cooperative facets, keeping officers, members and friends of the MAC network (including Birrenbach) apprised of the personnel, activities and plans of that network and of the individual clubs, all the while offering as well as requesting advice and suggestions, for instance with respect to potential members of future MACs.

<sup>121</sup> Most significantly, the Atlantic Institute demonstrated a marked benevolence towards the MACs. For instance, the AI and the Atlantic Council of the United States acted, at least early on, as central offices, receiving and expending all funds, maintaining special accounts and rendering periodic reports. On the AI, according to John Tuthill (Director General), being unable as of April 1971 to help finance the organizing work but willing to take the “important” step of accepting contributions earmarked for the “promotion” of the MACs, see Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2. On this appreciation for the MAC idea extending to the AI Policy Committee, see again Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2. The informal quality of the MACs was reflected in their organizational arrangements, with the London MAC, for example, not being legally incorporated, lacking a written constitution and, as of April 1972, not having had elections to choose its officers (the members considering this unnecessary). Without their own exclusive personnel, the MACs were run on a part-time basis by well-known Atlanticists in each location, themselves often tightly connected with other Atlanticist-minded institutions. Such personalities included Derek Ezra (Chairman of the London MAC; Chairman of the UK National Coal Board); Sir Kenneth

extent, from the participants themselves as well as from a variety of American-based sources: the US government; business corporations; foundations; assorted organizations; and certain individuals.<sup>122</sup> For Huntley and other advocates, the MAC represented an

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Younger (Chairman of the London MAC, having succeeded Ezra in Fall 1972; former head of the Royal Institute of International Affairs); George Franklin (Chairman of the New York City MAC; Council on Foreign Relations, including former Executive Director); Zygmunt Nagorski (Secretary of the New York City MAC; member of the CFR staff); Dr. Lincoln Gordon (Chairman of the Washington MAC; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars); Henri Bonnet (Chairman of the Paris MAC; former French ambassador to the US); and Prof. André Vlerick (Chairman of the Brussels MAC; head of the Business School of the University of Ghent, former Belgian Finance Minister).

Quite early on, the Mid-Atlantic Clubs were already eyeing an expanded collaboration with fellow Atlanticist organizations. At the “All-MAC” meeting of 27 March 1973 in Amsterdam, the “means of cooperation” with such “bodies” as the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission were considered and, as of November 1973, the AI and TC were among the institutions examining the possibility of using the MACs as “sounding-boards” to air policy-oriented draft proposals. For Huntley speculating that the MACs could serve as a forum where governments and private research groups might “float a trial balloon” (“important new ideas”), see the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1. On Huntley, and perhaps the AI itself, envisaging an AI-MAC cooperation that would broaden the AI’s “capacity to draw on the ideas of concerned people in major centers” and, in turn, would provide the latter with “access to experts” engaged with items on the “trans-Atlantic agenda,” see The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2. On the AI having arranged for Prof. Dr. Gardener Ackley (University of Michigan, former member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors), *Rapporteur* of an AI study on inflation, to lead a discussion on that topic (“Inflation: A Transatlantic Problem”) at the London MAC in May 1971, see again The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2. Similarly, on 9 March 1972, Pierre Uri (Counselor for Studies at the Atlantic Institute and Professor at the University of Paris) spoke at the London MAC on “Monetary Policy: The United States and Europe.” Indeed, for Huntley regarding the MACs as essentially “complementary” to the AI, see Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2. On the AI also willing to offer substantial assistance to a potential Rome MAC, see the Memorandum on the Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. Huntley, Secretary of the Network of MACs, 30 August 1972, ACDP K068/1. Likewise, with respect to future MACs in North America, Huntley claimed to have the backing of Adolph Schmidt (US Ambassador to Canada); Martin Hillenbrand (US Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs); as well as a number of private personalities, among them several at the ACUS like W. Randolph Burgess and Theodore Achilles (Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).

<sup>122</sup> The funding of the MACs was decentralized in nature, with each club responsible for its own financing. As of 6 December 1973, the New York MAC was the only one with paid memberships, with fees set on a sliding scale for businessmen, diplomats and academics (from most to least) and having resulted in a treasury of about \$4,000 (Huntley, Network Secretary, Memo to all Chairmen and Secretaries of MACs, 6 December 1973, ACDP K068/1 and Huntley, MAC Network Secretary, Memo to Officers of MACs, regarding MACs in North America, 4 October 1973, ACDP K068/1). Aside from the members themselves, sources for the requisite MAC funding encompassed the US Information Service, the US mission to the EC, the US delegation to NATO, Exxon Inc., the First National City Bank, the Insurance Company of North America, the German Marshall Fund, the North Atlantic Foundation (New York), the Hugh Moore Fund, the Batelle Memorial Institute, Mrs. St. John Garwood, and an anonymous source (via the ACUS). As of June 1971, the London MAC did not pay fees to nor cover the expenses of its “discussion-openers” and had no paid secretariat, its executive committee sharing in the “housekeeping” tasks (The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2). As of April 1972, the officers of the London MAC served gratis, and some of the incidental costs of the organization (e.g. postage, printing) had been “absorbed” by their own offices (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1). Thus, H. Walter Lessing’s office provided

effective means to broaden transnational communication and understanding and to expand the elite trans-Atlantic network.<sup>123</sup>

The idea of a German Mid-Atlantic Club was first brought to Birrenbach's attention in November 1970 by Sir Frank Roberts, a member of the London MAC.<sup>124</sup> Seeking advice in this matter, Roberts had initially approached Fritz Neef of the BDI Secretarial Office in London who, along with the BDI's Hellmuth Wagner in Cologne, had agreed that Birrenbach was the most suitable person in the Federal Republic for Roberts to contact with such a proposal. At a meeting arranged between Roberts and Birrenbach at Neef's house in November 1970, it was suggested to Birrenbach that he create such a "talk circle" in the Federal Republic and that he establish links between the British and German MACs. Huntley and H. Walter Lessing, both of whom Roberts was

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essential clerical services to the London MAC cost-free (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1). Nevertheless, on the difficulties of some MACs (among them the Washington DC MAC) with respect to finances, see again the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1. For Huntley's efforts to obtain contributions for the expenses he incurred (e.g. travel) in his work to organize the MACs (anywhere from \$10,000 to \$17,000 per year), including to prod "the Thyssen Company" (not the foundation), he hoped with Birrenbach's help, to make an initial contribution of \$3,000 to \$5,000 and to persuade the *Atlantica* to provide financial support for the MACs as well as for EURNAC (Huntley had also proposed this to Walter Stahl), see Huntley to KB, 13 April 1971, ACDP K066/2. Among other potential sources of such MAC funding, Huntley here cited H. Walter Lessing, a member of the London club who had made a tentative financial commitment in the range of \$1,000-\$2,000; Standard Oil of New Jersey at probably \$5,000 a year; and IBM at possibly \$5,000 a year. As of November 1973, there was an intensive financing effort with regard to the planned MAC central office and central fund, with contributions sought from North American and European sources (not the clubs themselves), including individuals and businesses not connected with the MACs as well as foundations and governments (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>123</sup> The founders of the London club had chosen the somewhat puzzling "Mid-Atlantic" designation to signify their desire to look at common "trans-Atlantic" problems "from some hypothetical halfway point in the great Ocean" (to achieve "a meeting of minds between Europe and North America") (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1). At this point (April 1972), Huntley considered the MACs more necessary than ever in light of the serious "Atlantic" issues emerging from major "developments" with fundamental "international repercussions" and indicative of "impending change" (e.g. the signing of the Treaty of Rome by Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland; the "crises" experienced by the American and other economies; President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow; Bonn's *Ostpolitik*; discussions about mutual balanced force reductions and a European security conference; questions about the maintenance of US troops in Europe; aid to and trade with "less-developed countries"; and the "world ecology crisis").

<sup>124</sup> Roberts was a former British ambassador to the Federal Republic (1963-68) and active in Atlanticist institutions such as the Atlantic Institute.

in close contact with, also encouraged the founding of a German counterpart to the London MAC. The Mid-Atlantic Club that Birrenbach created, the second founded overall after that in London, first convened on 29 March 1971 in the *Tulpenfeld* complex in Bonn. Birrenbach saw the considerable potential of the group in that it would examine and help surmount the complex trans-Atlantic military, political and economic problems that currently festered or potentially loomed between the United States and a possibly expanded EEC (embracing Britain among other new entrants) and that might impair their future cooperation. This would be undertaken within the larger framework of efforts pursued in the same direction by government, parliament, *Wirtschaft* and press, and perhaps in cooperation with them.<sup>125</sup> Birrenbach received generally positive responses from almost all those he addressed, about twenty in total, regarding their readiness to enter such a talk circle.<sup>126</sup> Members and participants in the group's discussions included personalities from politics, government ministries, the *Wirtschaft* and the press, as well as the American ambassador and figures from the European Commission.<sup>127</sup> The Bonn MAC was not supported in any way by outside organizations, rather its functions were of a strictly personal nature and, therefore, each member assumed the costs for himself.

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<sup>125</sup> Birrenbach Memo of 11 December 1970, ACDP K130/1. To Birrenbach, this appeared all the more "urgent" as "for the first time" in the United States a "certain anxiety [*Besorgnis*]" was being expressed (especially in connection with the Mills Trade Bill) regarding the potential expansion of the EEC, in particular the entrance of Britain. This conjured up fears of the further impairment of the world free-trade system (GATT) at a time when Europe did not appear to be advancing towards political unification. A "protectionist development" in the United States that the EEC failed to hinder could also acutely complicate European-American political and military relations, not least with respect to the crucial problem of the presence of US troops in Europe. Similarly reflecting such concerns, the Monnet Committee called in its meeting of 24 February 1971 for the creation of a permanent organ enabling steady consultations between high-level US and EC representatives on key questions.

<sup>126</sup> For instance, from Sigismund von Braun, State Secretary in the *Auswärtigen Amt*.

<sup>127</sup> These personalities from politics also, of course, encompassed parliamentarians, while those from the *Wirtschaft* included bankers. Meanwhile, representatives of the relevant government ministries included state secretaries and the chiefs of the ministerial departments.

Yet while Birrenbach had ostensibly founded a Mid-Atlantic Club, actually apart from its name and despite its origins, this Bonn MAC was quite different from the other clubs that were created along the lines proposed by Huntley. The membership of Birrenbach's MAC consisted solely of very high-level Germans and also reflected his decidedly partisan conception of such a talk circle.<sup>128</sup> While informal, the speeches and discussions of the Bonn MAC maintained a stringently confidential character. Finally, Birrenbach's Mid-Atlantic Club was extremely policy oriented, meeting now and then to clarify the state and pending issues of European (EEC)-American relations, identifying appropriate courses of action, and unabashedly striving to directly influence West German and possibly American policy in this regard. All of this differentiated Birrenbach's Bonn MAC from the others and rendered it an entity unto itself, effectively outside of the MAC network, thus *de facto* leaving the Federal Republic out of the MAC system entirely.<sup>129</sup> Although Birrenbach cited a number of reasons that dictated this approach, it seems clear that he ultimately had no real desire to create a MAC like the others and simply considered his own method to be more effective in achieving the goals he had in mind.<sup>130</sup> Birrenbach's virtually sole influence over such matters stemmed from

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<sup>128</sup> Underscoring the partisan nature of this endeavor, Birrenbach even made clear to Huntley that if clubs were established in Munich, Hamburg and/or Frankfurt, he would rely in each case on members of his own party (*Union*) from the *Bundestag*, meaning that the German MACs would all have their roots primarily in the CDU-CSU (James Huntley to KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2).

<sup>129</sup> For instance, in view of the rigorously confidential nature of the proceedings (not even any written records), it was impossible to invite to meetings anybody from outside the club, as Huntley had envisioned.

<sup>130</sup> Thus, Birrenbach pleaded a lack of time in explaining why his Bonn MAC had little or no contact with the other clubs. For Huntley's alarmed realization that Birrenbach's Bonn MAC (and possibly future German MACs) would differ fundamentally from the other clubs, his fear that Birrenbach's approach to the German MAC(s) would undermine their cooperation and common purpose with the non-German MACs, his grudging recognition that Birrenbach's MAC was perhaps a valuable (even necessary) undertaking in terms of the German situation, his attempt to clear up what he vainly hoped was merely Birrenbach's misunderstanding of the MAC concept, and his desire that at least one MAC somewhere in Germany be like the others, see Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2. On Birrenbach's blatant disinterest in being part of the larger MAC network, in particular his claim that the Bonn group needed "no mediator or broker" (i.e. Huntley) to carry out its activities, see again Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2.

a situation in which, unlike the other MACs that were already in or later came into existence, the Bonn MAC was essentially founded by him alone rather than created and shaped by multiple individuals, organized as steering and executive committees.<sup>131</sup>

However, Birrenbach's Bonn MAC was short-lived. Its second, and final, meeting occurred on 21 September 1971, with twenty-six members taking part, a seemingly considerable number.<sup>132</sup> Although he insisted that the meetings had gone very well and were more effective than those arranged by most of the other Mid-Atlantic Clubs, Birrenbach henceforth shut down the Bonn MAC, for all intents and purposes, citing the lacking interest of the parliament in matters of trade, currency and the like. Nevertheless, Huntley consistently saw the MAC project developing quite well as a whole.<sup>133</sup> Within quite a short time, there developed a loose network of similar, affiliated

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<sup>131</sup> Even with Huntley's central role, the decisions regarding the founding and development of the particular MACs were primarily taken by small groups of indigenous and foreign personalities located in the individual cities. Enabling them to adapt the MAC concept to widely diverse environments (e.g. local custom and law), these groups retained considerable freedom and flexibility with respect to a variety of questions related to organizational patterns and practices such as the maximum size of a given club and the specific members invited to join; the selection of officers; possibilities of legal incorporation and of formal elections; program, topics and format; the arrangement and frequency of meetings; modes of financing; and languages used (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>132</sup> At this meeting of 21 September 1971, Birrenbach provided a short overview about the current economic- and currency-political situation. Talks were then given by Amb. J. Robert Schaetzel (US Representative to the European Communities in Brussels), Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf (EC Commissioner) and *Ministerialdirektor* (AA) Dr. Axel Herbst (the latter "from the perspective of Bonn") on the efforts being undertaken between the EEC and the United States in this theme area. In his introductory *Referat*, Schaetzel pleaded for understanding for President Nixon's measures of the previous month (August 1971) and pointed out that Nixon had stressed in his annual State of the World Report of February 1971 that the US-European relationship had to be a genuine partnership, still not fully attained, in which both partners had to demonstrate patience (Summary of the Expositions of Schaetzel, Dahrendorf and Herbst at the Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic-Group-*Gesprächskreis* on 21 September in Bonn, ACDP K130/1).

<sup>133</sup> See, for instance, Huntley to KB, 28 June 1972, ACDP K068/1. While Huntley admitted that it could not yet be asserted (or ruled out) that their activities to this point had at all "changed history" or "even altered the thinking or policy of governments," he offered generally positive assessments of the individual MACs (e.g. New York: "dynamism and élan", "the most active and successful of all"; Paris: "vigorous") as well as of the MACs' overall development and effectiveness in fulfilling their goals ("rapidly becoming firmly rooted"), claiming, in part based on his personal conversations, that such enthusiastic judgments were shared by numerous other MAC members (see especially the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1). For the waiting list of people who had inquired on their own initiative about membership in the London MAC, see Notes on the

MACs in major centers around the “Atlantic Rim.” As of 10 May 1974, Mid-Atlantic Clubs existed in London, Washington DC, New York City, Paris (started by John Tuthill and Curt Gasteyger of the Atlantic Institute), Brussels and, a recent addition, San Francisco.<sup>134</sup> It was not least thanks to the ambitious Huntley, who perceived, at least during the early 1970s, promising prospects for a growth of the MAC network, that rumblings could be heard over the years about the founding of more such clubs in both North America as well as Europe, with an effort to maintain a certain geographic balance between the two. With respect to the latter, West Germany served as a focal point as Huntley entertained the notion of eventually spreading MACs across the Federal Republic, with Bonn, Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich all being mentioned at one time or another as potential sites.<sup>135</sup> In his attempts to revive a, this time non-partisan, MAC in

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Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1.

<sup>134</sup> The MAC phenomenon highlights the role of extant Atlanticist institutions in facilitating the establishment of others. Here, the personnel of the Atlantic Institute provided considerable assistance. Especially Tuthill (Director General), with the encouragement and counsel of Huntley, was involved in exploring the possible founding of a Paris MAC, even occupying a place on the steering committee. For Huntley also consulting the AI's Curt Gasteyger with respect to a potential Paris club, see the Memorandum for John Tuthill from James Huntley on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, copies to T. Achilles, K. Birrenbach, N. Campbell, D. Ezra, HW Lessing, AW Schmidt and S. Stamas, 22 October 1971, ACDP K066/2. Furthermore, the prior existence of MACs eased the process of establishing new ones, with creators able to draw on the experiences and advice of their predecessors. On officers of current MACs being available to assist in any way the founding of new clubs, see Memorandum on the Possibility of Founding a MAC in Rome, by James R. Huntley, Secretary of the Network of MACs, 30 August 1972, ACDP K068/1. For H. Walter Lessing of the London MAC taking part in the exploration of the possibility of founding a Paris club, see again the Memorandum for John Tuthill from James Huntley on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, 22 October 1971, ACDP K066/2. Moreover, to assist those contemplating the formation of a club, Huntley drew up and distributed a “handbook” on the organization and activities of the MACs, based on the experiences of the London club and on the views of those in other cities presently developing MACs (Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>135</sup> As of November 1973, the network of five active MACs in London (founded in October 1970 and on which the other clubs were patterned), Washington DC (May 1972, with US Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush as the “discussion-opener” at the first meeting), New York City (December 1972), Paris (January 1973), and Brussels (October 1973, with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns as speaker on the “State of the Atlantic Alliance” at the first meeting) boasted a total of more than two hundred and fifty members (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1). By January 1974, the six existing MACs (here rather optimistically including the stagnating Bonn MAC chaired by Birrenbach) totaled about four hundred members. As of November



Bonn, efforts begun at the latest by December 1973, Huntley continued to consult Birrenbach and even tapped him as a potential co-chairman or “honorary president” for such an undertaking. However, another Mid-Atlantic Club never appeared in the Federal Republic after the fading away of the Bonn MAC.<sup>136</sup>

While Birrenbach, and the Federal Republic, might have taken part in the larger MAC endeavor only ostensibly and fleetingly, the phenomenon of the Mid-Atlantic Clubs deserves a degree of attention in any study of German Atlanticism. For one thing, the MACs enjoyed a certain significance in so far as some Germans did participate in their activities, briefly in the Bonn MAC as well as, especially, abroad.<sup>137</sup> The MAC

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1973, Huntley predicted that within another year there would be at least seven or eight MACs and looked to a time when a MAC existed in each big city of the Atlantic world, collectively forming “the town meeting of the Atlantic Community.” Other major cities Huntley considered at this time as possible MAC locations included Amsterdam, Geneva, Milan, Rome, San Francisco, and Toronto (Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1).

<sup>136</sup> As of November 1973, Huntley acknowledged that the inactive Bonn MAC was no longer meeting but noted with cautious optimism that conversations were now taking place about the reconstitution of that club and that he was carrying out considerable organizing efforts in major cities elsewhere in the Federal Republic (e.g. Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg) with individuals and steering groups. Regarding a revived Bonn MAC, Huntley consulted Birrenbach (as well as Philip Schmidt-Schlegel of the West German consulate in New York and Frank Roberts) about personnel, including the future, respected *and* non-partisan chairman. Huntley hoped to base the future Bonn MAC not only on Birrenbach (as one of two honorary presidents, the other a member of the SPD), but also on Karl Kaiser (the new head of the DGAP Research Institute), Walther Leisler Kiep (whom Birrenbach had brought Huntley into contact with several years ago), and the DGAP itself (of which Birrenbach was, by then, president). On all this, see the Annual Progress Report on the MACs, October 1972-November 1973, dated 20 November 1973, ACDP K068/1; as well as *The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus*, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1; and Huntley to KB, 5 July 1971, ACDP K066/2.

<sup>137</sup> For instance, a number of Germans living abroad were members of the MACs there, prominent among them Curt Heidenreich (Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities), vice chairman of the Washington DC club. On the two German members of the London MAC as of November 1970, see *The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus*, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1. Other participants in US-based MACs included Karlfried Normann of Mercedes-Benz North America (at the New York City MAC); Otto Kaletsch, the West German General Consul (in New York City); Karl Carstens (speech on 10 April 1973 at the Washington MAC); EC Commissioner Ralf Dahrendorf (speech on 8 June 1973 at the Washington MAC); Jan Reifenberg of the FAZ Washington bureau (speech on 27 November 1973 at the New York City MAC); and Berndt von Staden, the German ambassador to the United States (speech on 21 March 1974 at the New York City MAC). Participants at the Paris MAC included Alfred Fritsch (*Stuttgarter Zeitung-Allgemeine Zeitung*); Günter Oehlke, Director, Bayer Chimie SARL; and a Dr. Türmer, Director, Robert Bosch France. As of September 1972, the London MAC had planned as its next speaker MdB Karl Moersch on “Germany’s *Ostpolitik* and the Atlantic Relationship” (Summary of the Monthly Discussions of the London MAC, 1971-72, September 1972, ACDP K130/1). Also, on 28 June 1972, the London MAC hosted a reception, with Amb. Karl-

episode also exposes the difficulties confronting such an endeavor in the Federal Republic due to its geographic peculiarities. Namely, it would have proven tricky in any case to establish a MAC there akin to those in, for example, London and Paris (or even New York) since no West German city was a genuine capital in that sense. Therefore, it was inevitably tougher to find the same proportion of highly qualified foreigners in the realms of business, journalism and academics. In Bonn, for instance, it would have been particularly thorny to find foreign businessmen, though diplomats and perhaps some academics and press correspondents would have been available. While Birrenbach, as noted, received generally positive responses to his inquiries regarding the founding of a German MAC and met with a broad readiness to enter the club, some individuals addressed also expressed criticisms regarding the inflation of talk circles and referred to the many bodies that had been discussing such issues for years.<sup>138</sup> Despite these hints of a certain fatigue with respect to further infrastructural expansion, the MAC effort ultimately demonstrates the ongoing desire among Atlanticists as a whole to build institutions and the continued impetus, also that coming from outside the Federal Republic, for such initiatives. The episode highlights as well Birrenbach's primary interest in relentlessly policy-influencing institutions. Finally, the starkly partisan form Birrenbach's Bonn MAC assumed underscores the unusually sensitive political situation

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Günther von Hase among those present, for the German parliamentary state secretary in the *Auswärtigen Amt*. On the other hand, Birrenbach appears never to have taken part in MAC activities abroad.

<sup>138</sup> Otto Wolff von Amerongen, for example, pointed in this regard to "bodies on the most varied levels," among them the DGAP, the Königswinter Conferences, the *Atlantik-Brücke* and the Atlantic Institute, as well as the German group of the International Chamber of Commerce, this last with respect to foreign trade (Amerongen to KB, 8 March 1971, ACDP K130/1). Birrenbach also heard concerns regarding the inflation of talk circles from Wilfried Guth (Deutsche Bank *Vorstand*) and Katharina Focke (*Bundeskanzleramt*).

in the Federal Republic, especially after the embarking on a “new” *Ostpolitik* that persistently and sometimes bitterly divided German Atlanticists from one another.<sup>139</sup>

### I. New Meeting Places: The Aspen Institute Berlin

Another effort involving German Atlanticists to shore up frayed relations between Europe, including the Federal Republic, and the United States during the first half of the 1970s was the establishment of the Aspen Institute Berlin in 1974. This European branch represented an expanded overseas presence of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies and was linked to the AIHS Program in International Affairs, also begun that year.<sup>140</sup>

The AIB primarily received financing from the West Berlin government but enjoyed considerable funding as well from private (overwhelmingly German) *Stiftungen*, *Unternehmen* and individuals, among them the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*.<sup>141</sup> With

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<sup>139</sup> For more information on MACs, see The Mid-Atlantic Club: A Modest Contribution to European-North American Consensus, 22 November 1970, ACDP K130/1; The Mid-Atlantic Clubs, June 1971, ACDP K066/2; Notes on the Organization of Mid-Atlantic Clubs, by James R. Huntley, Secretary-Rapporteur of the Mid-Atlantic Club of London, April 1972, ACDP K068/1; and Memorandum for John Tuthill from James Huntley on the Possibilities for Organizing a MAC in Paris, copies to T. Achilles, K. Birrenbach, N. Campbell, D. Ezra, HW Lessing, AW Schmidt, and S. Stamas, 22 October 1971, ACDP K066/2.

<sup>140</sup> On the AIB, see Volker Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Discussions about such an institution commenced at the latest by March 1970 between Joseph E. Slater (President of the AIHS) and J. Robert Schaezel (US Ambassador to the European Communities in Brussels). Founded in Fall 1949 by the Chicago industrialist (and son of a Prussian immigrant) Walter Paepcke (along with several personalities based at the University of Chicago), the AIHS grew out of a commemoration that summer in Aspen (Colorado) of Goethe's 200<sup>th</sup> birthday, attended by Albert Schweitzer, Thomas Mann, José Ortega y Gasset, Thornton Wilder and other world-renowned representatives of humanism. By 1975, though the core facilities were still located in Aspen, the AIHS headquarters was based in New York City, and the institute had expanded its activity into various parts of the country, with offices operating in Palo Alto (CA), Boulder (CO), Washington (DC) and Princeton (NJ). Harlan Cleveland directed the AIHS Program in International Affairs until 1980 out of the Princeton office. For the AIHS also maintaining an Aspen Regional Program that sought to deepen the attachment to humanistic values throughout the entire United States, see the Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2. However, as of June 1980, the AIB remained the only permanent Aspen Institute seminar facility outside the US (Harlan Cleveland Report, 18 June 1980, ACDP K191/2).

<sup>141</sup> At least initially, the AIB support from the West Berlin government included DM 2.5 million over four years for personnel and administrative costs as well as a plot of land and a rent-free building in a high-class residential area on the island of Schwanenwerder in the Havel River, featuring what was described as a magnificent view over Wannsee. As of April 1984, approximately two-thirds of the AIB budget derived from the West Berlin Senate, while the rest was provided by the above-mentioned *Stiftungen*, *Unternehmen* and individuals. Aside from the FTS, these *Stiftungen* consisted, among others, of the *Pressestiftung*

Birrenbach's American contact Shepard Stone as director, the AIB staged fifteen to twenty conferences per year on a variety of current themes, with a focus on the European-American relationship and the East-West dialogue.<sup>142</sup> Frequent cooperation with fellow Atlanticist organizations included the German-American Economic and Finance Seminars (on, for instance, trade and currency questions) conducted in Berlin, starting in May 1976, with the *Atlantik-Brücke* and American Council on Germany, each aiming to inform as well as to facilitate experience exchanges and personal contacts between *Führungskräften* from the younger generation (35-45 years of age).<sup>143</sup> The AIB also

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*Tagesspiegel*, the *Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung*, the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk*, the *Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft*, the *Axel Springer Stiftung* and the *Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH* (AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).

<sup>142</sup> As of 1974-75, the AIB Executive Committee consisted of Robert O. Anderson (Chairman of the AIHS Board of Trustees, Chairman of the Atlantic Richfield Company, Los Angeles), Marion Gräfin Dönhoff (Publisher of *Der Zeit* and the sole German among the increasingly international AIHS trustees), Joseph E. Slater (President of the AIHS), Shepard Stone, and MdB Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU). Other members of the AIB eV included Sir Alan Bullock (historian, Master of St. Catherine's College, Oxford); Ralf Dahrendorf (Director of the London School of Economics); Richard Löwenthal (Professor at the Free University of Berlin); Robert McNamara (President of the World Bank, Washington DC); and Jean-François Revel (*L'Express*, Paris). Meanwhile, the honorary members of the AIB eV comprised Willy Brandt (SPD Chairman); Alfons Goppel (Minister-President of Bavaria); John McCloy (former US High Commissioner); Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; and Klaus Schütz (*Regierender Bürgermeister* of West Berlin) (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2). Stone had previously been president of the International Association for Cultural Freedom (Paris), a private organization with worldwide activities and a significant trans-Atlantic character. Slater had earlier spent six years in Germany, three as the deputy American secretary at the Allied Control Council in Berlin and three as general secretary of the Allied High Commission in Bonn. As of April 1984, the AIB staff (counting the director as well as deputy and research directors) came to nine persons in all (AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2).

<sup>143</sup> Participants in the 1<sup>st</sup> German-American Economic Seminar (twenty per side) hailed from such institutions as *Deutscher Bank*, *Dresdner Bank*, *Commerzbank* and *Hapag-Lloyd* as well as First National City Bank, IBM, the *New York Times*, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Standard Oil Company of California, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Guests at the 1<sup>st</sup> German-American Economic Seminar included Klaus Schütz (*Regierender Bürgermeister* of West Berlin), Horst Elfe (President of the *Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Berlin*), and Prof. Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU) along with US Ambassador Martin Hillenbrand (all three days), Paul Volcker (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), John McCloy, and John Diebold. According to Walter Stahl, all the participants considered this first seminar particularly worthwhile, while Hillenbrand characterized it as one of the best seminars in which he had ever been involved (Stahl, *AB-Mitteilungen*, to AB members, 28 May 1976, ACDP K132/1). For another assessment of the 1<sup>st</sup> German-American Economic Seminar as "excellent," see the Protocol of the *AB-Vorstand* meeting on 14 September 1978, ACDP K134/2. A second such German-American Economic Seminar was planned for 12-15 December 1978 with the number of participants limited to twenty-four (twelve per side) because of space considerations. Karl Klasen (AB) suggested inviting as many qualified Berliners as possible to this second seminar and proposed Dieter Hiss (President of the *Landeszentralbank* in Berlin) as German chairman of the function. As of June 1977, the *Atlantik-Brücke* was furthermore

staged conferences with the DGAP and the Aspen Arms Control Consortium, dealing with issues like “Western Security Policy and Arms Control.”<sup>144</sup> While Birrenbach did not play a role in the founding and leadership of this organization, Stone did keep him informed about certain activities, and Birrenbach attended a number of its functions over the years, for instance giving a speech at the AIB on 29 September 1977 on “Relations between Europe and the United States.”<sup>145</sup> Ultimately, the specific endeavors and even

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encouraging the AIB to stage, under AB auspices, a political seminar in the Federal Republic in Fall 1977, in continuation of German-American meetings (essentially nuclear workshops) that had been held in Spitzingsee, Princeton, and Woods Hole (Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* meeting on 8 June 1977, ACDP K134/2). On the AIB’s interest in the generational question, especially its efforts to invite to its conferences “gifted men and women of the younger generation,” see the AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2. For personalities of “*geistiger Autorität*” along with “young people” from “all areas of society” pondering problems of “peace and social welfare [*Wohlfahrt*]” at the AIB, see the Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2. This brochure depicted the AIHS, as a whole, as being characterized by the “engagement of leadership forces and young people.”

<sup>144</sup> By April 1984, the AIB had carried out about 250 conferences with a total of about six thousand participants (AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2). Indicative of the themes addressed was the conference planned for May 1984 on “The German Question: The Two German States in the Context of the East-West Relations” (AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2). The Aspen Arms Control Consortium was organized and managed by the AIHS Program in International Affairs. Conceived of as the nation’s “first team” of academic research units on arms limitation and national security policy, the consortium initially comprised Cornell, Harvard, Stanford, MIT and the Aspen Institute itself and was then enlarged to include the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation and UCLA. Funded mostly by the Rockefeller Foundation, the consortium staged three or four major workshops each year, while a number of research houses around the world, most of them assisted by the Ford Foundation, functioned as active correspondents and, sometimes, participants or even co-sponsors in these workshops. As of June 1980, Paul Doty, Director of the Aspen Institute’s Program on Science, Technology and Humanism (co-located at Harvard with the JFK School’s Center for Science and International Affairs), would be assuming leadership of the consortium. For Harlan Cleveland’s assessment that the discussions of the Arms Control Consortium had “often presaged” shifts in the “postures and policies” of governments, see his Report of 18 June 1980, ACDP K191/2. In a different vein but one that highlights the diversity of interests, the AIB program for 1975 included, among other things, the study group of the Max Planck Institute for Molecular Genetics on 8-9 March (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2). At least at the outset, the AIB also maintained a guest program that offered artists and *Geisteswissenschaftlern* (among them, Bullock and the Indonesian author Mochtar Lubis) the chance to stay and work several weeks in Berlin (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2). As part of its efforts to make its work accessible to a larger Berlin public, the AIB staged as well the Hans Wallenberg Lecture Series (among the speakers: Bullock, Dönhoff, Nahum Goldmann, Pehr Gyllenhammar, Henry Kissinger, Rolf Liebermann, Steven Muller, William Norris, Fritz Stern, Daniel Bell and Edzard Reuter), each lecture followed the next day by a discussion with Berlin guests at the AIB.

<sup>145</sup> Prior to this, Birrenbach had at least planned to attend an international AIB meeting in Berlin from 29 November-2 December 1976 headed up by Raymond Aron. Furthermore, Germans (and other Europeans) also participated in seminars at the AIHS itself. For example, Birrenbach was invited (possibly at the suggestion of Schaetzel) and encouraged, by Dean Acheson and Schaetzel, to take part in a meeting of 17-30 July 1966 at Aspen, where Acheson himself would be the main attraction. Though Birrenbach insisted he would try to attend, he admitted that scheduling issues posed daunting obstacles. Among the German

the location of the AIB reflected the Atlanticist interest in, indeed growing concern about, Berlin and its future.<sup>146</sup>

*J. Expanding the Focus of German Atlanticism: The Trilateral Commission*

However, even as the German Atlanticists continued to strive to strengthen their institutional ties with the Atlantic realm, and especially with the United States, arguably the most significant development in the evolution of German Atlanticism in the early 1970s, and in some ways its most significant challenge, was the gradual expansion of its geographical focus. Here, the most important element was the substantial German participation in the efforts to integrate the Japanese into the Atlanticist worldview and the functioning of the Atlanticist network. This was largely a reflection of the growing recognition of Japan's increasing weight in world affairs, including with respect to trans-Atlantic relations. As with so many of the trends and perspectives we have already explored, this particular development also found institutional expression, in this case

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enthusiasts was Theo Sommer (editor-in-chief, *Die Zeit*), who, having spent time at Aspen, glowingly portrayed the AIHS to *Newsweek* as an unprecedented concentration of “*Begabung, geistige[r] Brillanz und Weltkenntnis*” (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2).

<sup>146</sup> Conferences staged by the AIB addressed, among other themes, Berlin's political situation (occasioned by the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the construction of the Wall and the approximate 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Four Power Agreement); economic prospects; architecture and city planning (in international comparison); and role as a center of *Wissenschaft* and culture. As Chancellor, Willy Brandt justified the well-considered choice of Berlin as the location for the AIB by pointing to the city's function as an “intersection” and “testing ground [*Prüfstand*]” of the new relations between East and West (Brochure on the AIHS, USA and AIB, ACDP K191/2). Furthermore, the directors of Berlin's leading institutions of *Wissenschaft* and culture regularly gathered in talk circles at the AIB, thus initiating, for instance, considerations about an institute for advanced study (in 1978, the AIB assumed the planning of the *Wissenschaftskollegs zu Berlin*, which was founded in 1981), the strengthening of the Berlin *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft*, and the shaping of the celebrations of the 750<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the city's founding (*AIB-Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2). Meanwhile, the German Marshall Fund of the United States also took into account the importance of Berlin, supporting a number of projects that were entirely staged or at least held meetings there, among them the International Center Cities Program; a Summer 1974 experimental German language improvement program (in cooperation with the DAAD) for American social scientists; and an April 1975 International Public Employee Unions symposium on issues confronting public sector labor organizations.

most notably in the form of the Trilateral Commission.<sup>147</sup> While, as we shall see, many of the forms and themes touched upon earlier in our discussions of the Atlanticist institutions recur with regard to the Trilateral Commission, this organization also presented Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists with new opportunities to be exploited as well as new problems to be resolved. Despite the rather precipitous decline in his political influence during the early 1970s, outlined in Chapter 6, Birrenbach served as a center point with respect to the German involvement in the Trilateral Commission. Consequently, as so often before, examining his activities in this regard offers us a valuable window into this aspect of the further evolution of German Atlanticism.

Birrenbach's own interest in Japan and his appreciation for that country's importance with respect to trans-Atlantic relations had evinced themselves at the latest by the early 1960s. The business of the Thyssen firm vis-à-vis Japan vitally contributed to Birrenbach's consciousness of that nation and directly led to his only trip there, in March 1962, prior to the 1970s.<sup>148</sup> Birrenbach's "early" interest in Japan during the first half of the 1960s is perhaps best attested to by his short book *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, which in addition to its German- and English-language versions was also published, in 1964, in translation in Japan. In a special afterword, Birrenbach stressed the

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<sup>147</sup> On the Trilateral Commission, see Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) as well as Holly Sklar, ed., *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management* (Boston: South End Press, 1980).

<sup>148</sup> On Birrenbach's eye-opening trip to Japan, particularly the case pertaining to his understanding of the Japanese relationship with China, which he considered "*sui generis*" and "hardly comparable to the relations of any two other states," see KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. He was astonished to find that Japan (including, on a deep level, the Japanese "population") "strangely" did not fear but rather "admired" China (at least in part as "the great bringer of culture [*Kulturbringer*]" to Japan, whereas Japanese achievements lay more "in the civilizational area") and valued it as "the great market of tomorrow." Therefore, also due to the "Hiroshima complex," Japan had not yet taken the security measures, such as those enacted by India, that one might have normally expected in reaction to the "development" of China. On Birrenbach already during his time in Argentina having noted Japan's appearance there, as well as in Chile, as a competitor, see KB, Buenos Aires, to Dir. Robert Nyssen, c/o Stahlunion-Export GmbH, Düsseldorf, 11 June 1952, ACDP K207/4.

significance of Japanese cooperation for the construction of the Atlantic Partnership.<sup>149</sup> However, despite these precedents, Birrenbach's engagement with Japan only became especially characteristic beginning in the early 1970s, a period during which the broad notion of trilateralism was gaining considerable currency. To some degree, Birrenbach's sources for information on Japan during this period were similar to those he enjoyed with respect to the United States. Books and other publications, his American contacts, as well as occasional personal meetings with the Japanese ambassador to the Federal Republic and with further prominent Japanese personalities helped him form a more accurate picture of contemporary Japan. To a far greater extent than his previous output, Birrenbach's writings from this time repeatedly insisted on the need for a recognition of Japan's importance in the process of solving trans-Atlantic problems.<sup>150</sup> Nevertheless, while Birrenbach exhibited a certain knowledge and appreciation of Japan, he did not possess with regard to that nation anything even remotely approaching the extensive network of contacts and constant communication that he enjoyed with respect to the

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<sup>149</sup> Also in the non-Japanese versions of the book, Birrenbach depicted Japan, along with Turkey, as belonging to the Atlantic Community, albeit not primarily by virtue of any cultural similarity but rather simply due to their status as powers threatened by the East.

<sup>150</sup> For Birrenbach acknowledging that "the factor Japan" had to be seriously "taken into consideration" when dealing with European-American relations, see KB to John McCloy, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach's awareness that durable settlements of certain issues could not be crafted in "purely bilateral" EC-US negotiations but required the inclusion of Japan in the "negotiation context [*Verhandlungskontext*]," see KB Report of 20 February 1973, ACDP K183/2. Thus, for Birrenbach on the "fundamental" necessity of negotiating "an acceptable world trade and monetary system" and, convinced that such problems could only be constructively solved "in cooperation with Japan," devising "some formula to connect Japan in trade and monetary affairs directly to the bilateral American-European partnership," see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach's cognizance as of 1969 of the "extraordinarily close" cooperation of Japan with the "main NATO partners" and Switzerland with respect to currency questions in the Club of Ten, see KB to Prof. Dr. phil. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2. In this letter to Schieder, Birrenbach argued that the "rapid upswing [*rasante Aufschwung*]" of Japan had transformed it into, "even if still not a power center [*Machtzentrum*]," a "first-order decision center [*Entscheidungszentrum*]" in the world" and a "first-order power factor in the Pacific." The further Japanese economic power developed, the more certain it became that Japanese military power (though "not absolutely the nuclear component") would also gain in consequence, a trend Birrenbach detected in the swiftly growing role of Japanese "security-political interests" with regard to the NPT negotiations, as manifested by a mounting hesitance to sign the treaty.



Atlantic sphere, particularly the United States. For Birrenbach, there was, prior to 1973, virtually no Pacific counterpart to his Atlantic network that enabled him to stay so well abreast of developments in this region.

In any case, Birrenbach was far from alone in his grasp of the significance of Japan and even prior to the founding of the Trilateral Commission, the expansion of the geographic focus of German Atlanticism had also expressed itself institutionally. This became evident earliest and most extensively at the Atlantic Institute, where the first major effort was undertaken to gradually and institutionally integrate the Japanese, so different in their culture and tradition, into the Atlanticist network. After a period during which Japanese participants were included in relevant Atlantic Institute conferences, as well as in the Young Leaders Program (starting in 1969), the Institute finally admitted the Japanese, at their own request, in 1970.<sup>151</sup> Henceforth, the Institute's program would take an even greater account of the need for a closer dialogue between the Atlantic countries and Japan, a recognition reflected in its studies, publications, conferences (some of which were actually held in Japan) as well as other projects and activities.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Given the generally business-oriented nature of the Atlantic Institute, it comes as no surprise that the key partner in this particular process of Japanese integration was the *Keidanren*, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations (essentially the Japanese counterpart to the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*). This entity hereafter handled AI affairs in Japan, and the president of the *Keidanren*, Kogoro Uemura, became one of the Japanese representatives on the Board of Governors.

<sup>152</sup> For instance, in March 1971, as part of a major study project on "Trade and Investment Policies for the 1970s," the Atlantic Institute, actively supported by the *Keidanren*, staged its first conference in Japan (Tokyo). The international conference, entitled "Trade and Investment Policies for the 1970s - New Challenges for the Atlantic Area and Japan," was chaired by Kogoro Uemura, an AI Governor and the President of the *Keidanren*. It was attended by about ninety leading representatives of the public and private sectors of Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan. Also around this time, the Atlantic Institute had several projects under consideration for 1972-73 dealing with Japan. These included, in the realm of "East-West Relations," a study of economic, financial and trade relations between the "countries of the Atlantic area (plus Japan)," on the one hand, and Eastern Europe (with the Soviet Union), on the other; and, with respect to "Japan and the Atlantic World," an examination of Japan's future political and security role in Asia as well as her relationship with North America and Western Europe. Furthermore, the Atlantic Institute and the *Keidanren* organized an international conference in Tokyo in September 1973 and published a collection of the resulting papers, edited by Curt Gasteyer, as an Atlantic Paper in 1974.

However, the integration of the Japanese into the Atlantic Institute was carried out in a manner that did not place them on an equal level with other key nations. While gaining entrée to several organs of the AI, the Japanese received a rather small number of seats on the Board of Governors given their relative importance and were denied a place on the newly created, and quite influential, Foreign Policy Committee. This appears to have been, at least in part, a result of the intractable problems existing at the time between Europe and Japan, and it was only on the basis of an organizational compromise that Birrenbach assumed the chairmanship of the FPC.<sup>153</sup>

In light of the qualified nature of such earlier efforts, we can say that the key institutional expression of the increasing appreciation of Japan's significance was the Trilateral Commission, the first organization that made a vigorous attempt to integrate the Japanese institutionally into the Atlanticist network on an equal basis. Inaugurated in July 1973, the commission was an American initiative, the brainchild of its chairman

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Guest speakers addressing AI Participating Members meetings included Hisao Kanamori (Japan Economic Research Center). Among the "respondents" to the AI's Participating Members meeting of 7 November 1975 was Kozo Okabe (Labour Attaché, Japanese Embassy in Bonn). For Japanese AI Participating Member firms as of 1977 (the collection done on a general basis by the *Keidanren*), see the Memo from Martin J. Hillenbrand, AIIA, Director-General, Paris, to all members of the Board of Governors, 9 June 1977, ACDP K058. On Katsuichi Hayashi, chief Paris correspondent of the major Japanese newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun*, among the journalists at the AI Press Seminar of 3 April 1978, see the Report on the AIIA Press Seminar, 3 April 1978, ACDP K129/1. The Atlantic Institute's interest in "non-Atlantic" countries besides Japan is intimated, for example, by the role of Roberto Campos (former Brazilian Minister for Planning) as a guest speaker at a Participating Member meeting. For new AI Participating Members in 1973 including the Bank of New South Wales (Australia), see the AI Activity Report 1973, ACDP K104/2.

<sup>153</sup> Announced at the Atlantic Institute's Board of Governors meeting on 27 November 1971, the organizational reshuffling connected with the Japanese entrance involved, in part, a redistribution of the functions of the Policy Committee (previously responsible for both the administration and policy direction of the institute). Thus, as of June 1972, the Japanese were represented on the Board and the Economic Committee as well as on a newly established Steering Committee. Indeed, the Economic Committee had been enlarged by one member and now included a representative from Japan as well as from Australia. Headed by the chairman of the Board of Governors, the Steering Committee was elected by the Board from its own members and acted on its behalf between meetings. Meanwhile, the Foreign Policy Committee took on many of the tasks of the now defunct Policy Committee, namely focusing on setting the guidelines for and supervising the work of the institute, in the process providing direction with respect to the diverse problems concerning the alliance and of relevance to the institute's activities. However, with the creation of a separate Steering Committee, Birrenbach was freed of the task of guiding the organizational work and management of the Atlantic Institute that had been among the responsibilities of the Policy Committee.

David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan Bank in New York City. The commission was based on the premise that the United States, Western Europe *and* Japan, the most powerful democratic industrial complexes in the world had common interests and global responsibilities. Cooperation between these three trilateral regions would be decisive not only for intra-trilateral development but also for the future development of the entire world, and therefore concerns existed, especially among Rockefeller and other Americans, about the trilateral strains in the early 1970s, for instance in the fields of finance, economics and trade. The Trilateral Commission, at least ostensibly, was an endeavor to institutionalize the necessary contacts and collaboration on a certain level of relations with regard to a wide range of issues, including foreign, political, security, economic and development policies. This was seen as being of considerable relevance especially for European-Japanese relations, the allegedly weak leg of the triangle. Looked at from a somewhat different perspective, just as the German construction of and participation in the Atlanticist institutions had been undertaken in large part as a means to break a certain strain of German isolationism, the Trilateral Commission was touted by many of its proponents as a prime instrument to overcome isolationist and nationalist tendencies in Japan and to encourage there a greater acceptance of internationalism as well as the notion of interdependence.

Whatever its novel elements, the Trilateral Commission was essentially an evolution of the Atlanticist institutions we have discussed earlier and shared many of their characteristics. This was, by and large, an American-style action committee, though in many ways operating on a bigger and more lavish scale than other variants, such as the

Monnet Committee.<sup>154</sup> The Trilateral Commission consisted of a broad professional range of leading private citizens from the three regions, comprising politicians, former government officials, businessmen, labor heads, jurists, scholars, and members of the media.<sup>155</sup> Sharing the critique of government already entertained by the Atlanticist institutions, the commission produced joint recommendations addressing the many problems confronting the trilateral regions as well as, indeed, the world beyond and promoted their implementation, especially vis-à-vis governments, intergovernmental organizations and other “opinion leaders.”<sup>156</sup> With its reliance on policy-oriented reports, drawn up by the various trilateral task forces established as a basis for discussions and proposals, the commission exhibited the same enthusiasm for and confidence in the practical utility of scholarship and *Wissenschaft* as the Atlanticist institutions that preceded it.<sup>157</sup> Likewise, with its chief publications, newsletters, press conferences, post-meeting communiqués and general desire to exert influence as well on the broader

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<sup>154</sup> As of July 1977, the Trilateral Commission totaled more than two hundred members from the three regions, although the Executive Committee was considerably smaller.

<sup>155</sup> As was typical of such organizations, the commission’s membership found itself in a certain flux with some figures entering and others leaving, the latter often because they had assumed government positions. Though no strict rotation was imposed, the commission remained constantly aware of the desirability of regularly introducing new and younger members.

<sup>156</sup> Governments were viewed as indispensable but also as experiencing difficulty in dealing with many of the key issues, either because they raised politically thorny questions or because they were of such a long-range nature that they failed to garner sufficient attention from men inevitably preoccupied with day-to-day crises. Members of the commission could not belong to governments, including in the capacity of officials, since it was believed they would otherwise not be free to express their own ideas.

<sup>157</sup> The trilateral task force reports were produced by *rapporteurs* (rooted in the *Wissenschaft*) from each of the three regions, themselves drawing on a wide array of consultants and experts (including the members of the commission) from politics, *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft*, also from each of these regions and sometimes beyond. For *rapporteurs* being in contact with prominent authorities and organizations like the respective development ministries, the World Bank and the OECD, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2. Task force reports stressed concrete proposals, while being brief enough that policymakers would actually read them. In addition to helping the commission understand the various issues in question and formulate its recommendations, the very process of generating the task force reports was intended to encourage cooperation between Americans, Europeans and Japanese. Like the products of many other Atlanticist organizations, the trilateral reports became a core source of Birrenbach’s knowledge. For instance, note the reliance on the Trilateral Commission paper of December 1974 on “Energy: A Strategy for International Action” in assessing Japan’s energy dependence in ACDP K198/2.

masses, the commission demonstrated a concern with public relations similar to that of its Atlanticist relatives.<sup>158</sup> All of this meant that, whatever the differences in detail, the functioning of the Trilateral Commission was well trodden ground for Birrenbach and other Atlanticists taking part, especially given the overlap in membership between the already existing Atlanticist organizations and the Trilateral Commission.<sup>159</sup>

In early 1973, Birrenbach accepted Rockefeller's offer to become a member of the Trilateral Commission. This invitation was facilitated by Birrenbach's having been in contact with Rockefeller, and other figures at Chase Manhattan Bank, since at least the early 1960s and also enjoying connections with several organizers of the commission. These organizers included Zbigniew Brzezinski, executive director of the commission; Gerard Smith, chairman of the American group; and Max Kohnstamm, chairman of the European group.<sup>160</sup> Birrenbach thus became the first German member of the Executive Committee, the commission's key organ.<sup>161</sup> In logistical terms, this meant yet another major commitment on his part, entailing effort, time, meetings and travel, to fit into an already tight schedule.<sup>162</sup> Whatever Birrenbach's lip service to goals such as

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<sup>158</sup> Chief publications of the Trilateral Commission included, most notably, its task force reports. Meanwhile, the American and Japanese groups also distributed newsletters, dealing with the activities of the commission as well as with more expansive trilateral issues, to a large circle of influential individuals. For example, as of July 1977, the American newsletter, entitled *Trialogue*, went to about two thousand people in the United States and elsewhere. On the expectation that commission members would further exercise influence beyond the principal but relatively narrow "target groups," even on "the masses [*die breite Masse*]," see the KB Report about the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>159</sup> For Birrenbach on the Trilateral Commission adhering to the "well-known" American practice of "free personalities" coming together to make proposals to governments, "independent of party and political ties [*Bindungen*]," see the KB Report about the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>160</sup> Central among the tasks assumed by Brzezinski as executive director was the preparation, planning and guidance of the commission's studies. McCloy was one of those with close ties to Chase Manhattan Bank.

<sup>161</sup> The ExComm of the Trilateral Commission was especially responsible for producing, discussing and deciding upon the commission's policy recommendations. Drawn from the larger group of commission members, the ExComm consisted of the regional chairmen and deputy chairmen as well as thirty other individuals, among them twelve from the various countries of the European Community and Norway.

<sup>162</sup> Meetings of the full Trilateral Commission occurred about once every nine months in one of the three regions. Such gatherings were characterized by discussions of task force reports; the adoption of

strengthening the American-Japanese and European-Japanese legs of the triangle, he clearly saw the commission's true value as a means to facilitate the construction of the bilateral European-American partnership, especially in so far as he continued to view Japanese cooperation as essential to solving the major problems bedeviling them in the fields of trade, currency and energy.<sup>163</sup> Aside from this overarching concern, certain contingent elements may also have encouraged his participation. For instance, Birrenbach considered the Trilateral Commission particularly useful at this time since he expected that the Watergate affair and its aftermath would cripple the ability of the American government, now more dependent on Congress, to arrive at constructive solutions to international problems.<sup>164</sup> Birrenbach may also have been encouraged by Wilhelm Grewe, the West German ambassador to Japan during the early 1970s and a former ambassador to the United States with whom Birrenbach enjoyed close contacts, who argued that it was essential to integrate Japan "into the Western world" via trilateral cooperation to prevent it from simply "swim[ming] around freely" in the wake of the American diplomatic opening to China.<sup>165</sup>

In addition to becoming a member of the ExComm, Birrenbach also played a key role in ensuring that a German group actually took part in the trilateral project. Funding

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resolutions and proposals; presentations by and consultations with government, legislative and international leaders as well as experts in the fields under consideration; and seminars about the country in which the meeting was being held. In the lead-up to meetings of the Trilateral Commission or its ExComm, there were also gatherings of the individual regional and national groups, with the primary purposes of providing commissioners an opportunity to proffer suggestions on the task force reports and to hammer out common group standpoints in preparation for the upcoming "higher-level" meetings.

<sup>163</sup> For such lip service as well as Birrenbach's genuine interest in the potentialities of the Trilateral Commission, see for example KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York, 5 July 1974, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>164</sup> KB to Otto Friedrich, President of the BDA, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1.

<sup>165</sup> Wilhelm Grewe to KB, 2 January 1974, ACDP K081/2. On Birrenbach's anticipation that "a certain arms build-up [*Aufrüstung*]" by Japan was "unavoidable," even if only to become "more independent" from the United States, see KB to Prof. Theodor Schieder, Cologne, 29 September 1969, ACDP K023/2.

the commission was no small undertaking, with the expected cost for the first triennium, comprising the expenses for both the administration and the task force studies, amounting to almost \$2.2 million.<sup>166</sup> While of course expected to provide only a fraction of this sum, the Germans were responsible for the largest share of financing of any of the members of the European group, a particularly daunting task given the fundraising difficulties in the Federal Republic noted earlier in this chapter.<sup>167</sup> With respect to securing the European financing, Birrenbach was among the first people to whom Kohnstamm turned. Indeed, Birrenbach's willingness to secure financing for the commission and his well-known proficiency in such endeavors was a major reason, along naturally with his expertise and authority in the Federal Republic, that he was invited to join the ExComm (as well as the commission's Finance Committee).<sup>168</sup> With respect to the German funding, Birrenbach addressed once again his proven financing network. Regarding the administrative costs of the European group, Birrenbach tapped both the federal government and the *Wirtschaft* for funds. Beginning in April 1973, Birrenbach was in touch with the heads of the four major German economic organizations: Hans-Günther Sohl (BDI President), Otto Friedrich (BDA), Otto Wolff von Amerongen

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<sup>166</sup> The Trilateral Commission had cost a projected \$2,193,000 for its first triennium, while the second triennium projection was \$2,278,491 (actually a considerable reduction in real expenses) ("The Trilateral Commission," July 1977, ACDP K062/1).

<sup>167</sup> This was due to a system of determining the various national shares of the administrative costs of the European group based on relative national economic strength (GNP). In practice, this meant that the Federal Republic was expected to pay 25-30% of the annual administrative expenses of the European group during the first three years (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2). As of May 1975, the costs of the Trilateral Commission for Europe were \$130,000 per year (meetings: \$60,000; research: \$50,000; secretariat: \$20,000) (François Duchêne to KB, 16 May 1975, ACDP K072/2).

<sup>168</sup> The other person, besides Birrenbach, that Kohnstamm immediately approached with regard to initial financing was the Italian Giovanni Agnelli, the president of Fiat, who also promised his assistance. Like Birrenbach, Agnelli was selected as a member of the ExComm in part due to his value to the commission with respect to financing. Thanks to Agnelli's largesse, in particular his early donation of approximately \$50,000 (Birrenbach cited a current figure of \$45,000 in KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1), Italy proved quite forthcoming with regard to its share of the commission's administration expenses.

(DIHT) and Alwin Münchmeyer (BdB).<sup>169</sup> It was from these *Spitzenverbänden* that Birrenbach obtained the lion's share of the German funding for the commission's administrative costs. Meanwhile, his key contact in the government was with the *Auswärtigen Amt*, particularly State Secretary Paul Frank, the result of which was the securing of a lesser governmental financing, to the tune of DM 20,000 a year.<sup>170</sup>

With respect to the German funding of the commission's individual task force studies, Birrenbach turned to the *Stiftungen*, believing that such financing could not be expected from the *Spitzenverbänden* and separate firms of the *Wirtschaft*. Here, Birrenbach strove to exploit his influential position at the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* as well as his connections to the other German foundations. These efforts were not entirely successful, with, for example, his attempt to encourage the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* (and even the UK-based Nuffield Foundation) to contribute to the funding of the trilateral reports apparently resulting in failure. They were not rendered any easier by an American-devised system of task forces that did not really fit neatly into the framework of European foundation law.<sup>171</sup> However, Birrenbach did succeed in securing adequate funding for the task forces from his own *Thyssen Stiftung*. Henceforth (after the first year), the *Thyssen Stiftung* would finance four-fifths of the European share of the funding for the task force reports, approximately \$40,000 per year out of the European share of

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<sup>169</sup> Wolff von Amerongen came to support the idea of a Trilateral Commission after consultation with his American and Japanese friends.

<sup>170</sup> While Birrenbach had initially entertained some hopes of obtaining at least nominal funding from the trade unions, such financing never materialized.

<sup>171</sup> On the most important European foundations having difficulty aiding the Trilateral Commission since, according to European foundation law, they could, as a rule, only finance projects centered on universities or research institutes, see KB Report about the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2. At the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, several such members, including Birrenbach, were entrusted with examining this question to determine whether a compromise between the American and European perspectives was possible.



\$50,000.<sup>172</sup> Thus, thanks primarily to Birrenbach's efforts, the German funding for the Trilateral Commission was rapidly secured. In so far as Birrenbach simply relied on the components of his financing network that had already proven their worth over the years with respect to the Atlanticist infrastructure, namely *Stiftungen*, the economic *Spitzenverbände*, and the federal government, we can speak not only of an institutional continuity between Atlanticism and the related phenomenon of Trilateralism, but also of a continuity in regard to the financing of their institutions.

However, merely securing the German funding for the Trilateral Commission was not the end of this issue for Birrenbach, particularly while the financial contributions of other key nations remained in doubt. In contrast to the relatively quick successes in the United States, Japan, Italy and the Federal Republic, such financing (and participation) posed a far more difficult proposition, at least at the outset, for several European nations, most significantly France and Britain.<sup>173</sup> Birrenbach insisted that the European financing of the commission assume a truly collective character, rather than becoming a burden

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<sup>172</sup> The annual research budget for the Trilateral Commission amounted to about \$220,000. The French committee provided the other one-fifth (about \$10,000) of the total European share of \$50,000. These figures all pertain to the commission's first triennium (Duchêne to KB, 16 May 1975, ACDP K072/2).

<sup>173</sup> A number of factors fed into this situation, among them the struggles of especially the European economies during this period with the effects of the "energy crisis." Furthermore, foundations remained comparatively still few and far between in Europe and, as already noted, the prominent ones that did exist were hampered in their dealings with the Trilateral Commission by incongruities between the American-designed task force system and European foundation law. Aside from these general European circumstances, there were also factors of specific relevance to individual countries. Thus, even apart from the straits in which its economy found itself, money had always been rather tough to collect in Britain. Meanwhile, attitudes in France towards any type of trilateral organization and vis-à-vis trilateral matters as a whole were mixed at best, with the posture of the Messmer government crucial in this regard. Well into 1974, therefore well into the life of the commission, a state of uncertainty persisted with respect to a sufficient financial contribution from and participation of these two nations, as well as several smaller ones. As of April 1974, the matter had still not been entirely settled, particularly as it pertained to France, though at this point the British representatives believed a certain amount of funding from their side would be possible (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2). Meanwhile, the Frenchman Georges Berthoin assumed that, following the upcoming French presidential elections, France would alter its course "in the sense of a *rapprochement* [*Annäherung*] with the United States," which would also lead to change in the French perspective on the Trilateral Commission, and was therefore requesting a postponement of a definitive decision in these affairs to the June 1974 ExComm meeting.

borne primarily by the Federal Republic and Italy.<sup>174</sup> Consequently, during the first year, Birrenbach withheld the German financing he had arranged, with the exception of an initial sum critical to enabling the European group (and, therefore, the commission itself) to function even without French and British funding.<sup>175</sup> Only starting in July 1974, the second year of the commission, when the French, British and other recalcitrant European groups belatedly resolved the funding questions originally bedeviling the organization by beginning to contribute to the financing (principally administrative expenses), did Birrenbach finally approve the release of the full German contribution he had previously secured.<sup>176</sup> All of this was especially significant in light of the stress the Americans placed at this time on shifting the onus of financing from themselves and, instead, having also the Europeans and Japanese shoulder it equally.<sup>177</sup>

In addition to this crucial matter of financing, Birrenbach also played a central part in determining the composition of and in actually recruiting the German group, thus

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<sup>174</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach's concerns in this regard became so great that, at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, he suggested, along with several other participants (though the view did not prevail in the end), that if a nation like France ultimately did not take part, the Trilateral Commission could be transformed into a "Multilateral Commission" in which the individual European "states" interested in such an undertaking could continue on with the project and its essential task together with the United States, Japan and Canada, albeit "on a somewhat less financially extravagant level" (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2).

<sup>175</sup> This initial sum of DM 30,000, paid one-third by the federal government and two-thirds by the *Wirtschaft*, was intended for the first meeting of the commission, actually of its ExComm, in October 1973 in Tokyo and possibly for the first meeting of the European group (KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1). At least at the start, the European group was able to operate thanks to American financial and intellectual assistance, funding support from the German and Italian groups, as well as financial and infrastructural aid from Max Kohnstamm's EC Institute for University Studies (Brussels).

<sup>176</sup> On the French taking full part in the work and financing of the commission after the change of government in France, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 3 July 1974, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>177</sup> During the first year of the commission, therefore through July 1974, the Ford Foundation paid entirely for the task force studies, but beginning in the second year, the European and Japanese groups were expected to pay an increasing share of the costs of the task force reports, each one-sixth of the amount in the second year and each one-third of the amount in the third year (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2). On the Americans assuming the complete expenses for the task force studies and almost the full expenses for the administration for the first year of the commission (1973-74), see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2.

continuing in his familiar role as gatekeeper. As usual, he took this function very seriously, convinced that the success of the Trilateral Commission depended to a large extent on the personnel involved.<sup>178</sup> In this regard, he remained in regular contact with Kohnstamm, who as European chairman was quite engaged in the recruiting of suitable members for the European group and was in consultation not only with Birrenbach and other Europeans to this end but also with Smith and Brzezinski.<sup>179</sup> While selecting the German group, Birrenbach had to take into account several factors. For starters, it was necessary to name another German member to the ExComm, this one linked to the governing SPD-FDP coalition (Birrenbach, of course, represented the opposition). In consultation with and with the support of Helmut Schmidt and Herbert Wehner, Birrenbach (along with Kohnstamm) ultimately agreed on the SPD MdB Klaus Dieter Arndt, president of the *Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung* in Berlin and former state secretary in the *Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft*, who had been suggested by the federal government. Besides Birrenbach and Arndt, twelve other Germans (the internal *Beratergruppe*, as Birrenbach referred to the twelve non-ExComm members), for a total of fourteen, formed the German group. Though not necessarily clearly differentiated according to party sympathy or membership, approximately six of these came from each the governing coalition and the opposition.<sup>180</sup> In working to get this group together, Birrenbach now maintained contact not only with Kohnstamm but also with Arndt.

Naturally, Birrenbach exercised the most influence over the selection of those individuals in his own “party group” to the Trilateral Commission. Here, Birrenbach had

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<sup>178</sup> KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1.

<sup>179</sup> Meanwhile, the Japanese chairman was Takeshi Watanabe, former executive director of the IMF and of the World Bank, as well as former chairman of the Asian Development Bank.

<sup>180</sup> KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1. Following his death in January 1974, Arndt was replaced by the SPD MdB Herbert Ehrenberg.

to take into consideration that the *Wirtschaft* was paying the preponderant share of the German contribution to the commission's administration costs. This meant that the *Spitzenverbände* of the *Wirtschaft*, and more specifically their leaders, also enjoyed a certain role in selecting and recruiting potential members for the commission. At the same time, in Birrenbach's mind, other factors made it eminently desirable to create something beyond a mere group (and conference) of *Wirtschaftlern*, a course proposed, for instance, by Otto Friedrich. For example, due to the emphasis placed on scholarship in the activities of the commission, it was important to include as well a *Wissenschaftler* in the opposition group. Furthermore, in light of the complexity of the problems to be confronted by the commission, which far transcended narrow *wirtschaftspolitische* questions, and in view of the linkages between foreign, security, trade, currency and financial affairs in trilateral relations, Birrenbach deemed it necessary to include representatives not only from the different parties but also from a wide range of social fields, comprising as well as outside of the *Wirtschaft*, since these diverse figures often brought with them a unique familiarity with at least some of these connections.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> KB to Otto Friedrich, 29 May 1973, ACDP K081/1. As of 27 September 1973, the German members of the Trilateral Commission included Birrenbach; Klaus Dieter Arndt (also member of the European Parliament); Werner Dollinger (MdB; Deputy Chairman of the CSU); Karl Hauenschild (President, *IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik*; member of the DGB-Vorstand); Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute; Professor of Political Science at the Saarland University, Saarbrücken); Otto Graf Lambsdorff (MdB, FDP; member of the *Vorstand* of the *Victoria-Rückversicherung AG*); Eugen Loderer (President, *IG Metall*; member of the DGB-Vorstand); Alwin Münchmeyer (President, *Bundesverband deutscher Banken*; partner in the bank Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., Hamburg); Gerhard Schröder (member of the CDU-Präsidium; Chairman, *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee); Hans-Günther Sohl (President of the BDI; Chairman of the Board of Directors of the *August-Thyssen-Hütte AG*); Theo Sommer (Editor-in-Chief, *Die Zeit*); Heinz Oskar Vetter (Chairman of the *Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes*); and Otto Wolff von Amerongen (President, *Otto Wolff AG*; President of the *Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages*) (List of European Members of the Trilateral Commission, 27 September 1973, ACDP K081/1). For the governing coalition being represented by Arndt, Lambsdorff, Kaiser, Sommer, Vetter, Loderer, and Hauenschild; and the opposition by Birrenbach, Schröder, Dollinger, Sohl, Münchmeyer, and Wolff von Amerongen, see KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1. While at this point Birrenbach was proposing a *Wissenschaftler* (namely Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz in Hamburg) to occupy the opposition's remaining free place, it appears that as of September 1973 this position had been filled by Fritz Dietz (President,

As with each of the Atlanticist institutions and initiatives we have previously examined, it is virtually impossible to gauge with any great precision the success of the Trilateral Commission. However, in touting the organization's growing impact and political achievements, pleased proponents over the years cited in all three regions the impressive number of commissioners entering high government positions and the wide press and mass media coverage of the institution and its activities, exposure providing in turn a substantial boost to the circulation of its reports and other published material.<sup>182</sup> Moreover, the organizers and members of the commission, as a whole, were sufficiently convinced of its effectiveness and of the ongoing need for such an institution to repeatedly extend its life at three-year intervals.<sup>183</sup> Initially conceived of as a temporary entity, intended to exist for only three years and designed to address the extraordinarily troubling circumstances of the first half of the 1970s, the Trilateral Commission became a *de facto* permanent institution. German funding for the commission continued to flow

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*Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels*), though Birrenbach was now hoping to recruit an opposition-minded journalist, particularly the FAZ's Günther Gillessen (KB to Münchmeyer, 26 September 1973, ACDP K081/1). Other German members of the Trilateral Commission over the years included Horst Ehmke (Deputy Chairman of the SPD-*Bundestagsfraktion*; former Federal Justice Minister); Herbert Ehrenberg (MdB, SPD); Wolfgang Hager (Senior Fellow, DGAP Research Institute); Hans Hartwig (President, *Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels eV*, Bonn); Dr. Diether Hoffmann (Vorstand Speaker, *Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft AG*, Frankfurt); Ludwig Huber (President, *Bayerische Landesbank*); Horst Jannott (Vorstand Chairman, *Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft*); Hans-Jürgen Junghans (MdB, SPD); Prof. Dr. Norbert Klotten (President, *Landeszentralbank* in Baden-Württemberg); Erwin Kristoffersen (Director, DGB International Division); Richard Löwenthal (*Wissenschaftler*); Hanns Maull; Karl-Heinz Narjes (MdB, CDU); Friedrich Neumann (Chairman, *Landesvereinigung der industriellen Arbeitgeberverbände Nordrhein-Westfalens eV*, Düsseldorf); Konrad Porzner (MdB, SPD); and Olaf Sund (SPD). As of July 1977, Birrenbach and Lambsdorff were the German members of the ExComm.

<sup>182</sup> The gratifying trend regarding government positions was particularly striking, for instance, in the period 1976-77, especially in the United States with respect to the composition of the recently elected Carter administration, though one could also point to the Federal Republic, where during this same time Herbert Ehrenberg became *Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung* and Olaf Sund became *Senator für Arbeit und Soziales* in the *Landesregierung* of West Berlin. In part, the commission's attempts to inform the media of its purposes, activities and recommendations were intended to counter the not inconsiderable attention dedicated to what it derided as conspiracy theories.

<sup>183</sup> The first such extension was unanimously approved in May 1975 at the ExComm meeting in Kyoto (Japan). In June 1978, the plenary meeting in Washington (DC) also unanimously accepted the continuation of the Trilateral Commission for a further three years.

principally from the *Wirtschaft*, especially the *Spitzenverbänden* and the *Stiftungen*, as well as from the *Auswärtigen Amt*.<sup>184</sup> Given that Birrenbach had devoted a substantial amount of effort to the commission's creation and maintenance and remained a crucial member, one might have assumed that he would be absolutely delighted about its apparent accomplishments and rather unexpectedly enduring nature. In reality, Birrenbach's attitude towards the commission was a quite mixed one. Certainly, he acknowledged positive aspects, as already noted largely approving of the institution's overall premises and purposes. He also judged many elements of the commission to be of a high quality, including the American and Japanese groups, the meetings of the ExComm, as well as the working papers and task force reports.

That said, Birrenbach entertained serious doubts and criticisms of various aspects of the commission as it actually functioned. Indeed, this marked ambivalence and his fervent efforts to overcome what he considered the commission's glaring flaws constituted some of the most salient characteristics of Birrenbach's participation in the entire venture. Among his chief complaints were those pertaining to a trilateral approach within the commission that, in practice, ignored to a great extent security and political issues. Quite early on, Birrenbach ascertained that, whatever the perfunctory nods directed at security affairs and East-West relations, the American plans for the commission focused primarily on the areas of economic, currency, trade, energy and development policy.<sup>185</sup> This realization meshed quite well with Birrenbach's suspicions

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<sup>184</sup> The overall budget for the Trilateral Commission in 1978 was about \$850,000. At the European plenary meeting of December 1978 in London, the proposed annual budget of the European group was stated as \$250,000 (Report of Hans Maull to All European Members regarding the European Plenary Meeting, 4-5 December 1978, ACDP K204/2).

<sup>185</sup> KB to Sohl, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1. For "development aid" as "a central task of our time" and not only a matter of "economic problems" but also of an "eminently civilizational problem" in so far as there existed an "action-reaction" dynamic, distinguished by "the reception of Western civilization by the

that the true American interest in trilateralism as an overall concept was principally as a means to persuade the Europeans and Japanese to help relieve the Americans of their deficits in the balances of trade and payments. Within the commission, Birrenbach repeatedly sought to alter this focus by insisting on the vital importance of security and foreign policy issues and on the need to address them holistically in connection with questions of economics, currency and trade. Such concerns on Birrenbach's part about the thematic of the commission were only intensified by continued rumblings during this period about the reduction of American troops overseas, including in Europe, and by the implications of the October 1973 war in the Middle East.<sup>186</sup> They also reflected and fueled Birrenbach's staunch belief that Japanese interests fundamentally differed from those of Europe vis-à-vis the United States and, therefore, his unabated stress on the "top priority" of the "American-European partnership," despite the admitted relevance to it of Japan in some respects, and firm objection to any alleged "partnership à trois."<sup>187</sup>

Birrenbach was also consistently perturbed by what he considered the sorry state of the European group. One major element of this concern was his intense dissatisfaction with Kohnstamm's replacement following the Dutchman's long-planned resignation in

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developing countries" and the reciprocal impact of this process on "the bearers of Western civilization" themselves, see already the Expositions by Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Deputy Chairman of the *Kuratorium*, in the Press Conference on 2 November 1962 on the Occasion of the Publication of the 1<sup>st</sup> Activity Report of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, ACDP K077/1. In these expositions, Birrenbach posited that this complex relationship would be "especially interesting" with respect to aid to "countries of high culture" like India, Pakistan or Indonesia.

<sup>186</sup> For Birrenbach's endeavors in this regard, here with reference to "the Near East conflict," see his Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2. On "alarming" votes in the US Senate in September 1973 regarding a cutback of American troops abroad, see KB to Brzezinski, Columbia University, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1 October 1973, ACDP K081/1.

<sup>187</sup> For Birrenbach balking at the prospect of a "partnership à trois," including a "strange partnership" that also encompassed the Soviet Union as "a silent partner," see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 29 June 1973, ACDP K184/2. On the "top priority" of the "American-European partnership," see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, Washington DC, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2.

late 1975 as European chairman.<sup>188</sup> During 1974-75, Birrenbach, along with figures such as Guido Colonna (Italy), François Duchêne (the European group's new executive vice president) and Kohnstamm himself, played a central role in identifying a suitable successor, only to discover that all his proposals proved either unfeasible or unacceptable to others in the commission.<sup>189</sup> At the Trilateral ExComm meeting of 29 November-2 December 1975 in Paris, the European group finally selected Georges Berthoin, a man a bitterly disappointed Birrenbach characterized as an "insignificant [*unbedeutenden*]" former ambassador of the European Communities to the United Kingdom who had been chosen over Birrenbach's own favorites "only because he was French." According to Birrenbach, this meeting imparted "an embarrassing picture." Interpreting the broader meaning of these events, Birrenbach argued "[t]he scenes that played out in connection with this presented a dreadful [*schreckliches*] picture of the steadfastness [*Standfestigkeit*] of the representatives of the other European nations, who simply let themselves be overrun [*niederwalzen*] without opposition [*widerspruchslos*] by the French side." For good measure, Birrenbach even admonished the Italian and British participants that if they continued thus, there was no long-term hope of preventing a French "hegemonial

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<sup>188</sup> A move in the offing for well over a year, Kohnstamm resigned his position in order to become president of the European University in Florence (Italy).

<sup>189</sup> For example, Birrenbach (at the Brussels conference of the European group in April 1974) and Kohnstamm had originally proposed the Belgian Jean Rey (former President of the Commission of the European Communities), impossible it turned out since Rey had meanwhile succeeded Walter Hallstein as President of the European Movement and could not further increase his work load (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 3 July 1974, ACDP K081/2). Although Birrenbach judged Duchêne (Director of the Institute for Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex) an "outstanding man," he opposed the notion prevalent among the English members of the ExComm that Duchêne should succeed Kohnstamm as European chairman, since he could not be, in Birrenbach's opinion, as "politically representative" as Rey or Kohnstamm (Birrenbach Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2). Duchêne had previously been director of the "superb" (Birrenbach's word) International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), editor of the *Economist* (London), and Monnet's personal assistant.



position” in Europe.<sup>190</sup> So, at least in Birrenbach’s eyes, the personnel decisions of the Trilateral Commission became the site for the parallel unfolding of some larger political issues confronting Europe. Birrenbach’s complaints about the quality and effectiveness of the European group stretched well beyond the person of its chairman, but for years to come, Berthoin would remain the embodiment for him of that group’s deficits.

Finally, closely related to these other two worries, Birrenbach was constantly concerned with respect to the costs of financing the Trilateral Commission and was especially intrigued by the possibility of reducing or at least limiting these expenses. At the same time, this raised the question of the ability or willingness of the commission to integrate itself into the already existing system of German Atlanticist institutions. In some respects, this integration proved to be quite smooth and rapid. Most notably, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik* not only offered logistical support, such as furnishing rooms for meetings of the commission members, but also served as a valuable source of *rapporteurs* to generate the various task force reports.<sup>191</sup> However, the commission’s relations with the Atlantic Institute were considerably more complicated. On the one hand, extensive personnel linkages (e.g. common membership) existed between the two organizations, including on the elevated level of the Trilateral Commission’s ExComm and the Atlantic Institute’s Board of Governors. Of course, Birrenbach was himself a prime example of this phenomenon, with his simultaneous positions in both the AI and the TC. To ensure a maximum coordination of activities

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<sup>190</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Fraktion, 5 December 1975, ACDP K173/2.

<sup>191</sup> German *rapporteurs* on task force reports over the years included Karl Kaiser, Director of the DGAP Research Institute (*Towards a Renovated International System* (1977), capstone report of the commission’s first triennium); Wolfgang Hager, Senior Fellow of the DGAP Research Institute (*Seeking a New Accommodation in World Commodity Markets* (1976)); Hanns Maull, European Secretary of the Trilateral Commission (*Energy: Managing the Transition* (1978)); and Richard Löwenthal, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the Free University in West Berlin (*An Overview of East-West Relations* (1978)).

between the two institutions, John Louden, Chairman of the AI Board, also became a member of the TC ExComm. Nevertheless, Birrenbach advocated a more far-reaching cooperation or even integration of the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission.<sup>192</sup> Given the substantial, though by no means complete, overlap of the two organizations' interest and activity areas and at a time when funding was becoming increasingly scarce, such a cooperative or integrative relationship, rather than a primarily separate and potentially competitive one, held out attractive prospects of enhancing efficiency, saving money and facilitating fund-raising efforts, surely in Europe.<sup>193</sup>

It is true that with respect to these concerns a certain amount of progress, from Birrenbach's perspective, was evident over time within the Trilateral Commission. While he may have been particularly adamant and vocal in expressing them, Birrenbach was far from alone in his reservations regarding the commission. Indeed, for all their willingness to continue on with the overall project, others in the European and German groups voiced concerns often similar to Birrenbach's own, whether they pertained to the thematic focus, the relative ineffectualness of the European group, or the costs of their undertaking.<sup>194</sup> Particularly with regard to security and foreign policy issues,

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<sup>192</sup> For instance, at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels, Birrenbach, along with several others, proposed utilizing the Atlantic Institute as a secretariat or administrative base for the European group, especially if the financing issues, among them those we have previously described with regard to France, were to persist and the commission were to switch over to a multilateral framework (favored by Birrenbach if the French were to drop out). That the Trilateral Commission was able to survive in its early stages was due, in part, to its reliance on the infrastructure of Kohnstamm's EC Institute for University Studies (Brussels), including initially as a secretariat. On such matters, see for example the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>193</sup> It was hoped that said efficiency could be improved through a more effective utilization of collective resources and fund-raising eased by creating an appealing, coherent complex and, thus, reducing the uncertainty of, for instance, foundations with regard to the roles of the respective organizations. See, for example, François Duchêne to KB, 7 July 1975, ACDP K072/2. One key field where the Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute did not totally coincide in their research interests was the theme "NATO," a prominent concern of the AI, but only much less so of the TC.

<sup>194</sup> For example, at the ExComm meeting in Tokyo on 22-23 October 1973, the two German participants, especially Alwin Münchmeyer but also Otto Graf Lambsdorff, as well as, somewhat more cautiously,

Birrenbach's worries actually formed part of a larger consternation, at least during the early 1970s, about the entire notion of trilateralism at seemingly all levels in Europe, including among governments, wrapped up with a sense that the trilateral approach threatened to undermine Europe's privileged relationship with the United States.<sup>195</sup> Beyond the complaints articulated by Birrenbach, the German trade unionists also expressed some discontent with the commission in so far as they believed that their names were being associated with reports whose views they did not fully support.<sup>196</sup> At times, certain German financial contributors even threatened to terminate their assistance if improvements were not implemented.<sup>197</sup> Not least due to the various criticisms emanating from the German and European groups, some changes were indeed made in the practices of the commission. Thanks in no small degree to Birrenbach's insistence,

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Kohnstamm and the Norwegian Otto Grieg Tidemand mirrored, sometimes explicitly, Birrenbach's arguments about the need to devote greater attention to security matters. Birrenbach could not attend this first meeting of the ExComm since his doctors forbade him to fly to Tokyo so soon after his heart attack in April 1973. However, at Birrenbach's request, Münchmeyer, who anyway generally shared Birrenbach's views and made his various objections known, represented him there (also on the topic of monetary policy). Likewise, for discussions at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels about how and by how much the future costs of the Trilateral Commission could be reduced, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2. On the British and Italian groups and financial contributors as well as important individuals within the European group, including Kohnstamm and Duchêne, promoting a very close cooperation between the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission, see François Duchêne, European Vice-Chairman, to KB, 7 July 1975, ACDP K072/2 and the Record of the European Regional Meeting, 9 May 1976, Ottawa, ACDP K056/2.

<sup>195</sup> Especially the French were also suspicious of American interference in European relations with Japan. For these reasons, many Europeans and European governments (among them that of the Federal Republic), sometimes simply to maintain solidarity with one another (including with France), favored bilateral structures of relations between Europe, the United States and Japan, rather than the principally American concept of a single trilateral structure. For the Nine having on 14 November 1973, correspondingly, recommended to Japan a bilateral European-Japanese declaration, thus excluding the possibility of "a later development" towards an "overarching" trilateral declaration, see Wilhelm Grewe (West German ambassador in Tokyo) to KB, 2 January 1974, ACDP K081/2.

<sup>196</sup> This unease may help explain the notable membership turnover experienced among German trade unionists within the commission. While Heinz Oskar Vetter (President of the DGB) remained on as a member after the first triennium, the other two German trade unionists departed, replaced by Erwin Kristoffersen (head of the DGB's International Secretariat). On this theme, see the Discussion of the European Regional Meeting, Sunday, 9 May 1976, Ottawa, ACDP K056/2.

<sup>197</sup> See, for instance, the record of Karl Kaiser's remarks in the discussion at the European Regional Meeting of 9 May 1976 in Ottawa, contained in ACDP K056/2.

the theme security was placed on the commission's agenda from a rather early date.<sup>198</sup>

Motivated by a desire to reduce expenses, the number of trilateral task force reports was halved beginning with the second triennium.<sup>199</sup> Also during the second triennium, half of the trilateral studies undertaken were conducted jointly with the Atlantic Institute.<sup>200</sup>

On the other hand, there also existed serious opposition within the Trilateral Commission to the vision of that body entertained by Birrenbach and, therefore, ample controversy over these specific connected issues. For instance, many ExComm members considered it at any rate premature to explore the field of security, with some furthermore believing this to be a regional matter wholly unsuited to trilateral discussions. Especially the Japanese, reluctant to enter immediately into a closer relationship with Europe and with at least American acquiescence, hesitated being drawn into dealing with the question of European security or, indeed, to address security affairs in general, a particularly sensitive topic for them.<sup>201</sup> With respect to a potential cooperation or merger of the Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute (or even the use of the AI as an administrative infrastructure), there was significant resistance among the American,

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<sup>198</sup> At the very first ExComm meeting, in Tokyo in October 1973, a sentence on the theme of security was inserted into the Statement of Purpose: "Although the risks of nuclear confrontation have diminished, world peace and security are still to be given a lasting basis." The incorporation of this sentence was, to a great extent, immediately attributable to the efforts of Münchmeyer (representing Birrenbach) and Lambsdorff at that meeting. This served as a compromise solution for the topic of security and seemed to pave the way for its informal inclusion in the future discussions of the commission. As Birrenbach put it, "[o]ne will therefore have to try in the future to continue to insist on this point, since it is politically of essential character" (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2).

<sup>199</sup> This decision was taken in May 1975 at the Kyoto (Japan) ExComm meeting. In addition to cutting costs, this approach offered commissioners more time to discuss the individual reports.

<sup>200</sup> Joint Atlantic Institute-Trilateral Commission projects dealt with subjects like "Industrial Relations" and "National Industrial Strategies." See, for instance, the Summary of Study Group Discussions on 17-19 March 1977, by Prof. Benjamin Roberts, ACDP K056/1.

<sup>201</sup> Whatever their personal views, Rockefeller and Brzezinski sought at minimum to accommodate the Japanese, arguing that the latter should be allowed to gain confidence in the Trilateral Commission by initially tackling themes of greater interest to them before taking up topics such as security.

Japanese and French members of the commission for a variety of substantive reasons.<sup>202</sup> Therefore, while shared by others, including many in the German and European groups, Birrenbach's assessment of the commission's flaws was in many respects not the consensus opinion within that body, and consequently these problems, as Birrenbach perceived them, persisted. Though, as we have alluded to, Birrenbach contributed to getting the issue of security on the agenda of the commission from an early date, this was achieved only in a broad, informal framework more palatable to the Japanese and never seems to have borne practical fruit, at least not to his satisfaction. Likewise, while the hypothetically far-reaching cooperation and integration of the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission advocated by Birrenbach was the subject of meetings between leadership figures of both organizations, actual collaboration never moved beyond the already mentioned joint research studies.<sup>203</sup> True, Birrenbach fathomed the motives for the hostility directed towards his proposals, but this made it no less frustrating for him, and well into the life of the commission, he continued to bemoan its defects.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> Opposition came as well from the *Keidenren*, which handled AI affairs in Japan. On the theme of opposition, see the record of the Discussion of the European Regional Meeting, Sunday, 9 May 1976, Ottawa, ACDP K056/2 and Karl Kaiser's Note About the Meeting of the European Members of the ExComm of the Trilateral Commission at Giovanni Agnelli's in Turin on 10-11 October (1975), dated 14 October 1975, ACDP K072/2. Birrenbach's own proposal to utilize the AI as infrastructure, a general concept to which the Americans objected, also encountered a "massive resistance" on the part of the French representative at the meeting of the European members of the ExComm on 4-5 April 1974 in Brussels that Birrenbach could not overcome even by means of a personal talk (KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 9 April 1974, ACDP K081/2). Diverse arguments were mustered against such cooperation or mergers: for example, that Atlanticism and Trilateralism did not enjoy the same basis of support; that two bodies could not effectively run a single research program; and that a provisional commission and a quasi-permanent institute, one focused primarily on contacts and the other on research, could not be married together.

<sup>203</sup> With regard to such meetings, for instance, an *ad hoc* Working Group, under the chairmanship of Amb. Egidio Ortona (Italy) and comprising personalities connected with the Atlantic Institute and the Trilateral Commission, gathered in Paris on 26-27 February 1978 to consider possibilities for the future relationship of their two institutions. On this theme, see *The Future Relationship Between the Trilateral Commission and the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs: Indications of Possibilities*, ACDP K204/2.

<sup>204</sup> For Birrenbach's recognition of "Japan's special situation [*Sondersituation*]" and his appreciation of that situation's impact on the Japanese posture, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2.

Given this mixed picture of a permanent but, from Birrenbach's perspective, flawed trilateral organization, what was the ultimate meaning for Birrenbach and German Atlanticism of the Trilateral Commission? On one level, the TC helped create linkages between the three trilateral regions, including between Europe and Japan, involving the members of the German group. Indeed, the commission became the centerpiece of a variety of complementary activities sprouting up around it and reinforcing such European contacts with Japan, among them separate European-Japanese meetings staged in Japan (e.g. in Hakone). For Birrenbach, a "Trilateral network" rapidly emerged, appended to, and in many cases overlapping with, the Atlanticist networks we have already examined. This Trilateral network consisted, to a great extent, of many of his Atlanticist contacts, sometimes now in different capacities, and encompassed a diversity of subsets: the overall leaders of the commission (Rockefeller, Brzezinski); the heads of the American and European groups (Smith, Kohnstamm); the members of the ExComm, especially the European ones (also certain personalities of the broader European group); the German members of the commission, particularly those from the *Union*; as well as the crucial financial contributors, namely the chiefs of the German economic *Spitzenverbänden* and the relevant liaisons in the *Auswärtigen Amt*. Thanks to this network, functioning *via* correspondence, telephone, private discussions and larger trilateral meetings, Birrenbach remained apprised of and provided information about the state and activities of the commission and its sundry elements; passed on copies of task force reports and working papers emerging from the commission; played a role in managing the commission and in

making key decisions determining its practices and future; pressed his case for changes to the commission; and secured the necessary financial support on a continuous basis.<sup>205</sup>

Beyond this expansive administrative network, the Trilateral Commission benefited Birrenbach in his political activities by, to some extent, enhancing his already impressive array of contacts. This development principally occurred in a distinctly “Atlanticist” direction as Birrenbach established new linkages with certain figures based in the “Atlantic region” and found further field to reinforce his ties to and utilize effectively his numerous existing American and European contacts that were now taking part in the commission.<sup>206</sup> Participation in the Trilateral Commission also enabled Birrenbach to expand his links in subsequent years with respect to Japan. These connections, which encompassed top members of the Japanese Diet, never formed much in the way of correspondence or other long-distance communications. Rather they were accessed primarily within the framework of the gatherings of the Trilateral Commission itself and occasionally proved useful for Birrenbach in gathering information about vital issues, such as those surrounding nuclear energy (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty), and especially Japanese attitudes towards them, as well as insights into overall events in Asia.<sup>207</sup> Birrenbach’s endeavors along such lines were aided by the commission’s

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<sup>205</sup> For example, see the KB Report on the Trilateral Commission, 8 November 1973, ACDP K081/2; KB to Alwin Münchmeyer, 26 September 1973, ACDP K081/1; and KB to the Members of the German Group of the Trilateral Commission, 15 June 1977, ACDP K056/1. In his efforts to alter the commission’s focus, especially with regard to the issue of security, Birrenbach acted along with a number of other Europeans on the ExComm and, furthermore, often presented this matter as a concern of the European group as a whole.

<sup>206</sup> Thus, the American group comprised at one time or another George Ball, Robert Bowie, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Henry Owen and George Franklin (Coordinator of the Trilateral Commission from 1977-82, Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1953-71).

<sup>207</sup> For Japan being among those countries (along with other “non-nuclear powers” like India, Sweden and Brazil) whose “demands [*Forderungen*]” vis-à-vis the “atomic powers” Birrenbach recommended the Federal Republic “to join [*anzuschließen*]” so as to provide the efforts to present “our reserve [*Zurückhaltung*]” towards and to modify the “*Atomsperrvertrag*” with a generalized “screen [*Schirm*]” of “cover [*Deckung*],” see KB to Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 19 January 1967, ACDP K117/2.

nurturing of its relations with governments and intergovernmental organizations, which made up a constituent aspect of its attempts to augment its own influence. Participants in Trilateral Commission meetings usually engaged, as part of these functions, in consultations with key governmental officials in the host country, among them assorted presidents (including each of the US presidents), prime ministers, cabinet members and other prominent political and parliamentary figures, some of whom themselves had once been commission members. They also met with leading personalities of intergovernmental institutions like the World Bank and the European Commission.<sup>208</sup>

Finally, the Trilateral Commission constituted part of a noteworthy broadening around this time of the German Atlanticist geographical and thematic perspective. Amidst still-pursued earlier approaches, this trend was reflected as well in the composition and activities of other elements of the Atlanticist infrastructure, among them many of those outlined earlier in this chapter such as the Mid-Atlantic Clubs, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Aspen Institute Berlin, and the various youth-oriented entities.<sup>209</sup> The AI's Board of Governors now subtly signaled such changes by

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<sup>208</sup> For example, the members of the Trilateral Commission came together for consultations over the years, to focus on the United States for the moment, with American Presidents (e.g. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan); Secretaries of State (Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance); as well as other cabinet officers (Secretary of Defense Harold Brown; Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson; Secretary of Transportation William Coleman; Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher) and a number of US Congressmen. Richardson and Coleman were former members of the TC. While in Washington DC, members also met with luminaries like World Bank President Robert McNamara. Similarly, during the TC European plenary meeting in Brussels on 26 May 1977, participants consulted with personalities of the European Commission, including in the context of sessions chaired by the President (Roy Jenkins) and the Vice President and Commissioner for External Affairs (Wilhelm Haferkamp). Details in "Trilateral Commission Meets in Ottawa," ACDP K056/2; the Report on the Trilateral Commission Washington Meeting of 12 May 1976, ACDP K056/2; and the Record of the Trilateral Commission Europe Plenary Meeting, Brussels, 26 May 1977, ACDP K056/1.

<sup>209</sup> Thus, speakers at the London MAC included, on 19 November 1971, Amb. Joseph Greenwald (US Representative to the OECD) about "Prospects for Trans-Atlantic/Trans-Pacific Trade Relations" and, on 12 April 1972, John Tuthill (Director General of the Atlantic Institute, Paris) about "Japan, the United States and an Enlarged EEC." In addition to the stress placed on the United States and Europe, GMF financing activities also encompassed other, actually virtually all, regions of the world. By the end of 1978,



augmenting their organization's name to the more spatially extensive Atlantic Institute for International Affairs.<sup>210</sup> These trends were underpinned by the recognition of an international interdependence existing not only between the industrial United States and Europe but increasingly reigning in a modern world that also comprised other developed as well as developing societies and that, far from solely providing benefits, might at times stoke tensions among countries with conflicting, rather than strictly mutual, interests; coupled with a desire to transcend Cold War themes in a period of détente. Intertwined

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welcome project applications were flowing from individuals and institutions in the United States, practically each of the European countries, Japan as well as other industrial nations, and a total of fifty-two industrial and developing countries were engaged in such projects, either through a direct participation of persons or institutions or in the form of subject matter.

At least initially, the AIB concentrated its work on seven *Schwerpunkte*: Environment and Quality of Life; International Affairs; Communication and Society; Science, Technology and Humanism; Justice, Society and the Individual; Education for a Changing World; and Pluralism and Society. Other AIB conference themes over the years included, for instance, "Changing Roles of Men and Women" and, more generally, those pertaining to *Wirtschaft* as well as *Bildung*, art and culture. Meanwhile, the AIB's Second German-American Economic Seminar, planned for December 1978, was expected to address North-South questions and the relationship to the Third World. Indeed, Paul Volcker (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), one of the initiators of this particular seminar, was motivated to a great extent by the hope that these gatherings could help the West, especially the United States and the Federal Republic, prepare to act in concert in the face of future threats like that emanating from OPEC. For AIB conferences in the field Communication and Society comprising topics like "European-American Relations in the Mirror of the Press," "*Informationspolitik* in the Countries of the Third World," and "Ownership Structure [*Eigentumsverhältnisse*] in the Press [*Pressewesen*]," see the AIB-*Pressemitteilung*, 10 April 1984, ACDP K191/2. Those involved in the AIB management and activities originated from a wide geographic spectrum. For the AIB being led by an "international board [*Gremium*]" consisting of scholars as well as "men and women of public life" in Europe, Asia, Africa and the United States, and for participants in AIB conferences and other functions hailing not only from Western Europe and North America but also "from all parts of the world," see the Brochure on the AIHS (USA) and AIB, ACDP K191/2.

Finally, such "expansionist" currents were also apparent in the discussions staged during this period by the Atlanticist youth organizations, whether at the AB's German-American Youth Conferences (e.g. the "North-South Dialogue," including relations between developed and less-developed countries, the New International Economic Order, and development aid; "Internal Affairs," like "The Responsibility of Government in a Democratic Society," "The Family in Modern Society," along with topics pertaining to domestic political, business, banking and legal affairs and systems; and "The Future" (for instance, questions about the fundamental values of the Western world)); the DEG's Young Königswinter Conferences (e.g. "A World Thrown Off-Balance," "The Bridging of the Differences and Gaps in the Modern Society" and "For which Goals should the Free World Struggle?"); or EURNAC ("Political Decision-Making and Technological Development," "Public Policy for the Multinational Corporation," "Policy Implications of the Changing Roles of Women and Men in Society," "The Public Responsibility of Television," "Science and Technology and the Public Interest," and "The Environment.")

<sup>210</sup> As of April 1975, while vigilant against "the danger of expanding into an unwieldy private sector UN organization," the Atlantic Institute was planning to invite, for the first time, business and banking figures from outside the nations represented on the AI Board of Governors to the next Participating Members meeting and was also considering opening up Participating Membership to firms and other bodies based in countries beyond the OECD area (John Loudon to Max Kohnstamm, 28 April 1975, ACDP K072/2).

with his continued focus on the vital Atlantic sphere, Birrenbach himself exhibited a notable interest in regions outside of Europe and the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example tracking events in East and Southeast Asia during the Americans' "Vietnam period" as well as those in the Middle East with an eye towards its essential oil supplies.<sup>211</sup> Though less pronounced, a certain penchant of the German Atlanticists to think in terms of the "world situation" (e.g. world politics, the world economy), to demonstrate an interest in regions outside of the Atlantic Community proper, and to exhibit a cognizance of the emergence of the Asian, Latin American, and African nations as a factor in international affairs was apparent well before the early 1970s. Already by the early to mid-1950s, Birrenbach was quite aware of the possible effects of happenings in the Far East (e.g. China and Indochina) on the situation in Europe and by the early 1960s evinced a definite interest in development policy.<sup>212</sup> Early

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<sup>211</sup> For developments in China offering one possible basis for the transformation of the "world constellation [*Weltkonstellation*]" imperative to bringing about a "European peace order [*Friedensordnung*]" (i.e. the "abolition [*Aufhebung*] of the status quo"), see KB to Prof. Alfred Grosser, Paris, 25 September 1967, ACDP K018/2. On the crucial need to determine and weigh the attitudes of the main "threshold powers" in arriving at a definitive judgement of the NPT, see KB, Düsseldorf, Berliner Allee 33, to Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, *Bundeshaus*, 8 April 1968, ACDP K020/1. For the significance of the Middle East due to "the European dependence upon oil" and, though this stake required that Europe's voice be heard there, Birrenbach's feeling "ashamed" at the "deplorable" "attitude of Europe in the Near East conflict," see KB to Sen. Jacob Javits, 28 November 1973, ACDP K184/2. On Birrenbach's anxiety as of late 1973 regarding the possible impact of the "oil crisis," see KB to Frau Prof. Dr. Helge Pross, Biebertal, *Ortsteil Königsberg*, 7 December 1973, ACDP K028/1. For Birrenbach's fear, related to the "problems of energy and inflation," that the "Middle East conflict" could endanger or "even destroy the cohesion not only of the European Community, but also of NATO," see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Deputy Director, FPRI, 5 December 1974, ACDP K184/1. More sweepingly, on Birrenbach's assessment that the entire world constellation had changed and his contention that one now had to consider the global perspective, see his February 1973 *Europa-Archiv* article "Partner oder Rivalen?" (3/1973), a work based on his talks with contacts in the US and among those writings from this period that dealt with issues soon to be addressed by the Trilateral Commission.

<sup>212</sup> On events in China holding substantial significance (even "world-historical importance") in so far as "every bipolarity of a political and doctrinal nature within the communist imperium" (here between the Soviet Union and China, including Mao's rise in stature following Stalin's death) contained the potential "in the long-run to awaken tendencies towards independence [*Selbständigkeitstendenzen*] within the satellite states," see "Rußland nach dem Tode Stalins," by KB, Düsseldorf, 10 September 1953, ACDP K001/1. For Birrenbach also following events in Indochina as of the mid-1950s with respect to their impact on France, see "Um das Schicksal der EVG," by KB, 9 May 1954, ACDP K001/1. Later, in his book *The Future of the Atlantic Community*, Birrenbach emphasized that a coordinated action vis-à-vis the

evidence of this process also revealed itself through the products, including studies and publications, emerging from the Atlanticist organizations, with the Atlantic Institute even establishing in 1962 a rather prolific Latin American program.<sup>213</sup>

Nevertheless, it can be said as a whole that Birrenbach, like many other Europeans apparently, never totally embraced the trilateral ethos. This is indicated, for instance, by the fundamental geographic composition of his network of contacts. While the Trilateral Commission undoubtedly improved his links with Japan, Birrenbach did not seriously cultivate there anything remotely approaching the plethora of contacts he already enjoyed in the Atlantic realm, particularly in the United States. Whether in an administrative or a political sense, Birrenbach's trilateral network would not extend in any substantial way to the Far East. Birrenbach's concern about the attention being lavished on Japan even manifested itself in his displeasure with the choice of Tokyo as the site for the first ExComm conference on 22-23 October 1973, a selection he attributed to the American view that "the Japanese problem" was "especially urgent."<sup>214</sup> For Birrenbach, whatever his considerable engagement, the Trilateral Commission and the broader notion of trilateralism were, ultimately, at best a useful offshoot of Atlanticism and at worst a dangerous distraction from the most significant, still chiefly "Cold War," matters. Indeed, the commission served him largely as yet another means, a

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developing countries, especially in light of the efforts of the East Bloc, was the greatest economic task of the Western world since the Marshall Plan and urged measures to open the markets of the industrialized countries to the goods from these developing nations, including the requisite structural industrial changes in the West, and to reduce the fluctuations of raw material prices.

<sup>213</sup> Already the first two DGAP Research Institute yearbooks, appearing in 1958 and 1961 respectively, aspired explicitly to provide in-depth accounts of the "*Weltpolitik*," while other DGAP Research Institute publications around this time included *Südostasien seit 1945* by Emanuel Sarkisyanz (1961) as well as "*Weltpolitische Aspekte des chinesischen Bürgerkrieges*" by Gottfried-Karl Kindermann (planned to have published in 1962). Likewise, the studies produced by the Atlantic Institute in the mid-1960s included "A Monetary Policy for Latin America" by Pierre Uri.

<sup>214</sup> KB to Hans-Günther Sohl, President of the BDI eV, Cologne, 26 July 1973, ACDP K081/1.

“*Verbindungsglied*,” to enhance his contacts with the US, for example especially within the Carter administration, and the rest of the Atlantic world. Another, perhaps secondary, factor in Birrenbach’s ongoing participation in the commission was a desire to placate its American promoters by acceding to their wishes regarding its continuation.<sup>215</sup> Despite the undeniable role of the Trilateral Commission in expanding the geographic and thematic nature of German Atlanticism, Birrenbach, and probably at least some other Germans with him, remained convinced of the primary importance of the bilateral European-American partnership in which security issues yet enjoyed a central place.

### K. Conclusion

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw German Atlanticism, as we have been examining it through the person of Kurt Birrenbach, in a state of transition. True, much remained essentially unchanged. German Atlanticism still involved not merely action on the level of government but also on the level of private initiatives and institutions. These private individuals and organizations went on espousing many of the same prescriptions as before, such as those pertaining to a close relationship between the *Wissenschaft* and *Politik*. Their activities continued to rely on the financial support of the firms of the *Wirtschaft*, the *Stiftungen*, the political parties, trade unions, and government. As Birrenbach’s ongoing presence demonstrates, numerous major personalities persisted in their engagement. However, German Atlanticism was also evolving, indeed operating in two main directions. Among these was a direct attempt to strengthen trans-Atlantic relations, in large part, through the maintenance of existing Atlanticist institutions as well as the creation of new ones. At the same time, there was an effort, to a great extent American-inspired, to expand the scope of Atlanticism itself both thematically and

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<sup>215</sup> KB to the Members of the German Group of the Trilateral Commission, 15 June 1977, ACDP K056/1.

geographically, most strikingly to take account of the growing and now essential role of Japan in trans-Atlantic relations. This latter especially found organizational expression in the establishment of the Trilateral Commission. However, such recognitions and undertakings, whatever their benefits, simultaneously represented a potential threat to certain “Cold War” German Atlanticists, in so far as Birrenbach and others feared they would devalue the bilateral European-American relationship and dilute its distinctive focus on security and political affairs. All of this occurred against a backdrop of economic troubles, demographic shifts in the United States, an aging Atlanticist network and disturbing strains in trans-Atlantic relations, a framework that provided impetus for the endeavors of Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists during this period, in addition to posing to them unique obstacles.

## Chapter 9: German Atlanticism as a “Mature” Establishment Phenomenon

### A. Birrenbach’s Changing Position

Although he continued to work quite relentlessly in his later years, from approximately 1973 onward Birrenbach gradually began to relinquish some of his varied posts and memberships. This was the case at Thyssen, where in April 1973, he gave up the chairmanship of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the August-Thyssen-Hütte AG to Hans-Günther Sohl and became that body’s deputy chairman. In late November 1979, essentially after twenty-five years, Birrenbach resigned as chairman of the *Verwaltungsrat* of the Thyssen Vermögensverwaltung GmbH. Finally and most significantly, in June 1981, Birrenbach vacated the chairmanship of the *Verwaltungsrat* of the important Thyssen Beteiligungsverwaltung GmbH (Düsseldorf) and, as a result, all of his places in the *Aufsichtsräten* of the other *Gesellschaften* of the Thyssen group, including that of the Thyssen AG (the former ATH).<sup>1</sup> Long after he had resigned from his official positions at the firm, Birrenbach retained contact with Thyssen, functioning in particular as an advisor to Dieter Spethmann, Sohl’s successor as chairman of the *ATH-Vorstand*, as well as more broadly to the Thyssen AG, where he also continued to maintain a Düsseldorf office and to enjoy a certain high-quality, albeit considerably numerically and temporally diminished, secretarial assistance. Furthermore, even after formally leaving Thyssen, Birrenbach acted as something of an informal lobbyist on behalf of the West German *Wirtschaft*, especially the Thyssen AG, in cooperation and coordination with Sohl, Spethmann and the Düsseldorf-based *Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie*.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> At the same time that Birrenbach departed, Sohl left his post as chairman of the Thyssen AG’s *Aufsichtsrat*. Founded in 1976, the Thyssen Beteiligungsverwaltung GmbH was the largest shareholder of the Thyssen AG, containing that big *Paket* of Thyssen stock also owned by the Allianz insurance company.

<sup>2</sup> Spethmann served simultaneously from 1974-84 as chairman of the WVES.

Nevertheless, on balance, the upshot was that Birrenbach had substantially reduced his presence and engagement in the realm of the *Wirtschaft*.

A similar trend was discernable with respect to Birrenbach and the German Atlanticist organizations. Long after the triumphant conclusion of the struggle against Occidentalism, the institutions created and inhabited by the Atlanticists remained active, carrying on many of the same types of endeavors and performing many of the same functions as before. Even subsequent to leaving the *Bundestag* (see later in this chapter), Birrenbach stayed involved in preparing and participating in their administrative meetings, for instance those of the Atlantic Institute and *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, and major gatherings, such as those staged by the *Atlantik-Brücke*, the *Deutsch-Englischen Gesellschaft* and the Trilateral Commission.<sup>3</sup> Such activities, along with a number of one-time events, continued to prove of significance for Birrenbach (also for his fellow German Atlanticists), providing him with the coveted opportunity to engage in a valuable exchange of views with foreign participants; enlightening insight into their perspectives and attitudes and, by extension, into the policies of their respective nations; as well as the occasion to undertake potentially fruitful efforts at persuasion. Thus, much as before, they considerably shaped Birrenbach's outlook on key substantive issues, in addition to the overall international situation, and were crucial in attempts to further

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<sup>3</sup> Among the functions in which Birrenbach took part were the now biennial German-American Conferences (the 9<sup>th</sup> on 4-6 March 1977 in Princeton (NJ); the 10<sup>th</sup> on 15-18 March 1979 in Hamburg; the 11<sup>th</sup> from 19-22 March 1981 at Princeton University); the Königswinter Conferences, including those held in Britain (Oxford in April 1978, Cambridge in March 1980); the annual Fall meetings of the AI Foreign Policy Committee with the NATO Council and the European Commission in Brussels (including at Comte René Boël's Château du Chenoy); and certain gatherings of the Trilateral Commission (e.g. Plenary Conference in Bonn in October 1977 and Plenary Conference in Washington DC in June 1978). For Birrenbach chairing the annual *Atlantica*-Atlantic Institute colloquia, here comprising American, French, Dutch and German personalities in June 1980 in Cologne and dealing with "the current world situation and the consequences for European-American relations," encompassing issues like détente, the military balance as well as the Persian Gulf "crisis" (Birrenbach's word), see Walter Stahl to *Atlantica* Members, 16 May 1980, ACDP K142/1 and KB to Paul Riebenfeld, 27 June 1980, ACDP K092/3.

maintain his network of foreign, particularly American, and West German political contacts, especially thanks to the many available possibilities to converse face-to-face at length with them and other figures either at the functions themselves or on the periphery.<sup>4</sup> The German-American Conference in March 1977 and the Königswinter Conferences of 1977 and 1980 are illustrative in so far as they were central in alarming and galvanizing Birrenbach with respect to the Carter administration's new non-proliferation policy and what he considered the negative British attitude towards European unification.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> On Birrenbach having "long talks [*Unterredungen*]," at least in part with respect to nuclear issues, with Emile van Lennep (OECD Secretary General), Ulf Lantzke (Executive Director of the International Energy Agency) and "several American representatives" in the framework of AI meetings in Paris in mid-December 1977, see KB to State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild (*Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie*), 20 December 1977, ACDP K182/1. For the US Secretary of Defense speaking of "the necessity of developing new tactical nuclear weapons" (perhaps referring to "the neutron weapon") in response to Birrenbach's concrete inquiry in the context of the TC gathering in Washington DC in mid-June 1978, see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 19 June 1978, ACDP K153/1. For Birrenbach making the acquaintance of Arthur Burns, soon to be appointed US ambassador to the Federal Republic, and Lawrence Eagleburger, soon to be appointed Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, at the March 1981 German-American Conference in Princeton (NJ), see KB to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Washington DC, 24 June 1981, ACDP K146/2. Regarding one-time events, in November 1982, Birrenbach attended a four-day German-American gathering on "The Future of German-American Relations" in Bad Godesberg's Hotel Dreesen, organized by the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, where he spoke personally with Paul Nitze (leader of the US delegation in the INF talks in Geneva), Amb. Robert Grey (Acting Deputy Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Amb. Edward Rowny (chief US negotiator in the START talks in Geneva), former ambassador Jonathan Dean (who until recently had conducted the MBFR negotiations for the US), Richard Allen (former Reagan national security advisor), former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as well as numerous American congressmen (including briefly Sen. Sam Nunn (GA)) and press representatives.

<sup>5</sup> At the German-American Conference in March 1977, Birrenbach along with some other Germans openly and bitterly criticized, in Birrenbach's case perhaps too sharply, the Carter administration's policy on non-proliferation and the "peaceful use of nuclear energy," as it had been explained there by American participants like Gerard Smith (soon to be appointed Carter's Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters), McGeorge Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation), and Joseph Nye (Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology). Also significant in sparking Birrenbach's fears regarding the Carter administration's policy in this field were the proceedings at the International Atomforum Conference staged in New York just a few days later. Beyond the substance, Birrenbach found it disturbing that the US administration had fundamentally declined the invitations to dispatch its key representatives (e.g. Mondale, Vance, Brzezinski, Christopher) to these two conferences, thus forestalling a proper dialogue. For instance, at the International Atomforum Conference, attended by figures from dozens of nations, the US was represented by only a relatively young, subordinate *Beamten* who issued no statement relevant to the theme. Following the March 1977 German-American Conference, Bundy sent Birrenbach the recently released study on "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," produced by the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group (chaired by Spurgeon Keeny Jr., sponsored by the Ford Foundation, and administered by the MITRE corporation) that formed the basis of his remarks at the conference and, at least in part, of the Carter administration's nuclear energy policy. On Birrenbach being "disappointed" as of early June 1977 about "the British attitude at Königswinter" that year regarding



In June 1973, Birrenbach assumed from Günter Henle the mantle of DGAP president, so inheriting the leadership of an institution facing serious organizational and financial challenges. In this capacity, Birrenbach focused his attention primarily on carrying out effective fund-raising campaigns. Though the rapidly increasing complexity of world affairs dictated an expansionary development of the DGAP and its activities, he also steadfastly rejected proposals during his tenure to transform the DGAP into a type of “super-organization.” Largely as a result of Birrenbach’s course and efforts, the DGAP was able to remain afloat even while continuing to rely significantly on funding from the *Wirtschaft* and consistently limiting or outright rejecting governmental outlays, thus securing its immediate financial (as well as political) independence from the state.<sup>6</sup> Working intensively within the framework of its institutional structure, Birrenbach crucially stamped the DGAP during this time, playing a central part in policy and personnel decisions and, in this way, reshaping the composition of key organizational bodies (e.g. the *Präsidium*, the *Geschäftsführenden Präsidium*) as well as constantly influencing and stimulating substantive endeavors, not least by securing outstanding figures (among them his own foreign contacts) to deliver the regular *Vorträge* before the members.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile, he continued to engage in the steady stream of DGAP activities,

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Europe as well as that in “our meeting” of the European members of the Trilateral Commission with the European Commission in Brussels in late May “the British participants” had avoided taking a clear position apropos “the fundamental questions the present situation raises concerning the future of the [European] Community,” see KB to Julian Ridsdale, MP, Chairman of the Anglo-Japanese Parliamentary Group, London, 3 June 1977, ACDP K068/2. For Birrenbach finding the “anti-European” stances of the British as manifested at the 1980 KWC “worse than could be imagined” and also finding them “clearly [*eindeutig*] anti-French (which I understand),” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980, ACDP K210/2.

<sup>6</sup> Birrenbach was greatly assisted in financing campaigns by the successive DGAP treasurers: Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen (until 1975; the *Bankhaus* CG Trinkaus & Burkhardt, Essen); Jürgen Ponto (1975-77; *Vorstandssprecher*, Dresdner Bank AG); and Hans Friderichs (starting in 1978; *Vorstandssprecher*, Dresdner Bank AG). Such figures engaged in campaign planning, lent their names to these fund-raising efforts, and themselves carried out targeted interventions vis-à-vis proposed firms.

<sup>7</sup> DGAP guest speakers in this period included Congressman John Anderson (US presidential candidate; July 1980); Jean-Pierre Brunet (French ambassador to the Federal Republic; October 1979); Richard Burt

retaining his chairmanship of the Study Group II until 1978, when he was succeeded by the CDU MdB Richard von Weizsäcker, and leading the *Vortragsveranstaltungen*, which not only provided him the opportunity to present his own, often pregnant, introductory remarks but also to talk alone at length with many of the guest speakers.<sup>8</sup>

However, Birrenbach also gradually withdrew from the Atlanticist organizations. Beginning in the late 1970s, he officially resigned his place in the TC ExComm (October 1979), the DGAP presidency (June 1981), membership in the SWP *Stiftungsrat* (October 1982), his post in the AB *Vorstand* (July 1984), his positions in the AI (vice presidency in June 1982; spot on the Board of Governors apparently in December 1984), and the 1<sup>st</sup> Chairmanship of the *Atlantica* (December 1984).<sup>9</sup> Birrenbach's participation in the various Atlanticist gatherings, like the Bilderberg Conferences, waned as well, 1983 being the last year he attended a German-American Conference and the Königswinter Conference, though even afterwards he trained an alert eye on the goings-on at such

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(*New York Times*; October 1978); Lord Carrington (British Foreign Secretary; October 1979 on "Europe: Prosperity and Security"); Jacques Chirac (Mayor of Paris; October 1978 on "European Perspectives"); Hans-Georg Wieck (former West German ambassador to Moscow and new ambassador to NATO; November 1980 on "The Soviet Union in the 80s"); SACEUR Gen. Alexander Haig (October 1975 and September 1978); Giovanni Malagodi (Chairman of the Italian Liberal Party (PLI), Monnet Committee member; October 1974 on "Europe, seen from Rome"); Yohanan Meroz (Israeli ambassador in Bonn; November 1976 on "Prospects for Peace in the Near East"); Konstantinos Mitsotakis (Greek Foreign Minister; May 1981 on "The Foreign Policy of Greece after the Entrance in the EC"); the retired Israeli diplomat Gideon Rafael (April 1981 and September 1983); SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers (October 1980 on "NATO in the 1980s: A Decade of Challenge and Decision"); Eugene Rostow (Director of the US ACDA; October 1981 on "Arms Control in the 80s: Problems and Concepts"); Sir Christopher Soames (Vice President of the European Commission; May 1974 on "Europe in the World"); and US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (May 1983). For more, also earlier, speakers, see Ch. 7, p. 353, fn. 1.

<sup>8</sup> After being elected Governing Mayor of Berlin, Weizsäcker was himself succeeded in 1981 by the CDU MdB Alois Mertes as chairman of the Study Group II. As before, this body explored the broad development of East-West relations as well as more specific themes, during the first half of the 1980s, for example, facets of the Polish "crisis," among them the current state of West German-Polish relations and conceptual considerations of Western policy towards Poland.

<sup>9</sup> For Birrenbach's resignation from the TC ExComm, see KB to David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan Bank, New York City, 1 October 1979, ACDP K081/3 and KB to Georges Berthoin, European President of the Trilateral Commission, 28 September 1979, ACDP K081/3. In 1973, Birrenbach relinquished the chairmanship and in June 1982 the vice chairmanship of the AI Foreign Policy Committee but seems to have remained a member of that entity until December 1984. Birrenbach had succeeded Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim as 1<sup>st</sup> Chairman of the *Atlantica* in June 1977. Beyond all this, Birrenbach also left the Senate of the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft* in May 1981.

events.<sup>10</sup> In certain cases, he remained connected in some capacity with these organizations, for instance as honorary president of the DGAP (like Henle before him), as a member of the newly created AB *Kuratorium*, or as an ordinary member of the TC, thus facilitating a limited participation in, influence on and support for particular personalities, activities and projects, whether they be administrative and member meetings, especially interesting functions, or financing operations.<sup>11</sup> Final performances of his gatekeeping role, Birrenbach often took part in identifying suitable successors, for instance Karl-Heinz Narjes and Otto Wolff von Amerongen in the TC ExComm, Günter Diehl as DGAP president, and Wilfried Guth as vice president in the AI Board of Governors.<sup>12</sup> With regard to some bodies, among them those at the AI and SWP, a proud Birrenbach exited as the longest serving member. Despite the accompanying recognition for his efforts and achievements, typically in the form of a copious correspondence and worthy farewell functions, Birrenbach usually found his departure from such institutions “pretty sad.”<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, with the exception of the AI, which ceased to exist in 1987, virtually all these organizations went on well after Birrenbach passed from the scene.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Birrenbach’s last Bilderberg Conference was that of April 1972 in Knokke (Belgium). In March 1983, Birrenbach took part in the German-American Conference in West Berlin but had to leave on the first day due to health issues (fever and bronchitis).

<sup>11</sup> Birrenbach was also bestowed the rare title of “Honorary Governor” by the AI and named Honorary Chairman of the *Atlantica*. Similarly, in June 1977, Friedrich Carl Freiherr von Oppenheim became honorary president of the *Atlantica*. At the same time that Birrenbach resigned the DGAP presidency, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff left her post as a vice president and was elected an honorary member of the *Präsidium*.

<sup>12</sup> Narjes was a CDU MdB. Birrenbach tapped Wolff von Amerongen, president of the DIHT and tied closely to the Chase Manhattan Bank, primarily due to his links with the *Wirtschaft* and his consequent value in securing the commission’s future German funding. With regard to the DGAP presidency, Birrenbach undertook a trying and ultimately futile year-long search for a figure with direct contact to the *Wirtschaft*, in light of the organization’s financial situation, but did approve of his eventual replacement, the former ambassador and state secretary Diehl. Guth was *Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*.

<sup>13</sup> KB to John McCloy, 30 March 1981, ACDP K178/2, actually referring here to his final Thyssen meetings but also perfectly applicable elsewhere. For example, *Schlussveranstaltungen* were staged for Birrenbach in 1981 within the context of the DGAP *Präsidium* and *Mitgliederversammlung*.

<sup>14</sup> As we have noted in Chapter 8, some Atlanticist organizations closed down earlier, most notably the Monnet Committee in 1975 as well as the Birrenbach-Groeben Circle in 1973.

Birrenbach's relinquishing of such offices and positions owed much to advancing age and declining health. As he bluntly put it to Max Kohnstamm in 1980, "enough is enough."<sup>15</sup> One particularly stark example illustrating the latter was Birrenbach's resignation from the TC ExComm as a result of heart problems that increasingly rendered it inadvisable or even impossible for him to fly long distances, especially to Japan. However, given the obvious pleasure and meaning that Birrenbach derived from his work in the Atlanticist organizations, his laying down of these accustomed roles was never entirely voluntary, rather at best grudgingly accepted. Indeed, Birrenbach's departure from the DGAP presidency was to no small degree the belated, logical, and essentially amicable upshot of his own complicated efforts to reform and rejuvenate ("*Verjüngung*") the *Präsidium*, efforts that also impacted during the late 1970s and early 1980s on the now elderly Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Carlo Schmid, Hans-Günther Sohl, and Hans Speidel.<sup>16</sup> In some cases, Birrenbach openly bristled when he sensed, rightly or wrongly, that he was being unjustifiably excluded from, for example, the Königswinter Conferences or certain AB activities.<sup>17</sup> Thus, Birrenbach did, at times, experience the frustration of other older Atlanticists, some of whom, usually not disinterestedly, warned that the institutional desire to introduce "fresh blood" into the network was tipping the balance too far towards the side of callow youth.<sup>18</sup> In the final analysis, Birrenbach

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<sup>15</sup> KB to Kohnstamm, 24 January 1980, ACDP K150/2.

<sup>16</sup> An internal DGAP group decided which members should be cordially requested, including by a sometimes remorseful Birrenbach, to resign whether due to age or lack of participation. This body permitted Birrenbach, whose exit had already been announced the previous year, to stay on until 1981.

<sup>17</sup> For a peeved Birrenbach not having been invited "for the first time in thirty years" to the KWC, see KB to Prof. Hans Merkle, Chairman of the *Geschäftsführung* of the Robert Bosch GmbH, 12 February 1982, ACDP K076/2. On a likewise irritated Birrenbach not being invited to the 7<sup>th</sup> German-American Young Leaders Conference, staged by the AB and ACG in Hamburg in August 1984, see KB to Peter Pechel, Vice Chairman of the *Atlantik-Brücke*, Bonn, 20 September 1984, ACDP K054/1.

<sup>18</sup> On the need for "fresh blood," see the Protocol of the AB-*Vorstand* Meeting on 28 January 1980 in Bonn, ACDP K114/2 and the Hanns Maull memo to David Rockefeller et al., on the European Response

became, to an extent, a victim of processes, whatever their broader merits, that he too had played a considerable part in promoting within the Atlanticist infrastructure.<sup>19</sup>

The main exception to Birrenbach resigning his positions was his continuation as chairman of the *Kuratorium* in the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*, a post he retained to the very end. Unfortunately for Birrenbach, economic conditions from the mid-1970s onward, characterized by oil shocks and a dire crisis of the West German steel industry that he considered the worst since the Great Depression, somewhat crippled the *Wirtschaft* as a source of financing. This situation was reflected in the mounting hurdles Birrenbach confronted in his ongoing efforts to gather money from the *Wirtschaft*, particularly to support Atlanticist organizations and endeavors, and also drastically impacted on the state of and dividends distributed by the Thyssen AG, whose shares still constituted the foundation's "basic fund."<sup>20</sup> With its means thus limited, the *Thyssen Stiftung* substantially curtailed its overall program and individual grants, including for "foreign-political projects."<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, Birrenbach was still able to effectively promote

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about the Future of the Trilateral Commission, 24 January 1978, ACDP K204/2. For much earlier complaints, specifically regarding the Königswinter Conferences, see Prof. Dr. Friedensburg (MdB) to KB, 11 April 1963, ACDP K103/1 and Ernst-Ulrich Fromm, *Die Welt*, to KB, 20 January 1965, ACDP K103/1.

<sup>19</sup> Age dictated Birrenbach's quite frictionless departure from the Thyssen group as well.

<sup>20</sup> For Birrenbach's "extremely difficult" and "disappointing" experiences "today with the collecting of money [*Geldern*]," see KB to Dr. Karl Hohmann, Bonn, 4 November 1976, ACDP K190/2.

<sup>21</sup> On the disturbing shape of the European steel industry that had last year seen Thyssen as "almost the only company in Europe" that still distributed "some dividends," see KB to John McCloy, New York City, 24 June 1981, ACDP K178/2. For the FTS issuing "merely" DM 4 million in "approvals" at its most recent meeting, whereas "earlier" DM 14 million would have been typical, see KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, Newtown Square (PA), 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2. On the Thyssen AG paying no dividends in 1984 "for the first time in its history" due to the "structural crisis" that afflicted the steel industry in Germany (and "all other countries"), see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV*, Munich, 9 February 1984, ACDP K030/1. For a particular German sensitivity to the current recession in Europe that was "the worst... since the end of the war" (indeed a "deep economic crisis" whose "solution" was still not yet in sight), especially as "Germany has made this experience now the third time in its recent history," see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, CSIS, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 7 December 1982, ACDP K132/2. On Birrenbach being "glad" that J. Robert Schaetzel's "very valuable" and "useful" project, designed to establish a "special arrangement" between the directly elected European Parliament and the US Congress and in which Prof. Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute) was also involved, would apparently be supported

specific research directions, while the hobbled FTS managed, in part relying on its reserves, to remain active during these lean years in a surprising breadth of fields, not least through the encouraging, organizing and financing of important Atlanticist initiatives, among them conferences, studies and guest professorships.<sup>22</sup> German Atlanticist entities like the DGAP and the Atlantic Institute, as well as several like-minded, strictly American outfits such as the Brookings Institution (Washington DC) and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge MA), ranked as some of the most prominent beneficiaries.<sup>23</sup> Simultaneously, other Atlanticist-inclined West German

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by the European Cultural Foundation (Netherlands) rather than by the FTS, see Schaetzel to KB, 31 January 1979, ACDP K098/2 and KB to Schaetzel, Washington DC, 13 February 1979, ACDP K098/2. Here, Birrenbach cited the “very severe” impact on the Thyssen AG of “the five years’ crisis of the steel industry” (“the deepest since fifty years”), intensified by “a steel workers’ strike of fifty days.”

<sup>22</sup> On the *Thyssen Stiftung* being forced this year (1984) to “dig into” its reserves, see KB to Butenandt, 9 February 1984, ACDP K030/1. Regardless, Birrenbach maintained in this letter to Butenandt that “the level [*Niveau*] of the discussions” in the FTS was “still excellent [*vorzüglich*].”

<sup>23</sup> For example, the FTS financed *The Atlantic Community in Crisis* (New York City: Pergamon Press, 1979), a work produced by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc., edited by Prof. Walter Hahn and Prof. Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., and also appearing several years later in the Federal Republic in German translation (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982). Founded in 1976, the IFPA was associated with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Birrenbach was in contact via correspondence with Pfaltzgraff (IFPA President) and Hahn (IFPA Deputy Director). Furthermore, the FTS funded the IFPA’s Cape Route study that by August 1982 had so far spawned three published monographs. Along with private American sources, the FTS funded the work of the Brookings Institution on new forms of “International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy,” including a small conference convened in Bellagio (Italy) in late March 1980. Meanwhile, the FTS proposed and financed an AI study on “The Future of Berlin,” edited by Martin Hillenbrand (AI Director General), that emerged as a book in English (Montclair NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co., 1980) and German (Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna: Ullstein, 1981). Similarly, the DGAP study on “Die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und Nichtverbreitung,” expected to appear soon as of May 1981, enjoyed FTS funding. On the FTS about to examine an application of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC) for a project dealing with “The Neutralist Temptation in Europe” that would involve American and German figures like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Adelbert Weinstein, see KB to John McCloy, 30 November 1981, New York City, ACDP K132/2. For Heino von Meyer (*Institut für ländliche Strukturforchung*, Frankfurt) working on an FTS-financed study about “Regional Development Policy: A Task for the EC,” see KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Dr. Philipp Jenninger, *Staatsminister* in the BKA, Bonn, 31 January 1984, ACDP K030/2. Thanks crucially to FTS funding as well as Birrenbach’s interventions with personalities at or close to the German universities in question, among them Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (the “excellent” Bavarian *Staatsminister für Unterricht und Kultus*), Robert Strausz-Hupé served as a guest professor during the period 1978-81 at the Universities of Munich (*Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft*) and Münster, enabling him also to give lectures there addressing international relations, European security and the foreign policy of the Atlantic alliance. In some cases, these interventions of Birrenbach were guided by members of the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*, for instance Prof. Helmut Schelsky (Chairman for *Rechtssoziologie*, University of Münster). FTS grants in this respect

foundations sustained their own operations in comparable fashion, with, for instance, *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* funding crucial to the 1983 creation of the McCloy Academic Scholarship Program for German exchange students at Harvard's Kennedy School.

However, already by February 1976, Birrenbach had made the momentous decision to forego another *Bundestag* candidacy in the fall.<sup>24</sup> While in part dictated by the mounting burdens imposed on him given his age and health, several other factors eased this still difficult choice.<sup>25</sup> Some were of a rather static nature, with Birrenbach explaining, for instance, that “the perpetual election campaign [*ständige Wahlkampf*] renders a profound addressing of the problems difficult” and, therefore, “[t]he parliament as such has never satisfied me.”<sup>26</sup> Others were more recent in origin, among them the tribulations of years in opposition for a man with “executive experience” and what he portrayed as a decline in the quality, including the “intellectual level,” of the *Bundestag* as well as the other Western parliaments. Plagued by a sweeping failure in the system and principles for selecting parliamentarians as well as from the “diminished attraction” for “intelligent people” of such a career, these bodies now consisted largely of mediocrities incapable of grasping the complexity of the contemporary and long-term

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included DM 25,000 to the University of Munich for Winter 1979-80 and DM 30,000 to the University of Münster for Winter 1980-81. As of February 1979, the FTS was also funding functions of the *Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen* (University of Cologne), with Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schwarz, director of the institute, Birrenbach's key connection in this regard. Such functions included a week of lectures given by Strausz-Hupé in January 1979, one of which Birrenbach attended, with the FTS providing for travel within Germany and an *Honorar* of approximately DM 1,200.

<sup>24</sup> For Birrenbach suggesting that, in lieu of formally taking part in the campaign, he contribute by carrying out discussion sessions, press conferences and other functions involving small but vital groups of the *Politik, Wirtschaft* and press in the lead-up to the election, see KB to Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU Secretary General), 8 March 1976, ACDP K130/2. It is unclear if Birrenbach actually followed through on this idea.

<sup>25</sup> As Birrenbach succinctly put it, elucidating his decision in terms of the work load he had continued to bear, “that was just too much! I believe I have acted correctly” (KB to Hans-Helmut Kuhnke, Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the *Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft eV*, 28 April 1976, ACDP K130/2).

<sup>26</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. hc Hans Merkle, 28 April 1976, ACDP K130/2. In this same vein, Birrenbach also remarked that “[t]he parliament was always more of a strain [*Belastung*] for me than a stimulus [*Anregung*]” (KB to Ernst Plesser, 2 March 1979, ACDP K130/2).

challenges facing them.<sup>27</sup> All this was part of his larger, similar critique of the declining quality in the Western democracies of political leaders across the spectrum (including the *Union*) in both the executive and legislative spheres.<sup>28</sup> Longing for the giants of the 1940s, 50s and 60s, Birrenbach embraced the concept of an age of “epigones” and cautioned that “[w]e are not living any more in the world of Churchill, Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schuman, Monnet,” evidence of his greater appreciation for the deceased Adenauer in later years, at least for his clarity of thought and judgment as party leader and dedicated European.<sup>29</sup> As of May 1986, Birrenbach regretted not only Chancellor

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<sup>27</sup> KB to Robert Bowie, 21 January 1977, ACDP K160/2. On Birrenbach now pleased that “I have not to sit in the *Bundestag* and listen to debates without real substance,” see KB to Jean Monnet, Houjarray, France, 21 March 1978, ACDP K158/2. On “the strength of your [the US] presidency” being “now worsened by the lack of experience... of the Congress,” see KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, Washington DC, 17 April 1979, ACDP K098/2. Birrenbach’s criticisms extended as well to the, from 1979 on, directly elected European Parliament. On this European Parliament’s “very poor start,” see KB to Robert Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979, ACDP K210/2. For Birrenbach on “the low level of modern parliaments,” see KB to J. Robert Schaetzel, Washington DC, 20 November 1978, ACDP K098/2.

<sup>28</sup> For Birrenbach’s reference to the deleterious impact of “the modern political leadership,” see KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, ACDP K098/2. During this period, he regularly lambasted the most prominent West German political leaders for their lack of hardness, persuasiveness [“*Überzeugungskraft*”], and will to act on behalf of their convictions. In explicating this phenomenon, Birrenbach declared that “it is well known [*bekannt*] that the military courage of the German people [*Volk*] is simply [*nun einmal*] greater than its *Zivilkourage*” (KB to Prof. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, 18 March 1980, ACDP K193/1). While Birrenbach claimed to view Margaret Thatcher as a positive figure for Europe, he also criticized the British efforts to “solve” their “terrible budget problem” as of April 1980 as too “Thatcherous” (i.e. “stormy”) (KB to George Ball, 9 April 1980, ACDP K160/3).

<sup>29</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 August 1984, ACDP K212/2. On “epigones,” see KB to Amb. Martin Hillenbrand (US), Bonn, 4 May 1976, ACDP K083/1. For a skeptical Birrenbach asking, “[h]ave you the impression that personalities of the rank of the fifties are in power now?” see KB to Henry Kissinger, 24 July 1984, ACDP K146/3. On Birrenbach’s belief that “the leadership in Europe and the United States is not any more comparable with that of the personalities... like Dean Acheson or Adenauer,” see KB to Rostow, 10 May 1984, ACDP K212/2. For Birrenbach bemoaning that “we have no Adenauer any more. But where do you have a man like Adenauer?” see KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982, ACDP K146/3. On Birrenbach’s lament that “K[ohl] is not Adenauer,” see KB to George Ball, 18 October 1982, ACDP K160/3. For Birrenbach asserting that, while an intelligent and “excellent” man *per se*, “[Jacques] Delors [President of the European Commission] is also no Walter Hallstein” and that Delors’ predecessor as well “was not entirely up to his tasks,” see KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 30 January 1985, ACDP K029/2. In this letter to Kohl, Birrenbach stressed that, in particular, Delors was “not sufficiently politically-structurally oriented,” citing the proposal that the Frenchman had presented in Strasbourg on 14 January that “hardly leads to a result” since “the concept is formulated too intellectually and economically” and did not make clear “the structure of a possible European charter.” Ultimately, Birrenbach wondered “[w]here are there still men who at the same time so master the economic policy [*Wirtschaftspolitik*] that they would be able to present a convincing draft?” Likewise, as of 1979, Birrenbach detected in England a dearth “on both sides” of “constructive” political figures, as they had existed earlier under the likes of Bevin, Eden,



Helmut Kohl's inability to mobilize sufficient foreign policy *Kräfte* "of format" but, even more, the sheer paucity of such in the present-day Federal Republic, professing himself

astonished about the lacking format of the average *Politiker* today. A large part of the contemporary *Politiker* and voters is still far removed from the democratic *Geist* of the Weimar time or from the *Staatstreue* of Prussia.... The political world in its current level [*Niveau*] in the Federal Republic disappoints every expert [*Kenner*] on the German *Politik*.<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, confronted by this desolate setting, an at least ostensibly relieved Birrenbach still insisted a few years after departing the *Bundestag*, "I prefer the *Wissenschaftliche Beirat* of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* to the [*Bundestag*] Foreign Affairs Committee."<sup>31</sup>

Whatever changes it entailed, leaving the *Bundestag* in 1976 did not halt Birrenbach's intensive political efforts, particularly with respect to foreign policy. Here, he retained his broad interest in the contemporary developments transpiring within the fields of international security, political, economic (including trade and monetary), and

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Macmillan, Macleod and Heath (KB to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, ACDP K068/2). With regard to parliaments, see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Trilateral Commission, New York City, 7 February 1975, ACDP K146/1; KB to Rostow, 8 August 1984, ACDP K212/2; and KB to Rostow, 2 October 1984, ACDP K212/2. On Birrenbach's assessment that "also the [US] Congress is today no longer that, what it has been at the time of Vandenberg and Johnson" and "[t]he abandoning [*Aufgabe*] of the 'seniority rule' is one of the reasons for its failure [*Versagen*]," see KB to *Ministerialdirektor* Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, ACDP K034/1. For Birrenbach claiming still "to pursue... the goal set by Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer and De Gasperi" in Europe, see KB to John McCloy, 25 March 1980, ACDP K134/1.

<sup>30</sup> KB to Kohl, 27 May 1986, ACDP K029/2. For Birrenbach on the personnel sources of Kohl's "tough situation," requiring that he "strengthen the structure of the current government," see KB to Kohl, 28 June 1984, ACDP K029/2. In this letter to the chancellor, Birrenbach raised doubts whether "all the members of the cabinet" possessed "the necessary caliber" in "today's trying circumstances." The "functionality [*Funktionsfähigkeit*]" of the *Bundeskanzleramt* was "absolutely crucial," yet "[k]ey positions" there were "inadequately occupied [*unzureichend besetzt*]" in comparison to the "Adenauer-time." Kohl simply did not have at his disposal "the ample [*ausreichende*] number of *Mitarbeitern*" enjoyed by Adenauer, Kohl's "great model [*Vorbild*]."

<sup>31</sup> KB to Ernst Plessner, 2 March 1979, ACDP K130/2. For Max Kohnstamm, perhaps alluding to subtle or potential pressure surrounding this departure, insisting that Birrenbach had accomplished too much "to be pushed out in the end by young and ignorant people," see Kohnstamm to KB, 8 March 1976, ACDP K150/2. For Amb. Karl-Günther von Hase speculating that Birrenbach's departure was motivated by "political and personal reasons," see Hase to KB, 23 March 1976, ACDP K068/2. However, for CDU Secretary General Kurt Biedenkopf's trepidation about the anticipated absence of Birrenbach and his "multifaceted" foreign policy counsel, see Biedenkopf to KB, 26 March 1976, ACDP K130/2. For MdB Rainer Barzel being "blindsided [*unerwartet getroffen*]" by Birrenbach's decision, which "I respect but do not approve," see Barzel to KB, 10 March 1976, ACDP K130/2. It was only now, in 1976, that Birrenbach's membership in the *Vorstand* of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion* also came to an end.

energy affairs. Especially trans-Atlantic but also East-West, German-German and German-Israeli relations, all crucial for the Federal Republic, remained the matters of his primary attention. Following his announcement but prior to actually exiting the *Bundestag*, Birrenbach repeatedly stated his firm intention to maintain the closest of contact with the party leadership and to continue providing advice and assistance on vital issues to party and *Fraktion*.<sup>32</sup> At least outwardly, Birrenbach put on a brave face and even claimed to have benefited from terminating his parliamentary activity since, “as a free man,” he could now speak more openly and, no longer engaged in what he denigrated as the often insignificant and insubstantial work, meetings and proceedings characteristic of *Fraktion* and *Bundestag*, could focus on tackling significant problems more productively.<sup>33</sup> As Birrenbach put it, “I work now more in politics than before because I am liberated from the senseless *Bundestag* debates without real dimension.... I can now work in a deeper dimension... which satisfies me more than sitting on the opposition bank [*sic* bench] and discussing the budget deficit now and in the future.”<sup>34</sup>

Henceforth, Birrenbach sought to fulfill the quintessentially American role of “elder statesman.” This comprised aggressive efforts to counsel key government and political personalities in the Federal Republic, among them the Presidents, Chancellors, relevant ministers and, up to October 1982, the leadership figures in the opposition *Union* (mainly Karl Carstens and Helmut Kohl).<sup>35</sup> Birrenbach’s attempts to advise Chancellor

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<sup>32</sup> KB to Helmut Kohl (CDU Chairman), 8 March 1976 and 1 April 1976, both contained in ACDP K130/2 as well as KB to Heinrich Krone and the former chancellors (now MdBs) Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger, all dated 23 February 1976 and also located in ACDP K130/2.

<sup>33</sup> KB to Prof. Eugene Rostow, Yale University Law School, 13 November 1979, ACDP K212/1.

<sup>34</sup> KB to John McCloy, 21 March 1978, ACDP K210/1.

<sup>35</sup> Among the relevant ministers that Birrenbach tried to advise, including during the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt, were Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff (FDP) and Defense Minister Georg Leber (SPD). Previously Director of the DGAP Research Institute (1970-73) and Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion* (1973-76), Carstens functioned

Helmut Schmidt and his social-liberal government coexisted uneasily with his professed loyalty to “our party,” his belief in its crucial part in bringing about the much-needed “*Wende*” and his continued involvement in some *Union* activities, especially as a member of the CDU’s *Ältestenrat* and *Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik*.<sup>36</sup> As justification, an embittered Birrenbach stressed not only his desire to influence the executive, directly active as it was in foreign policy, but also a decline in level within party and *Fraktion* that left him a relative vacuum of genuine contacts willing to seek and follow his proposals.<sup>37</sup>

Despite his model, Birrenbach never truly grasped the, ideally, reserved grace of the

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now as President of the *Bundestag* (1976-79) and President of the Federal Republic (1979-84). Even before becoming Chancellor in October 1982, Kohl was Chairman of the CDU party and of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*. Important subordinates and intermediaries substantively addressed in some cases by Birrenbach encompassed, during the Schmidt chancellorship, Berndt von Staden (*Ministerialdirektor* in the BKA and, then, *Staatssekretär* in the AA) and, during the Kohl chancellorship, *Ministerialdirektor* Horst Teltschik (BKA), *Staatsminister* Philipp Jenninger (BKA), and *Staatsminister* Alois Mertes (AA). For Birrenbach visiting the next day Gen. Jürgen Brandt (Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr* but not somebody with whom Birrenbach regularly dealt) following “my recent contacts with the United States,” see KB to George Ball, 19 November 1981, ACDP K160/3.

<sup>36</sup> At the meetings and discussions of the KAS-administered *Ältestenrat*, Birrenbach interacted with notables like Heinrich Krone (the chairman), Eugen Gerstenmaier, and Bruno Heck. On Birrenbach hoping to see Kai-Uwe von Hassel at the next gathering of the “*Senioren*,” see KB to Hassel, *Bundestagspräsident aD*, MdB, 16 July 1984, ACDP K082/2. For Birrenbach on his “good contact” with the *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*, in part through its “extremely interesting” *Vortragsveranstaltungen*, see KB to Karl-Heinz Bilke, *Hauptgeschäftsführer*, KAS eV, 6 July 1983, ACDP K082/2. The *Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik* was chaired by the MdBs Werner Marx and, later, Volker Rühle. Birrenbach also attended at least the May 1983 CDU-*Bundesparteitag* in Cologne.

<sup>37</sup> On Birrenbach declaring his devotion, as before, to “the cause [*Sache*] of our party,” see KB to Josef Rösing, KAS eV, 23 July 1979, ACDP K160/1. For Birrenbach asserting that he was no Social Democrat, rather “a man of the CDU,” see KB to MdB Heinrich Köppler, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1. However, for Birrenbach admitting to be “deeply worried [*beunruhigt*] about the fate of our party,” see KB to MdB Paul Mikat, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1. On Birrenbach’s regret that “the prospects for the development of ideas in the *Bundestag*, in light of the current state of the *Fraktion*, certainly makes a treatment of the more complex problems in a deeper dimension more difficult rather than easier,” see KB to Gerhard Stoltenberg, 6 July 1978, ACDP K160/1. For Birrenbach clearly upset about Kohl’s failure to consult with him prior to Kohl’s recent US-trip and remarking that his contact with “the leader of our party” (Kohl) was “practically non-existent,” see KB to Köppler, 7 July 1978, ACDP K160/1. Birrenbach’s cooptation into the *Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik* only occurred once he brought pressure to bear in July 1977 following an “amusing” letter from CDU Secretary General and *Sozialpolitiker* Heiner Geißler explaining the desire to rely instead on younger personalities to generate fresh ideas on the world situation. An incensed Birrenbach, referring to the need to fully understand the intricate thematic linkages and to master multiple foreign languages, responded that “in order to produce new ideas about the world, one must first of all know [*kennen*] the world (and not only from the perspective of *Sozialpolitik*)” (KB to Kai-Uwe von Hassel, 19 May 1978, ACDP K153/1). In this letter to Hassel, Birrenbach moaned, “[t]hat is a sad [*trauriges*] picture. However, it unfortunately corresponds to what the party is doing at the moment. That is extremely painful for someone who has served the party twenty years. [It] will be even more painful for the country,” which was thus denied “a genuine alternative for tomorrow.”

American “wise man” that led John McCloy, resisting Birrenbach’s entreaties, to remark, “I fear that if I intervene [with US government figures] I would be viewed as an officious intermeddler.”<sup>38</sup> Though a limited contact emerged via correspondence, the drawing up and passing along of confidential reports and analyses, and occasional discussions, both on the phone as well as in face-to-face meetings, the busy personalities Birrenbach targeted generally sought to ward off these unwelcome and sometimes, to be generous, overassertive approaches. For all his persistent exertions, Birrenbach never succeeded in recreating with Chancellors Schmidt and Kohl the close relationship that had once existed with Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger and operated in later years primarily as an irritating and, as we shall discover, even potentially dangerous “loose cannon.”<sup>39</sup>

In all of this, Birrenbach cited not just his vaunted, decades-long experience with America as well as Europe as a basis for his judgment but also proudly, and insecurely, insisted that, even after leaving the *Bundestag*, his activities otherwise went on virtually as before. To all who would listen, Germans and foreigners alike, he asserted that he continued to work at least as intensively and productively and in a similar fashion, performing essentially the same functions and tasks, as during his parliamentary time. Here, Birrenbach pointed to the various non-legislative posts he still occupied, his unabated travels abroad, and his ongoing participation in diverse international gatherings. Furthermore, he claimed to remain in a constant, trustful contact and substantive

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<sup>38</sup> McCloy to KB, 4 February 1983, ACDP K178/1. As McCloy observed regarding his own relations with the American government, “[i]f they need my help, they know where they can reach me at any time” (McCloy to KB, 16 March 1978, ACDP K210/1).

<sup>39</sup> For Kohl’s apparently “angry [*böse*]” reaction to Birrenbach’s criticisms, see KB to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 22 December 1982, ACDP K029/2. On Birrenbach’s difficulty in convincing Kohl to follow his advice on particular issues, see KB to McCloy, New York City, 25 November 1982, ACDP K178/2. Birrenbach’s efforts to establish and maintain a meaningful contact with Franz Josef Strauß (as Minister-President of Bavaria and, more significantly, chancellor candidate of the *Union* in 1980) and Richard von Weizsäcker (as Federal President beginning in 1984) were similarly in vain. For Birrenbach’s attempts vis-à-vis the latter, see KB to Weizsäcker, Berlin, 24 May 1984, ACDP K031/2.

cooperation with many leading personalities (in large part at their initiative), among them key government and political figures, in the Federal Republic and throughout the Western world, especially the US (including access to those inside or very close to the successive administrations) but also Western Europe, and even in the Middle East. Moreover, he maintained that, not least due to these foreign contacts, he continued to possess valuable expertise and advice, exclusive knowledge and often secret information, along with extensive materials pertinent to contemporary foreign policy and international affairs.<sup>40</sup>

The picture painted was of a Birrenbach who, as respected and influential as ever at home and abroad, remained indispensable. However, striving to sustain this illusion dictated that Birrenbach's final years devolved into an extended episode of embarrassing obfuscations, blatant exaggerations, ostentatious name-dropping ("my old friend John McCloy"), dubious boasts and brazen self-promotion. These practices evoke a rather distressing image of a man, incapable of crafting a new role in life, desperately striving in myriad ways to regain or retain some relevance in his currently disintegrating one.<sup>41</sup>

True, even after leaving the *Bundestag*, Birrenbach did maintain substantive links with prominent personalities in a variety of fields both inside and outside the Federal Republic. Within the *Wirtschaft*, he remained in contact with figures at a number of firms, especially in the steel industry (of course at the Thyssen AG) and banking sector

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<sup>40</sup> As evidence of the enduring strength of such linkages, Birrenbach highlighted, for example, the speed and positivity with which contacts responded to his letters, circulated appreciative missives from said figures, and revealed little-known details about these personalities (e.g. regarding health conditions).

<sup>41</sup> For Birrenbach making clear that he remained "on the ball," see KB to Karl Carstens, 15 March 1978, ACDP K110/3. On a satisfied Birrenbach informing Eugene Rostow that Alexander Haig had told him "to call him Al" and that Haig had "real confidence" in him, see KB to Rostow, 13 December 1979, ACDP K212/1. For Birrenbach requesting that George Ball secure for him a special invitation from Peter Peterson (Ball's partner at Lehman Brothers) so that he could participate in an upcoming discussion among German and American "industrialists" about world affairs, particularly in the context of the "economic crisis," see KB to Ball, 19 November 1981, ACDP K160/3. On Birrenbach reminding Chancellor Kohl that "[f]ew in Germany know [*kennen*] America as well as I," see KB to Kohl, personal-confidential, 22 March 1983, ACDP K029/2. For Birrenbach claiming to know "dozens of Reagan advisors who will probably get key positions in the ministries," see KB to Helmut Schmidt, 22 December 1980, ACDP K033/3.

(e.g. *Deutsche Bank*), as well as key economic associations like the BDI and the *Ostausschuß der deutschen Wirtschaft*.<sup>42</sup> Within the *Wissenschaft*, Birrenbach still operated in the context of his *Stiftung* sub-network, with men like Hans Merkle, and sustained connections with individuals in the crucial organizations, such as Adolf Butenandt, along with scholars at relevant institutes at home and abroad, among them Boris Meissner, Hermann Priebe and Ulrich Karpen.<sup>43</sup> Meanwhile, he continued to cooperate with those constituting his Atlanticist institutional network.<sup>44</sup> In West German politics, these links included members of the government and, even during the social-liberal era, the governmental bureaucracy (for instance, in the AA and BKA as well as at NATO), along with figures of the CDU-*Bundestagsfraktion* (e.g. Werner Marx, Karl-Heinz Narjes, Kurt Georg Kiesinger) and men who had essentially passed from the scene, such as Eugen Gerstenmaier, Heinrich Krone, and Walter Hallstein.<sup>45</sup> At the same time, Birrenbach remained in touch with the embassy system, enjoying relations, to one extent

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<sup>42</sup> Among these figures was Wilfried Guth, *Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG* (Frankfurt). Likewise, see KB to Helmut Haeusgen (*Vorstand* Member of the *Dresdner Bank AG*, Frankfurt), 5 December 1977, ACDP K141/1. Birrenbach had just seen Haeusgen the previous week at the most recent meeting of *Dresdner's Zentralbeirat*, where they had spoken about the state of the steel industry and, related to this, the “lack of solidarity” in the European Community.

<sup>43</sup> Merkle was Chairman of the *Geschäftsführung* of the Robert Bosch GmbH (Stuttgart). Butenandt served as Honorary President of the *Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV* (Munich). Prof. Dr. Boris Meissner directed the *Institut für Ostrecht* (University of Cologne). Prof. Priebe led the *Institut für ländliche Strukturforchung* (University of Frankfurt), where he dealt with European agricultural policy, not least the therein differing Franco-German interests. As of July 1981, Dr. jur. Ulrich Karpen was based at the *Institut für Staatsrecht* (University of Cologne).

<sup>44</sup> In 1973, Prof. Karl Kaiser became Director of the DGAP Research Institute. In 1978, Vice Admiral (*aD*) Herbert Trebesch succeeded Amb. (*aD*) Dr. Gebhardt von Walther as *Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender Präsident* at the DGAP eV. For Birrenbach feeling that, aside from Günter Henle, he had been closest to Trebesch at the DGAP, see KB to Trebesch, 6 July 1981, ACDP K136/1. Martin Hillenbrand took over as Director General of the Atlantic Institute in 1977. On Birrenbach looking forward to upcoming “cooperation” in the SWP with Hans Merkle (already a member of the DGAP *Geschäftsführenden Präsidium* and now the new president of the *SWP-Stiftungsrat*), see KB to Prof. Hans Merkle, 25 January 1979, ACDP K130/2. In May 1984, Dr. Walter Damm (*Generalbevollmächtigter*, Bankhaus Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie, Cologne) succeeded Walter Stahl as *Geschäftsführer* of the *Atlantica*.

<sup>45</sup> In addition to heading the CDU's *Bundesfachausschuß Außenpolitik*, Marx chaired, from 1969-80, the AK V of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*. On Birrenbach hoping for and having discussed “a personal cooperation in the future” with Gerstenmaier and Krone, see KB to Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, *Bundestagspräsident aD*, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, ACDP K086/1. Hallstein's Stuttgart base appears to have made face-to-face meetings rare, requiring instead a stress on correspondence and the telephone.

or another, with the ambassadors and personnel of the significant foreign missions in Bonn (i.e. United States, Britain, France, Israel) and with the West German ambassadors in Washington DC.<sup>46</sup> Finally, despite his considerable initial anxiety after departing from the parliament, Birrenbach was able to retain many of his foreign contacts, notably those in the United States and Western Europe (this encompassing Britain and Brussels). Much as before, these valuable assets functioned to keep him better apprised, even from a distance, of the personalities, situations, events, proposals, conceptions and policies existing in the Federal Republic and beyond.<sup>47</sup>

Such links also proved essential in enabling Birrenbach, though no longer occupying an official political position, to continue acquiring and digesting a still rather impressive amount of materials pertaining to complex international affairs and issues. True, on one level, these sources comprised simply the mass media (i.e. print, radio, television), not only the key West German outlets but in some instances foreign, including American, ones, as well as relevant books, articles and journals (e.g. *Europa-*

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<sup>46</sup> With respect to the US embassy in Bad Godesberg, this included the ambassadors Walter Stoessel (1976-81), Arthur Burns (1981-85) and Richard Burt (1985-). Regarding the British embassy, this applied especially to Amb. Sir Jock Taylor (1981-84). For Birrenbach's letter to the recently departed French ambassador Jean-Pierre Brunet, see KB to Brunet (Paris), 15 February 1982, ACDP K033/1. On Birrenbach conducting a discussion and correspondence with Richard Burt (already while the latter was Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), see KB to Burt, 13 April 1983, ACDP K132/2. For Birrenbach claiming that he had "many a time... dealt [*des öfteren... verhandelt*]" with Burt (who was still not ambassador yet) on US-European relations, see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 1 March 1984, confidential, ACDP K029/2. Among other things, these links comprised visits by Birrenbach to the embassies themselves; extensive, in-depth talks with the US and other ambassadors; the dispatching of letters or telexes to American contacts and personalities, for example in the State Department, via the US embassy (e.g. courier mail); as well as invitations to and attendance at diverse embassy functions (for instance, American and British garden parties, annual meetings, and receptions).

<sup>47</sup> For Birrenbach claiming that he still boasted a "circle" of "ten or twelve first-class American friends [*erster Kategorie*]," see KB to Chancellor Schmidt [cc Carstens], 26 October 1979, ACDP K033/3. After the dissolving of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Birrenbach stayed in touch with Monnet, including via the latter's wife and through visits to Houjarray. With the additional time at his disposal, Birrenbach's own letters became, if anything, even more extensive and detailed in this period.

*Archiv, Foreign Affairs*).<sup>48</sup> However, he also accumulated abundant materials being churned out in the Federal Republic and abroad, particularly in the US and elsewhere in the West, by governments, legislatures, political parties and international and intergovernmental organizations as well as by influential statesmen, officials, politicians, soldiers and scholars. Notable among the last were Americans like the still influential University of Chicago political scientist Albert Wohlstetter.<sup>49</sup> These materials, some of an internal or confidential nature, encompassed a motley collection of analyses, reports, speeches, statements, communiqués, resolutions, testimony, legislative bills, publications

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<sup>48</sup> For a *US News & World Report* article on the neutron bomb in Birrenbach's *Nachlaß* ("Pro and Con: Go Ahead with the Neutron Bomb?"), undated but apparently from June 1977, see ACDP K115/2. Likewise, for Rudolf Woller's "contribution to the strategy discussion just beginning in the Federal Republic" (entitled "Which War Does Not Threaten Us"), a piece from the *Deutschen Zeitung* of 19 August 1977 (Nr. 35), p. 3, see ACDP K115/2. On Birrenbach praising Alain Peyrefitte's "great volume" *Le Mal Français*, see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 21 December 1978, ACDP K033/3. For Birrenbach reading the quarterly *Strategic Review*, published by the United States Strategic Institute, and the USSI Special Reports "with greatest interest," see KB to Mrs. Donna Razeto, Administrative Assistant, US Strategic Institute, Washington DC, 28 February 1979, ACDP K098/2. For Birrenbach being "extraordinarily interested" in and planning to "immediately" order Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens' upcoming *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung* and having already ordered Lipgens' *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik* (1977), see KB to Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, ACDP K036/1. On Birrenbach subscribing to *Strategic Survey* (IISS), actually "since almost twenty years," see KB to Hans-Otto Thierbach, *Deutsche Bank AG*, Frankfurt, cc Stahl, 27 June 1983, ACDP K142/1. For Birrenbach on the "great" *Strategic Review*, see KB to Prof. Walter Hahn, Editor in Chief, USSI, Cambridge MA, 5 January 1984, ACDP K092/1. On Birrenbach listening to the "excellent" BBC, see KB to Sir Jock Taylor, Ambassador, British Embassy, 8 June 1984, ACDP K068/2. For Birrenbach having recently read Rose's "excellent" *Contre la stratégie des Curiaces* (1983), which dealt at least in part with Franco-German relations and cooperation, as well as Rose's essay in the Fall 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs* along with "all the articles" appearing in that journal during the year 1982 addressing future NATO policy and strategy, such as the "interesting plans" of SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers, see KB to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, ACDP K074/1.

<sup>49</sup> See Wohlstetter's essay "Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules" (*Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-77) in ACDP K141/1. For Wohlstetter's "Möglichkeiten zur Verlangsamung und Begrenzung der Ausbreitung von Nuklearwaffen," based on a working paper for a German-American *Arbeitstagung* about energy policy in Spitzingsee in January 1977 and appearing in the *Europa-Archiv* (8/1977, pp. 234-248), see ACDP K180/2. On State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild, having been approached at the MPG-Senate meeting in Bremen, sending Birrenbach a BMFT copy of the Wohlstetter study on the "plutonium Problematik" (with the potentially interesting marginalia of the responsible *Referenten*) as well as "restricted" British memos offering a summary of Wohlstetter's standpoint as revealed in his September 1977 testimony at the hearings on the Windscale (UK) reprocessing facility, see Haunschild to KB, 23 November 1977, ACDP K141/1. On Uwe Nerlich (SWP) having sent Birrenbach three *Foreign Affairs* articles by Wohlstetter and Birrenbach's desire to discuss their contents, see KB to Nerlich, 11 April 1979, ACDP K176/2. For Wohlstetter's April 1983 paper "Statesmen, Bishops and other Strategists on Bombing Innocents," also sent to Birrenbach by Nerlich, see ACDP K132/2. Wohlstetter sat on the organizing committee of the European-American workshop on "Soviet Military Power in Europe: Some Threats and Responses" held at the SWP from 2-4 June 1976 and funded in part by the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung*.



and other documents.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, thanks largely to his ongoing connections to and work with the Atlanticist institutions, Birrenbach continued to receive similar types of materials, as well as detailed studies, produced and presented within the framework of the Atlanticist infrastructure and by the personalities associated with it, as well as helpful suggestions on and corrections to his own papers.<sup>51</sup> All of this expert information and advice remained crucial in permitting Birrenbach to carry out his activities, especially regarding intricate technical matters of an armaments, economic, and energy nature.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Among the materials obtained by Birrenbach were those produced by the US Information Service (e.g. the Wireless Bulletin from Washington), the *Auswärtigen Amt* (internal reports from West German embassies), other departments of the federal government (the Bulletins of the *Bundespresseamt*), the *Unionsfraktion* and its AK V, NATO (the *NATO-Brief*), and the European Commission, along with texts of American legislation and Senate testimony, US party policy documents, and pertinent *Bundestag* protocols.

<sup>51</sup> For Birrenbach having received the “brilliant speech [*glänzenden Vortrag*]” of Prof. Dr. Klaus Ritter (SWP) given at the seminar of the International Peace Academy in July 1979, “one of the best papers” he had read about “this extraordinarily difficult theme,” see KB to Ritter, 20 August 1979, ACDP K200/2. On Birrenbach having gotten and read “with great interest” Uwe Nerlich’s paper analyzing the SALT II treaty, see again KB to Ritter, 20 August 1979, ACDP K200/2. For Birrenbach being “pleased” about the “opinion exchange” that had “come about” between him and Nerlich (SWP), see KB to Nerlich, 11 April 1979, ACDP K176/2. On Birrenbach receiving a *Kurznotiz* about the effects of SALT II on the US “Cruise Missile Program” drawn up by the SWP’s Hubert Feigl, which had otherwise only gone to the AA as “input” for its policy briefs, see Ritter to KB, 9 August 1979, ACDP K200/2. For the SWP-*Lagenotiz* of March 1977 on the “Determinative Factors of Israeli Domestic and Foreign Policy” by Bernd L. von Bismarck, see ACDP K174/2. For Birrenbach thanking Prof. Dr. Eberhard Schulz (DGAP Research Institute) for sending papers relating to “the German-Polish *Westgrenze*,” see KB to Schulz, 5 August 1980, ACDP K070/1. On several assisting “commentaries” being currently prepared at the SWP with respect to Birrenbach’s SALT II paper, see Nerlich to KB, 3 August 1979, ACDP K200/2. On Birrenbach making use of the arms figures contained in the IISS (London) publication of 1978-79 (probably *Strategic Survey*), see his confidential “Interim Report” on the state of the SALT negotiations, dated 6 July 1979, in ACDP K200/2. The publications Birrenbach received in this vein included *Triologue* (Trilateral Commission).

<sup>52</sup> On Birrenbach acquiring information for personal use from Vice Admiral Herbert Trebesch (German Military Representative in the NATO Military Committee, Brussels) and his office, see the report of 23 May 1977 on the bilateral US-USSR SALT negotiations in Geneva, ACDP K200/2; the text of 18 January 1978 containing technical analysis and views, especially regarding SALT II, in ACDP K115/3; the document addressing “nuclear weapons for tactical use [*Einsatz*]” (containing the ranges of various NATO and Warsaw Pact arms) of 26 January 1978, ACDP K115/3; and Trebesch to KB, 6 February 1978 along with corrections to and statistics for Birrenbach’s article on European security, ACDP K110/3. For the Federal Economic Ministry’s monthly reports on the West German economic situation (here January 1979), see ACDP K127/3. On Narjes providing Birrenbach with a confidential interim report about the German-Brazilian nuclear deal of June 1975 (“concerning the export of nuclear energy plants [*Kernenergieanlagen*] to Brazil and the German-Brazilian agreement about cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy”) produced by an ad hoc working group of the *Fraktion*, see MdB Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes to KB, 25 March 1977, along with the actual report, in ACDP K180/2. On the confidential draft program for consultations between the West German and British heads of government in October 1979 in Bonn, worked on by VLR von Puttkamer, see ACDP K068/2. For Birrenbach citing John M. Collins of the Congressional

However, Birrenbach's network of foreign Atlanticist political contacts stagnated rather than evolved during later years. In rare cases, his links with particular figures simply became dormant.<sup>53</sup> Over time, the advancing age, declining health, and death of contacts, along with other colleagues, damaged this web to some extent, with Monnet's failing health and ultimate demise in March 1979 a key loss.<sup>54</sup> Though, to Birrenbach's delight, some of his American contacts held posts in the administrations of this era (for instance, Brzezinski, Smith, Bowie and Owen, under Carter, and Nitze and Rostow, under Reagan), he was dismayed that others left government positions for good (e.g. McCloy, Kissinger, Ball, Schaezel), thus becoming permanent "outers."<sup>55</sup> While Birrenbach remained connected to these men in their roles as private citizens, often occupying prestigious stations in law, business, consulting and academia in the Northeast, whether on Wall Street, in the Ivy League or elsewhere, as they continued striving to impact international affairs via other avenues, this represented a process by which the

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Research Service as one of his sources for detailed relative figures pertaining to the US-USSR arms race, see KB to Helmut Kohl, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, 11 August 1981, ACDP K032/1.

<sup>53</sup> For instance, those to Sen. Jacob Javits (US) and Col. William Bass (UK).

<sup>54</sup> Further individuals that passed away included Christian Herter (December 1966), Fritz Erler (February 1967), Hajo Holborn (June 1969), Dean Acheson (October 1971), Goetz Briefs (May 1974), Prof. Ulrich Scheuner (February 1981), and Axel Springer (September 1985). Monnet's death hit hard from a personal perspective, with Birrenbach remarking, "I miss him very much. He was as a man unique" (KB to Eugene Rostow, 25 April 1979, ACDP K212/1). Birrenbach attended Monnet's burial in Paris and a "very worthy" ceremony in the small church of Montfort. "Strangely there prevailed no mood of sorrow, not even in the songs of the priest, rather one of triumph. A real experience [*Erlebnis!*]" (KB to Horst Osterheld, *Zentralstelle Weltkirche*, German Bishops Conference, 23 March 1979, ACDP K112/2). Experienced vicariously by Birrenbach through correspondence, Holborn's deterioration, including emphysema, was especially notable for its drawn-out misery. For Birrenbach (and apparently Shepard Stone) being "pretty worried" about John McCloy's physical appearance and health, see KB to McCloy, 25 November 1977, ACDP K188/3. On Hans Speidel resigning the SWP presidency in 1978 following a stroke, see KB to Monnet, Houjarray, France (Montfort l'Amaury), 8 November 1978, ACDP K158/2. For Theodor Schieder being unable to correspond since he was suffering the effects of diabetes, see KB to Dietrich Gerhard, 18 June 1979, ACDP K158/1. Hallstein was also sick for an extended period in his final years.

<sup>55</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski served as National Security Advisor; Gerard Smith as Ambassador at Large in the State Department from 1977-80 (Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters); Prof. Robert Bowie as Deputy Director of the CIA for National Foreign Assessment; Henry Owen as Ambassador at Large in the Executive Office of the President (responsible for international economic summits); Paul Nitze as leader of the US delegation in the INF negotiations (Geneva); and Eugene Rostow as Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (but fired in January 1983). During the Carter administration, Birrenbach's contact with Smith was especially valuable on the theme of the civilian use of nuclear energy.

political influence and explanatory powers of even Birrenbach's most prominent contacts, and indirectly his own, gradually diminished.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, Birrenbach's relationships with top US officials dwindled as he never developed genuine ties with many of the crucial personalities in the Carter and Reagan administrations (e.g. Presidents, Secretaries of State and Defense).<sup>57</sup> Virtually the sole reinforcement to Birrenbach's trans-Atlantic political network was the rapport he attained from the late 1970s onward, primarily thanks to the annual Fall AI Foreign Policy Committee function in Brussels, with Gen. Alexander Haig (US).<sup>58</sup> In a sense, Birrenbach was correct in

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<sup>56</sup> In addition to their other endeavors, McCloy (law) served as Chairman of the American Council on Germany (1972-87), while Brzezinski (academia) became a Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. On George Ball mostly spending the last two years writing and speaking, see Ball to KB, 28 January 1985, ACDP K160/3. For Eugene Rostow's *New Republic* article on the "stakes of the nuclear negotiations" that "continues to circulate and to be read," his enclosed speech, and his being still "in touch" with Robert McFarlane (National Security Advisor), George Shultz (Secretary of State), Kenneth Dam (Deputy Secretary of State) and Fred Iklé (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), see Rostow to KB, 23 August 1984, ACDP K209/2. For McCloy, as a member of the transition committee on foreign affairs, engaging in discussions with and offering policy recommendations to the incoming president and administration (including on "the need for close attention to the German relationship"), as well as having made suggestions on the "types" of people who would be "equipped" to accomplish what was necessary on the US side, see McCloy to KB, 23 January 1981, ACDP K178/2. On William Bundy (now editor of *Foreign Affairs*) having "personal contact" to candidate Carter, see KB to Bundy, New York, 14 June 1976, ACDP K083/1. For one of Birrenbach's American "friends" passing on Birrenbach's letter to McGeorge Bundy of 27 April 1977 (dealing with American nuclear energy policy) to the US Secretary of State, another of his American friends sending the text of a speech Birrenbach had given in February 1977 before American bankers in the Redoute (Bad Godesberg) to the US Secretary of the Treasury (who in turn circulated it within the "upper ranks" of his department), and a third American "personality" passing along to Brzezinski (National Security Advisor) correspondence of Birrenbach about "the current American situation," see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 16 May 1977, ACDP K033/3. In the late 1970s and 1980s, McCloy, Kissinger and Ball all testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on issues like SALT II (1979) and the East-West pipeline controversy (1982). On Birrenbach's belief that the "proposal" of the Kissinger Commission (the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America) "seems to me... to make progress possible," see KB to Bowie, 5 June 1984, ACDP K160/2.

<sup>57</sup> This was true, for example, of Secretaries of State Cyrus Vance and George Shultz as well as Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Nevertheless, Birrenbach *had* made the acquaintance of Shultz in October 1973, when the then-Secretary of the Treasury had spoken, at Birrenbach's invitation, before the DGAP. Birrenbach's sole personal encounter with Carter occurred in June 1978 at a presidential reception at the White House in the framework of the Trilateral Commission's Plenary Conference in Washington DC. At times, Birrenbach admitted that his links with the US embassy withered in later years. For Birrenbach lacking "a real contact" with Amb. Arthur Burns ("although I have seen him two or three times"), in contrast to his relations with "all the predecessors of [Walter] Stoessel" (therefore including Amb. Martin Hillenbrand up to October 1976), see KB to Alexander Haig, 29 March 1982, personal, ACDP K146/2.

<sup>58</sup> Haig served as SACEUR (December 1974-July 1979) and then as Secretary of State (January 1981-July 1982). Birrenbach initially came into a distant contact with Haig when the latter had first delivered a talk,

insisting that since departing the *Bundestag* “[m]y contacts in foreign policy questions remain the same as before,” but implicit in this was a stagnating network largely confined to his long-time contacts, an instrument of declining value.<sup>59</sup>

Into the early 1980s, Birrenbach continued embarking on his trips to the United States, often combining them with Atlanticist functions there.<sup>60</sup> Whatever the American geographic-demographic trends, these visits remained quite narrowly focused on elite

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at Birrenbach’s invitation, before the DGAP in October 1975. On the “great openness” with which Haig had spoken and the “approval [*Anerkennung*]” demonstrated by those in the auditorium, see KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Schmidt, Bonn, strictly confidential, 15 November 1978, ACDP K033/3. In this letter to Schmidt, Birrenbach stressed his “very personal contact” with Haig, including his having traveled two weeks ago to SHAPE where he had met with the general for about one and a half hours, a conversation of “extremely confidential [*höchst vertraulicher*] nature but of an astonishing openness.” On Birrenbach’s discussion with Secretary of State Haig in Washington DC after the March 1981 German-American Conference in Princeton, see KB to Haig, 24 June 1981, ACDP K146/2. For Birrenbach being “very happy and grateful” that Haig had “supported our common ideas” in the Scowcroft Commission (the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces) and his hope that Congress “will finally approve your proposals,” see KB to Haig, 13 June 1983, ACDP K146/2. From 1977 onward, Birrenbach did establish an enhanced linkage with Amb. Comte François de Rose, former French ambassador to the US and NATO and now Director General of the *Société Nouvelle Pathé Cinéma* (Paris) as well as a member of the AI Board of Governors and Foreign Policy Committee and of the Trilateral Commission. For Birrenbach’s proposal that Rose enter the FPC to provide “in our discussions a competent French voice,” see KB to Martin Hillenbrand, 31 May 1977, ACDP K058. On Birrenbach having had “several times close contacts” with and gotten a “first-class impression” of Rose, the need to nominate a man like Rose chairman of the FPC, but also his uncertainty whether Rose “as a Frenchman” would “dare to accept this position,” see KB to Jonkheer John Loudon, 5 November 1981, ACDP K076/2. For certain brief, relatively ephemeral, flurries of correspondence, here Birrenbach having recently written to “prominent English personalities” (Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington; former Vice President of the European Commission Sir Christopher Soames; and Lord Alec Douglas-Home) to call their attention to the “fundamental importance” of Britain’s “active cooperation [*Mitarbeit*]” in the European Community, as well as his having acted similarly two years ago with respect to several “prominent” Labour Party figures, such as Roy Jenkins (President of the European Commission) and Shirley Williams [also Christopher Tugendhat, the Conservative member of the European Commission], see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 11 June 1979, ACDP K068/2.

<sup>59</sup> KB to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 6 July 1981, ACDP K032/1. On Birrenbach being “in contact with all my old friends,” see KB to Monnet, Houjarray, France, 21 March 1978, ACDP K158/2. For Birrenbach’s claim that “I have maintained my old contacts in all these countries exactly the same as before [*genauso... wie bisher*],” see KB to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, ACDP K068/2. On Birrenbach’s insistence that the *Atlantik-Brücke* be further “politicized,” not least because he and his fellow “older” members of the *Vorstand* no longer possessed sufficient, and sufficiently important, contacts in Washington DC, see Walter Stahl’s *Aktennotiz* regarding his phone conversation with Birrenbach on 7 June 1976, ACDP K132/1. A major aspect of this organizational “activation” was the establishment of an office in Bonn initially headed by former West German ambassador to the US and NATO Wilhelm Grewe (as Deputy Chairman of the AB from 1978-81), whose tasks in part consisted of efforts to counteract this deficit.

<sup>60</sup> Birrenbach visited the US in March 1977, October 1977, June 1978, July 1980, March 1981, January 1983, and October 1983. He canceled a number of planned trips in 1982 due to illness, the Falklands crisis, and the “incalculable” political and internal situation in the Federal Republic (see, for example, Birrenbach’s *Aktennotiz* of 24 September 1982, ACDP K146/2).

environments in Washington DC and New York City.<sup>61</sup> During these trips, Birrenbach went on carrying out his extensive talks on concrete issues with American contacts and personalities. These comprised meetings not only with figures currently functioning outside of the government proper, among them journalists, individuals closely associated with the Atlanticist organizations, and official representatives of the Federal Republic, but also at times with those actually operating within the successive administrations and the Congress.<sup>62</sup> In all of this, Birrenbach still received logistical support (e.g. advice regarding, along with communications and the arranging of appointments with, prospective talk partners), especially that provided by the personnel of the US embassy

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<sup>61</sup> On Birrenbach staying in Washington DC in June 1978 at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel (also the site of the Trilateral Commission meeting he attended), see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 June 1978, ACDP K146/1.

<sup>62</sup> For example, in March and October 1977, Birrenbach met with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, both times in the White House (but not in June 1978 due to Brzezinski's health nor in July 1980 when Brzezinski was in Tokyo); Ambassador at Large Gerard Smith; Amb. Henry Owen; and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman (March 1977). On Birrenbach having met with "some higher civil servants" in the White House and State Department in March 1977, see KB to George Ball, 30 March 1977, ACDP K160/3. For Birrenbach meeting with Senators in October 1977, among them Frank Church (future Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee) and Sam Nunn (GA), see KB to Amb. Walter Stoessel (US), 14 October 1977, ACDP K100/2. On Birrenbach hoping to see William Diebold Jr. (a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) in New York in October 1977, see KB to Diebold, 19 August 1977, ACDP K106/2. For Birrenbach having had the chance during his June 1978 trip, on the "periphery" of the Trilateral Commission conference, to again conduct informative talks in New York and Washington, also with "numerous" influential Americans not directly connected to the TC such as McCloy, Kissinger, Ball, Eugene Rostow, Bowie (in his Washington home), Owen, and Paul Volcker (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); the "understanding" exhibited by his "discussion partners" for the "vital interest" that "we must have" in the question of civilian nuclear energy; as well as his brief consultations with Amb. Berndt von Staden (DC) and Amb. Rüdiger von Wechmar (UN), see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, ACDP K098/2. On Birrenbach's "constructive" conversation at "the Council" with Winston Lord (CFR President) in July 1980, see KB to Lord, 13 August 1980, ACDP K134/1. For Birrenbach and Amb. von Wechmar having discussed "in detail" in July 1980 Birrenbach's "observations," see Wechmar to KB, 20 August 1980, ACDP K134/1. In March 1981, Birrenbach met with figures like Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Lawrence Eagleburger (soon to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), Walter Stoessel (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), and Helmut Sonnenfeldt. For Birrenbach in March 1981 having met in Ball's home in Princeton (at Ball's invitation) with, among others, Paul Volcker (now Chairman of the Federal Reserve) and Lloyd Cutler, see KB to Ball, 13 April 1981, ACDP K160/3. On Birrenbach in January 1983 having discussions with "the Geneva group," Amb. Edward Rowny (chief START negotiator in Geneva), Richard Burt (soon to be Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), "members of the State Department," and Fred Iklé (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, with whom Birrenbach had in the Pentagon his "most difficult discussion"), see KB to Ball, 24 February 1983, ACDP K160/3. For Birrenbach claiming that in October 1983 he had spoken in the United States with "leading personalities of the armaments and arms control policy [*Politik*]" as well as for two hours with James Reston (*New York Times*), "the most prominent American political journalist," see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 14 October 1983, confidential, ACDP K029/2.

(Bonn), the West German embassy (DC), and Thyssen Inc. (NY). Birrenbach's post-trip activities continued to include informing contacts and others in the Federal Republic and abroad about his talks and broader impressions, not least by generating and distributing to a limited number of recipients his familiar, confidential, written reports.<sup>63</sup> Of course, Birrenbach's trips to the United States during this period still constituted only one element in the larger framework of such travels being undertaken also by other German Atlanticists.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, whatever their similarities, Birrenbach's *Amerikareisen* in later years were merely pale imitations of those that had come before, occurring with lesser frequency, lasting for a shorter duration (usually about a week) and, despite his hopes but essentially confirming his fears, manifesting a lower quality and quantity of discussion partners, particularly within the presently governing administrations.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Such recipients included foreign contacts like McCloy and Ball as well as a few important German figures like Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Amb. Hans-Georg Wieck (Standing West German Representative at NATO) and Alois Mertes (Chairman of the *Arbeitsgruppe Außenpolitik* of the *Unionsfraktion*). On Birrenbach planning to report to Kaiser after the former's trip in July 1980, see KB to Prof. Karl Kaiser, Director, DGAP Research Institute, 4 July 1980, ACDP K160/1. For Birrenbach expecting to "briefly report" to Butenandt by phone about his "impressions" gathered from his imminent USA visit, see KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, ACDP K141/2. On Amb. Peter Hermes (Washington DC) as the lone dissenter with respect to Birrenbach's *Amerika* report dealing with his trip in March 1981, a document based on "first-class, direct [*unmittelbarer*] and personal [*persönlicher*]" information that encompassed talks with "prominent personalities" from the United States, see KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, ACDP K134/1. Otherwise, this report had been "fully endorsed [*bestätigt*]" not only by Chancellor Schmidt but also by "first-class personalities [*ersten Persönlichkeiten*]" in the US, France and England.

<sup>64</sup> For John McCloy having explained to Erik Blumenfeld (CDU) the situation in the US during the latter's most recent visit to New York, see KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, ACDP K178/2.

<sup>65</sup> On Birrenbach's consternation about whether it would be possible for him to secure appointments with figures in Washington (presumably meaning in the Executive and Congress) since he was no longer a member of the *Bundestag* and his concern that even his being DGAP president might not suffice in this regard, see KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, Washington DC, 24 January 1977, ACDP K100/1. On his visit to the US in March 1977, Birrenbach met with approximately nineteen American personalities. For Birrenbach claiming that in October 1983 he had conducted talks with "about twelve American politicians of rank," see KB to Chancellor Kohl, 14 October 1983, confidential, ACDP K029/2. At the latest by November 1982, it appears that Birrenbach's trips were not much of a priority for the West German embassy, which now seems to have performed its related functions rather lackadaisically. Also, for Birrenbach expecting to meet with Amb. Hans-Georg Wieck (Standing West German Representative at NATO) at the latest in October, indeed hoping to come to Brussels the day before the Atlantic Institute function there in order to speak with him, see KB to Wieck, Brussels, 16 July 1981, ACDP K033/2.

Thus, as Hans-Günther Sohl recognized, Birrenbach did not spend the “twilight of [his] life [*Lebensabend*]” in “peace and tranquility [*Ruhe und Beschaulichkeit*].”<sup>66</sup> Spurred on at least in part, as in so many other respects, by John McCloy’s example, Birrenbach never truly retired and continued to work, even into “old age,” quite actively and at considerable personal expense in fundamentally those same fields that had previously occupied him: political and, especially, international affairs; the *Wirtschaft*; and *Wissenschaftspolitik*.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who saw Birrenbach from time to time at political events in Bonn (e.g. the CDU-*Ältestenrat*), could remark to Birrenbach with pleasure that “[y]ou have, you know [*ja*], remained truly *der Alte*.”<sup>68</sup> However, Birrenbach’s final years were primarily stamped by his desperate efforts to remain relevant in both the Federal Republic and abroad, particularly in the United States, even as he slowly relinquished the posts that in many cases he had occupied for decades. Though he was able to preserve certain superficial forms, the substantive functions of many of his activities gradually became hollowed out. Birrenbach’s attempt in this period to carve himself a new position of influence ultimately resulted in failure.

### B. Internal Threats to Atlanticism in the Federal Republic

To the end, a fearful, “preoccupied,” at times even defeatist Birrenbach radiated an increasingly intense pessimism, characterized by a sense of instability, uncertainty, crisis and catastrophe. This remained not merely a gloominess regarding virtually all

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<sup>66</sup> Sohl to KB, 1 July 1985, ACDP K082/2.

<sup>67</sup> On Birrenbach’s admiration for McCloy’s “effort [*Einsatz*]” even at the age of eighty-eight, see KB to Michael Hoffmann-Becking, 15 August 1983, ACDP K178/1. For Birrenbach taking part as of early 1978 in “numerous” meetings of *Aufsichtsräten* and other organizations, see KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 22 February 1978, ACDP K033/3. On Birrenbach toiling “still” eight to ten hours a day and reading on the weekends at least six hours a day, see KB to Kiesinger, 6 July 1981, ACDP K032/1. For Birrenbach spending more than DM 100,000 per year on his “political work,” see KB to Kohl, 29 September 1981, ACDP K032/1.

<sup>68</sup> Hassel to KB, 2 July 1984, ACDP K082/2.

contemporary affairs but a deeper cultural pessimism about the modern West, a sense that all areas of society, both elites (e.g. the *Politik*) as well as broader populations, had been “infected” by a debilitating “sickness.”<sup>69</sup> Birrenbach continued to bemoan many of the

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<sup>69</sup> KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982. Perhaps due to his own health history or his father’s profession, Birrenbach regularly utilized illness/sickness analogies in this context. Birrenbach often referred to the “symptoms of sickness.” Birrenbach saw “symptoms of decay” in Europe (KB to Henry Kissinger, 14 July 1982). “The resistance against the use of nuclear energy is taking epidemic forms with catastrophic results in view of our energy situation, if it cannot be stopped.” (KB to Eugene Rostow, 1 June 1979, ACDP K212/1). Reflecting on the assassination attempts on the US president, the English royal couple and the Pope (a “*Wahnsinnsakt*”), Birrenbach remarked “What a world we live in!...[H]umanity finds itself in a condition which one can only describe [*bezeichnen*] as pathological.” (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2). As of October 1979, Birrenbach insisted that the Americans were “*kurierbar*.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979). The state of the West was worse than it had ever been since the war. The western countries on both sides of the ocean did not have sufficient statesmanship. The welfare state system for instance in Western Europe, and the increase of the influence of the American Congress on the administration had increased in such a way that the US, apart from the lack of statesmen, was not able to act as they wanted. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, K074/1). Birrenbach saw the high points of Gerstenmaier’s life in his activity in the *Kreisauer Kreis* and as president of the *Bundestag*. In both institutions, Gerstenmaier had played an outstanding role by which *Geist*, strength of character, courage and readiness to act [*Einsatzbereitschaft*] for the interests of our country had been the most important preconditions. “There are almost hardly men like you in the present [*heutige*] time any more.” That was the reason for the symptoms of decline [*Verfallserscheinungen*] in our society. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to *Bundestagspräsident aD* Prof. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, Oberwinter, 21 August 1981, K086/1). In his book’s first chapter, Lübke spoke of the growing hostility towards *Wissenschaft* [*Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit*]. As a non-*Wissenschaftler*, Birrenbach would assert that indeed [*überhaupt*] in the current epoch the inclination to deal in-depth with problems of a profound nature had waned universally [*allgemein*]. This was why comfortable television was preferred to reading the newspaper. On top of it, after the even more rapidly increasing secularization, one initially had connected expectations with the *Wissenschaft* which, as before by religious conceptions [*Vorstellungen*], could not be fulfilled in the desired extent. When Lübke said that there was no destination-crisis [*Zielkrise*], rather only a steering-crisis [*Steuerungskrise*], Lübke himself said there were limits to the innovation-processing capacity for individual as for social systems and that today we moved in the area of these limits. Birrenbach agreed that the *Wissenschaft* and the *Technik* dependent on it were included in this process of self-distancing [*Selbstdistanzierung*] of our civilization, from which everything had been expected, but simply only that could get what it was able to provide [*leisten*]. There normally developed from it, in view of the aspirations [*Anspruchs*] which the *Wissenschaft* as such had raised, a *Wissenschaftsfeindlichkeit*, as today also existed such a thing vis-à-vis the *Politik*, from which also more had been expected than it could fulfill. That leads in political life to a disaffection with the state [*Staatsverdrossenheit*], the erosion of authority and *Staatsräson* and precisely of the fundamental values that were the precondition for a successful political process. (KB to Lübke, 15 August 1977, K171/1). Berglar knew how much Birrenbach since years had been worried about the decay [*Verfall*] of the authority, of *Staatsräson* and the fundamental values [*Grundwerte*] of the state by us and in the welfare states of Europe, especially however by us. The secularization in the world, especially also in the Federal Republic, did fundamental harm to the authority, since the authority somewhere had a transcendental root. The longer Birrenbach pondered it and looked at Berglar’s seven theses on the authority, the more Birrenbach wanted to raise the problem whether in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there was still anything at all present of this transcendental content [*Gehalt*] of the authority. After all, the authority of a personality rested today essentially more on his *geistigen* superiority, his proving [*Bewährung*] in life, in the profession, his *menschlichen* dignity [*Würde*], personal/character qualities, his resolve [*Entschlossenheit*], his prestige [*Ansehen*], his influence, his power [*Macht*], than on something



same interrelated “*Verfallserscheinungen* of our time” that he had detected at the latest by 1968: the permissive society; the decay of spiritual and moral virtues; a decline in the fundamental values of state (e.g. a sense of *Staatsraison* and power politics); an erosion of respect for authority, including that of the state; a decline in historical consciousness; a loss of national identity and feeling (in the FRG); a decline in courage, will and morale; the complexes comprising the illusionary “*détente* thought” and the soft, selfish, exaggerated “welfare state thought.”<sup>70</sup> The crucial implications of these perhaps

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else. Birrenbach even doubted that the element of tradition today still played a great role for the authority. Who was today the crown prince of Prussia or the head of a great noble family or otherwise the bearer of a great name? The authority of an institution rested on the consensus of those who had chosen the bearer of the authority in State, *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft*, *Gesellschaft* and, with this, on legal right [*gesetzlichem Recht*]. Here, Birrenbach admitted that tradition, connected with the office, played a larger role than by personal authority. Naturally, important for the authority of the institution was the quality of the bearer or bearers. Therefore, also the decrease [*Abfall*] of the authority of the modern parliaments, since their members were no longer to be compared with the House of Commons at the turn of the century, to name one example. That authority and power did not coincide and need not coincide was evident. Therefore, the problem that Birrenbach saw was whether the authority, as it today existed, as (as Berglar said) “appears derived from God”, and also the performance-related [*leistungsbezogene*] authority could be separated from the divine authority origin. In this sense, Birrenbach could today no more see that all authority, as Berglar said, stemmed from the “*summa auctoritas* of God” and for this reason was “constituent part and execution [*Vollzug*] of religion.” In the British, Spanish, Japanese and perhaps Saudi Arabian and Persian monarchy, but probably only in these, there still existed an aura [*Hauch*] of transcendental origin. But this was an exceptional phenomenon. Greater importance came to the element of tradition by that than to the religious element. In the church sphere, the authority of the pope had sunk to a minimum in comparison to other times, although the transcendental origin here was not to be denied. In the sense of the starting point of Berglar’s *Vortrag*, the “moral and practical rearmament,” Birrenbach believed that it would be nice if it would be or could come again so. But the signs of the time did not appear to confirm this hope (KB to Prof. Peter Berglar, Cologne, 5 November 1977, K151/2). As of September 1977, Birrenbach feared a potential “Balkanized Europe” (unlinked Europe) (KB to Prof. Raymond Aron, *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie Historique*, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1). As of September 1977, Birrenbach saw a “dissolution” of the EC and NATO. (KB to Marjolin, 14 September 1977). In line with his historical thought, Birrenbach saw these as lost years in a decisive/critical period of history.

<sup>70</sup> Birrenbach (wrongly) opposed and advised Kohl against the holding of elections in March 1983 not only because of constitutional concerns (constitutional manipulation) but also because it would submit the vital decision to deploy American missiles in Germany to a plebiscitary vote. On his US trip of March 1981, Birrenbach replied to Kissinger’s question what he thought of the US situation only with “Let’s hope.” (KB US trip report of 1 April 1981). With respect to spiritual and moral decay, Birrenbach pointed to the lack of transcendental bonds [*Bindungen*] and the lack of family cohesion [*Zusammengehörigkeit*]. With respect to the erosion of state authority, Birrenbach saw a *Rechtsstaat* coming “unhinged”; and the undermining of FRG political stability and of the normal functioning of the state. Birrenbach identified a decline in national cohesion in the FRG. In connection with the decline in historical consciousness, Birrenbach pointed to a lack of historical knowledge and a lack of understanding for all tradition. With respect to the decline in the fundamental values of state, Birrenbach pointed to a declining sense of *raison d’état* and an undermining of the substance of states and of the will to power of the state [*staatlichen*

irrevocable phenomena led him to designate them (this spirit) “the enemies of the West, I would almost say even worse than the East.”<sup>71</sup> Ever historically minded, Birrenbach conjured up specious analogies with the interwar period, referring to the path to Weimar, “the world economic crisis” of the late 1920s and 1930s and appeasement.<sup>72</sup> He found

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*Machtwillens*]. With respect to national-state thought, Birrenbach referred to the priority of mere narrow national interests, complete independence and self-interest. With respect to the decline of moral values, Birrenbach referred to the decline of the respect for the *Menschen*. With respect to the non-identification with the state, Birrenbach referred to a *Staatsverdrossenheit*. In connection with welfare state thought, Birrenbach saw an unrealistic and overdrawn welfare state; an entitlement mentality [*Anspruchsdenken*]; a lack of stamina among the citizens; a stress on individual and private well-being, happiness, interests and material advantage; a revolution of expectations; an unwillingness to sacrifice for the common cause; a lack of unselfish effort [*Einsatz um der Sache willen*]; and a priority to increase living standards rather than military strength/defense. Birrenbach believed they had wrongly interpreted détente. Birrenbach complained about a non-identification with the state. Birrenbach saw these phenomena as “just [*eben*] a sign of our time.” (KB to Dr. Dieter Spethmann, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, 5 September 1978). For Germany being more sensitive with respect to the future than other countries, “particularly being a divided nation with an insufficient sense of identity,” see KB to Prof. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, ACDP K132/2. For Birrenbach’s complaint that “[i]n the *Politik* itself, historical arguments are hardly discernible [*erkennbar*]” and that “[t]he knowledge of the history of the most important nations, for instance in the *Bundestag*, is minimal,” see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, ACDP K032/1.

<sup>71</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 30 June 1980. As Birrenbach put it, “The West is retreating in all realms, with the exception of technology and economy, particularly spiritually.” (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupe, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1). As of September 1979, Birrenbach saw the “symptoms of political decay in our time” contributing to the failures of US and European policies. (KB to Rostow, 19 September 1979 and KB to McCloy, 20 September 1979). As of February 1980, Birrenbach agreed with Kohnstamm that they lived in “ugly” times (KB to Kohnstamm, 21 February 1980). In November 1979, Birrenbach moaned “What becomes in Europe actually not bad [*schlecht*]? The Western world is in the condition of a latent crisis.” (KB to Kohnstamm, 16 November 1979). Reflecting on what he considered the dire arms situation in September 1979, Birrenbach remarked on the possibility that “this all initiates perhaps the final defeat.” (KB to Rostow, 19 September 1979 and KB to McCloy, 20 September 1979). Birrenbach was appalled at the inability of the big Western countries to muster the internal strength to substantially reduce their energy consumption. According to Birrenbach, a process of renewal [*Erneuerung*] would be extremely difficult (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). Birrenbach cited the potential implications for security (e.g. defense budgets) and energy (consumption) policy.

<sup>72</sup> As of October 1981, Birrenbach feared that “the same could happen [in the FRG] as in Britain when Chamberlain spoke after the meeting in Munich in 1938 about ‘peace for our time.’” (KB to Bowie, 9 October 1981). Who could have imagined that Western Europe, more than three decades after WWII, would be considered weak-willed and complacent, an attitude now characterized as “Finlandization”? Europe in recent years had shown some symptoms of weakness, as we had discovered historically in France and Britain before WWII. McCloy and Birrenbach still remembered the weakness both countries showed in the midst of the victories achieved by Hitler in occupying the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and even Poland. The present mood in many countries, particularly the smaller ones like Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, perhaps Italy and some groups in Britain, Germany and France, tended towards accommodation to the security demands of the USSR. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). Rather than Weimar, Birrenbach also sometimes referred to the danger of ending up like the 3<sup>rd</sup> French Republic. As of November 1982, Birrenbach wondered if they were facing a new world economy crisis as he had experienced it at the start of the 1930s. Referring to the German terrorism and the tepid response to

these trends more acute in Europe, especially the FRG, than in the US, where they were also present to some extent but which he continued to trumpet as having an incomparably greater stability and moral and material substance.<sup>73</sup> By the early 1980s, Birrenbach was declaring that “Europe is now the ‘sick man’ like Turkey before the First World War.”<sup>74</sup> Yearning in many respects for a return to the 1950s, 60s and even early 70s, he was haunted by the notion that “the best part of the post-war time lies behind us.”<sup>75</sup>

Within the Federal Republic, the primary threat to the now institutionalized establishment German Atlanticism continued to stem from an extra-governmental Left. Among the new, yet apparently deep-rooted, factors nourishing Birrenbach’s pessimism in the late 1970s and into the 1980s were the burgeoning “irrational” radical mass (public; social) movements opposing and pressuring both the Schmidt and Kohl

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it, Birrenbach claimed “I feel vividly reminded of the years 1931-32.” (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). The demonstrations in view of the swearing-in of the young recruits on the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the *Bundeswehr* reminded Birrenbach of the worst times of Weimar (KB to Hallstein, 14 November 1980). Birrenbach also remarked on the “mentality of Vichy of ‘anxiety and defeatism’” in Europe (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). As of October 1981, Birrenbach believed with respect to the peace movement in the FRG that “Sometimes I thought that the same could happen as in Britain when Chamberlain spoke after the meeting in Munich in 1938 about “peace for out time.” (KB to Bowie, 9 October 1981). Birrenbach’s references to Weimar were in part due to his perception of an increasingly plebiscitary democracy. Even as Birrenbach pointed to his voluntary emigration in 1939 as evidence that he was a “democrat” and not a “reactionary,” he argued that “I find a democracy that orients itself by opinion polls unbearable [*unerträglich*]” (KB to *Staatssekretär* Hans-Hilger Haunschild [BMFT], 20 December 1977, ACDP K182/1).

<sup>73</sup> All in Europe thought the United States had more substance and was more stable than any other country in the West and that the symptoms of decay in Europe did not exist in the US. (KB to Robert Schaezel, DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2). Birrenbach included Britain as part of Europe in this assessment.

<sup>74</sup> KB to McCloy, 22 March 1982.

<sup>75</sup> As of July 1983, concerned about events in Europe and the Atlantic areas, Birrenbach feared “that the best part of the postwar time lies behind us.” As of 5 April 1978, Birrenbach remarked that they lived in a “world full of worries.... I almost would say the better part of the postwar time lies behind us.” (KB to Sir Siegmund Warburg, Warburg Paribas Becker Inc., NY, 5 April 1978). In July 1979, Birrenbach moaned “We are living in the wrong century.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979). As of October 1979, Birrenbach feared that “Dangers threaten us therefore from all sides.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979). As of June 1982, Birrenbach’s concerns were “deeper today than they have ever been since the end of the 1950s.” (KB to McCloy, 23 June 1982). As of January 1981, Birrenbach expected the new year to be a very difficult one, “perhaps the most difficult one since the end of World War II.” (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 13 January 1981). We stood before the most difficult situation of the postwar time (KB *Aktennotiz* of 6 July 1981, K178/2). It had never been so bad with respect to the European question (European unification process) as now. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).

governments.<sup>76</sup> These included peace/neutralist demonstrations, most specifically resisting the local deployment of US/Western nuclear weapons (including the neutron bomb; INF weapons; criticize arms policy), as well as environmentalist (alternative; citizens initiatives) demonstrations against nuclear energy. Birrenbach saw these allegedly criminal, dangerous and violent movements threatening “catastrophic results” for the FRG’s foreign, security and economic policy and was appalled by what he considered the weak toleration of such demonstrations by a considerable part of the *Politik* and population and the failure to halt them. Particularly dismaying to Birrenbach and other Atlanticists was the fact that, at least from the late 1970s, Berlin, once a staunchly pro-American city that embraced the US as the defender of its freedom and security, a city that continued to be a destination for American Atlanticist visitors and the target of Atlanticist efforts to maintain its status, served as a hotbed for such movements.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, after seeing them hitherto as relatively well-behaved and moderate, Birrenbach viewed the demands and activities (e.g. demonstrations) of the German trade unions and their leaders during this period (at least between 1977-83)

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<sup>76</sup> At times, Birrenbach referred to these movements as emotional, “hysterical,” dramatic and a wave.

<sup>77</sup> As of August 1981, McCloy had taken a trip to Berlin. Reagan planned to visit Berlin in June 1982. In line with his yearning for the past, as of September 1981, Birrenbach believed that Berlin was no longer comparable to the Berlin of McCloy’s time (KB to McCloy, 21 September 1981). As of June 1975, Stone (in contact with Monnet) was suggesting (and Monnet was enthused at the prospect) to and asking for advice from the responsible German *Stellen* (the governing mayor, the *Bevollmächtigten* of the FRG, Birrenbach and Brandt) that the Monnet archive be purchased by a German *Stiftung* or the *Staatsbibliothek* in Berlin and be housed in Berlin in the new *Staatsbibliothek*. Thanks to the christening of this archive (Monnet would visit Berlin on this occasion) and the attraction the archive would present for many *Wissenschaftler*, *Politiker*, journalists and *Schriftsteller* from the entire world, Berlin’s importance as a European city would be underscored (in the interest of the *Land* Berlin). Birrenbach informed Stone he would talk with Kohnstamm and try to get a solution to the matter. (Stone to KB, 10 June 1975). As of December 1981, Birrenbach had the *Briefdienst* (September 1981) of the work circle *Sicherung des Friedens* which included a contribution by Inspector General (aD) Ulrich de Maizière (as of July 1981, General (aD) de Maizière was a member of the DGAP).

regarding economic and social issues as elements of these deleterious phenomena.<sup>78</sup>

While only the peace movement was overtly anti-American, each of these extra-/anti-governmental left-wing movements, and their objectionable attitudes, represented a threat or obstacle to the plans of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> These various pro-labor measures included the 35-hour week and increases in social status, wages and benefits. On the “outburst” and protests of the trade unions and the left-wing of the SPD, see KB to McCloy, 25 November 1982, K178/2. These struggles included criticisms of government legislation and, as of 1983, demonstrations for the 35-hour week. Birrenbach did not view all trade unionists negatively during this period on the key issues. When, as of November 1977, Birrenbach had been asked by Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch (*Geschäftsführendes Präsidialmitglied* of the *Deutschen Atomforums eV*) which member of the SPD-Fraktion he would propose for a seat in the *Atomforum*, Birrenbach proposed to co-opt Herrn Adolf Schmidt (Deputy Fraktion Chairman and Chairman of the *IG Bergbau und Energie*), who was a proponent of the nuclear energy and an “experienced [*gestandene*]” personality.

<sup>79</sup> Regarding the wave of neutralism, set through with anti-American elements, such a thing was hardly to be observed in countries like France, Britain and Italy. Naturally, the position of the Federal Republic was more vulnerable than that of these three other states. This qualification was however considerably less relevant in the age of nuclear weapons, especially of the LRTNFs, since these countries were endangered by these weapons in the same way as the Federal Republic. The mood of neutralism was characteristic for the northern regions of Europe (i.e. North Germany more than South Germany). That went also for the predominant Protestant churches or groups of members of these churches in these countries. A certain anti-Americanism could be observed in France already since the end of the war. At the moment it was less acute than in the years of the Gaullist period, though also now it was symptomatic for a certain attitude in France. The strongest of all was the anti-Americanism in countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and currently in the Federal Republic. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1). Among the key elements of the US-FRG relationship currently, Birrenbach cited the increasingly strong neutralist wave, which, with anti-American elements, set itself through, had begun to emerge more and more clearly in parts of the population, especially the youth, the youth organizations of the SPD, in part also of the FDP, church groups, also the leadership of the SPD-Fraktion. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1). While critical of the “irrational” opponents of nuclear energy and claiming to be aware of the concerns regarding the effect of nuclear energy, Birrenbach was rather cavalier about the health issues involved. So far as was known, in the last 30 years not a single fatality had been recorded due to *Leichtwasser*-reactors, which were functioning in the Federal Republic as in other countries. In the *Bergbau*, in the steel industry in the last thirty years, there had been numerous fatalities. Auto traffic alone claimed victims. One could not therefore eliminate these three factors. That could not seriously be the view of even a church representative. In the world today there were almost four billion people, including a billion who starved and had no energy resources of whatever type. Based on the magnitude of the energy need, the development of sun energy and other substitute energies would require one or two decades. Whether this then would be fully usable could still not be said today. Birrenbach agreed with the Cardinal that it was not the task of theology rather of *Fachwissenschaft* to ascertain whether the construction of breeder reactors and reprocessing plants, whether the transport and deposit of atomic waste was possible according to the current state of *Wissenschaft* and *Technik* in a way that certainly excluded explosions, radiation damage and other catastrophes. Birrenbach agreed that risks were also connected with other industrial processes. But Birrenbach disagreed with the Cardinal when he said that it was not sufficient if the *Fachwissenschaft* thought it was likely that through safety controls and surveillance technology damage could be prevented, that the absolute certainty was necessary. Even the catastrophe in Harrisburg had not provably led to deaths. Clearly, radiation damage was dangerous, but the degree of endangering was not clear. The development of safeguard technology had made such progress that a rationally acceptable safety concept

At the same time and ultimately to the end, Birrenbach identified this dangerous irrationalism increasingly impacting also on the German parties. In key policy areas (e.g. foreign policy, nuclear energy), Birrenbach saw the powerful left-wings of the SPD and FDP (apparently less-powerful) as well as an influential left-wing Green Party allied with the peace, anti-nuclear energy and trade union movements.<sup>80</sup> Within the SPD, the leader of this group was Willy Brandt, a man whose political resurgence Birrenbach deeply regretted “because he is a visionary and without understanding for the realities of the world.”<sup>81</sup> Other prominent personalities in the SPD left-wing, contemptuously referred to by Birrenbach as the “comrades [*Genossen*],” included Wehner, Egon Bahr, Alfons Pawelczyk, Apel, Lafontaine, Ehmke, Koschnik, Eppler and Vogel.<sup>82</sup> With regard to foreign policy, their views were distinctly neutralist, anti-American and anti-NATO/alliance, explicitly accusing the Atlanticists of a vassal-like allegiance to the United States, while eager to conduct an expansive *Ostpolitik* towards the USSR/East.<sup>83</sup>

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already existed today. When the cardinal referred to the dangers of the reprocessing and the quick breeder reactors, Birrenbach believed that both processes on the one hand offered the chance of exploiting the nuclear fuel elements to a higher degree, by the quick breeder reactors alone by 60% more, and on the other hand were stages of disposal. The danger by the reprocessing plants lay less in the possible environmental damage than in the possibility of using high-percentage uranium for military purposes. True, the question of the final elimination of the remaining nuclear fuel elements had still not been completely solved. The problem of final disposal could certainly be solved by the *Wissenschaft* in ten or twenty years. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2). As of December 1984, there was the question of a unified European environmental protection (*Katalysator*), which does not seem to have been high on Birrenbach’s priorities. As of January 1986, Birrenbach saw the complete overestimation of the ecological events impeding the development of nuclear energy and other modern productions. As of January 1984, Birrenbach wanted to take the savings from a settlement of the EC budget question and devote it to other European areas like research and environmental protection. Birrenbach saw the German environmental movement ignoring the main safety data regarding nuclear energy.

<sup>80</sup> These left-wing party elements in the FRG included or were influenced greatly by theorists and intellectuals. Apparently the FDP left-wing was not as bad as that of the SPD, at least by the 1980s, but it was still a problem.

<sup>81</sup> KB to Bowie, 21 January 1977. As of 1979-82, Brandt was SPD Party Chairman.

<sup>82</sup> Wehner was old. Wehner was another leader in the SPD and as of March 1979 the SPD’s leader/whip in the *Bundestag*. Bahr was SPD General Secretary as of March 1979 and *Staatsminister* in the BKA as of October 1982. Pawelczyk was the SPD disarmament spokesman as of 1979.

<sup>83</sup> For Birrenbach, this “pacifist”-minded foreign policy (including moral arguments) included opposition to the neutron bomb and to the NATO double-track rearmament decision of December 1979; a misjudgement

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of the East-West arms balance; proposals for a special status in Central Europe between East and West (including the DDR and an atomic-free zone); a willingness to make too many concessions to the USSR (at least in part in an effort to get important concessions regarding the DDR); an exaggerated desire to avoid irritating and precipitating a war with the USSR and even the DDR; and false positions on security/arms/peace issues like East-West disarmament negotiations/SALT (e.g. receptivity to USSR disarmament initiatives). As Birrenbach put it, "When I hear a man like Eppler speak about this question [nuclear energy], I simply get sick [*schlecht*]." (KB to Beckurts, 18 March 1980). As of January-May 1982, Birrenbach at least implicitly believed that even if the parties were split, still about two-thirds of the FDP and a majority of the SPD was pro-Atlanticist (supporting the NATO double-track resolution) and apparently the rest not. Birrenbach continued to view the *Union* as far preferable to the much-criticized SPD and Greens (and to a lesser extent the FDP) with respect to foreign and domestic policy and welcomed the replacement of Schmidt's Social-Liberal coalition by Kohl's *Union*-Liberal government. At least ostensibly on particular issues, Birrenbach attributed Atlanticist views to Kohl. The political theses of the SPD could not represent the German *Politik* of tomorrow. The new government of the CDU/CSU and FDP, which would permit to the government Rau no government capable of action, would see to it. (KB, ill, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Richard Burt, Ambassador of the US, American embassy, Bonn, 10 September 1986, K030/1). Schmidt was facing difficulties now in his party, particularly in the military field and in the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This internal situation preoccupied Birrenbach "very deeply." (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1). With respect to the stationing of American weapons in Europe, the attitude of the German government was clear, but the opposition parties in Germany conducted a policy which was not in accord with the alliance policy, this applied for the larger part of the SPD and the Green Party in Germany and certain elements of the Protestant church. The motives were the ever-growing welfare state thinking in Germany; the increased fear that the Federal Republic could become the battlefield in a nuclear conflict between East and West and/or the hostage of such a conflict; and the fact that the USSR would try with all political measures of different categories to convince large parts of the population that a German attitude in accord with the alliance would damage basic German interests. The Russians had in mind economic measures by blocking German exports and trade relations with the USSR and East European states. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 November 1984, K074/1). The Social Democratic Party, apart from the Greens, had not clearly supported the American policy in the same way as the CDU/CSU and FDP. (KB to Burt, 13 April 1983, K132/2). In Germany, the Greens and the larger part of the SPD were partly against the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2). Haig could have full confidence in men like Genscher and Graf Lambsdorff. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2). The Social Democratic Party had now joined the peace movement. The SPD plus the Greens and possibly certain parts of the trade unions would fight the stationing of INF weapons on German soil. (KB to Haig, 20 April 1983, K146/2). Birrenbach repeatedly complained that the Federal Republic now had two Chancellors (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). Birrenbach considered the comments he read about the neutron weapon and MBFR by many Socialist politicians in the whole West irresponsible and ridiculous. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). The CDU, 45% of the German electorate, supported the present direction of American policy. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). Schmidt, Genscher and the CDU/CSU would maintain their attitude and defend the American position. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). Schmidt and Genscher had defended US policy. But Schmidt was not identical with the SPD and the left-wing of the FDP, or with one part of the population, nor with other northern European countries. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). A certain part of two parties, especially the SPD but also the FDP, gave too high a priority to détente which had less importance than the men behind Brandt thought. (KB to McCloy, 3 March 1980, ACDP K134/1). One part of the political community in Germany was not any more as Atlantic-minded as it had been in the past. The idea that détente was divisible became more popular in Germany, particularly in certain groups of some parties. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). We had committed the mistake of pumping into industry too much public money on account of loans taken by state governments and the federal government. They did not go into investments but ultimately into consumption. This was the tribute a social-democratic government paid to its electors. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1). In comparison to the US, the Federal Republic had the advantage of the full autonomy of the German federal reserve bank (the *Bundesbank*), the experience of two total inflations and the pretty constructive international economic policy of Schmidt and Lambsdorff.

With respect to personalities like Brandt and Bahr, this represented for Birrenbach simply a continuation of earlier animosities. Indeed, as of April 1980, Birrenbach still stewed over Brandt's reference ten years ago to our "partners" in the East.<sup>84</sup> These party left-wings limited the power and authority of the Atlanticist-minded, pro-nuclear energy right-wings of the SPD and FDP, which Birrenbach, in a display of Atlanticism's cross-party nature, genuinely held in high regard, notably Chancellor Schmidt (SPD) as well as personalities like Foreign Minister Genscher (leader of the FDP) and Minister Leber.<sup>85</sup>

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(KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1). Our system was that of assuring a maximum of free economy and, in a restricted way, interventions from the government in the economic process. But these interventions had recently increased too much. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1). As of November 1980, Schmidt had withdrawn from the 3% formula. As of June 1984, Birrenbach deeply regretted the terrible difficulties Kohl had with the "infamous *Politik*" of the SPD (KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984). Hoping for the appropriate election results, Birrenbach suggested arguments/viewpoints to Kohl ostensibly to help him win the March 1983 election. As of September 1980, Birrenbach believed that a poor 1980 election result could mean a further four lost years and that they then would not recognize their country. (KB to *Staatsminister für Unterricht und Kultus* Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, Munich; 23 September 1980). As of December 1985, Birrenbach believed that in the stationing of the nuclear weapons, Kohl had achieved a historic success. As of December 1982, Birrenbach referred to the "abusive [*missbräuchliche*]" social legislation of the CDU/CSU (KB to Kohl, 30 December 1982). As of April 1980, Birrenbach believed that Schmidt gave a somewhat higher priority than Strauß and Birrenbach to the specific German problems.

<sup>84</sup> Bitterly citing Brandt, Birrenbach derisively referred to "our charming Eastern 'partners.'" (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980).

<sup>85</sup> The situation in the Federal Republic was characterized by the strong leadership of Helmut Schmidt who had, however, serious difficulties with men like Brandt, Ehmke, Bahr and his whole left wing and made it impossible for him to act in each case as he wished. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2). Birrenbach assured Haig of the Atlanticist attitude of the Chancellor and his close friends and of the leadership of the FDP and the whole CDU. Only certain elements on the left-wings of the coalition partners thought in the terms published in the press. The whole German nation was deeply convinced that without the US an effective defense against the USSR would be impossible. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 1979, K153/1). Europe was neither politically stable nor economically consolidated; on the contrary. This applied to almost all the states in Europe. The German position was in some respects better than that of others like Britain, France or Italy. But the economic crisis had not been overcome. The two coalition parties were deeply split into a right- and left-wing, with the left-wing possibly stronger than the right-wing. On the other hand, the leaders of both parties (i.e. Schmidt (not Brandt) and Genscher) still had decisive influence. They only had to make some compromises with their left-wings because of the internal votes. The right-wings of the SPD and also the FDP were as Atlanticist as before. The CDU party had no real leader, but was one hundred percent Atlanticist. 49 per cent of the CDU gave the leaders of the two coalition parties a wider basis enabling them to impede any step by the left fractions of their parties which would be negative for the Atlantic policy. (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2). The left-wings of both (coalition) parties were using the emotional and hysterical mood to force Schmidt, Genscher, Lambsdorff, [Volker] Hauff and other reasonable leaders to abstain from any kind of use of nuclear energy. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). The Christian Democratic Party with 49.5% of the votes was overwhelmingly in favor of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). That was



Such intra-German divisions also found expression at the Atlanticist functions (e.g. the 1980 KWC), particularly with respect to explicitly Atlantic questions (not European questions).<sup>86</sup> For Birrenbach, much of this situation was reminiscent, after a considerable lull, of the Vietnam era.<sup>87</sup>

Linked to some extent with these left-wing movements was the persistent and uncontrollable intrusion into politics of what seemed to Birrenbach irrational religious

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Birrenbach's opinion (regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy) and the opinion of the most powerful politicians in this country of all the parties, except the extremists like Bahr, Ehmke, Koschnik or others. It was the opinion of the whole board of the CDU/CSU. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). We urgently needed nuclear energy. But there was a certain movement in the Federal Republic of "dreamers" and the left-wings of both coalition parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party, which wanted, repeating the movement of ten years ago, to have nothing to do with nuclear energy. The program which this group of demonstrators had proposed to the Chancellor was "ridiculous." Every word is "nonsense": no growth any more, equality of all earnings in the whole population, to live under the most modest conditions as in previous centuries. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). Each of the principal European states was split as far as foreign policy was concerned. This applied also to the two principal German coalition parties, the SPD and FDP. Schmidt's difficulties had come particularly from this side. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2). The SPD had split into two parts. The left-wing was very strong, led by men like Brandt, Wehner, Bahr, Koschnik, Ehmke and others. Their principal goal was détente. Schmidt was a man in whom Birrenbach generally had confidence. This applied also to a certain smaller part of his party. (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2). Schmidt was strongly blocked in his Atlanticist attitudes by Brandt, Wehner, Bahr, Ehmke, Koschnik, Pawelczyk and others and the *Jusos*. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1). Grass did not understand anything about European policy. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). It was neither Schmidt nor Genscher nor the CDU/CSU party, which would emit the pacifist and anti-American commentary. It was the left-wing of the SPD. The influence of Brandt in this context was large. There was no doubt that the majority of the *Bundestag*, including the entire CDU/CSU, would place itself behind the NATO resolution. There was no doubt about my attitude and that of the CDU/CSU. Birrenbach was always for the fortification of the German-American relationship. He could be sure that men like Schmidt, Genscher and the leaders of the CDU/CSU party did everything not to endanger the alliance. (KB *Aktennotiz* of 6 July 1981, K178/2). An over-sensitiveness in the question of nuclear weapons was promoted by a certain political side, which only damaged the cause [*Sache*]. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). Birrenbach also considered Lambsdorff, Friderichs and Ertl good men in the FDP but I am not sure if they were Atlanticists. Birrenbach (aside from all the blatantly obsequious flattery) did express to his US contacts his high regard of Schmidt, including as Chancellor. This extended to Schmidt's pro-Atlanticist and pro-European efforts (including in cooperation with France/d'Estaing). It was Chancellor Schmidt who in 1977 in London had recommended the idea of the deployment of medium-range rockets. As of July 1981, Birrenbach agreed with McCloy that among the present European leaders, Schmidt was the best. As of February 1981, Birrenbach considered Schmidt the best man they had now (in the FRG, I guess). For an example of questionable flattery, see Birrenbach's letter to Schmidt for the latter's birthday, in which Birrenbach lauds Schmidt as "a true statesman", among many other things for his combating of terrorism (internally and the Mogadishu coup) (KB to Schmidt, 21 December 1978).

<sup>86</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980.

<sup>87</sup> KB to Rostow, 14 August 1981. During the late 1970s and into the 1980s (to the end), the British Labour Party (including Michael Foot) also displayed strong anti-American and anti-NATO attitudes.

perspectives. Long after the triumph of Liberal Atlanticism over the *Abendland* worldview in the Federal Republic, this phenomena appeared to be one of the most disturbing trends in many regions of the world. For Birrenbach, the impact of religion on international relations continued to be a constant source of concern.<sup>88</sup> For Birrenbach, who in later years portrayed himself as somebody who “thinks in realistic terms and does not expect miracles,” personalities like Carter (as a Baptist), Israeli Prime Minister Begin (as an Orthodox Jew), Sharon, Khomeini, as well as the religious groups in Israel (as of 1976) represented “another world.”<sup>89</sup> These personalities and groups were religious fanatics, whose strictly past-oriented perspectives and judgments and ignorance of the contemporary and future realities in the world undermined the entire basis for any reasonable policy, including that of the United States and Israel.<sup>90</sup> Particularly in the wake of the revolution in Iran in 1979, a concerned Birrenbach saw the entire Arabian world “in an emotional state of Islamic renaissance,” and feared a dangerous Islamic religious radicalism, due in part to Israeli policy (in Palestine) that enraged the Arab world and inflamed the extraordinarily serious Israeli-Palestinian/Arab (Near East) conflict (not merely a regional but an international/world problem), that threatened to

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<sup>88</sup> Birrenbach feared that “the Renaissance of Islam” would stretch to the entire east coast of the Arabian Peninsula and from the Horn of Africa up to the Persian harbors. Then there would be not a single secure point in this region including the thirty “princesses” in Saudi Arabia, on which the Western world could count (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2).

<sup>89</sup> For Birrenbach thinking in realistic terms and not expecting miracles, see KB to Shirley Williams, 25 July 1977. For “another world,” see KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983 (speaking here specifically of Sharon). Birrenbach also longed for the times of Ben Gurion as Prime Minister (“one of the greatest statesmen of his age”), convinced that he would have acted differently.

<sup>90</sup> Thus he criticized Begin, “a man of religious fanaticism who lives in the past” for “judging the situation based on a historic perspective of biblical origin.” (KB to Henry Kissinger, 25 January 1978; KB to Eugene Rostow, 3 March 1978, ACDP 188/3). As of January 1978, Birrenbach criticized Begin’s “biblical approach.” For Birrenbach on Carter and Begin in this regard, see KB to Rostow, 9 April 1980, ACDP K209/2. The zeal of Thatcher was dangerous. It could end in a catastrophic confrontation with the trade unions. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1). This was probably the case in July 1979 when Birrenbach criticized what he saw as merely “pious admonitions” coming from the US. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2).

spread throughout the Islamic population in the entire Middle East (including Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates; disintegration of the whole region between the Persian Gulf and Israel/Horn of Africa; undermine the consolidation of the situation), triggering fundamentalist revolutions and rousing them to work for the Palestinians.<sup>91</sup>

Moreover, during the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. 1981-84), such irrational religious phenomena also threatened to impact Europe and the Federal Republic via the role of the churches. At least in the case of the Catholic Church, an interest in international affairs manifested itself in the public positions assumed on key issues by the leadership and at least certain clergymen (German bishops; Cardinal Höffner; German Bishops' Conference), its participation in and even staging of particular functions and the publication under the auspices of prominent clergymen of studies on relevant themes.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> KB to Bowie, 14 June 1982; KB to Eugene Rostow, 23 March 1979, ACDP K212/1. Birrenbach doubted that the United States would be able to influence the irrational power in Iran by the measures they had in mind. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 16 April 1980, K134/1). Irrational power could not be convinced by economic sanctions. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). The Arab world was now in an emotional state of Islamic renaissance. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2). Birrenbach feared that the Islamic revolution would extend over the whole Eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and also to Saudi Arabia. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2). Saudi Arabia was in danger of becoming a victim of Islamic fundamentalism. (KB to Kissinger 13 December 1982, K132/2). The position of Saudi Arabia was endangered by the wave of Islam and also the other countries on the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). Birrenbach considered Begin disastrous [*verhängnisvoll*] for Israel in spite of certain charismatic traits, which Birrenbach did not deny him; but exactly since he disposed of an "indirect connection to heaven [*Verbindung zum Himmel*]," the man was so dangerous in practical *Politik*, "like a certain other President." (KB to Dr. Günther Gillissen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1). As of August 1979, Birrenbach saw Iran and potential similar developments in Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Kuwait and Anatolia as warning signs of what might happen in the Middle East if peace were not established in this region (Palestine). As of February 1979, Birrenbach feared the Palestine conflict fed into "the renaissance of Islam." (KB to Schaetzel, 13 February 1979, K098/2). As of October 1978, Birrenbach saw since 1972 a renaissance of Islam in the critical Middle East (e.g. Iran) that could one day have serious consequences for the Western powers and for which the Palestinian question could become the powder-barrel (e.g. in Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Lebanon and other important states could be affected by the constant opposition of the Palestinian elements) (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2).

<sup>92</sup> For instance, in the 1981 invitation of the DGAP that Birrenbach (along with the AA/Amb. Gehlhoff and Homeyer/the German Bishops' Conference) was involved (cooperated) in bringing about to Cardinal State Secretary Archbishop Casaroli to speak before the DGAP. Casaroli was glad to accept (and I think even

To Birrenbach's dismay, the declarations emanating from the Church contained many objectionable elements, tending toward an opposition to nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy as well as towards a definitive recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Distinctive in Birrenbach's post-*Bundestag* period, especially the early 1980s, were his efforts to influence the German Catholic Church through an increased contact (e.g. letters, discussions) with its leadership, including personalities within the German Bishops' Conference in Bonn (e.g. the Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach).<sup>93</sup>

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stimulated) the DGAP invitation (though I am not sure if anything ever came of it). Also the *Fachgespräch* planned for 24 June 1981 in the *Erzbischöflichen Haus* (Cologne) about questions of Energy Supply and the use of nuclear energy to which Birrenbach was invited (but could not attend). Invitations for the June 1981 *Fachgespräch* went out (at least formally) from Joseph Cardinal Höffner. Aside from Birrenbach, invitees (experts) included religious personalities (bishops/archbishops, including Höffner himself; also from Switzerland), businessmen/*Wirtschaft* (including Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, *Firma Siemens*, Munich), *Wissenschaftler* (Prof. Dr. Adolf Birkhofer, *Forschungsgelände*, Garching; also from universities), environmentalists (Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Engelhardt, President of the *Deutschen Naturschutzrings eV*, Munich), those in the nuclear/energy organizations (Prof. Dr. Rudolf Guck, President of the *Deutschen Atomforum*, Bonn; Prof. Dr. HW Levi, *Hahn-Meitner-Institut für Kernforschung*, Berlin; Dr. jur. Horst Magerl, *Geschäftsführer* of the *Vereinigung deutscher Elektrizitätswerke*, Frankfurt; Prof. Dr. Hubertus Nickel, *Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*; Prof. Dr. Rudolf Schulten, *Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*) and *Politiker* (e.g. members of the *Bundestag*). As of May 1981, Birrenbach was familiar with (and to Hengsbach claimed to agree with) the study "Energie und Umwelt" published on 25 August 1979 by the *Rhein-Ruhr Stiftung* (led as of 1981 by the Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach).

<sup>93</sup> Other such personalities with whom Birrenbach was in contact were Ilgener; and *Prälat* Dr. Josef Homeyer, the leader of the General Secretariat of the German Bishops' Conference. As the Bishop of Essen, Hengsbach was therefore the bishop in the Ruhr area. As of 4 July 1980, he was also Chairman of the Commission *Weltkirche* in the German Bishops' Conference. I am not really sure what Ilgener's position was. Homeyer was also referred to as (or as part of) the *Zentralrat* of the German Bishops' Conference. Though I believe Homeyer presented Birrenbach's letters to the cardinals (at least Cardinal Joseph Höffner) and despite Birrenbach's efforts, I have no evidence that Birrenbach ever came into direct contact with Höffner (Archbishop of Cologne and Chairman of the German Bishops' Conference). Birrenbach was also in touch during the late 1970s and early 1980s with Amb. (aD) Dr. Horst Osterheld and his successor *Prälat* Alfons Mappes (both *Zentralstelle Weltkirche* of the German Bishops' Conference, the latter as of February 1981) but these two were not political contacts like Homeyer and Hengsbach, rather they supplied Birrenbach with copies of the relevant brochures published by the office of the German Bishops' Conference. As of January 1982, Hengsbach was attempting to get Birrenbach to prevent the closing of some Thyssen work (*Schalkler Verein* in Gelsenkirchen) to save jobs, so this relationship between Birrenbach and churchmen was a two-way street. As of September 1980, Birrenbach believed that the church in Poland could (or did?) attempt to compensate for its careful attitude in the course of the strike through an initiative in the border question. See Birrenbach's remarks on the statement of Cardinal Höffner before the plenary assembly of the German Bishops' Conference in Fulda in September 1980 [KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2]. Birrenbach agreed with Cardinal Höffner's conclusion that "the responsibility consciousness of all *Menschen* and *Völker* vis-à-vis nature had to be awakened and strengthened." However, the consequence which he drew from it in his sixth conclusion regarding the use of nuclear energy Birrenbach did not find convincing. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2).

Demonstrating the dramatically different modes of thought, Birrenbach sought to inform, even awe, these religious contacts with his knowledge, experience, and judgement, supplying them with a variety of arguments and materials (books, *Briefdienst*) more suited to an audience of international affairs experts than to the bewildered clergy. Birrenbach also depicted a disputed state-church relationship and argued that such theses undermined the *Staatsautorität*.<sup>94</sup> However, the roles played by both the Protestant and (to a lesser extent and in a moderate way; at least elements of) the Catholic churches in the FRG and Western Europe ultimately promoted the extra-governmental movements there and reflected a contentious relationship between them and German Atlanticism.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> KB to Hengsbach, 14 December 1981. Birrenbach insisted that the church not get involved in areas that, according to the *Grundgesetz*, belonged to the state (e.g. regarding the Oder-Neisse Line). Birrenbach claimed to be interested in the fundamental problems of state, church and society.

<sup>95</sup> As of June 1981, Birrenbach was upset about the “irrational” scenes at the Protestant church festival in Hamburg (peace movement, vs. NATO decision of December 1979). (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2). As of November 1981, Birrenbach believed that the situation in the FRG with regard to neutralism (anti-Atlanticism) was no different from that of the Protestant countries in Europe (including Britain; the other northern European countries), although signs had recently become visible also in the Catholic countries (e.g. France and Italy). As of July 1981, Birrenbach found a feeling of uncertainty in the FRG and other countries, particularly in the northern states of Europe. With respect to Birrenbach’s stress on religious irrealism, as of December 1979, Birrenbach also believed that Pope John Paul II had forced his tempo too strongly and comprised too much of the globe too quickly (e.g. pastoral trips; the entire earth) in his efforts to make an impact and to change this new *Gesellschaft* (might bring people into irrevocable conflict with the contemporary world). Birrenbach seems to have thought positively about the Polish Church. In later years, Birrenbach saw the church in Poland as an element of authority, indeed the only non-political institution with authority in that country and professed (at least to Hengsbach) to see the Polish episcopate in a brave struggle against USSR power and the Polish Communist Party as of January 1982 in the face of enormous difficulties. However, he also argued that “the Church alone cannot govern Poland.” (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982). As of March 1983, Birrenbach seems to have approved of the (I think Polish) Church’s middle course with respect to Poland as the only possible one. Whatever his views of the impact of religion on international affairs, Birrenbach does seem in general to have thought highly of (admired) Pope John Paul II (personality; strength [*Kraft*]; at least to Osterheld and Homeyer), believed he occupied a key position with potential impact, claimed to be astonished by his patriotism, welcomed the Pope’s successful visit (as of November 1980) to the FRG and its potential results, and was impressed with and expressed interest in his encyclicals and speeches (and owning a volume of earlier speeches; at least some of these materials, along with other interesting Church works, were sent to him by Osterheld). On the other hand, Birrenbach never had any significant contact with the popes. Of the popes, Birrenbach had only known (how well? from afar?) Pius XII, already from Birrenbach’s time in Berlin, when Pacelli was Nuncio there. As a member of a small commission of six members of the European Parliament under the leadership of the Italian Foreign Minister, Birrenbach had had an audience by him in Castel Gandolfo. Pius XII had impressed Birrenbach. As of November 1980, Birrenbach had personally experienced [*erlebt*] the impressive Pope John Paul II in the *Kölner Dom*, where Birrenbach had sat hardly more than 12 meters away from him. As of December 1981, Birrenbach

Birrenbach saw these extremist movements receiving added impetus from abroad. Indeed, the peace, anti-nuclear energy and trade union movements were burgeoning international, in some cases trans-Atlantic, phenomena with developments in the United States, Britain and continental Western Europe mutually stimulating one another.<sup>96</sup> Thus, Birrenbach complained about the peace (nuclear freeze) movement in the US, including leaders of the Democratic Party, the Catholic bishops and certain foreign policy thinkers, with a “terrible” article in the Spring 1982 edition of *Foreign Affairs* by Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan and Gerard Smith particularly egregious.<sup>97</sup> Meanwhile, the Socialist parties in Europe exhibited a considerable

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professed himself happy that the Catholic Church (“our church”), unlike the Protestant Church, had merely peripheral groups [*Randgruppen*] propounding such irrational theses (KB to Hengsbach, 14 December 1981). As of the late 1970s, Birrenbach found Christian-Social elements in the CDU supporting various pro-labor measures (e.g. purely *paritätische Mitbestimmung*). As of September 1978, Birrenbach claimed to have 25 years experience in this area (I guess *Mitbestimmung*).

<sup>96</sup> The peace movement seems to have first appeared in Europe, including the FRG, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and probably Britain. As of the early 1980s, the peace movement also existed in the US, apparently after its appearance in Europe, including in the form of the attitudes/movement of the American (Catholic) bishops/church. The opposition to nuclear energy existed in the US and Europe. The trade union movement existed in at least Britain and the FRG. Indeed it appears that the peace movement in Europe encouraged the appearance of such a movement in the United States. As of December 1982, Birrenbach was upset at the impact of the American bishops’ peace movement/offensive on two Italian Catholic bishops in Sicily, who apparently had been in personal contact with the Pope. Birrenbach remained well aware of the domestic situation and developments abroad and their impact on Europe and the German domestic scene (e.g. the major West European countries, especially Britain and France, also Italy and Spain; e.g. politics, elections, economics, finance, mood, military affairs).

<sup>97</sup> Birrenbach complained about the declaration of the US Catholic bishops on this issue. The Spring 1982 *Foreign Affairs* article proposed pledging the renunciation of a nuclear first-strike (no first use; as frequently proposed by the USSR) and was considered isolationist by some. Rostow hated this article. The freeze movement in the US was endangering the situation in the Federal Republic and Europe. This applied especially to the proclamations of the American conference of bishops. (KB to Kissinger 13 December 1982, K132/2). The declarations of the conference of American Catholic bishops and the freeze movement which became visible also in the November elections preoccupied Birrenbach very much. Birrenbach was in contact with the Catholic church in the Federal Republic, which intended to publish the documents edited by the last Catholic Bishop conference. If the whole contents of this declaration would become known in Germany, it would be even more difficult for us to deploy the Pershing 2. Birrenbach feared that then demonstrations would not make impossible but would disturb the process of stationing these weapons. (KB to McCloy, 25 November 1982, K178/2). While acknowledging that the situation in the FRG was worse, Birrenbach did remind the Americans what had happened in the US during Vietnam (KB to Haig, 29 September 1981). As of November 1982, Birrenbach (in line with his medical thought) feared that the nuclear freeze movement in the US could increase “the infection” that had affected parts of the youth in Europe (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 5 November 1982). As of 1983, Birrenbach claimed that many of the leading personalities in the US freeze movement were known to him since one or two decades.

neutralist and anti-American sensibility.<sup>98</sup> Ironically given his own occasional clashes with the government executive, the authoritarian-minded Birrenbach, always disturbed by diverse and competing interests, stressed the need at home and abroad to eliminate or control those elements (among nations, within governments, parties, populations) dissenting from the Atlanticist line.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach insisted, sometimes

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In explaining the German peace movement to his US contacts, Birrenbach pointed to feelings of fear and frustration in many parts. For the “terrible” article on “Nuclear Weapons in the Atlantic Alliance” in the Spring 1982 edition of *Foreign Affairs* (written by people Birrenbach considered “serious personalities”), see KB to Rostow, 3 May 1982. As of October 1983, Birrenbach rejected Kennan’s arms policy. Birrenbach also referred to these movements as a wave (nature imagery; also used this to refer to other things). With respect to Democratic leaders, Birrenbach cited Kennedy, Hart and Mondale.

<sup>98</sup> The British Labour Party exhibited increasingly left-wing attitudes and resolutions which aligned it at least with the peace movement.

<sup>99</sup> Birrenbach demanded clarity. Birrenbach complained repeatedly about a situation in which the Federal Republic had two chancellors (Schmidt and Brandt), whereas one was enough. Important SPD personalities, especially Brandt, the party *Geschäftsführer* Bahr, and leading personalities of the SPD in the *Bundesländern*, had given statements at home and abroad which stood in clear contradiction to the outwardly declared policy of the *Bundesregierung*. Especially the negotiations of Brandt in Moscow and the proposals presented by him there and his interpretations of alleged USSR concessions had extremely worried the American administration, but also other NATO partners like Britain and France. Who was the representative of German foreign policy: Chancellor Schmidt or the leader of the Socialist Internationale and SPD Party Chair, who constantly intervened in German foreign policy? This question was repeatedly asked inside and outside of the Federal Republic. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1). The fact that political personalities, who as such oversaw the effective circumstances, indirectly supported the *Alternative*-thought of misguided masses and still more the pronouncements of the USSR, directed at the division of Europe, meant an undermining of the *Staatsautorität*, which could lead to the most dangerous consequences. It weakened the position of the Federal Republic in the circle of alliance partners, as the commentary from the countries of our Western alliance partners showed, and even more confirmed the main thrust of the irrational forces in the Federal Republic. In times of adversity there could not be two *Außenpolitiker*, who went out from opposed viewpoints and not from those which had belonged to the principles of our state since the existence of the Federal Republic, namely the maintaining of freedom, the stability of our country and the survival of Western Civilization. If in this context mass demonstrations were staged or encouraged, which contradicted the official policy and the fundamental interest of the country, so is given to the factor of the emotional effect of *Alternative*-forces a political significance which it did not deserve. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1). One of the things that Birrenbach claimed to like about Pope John Paul II was his *Integrationskraft*. On Genscher’s “intolerable” *Doppelpolitik*, which made Chancellor Kohl’s efforts more difficult, undermined Kohl’s authority and hindered the federal government’s success, see KB to Kohl, 25 June 1985. Birrenbach was surprised (and appreciative) to find that in some instances the demonstrations in the FRG found more understanding among his American contacts than himself. As of September 1981, Haig had shown understanding for certain demonstrations as a symbol of the freedom of opinion/speech (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). For an example of Birrenbach’s statements and activities disturbing certain personalities, in this case most notably Chancellor Helmut Schmidt with respect to his in-depth depiction to Gerard Smith of the role of US nuclear weapons, and Birrenbach’s apparent incomprehension and insistence to Schmidt that he had not contradicted the views and attitude of the federal government, see KB to State Secretary Dr.

bizarrely, that the German and European peace movement (and foreign policy divisions in the two principal German coalition parties and the principal European states) was stoked by concerns and doubts raised by US practices and policies, including those involving the stationing of new weapons in Europe and alternately those that led to the decline of US military power and, particularly under Reagan, a fear of nuclear war aggravated by an overheated policy and rhetoric, including a lack of prior consultation (e.g. on the neutron bomb) and an apparent unwillingness to negotiate realistically with the USSR on disarmament.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, though Birrenbach believed international events (e.g. Poland crisis) might modify this trend, he also urged on his US contacts policies and measures crucial to countering it.<sup>101</sup>

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Manfred Schüler, Head of the BKA, 15 September 1980, K192/3. To the extent that Birrenbach expressed understanding for Carter's human rights and open foreign policies, it was due in part to the greater chances these policies had, in comparison to a solely balance-of-power policy, in integrating the US nation and in holding together the Western world. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 17 August 1977). While McCloy sensibly saw no chance to completely stop the attacks on him in 1983-84, Birrenbach not only regretted these attacks against McCloy, he wondered why it was not possible to stop this "completely incomprehensible" hostility (KB *Aktennotiz*, 29 July 1984). As of April 1986, Birrenbach hoped that Kohl would succeed in bringing the German *Politik* again to a clear line, which would be extraordinarily difficult in view of the efforts of personalities like Genscher, Rau, Vogel and Prof. Biedenkopf. (KB to Kohl, 3 April 1986). As of September 1981, Birrenbach was referring to the "misused freedom of speech" in connection with the demonstrations in the FRG (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). Birrenbach praised Reagan's charismatic ability to restore to the American population the unanimity, sympathy and self-confidence lost after Vietnam and Watergate. On such charismatic and psychological elements, see KB to Kohl, 24 February 1984 and KB to Kohl, 12 November 1984. The psychological upswing in foreign, economic and domestic policy in the US was clear. (KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1).

<sup>100</sup> With respect to lack of consultation, Birrenbach cited a recent US neutron bomb decision as of August 1981. With respect to rhetoric, Birrenbach cited the mention by US representatives of a possible limited nuclear war in Europe and Secretary of Defense Weinberger's mentioning the possible use of the neutron bomb. The plans of Kissinger and Nunn to strengthen the conventional potential of Europe could not be successful because the threat contained in these proposals to withdraw American troops would encourage the neutralist and peace movement in Europe. If the US conducted a cool, flexible and strong policy vis-à-vis the USSR it would be possible to reduce in Europe the danger of separatism, pacifism and anti-Americanism. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984 K160/2). For instance, at least as of April 1983, Birrenbach argued that a US (Congress) rejection of the deployment/bunkering of the land-based MX missile on US soil (Utah, Nevada, Nebraska and Wyoming) would cause difficulties for the Federal government insofar as it would encourage and strengthen the left-wing parties and the political peace movement in Europe to resist the discriminatory stationing of Pershing 2 and Cruise Missiles in the densely populated areas of the European continent (Netherlands, Belgium and Britain) and in the FRG (the most populated area on the demarcation line).

<sup>101</sup> This included a greater care in announcing weapons decisions and an improved rhetoric. The European peace movement grew out of abhorrence and fear of an all-out nuclear war between the two suicide-minded



During the mid- to late-1970s (at the latest by November 1977; perhaps into the early 1980s), Birrenbach was very concerned about the problem of and need to combat the wave of terrorism (left-wing radicalism) in the Federal Republic (apparently also occurred elsewhere in Europe). Birrenbach promoted a cool, calculating and consistent policy against the terrorism, which he saw as a product of the permissive society. Birrenbach advocated tough measures/threats against hostage-taking groups and states (e.g. Iran). He was appalled by what he considered the defencelessness and half-hearted fight in the Federal Republic against this terrorism (silence, sympathy, weak and insufficient response) on each level of society, including the coalition government as well as the population, the courts and the police, seeing this as part of a larger failure of the *Rechtsstaat* in the face of spreading violence. Keeping in line with his historical consciousness, Birrenbach distinguished the German terrorism from that in Ulster/Ireland, the Middle East (e.g. Palestinian) and the USA (which he seems to have considered as having more of a motive) and instead was reminded of the Russian nihilists in the reign of Alexander II.<sup>102</sup> Aside from any general interest in this phenomena, this issue challenged and impacted on Birrenbach and the Atlanticists with respect to security arrangements for Atlanticist meetings, with Birrenbach for instance having to arrange with the Chancellor for the security of the foreign guests at the TC conference in Bonn as of November 1977 (it does not appear that any Atlanticist conference was actually harmed by terrorist activity), and also claimed the lives of certain personalities associated

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superpowers that seemed to have no utility as the means were so disproportionate to any ends. I believe Birrenbach praised in this respect the excellent speeches in the US and Europe/FRG, for instance by Reagan and Haig.

<sup>102</sup> KB to Bowie, 4 November 1977.

with the German Atlanticist network.<sup>103</sup> Birrenbach addressed the issue of the German terrorism.<sup>104</sup> Birrenbach was disturbed by a series of assassination attempts in the late 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. vs. the Pope, the English royal couple and Reagan).<sup>105</sup>

As in the 1960s, the presence of a German Left challenging the tenets of Liberal Atlanticism in the Federal Republic continued to be linked to the generational issue. As elsewhere in Europe, Birrenbach saw a young generation largely characterized by alienation, utopianism and a dearth of political knowledge, depth and perspective. In addition to the disturbing implications for upcoming elections as well as the entire

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<sup>103</sup> As of October 1977, Birrenbach was very upset about the recent death of Ponto and the kidnapping and murder of Schleyer, remarking that the murder of Schleyer was “a horrendous indication of that which still awaits us.” (KB to Schmidt, 20 October 1977). As of September 1976, Jürgen Ponto (*Vorstandssprecher* of the *Dresdner Bank AG*) was one of Birrenbach’s contacts in the business world.

<sup>104</sup> During the TC conference, Birrenbach had been asked by the Americans to put down a few ideas about the German terrorism, which Birrenbach had done. Birrenbach had drawn a parallel to the *Narodnaya Volya*, the Russian development under Alexander II. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1). Birrenbach enclosed the ideas he had put down on the German terrorism. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1).

<sup>105</sup> Keeping with the imagery of illness, Birrenbach argued that Europeans were suffering from a “peace syndrome.” [KB to Henry Kissinger, 10 February 1982]. In line with his medical thought, as of November 1978, Birrenbach saw the FRG population “infected” by the opposition to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (KB to Schaezel, 20 November 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach saw the peace movement “infecting” countries. Birrenbach saw those Germans and Europeans in the peace movement and the movement itself as manifesting “extreme symptoms” and also as symptoms of other problems. Birrenbach’s revulsion against the terrorism in Germany was also due to the fact that it was directed not only against the state but also against major personalities like Ponto, Schleyer, Drenkmann and others and even against the American commander in Germany. For Birrenbach the demonstrators and terrorists (both of which used violence; I think in the FRG) did not have relevant motives. As of September 1981, Birrenbach also complained about the demonstrations that he saw directed against any kind of improvement of the university system and other important problems of their civilization (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). As of April 1981, Birrenbach also complained about demonstrations against the public oath of recruits and against *Hausbesitzer*. As of June 1981, Birrenbach saw a part of Germany as “irrational.” (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2). Ultimately, Birrenbach acknowledged that the resistance against the stationing of rockets had been lower than expected (KB *Aktennotiz*, 14 September 1984). As of September 1982, Birrenbach referred to “symptoms of a certain anti-Americanism” in the FRG. Birrenbach also referred to the peace demonstrations as “eruptions of emotions” (KB to Haig, 29 September 1981). Birrenbach continued to identify troubling “symptoms” in the FRG. Birrenbach referred to “symptoms” of neutralism and other undesirable phenomena in Europe/FRG and remarked that “The neutralism is like an infection which extends like an epidemic all over Europe.” (KB to McCloy, 9 November 1981, not sent off since KB phoned with McCloy). Birrenbach saw the peace movement and the opposition to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a “symptom.” Birrenbach saw the peace movement as an infection spreading from country to country. As of 1984, Birrenbach appears to have seen the organized peace movement advocating such bad ideas as Western unilateral (nuclear) disarmament, a Western nuclear freeze and FRG/European denuclearization. As of December 1977, based on the experiences of his life, Birrenbach believed that the Germans tended to an “emotionalism and sometimes also irrationalism” which found their expression in positive and negative exaggeration.

democratic process, the problematic state of the German youth manifested itself in its significant role, especially particular subgroups (e.g. Protestants, *Jusos*, intellectuals and the unusual and regrettable mass of students), in the left-wing movements and terrorism.<sup>106</sup> Faced with this situation, the Atlanticists continued with their generational efforts to influence the German youth.<sup>107</sup> In his various leadership capacities, Birrenbach

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<sup>106</sup> For Birrenbach on such issues, see KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2. On the alienation of the young generation in the Federal Republic, see KB to Kissinger, 30 March 1982. On the disturbing traits of the European youth and their results, see KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2. For Birrenbach linking the contemporary protests/demonstrations to the “*Ohne mich*”-movement of the early 1950s, see KB to Hallstein, 14 November 1980. As of 1980, the *Jusos* (SPD youth organization) were chaired by Gerhard Schroeder. With respect to the youngest generation of intellectuals, Birrenbach was explicitly critical of the political expressions of Grass (KB *Aktennotiz*, 16 June 1980, K134/1). As of April 1981, Birrenbach bemoaned the lacking cultural homogeneity of the generations in the FRG. Sontheimer was right in his last interview of April 1981, when he expressed deep concern about the *Geisteshaltung* of the German youth. Birrenbach agreed with Sontheimer that a defeatism spread in certain parts of the youth. It was no longer ready to secure and defend our political order. Also the “*Leistungsbereitschaft*” waned by the younger generation. This had grown up in affluence and was less resilient than earlier age groups like our generation. It feels, as Sontheimer says, normal requirements of the work- and professional life as an imposition, at times as an oppression. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, K032/1). As of June 1981, Birrenbach saw in the FRG the encouraging of the political left-wing and the development of an “alternative,” totally irrational thinking of parts of the youth, both facilitated by the US-USSR imbalance of power. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2). The problem of the generations was of great importance. The Federal Republic increasingly devoted itself to this question and hoped that this also would happen in the US. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, personal, confidential, 10 November 1982, K029/2). Electoral concerns particularly with respect to Strauß in 1980. As of May 1980, Birrenbach believed that as “a baroque figure” Strauß was not accepted by a large part of the FRG youth (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach claimed that the unusual mass of students in the FRG had become clear as of 1968 and was a sign of false priorities in the FRG (and it seems a symptom of decay).

<sup>107</sup> Birrenbach welcomed it that Butenandt was ready to direct an appeal to rejuvenate [*verjüngen*] the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*. “We would otherwise copy the central committee of the KPDSU.” That was just not possible in the long run. Birrenbach had made the first attempt. Birrenbach had traveled to Prof. Hauss to Münster and presented his request. The main justification was that he no longer was the leader of the clinic and that Birrenbach’s letter at the time had limited his activity to the time up to 1 January 1980. He had told Birrenbach that this bitter news could not have been more kindly transmitted to him and therefore he had complete understanding that Birrenbach directed this request to him in the name of the *Kuratorium* and of the leader of the WB. They had then talked both as “old Münsteraner.” You can imagine what still confronts us (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2). Strausz-Hupé was right when he drew attention in his speech to the youth in many countries, including the Federal Republic. They had no sense of history. They no longer considered what had happened in the past. For selfish reasons, they took the security of our civilization for granted. This created doubts regarding the purpose for which they thought to have to fight. Western governments had failed to clearly tell the truth to their citizens, particularly to the young population. (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1). As of February 1980, Birrenbach had had the chance to talk (I think in the FRG) with former Amb. Strausz-Hupé. Part of the Atlanticist generational effort, Birrenbach saw Strausz-Hupé’s 1978-81 guest professorships at the Universities of Munich and Münster (see earlier in

played a key role in efforts to rejuvenate (*Verjüngung*) the bodies of the Atlanticist institutions (e.g. DGAP).<sup>108</sup> Indeed, a younger generation of German Atlanticists did emerge to succeed Birrenbach's to take part in and maintain the Atlanticist network and infrastructure, including personalities in the political (e.g. Prof. Biedenkopf, Kiep) and *Wirtschaft* (e.g. Dr. Dieter Spethmann of Thyssen) realm.<sup>109</sup> Though in spite of their international experience Birrenbach's children never entered the network he inhabited, some sons did follow in their fathers footsteps (e.g. A. Freiherr von Oppenheim, Christian Peter Henle).<sup>110</sup> While Birrenbach sought to involve Spethmann, the politically

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this chapter) as an effective means of exposing hopefully impressionable Germans to Strausz-Hupé's views, as well as keeping in touch with Strausz-Hupé personally, sustaining Strausz-Hupé's engagement with German questions, honoring Strausz-Hupé, and simply doing Strausz-Hupé a favor.

<sup>108</sup> As DGAP President, Birrenbach took a leading role as of April 1979 in the efforts to reform the DGAP *Präsidium*, including a rejuvenation [*Verjüngung*] of its members. Birrenbach cooperated in these DGAP efforts with Gräfin Dönhoff (Deputy President of the *Präsidium*), Trebesch (*Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender Präsident*) and Chancellor Schmidt and with the input of the DGAP *Geschäftsführenden Präsidium* (discuss the list). However, it appears that Schmidt did not have much time to deal with such matters as Chancellor. These reform efforts involved a changing of the DGAP *Präsidium* due to age and non-participation and involved the drawing up and making proposals about and reworking a list. Birrenbach's son-in-law was at the DGAP MV on 25 June 1987.

<sup>109</sup> Biedenkopf gave a speech at the March 1977 German-American Conference. As of July 1981, Kiep was a member of the DGAP *Geschäftsführenden Präsidium* and as of June 1987 a member of the AB eV. In later years, Mertes took part in a number of Atlanticist functions and organizations (attended the 1981 KWC; was Deputy Chairman (of the commission?) in the 28-30 April 1981 *Arbeitstagung* of the North Atlantic Assembly's special commission "Nuclear Weapons in Europe"). As of 1971, Spethmann was by Thyssen, as of 1977-83 he was Chairman of the Thyssen AG *Vorstand* and Chairman of the WVES and as of 1971 he was possibly head of the French Society in Düsseldorf.

<sup>110</sup> There were also American counterparts to this phenomenon. As of May 1968, Birrenbach would within a fortnight have the chance to meet Christian Herter's son who had become a member of the AI Board of Governors. As of June 1987, A. Freiherr von Oppenheim was the 1<sup>st</sup> Chairman of the *Atlantica*. As of June 1987, Christian Peter Henle was the newly elected President of the DGAP. There was especially Thomas' considerable work experience in the United States. Birrenbach's son, Thomas, had been trained in the steel export business (1961-63: apprenticeship in Hamburg in the firm Ernst Komrowski & Co.), married an Iranian woman (Cleopatra Broumand; it appears married in NY; possibly gave up her Persian citizenship in the mid-1970s to become a German citizen), spent a considerable amount of time abroad, including in the United States (internship at the Thyssen Steel Corporation (NYC) in the 1964 summer semester; worked in New York City from 1969-74 at the Thyssen Steel Corporation (NYC) in a number of capacities (e.g. steel sales business, including sale of products of the ATH AG to industrial and trade firms on the US East Coast; reorganization of the Edgcomb Steel and Aluminum Corporation; corporate planning; including as assistant to Günther Drechsler (President of the Thyssen Steel Corporation)), during which time Birrenbach and his son visited one another; was again in the US for some reason as of December 1981) and Iran (Teheran; 1978-79; working in the steel business (sale of steel mills and other projects), I believe for the Thyssen firm; apparently left ultimately due to the revolution/situation there) and had foreign language knowledge (English: worked in the US; Spanish: 12 years in Argentina; and French:

engaged Thyssen industrialist, more than any other individual of this younger generation in the network, in general he never welcomed or respected the new generation of German Atlanticists (politicians), including those in the *Union*, seeing Kiep as someone who makes “press statements [*Presseverlautbarungen*] which are untimely [*unzeitgemäß*] and superfluous [*überflüssig*]” and Biedenkopf as “an intellectual crank [*Spinner*], who is filled at the same time by an enormous ambition.”<sup>111</sup>

This new internal threat to Liberal German Atlanticism was merely the most significant factor in the tensions and fractures within the Atlanticist network in later years.<sup>112</sup> For Birrenbach, disagreements continued to emerge with foreign contacts on themes of *détente*, nuclear strategy and the arms race/balance (e.g. Ball and Smith) and,

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school, reading and several multi-week stays in France to study the French language). In 1964, Thomas had been in England (I think London), though I am not sure how long. Birrenbach's daughter (Irene) also had some international experiences, particularly with regard to Britain (enjoyed living in London (Marlow, Bourne End), apparently also to Birrenbach's delight/pleasure, with her husband and children as of July 1975, but left England in 1976 since the trilateral cooperation in the nuclear field did not work very effectively and her husband had become the manager of a nuclear company in Germany; Birrenbach sometimes visited them in England (e.g. possibly in April 1976)). Birrenbach's children spent part of their vacation in England (e.g. Southwest England, near the sea; at least this was planned as of July 1963 for August-September 1963). Thus they had the opportunity to stay as (paying) guests with good English families and to interact with other young British people. As of July 1963, this had all been arranged by the German-British exchange agency in Düsseldorf.

<sup>111</sup> KB to Kohl, 4 February 1986. Birrenbach referred to the Biedenkopf planning. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, Federal Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2). Biedenkopf was an “outspoken intellectual.” (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2). As of February 1986, Birrenbach was upset that Biedenkopf would lead the *Land* NRW during the election period. Birrenbach had known his activity in NRW since the death of Köppler. Birrenbach believed that Biedenkopf was inappropriate in his attitude and character for the CDU leadership in the largest German *Land*. It would not be possible for Biedenkopf (just like Worms in the past legislature period in NRW) to crucially promote the development of the CDU in this extremely difficult and important *Wahlkreis*. Birrenbach feared that this election by Biedenkopf could have “possibly fatal consequences.” His deputy Pützshofen would still not have sufficient experience by the election to lead NRW in our sense. (KB to Kohl, 4 February 1986). As of 30 June 1978, Biedenkopf hoped for a continued good cooperation. As of October 1981, Birrenbach's main Thyssen contacts were Spethmann and Sohl. As of February 1979, Birrenbach thought little of the judgment of Kiep, who was Albrecht's advisor (peaceful use of nuclear energy). Birrenbach kept Spethmann informed as of 1981-82 about some of his correspondence with US contacts.

<sup>112</sup> One could say that the *Ostpolitik* threatened to or actually did lead to an undermining of the Atlanticist network.

more heated, the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Smith).<sup>113</sup> Even more intense were disputes surrounding Israel, whose policies Birrenbach criticized from about 1970 on due to his concerns about Mideast turmoil and conflict.<sup>114</sup> Ironically, he looked to the US to exert pressure on a dependent Israel and was dismayed at the one-sided pro-Israel perspective of the Carter and Reagan administrations.<sup>115</sup> As with the entire West, Birrenbach saw a decline in Israeli leadership, particularly when comparing Likud right-wingers (e.g. Begin, Shamir and Sharon) with personalities like Ben-Gurion (or Sadat).<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ball appears to have been anti-Reagan, including with regard to East-West and Middle East policy. Birrenbach's disagreements with Smith included, but not only, the well-known *Foreign Affairs* article. Zbigniew Brzezinski clearly did not see the USSR as so powerful a threat as did Birrenbach in later years. For instance, as of July 1980, Gerard Smith questioned whether Birrenbach's doubts regarding the credibility of the US deterrent were technically justified. (Gerard Smith to KB, 29 July 1980). Ball supported the SALT II treaty. As of July 1979, Birrenbach claimed that Schmidt did not like the SALT II treaty. As of June 1977, Dönhoff had pointed out to Birrenbach with respect to deterrence the existence of an overkill capacity (objective) while Birrenbach, agreeing with this (nuclear potential of the two superpowers too large to serve rational military purposes) but unconvinced, countered with the need for the readiness of the deterring power to use these weapons in emergency and to make this credible in the minds of the Soviet opponent (subjective) (KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2). As of April 1980, Birrenbach claimed that he had been in a "clinch" with Smith since many years on the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (KB to McCloy, 23 April 1980). As of February 1985, Birrenbach disagreed with Ball's idea of relying on SLBMs. As of August 1977, Carstens did not entirely agree with Birrenbach on the issue of the Carter human rights policy, and Birrenbach hoped that his depiction of that policy "even if it does not find your applause [*Beifall*], so nevertheless does not excite your objection [*Widerspruch*]." (KB to Carstens, 18 August 1977).

<sup>114</sup> As of April 1976, Birrenbach was quite critical of what he considered inflexible, catastrophic, dangerous, unreasonable, extremist, intransigent, irrational, "fatal," irresponsible, nationalistic, militarized (not political), unrealistic, illegal go-it-alone Israeli policy (in the occupied territories (e.g. settlements; status of Jerusalem; rejection of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; annexations; claims to Judea and Samaria (part of *Eretz* Israel); total rejection of genuine Palestinian autonomy; lack of concessions in peace negotiations; bombing of the Baghdad reactor as of June 1981; invasion of Lebanon in June 1982; as of 1984 rejection of the Reagan plan). He saw Israel facing a potentially dangerous/fatal/desperate isolation in the world (including UN, Third World, Arab world, and the West, including the US and Europe and even a considerable part of the crucial Jewish diaspora).

<sup>115</sup> KB to Ball, 27 June 1979. Birrenbach conceived of US pressure to alter Israeli policies as threatening a temporary halt/reduction to the US delivery of arms and money. As of October 1978, Birrenbach doubted that Carter had the "guts" needed to pressure Israel to achieve a peace settlement (KB to Schaezel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach wanted the US to pressure Israel to accept American plans and offers (e.g. guarantee, Reagan Plan).

<sup>116</sup> While Birrenbach was critical of Labour in this regard (e.g. Prime Minister Rabin), Birrenbach clearly favored Labour personalities like Peres (who however as of 1983 he considered no sufficient leadership personality). Ben-Gurion served as the gold standard, sort of like how Birrenbach viewed and admired Truman for the US. Birrenbach had met Ben-Gurion on his 1965 Israel mission and saw him as a "great man" who was understanding and moderate. As of September 1983, Birrenbach argued that Israel was no longer the state of Ben-Gurion or even of Levi Eshkol or Golda Meir. As of August 1984, Birrenbach believed that the Israel of today, deeply divided, was no longer the Israel of Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol,

Israel trips in May 1971 and March 1976 had confirmed his view of a leadership and population gripped by an obsessive “siege mentality,” setting Israel “on the road to Massada.”<sup>117</sup> Birrenbach was influenced in this by his contacts and knowledge of the perspectives in the US and Europe, the persistence of his rudimentary Israel network and incipient contacts with personalities in the Arab world.<sup>118</sup> Birrenbach repeatedly warned

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Golda Meir, Abba Eban or Teddy Kollek, Gideon Rafael and Weizmann. For Birrenbach, Begin was “a fatal figure.”

<sup>117</sup> On the irrational siege mentality, see for instance KB to Schmidt, 8 May 1981; KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2; and KB to Dr. Ephraim Lahav, 21 January 1982. As of July 1975, Birrenbach believed that a militarized Israeli policy ran the dangerous risk that Israel would “assume a position à la Sparta in the Near East.” (KB to Siegmund Warburg, 16 July 1975). Birrenbach also referred to a “siege psychosis.”

<sup>118</sup> Birrenbach’s rag-tag Israel network included a number of prominent, influential, leading personalities/circles at home and abroad, inside and outside of Israel, including the US, continental Europe and Britain, with which he maintained contact (e.g. correspondence), including his contact with foreign/US Atlanticist contacts (e.g. Javits; overlap); members of the international Jewish diaspora in the Western world (Nahum Goldmann; Sir Siegmund Warburg (London)); regular contact with the Israeli embassy and ambassadors in Bonn (e.g. Meroz as of August-September 1977); former Israeli ambassadors (corresponded at least somewhat with Natan and Rafael in Israel); personalities associated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (e.g. Prof. Avraham Harman, President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, if he was a contact at all; Prof. Alex Keynan, Prof. at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as of 1981-83, Marine Biological Lab in Woods Hole, Massachusetts as of August 1977, Brandeis University, Rosenstiel Basic Medical Sciences Research Center as of July 1978) and Teddy Kollek (at least somewhat). As of July 1978, Birrenbach believed that he and Hesselbach thought alike about the Israel/Middle East situation. Birrenbach’s views on US policy towards Israel and the Middle East seem to have been generally at least in line with other contacts of his (e.g. McCloy, McGeorge Bundy, Ball; conventional wisdom in Europe (since about 1970) and the US). According to Siegmund Warburg, Begin’s policy represented an aggressive ideology. As of May 1981, Birrenbach argued that supporting a “fatal” Israeli policy did not correspond to a moral obligation expected from the German government and insisted that he had never done anything that was not in the higher interests of the Jewish destiny (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Alex Keynan, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 8 May 1981, K033/3). Birrenbach claimed that most people in Europe agreed with his views on Israeli policy and argued that his January 1978 FAZ letter to the editor had found an echo everywhere. Among Birrenbach’s contacts in Israel, Keynan was apparently anti-Likud and generally agreeable to Birrenbach. As of 1977, Keynan had joined the Party of Yigael Yadin and hoped Birrenbach would agree to show him their correspondence. Keynan also wanted to show Birrenbach’s letters to President Katzir who was a good friend of Keynan’s and who had a variety of unofficial study groups in his home. However, not all of Birrenbach’s contacts in Israel agreed with his advice on Israeli policy. This was the case for instance with Kollek. As of 1985, Birrenbach was surprised to find that in his view Kollek was calling his attitude towards Israel into doubt. In 1977 in Bonn, Birrenbach met the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister who was as of April 1979 about to become the leading personality in that country. In January 1982, Birrenbach had a long discussion with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan. As of December 1982, Birrenbach claimed he had 20 years of contacts with that area (I think meaning the Middle East), with Israelis as well as with leading prominent figures of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. (KB to Kissinger 13 December 1982, K132/2). As of May 1981, Keynan had been up to the formation of the Begin government the chairman of a committee of university professors who dealt with Israeli foreign policy. As of September 1980, I believe Keynan could not do much to change the situation or policy of Israel but was in contact with Peres. As part of his move towards the Arab world, Birrenbach also embraced the admirable and “courageous” efforts of Sadat for peace. As of September 1983,

Israeli political leaders, in government (e.g. Prime Ministers Meir, Rabin and Peres) and opposition, via letters as well as extensive private meetings on his trips.<sup>119</sup> However, Birrenbach's Mideast peace proposals and criticism of Israeli policy merely led to serious tensions with the Israeli embassy, strained relations with certain pro-Israel Atlanticist contacts, particularly Eugene Rostow, and ruptured ties to Axel Springer.<sup>120</sup> On the sole

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Birrenbach had been a certain time (just some correspondence in 1982 it looks like) in contact with the crown prince of Jordan (Hassan bin Talal). As of February 1982, Talal had given a speech in Bonn that Birrenbach had heard and they had met one another there in Bonn (perhaps DGAP?). As of February 1982, Talal had invited Birrenbach to Jordan and Birrenbach claimed to be very interested in such a trip (which never happened to my knowledge). Birrenbach claimed as of 1982 to have seen Jordan and also Amman in 1965 and to have been very much impressed by Jordan. As of August 1977, Birrenbach had had discussions with leading personalities of Saudi Arabia. In November 1980, there was a German-Israeli Conference in Bonn. As of January 1985, Ball was collaborating with his historian son, Douglas, on a larger study of relations between the US and Israel (also published as a by-product a small book describing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and some of its implications) (Ball to KB, 28 January 1985, ACDP K160/3).

<sup>119</sup> While one could not characterize this as a genuine correspondence with these personalities, Peres at least did answer Birrenbach's letter (to former Prime Minister Meir and to Peres) of 26 July 1978. On his trip of March 1976 to Israel, Birrenbach had the chance to speak with leading personalities of the Israeli government (including the head of government), the ministries (three or four state secretaries and ministerial directors, including in the foreign ministry), the universities and also in the population and commandants of individual stations. Both of Birrenbach's Israel trips (May 1971 and March 1976) included visits to Jerusalem. Birrenbach spoke with Prime Minister Rabin in July 1975 in Bonn. It appears that the Rogers mission in 1971 may also have had some impact on Birrenbach's Israel views. Among those in opposition, Birrenbach warned the leader of the opposition Peres.

<sup>120</sup> Tensions with the Israeli embassy included most notably sharp exchanges with the respective ambassadors during the October 1973 war and in the wake of Birrenbach's January 1978 FAZ letter to the editor. Apparently these occasions/incidents did not lead to a break in relations with the Israeli ambassador(s) in Bonn. During the October 1973 war, Birrenbach had offered to Ambassador Ben-Horin on the phone "well-meant advice" regarding the need for restraint which seems to have brought Ben-Horin to heatedly (reproach) suggest that Birrenbach and perhaps the *Union* were anti-Israel (which hit Birrenbach very hard). In 1978, Birrenbach's January FAZ letter to the editor (which Birrenbach had also sent to the ambassador) resulted in a correspondence between the two that included what Birrenbach considered "sharply formulated" and "extremely astonishing" letters from Amb. Meroz. As of 1981, Birrenbach believed Meroz was avoiding him (not meet with him) due to their differences of opinion on Israel/Middle East (though Meroz denied there was any problem and claimed that it was he who had requested that Birrenbach be at the meal in May 1981 given by Foreign Minister Genscher as Meroz's farewell dinner). Birrenbach's Mideast peace proposals professed to do justice to all parties/states in the region (Arabs and Israelis; apparently Palestinian homeland). As of 1975, with respect to Israel and the Near East, Birrenbach argued for the need for an exchange of territory (Israeli political and territorial concessions) for security and a genuine peace settlement/treaty (all in accord with his interpretation of UN Resolutions 242 and 338). In later years, Birrenbach's proposed Middle East peace plan (solution of the Palestine conflict) included the security of Israel (limited frontier changes); a confederative union of Jordan with the territories that Israel conquered since 1967 (West Bank and Gaza Strip; genuinely autonomous homeland, some kind of self-determination for the Palestinians); and a Vatican status for Jerusalem (internationalization/neutralization of the Holy Places for all religions (including Islam); on basis of an autonomous Washington DC to quote a US personality). As of January 1979 (in the midst of heated correspondence) Birrenbach feared Rostow might even break off relations with him (KB to E. Rostow, 9



occasion that Birrenbach dropped his philo-Semitic/Israeli posture, unusual for a German, he withdrew from *Der Welt* a Mideast piece due to substantive differences with Springer, publishing it instead as a Letter to the Editor in the FAZ in January 1978.<sup>121</sup>

Birrenbach's concerns with regard to the state of the Federal Republic manifested themselves not merely in his writings, but also in his FTS activities. Largely due to

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January 1979). By October 1980, Birrenbach was explicitly trying to extend his correspondence with Rostow to problems other than the Middle East and by March 1982 Birrenbach was explicitly avoiding the theme altogether in his correspondence with Rostow, and by June 1983 he and Rostow seem to have simply agreed not to deal with the theme at all. Birrenbach also clearly disagreed in this general sense with other contacts (e.g. Haig, Strausz-Hupé) about the Middle East/Israel but it did not really come to any significant tension between them over this. It is clear there were other tensions among Atlanticists over Israel (e.g. between Ball and Rostow). As of August 1983, Birrenbach was also critical of a part of the US Congress for its views on the Middle East. Birrenbach described the pro-Israel Axel Springer as "a one hundred percent supporter of Begin." (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 February 1978). The issue of Israel divided the German Atlanticists. Chancellor Brandt confronted the opposition of the papers of the Springer-Konzern (I believe *Die Welt* and the *Bild-Zeitung*). In New York, a Zionist paper blamed Brandt for appeasement (1973) and for having made the comfortable choice when he had to decide between the existence of Israel and the warmth of German homes. However, on 14 November 1980, Birrenbach would chair a function in Berlin in the *Haus Springer* about "Europe and America After the American and German Elections." (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Prof. Dr. Hans Ritter, Stuttgart, 14 November 1980, K084/2). Ironically enough, with respect to the Middle East, Birrenbach found himself often rejecting the strictly legalistic and historic arguments of Rostow (himself a professor of law) and arguing from a more politically motivated view. Ironically, on his March 1976 trip to Israel, Birrenbach got a sense that the views of the youth and part of the intellectuals were more accurate (regarding Israel/Middle East) than those of the Israeli government and many politicians. Ironically, among Birrenbach's criticisms of US views on the Middle East (at least during the Reagan years) was that they focused solely on the East-West aspects. Rostow and Springer were both Cold Warriors generally in agreement with Birrenbach.

<sup>121</sup> This appeared in the FAZ of 30 January 1978. Birrenbach was constantly concerned about being seen as anti-Israeli or anti-Semitic. Among other things, Birrenbach repeatedly professed his friendship towards and concern for the interests and fate of Israel, including the need for Israeli security from dangers and a peace favorable to Israel. He also claimed to be pushing the responsible German *Stellen* to implement viable measures to improve German-Israeli relations. Birrenbach's concerns for Israel seem to have been derived from a sense that time was working against the Israelis (e.g. declining Israeli position; the belief that the Arabs would eventually learn to use modern weapons) and his doubting of US (and Western/European, including to some extent it seems the FRG) willingness to continue to support/aid Israel indefinitely (military and financial aid) in its policies/views (and Israeli reliance on such a thing; symptoms of fatigue regarding the Middle East). The people at the Springer press appear to have been very pro-Israel. I believe that Birrenbach had originally planned to summarize his proposals for the solution of the Palestine question in a section of a chapter of the book (MS) he was preparing but had decided instead to interrupt the completion of this chapter with the beginning of the Lebanon war (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2). From his vacation in Baden-Baden shortly after Christmas, Birrenbach had dictated an article for *Die Welt* on the theme of peace in the Near East ("Wohin führt der Weg Sadats?", 29 December 1977, K071/3). However, he had withdrawn this after he read Begin's statement in Ismailia and got an earlier expression of Springer on the question of the "settlements" in the occupied areas. After he had conducted the negotiations at the time about the introduction of diplomatic relations to Israel, Birrenbach did not want to appear as a critic of Israeli policy. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillissen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1).

Birrenbach's efforts/proposals as president, the FTS sought to preserve the experiences of Weimar and the tradition of Prussia in the historical and political consciousness/memory. The upshot was a historians colloquium staged in Cologne (in the FTS?) in June 1979, financed by the FTS, to explore the reasons for the downfall [*Verfall*] of Weimar as well as a series of almost twenty lectures about Prussia and its impact on German history, staged/organized by the FTS/Birrenbach from 1980-84 in the *Preußischen Staatsbibliothek* in Berlin with the help of (together with) the *Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz*. Birrenbach had a key role in selecting the speakers/participants, which included top German historians and *Wissenschaftler* (e.g. Hillgruber (Weimar, gave the speech on foreign policy), Profs. Erdmann, Nipperdey, Schieder; Bracher; Hagen Schulze) and, in the case of the Prussia lectures, foreigners (e.g. Raymond Aron, Michael Howard).<sup>122</sup> Also at Birrenbach's behest, there emerged a number of volumes based on these conferences, among them *Weimar-Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie* (edited by the FTS, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Hagen Schulze; 1980) and several from the Prussia lectures. These also contained Birrenbach's introductory *Vorträge* (given as chairman of the FTS-*Kuratorium*), most significantly "Sind Symptome von Weimar in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erkennbar?", which served as a fundamental introduction to the Weimar book and argued that symptoms of decline [*Verfallserscheinungen*] at least similar to those in Weimar were indeed apparent in the contemporary FRG.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> The Prussia lectures ("Preußen-seine Wirkung auf die deutsche Geschichte") represented the initial part of a larger effort of "Thyssen-Vorträgen", established in 1979 and aimed at introducing the Anglo-Saxon model of "Lectures," hitherto absent/lacking from the *wissenschaftlichen* life of the FRG. As of March 1984, another lecture series was planned to be staged soon in Munich, this one on the theme "Auseinandersetzungen mit der Antike." I am not sure who exactly was invited to the Prussia lectures. Nipperdey spoke on "The Prussian University History."

<sup>123</sup> Birrenbach depicted and analyzed these "symptoms à la Weimar." This particular meeting may have actually been the capstone/finale of a series of FTS lectures and conferences involving eminent historians and scholars (e.g. Coing, Erdmann, Schieder) on the reasons for the decline of the Weimar Republic. At

Birrenbach distributed the published versions of such speeches, including to all the top German politicians.<sup>124</sup> Though they never came to fruition, Birrenbach also had a

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times, Birrenbach conjured up the possibility of a new economic crisis à la 1929 that the FRG and the German people would not survive (KB to Gerard Smith, 21 April 1980). Birrenbach would send the book about the reasons for the decline of Weimar. Birrenbach believed that the situation had meanwhile (since the conference) even worsened with respect to the *Verfallserscheinungen* in the Federal Republic. (KB to Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1). As a birthday gift, Birrenbach gave Hallstein the decline of Weimar book. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Professor Dr. Hans Ritter, Stuttgart, 14 November 1980, K084/2). Birrenbach distributed this Weimar book to his contacts. For Birrenbach, the symptoms of the failure (of Weimar?) in the contemporary Federal Republic were not dramatic but could lead in the long-term to serious consequences. As of August 1979, this colloquium had been held recently. Birrenbach's introductory *Vortrag* was improvised in so far as it had been hastily dictated by Birrenbach after the cancellation of Prof. Schieder on the eve of the meeting without using a single book so obvious were the symptoms. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3). With respect to the symptoms of Weimar today in the Federal Republic, Birrenbach could have stressed even more the position of the church (although he had twice mentioned it with the concept of secularization) or the disastrous [*verhängnisvolle*] effect of the media. Birrenbach had sent Guth his introductory *Vortrag* a few days ago and would also send him a list of the themes and *Referenten* before which Birrenbach had spoken. (KB to Dr. rer. pol. Wilfried Guth, *Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 5 July 1979, K034/3). Springer had mentioned a series of symptoms of the current time in his *Vortrag*, some of which corresponded to a series of points in Birrenbach's introductory *Referat*. Birrenbach sent Springer the book. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Axel Springer, Berlin, 10 August 1981, K033/2). Birrenbach sent Strauß his introductory speech for the colloquium on the decline of Weimar. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to *Bundesminister aD* Franz Josef Strauß, Minister President, *Freistaat* Bavaria, Munich, private-confidential, 4 July 1979, K034/1). Birrenbach sent Schmidt a reprint, which contained this introductory *Referat*. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 24 June 1981, K033/3). The book published by us regarding Weimar was enjoying good sales. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, K032/1). At Birrenbach's behest (see also the introduction), a historians colloquium had met a year ago and discussed the reasons for the decline of Weimar. The meeting began on a Thursday morning at 10 AM. On Wednesday evening around 6 PM, Prof. Dr. Th. Schieder (University of Cologne), who was the historian in the *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat* of the FTS, called Birrenbach to tell him that he could not come due to health reasons and that Birrenbach should give the introductory speech. Birrenbach told him that since he was no historian, in spite of all his historical interest, that would not be appropriate by the rank of the historians who would appear there. Schieder insisted on it. Thereupon, Birrenbach had used a "*ruse de guerre*." On the next morning (i.e. not even a half day later), Birrenbach had spoken about the theme "Are Symptoms of Weimar Discernible in the Federal Republic?" That was not so simple. But Birrenbach had more or less succeeded and it appeared now as the first chapter of this book. The book had a forward. Birrenbach had written the first chapter. Birrenbach found that the symptoms he had there depicted increasingly strengthened in recent years in the Federal Republic. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Hallstein, c/o Professor Dr. Hans Ritter, Stuttgart, 14 November 1980, K084/2). In an introductory speech at a meeting of historians of the FTS about the causes of the decay of Weimar, Birrenbach spoke, as President of the Board, about the present symptoms of Weimar in the Federal Republic. Birrenbach did not come in this speech to dramatic conclusions, but the result was not at all encouraging. This applied also to the internal situation in the other Western European countries (KB to Kissinger, Washington DC, 27 July 1979, K098/2).

<sup>124</sup> As of December 1985, Birrenbach had sent the published version of the Prussia lectures to more than 160 top German politicians. At least the first volume of the Prussia lectures came out by Klett-Cotta. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1). At least up to May 1982, Birrenbach had two copies of the first volume of the Prussia lectures. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May

number of other potential projects in mind that he saw as of real importance in the present state of history.<sup>125</sup>

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1982, K033/1). Birrenbach would send Carstens the first volume of the Prussia lectures. (KB to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1). In his capacity as chairman of the FTS-*Kuratorium*, Birrenbach had to introduce Prof. Nipperdey in the Prussian *Staatsbibliothek* in Berlin for a *Vortrag* about the university history of Prussia. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2). Birrenbach sent at least some of his German contacts the first volume of the Prussia lectures. Birrenbach continued to distribute the products of those projects financed by the FTS (e.g. to Chancellor Schmidt).

<sup>125</sup> KB to Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1; KB to Bowie, 11 December 1985. As of September 1981, these lectures had been going on for about 1.5 years. At the end of this month (September/October 1981?), Birrenbach would introduce there Prof. Gall for his *Vortrag*, entitled “Bismarck’s Prussia, the *Reich* and Europe.” The first four *Referate* would appear in January 1982 in the *Propyläen-Verlag* in Berlin. Birrenbach would perhaps then send this book. (KB to Hans Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 30 September 1981, K032/1). At Birrenbach’s initiative, a study had just taken place by the FTS of the *Grandes Écoles* in France, of the civil service in Britain and of the post-graduate study in the US and in Britain that showed how important it was to place the accent on achievements [*Leistungen*]. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 22 December 1982, K029/2). In the middle of January, Birrenbach sent the introduction he had written for the first FTS Prussia volume to Merkle. This volume contained the first four Thyssen (FTS) lectures, which would be printed in three volumes. Birrenbach sent Merkle another copy. Birrenbach had drawn up a program for the next lectures, which he had told Prof. Knopp a few days ago after Birrenbach had already informed beforehand Schieder and Ritter. Birrenbach assumed that Merkle agreed with this program. Such a summary gave a meaning to the lectures. From the start on, Birrenbach did not want to view them merely as Prussia lectures, rather as a “means to an end” for the filling of a vital *Legitimitätslücke* for the political development of the Federal Republic. (KB, FTS, Chairman of *Kuratorium*, Cologne, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. hc Hans L. Merkle, Chair of the *Geschäftsführung* of the *Robert Bosch GmbH*, Stuttgart, K036/1). As of April 1981 (actually already by 1979), Birrenbach believed that a historical consciousness and interest was again gradually developing in the FRG (e.g. biographies; not only for the recent past like Weimar but for the larger German history) and believed there was a remarkable upswing in the interest in Prussia not only in the FRG but also in the DDR and demonstrated a seeking for a historical identification possibility (which had to go deep into history and include the development of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation) (KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, 23 April 1981, K032/1). The situation in the Federal Republic worried Birrenbach *innen-, wirtschafts-* as well as *außenpolitisch*. Birrenbach referred to his Weimar initiative and his proposal to make the problem of the post-graduate study and of the *Grandes Écoles* in France the subject of a project. The project of the Prussia lectures had developed well. Birrenbach believed that he should still propose now several other themes. What did Butenandt think about it? The first would be the relationship of *Geist* to *Politik* or *Staat* and vice-versa. The second theme would be the problem of the complete decay [*Verfall*] of the historical consciousness and the displacement [*Verdrängung*] of the idea of the nation. Finally, Birrenbach thought of a theme which emerged from the demonstrations against nuclear energy, the *Hausbesitz* and the public oath of the recruits. The extent and the limits of freedom had clearly blurred in the last ten years. The reason was, among others, the decline [*Verfall*] of the *Staatsautorität*. The leap from authoritarian state [*Obrigkeitsstaat*] into a demonstrations democracy (as Prof. Weichmann had characterized it) was a serious symptom. Birrenbach felt vividly reminded of the 1930s. Next time, Birrenbach wanted to make proposals in this direction, initially only tentatively to ask if on this basis the FTS could become active. (KB to Professor Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2). Birrenbach was pleased that Lübke had agreed to collaborate on the project “Berlin,” which was so important to Birrenbach for the above-named reasons (i.e. concerns regarding historical/national consciousness). (KB to Lübke, 15 August 1977, K171/1).

At the same time, German Atlanticism was modified and potentially undermined in later years, among other factors, by its increased interest in the East. At least in later years, Birrenbach increasingly recognized that the USSR (Warsaw Bloc) was a vulnerable, one-dimensional (military, not economic) superpower facing considerable internal and external crises and tensions and weaknesses and inferiorities vis-à-vis the West. Internally, the USSR confronted problems of a political, economic, ideological and demographic nature, while internationally, it faced difficulties with respect to China, Afghanistan and in controlling Eastern Europe (perhaps imperial overstretch).<sup>126</sup> As Birrenbach realized, such trends (some apparent since the Stalin period) portended significant effects on the power and stability of the USSR/East, offering the West long-run prospects for genuine settlements in various areas (e.g. disarmament).<sup>127</sup> Nevertheless, based on his experiences in the 1930s with totalitarian states (including the NS-regime), Birrenbach continued to stress the strengths of such states, (i.e. the East, USSR) in comparison to the Western democracies, in dealing with internal difficulties, for instance their ability to impose hardships on their populations and to isolate themselves from the outside world (close frontiers), as well as the possibility of a more adventurous USSR foreign policy, even armed aggression, as a means to escape from

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<sup>126</sup> Politically, these problems included leadership transitions/successions (including generational change), a stagnating, over-bureaucratized system of the *nomenklatura* that was only capable of limited action, and a rule becoming immobile near the end of the Brezhnev period. Economically, these problems included industrial and technical issues, the burden of an overlarge arms expenditure and an oil gap as of 1981. Ideologically and demographically, these problems included difficulties in controlling the central Russian and Asiatic nationalities, instability/insecurity/unrest, a softening up in the border areas and in the regions east of the Urals.

<sup>127</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the *MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV*, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1. The position of the USSR in Southeast Asia and the Middle East showed, together with its complete abstinence from the material support of underdeveloped countries, how vulnerable the East is also. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). As of July 1981, Birrenbach even acknowledged that Soviet decline might be irreversible in the long term (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2).

internal problems.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, even as the Cold War neared its conclusion (even as of May 1986) and in spite of the various leadership and regime changes and difficulties confronting the USSR, Birrenbach continued to think in terms of an often increasingly dangerous East-West conflict/tension, in which a powerful USSR (Communist menace) was the principal prospective enemy, an aggressively expansionist power-political threat to the security and peace of Western Europe, the US and the world.<sup>129</sup>

Given this perspective, it is not surprising that while Birrenbach ostensibly exhibited elements of moderation with respect to East-West relations, he ultimately remained a hawk to the end.<sup>130</sup> Rejecting what he considered the “moral,” “idealistic” and “naive” arguments of the peace movement and left-wing politicians, Birrenbach continued to call for a strong, tough rhetoric and policy to limit and defend against the

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<sup>128</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 20 July 1981, ACDP K210/2. Also KB to Prof. Raymond Aron, 22 September 1977, K074/1. As of February 1979, Birrenbach argued that “It is, as is known [*ja*], our experience in Europe that totalitarian regimes simply cover-up [*zudecken*] internal problems through outer measures. I could absolutely imagine that by the USSR.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 1 February 1979). As of February 1981, Birrenbach suggested the USSR might solve its new shortage of oil (economic problem) by controlling the Strait of Hormuz from Afghanistan (KB to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1). As of October 1986, Birrenbach seemed at least implicitly (at least reporting it from elsewhere) to have recognized that the deterioration of the USSR economy forced it to place more stress on improving/modernizing its worsening economy (including due to the reactor accident at Chernobyl) and made necessary a reduction of outlays for armaments and a breathing pause for its foreign policy. (*Notizen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, and *Anhang*, 15 October 1986, by KB).

<sup>129</sup> As of 1984, Birrenbach saw the new USSR regime as rigid (I think like those before). As of June 1979, Birrenbach believed that the USSR did not think in terms of arms control (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979). As of 1977, Birrenbach believed that the USSR would view proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons on all sides as utopian. As of September 1983, Birrenbach believed that the USSR behavior in Sakhalin showed with whom they were dealing. As of December 1982, Birrenbach argued that the influence of the USSR military power would impede the success of the negotiations, though Andropov would be more flexible than Brezhnev (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2).

<sup>130</sup> Elements of moderation included Birrenbach’s calls to avoid deepening the existing conflict with the USSR; for a cool, flexible, patient, convincing, constructive and flexible policy vis-à-vis the USSR as of 1984; acceptance in principle of constant efforts of the US/West for a cautious, flexible, serious diplomacy, negotiations, dialogue, compromises, cooperation, summits, agreements and understanding with the USSR/East in various areas to help solve important international problems (e.g. disarmament, arms control/reduction) and come to an acceptable genuine solution/settlement with the West; opposition to exaggerated demands in those negotiations; vs. overreaction in the arms race; see limits of their possibilities. Birrenbach claimed not to underestimate the importance of *Ostpolitik* and détente.

threat posed by the USSR.<sup>131</sup> He remained critical of the exaggerated priority the West attached to *Ostpolitik* and the “illusion” of the “so-called détente” (at the expense of the priorities of security and liberty), anticipating only extremely limited, even harmful effects.<sup>132</sup> Birrenbach remained skeptical of the possibilities in the foreseeable time of fundamentally transforming Russia into a peaceful, status quo state, into a democratic system respecting human rights, reaching a real overall settlement [*Gesamtregelung*] with the USSR (negative USSR attitude), achieving a major improvement in relations/cooperation (including German-Soviet relations, including their economic relations (deals) or gaining substantial concessions from it (e.g. also for the FRG, including political concessions)).<sup>133</sup> Indeed, Birrenbach saw only a low scope [*Spielraum*] for the totalitarian USSR in this regard for various internal (e.g. endanger the system) and external reasons (e.g. undermine its control of the East Bloc; overall situation in the

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<sup>131</sup> Birrenbach actually opposed the NATO double-track resolution itself, fearing the Europeans would put too much emphasis on negotiations and the Soviets would have an enormous chance, and he favored simple deployment (KB to Kissinger, 8 February 1983 and KB to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1). Birrenbach’s preferences manifested themselves in an opposition to an “exaggerated” stress on negotiations with the USSR; an opposition to unilateral (US) concessions to the USSR in the mere expectation of facilitating negotiations and of gracious counter-concessions (e.g. arms control like SALT II; renunciation of neutron bomb under Carter; about nuclear arms; weakness achieved nothing; no concrete quid pro quo or relevant concessions). As of July 1980, Birrenbach seems to have been pleased that Schmidt had spoken clearly to the USSR about Afghanistan. Birrenbach even saw some German military personalities propounding such “naive” arguments.

<sup>132</sup> In Germany too many politicians had a wrong concept of the priority of the *Ostpolitik*. Of course it was very important to maintain the advantages earned by paying such a high price as we did in the Eastern Treaties. Of course, Rose admitted that the Federal Republic did not want to choose between Moscow and Washington DC. But Birrenbach agreed that Moscow and the GDR disposed today of certain levers to influence the public opinion and economy in our country. Birrenbach agreed that this was one of the consequences of Helsinki. The position of Germany was the key for the Russians in their European policy. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1).

<sup>133</sup> Détente included involving the USSR in economic, technological, cultural and political agreements. Birrenbach pointed out that the West had not understood that the Soviet policy of co-existence was something completely different. As of August 1978, Birrenbach saw the opening up of the Tyumen as the historic task, it was a “generations problem.”

East).<sup>134</sup> Therefore, perhaps more than ever, Birrenbach opposed potential concessions from the West to the Russians (including in the FRG's Africa and economic policy, including economic concessions via the efforts of the German *Wirtschaft*, especially those that went beyond our abilities [*Kräfte*]).<sup>135</sup> Birrenbach historically justified his anti-détente stance to Chancellor Schmidt in February 1978 in a lengthy confidential account of Russo-German relations since the Congress of Berlin (since 1880).<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> For instance, if the USSR permitted the GDR to become more liberal (made crucial concessions to the FRG that led to the loss [*Wegfall*] or loosening [*Lockerung*] of the lock [*Riegel*] of the DDR), the USSR's relations with the entire Eastern bloc would be endangered. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980). Birrenbach was doubtful of the ability of totalitarian governments to make concessions to their own people. As of September 1980, he doubted that the Polish government could afford free unions. As of June 1985, Birrenbach confessed that the proposals of Gen. Abrahamson (I think regarding SDI) were not fully convincing, particularly with regard to Europe. The USSR would not reduce its weapons in favor of laser rays, neutral particle beams and anti-satellite weapons. The USSR conventional power alone was necessary for the protection of Eastern Europe.

<sup>135</sup> The idea of including the Russians by economic offers and military concessions to become a "peaceful partner" had been from the start a pure illusion (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2).

<sup>136</sup> Birrenbach seems to have dated détente in the West (including the US, Europe and the FRG) to around the late 1960s (more than a decade as of July 1981; the last decade as of August 1977; the Carter and previous US administrations). Moscow saw the global world problems under the perspective of a confrontation and not, as the West, of détente. Possibly, the US and France were about to abandon this concept in favor of the stabilization of the balance of power which had no constructive basis in the relations between our countries and the USSR which did not know this concept because it was not identical with co-existence. In the West, one was accustomed to say that there was no alternative to the policy of détente. Birrenbach agreed that this formula was disastrous because it meant that whatever the USSR did, we were condemned to pursue a wrong policy. Thus, we would lose our independence from Moscow. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1). After Afghanistan it would be very difficult for the West to continue the economic and cultural policy with those countries where "the conception of the détente adapts [*s'accommode*] perfectly [etc.]." Birrenbach agreed that nobody was condemned to face the dilemma of either détente or Cold War. It would be necessary to maintain the dialogue with the East to keep the door open for possible negotiations. But one had to see and recognize the real nature of the USSR which Birrenbach agreed was not a state like France, the Federal Republic or the US. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 10 February 1981, K074/1). We stand in a serious world crisis, more difficult than it ever had been after the Berlin blockade. Thereby was to consider that the American deterrence factor was no longer credible. A balance of forces no longer existed and could not be reestablished for a number of years, at least not before 1985. What would happen by then in Afghanistan, in Iran or in both countries or even on the European front, if it came on the Persian Gulf to some type of military operations? With European and American hardness the worst could be averted. In case of a softening up of public opinion, which we currently faced, and a completely wrong interpretation of the concept "détente," which was completely incomprehensible for the USSR (as had been known since many years but ignored), developments could emerge that would be fatal for Europe. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Leo Tindemans, Minister President (aD), Brussels, 10 April 1980, K074/2). The SALT Treaty did not reduce, unless it amended, the present arms race, but confirmed or perhaps pushed it. (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2). The government had spoken too much about the definite



In line with this, Birrenbach urged particularly the US to take measures to reverse current trends and restore a stable global and regional equilibrium of (military) power in order to preserve peace and security (FRG, West, Europe, world; contain), eliminate

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state of détente and discovered now that détente as it had been understood by many people in the Federal Republic was an illusion. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2). Birrenbach was happy that the US seemed to be discovering that détente did not mean what it had believed in the last decade. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). A strong group in the SPD blindly believed in détente and did not understand the basic Soviet policy from the start. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). After the war, the Russians had never respected the idea of détente, a term unknown in their country. Coexistence was something completely different and did not exclude aggression as in Afghanistan and Angola. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). There was no real détente in the world. This was not the opinion of the French and German government. On both sides of the ocean, the Russian policy had been miscalculated since at least 12-15 years. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). The American administrations had had illusions regarding the expectations about Soviet détente policy. One could not change fundamentally the Russian policy by involving the USSR in economic, cultural and other kinds of agreements. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1). Birrenbach agreed with Strausz-Hupé's analysis of Soviet motivations as a nuclear and global power. The build-up of the Soviet navy alone, apart from the enormous speed of their armaments development, showed that the USSR understood détente in a different way than the West. But it was like in the times of Hitler: he had said in his terrible book everything he did. Nobody had taken it seriously. The same applied to the Soviets. They spoke openly about coexistence and never about détente. They mentioned continuously that they had to support the liberation movements everywhere in the world. Birrenbach agreed that they probably would not take recourse to a full-scale war. But the creation of an imbalance of power, the political interference in other countries and their wars by proxy showed the goal of Soviet policy. Détente in the Western sense was possible only in a very limited way. One could concretize it by the word "restraint," and they meant by restraint the intent to avoid nuclear war. But the nuclear deterrent did not work if there was not a readiness in the West to use such weapons *in extremis*. Whether in the long run détente would bring about a gradual transformation of Soviet society was doubtful to a certain degree. Russia had always been an autocratic country. The number of dissidents was as small as in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Birrenbach agreed that they should pursue détente but only on the basis of a recognition of its natural limits vis-à-vis a totalitarian superpower like the USSR. It might have an effect on the Eastern European peoples democracies, but it would not fundamentally affect the USSR itself. One of the effects of détente was that it eroded the spirit of resistance in the West. It was our task to keep this under control, which was very difficult, in the welfare states, particularly with socialist majorities or big minorities. (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1). Birrenbach doubted whether the idea of an open linkage with a constraint of the Russians in other parts of the world would be accepted by the USSR. The SALT agreement would not liberate the United States from new Angolas, Yemens, Zaires and other interventions influenced by the Russians through third countries like Cuba or the GDR. But I may be mistaken. Brezhnev's age and his will to get the SALT agreement approved by the Senate at any cost might induce him to be more cautious this time. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). Arms control was neither defense nor deterrent. Its effectiveness was not proven and was doubtful vis-à-vis a state like the USSR. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). In the Nixon period, the word détente had been abused in an irresponsible way. To speak about creating peace in our generation, as Nixon repeatedly said, undermined the readiness of modern welfare states in Europe and to a certain degree only also of the American nation to draw the consequences from the enormous growth of Soviet military forces and the development of the USSR policy as a new global power. (KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, K100/1). It was doubtful that most European states were ready to increase substantially their conventional forces according to the welfare state thinking and the wrong assessment of the effect of détente. (KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, K100/1). Birrenbach's report was dated 22 February 1978. Birrenbach's report (*Gutachten*) was seventy pages long.

existing windows of vulnerability (e.g. to a USSR counterforce first strike) and facilitate successful negotiations with the USSR (need strong bargaining chips to get concessions, quid pro quo). Due to the massive USSR military build-up (“*Überrüstungspolitik*”) during the 1960s and through the 1970s and the failure of the Western powers/states, most significantly the US but also Europe (Britain, France and FRG), to respond adequately (decline in real terms arms/defense expenditures; détente; since the end of the 1960s through the Carter administration), Birrenbach perceived throughout these later years (e.g. 1977-85) a USSR (East, Warsaw Pact) dangerously superior to the US (the West, NATO, Europe) in a broad range of military power, not merely conventional but now in a fundamental shift from the period 1950-70 also nuclear (strategic) forces.<sup>137</sup>

Like that of certain other Atlanticists, Birrenbach’s perspective was noticeably warped by something of an inferiority complex with respect to the USSR as well as a tendency to

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<sup>137</sup> As of March 1980, Birrenbach believed (and probably disagreed with it) that the US had abandoned after the two Cuba crises its Euro-strategic weapons as a concession to the USSR. As of November 1978, Birrenbach believed that the US and Western Europe were no longer in the same “militant mood” as in the past (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2). As of 1985, Birrenbach saw the USSR having made far higher research expenditures for space defense than the US since the ABM treaty. In later years (e.g. 1980-81), Birrenbach had doubts about the state/weaknesses of the US army and was still very upset about Nixon’s abolishing (or 1975?) of the draft/conscription system and its quantitative and qualitative impact on US military strength and insisted on the need for a US draft, conscription (restructuring) or selective service. As of 1980, Birrenbach saw the US army in a state that was not comparable to that of the Soviet and perhaps the German army (as evidenced in part by the “disaster” of Tabas), citing as reasons “[t]he percentages of illiterates and unemployed” and the lack of qualified pilots and engineers (due to insufficient pay) (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). Among other things, Birrenbach pointed out the halting by the US of the bomber program and some technically high-quality weapons system (I think ABM or at least some defense network) after the conclusion of SALT I. Birrenbach also saw the USSR enjoying geographical advantages. Birrenbach saw this with respect to e.g. ground forces, artillery, tanks, (fighter) bombers, transport planes, strategic power, strategic land-based missiles, inter-continental nuclear weapons, theater war, land-based nuclear weapons, Euro-strategic weapons (even including the French and British weapons), SLBM, IRBM, INF, gray zone, all parts of the triad, tactical-nuclear (nuclear medium range) and intercontinental areas; no effective civilian or air defense; shrinking US navy. Birrenbach saw a “defense gap.” The US had enjoyed a clear traditional superiority in strategic/nuclear weapons. With regard to nuclear forces, Birrenbach saw the USSR build-up taking place since the Cuba crisis. At his June 1978 encounter with Carter, Birrenbach had his judgement of the past three years confirmed when Carter responded to a question from Birrenbach by insisting on the current existence of a balance of power with the USSR in the various military areas.

reduce East-West relations to a narrow exercise in nuclear accountancy.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, Birrenbach proposed a broad increase in US military strength (rearmament, buildup), including support for the timely production and deployment of a range of controversial weapons systems, including the neutron bomb, Euro-Strategic weapons (NATO Council double-track rearmament resolution of December 1979; scheduled for 1983) and at least in principle SDI; and in practice opposed actual arms control negotiations and agreements (e.g. SALT I and II, MBFR) as well as the various proposals for the unilateral Western nuclear weapons renunciation, disarmament or freezes or the complete denuclearization of the FRG/Europe.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Birrenbach continued to exaggerate the relative Russian strength, technological and productive prowess (e.g. in weapons), experience, strategic/military thought/perspective, quality of leadership (e.g. Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov), skill and toughness (e.g. in negotiations, use of its (nuclear) weapons; skeptical of prospects of Russian generosity in negotiations; Gorbachev). As of June 1979, Birrenbach claimed that the USSR was an “imperial power” (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979). As of August 1977, Birrenbach took account of the US technical superiority in armed forces (including in nuclear weapons) vis-à-vis the USSR but did not believe that new technologies could offset the quantitative advantages of the East, and the USSR was making every effort to catch up in technology. As of July 1980, Birrenbach saw the West ignoring the USSR approach to military power (striving for supremacy, not deterrence) and forgetting the nature of deterrence (must make clear they use their weapons *in extremis*). With respect to nuclear accountancy, Birrenbach was a victim of his own knowledge of and obsession with the minutiae of nuclear strategy/technology. Birrenbach’s inferiority complex led him to overestimate this adversary in material and non-material respects in comparison to the US and the West.

<sup>139</sup> Birrenbach also supported, for instance, the American strengthening of the conventional potential (e.g. tanks), the improvement of the entire American triad, the mobile MX missile, inter-continental ground missiles, the resumption of Minuteman III production, Trident, B-1 bomber; strategic weapons; re-introduction of the draft system in the US that had been abandoned by Nixon; improving current weapons (e.g. weapons research and modernization/technology); and the maintenance of the ABM system. The flip side of this was that Birrenbach was aggravated by any unilateral delays, wavering or cancellations of such weapons (unilateral disarmament; abandonment of the ABM system; concessions to the USSR without USSR concessions, especially under the Carter administration (e.g. B-1 bomber, neutron bomb, mobile MX and Trident submarines (Congress delaying significant budget appropriations here for the MX, apparently under both Carter and Reagan); appear to have been difficulties in producing the MX and B-1 under Reagan but I am not sure whose fault); delays reflected the poor judgement of the US technical military complex of the situation). In Birrenbach’s final years, Reagan’s SDI program/idea (defense in space) became an important issue in German-American relations, and Birrenbach seems to have given a general support (had not rejected it; Europeans should seriously examine the US planning) and believed it might display some advantages and achieve certain goals (e.g. defend the US and Europe from USSR aggression), though he never seems to have come to a final definitive view of SDI (cautious; regarding European participation), given the long-range nature of the complete project (at least ten years) and unknowns such as its chances of acceptance and realization and its final effect/result and given the need that it fulfill certain conditions and avoid certain dangers (not permit the USSR to undermine the Western defense in Europe; still possibly reject SDI). With regard to the double-track resolution, though Birrenbach ostensibly

As of 1977-86, while Birrenbach remained concerned about an overwhelming or limited USSR military aggression against Western Europe, he continued to fear as even more likely a bandwagoning Finlandization of a weak, frightened Western Europe.<sup>140</sup> The USSR could impose its will through diplomatic pressure on a vulnerable, demoralized Western Europe (declining spirit of resistance; undermine its independence), undermine the trans-Atlantic partnership and ultimately bring about a decoupling of the trans-Atlantic alliance.<sup>141</sup> Birrenbach already claimed to detect symptoms with respect to France and Britain and in the Federal Republic under Chancellor Schmidt, even detecting “Rapallo” tendencies in the FRG as of 1979. Citing Dean Acheson’s earlier reference to Birrenbach to the possibility of Europe embarking on “a mad race towards Moscow,” Birrenbach insisted that “Already many groups in Europe sit at the starting blocks

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supported simultaneous negotiations, he always assumed that a US-USSR agreement on the zero option was unrealizable. As of July 1985, the FRG, Britain, Italy and Belgium had successfully stationed the Pershing II and cruise missiles. The Euro-strategic weapons included TNF, INF, Pershing II, cruise missiles, intermediate-range rockets, gray-zone weapons, and medium-range ballistic nuclear missiles. The NATO Council double-track resolution of December 1979 called for the deployment of US/Western Euro-strategic weapons in the Federal Republic and several other important European states/nations in 1983 if the Geneva TNF negotiations failed and seems to have been an effort at modernization. Birrenbach also opposed the Nitze-Kvitsinsky compromise of July 1982 and I guess also START, INF, TNF, and gray zone negotiations and agreements. As of June 1979, Birrenbach was urging the US to build the B-1 bomber in secret even if it violated the SALT II treaty (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979). The MBFR negotiations aimed at the reduction of conventional troops. SALT II dealt with strategic nuclear weapons. Birrenbach argued that SALT II needed amendments.

<sup>140</sup> For Birrenbach, force relationships (military balance; universal power balance system, including the nuclear balance) lay at the basis of and influenced international politics and diplomacy. Birrenbach saw a close relationship between the military balance (force relationships; power balance) and the prospects for Finlandization. As of November 1977-April 1978, Birrenbach was shocked that some US representatives could argue that a worsening of the strategic nuclear balance would have no negative international political or diplomatic impact (he rejected this view). He pointed to the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuba crisis of 1962 and the Mideast crisis of 1973. In the first two, the US had relied on and used its strategic nuclear superiority (and in the second in the war zone) to achieve successes. In 1973, the military balance in the war zone and the strategic nuclear balance were more balanced and therefore there came about a compromise.

<sup>141</sup> As of April 1980, Birrenbach feared the East would “cream off [*absahnen*] the European cake because none stands anymore” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980). Birrenbach saw the USSR operating with a combination of threat and sham concessions. In a meeting of the NATO Council last week, Birrenbach had observed that the Turkish-Greek conflict had not yet been overcome. (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2).

[*Startlöchern*].”<sup>142</sup> For Birrenbach, this represented part of a larger loss of credibility of and confidence in the United States and its policy in the world, a process occurring not just in Europe, but also among American allies in Asia (e.g. Japan) and the Middle East (e.g. Arab countries) as well as in the East bloc.<sup>143</sup> He continued to the end to cite German history in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in opposing a “dangerous [*gemeingefährlich*]” operating of a neutralist FRG between the two fronts. Indeed, as part of his efforts during this period and as late as December 1985, as part of his efforts to soothe such concerns within the Western alliance and among his own foreign contacts, Birrenbach denied any such German ambitions and objected to any German policies or actions that stoked such fears.<sup>144</sup> While Birrenbach remained interested in a solution of the German question/problem, he continued to insist also here on the need for a

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<sup>142</sup> KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980. “The wild race has not yet begun. But I see symptoms that some countries are looking now for the start blocks.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 19 February 1979). During a stay of two days in Paris, Birrenbach had had the chance, to speak with numerous French personalities, who almost all cautiously asked Birrenbach, what the actual goal of the German *Politik* in the framework of the mediation [*Vermittlung*] between the USSR and USA was. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, personal, 4 February 1982, K033/1).

<sup>143</sup> In later years, Birrenbach offered contradictory images of the Europeans, sometimes as fearful of but also sometimes as distressingly oblivious to the changes in the military balance (e.g. KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 15 October 1979, K098/2). In later years at least, Birrenbach seems to have sensed a general loss of US credibility in the world. As of September 1985, Birrenbach complained that in the Middle East the US had since several years lost the faith of the war-waging powers that they really seriously meant it in the carrying out of their policy. As of September 1985, Birrenbach complained that the Israeli population began (after the US withdrew its armed forces from Lebanon in March 1984) to doubt the seriousness of US military intervention in its favor. The Israeli citizens doubted the seriousness of the US effort to achieve a constructive solution of the Palestine conflict including the protection of Israel. (KB Middle East Paper, 6 September 1985). As of April 1980, Birrenbach saw the US economic development alone creating doubts all over the world which also had consequences for the US international security relations. (KB to Ball, 9 April 1980). As of April 1981, Birrenbach believed that the way the US had handled the fate of the Shah had further contributed to the reluctant attitude of the rulers of the Arabian states.

<sup>144</sup> Examples of such disturbing visits, agreements or policies included the economic agreement of 6 May 1978 as a special agreement with the USSR and its treatment in the *Bundesrat*; as of July 1978, agreement to the Brezhnev visit to Bonn; as of January 1982, Schmidt’s visit to the Werbellinsee and to Güstrow shortly before the imposition of martial law in Poland; as of July 1978, German Africa policy with regard to the conflicts on the basis of the USSR-Cuban interventions in the region on the Horn of Africa up to the South.

fundamental policy of solidarity with the US and the Atlantic/Western alliance

(“reinsurance” in the East required insurance in the West).<sup>145</sup>

On the other hand, Birrenbach also demonstrated a greater openness towards the East in some respects. During this period (1980-85; in later years), while vocally disapproving of it, Birrenbach was at times almost understanding of and sympathetic to and explaining what he considered legitimate excuses/influences to his US contacts for an FRG (West Europeans’; also of the Social-Liberal government) Finlandizing tendencies/policies (e.g. unique elements of the German situation; endangered/vulnerable to USSR military aggression (especially in anomalous West Berlin), division of Germany, most exposed/endangered/vulnerable geographic situation near the border with the area dominated by the Warsaw Pact (East Bloc; East-West demarcation line), different Europe/FRG circumstances, situation, limits and geopolitical situation compared to the US, the need to maintain contact between the FRG and GDR (e.g. through visitors, which could be reduced by raising the minimum entry charge to the GDR; human rights policy); claimed as of June 1979-April 1980 that the FRG government could not afford to irritate the USSR in an isolated way.<sup>146</sup> As part of this, Birrenbach seems to have gained

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<sup>145</sup> As of April 1980, Birrenbach argued (in agreement with Strauß and Birrenbach’s party) that the security and liberty of the FRG and Europe had priority in moments of danger over other interests. (KB to Ball, 9 April 1980). As of 1977, Birrenbach saw the FRG’s scope [*Spielraum*] for substantial concessions to the USSR as very low (foreign policy considerations). As of April 1986, Birrenbach had repeatedly warned Kohl about Genscher’s policy, which he saw as operating between the fronts (KB to Kohl, 3 April 1986). Birrenbach believed that operating between the fronts was not sustainable for a Germany acceptable in the world (KB to Kohl, 27 May 1986). As of August 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski had spoken of a German “self-Finlandization.”

<sup>146</sup> It was dangerous to operate between the fronts in spite of the clear commitment of Schmidt to NATO and German friendship towards the US. Germany was in a different position than other countries, including the US. It had been divided by the last world war. Birrenbach had never fully accepted the *Ostpolitik* because it was not based on equivalent contributions from both sides. One of the greatest achievements of the *Ostpolitik* had been a mutual contact between the two parts of the German nation. Also, the Federal Republic was geographically situated on the limit of the Eastern hemisphere over a thousand kilometers and thus was more endangered than any other country in Europe and the world. Also, the Federal Republic developed substantial trade with the GDR which at the same time meant a bridge

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between the two countries which was not comparable with the situation of any other Western country. The USSR which had always had a superiority in conventional weapons had acquired a clear superiority in Euro-strategic weapons, perhaps also in tactical nukes. Berlin was situated in the midst of the GDR and was therefore enormously endangered. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2). The FRG may (or may not) have been a host nation (the only one?) for missiles in the Kennedy period, in which case there would have been a significant change with the 1980s. The Federal Republic had special interests in the GDR and therefore détente. In the Federal Republic, there were no sympathies for the East, but people in the GDR were also Germans, in spite of all the treaties, and there was an understandable wish of the German population to create more intimate relations with their relatives and friends in the GDR. In the long run, they wanted to hold open the option for a settlement with the GDR but this was far away and impossible without a previous arrangement between the US and USSR. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 1979, K153/1). The Federal Republic was vulnerable due to the division of our country and 1,000 km of frontier with the Eastern bloc. The risk of not fulfilling written agreements with the USSR was a dangerous question for the Federal Republic. Almost 80 or 90 percent of our imports from the USSR consisted of fuel or raw materials that we could not get in other countries. Therefore, they were interested for political and economic reasons in maintaining a trade contact with the USSR. Certain contact with the USSR should be kept open. The division of Germany made the Federal Republic very sensitive vis-à-vis the East. But we cannot take recourse to reinsurance in the East without having clear insurance in the West. This insurance could only come from the US. (KB to Haig, 23 July 1980, K146/2). The social-liberal coalition had invested much in the so-called Eastern Treaties and did not want to sacrifice the minor concessions they got. The negotiations in the framework of the *Ostpolitik* had not stressed enough the idea of a *modus vivendi*. Therefore the treaties were unclear and gave the other side the possibility of different interpretations of the treaties. This made the Federal Republic vulnerable. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). Schmidt was a genuine Atlanticist who saw the limits of détente but also considered the risks Germany would run in a conflict with the USSR. We were located on the demarcation line but we had created certain contacts, meager, with the GDR. He did not want to provoke Russian aggression when the military superiority of the USSR was a generally confirmed risk. We had to think of the exposed situation of Berlin. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). Schmidt did not perhaps sufficiently stress the possibilities to influence the USSR to a certain degree in the economic field. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1). The maintenance of a stable relationship with the East to maintain contact with the 16 million Germans in the GDR and military vulnerability were legitimate interests of the Federal Republic but, as Strauß and Birrenbach's party said, the security and liberty of the Federal Republic and Europe had in moments of danger priority over other interests. We have to see both problems in conducting our policies. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1). In regard to Afghanistan, the Federal Republic defended today for one the results of its *Ostpolitik* and on the other hand also the advantage which had accrued to the Federal Republic from the *Osthandelspolitik*. The Federal Republic did not want to give that up especially as the Federal Republic was the most vulnerable country of Europe. In so far, the interest situation of the Federal Republic was not completely identical with that of America. However, it was clear to all reasonable people that any détente, limited as it was, which was grudgingly admitted by some forces, depended on the security of the Federal Republic, which only the US could guarantee. However, since this guarantee was less convincing today, German foreign policy did not coincide completely with the American one, although the Federal Republic had full understanding for American leadership in the alliance, in case and in so far as it was exercised in convincing form. This had not been the case in recent years. The Federal Republic would not strive for a neutrality course, which would be a catastrophe. The times of the Reinsurance Treaty or Rapallo were no longer given. This was not the general German opinion. But the Federal Republic tried to hold on to the achieved advantages of the *Ostpolitik* which had been so dearly bought and for instance in the question of the Euro-strategic weapons did not want to be so clearly alone exposed. Therefore, the Federal Republic operated in the military nuclear area very cautiously. The attempt to maintain the détente condition directly with the USSR did not mean a falling back into a neutrality policy for which there was no basis in the Federal Republic. (KB *Aktennotiz*, 16 June 1980, K134/1). It was the desire to avoid irritating the USSR that led Birrenbach to reject an isolated German-American venture on the European continent by deploying as the only continental (non-nuclear) host power/state/nation the new Euro-strategic weapons on FRG soil (NATO Double-Track Resolution), they could only do it if at least one other European non-nuclear state (or possibly Britain; need Italy; other European countries) did the same.

a greater appreciation of and to defend the value (benefits, interests) to the FRG of the (German initiatives towards the East) *Ostpolitik* (*Ostverträge*, détente, *Deutschlandpolitik*) with the Warsaw Pact states in later years (need to maintain a certain stable relationship/contact with the USSR/East; political and economic reasons for maintaining trade contact with the USSR; maintain contact with Germans in the GDR; FRG thus gained certain advantages/concessions from the USSR (“the expensive fruits of the *Ostpolitik*”; as of July 1980 Schmidt’s visit to Moscow) worth preserving and therefore had to fulfill the treaty obligations (vis-à-vis the USSR) imposed on it (e.g. as of July 1980 written agreements with the USSR like the Tikhonov agreement)).<sup>147</sup>

During the early 1980s, including with regard to East Europe, Birrenbach stressed the need for cautious gradualism, believing that overambitious efforts to bring about change were doomed to failure or even to produce serious harmful consequences. Whatever hopes (e.g. they would regain freedom), his respect for the bravery, understanding for their difficult situation, and his professed awareness of Poland’s tragic/sorrowful history (and therefore obligatory connection to its dramatic situation), even the upheaval in Eastern Europe during the early 1980s, particularly Poland, left Birrenbach feeling rather gloomy (disturbed, pessimistic, worried, concerned, problems).<sup>148</sup> On one hand, Birrenbach doubted the prospects for a genuine change and reform in Poland and the other people’s democracies, at least in the short-term.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> At least to Schmidt on Schmidt’s birthday, Birrenbach praised Schmidt’s détente efforts to the extent that they had established an astonishingly good relationship to certain East European states such as Poland and Hungary (I doubt this was sincere). For the “expensive fruits,” see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980. As of July 1980, Birrenbach saw pros and cons with respect to the Tikhonov Agreement.

<sup>148</sup> The events in Poland were going on as of August 1980-March 1983. Birrenbach referred to a “dangerous crisis” and a “terrible tragedy.” There were also events in the GDR as of December 1980.

<sup>149</sup> Birrenbach remarked, “I got the impression that ‘*Solidarnosz*’ has not really understood what it dared to do. Less would have been more.” (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982). Birrenbach doubted that the other Peoples Democracies bordering on Poland would follow the Polish example. Birrenbach believed



Furthermore, Birrenbach feared that the concerned USSR and other fearful Eastern Bloc states (including the GDR) were not ready to permit fundamental changes in the existing governmental and economic systems in Eastern Europe or a blowing up of the artificial states (Birrenbach referred to the possibility of “the whole Eastern bloc in flames”;  
endangering of the internal cohesion of an Eastern state) and would respond to such a dangerous threat with a disastrous repetition (e.g. in Poland) of previous interventions/invasions (e.g. GDR, Hungary, Prague Spring).<sup>150</sup> Therefore, Birrenbach pointed to the dangers of a too rapid FRG *Ostpolitik* (including vis-à-vis the GDR), a too aggressive, overambitious human rights policy, and even a perceived Western

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that even a relatively free Polish regime of tomorrow would at best be like the Hungarian solution/status, though there was no Kádár in Poland (including Walesa). Birrenbach doubted the waning potential effectiveness and strength of the overreaching and unrealistic *Solidarnosz* union, particularly after the declaration of martial law in Poland after 13 December 1981, an event that Birrenbach claimed left him “deeply shaken.”

<sup>150</sup> The development in Poland was astonishing, the dynamism of its *Volk* was admirable. Surprising was the extent to which the large organizations in their actions imposed themselves vis-à-vis the state. There were always groups that were not controllable. The danger for Poland was great that the USSR would finally intervene, since the democratic process in Poland crossed a threshold, which could be hard to stop. Poland faced two difficult obstacles. If via strikes or other fundamental changes of the internal situation, Poland was viewed as a center of infection for the neighboring states by the USSR, this would hardly permit any other possibility than to intervene. Therefore, a moderation in the development of this new Polish *Dynamik* was crucial. Birrenbach referred to the economic situation in Poland. Birrenbach doubted if capitalism in the Polish way was achievable. The transformation of a planned economy into a relatively free economy was an unusually difficult task under the conditions of Poland. Only thus could the problems in industry and agriculture really be solved. Birrenbach wondered if that was possible. A Polish Marshall Plan via the Western powers in the current recession stage could not be financed. It would also not be accepted by the USSR. There was goodwill (in the West) towards Poland, but today the means were lacking. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Zbigniew Rapacki, Paris, K070/1(?), I think this is from the early 1980s, probably 1981). The situation in Poland particularly interested Birrenbach. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2). *Solidarnosz* had made very serious mistakes, passing over the limits in politics which were politically prudent. Walesa was no politician but an idealist. If Poland would become a democratic state, this fact would infect the whole area between the Soviet frontier and the Western demarcation line. Progress in this area was only possible if it was made step by step. (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2). The Polish military regime was violating the Helsinki Act. The question of Poland could be dealt with only in a very cautious way. The moment the USSR would invade Poland, the situation would change fundamentally. (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2). Birrenbach pointed to the danger to the USSR of the possibilities of economic crisis in Poland and the weakening of the Polish party apparatus and the creation of a Polish system, including more freedom, that might be copied by neighboring states/nations. In this, Birrenbach warned against a potential convulsion/catastrophe in Eastern Europe triggered by an encouraging of the hopes there of American support followed by a leaving of the population in the lurch (e.g. Hungary in 1956, GDR on 17 June 1953 and Berlin Wall in 1961). This would result in the loss of any remaining belief in the values of the Western world.

intervention in the Eastern Bloc.<sup>151</sup> Only a very slow, step-by-step development could be successful, involving a constant comparison of the standard of life.<sup>152</sup> As of 1980-81,

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<sup>151</sup> Therefore, Birrenbach seems to have opposed forcing the European nations to impose sanctions regarding Poland (apparently unless the USSR invaded, then more would be possible and necessary, including from Europe). Ultimately, Birrenbach had a mixed, not entirely negative, attitude towards the American human rights campaign. At least in principle, Birrenbach endorsed in later years (e.g. 1978) an active West/US/Carter human rights policy and campaign (“ideological counter-offensive”; in accord with the Helsinki Conference agreements (CSCE); not resignation), practiced on a universal basis, including vis-à-vis the East (totalitarian states). Indeed, Birrenbach stressed the unique interest of a divided Germany in the human rights issue, complained that the human rights policy of the federal government as of 1977 did not go far enough, for instance with respect to criticizing the GDR, and also bemoaned the different measures applied by the West (particularly the Left) to the crimes of right-wing regimes and the repressive systems of the East. As of March 1978, there was a German branch of Amnesty International pushing the human rights effort from the German side. To try to substitute an effective defense, not only deterrent, by a human rights campaign would not work. If the Americans stressed human rights beyond a certain point, the result would be a negative one. All the doors in the East would be closed. The idea of human rights was a good one and a necessary complement to the general defense policy. But it presupposed a very strong West, particularly the US. (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2). The idea of human rights was important and had a visible effect on the population in the Eastern countries, more than perhaps in the USSR, an autocracy since the creation of the principality of Kiev. The introduction of human rights might be the beginning of a long period which one day could have important results if the West remained within the limits we discussed. (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 17 April 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach would never forget the linkage Sen. Jackson tried to reach through the vote of the Senate in SALT I to attach a clause that would permit the larger emigration of Jewish citizens from Russia to Israel (Jackson Amendment). It was clear to Birrenbach that the Russians would never accept this unless it was arranged in very cautious and discrete way. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). If one said that the President had shown his toughness by writing a letter to Sakharov, then Birrenbach answered that the effect of the letter would be further repression in the USSR and not the alleviation of the situation of the dissidents. American history showed two trends in foreign policy: the moralistic one and the pragmatic one. The combination of both would be the right thing. But to concentrate on the moral one alone could have disastrous effects, particularly if the admonitions could not be followed up by deeds. (KB to William R. Tyler, Director, Dumbarton Oaks, Trustees for Harvard University, DC, 24 February 1977, K100/1). Regarding Carter’s championing of human rights, Birrenbach argued that the espousal of human rights was for no country more important than for ours. The question was only what methods one used. According to the mentality of the leadership of a totalitarian state like the USSR, it could lead to the opposite of what one strived for in the West, an effective improvement of the status of the Soviet citizens. It could be viewed as an open snub which only made it more difficult for the Soviet leadership to yield to the Western pressure. In discrete form, the representatives of the US government by their negotiations with the USSR could refer to the importance of human rights and say that without a change of Soviet policy it would be hard to win American public opinion for political and economic agreements with the USSR. (KB to Carstens, President of the German *Bundestag*, 12 May 1977, K151/2). Birrenbach questioned the method and degree of Carter’s human rights campaign, not the matter as such. (KB to Carstens, 19 April 1977, K151/2). In line with this approach, even as Birrenbach stressed the readiness of the FRG and the West to help cautiously in regard to Poland, he also stressed the limited possibilities, sources and means for doing so (e.g. limited credit in the FRG from private banks). Birrenbach laid this out in a letter to Archbishop Glemp a few days ago as of 20 January 1982. Ultimately, at least ostensibly, Birrenbach apparently hoped for and welcomed and highlighted (and claimed to promote that) the FRG and the West to give vocal support and humanitarian aid to Poland and the Polish people (e.g. displays and gestures of sympathy of the people, including demonstrations; reaction by governments; statement of solidarity of the *Union* party with the Polish nation; improve the relationship between the German and Polish peoples; NATO demands about lifting martial law, release of all prisoners and renewed negotiations of the military council with the episcopate and the former leadership of the Solidarity union; social aid, agrarian

Birrenbach pointed to the danger that the USSR and neighboring states might respond to a perceived Western intervention in Poland by an aggressive (military) action in Europe or elsewhere in the world.

As was typical of Atlanticism, this interest in the East led to the creation of relevant meeting functions, aiming to express policies, deal with specific issues and problems, exchange opinions and generate contacts in this direction. In line with the closeness of the FRG contacts with Poland relative to the other countries in the East, the centerpiece of such efforts was the German-Polish Forum, a series of periodic, confidential multi-day conferences held in both the FRG and Poland, meeting for the first time a few months prior to March 1978 and going on at least into 1984. This forum was intended to be creative, cooperative and fruitful and to play a constructive role to the benefit of their two states and peoples. The German and Polish delegations/participants included representatives from government, parliament, politics (of all directions), the Polish embassy (including the ambassador), *Wirtschaft*, trade unions, *Wissenschaft*, press, institutes/academies and the churches. Meetings included speeches and discussions on themes of German-Polish relations, like the border question (a particular Polish concern) and human rights issues. This forum emerged pursuant to the German-Polish Treaty (as of March 1978) as a result of the discussions at summit conferences between the German and Polish leadership and clearly enjoyed some level of official approval. The DGAP Research Institute, including its leader Prof. Kaiser, played a major role in organizing and

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provisions, products and food aid, including from the Christian aid organizations and from German individuals; credit for a partial debt restructuring; in February 1982, Birrenbach suggested to Rostow the halt of all payments as the best measure, together with the grain embargo).

<sup>152</sup> Birrenbach's report of 22 February 1978 had concluded that the USSR was not at all in the situation to make fundamental concessions in regard to the GDR since their entire Central European belt would then collapse sooner or later.

running these conferences, which had steering committees comprised of German and Polish members, and also kept Birrenbach informed about their proceedings and press echo.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Though it had been initially foreseen that the forum would meet alternately in Warsaw and Bonn, the 2<sup>nd</sup> forum had occurred as of 24 November 1978 in Olsztyn (Allenstein; as of March 1978 had been expected to occur in Warsaw). From 13-15 May 1980, the 3<sup>rd</sup> German-Polish Forum (FRG-VRP Forum) was held in Darmstadt. As of July 1984, the next meeting of the German-Polish Forum was foreseen for the end of September in Krakow. German participants (I think in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Forum) included among others: Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser (greeting introduction), *Staatsminister* Dr. Klaus von Dohnányi (MdB); MdB Anton Pfeifer; MdB Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes; MdB Herbert Wehner (Chairman of the SPD *Bundestagsfraktion*); MdEP Dr. Philipp von Bismarck (CDU); MdB Martin Grüner; and MdB Gerhard Jahn. Polish participants included members of government ministries; journalists/editors; members of the Central Committee of the PVAP and other bodies of the PVAP; Deputies of the *Sejm*; personnel of the Polish embassy; the Polish Ambassador in the FRG; the heads of various institutes and academies (e.g. the Rector of the Christian Theological Academy; the Deputy Director of the West Institute); members of the Polish chamber of commerce; members of the departments of the PISM; *Wissenschaftler*; trade unionists (members of the Central Council of the Trade Unions); the director of the state publishing institute PIW; the leader of the central direction of the state archive; and the deputy leader of the foreign department in the Head Council of the Federation of the Socialist Youth Organization. Being confidential, press representatives were permitted for reporting only at the opening and closing meetings. The 3<sup>rd</sup> forum participants received greeting messages from Chancellor Schmidt and from Edward Gierek (Warsaw; 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party). These forums also involved certain public figures in certain events (e.g. dinner at the invitation of Dr. Bernhard Vogel, the Minister-President of *Rheinland-Pfalz* in the *Festsaal* of the *Staatskanzlei*; lunch at the invitation of the Mayor of Darmstadt in the *Orangerie*; dinner at the invitation of Foreign Minister Genscher (MdB) in the Restaurant Burg Frankenstein; dinner at the invitation of the *Kultusminister* of Hesse Hans Krollmann (MdL) in the *Jagdschloss Kranichstein*; lunch in the *Justus-Liebig-Haus*; the conference was held at the Congress Hall of the new *Rathaus* in Darmstadt and the conference secretariat was in the foyer of the Congress Hall). The Polish delegation and the German members of the Steering Committee at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Forum stayed at the *Hotel Weinmichel*, while the German participants got rooms reserved in the *Parkhaus Hotel*. Rapacki did not consider the representatives (German? Polish? both?) in the Poland/Polish Forum (Darmstadt) independent since they were delegated by the government. The DGAP Research Institute drew up programs for these forums. Kaiser was a member of the German-Polish Forum in Darmstadt, functioned as Chairman of the first meeting of the German-Polish Forum, was in contact with Wojna regarding the forum as of July 1984; was as of June 1984 co-chairman of the German group of the Steering Committee or perhaps of the entire Steering Committee. As of July 1980, Dr. Eberhard Schulz (DGAP Research Institute) was the German Secretary of the Steering Committee (of at least the 3<sup>rd</sup> Forum). Schulz kept Birrenbach informed about these forums, sending him reports drawn up by Consul General (aD) Dr. Alfred Blumenfeld about their course and compilations of the press echo. On the Polish side, Ryszard Wojna appears to have been central in organizing these meetings (leader of the Polish delegation at the 3<sup>rd</sup> forum; as of July 1984 in contact with Prof. Kaiser regarding the forum). The German-Polish Forum corresponded to the spirit and letter of the German-Polish (VRP) Treaty of 7 December 1970 about the normalization of relations. Guest speakers at the DGAP included Soviet Amb. Falin (1977 and I believe also earlier; as of June 1979, Birrenbach had also invited Soviet Amb. Semyonov though I don't know if this happened or not). On 9 November 1982, Birrenbach had attended (at the invitation of the CDU; CDU *Bundesgeschäftsführer*) a conference in the *Konrad-Adenauer-Haus* (in the *Großen Saal*; Bonn) on "Two Years Solidarity: How Can We Help?" Taking part in this function were a series of representatives of Solidarity, including the founder and leader of the underground publisher NOWA (Paris), the leader of the radio Solidarity, a representative of the information and coordination office of Solidarity (Bremen) and others (e.g. the leader of the initiative *Hilfe für Polen eV* (Bonn; Michael Lingenthal); CDU General Secretary Federal Minister Dr. Heiner Geißler; Dr.

Another element of all this were the expanding cooperative ties of the DGAP (and also other Western foreign affairs institutes; other Atlanticist organizations?) with the Communist countries in the East, including at the latest by 1974 with the cooperative network of influential (over there) scholarly international affairs institutes that had also grown up there by 1974. During this time (at least up to 1979, presumably beyond), these included good and constructive contacts and work/cooperation, for instance, with the Soviet Union's IMEMO and the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Such cooperation included the staging of a joint DGAP-IMEMO conference on some theme in Fall 1980 in Bonn, the staging with the PIIA of a Polish-German conference in June 1977 to discuss all problems frankly (could this be the German-Polish Forum?), visits of top IMEMO personnel to the DGAP, visits of Germans to the IMEMO for discussions there and participation of DGAP Research Institute personalities in IMEMO colloquia. Meanwhile, around this time, the DGAP was also engaged in general information visits (including for individual conversations) of the personnel of its Research Institute to the East (e.g. USSR) and staged speech functions for prominent Soviet personalities (e.g. influential foreign policy journalists) on information visits to the FRG. This overall process was promoted/facilitated not only by the German Moscow embassy and the Bonn AA, but also by Birrenbach himself, though it appears that he did not (or was not able to) attend or take part himself in such activities.

Nevertheless, in line with this overall trend, in later years, Birrenbach manifested an increasing and explicit interest in the East, particularly a desire to gain some valuable

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Christina Graef, Polish doctor (Frankfurt); Walter Brückmann, Editor-in-Chief, *Deutsches Monatsblatt* (Bonn)). These Solidarity representatives had presented their problems that they currently had in Poland and with which the FRG might be able to help (humanitarian aid, replacement parts, etc.). Birrenbach had been convinced by the arguments and had taken part in the discussion.

and lacking experience and knowledge of life there (including with respect to politics, *Wissenschaft* and *Wirtschaft*) and to meet (make contacts and talk with) leading decision-making personalities (especially in the USSR/Moscow). Though Birrenbach planned a number of unusual and promising (foreign) trips and activities in this regard, health issues precluded any from actually coming to fruition. In his capacity as DGAP President, Birrenbach received several personal invitations from 1979-81 from the director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (IMEMO) in Moscow to be a guest of/at the institute for ten days, a personal visit that would involve giving a speech before the institute to a USSR audience as well as what Birrenbach expected to be difficult meetings (discussions, talks; not least due to his own opinions) on key East-West political, military and economic issues with personalities (*Wissenschaftlern*) based at the institute, with prominent USSR politicians (representatives, functionaries), and (perhaps on the side?) dinners with representatives of foreign embassies and the press.<sup>154</sup> With respect to meeting (making contacts with) key personalities, at least the German embassy mentioned as possibilities

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<sup>154</sup> The director of the IMEMO was Prof. NN Inozemtsev, who was also a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and an advisory member of the Central Committee and an advisor to Brezhnev. As of 1979, Birrenbach maintained substantive relations to one extent or another with the USSR ambassador in Bonn. In later years, Birrenbach may have read the journal *Kontinent*. Birrenbach had read Sakharov's letter to the assembly of the Nobel Prize winners on 26 October 1983 in the Paris Sorbonne in the journal *Kontinent* (Nr. 1/1984). For Birrenbach coming across and sending Rapacki a "quite interesting" article from the journal *Kontinent*, see KB to Rapacki, 6 February 1984, ACDP K070/3. As of 1984, Birrenbach at least at times heard speeches of USSR Politburo members (e.g. Gorbachev) on *Moscow-Rundfunk*. As of 1981, Birrenbach was aware of the reactions in the USSR press to certain things and to certain USSR press conferences. With respect to his planned IMEMO trip, Birrenbach got assistance from the governmental bureaucracy (e.g. the Foreign Ministry (e.g. VLR I Sieger, Eberhard Boenke, Amb. Dr. Friedrich Ruth (AA, Bonn) and *Ministerialdirigenten* Dr. Heinz Dröge), the Economic Ministry (e.g. Dr. Jahnke) and the Defense Ministry) and the European Commission (Brussels; e.g. Hans Beck in the cabinet of Haferkamp, Vice President of the EC Commission), while personalities helpful to Birrenbach at the *Deutschen Bank AG* included Dr. Trouvain and those based in Moscow, and, among those at the BDI, Kurt Steves (Leader of the *Hauptabteilung Außenwirtschaft* of the BDI eV, Cologne). As of April 1981, to put his IMEMO *Vortrag* together, Birrenbach had been in contact personally with eight or nine institutes (including Meissner), both at home and abroad.

even Prime Minister Kosygin, as well as a courtesy visit to a high post in the foreign ministry and meetings with Amb. Falin and Samjatin (at least the latter and possibly both members of the Central Committee) and Arbatov (leader of the America Institute).

Birrenbach's increasing interest in the East in later years (1977-January 1985) also manifested itself in his efforts to improve and overcome differences in FRG-Polish relations. During the early 1980s, Birrenbach himself remained in contact with a series of Polish friends with whom he had been in contact in part for many years close to the Polish church (including directly involved with Zbigniew Rapacki, the Polish representative in Paris). Spurred on by developments in Poland, the insistent Rapacki was a/the principal force in generating the various proposals in this realm, with Birrenbach functioning as a/the central figure in the FRG, examining Rapacki's ideas, making his own proposals, informing Rapacki about progress and obstacles, engaging him in an idea exchange, and serving as an intermediary between Rapacki and German personalities potentially interested in such projects (e.g. contacts, meetings, functions, activities).<sup>155</sup> Birrenbach's most significant such effort was his central role (at least

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<sup>155</sup> As of June 1977, Birrenbach considered Rapacki's idea of forming a non-governmental organization composed of known personalities (Polish dissidents, I believe), invested with moral authority, worth examining (though I believe he also had certain doubts/questions regarding particular elements). Rapacki was close to Cardinal Glemp. One of Birrenbach's main undertakings in this regard was to try to create other contacts in the Federal Republic for Rapacki with various important Germans (e.g. Mertes). As of January-March 1981, Birrenbach was in touch (discussed) with Bismarck (official member of the Steering Committee of the German-Polish Forum), Weizsäcker and Mertes (Chairman of the *Arbeitsgruppe Außenpolitik* of the *Unionsfraktion*; at least certain members of the German *Bundestag*, at least in the *Union*; Birrenbach wanted Mertes to get in touch with the other colleagues in the parliament regarding this) regarding the arrangement of a secret and what Birrenbach considered useful and important German-Polish *Gespräch/meeting* (exchange of views; with an agreed upon program and time) on future FRG-Poland relations for May proposed by Rapacki between him and five of his friends (independent Polish personalities, not delegated by the government) and members of the *Bundestag* (representatives of the CDU; not sure who all would take part but apparently certain important *Union* MdBs, at least Birrenbach and Mertes; Weizsäcker proposed as the German participants Bismarck, Mertes, Birrenbach, Blüm and possibly Pieroth and Stercken; Weizsäcker himself could not take part; Bismarck did not want to participate since he did not want to play a double role, an official one and an unofficial one, but did wish to coordinate his opinions with those of Birrenbach and Mertes and to this end wanted to occasionally meet with Rapacki in Paris) and the securing of the requisite and intentionally non-official financing in the FRG (for the trips

1982-around January 1985) in plans to organize a German “Poland Committee.”<sup>156</sup>

While considerable uncertainty persisted over the years regarding the exact goals, functioning, activities, financing and infrastructure of this group, it aspired to be an action committee (*Aktionskreis*) consisting of about twenty-five high-quality, prominent, non-state German members enjoying a certain connection to Poland and representing the various realms of public life.<sup>157</sup> Functioning in close cooperation with larger West European governmental and non-governmental efforts, the institution would have sought to improve relations with Poland, including by creating and strengthening contacts and dialogue (e.g. political, humanitarian) with all Poles inside and outside of Poland and providing urgently needed charitable aid to Poland.<sup>158</sup>

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and two-day stay costs of the Polish participants in the FRG). As of March 1982, Hillenbrand had promised Birrenbach a colloquium on the problem of Poland (I guess AI).

<sup>156</sup> This was the *Deutsche Vereinigung zur Aussöhnung mit Polen*. Together with Birrenbach, it appears that MdEP Dr. Philipp von Bismarck and MdB Dr. Hans Stercken were especially central/energetic in discussing, shaping and attempting to realize this idea (get the group functioning and organized), about which these three had a first and thorough discussion/meeting in Bonn (I believe in the *Haus Tulpenfeld* of the *Bundestag*) on 12 July 1982 (including a decision about goals, number of members and groups to be addressed). It was expected that in September 1982, the three would meet again in Bonn or Düsseldorf to deal with their experiences to that point. As chairman, Birrenbach would summon meetings of the German group to discuss the implementation in-depth (to consider ideas and deal with problems).

<sup>157</sup> These realms included the *Politik* (each of the three major political parties, including CSU and FDP); the *Wirtschaft* (e.g. industry and firms, including those carrying out foreign trade with Poland in the higher sense); the *Wissenschaft*; the trade unions; the press, publicists/journalists; the churches, both the Protestant and Catholic; and cultural life.

<sup>158</sup> The personalities in this action committee were to be proposed by their respective organizations. The committee, including Birrenbach, identified, considered, proposed, spoke with, addressed, agreed on, expressed doubt about, chose and appointed (offered membership to) the (suitable potential) members. As part of these efforts with respect to the German group composition, Birrenbach engaged in difficult talks with the *Wirtschaft* to find another suitable representative. As of October-November 1984, the composition of the German group had originally had Birrenbach (chairman); the Church represented by Prelate Wilhelm Schätzler (Secretary/Office of the German Bishops' Conference, Bonn), *Oberkirchenrat* Uwe-Peter Heidingsfeld (Leader of the *Hauptabteilung* III of the *Kirchenamtes* of the EKD, Frankfurt), Clemens Prinz von Croy (Odenthal; since 25 years President/leader of their Malteser Aid Service (Order) and had proven himself in the area (transport) of the Catholic Church's help (relief supplies) for Poland (at least from Essen to Poland)); the parties represented by (CDU/CSU) former MdB Birrenbach (at least initially in place of Bismarck; as a member of his party), MdEP Dr Philipp von Bismarck (Oberholz; had difficulties with his organization and therefore would take part in the group but at first not publicly), MdB Dr. Hans Stercken (Bonn), (SPD) Federal Minister (aD) Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski (MdB; SPD Vice President), Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser (Director of the DGAP Research Institute), and (FDP) Federal Minister (aD) Josef Ertl (MdB; former Federal Agriculture (*Ernährung*) Minister); the *Wirtschaft* represented by Dr. hc Berthold Beitz (Chairman of the AR of the *Fried. Krupp GmbH*, Essen; Chairman of the *Kuratorium* of the *Alfried Krupp*



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von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, Essen; chief of the house Krupp; close connections with Poland since the war and one of the best Poland experts), with Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (*Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Düsseldorf; personality from the banking world; very well-versed *Osthändler*) being especially considered (he had shown much interest). Birrenbach also planned to propose (at the suggestion of Stercken) for the CSU the President of the Catholic *Kirchentages* Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (Munich; Bavarian *Kultusminister*; Chairman of the Central Committee of the German Catholics, Bonn). As of October 1982, the German group would consist of at most 20-25 members from all areas (including Prof. Dr. phil. Georg Strobel), with the core group consisting of Dr. Philipp von Bismarck (MdB; thought exactly like Birrenbach and Rapacki), Dr. Hans Stercken (MdB) and Birrenbach. As of October 1982, the group had proposed Prelate Binder or Prelate Bocklet to represent the Catholic Church. As of August 1984, one of Birrenbach's major difficulties was in finding a personality from the CSU (MdB) suitable to the demands of the task. After the experiences of the last year, Birrenbach had become very careful because the political diction of many CSU MdBs on the *Ostpolitik* could be extremely disruptive to the German-Polish relationship. He had still not found anybody who was politically experienced and diplomatically schooled who could represent the CSU in this group. As of July 1984, there were also difficulties in finding additional suitable personalities in the *Wirtschaft* corresponding to the weight of Beitz. Both Croy and Schätzler had been active for years in the question of aid for Poland and both had been proposed to Birrenbach by Bishop Hengsbach. As of 6 February 1984, Birrenbach had also considered for membership the former Foreign Minister and Federal President Walter Scheel (FDP), the former Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU; no connection to Poland), the former Defense Minister Leber (SPD), Jahn or State Minister (aD) Corterier (both SPD; Corterier was in the DGAP *Präsidium* from 1981-82), and Prof. Rhode (Mainz; the best Poland expert among the *Wissenschaftlern* in Germany). As of June-July 1984, Bishop Lohse (the Chairman of the EKD; who had apparently traveled repeatedly to Warsaw, at least once with Heidingsfeld) and the Prelate Binder (*Bevollmächtigter* of the Council at the seat of the FRG in Bonn) had been consulted by Bismarck with respect to desired proposals for representation from the Protestant Church (EKD). Birrenbach was particularly active in addressing the (searching for; asking) representatives of the *Wirtschaft*, in particular Berthold Beitz, while Stercken addressed the appropriate politicians of all *Fraktionen* and Bismarck addressed certain organizational personalities (MdB Dr. Otfried Hennig as chairman of the *Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen* and Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser (DGAP)). As of July 1982, the proposed members included *Politiker* (Dr. A. Mertes; *Bundestag* Vice President Frau A. Renger; Georg Leber; Gerhard Reddemann (Birrenbach wondered if he was competent enough in this area); Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker; Norbert Blüm; Leber; Dr. Marx; Peter von der Heydt; and if need be an appropriate representative of the *FDP-Bundestagsfraktion*); publicists (proposed: Marion Gräfin Dönhoff; Jürgen Wahl (whom Birrenbach did not know)); Churches (proposed: Prelate Binder, Prelate Bocklet; Birrenbach did not know either of these two; Birrenbach would have proposed Hengsbach); *Wirtschaftler* (proposed: Berthold Beitz); Trade Unionists (proposed: Sperner; Birrenbach did not know him) and *Wissenschaftler* (proposed: Prof. Strobel, Darmstadt; Prof. Schnur (Birrenbach did not know him), Tübingen; Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, Bonn, Leader of the DGAP Research Institute) and MdB Dr. Otfried Hennig (as chairman of the *Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen*). (Except where noted, Birrenbach agreed with those proposed). As of July 1984, Birrenbach found the interest of the *Bundestag* and the *Wirtschaft* quite low (limited to relatively few people). As of 21 October 1982, Birrenbach expressed agreement but also doubt regarding some of the personalities proposed for the committee with regard to whether some were competent enough in this area and others whom he simply did not know. As of October 1982, Birrenbach would also have proposed Bishop Hengsbach (the Church's contact man to Archbishop Glemp) and recommended including Kurt Steves (the leader of the BDI's *Hauptabteilung Außenwirtschaft und Integration*) in the group. As of July 1982, Stercken wanted to include the presidents of the large economic organizations in this committee as well (BDI, BDA, *Zentralverband des deutschen Handwerks*, and the *Bauernverband*). As of July 1984, Schätzler was in contact/talks with their Polish partners with respect to the project. As part of the aid to Poland, the group aimed to promote the transfer of technology as a precondition for the strengthening of *mittelständischer* structures and to provide aid (e.g. production means) to the benefit of the undersupplied population in private agriculture and private *Handwerk* in Poland (rehabilitation of these two especially suffering economic branches to prevent a further aggravation of the situation in Poland). Possibilities for the financing of the group (work) were the Catholic Church and/or the federal government. Such financing would provide for an office and the executive organ working there. In 1982, as part of his efforts to

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examine ideas/ways to significantly aid Poland, including by making the Polish *Wirtschaft* somewhat productive without requiring visible, not justifiable means in the West (costing us nothing) and therefore being in our interest and in the interest of the German creditor of credits to Poland, Birrenbach wondered and as of November 1982 was in contact with the AA and Dr. Hansjörg Häfele (MdB; Parliamentary State Secretary by the Federal Minister of Finance) to see if they could examine whether the lacking replacement parts in Poland for machines of German firms possibly could be supplied (limited sum in the whole and temporally) on the basis of a tax arrangement which made the value of the necessary replacement parts tax-deductible. Perhaps there was a public relations angle to this whole thing since the action would be presented to the public (or was this simply in order to raise funds/goods?) and, in general, Birrenbach sought to present the Germans to his foreign contacts (i.e. Rapacki) as sympathetic to the fate of Poland. As of March 1983, while admitting this was only a low consolation, Birrenbach pointed to the masses of packages sent from Germany to Poland as evidence for and to convince Rapacki of the large sympathy in Germany today for the fate of Poland. This larger context/framework/process within which the group would closely cooperate (contact, partnership, coordination) included the larger joint efforts of the West European governments (including the federal government), the EEC, the highly qualified active counterpart/parallel groups (e.g. the French group in Paris, in existence as of February 1984), Polish representatives independent of the Polish government (Rapacki?; the Polish side), the churches in both countries (including the Catholic Church in the FRG, perhaps elsewhere as well; the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the EC), a "kirchlichen" foundation created in Western Europe and a partner foundation created in Poland specifically for this context (execution of government, private and church aid program in the West; administrative basis; Polish-German-French charity policy). Z. Rapacki had brought about the connection with the French sister group. It is not surprising that France had a group since France was particularly interested in Poland. It was expected there would be a common German-French platform. The French group included personalities like Maurice Schumann (RPR), François Poncet (UDF) and Jean-François Deniau (UDF) (as of February 1984, Couve de Murville and Kosciusko-Morizet may have represented the RPR). As of July 1984, it appears that Birrenbach had met with the French group and was considering meeting with it again to show them that they took the aid for Poland seriously. As of July 1984, Birrenbach claimed that the French group had asked him repeatedly to discussions in Paris in the past months. It appears that the Polish church had especially suggested (to whom exactly?) this form and ultimate destination of aid. The foundation in Western Europe was created by (but not legally dependent on) the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the EC (association according to Belgian law in Brussels), while the foundation in Poland was created by the Polish Church/episcopate (passage of the foundation law in Poland by the *Sejm*). The existence of these foundations would enable tax-free donations of the church, population and industry to pass through as aid/shipments/relief/supplies (e.g. food and similar goods) to Poland where they would be received and "neutralized" (so that they were not credited to the Polish government; not go directly from government to government) and passed on to the Polish population in private agriculture and *Handwerk*/industry. To Birrenbach's apparent approval, the substantial financing of the goods/project/program (as of February 1984 a project running potentially into the billions over five years) should be through contributions from the private side, the Church (including the German Bishops' Conference; Catholic Church; churches in the various countries, presupposing the formation of a committee), the Federal Government, later other Western governments/states (e.g. France), the EC and possibly the US. In the FRG, there was as of February 1984 a pilot project (but only a pilot project) for the aid to Poland of about DM 20 million. During 1982-84, in his capacity as foreseen chairman, Birrenbach cooperated (consulted; in contact with; discussions/negotiations) in these activities with other personalities in the FRG, including the (Catholic) church (at least Dr. Franz Hengsbach (Bishop of Essen) (e.g. about the Poland Group, including whom Hengsbach would consider appropriate (recommend) from the Catholic Church, including perhaps Hengsbach himself, and about means to secure the financing and assessment of and informing about the situation and advice regarding favorable scheduling of a first group meeting/discussions and assessment of the prospects of success of the overall group proposal)) and the government/state/AA (representatives of the federal government; official political side; at least the responsible Amb. (aD) Per Fischer (AA) who had as one of his most important tasks the treatment of the Poland aid (about the Poland Group to inform him about the developments regarding putting this group together; got assessment of and informing about the relevant overall/larger/political situation/project and advice on and assessment of the prospects of success of the overall group proposal and suitable scheduling of first group meeting; about possible financing of the project/group)) and also kept the

Though Birrenbach accepted these invitations, he ended up postponing/cancelling each of them and the planned trips (flight) to Moscow never happened. Health problems (e.g. heart issues, laryngitis) go a long way towards explaining this.<sup>159</sup> However,

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foreseen members of the proposed group informed (in contact with) about progress/details with respect to organizing the German group (e.g. at least consulted them and perhaps got their approval regarding when first summon group and start plan; circulated proposals/drafts (by whom?; at least some by Birrenbach himself) regarding group composition and formation and seeking to put together the draft of a text/statement regarding the group's work (draft I believe by Birrenbach and passed around for opinions and change proposals; to be voted on)), thus bringing about by December 1984 something of a German network with respect to Poland made up of these personalities and formed by Birrenbach (including also Rapacki; e.g. Birrenbach passed on information regarding Poland (analyses by others) to them). As of July 1984, Bishop Hengsbach had communicated to the Polish Church the efforts of the German group. As of about July 1984, Birrenbach claimed that his efforts since a year regarding a German Committee had been at the stimulus of Hengsbach. Hengsbach was of considerable importance to this endeavor since he was very interested in their matter and was the Church's contact man to Archbishop/Cardinal Glemp (relevant discussions during Hengsbach's trips to Poland and during Glemp's visits to the FRG). Hengsbach also attempted to bring about a contact between Birrenbach and Glemp by inviting Birrenbach to visit Glemp during his visit to the FRG (I think in late July 1984) though Birrenbach was sick and could not make it. As of July 1982, Stercken was in contact with Prelate Dr. Homeyer (Secretary of the Catholic Bishops' Conference) about the committee. Homeyer welcomed such an idea since the German Catholic Church sought to promote aid actions vis-à-vis Poland on the basis of an as plural as possible representative circle. However, Homeyer wanted a decision on this question (committee or overall aid efforts to Poland) to be postponed until more information had been gotten from sources in Rome and Poland in the next weeks. In March 1982, following up on their discussion in Liesen's *Kasino* a few days prior, Birrenbach sent Dr. Klaus Liesen (Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the *Ruhrgas AG*, Essen) an extremely confidential secret report (looks like "Additional Foreign-Political Information") about the situation in Poland that should be of interest to Liesen. As of November 1984, Birrenbach was receiving reports from Poland (he probably means Rapacki) and was passing them on to his German contacts interested in Poland (I think primarily those in the prospective German "Poland group").

<sup>159</sup> Health reasons were not solely responsible for this. In 1980, Afghanistan was at least part of the cause of his cancellation. Birrenbach also cited other international circumstances/issues that would have also made his trip difficult during this period (e.g. Poland crisis as of 1981), particularly given Birrenbach's acknowledged frankness regarding his concerns, though I am not sure if these actually contributed to the cancellations. Birrenbach also postponed his Moscow trip in 1980 due to the change in German ambassadors, which left only a *chargé d'affaires* there for an interim period (including during the period 1-10 October when Birrenbach would have come; no more Amb. Dr. Hans-Georg Wieck; the German ambassador would also have been away during the 1981 trip, something Birrenbach preferred would not have been the case (want a constant opinion exchange on that day's events), though I am not sure if this played any role in the cancellation). The personnel of the German Moscow embassy (including Amb. Wieck and then Amb. Dr. Andreas Meyer-Landrut and *Gesandter* Hermann Huber) and the AA (Bonn; Birrenbach claimed the Foreign Minister himself approved of the trip; e.g. VLR I Sieger and Eberhard Boenke, Amb. Dr. Friedrich Ruth (AA, Bonn) and *Ministerialdirigent* Dr. Heinz Dröge) apparently welcomed Birrenbach's planned trip and played a very valuable intermediary and advisory role in supporting and helping organize it, including with respect to the conditions in the USSR, providing valuable informational and analytic materials, easing the paperwork/formalities for entry into the USSR, transportation within the USSR (pickup from airport), arranging embassy functions for Birrenbach (e.g. dinner), perhaps substantive suggestions, communicating with and making requests to the IMEMO (e.g. regarding contacts) and arranging meetings/contacts with appropriate German and Soviet personalities and leading embassy *Mitarbeiter*. As of June 1980, Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser (leader of the DGAP Research Institute) had also gotten an invitation. The trips of the two did not need to coincide. Birrenbach would

Birrenbach's declining of these invitations also demonstrates the tensions and difficulties for a German Atlanticist with respect to contacts with (trips to) the East, in particular the difficulties presented by the international situation/atmosphere during this period (need favorable political conditions; East-West relations; in 1981 only if reduction in the Polish crisis/tension) and its potential impact on his trip (e.g. date and speech theme; conversations; little openness with regard to the talk substance and atmosphere; not permit fruitful discussions due to host's iron-clad position; very difficult; difficult debates [*Auseinandersetzungen*]) and the need to demonstrate Western solidarity. It appears that perhaps these conditions (and not just health) played some role in Birrenbach postponing/canceling these planned trips to Moscow. By March 1983, though willing to stay on as an organizer, advisor and member (in the CDU group), Birrenbach had declined the chairmanship (leadership) of the Poland group (project) foreseen for him due to advancing age, poor health and numerous other tasks, all of which sapped him of the necessary energy.<sup>160</sup> However, it appears that after prolonged uncertainty, in part due to external framework obstacles including in the East, this planned German group never came into existence, certainly not with any role for Birrenbach, thus undermining one

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have flown with Lufthansa (with SU 2413 within Russia; with AY 713 back to Germany via Helsinki). Birrenbach wanted to keep this trip confidential (not in press) and did not want it to be "*hochgeputscht*" by any side (something with which Wieck agreed), maybe to keep it secret from the Americans. Birrenbach's Moscow trip would have also included shorter stays elsewhere, namely Leningrad and Zagorsk (the monastery), with Birrenbach wanting to visit historically and culturally interesting points in all three locations. Birrenbach's desire to go on this Moscow trip can be seen by his conscious efforts to avoid any actions, such as offensive publications, that might prevent it from occurring (KB to Uwe Nerlich, SWP, 14 August 1979). As of July 1984, Kaiser planned in September to travel to Warsaw to sound out the situation there.

<sup>160</sup> As of 1984, Birrenbach requested that Hengsbach consider who should replace Birrenbach in the foreseen position in the group. Birrenbach saw his abdication as a disappointing of Hengsbach. Birrenbach was involved in identifying a suitable chairman. By October-November 1984, Birrenbach proposed and wanted to talk to Dr. hc Berthold Beitz (*Fried. Krupp GmbH*, Essen) to get him instead to assume the chairmanship/leadership of the Poland group. Beitz, whom Birrenbach seems to have thought very highly of as of August 1984 (and apparently believed would be able to raise/collect the necessary sums (millions each year), had a decades-long experience and a good reputation in Poland and was known and recognized internationally in the German-Polish area.

prospective element in a permanent German “Poland” network.<sup>161</sup> In any case, Birrenbach’s activities demonstrate that German Atlanticism was clearly wrestling during this period with the proper posture to be assumed towards the East.

### C. Criticism and Concerns Regarding the United States

Little changed in Birrenbach’s overall Atlanticist perspective in later years. He remained to the end a staunch advocate of not merely a stable Atlantic Alliance but also of a more extensive consolidation of the West, including such measures as the establishment of a tight-knit Atlantic Community and a still-unachieved Atlantic Partnership between the United States and a closely united Western Europe.<sup>162</sup> This was

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<sup>161</sup> As of December 1984, it had still not come into being or held its first meeting. As of January 1985, an overall plan had still not been concretized. As of about July 1984, Birrenbach still seems to have seen hopeful prospects for success for this venture, arguing that the fact that the German population had supplied in an outstanding way/extent over the last years the Polish population with food showed that the German population was ready in principle to help Poland in its fatal situation. As of 1984, Birrenbach still saw the situation containing a number of external obstacles inhibiting/postponing the carrying out of the generous plans/work/efforts related to the German Committee that needed to be eliminated (e.g. regrettable incident that created waves in the discussion in public opinion and addressed several problems and that involved the text of a sermon and letter from Cardinal Glemp to Cardinal Höffner; belief of everybody, including the German ministers, that action on our part would be premature; blocking of the EC budget until the end of March 1984 as of February 1984; still open questions requiring agreement/settlement; uncertain whether foundation would be founded in Poland; USSR displeasure vis-à-vis such a project; a changed, more complicated, uncertain and not assessable but not necessarily definitive situation/difficulties/events in Poland to the disadvantage of the project largely due to USSR pressure in the RGW meeting so that the neutralization of supplies was not currently secured; lack of final decisions about the setting up of corresponding institutions in Poland and also in Europe (counterparts to the German group?); unripe political situation; not clarified conditions for the supplies between government, church and foundation in Poland; still need agreement with the Polish government; difficulties in the contact with Poland in Summer 1984; need to clarify open questions of detail; lack of necessary preconditions for founding; contact partners on the Polish side; skepticism in Poland, particularly in the Church, with respect to the plans regarding the Birrenbach/Rapacki/German group as a result of the trip of the high clergy of the other confession to Poland as of May 1984 (German Protestants?); Birrenbach’s health/sickness).

<sup>162</sup> For Birrenbach, notions such as Atlantic Partnership involved mutually beneficial, trusting, extensive, cohesive, rapid, vital trans-Atlantic understanding, relations, connections, cooperation, exchange, consultation, coordination (policy), solidarity, combination of efforts/strength, planning, measures and overcoming all the existing problems between the US and a closely united Western Europe (*Verein* of the Atlantic nations). The common global dialogue (concept, consensus) involved would go far beyond particular limited themes and encompass the political, economic/trade (e.g. agrarian trade; vs. protectionism; sanctions), military/security/defense/strategy, currency, technological/industrial (most explicitly in these years with respect to (conventional) armaments/weapons, SDI) policy realms. The conception of Atlantic Partnership aimed to further the internal cohesion of the alliance by bringing about a common concept, strategy, consensus, perspective, and priorities and thus avoid surprise decisions on a wide variety of fundamental international relations decisions/policies/issues, whether it be with respect to

even as such grand conceptions had become increasingly less common, a fact implicit in Birrenbach's references to himself as an "old Monnetaner."<sup>163</sup> Though cognizant of certain differing interests between the United States and Europe (including the FRG), for instance due to geopolitical factors, Birrenbach continued to view their interests as interwoven and fundamentally identical and their mutual survival as dependent on their cooperation.<sup>164</sup> Though Birrenbach paid lip service to the notion of these two partners functioning as equals, he more than ever stressed the centrality to Europe and the Federal Republic of a militarily, politically and economically powerful and engaged United States as the key power in virtually every aspect of international affairs, regardless of theme or geography. Within the context of Atlantic Partnership, he stressed the significance of this United States exercising a just, wise and strong leadership (authority), a concept that recognized the possibility of US pressure but that also pointed to the crucial importance of compromise and consultation, ensuring that the US take into account the key interests of a dependent Western Europe and Federal Republic and enhance their influence on US policies.<sup>165</sup>

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internal Western affairs (e.g. major Western states, the Western/Atlantic Alliance, intra-West European policy; Atlantic Council) or external affairs such as East-West relations (e.g. trade, especially technology transfer, and negotiations, including arms control like SALT II and ABM Treaty). In later years, Birrenbach believed the larger European nations should take part in the research stage of the SDI plan (as Britain and Germany had just announced as of February 1985). The German Atlanticists hoped there would be a spill-over effect to the European or German *Wirtschaft* and employment through a technological-economic success of the American SDI project in which they participated (either state or non-state participation; including hopefully participation of German firms in the SDI research; SDI involved not just US-FRG negotiations but also purely economic aspects).

<sup>163</sup> Birrenbach admitted in 1975 that the idea of an Atlantic Partnership "unfortunately has never been defined." (KB to Ball, 22 January 1975). In later years, Birrenbach saw Strausz-Hupé as still a supporter of an Atlantic Partnership (as in the past), though this may not have been a very precise characterization. Birrenbach still saw himself supporting and working for Monnet's goals and vision of Europe (e.g. United States of Europe, Atlantic Partnership) and insisted that he was a "Monnet-European" (an "old Monnet loyalist [*Anhänger*]").

<sup>164</sup> KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2. As of 1980, Birrenbach saw US and European interests differing with respect to the Middle East and Iran due to geopolitical reasons.

<sup>165</sup> In later years, Birrenbach saw no European nuclear factor. Birrenbach was critical of various French weapons/military policies/strength (e.g. transformation in the early 1980s into a *Volksarmee* ineffective in

Paradoxically, Birrenbach saw the importance of the trans-Atlantic link enhanced in later years even as he endorsed the trend of German Atlanticism towards a world system perspective, accepting that they now inhabited “a global world.”<sup>166</sup> As previously explained, economic, financial and energy developments had earlier led him to recognize the value of global economic institutions (e.g. OECD) and in some respects the need for cooperation with extra-Atlantic allies, notably Japan.<sup>167</sup> From the mid-1970s on, while factors such as EC expansion probably played a role, the increasing attention Birrenbach devoted to far-flung regions was also the product of developments emerging from the dangerous North-South and interwoven East-West conflicts and potentially impacting critical Atlantic and German political, economic and military interests.<sup>168</sup> Among the most ominous threats, the USSR, traditionally a land power, was extending its direct and indirect influence into vital areas of the Third World, aided by a much-expanded navy and various proxies.<sup>169</sup> Meanwhile, crucial energy and raw material sources found themselves vulnerable in unstable crisis regions like Africa, Southeast Asia and, especially, the Middle East (oil), the latter menaced by the related problems presented by

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modern war; priority to nuclear weapons rather than army; low deterrence effect of the numerically inferior French nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the USSR). Birrenbach continued to stress that Atlantic Partnership could not be a command relationship. As of December 1985, Birrenbach sought a genuine connection with respect to SDI between the US and the FRG along the pattern of Britain to ensure the FRG's influence on the shaping of US strategic conceptions (like Kohl but apparently unlike Genscher; participation of the FRG in decisions about future defense strategy; in a sense to this extent an Anglo-Saxonization of German foreign policy). (KB to Kohl, 19 December 1985).

<sup>166</sup> KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980.

<sup>167</sup> Such cooperation included the consideration of their interests.

<sup>168</sup> Birrenbach followed events in the Middle East/Persian Gulf (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan), Central America (underbelly of the American continent), South America (e.g. Falklands War), Africa (e.g. Rhodesia and Namibia as of 1978, Angola/Horn of Africa, South Africa) and Asia (e.g. Southeast and Southwest Asia). With respect to EC expansion, one can point especially to that towards the Mediterranean.

<sup>169</sup> Admiral Gorshkov led this expanded modern navy, a historical novelty. Birrenbach saw the USSR efforts for instance especially in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; Afghanistan; Cuba; Southeast Asia (e.g. Cambodia); Africa (e.g. South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia); and the Barents Sea. This included USSR political, economic and military power and influence. These proxies included the Cubans, the GDR and liberation movements.

the USSR (invasion of Afghanistan), the Arab-Israeli conflict and the disintegration in the Arab world.<sup>170</sup> The cutting off, by embargo or otherwise, of such sources on which the West depended portended devastating economic and social instability and crisis.<sup>171</sup> While rejecting a geographic expansion of the NATO Treaty, Birrenbach remained true to the notion of Atlantic Partnership in insisting that the European powers (including the FRG), though essentially lacking a military capability in these regions, transcend their continental perspective and assume an expanded role in the world in support of the essential US efforts there to defend their common interests (division of labor).<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> There was uranium in South Africa and oil in Southeast Asia.

<sup>171</sup> As an indication of the importance Birrenbach attached to oil, as of August 1977, Birrenbach considered Saudi Arabia the second or even the most powerful state in the Near East. As of April 1980, Birrenbach feared that aside from any military consequences military measures with respect to the Iran crisis might lead to a complete cutoff of oil from Southwest Asia. It appears that continental Europe was dependent on oil from the Middle East, perhaps Britain was not so dependent. Other sources of imported energy in later years for the FRG/Europe included Russia (natural gas), Canada (uranium) and the US (uranium) as well as coal in part from somewhere. Birrenbach saw this disintegration beginning from Iran (and Iraq and Yemen to Saudi Arabia). The FRG and Japan also depended on these sources.

<sup>172</sup> Birrenbach also called on Japan in this respect. In general, demands for greater European defense contributions were related in part to growing US responsibilities in the Persian Gulf. With respect to a division of labor, Birrenbach pointed to French efforts in Africa, the possibility of Britain contributing to an interim solution in Rhodesia and Namibia via patience and pressure, the major support the FRG was giving Turkey and Pakistan and possibly an increase in the FRG navy to protect the sea lanes that would enable the FRG to import the necessary raw materials in a conflict and possibly an FRG mobilization of reserves to allow the withdrawal of US troops from the Central front (European continent) so that they could be used for instance in an RDF on the Straits of Hormuz (e.g. KB to Rose, 10 February 1981, K074/1). On the other hand, as of August 1977, Birrenbach doubted the *Bundeswehr* could act outside the national space (even stationing functions in the Mediterranean or on the north flank) without inner difficulties. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). As of May 1982, Birrenbach believed that all three powers (Britain, Argentina and the US) plus the EC and perhaps NATO would be losers in the Falklands war (he wanted a solution), with Britain losing sovereignty of the islands, Argentina's economy almost breaking down, while the US would damage its relations with Latin America and perhaps the entire Third World (which would endanger the security of the US "underbelly" and enhance USSR influence). As of April-July 1980, Birrenbach hoped the US would not impose a sea blockade vs. Iran (postpone military action vs. Iran) that would mean a war with Iran and perhaps the USSR (and push Iran into the arms of the USSR) and the death of the hostages without getting the consent thus of the Arabian states around the Gulf. As of April 1978, while claiming to be strongly opposed to and in favor of the elimination of apartheid, Birrenbach's objection to a dangerous and irresponsible rapid transition in South Africa to a "one man one vote" election system (possibly US policy at this point) was based in part on the danger of inviting a Cuban and Russian intervention in the resulting revolt/bloodbath. (KB to Brzezinski, 17 April 1978, K098/2). As of April 1977, Birrenbach saw a "geopolitical retreat of the West" in many regions of the world. (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1). As of August 1980, Birrenbach saw South Africa pursuing "its impossible internal policy of apartheid with an ideological madness which could lead to an explosion in the south of the African continent." (KB to Gerard Smith, 12



For all the importance he attached to them, Birrenbach saw trans-Atlantic (including US-German) relations in a state of deterioration, plagued throughout these later years by internal disputes and crises, encompassing a wide variety of political, economic and security issues, that threatened a drifting apart and even irreparable decoupling of the US and its West European allies.<sup>173</sup> East-West relations constituted a central source of such tensions, particularly the viability and divisibility of *détente*, a theme comprising arms control negotiations, weapons deployment (neutron bomb, TNF), visits of leaders to one another's countries, economic sanctions and the *Osthandel*. With the USSR invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland, the US advocated a harder line towards the East, while the European nations (FRG) sought to preserve *détente*.<sup>174</sup> Other sources included conflicting views on nuclear energy (a specifically US-German dispute during the Carter administration), out-of-area issues in the Third World (response to Iran after the Shah's fall, conduct of the Middle East negotiations), European defense contributions, and SDI. In an effort to clarify what he considered trans-Atlantic misunderstandings, Birrenbach tried to soothe his US contacts' concerns about European and German policy, including, in a departure from his behavior in the early 1960s, those related to the *Osthandel*, most specifically the gas-pipeline deal of the early 1980s (e.g.

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August 1980). As of June 1982, Birrenbach saw "a world which has now become a global problem in a real sense." (KB to McCloy, 23 June 1982). Birrenbach's proposed Middle East (Israel-Palestine) peace plan/settlement comprised of a Western (full US) guarantee and military peace contingents (at least the US, including a treaty ratified by Congress, and possibly the USSR and perhaps other European countries (Britain and France)) to ensure Israeli security for a series of years since the future Israeli frontiers would be less defensible than present ones. As of July 1979, Birrenbach complained about Europe's current condition of "uncertainty [*Unsicherheit*], frustration and disorientation in *weltpolitischer* respect." (SALT Negotiations, Interim Report on the Situation at the End of the Year 1978, by KB, 6 July 1979).

Birrenbach apparently saw this as a foreign policy effort on the part of the European powers.

<sup>173</sup> Birrenbach saw a *Vertrauenskrise* (crisis of confidence). During the Carter administration, there seems to have been tension over that administration's insistence on the "locomotive theory" in economic questions.

<sup>174</sup> As of July 1980, Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow had apparently caused criticism from the US. As of January 1982, Schmidt had received criticism in the US (which Birrenbach disagreed with) for his attitude during Brezhnev's visit.

McCloy).<sup>175</sup> Birrenbach's discouragement with the state of trans-Atlantic relations contrasted with the optimism of some foreign contacts, especially Monnet regarding their overall plans, but was nourished by the gloominess of others, including McCloy, Strausz-Hupé, and Rostow (CPD).<sup>176</sup> Despite lingering hopes and a sense of personal accomplishment, Birrenbach ultimately fell prey to a certain despair, resignation and fatalism about the prospects of realizing his decades-long Atlanticist projects and "dreams."<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> With respect to the *Osthandel*, there was the Tikhonov Agreement (FRG) as of June 1980 and the gas-pipeline deal/project as of July 1980-June 1983.

<sup>176</sup> In later years, Monnet admonished Birrenbach and perhaps even feared Birrenbach had given up hope in their project. Birrenbach sometimes put on a false front of optimism vis-à-vis Monnet. As of November 1978 (to Monnet), Birrenbach claimed that in observing the creation of the European Council, the future election of a parliament on the basis of a universal suffrage and the efforts for the constituting of a monetary zone by d'Estaing and Schmidt that Monnet's Europe had created a self-operating dynamism. Therefore, he hoped that one day Monnet's dream would become reality. (KB to Monnet, 8 November 1978). Birrenbach's pessimism sometimes also drew rebukes from contacts such as Kissinger. (Kissinger to KB, 9 July 1984). The CPD was a manifestation of the stunning pessimism of many American right-wingers during the Carter years, not just regarding the short term but also the overall prospects of the US vis-à-vis the USSR (West on verge of losing the Cold War) even as the USSR neared collapse. Ultimately, Birrenbach can also be counted amongst these right-wing Chicken Littles. This cultural pessimism was not unique to Birrenbach but was an element of a larger crisis of confidence in the West during part of this period. See Brzezinski's speech at the Trilateral Meeting in May 1976, "Trilateral Commission Meets in Ottawa," ACDP K056/2. Birrenbach had the impression, to quote the title of Aron's last book, that they were facing "une Europe en décadence" (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), President, to Prof. Raymond Aron, *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie Historique*, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1). As of February 1979, Birrenbach saw the European states (quoting Raymond Aron) in a condition of "Dekadenz." (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 1 February 1979).

<sup>177</sup> According to Birrenbach, Europe almost did not exist any more, the unity was a very weak one (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2). Indeed, it appears that the vision of Europe as Monnet and Birrenbach shared it never really caught on in Cognac (as Monnet used to say). However, the reality of Europe as Kant, Voltaire and Gibbon perceived it was stronger than ever. This was a sense that Europe was an entity divided into provinces. In September 1984, Birrenbach moaned, "You can see almost nothing of the dreams of Jean Monnet." (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2). As of June 1980, Birrenbach saw a slowing, even a regression, in the *Politik* of European unification (KB *Aktennotiz*, 16 June 1980, K134/1). Birrenbach seems to have viewed Europe in a state of dissolution/disintegration. As of May 1977, Birrenbach acknowledged that Europe had made progress after 1950 politically and economically. A new war between the nations of West Europe was no longer conceivable. (KB to Monnet, 24 May 1977). At least in later years, Birrenbach stressed the long-term nature of the process of European unification, seeing this "dream" as "a secular task" requiring at least twenty years (KB to Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980). Birrenbach continued to see European unification as a secular task. Birrenbach referred to "the European dream."

These disputes exhibited a clash between Atlanticist interests and a greater German assertiveness regarding economic interests, manifested in Birrenbach's own behavior. In contrast to the early 1960s, he conspicuously and reassuringly defended, even in the face of US opposition, the controversial German trade deals of the period in an effort to ensure the export credibility and possibilities of German industry, so crucial to one of the world's principal exporters. These deals included, at least in their aftermath, the German-Brazilian nuclear treaty and the *Osthandel* in general, more specifically the natural gas-pipeline treaty concluded in November 1981 by the Federal Republic and other European nations with the USSR.<sup>178</sup> With respect to the gas-pipeline deal, Birrenbach acknowledged the validity of the concerns, including among US contacts like McCloy, regarding the timing of the treaty's conclusion, the enormous sums of hard currency that would flow to the USSR and which could be used to acquire military and non-military technologies in Europe, the favorable trade and financial conditions afforded the USSR, the potential creation of an energy/trade dependence on the USSR facilitating its political domination/leverage over Western Europe and also promoted an expansion of the COCOM list to prevent the delivery of militarily valuable goods to the USSR, but rejected the notion of imminent dependencies and stressed the essential nature for the

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<sup>178</sup> The German-Brazilian nuclear treaty existed as of April 1977 and involved capital goods. The German-Brazilian agreement and the US effort to impose political conditions became a test case of German faithfulness to contracts [*Vertragstreue*] and the FRG's need to protect the certainty of its ability to supply goods [*Lieferfähigkeit*] as a producer of advanced technologies and could impact on many other areas as well. The other European nations involved in the gas-pipeline treaty included at least France. As of September 1982, Birrenbach argued that it would be extremely difficult for the European states to break the gas-pipeline treaty after it had been concluded (why?). The second embargo against the licensee firms he considered legally inexcusable. (KB *Aktennotiz*, 24 September 1982). The Siberian gas-pipeline treaty/deal/project/agreement (natural gas; Tikhonov Agreement) involved the German and European export of pipes to the USSR and the import of gas energy via pipeline from the USSR.

FRG of many fuel and raw material imports from the USSR.<sup>179</sup> Ultimately, Birrenbach embraced the idea that good business could be good policy.<sup>180</sup> Finally, from late 1982-85, he repeatedly urged Chancellor Kohl to resist the “strangulation” of the competitive, private, unsubsidized German steel firms (industry) within the EC framework caused by the subsidy- and nationalization-policies of the surrounding EC governments to the benefit of their own largely uncompetitive, unprofitable steel industries.<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> Birrenbach argued that the increased resulting dependencies on the USSR in primary energy supply were acceptable (not so dangerous), especially if gas was also gotten from other sides. Birrenbach also downplayed the USSR’s importance as an overall trading partner of the FRG (including when compared to FRG imports from and exports to the competitive countries in the West). As of July 1980, Birrenbach reported the FRG’s trade with the USSR to be only a small percentage (2.3%) of its overall foreign trade and the FRG’s 1979 imports from the USSR as DM 7.4 billion and 1979 exports to the USSR as DM 6.6 billion (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980). As of July 1980, Birrenbach also pointed out to his US contacts that the Tikhonov agreement was the consequence of the agreement of 6 May 1978 and was therefore similar to the US action of eliminating from the US grain embargo the seven million tons that the US had agreed to deliver to the USSR before the crisis in Afghanistan. Although I have no exact evidence, it is possible/probable that Birrenbach approved of the gas pipeline from the USSR at least in part due to its appealing balance of trade contracts to supply the pipe.

<sup>180</sup> As of July 1980, Birrenbach pointed out that almost 80-90% of the FRG’s imports from the USSR consisted of fuel or raw materials they could not get from other countries. As of August 1978, Birrenbach claimed to Schmidt that he considered Schmidt’s (I think economic) agreement with the USSR of 6 May 1978 valuable. However, as of July 1980, Birrenbach believed that the idea to conclude a general agreement to cooperate with the USSR in 1978 during a period of 25 years was a question that could be the subject of discussion (sounds quite skeptical).

<sup>181</sup> This situation/practice had been accepted/conceded by the social-liberal coalition, including as of August 1981 Graf Lambsdorff, at least since the mid-1970s. Those countries giving out subsidies to their steel industries included Belgium, Britain, France and Italy. Important with respect to the subsidy policy was the “fatal” 1981 EC subsidy code. In addition to the cessation of the nationalization and subsidy policies, Birrenbach also desired in the meantime (balances) the assignment to the FRG steel industry of a proper production share within the EC quota system (not the currently depressed share of the EC quota arrangement since 1980) and potentially government financial aid/subsidies to the German steel firms/industry. At least during the 1980s (at the latest by July 1981), Birrenbach saw actions in Europe/EC impacting very negatively on the German steel industry and at least contributing to the steel crisis (i.e. nationalization, subsidy policy, efforts to place the social and regional problem in the foreground) and resulting in a dispute of the German steel industry with the EC and the neighboring states. As of June 1983, Birrenbach argued that with the nationalization by certain EC states of steel works (as of 1983, there were large nationalized steel firms in Belgium, France, Britain and Italy; not FRG firms), it was now a row between states rather than between free firms. (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1983). In September 1983, Birrenbach believed that Chancellor Kohl’s personal “intervention” in the “steel crisis” was “more urgent than ever.” (KB to Kohl, 15 September 1983, cc Dr. Stein). In June 1983, Birrenbach informed Kohl that “the fate of the steel industry...lies now purely in your hands.” (KB to Kohl, 28 June 1983). As of December 1982, Birrenbach was warning Kohl that unless policy was changed, the Ruhr would become “an undeserved poverty zone.” (KB to Kohl, 22 December 1982, K029/2). Probably playing on the Chancellor’s domestic political interests, Birrenbach complemented his economic arguments by also pointing out to Kohl the political/electoral repercussions, particularly in the Ruhr/NRW, the industrial core area of the FRG where coal and steel was the crucial economic basis. But most of the (steel) companies in other (European)

Birrenbach's efforts to further the interests of German industry also intersected with trans-Atlantic disputes on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. While supporting safeguards against nuclear proliferation in principle, he continued to promote the crucial introduction of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic, including the construction of new power plants and the rapid development and employment of advanced technologies (e.g. plutonium, including the fast breeder). In resisting any discrimination or dependence vis-à-vis the nuclear weapon states (e.g. US, France and Britain), Birrenbach stressed not only the negative impact on the FRG itself but also on European unification, with the creation of two classes of states regarding civilian (and military) nuclear power potentially fueling French and British claims to complete independence and French claims to hegemonic leadership in Europe.<sup>182</sup> This desire to attain energy independence and security for the FRG was largely based on concern about the unpredictable attitudes of other countries (e.g. the US and France) and, in particular, fears of an embargo on the delivery of nuclear materials.<sup>183</sup> Such concerns were stoked by bitter past experiences with the US and other Western countries in the nuclear and energy field, including US behavior during the 1960s regarding the MLF and NPT and, more recently, the neutron

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countries lived only from state subsidies or were nationalized. How could we in Germany compete against the budgetary and protectionist policy of their neighbors? (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2).

<sup>182</sup> As of 1977, the German position with respect to nuclear energy differed from that of the US since the FRG had a large dependence on imported oil, thus requiring the strong use of nuclear energy, and also had only a low stock of uranium. As of April 1979, Birrenbach considered France and Britain as nations of "equal rank [*gleichgeordneter*]" to "us." To McGeorge Bundy, Birrenbach remarked, "Thirty years after the war, one should treat Germany now as an equal partner among equals." (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1).

<sup>183</sup> Birrenbach's stress on independence led him in later years to oppose the FRG's involvement in various current or potential forms of international cooperation in the realm of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (e.g. multi-national partnerships/consortiums/cooperation (e.g. fast breeder organization; Super Phoenix consortium; COGEMA; Almelo; URENCO (involving the construction of a British enrichment plant in Capenhurst)) involving various West European countries (and Iran) in which Germany apparently would be a junior participant (e.g. to France); apparently largely French solutions/proposals). Birrenbach opposed any FRG dependence on the uncertain supply of enriched material from a nuclear bank (Gerard Smith proposal) or of uranium from South Africa, USSR, US, Canada and Australia. Birrenbach was concerned about the possible formation of a uranium cartel.

bomb; the US interruption in delivery of nuclear materials in 1977; and US legislation (new as of April 1978) that further threatened this possibility.<sup>184</sup> All this also contained elements of international competition, with Birrenbach expressing frustration at the low civilian use of nuclear energy in the FRG compared to other countries (e.g. France), agonizing about the eroding technical advantages of the German reactor (nuclear) industry and stressing the related need to ensure its ability to produce and export reactors to the world in competition with, especially, the US but also France and Japan.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Birrenbach also pointed out that the Dutch had hesitated in the midst of the 1973 crisis to deliver gas to the FRG and that Britain and Norway were not very willing to distribute their oil production among their European partners. In later years, Birrenbach objected to the risks of what he saw as an increasing German dependence on other nations with respect to nuclear and other energy. As of 1977-78, Birrenbach recognized the risks in his proposed course of action and feared that the building of sensitive installations in the FRG might lead the US government to (again) halt the delivery to the FRG of nuclear/enriched materials/uranium. These deliveries were the subject of US-EURATOM agreements. Birrenbach believed that the new US nuclear non-proliferation law decreed in 1978 contained the condition that the US government's approval/consent was necessary to supply US uranium or enriched material, a condition aiming to keep the non-military nuclear states from setting up reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Birrenbach saw this law creating for the US a right of *Mitbestimmung* of discriminatory nature. With respect to the need for FRG independence with respect to the full nuclear fuel cycle and his lack of trust, Birrenbach pointed to prior negative German experiences in the supply of uranium even with the US and Canada and feared that an anti-German French left (*Front Commun*) that won the elections might cut-off reprocessed uranium from France. Birrenbach also pointed to negative prior German experiences regarding the supplying of natural gas in the embargo crisis in the Netherlands and the dangers with respect to the USSR (I guess regarding natural gas). As of April 1977-September 1980, Birrenbach saw the Netherlands/Dutch trying to prevent/delay the construction of a German enrichment plant (i.e. discrimination via the Troika treaty; based on his experiences by the URENCO (i.e. the enrichment plant in England) and by Almelo; e.g. by non-fulfillment of the target production). Birrenbach argued that the experiences with the URENCO unfortunately proved that they could not enjoy the confidence of even an ally that would permit them to build such a plant for themselves. Nuclear materials included enriched material, uranium and similar products. The US embargo/interruption in 1977 dealt with deliveries of enriched/nuclear materials or uranium contracted on the basis of the US-EURATOM treaty (the first receiver was EURATOM). As of April 1978, a critical Birrenbach claimed that the recent US decision about the neutron bomb was a new reminder for the FRG not to put all its eggs into one basket. Birrenbach complained that the US had eliminated the European option in 1966.

<sup>185</sup> At this point, the US had the largest export opportunities. As of 1980, Birrenbach saw the US, France, Britain, the USSR and the FRG striving to benefit from the reactor (nuclear?) industry. This relative backwardness vis-à-vis France may have been implicit when, as of December 1977, Birrenbach noted the lack of a "Cartesian clarity" by many representatives of the public hand with respect to nuclear energy which could have removed problems within the FRG. The German-US rivalry in this regard was reflected for instance in the fact that the US objections to the German-Brazilian agreement (as of March 1977) were in part the result of American industry-political/policy interests, including the firm Westinghouse. As of March 1977, Birrenbach saw the FRG with the largest export opportunities, after the US. To export reactors, the German reactor industry had to be able also to deliver nuclear fuel elements. As of October 1980, Birrenbach complained that the French had an export advantage over countries like the FRG and Japan due to its independence from outside uranium sources.

These views on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, brought him into active opposition against the new/alterd US non-proliferation policies of the Carter administration (apparently not Reagan), which at least temporarily called for a prohibition in non-nuclear weapon states on advanced technologies (plutonium) until alternative technology became available; a system of multi-national regional centers in which sensitive but crucial fuel cycle installations/services (uranium enrichment and waste reprocessing facilities) would be located solely in the military nuclear powers (e.g. France; supplier nations); and a prohibition against the export/sale of such facilities to third countries.<sup>186</sup> Birrenbach's view of Carter's policy in this regard was that of disappointment, "if not even of a certain bitterness [*Verbitterung*]."<sup>187</sup> Indeed, by the late 1970s, in large part due to what he considered the unilateral American violation of Article 4 of the NPT, guaranteeing the freedom of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Birrenbach even came openly to doubt the wisdom of the ratification of the NPT by the Federal Republic, believing that the bases of this acceptance no longer existed.<sup>188</sup> During the late 1970s (April 1977), Birrenbach defended and urged firmness (not unilaterally cancel) with respect to the German-Brazilian nuclear energy deal/agreement regarding sensitive facilities (cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy) signed in June

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<sup>186</sup> Waste reprocessing facilities were necessary for the disposal of nuclear waste.

<sup>187</sup> KB to Schmidt, 22 February 1978. As of October 1980, Birrenbach pointed out that the fact that President Carter had made special concessions to India in the matter of the peaceful use of nuclear energy demonstrated that US policy was not a pure policy of moral conviction but also of political interest. (KB to Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980). Birrenbach was also harshly critical of Carter's policy on the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the Trilateral Commission. As of April 1977, Birrenbach said he was not ready to bow to a "unilateral American *Diktat*" (regarding Carter's policy on the peaceful use of nuclear energy). (KB to Amb. (aD) Hellmuth Roth, 1 April 1977). Birrenbach was quite concerned with the possibility that the Carter administration's policies on the peaceful use of nuclear energy were "a veiled effort by the United States to obtain an unfair commercial advantage." (KB to State Sec. Hans-Hilger Haunschild, BMFT, 23 December 1977).

<sup>188</sup> In this regard, Birrenbach also pointed to the decline in credibility of the US nuclear deterrent vs. the USSR which removed the anticipated protection of the non-nuclear weapon states by the nuclear weapon states vs. other nuclear powers.

1975 in Bonn.<sup>189</sup> As part of his efforts, Birrenbach impatiently promoted throughout the late 1970s the construction of its own sensitive facilities in the FRG, especially by repeatedly urging Kohl (and to a lesser extent Bavarian Minister-President Strauß) in vain to prod Minister-President Ernst Albrecht (*Niedersachsen*) to rapidly proceed with the construction of a German reprocessing facility in Gorleben to forestall a dependence on the sensitive facilities in France (La Hague) and Britain (Windscale).<sup>190</sup>

During the late 1970s, an international network and infrastructure, exhibiting certain general similarities to and even overlapping to some extent with their Atlanticist

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<sup>189</sup> As Birrenbach saw it, the agreement was in accord with the approval process involving the IAEA (IAEO), the suppliers club and the US administration (consulting). He saw this as a precedence case and a matter also of the entire plutonium technology.

<sup>190</sup> Birrenbach also spoke to Albrecht himself on this at some point and also made requests to the Chancellor for clear words to the US and to the German parties. Birrenbach became very upset/frustrated with Kohl (and Albrecht) due to what he considered not kept promises and evasions (attitudes; excuses) in this regard, with Albrecht hesitating to proceed due to *Land* electoral/psychological/domestic-party political considerations (internal development) that Birrenbach detested (“the sphere of opportunism”). As of 5 September 1978 Birrenbach admitted that, based on his experiences with regard to Gorleben, “interventions vis-à-vis [*Einwirkungen auf*] Kohl according to all my experiences are completely pointless.... It’s simply not worth it!” (KB to *Bergassessor aD* Dr. hc Hans-Günther Sohl, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, 5 September 1978). As Minister-President of *Niedersachsen*, Albrecht was not actually subordinate to Kohl (Chair of the *Fraktion*) but they were from the same party and Birrenbach thus wanted the *Fraktion* to pressure Albrecht. In March 1979, Strauß pointed out to Birrenbach that as Minister-President Albrecht had to deal with more problems than simply nuclear energy, that his domestic political considerations were understandable and had helped him achieve a considerable government majority. As of November 1977, the FRG had a pilot plant for reprocessing in Karlsruhe and a share in the enrichment plants built in Britain and the Netherlands by URENCO (a British-Dutch-German firm; tripartite contract/treaty with Britain and the Netherlands; built by Britain and the Netherlands). As of June 1978, Birrenbach did not believe that the URENCO treaty had led to concrete results for the FRG in certain questions. As of June 1978, the FRG had a pilot enrichment plant in Jülich. As of March 1979, Birrenbach had a confidential source informing him about Albrecht’s plans (perhaps Szekessy?). As of November 1977, Birrenbach hoped that Chancellor Schmidt would disregard a possibly negative vote in the SPD *Parteitag* regarding the construction of a *Zwischenlager* in NRW on the basis of the *Grundgesetz* conditions on the setting of the guidelines of policy (KB to Kohl, 11 November 1977, K141/1). Birrenbach had spoken with Schmidt about this and it is possible Birrenbach encouraged Schmidt in this though I am not really sure. As of June 1978, Birrenbach wanted progress with respect to the planned enrichment plant in Gronau (NRW competence) and had had a not very encouraging last talk with Kühn (I believe the SPD Minister President of NRW). As of October 1977, Birrenbach saw the Federal Government and certain *Länder* governments perhaps looking for an alibi not to build sensitive installations in the FRG. Birrenbach saw Kohl’s and Albrecht’s lack of action as a manifestation of the lack of “civil courage” among many German politicians with respect to the issue of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As of April 1981, Birrenbach disliked the impossible administrative legal procedures [*Verwaltungsrechtsverfahren*] with regard to nuclear energy.



counterparts, explored the increasingly significant peaceful use of nuclear energy.<sup>191</sup>

Indeed, the theme nuclear energy featured in the work of the German-American Conferences (March 1977), the DGAP Research Institute (project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation”) and a series of US-German nuclear energy conferences staged by the *Max-Planck-Institut* and apparently the ACG.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> These similarities included (e.g.) a stress on industry, technology, international exchange and secure, cooperative and peaceful relations between states marked by mutual confidence; institutional and political approaches to solving problems; ideas for international regimes; internationalism; world-wide/global perspective; focus on specific current problem/issue areas; plenary sessions, at least sometimes broken up into working groups.

<sup>192</sup> As of June 1977, the *Atlantik-Brücke* again planned a nuclear energy conference (I believe US-German) with parliamentarians for Fall 1977. A meeting of this DGAP project group occurred on 19 September 1980. The DGAP Research Institute ran its project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation” as of December 1978-September 1980. On Thursday 22 June 1978 at the DGAP there was a *Vortrag* on the international problems by the introduction of nuclear energy by KH Beckurts (*Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*) that interested Birrenbach very much. I am not sure if this was part of the DGAP project group or just a separate *Vortrag*. The meetings of the DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation” were held in the DGAP. The meetings of the DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation” included first-class experts. This was the *Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt* (especially Prof. CF von Weizsäcker). The MPI-ACG conferences took place on the Spitzingsee (Spring 1977), in Woods Hole (17-20 June 1977) and in Airlie, Virginia (Airlie House, 12-15 January 1978). Participants in the MPI-ACG conferences included American and German government bureaucrats, parliamentarians, *Wirtschaftler*, *Wissenschaftler*, personalities of the nuclear energy organizations and those of the Atlanticist-minded organizations. These bilateral German-American conferences had as participants German and American parliamentarians (MdBs: Blumenfeld, Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes and Werner Zywiets; Congressman Paul Tsongas, DC; also various relevant Congressional counsels and staff members), government bureaucrats (German: *Ministerialdirigent* HW Dittmann, AA, Bonn; Christian Patermann, FRG embassy, DC; *Gesandter* Hans Schauer, FRG embassy, DC; American: Joseph Nye, Dep. to the Under-Secretary of State for Security, Science and Technology, Dept. of State, DC; Charles van Doren, ACDA, DC; Ted Greenwood, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, DC; Philip Farley, Dep. US Special Rep. for Non-Proliferation Matters, State Dept., DC; Marvin Moss, Dept. of Energy, Office of Energy Research, DC), *Wissenschaftler* (German: Prof. Dr. KH Beckurts, *Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*; Prof. Dr. Walter Köhler, *Interatom GmbH*, Bergisch Gladbach; Prof. Dr. Horst Böhm, *Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH*, Karlsruhe; Prof. Dr. CF von Weizsäcker and Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein, both of the *Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt*, Starnberg; American: Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty and Frederick Williams, all three from the Program for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; Eugene Skolnikoff, Director, Center for International Studies, MIT; Henry Jacoby, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge; Thomas Neff, Policy Analyst, Center for Energy Policy Research, MIT), *Wirtschaftler* (Dr. Günter Hildenbrand, *Kraftwerk Union AG*, Erlangen; Dr. Albrecht von Kienlin, *Urangesellschaft mbH & Co KG*, Frankfurt; Dr. Carsten Salander, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH*, Hannover), personalities of the Atlanticist-minded organizations (Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser, DGAP Research Institute; David Klein, Ex. Dir., ACG, NYC; Abram Chayes, The Brookings Institution, DC) and institutional personalities of the nuclear energy organizations (Dr. Felix Oboussier, *Wirtschaftsverband Kernbrennstoffkreislauf eV*, Bonn; Carl Walske, President, Atomic Industrial Forum, DC; John Gray, President, International Energy Assoc. Ltd., DC). The *Rapporteur* was James Cooney (Amherst, MA) and

Meanwhile, a separate and more specifically focused multilateral infrastructure included continuing forums like the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations Program, a multi-year conference decided on in May 1977 by the summit of the trilateral countries and chaired by Gerard Smith, and the International Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy, convened in London in October 1977 and sponsored jointly and privately by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.<sup>193</sup> Such forums

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the staff was Sara Ann Fagin and Karen Furey. Confidential papers for these MPI-ACG conferences were prepared by, among others, Frederick Williams (Harvard University). Reports on the MPI-ACG conferences were written e.g. by David Klein (ACG), the *Rapporteur* James Cooney and by Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein (*MPI zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt*; intended for Amb. Grewe FYI).

<sup>193</sup> At the March 1977 German-American Conference, these issues (including the Brazil agreement and more) were dealt with in Panel A, of which Birrenbach was not a part, with the German participants on this panel including Prof. Dr. Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker (German introducer) and (I believe) Prof. Beckurts and Dr. Hildenbrand. A background paper was produced for this panel by Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Director, Center for International Studies, MIT. From 15-18 January 1977, there was a US-German Energy Policy Workshop, for which Henry Jacoby (MIT) had prepared a paper. As of August 1977, there had been within the past six months a German-American Conference in Spitzingsee organized by CF von Weizsäcker. Häfele had written a paper on the theme “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” for this conference. As of 1981, quite a few of the important works that Birrenbach read in his efforts to stay up-to-date on the peaceful use of nuclear energy emerged from Atlanticist-minded institutions. As of 1981, these included the DGAP’s soon to appear “Die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und Nichtverbreitung”; and “Die Weltenergieperspektive-Analyse zum Jahre 2030” by Robert Gerwin based on the IIASA research report (presented by the MPG in Germany). These also included materials emerging from the US, for instance, the well-known Ford Foundation study “Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices”; “International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy” of the Brookings Institution (Washington DC); and (I guess not necessarily Atlanticist-minded) the studies of the American development ministry. The *Deutsche Atomforum eV* appears to have been a promoter of nuclear energy. As of November 1977, the *Deutsche Atomforum eV* had a *Geschäftsführendes* member of its *Präsidium* (Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch) as well as seats occupied by members of the *Bundestagsfraktionen* (including the *SPD Fraktion*; co-opted). As of August 1979, the *Deutsche Atomforum eV* had a working group “International Cooperation” (which held its first meeting on 5 June 1979) in its AK III (Law and Administration). At least at times, the working group meetings were attended by Szekessy (I guess a member) and by a *Ministerialdirigenten* from the BMFT, enabling those present to make requests of the latter (e.g. the making available to the members of confidential internal governmental reports/opinions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy (including on the Euratom Treaty), a request which was indeed granted and carried out). On 21-22 January 1980, there was an International Information Conference of the *Deutschen Atomforum eV* at the Hilton Hotel in Mainz. At this conference, KH Beckurts had given a *Vortrag*, and there was also a report on INFCE (also by Beckurts?). As of June 1977, there had recently been an Atomic Industrial Forum Fuel Cycle Conference in Kansas City at which Donald Couchman (NUS Corporation, Rockville MD) had given a speech and Karl Cohen had presented a technical paper. In May 1977 in Salzburg, Austria, the International Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle was held. Nye (Deputy to the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) spoke at this conference. In late November 1977, there was in San Francisco the annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society. At this meeting, State Secretary Hans-Hilger Haunschild (BMFT) gave a *Vortrag* on “Nuclear Energy Policy: A View from Western Europe.” In 1978, there was a Fuel Cycle Conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum

brought together, as participants and members, experts from the parliaments, nuclear energy organizations (including national ones), international and government agencies, Atlanticist-minded organizations, *Wirtschaft* (including the nuclear and energy industries) and *Wissenschaft* (including research institutions and universities) from developed and developing countries around the world.<sup>194</sup> Birrenbach welcomed this infrastructure, with its frank, informal discussions, debates and study, believing that such policy-oriented conferences fostered a better international understanding about the international aspects and problems raised by nuclear energy, and in particular significantly improved the US attitude in this field.<sup>195</sup>

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(Inc.). In October 1978, there was an “International Conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards” staged by the Atomic Industrial Forum Inc. at the Hilton Hotel in New York City. At this conference, Joseph Nye (Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) gave a *Vortrag* about “The US Approach to Non-Proliferation: Are We Making Progress?” As of December 1977, Carl Walske was the president of the Atomic Industrial Forum. The Atomic Industrial Forum dealt at least in part with issues of nuclear power and nuclear proliferation. As of June 1979, the INFCE appears to have been at work. From 9-11 September 1979, the American Nuclear Society staged in New Orleans (US) an “Executive Conference on International Nuclear Commerce.” As of 1978-79, there existed a *Wirtschaftsverband Kernbrennstoffkreislauf eV*. Dr. F. Oboussier (not a Birrenbach contact) was the *Geschäftsführende VS* member (the organization also had a central secretariat). This organization distributed documents/information/circulars to its member firms (including I think Szekessy’s GWK). On 9 March 1978, Oboussier conducted discussions in Washington DC in the State Department and Department of Energy about the interpretation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and drew up a memo about these discussions. It appears that there was also a nuclear industry transnational network, with representatives of at least the German and American nuclear industries holding talks with one another and both at least expressing opposition against at least elements of the Carter administration’s policy regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In May 1979, there was a European nuclear conference 1979/FORATOM VII. Chancellor Schmidt gave a speech at the opening of this conference. The nuclear/energy industry developed its own system of conferences. In October 1977, the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* staged a conference in Bonn (at the *Ebert-Stiftung*) on Problems of Nuclear Energy Supply. At this conference, Joseph Nye Jr. (Deputy to the Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) gave an address on “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation.” As of Fall 1978, the ICGNE had held three plenary sessions (London, October/Nov 1977; London, May 1978; Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland, September 1978). Its next plenary meeting would be held in January 1979. The ICGNE had a working program.

<sup>194</sup> US personalities, including government figures, gave speeches at the nuclear energy conferences.

<sup>195</sup> The DGAP Research Institute’s project group on “The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation” may have been initiated at Birrenbach’s prompting (not sure). Themes addressed by the nuclear energy infrastructure included, for instance, technologies, institutional arrangements and fuel cycles; peaceful nuclear relations between states; means of minimizing nuclear weapons proliferation; the need to ensure the security of energy supply for all countries; the international political, social and economic implications; future alternative scenarios; how civil nuclear activities could be conducted safely, rationally and in a manner generally acceptable to the world community. As of September 1977, Gerard

Though Birrenbach did not really participate in the dedicated nuclear energy conference system, he did continue to monitor the relevant international discussion, especially as it pertained to the Federal Republic.<sup>196</sup> Particularly during the Carter administration but also after, Birrenbach maintained his mutually advantageous links, existing since many years, to the most prominent German personalities in the nuclear and energy industry/area.<sup>197</sup> Such contacts assisted and advised him with, often technical,

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Smith was the special commissioner of the London summit conference for the working out of a nuclear program, who had been asked to draw up a report on the nuclear question. Gerard Smith chaired the INFCE as of April 1979. The INFCE lasted at least a year and a half and had concluded by March 1980. The ICGNE existed at least through the end of 1979 and as of November 1978 was chaired by Ian Smart (consultant/advisor on international energy affairs, UK). The ICGNE Secretariat consisted of a *Rapporteur* (Myron Kratzer, USA/DC, senior consultant, International Energy Associates Ltd.), a Research Associate (Dr. Richard Lester, Department of Nuclear Engineering, MIT, USA), and a Secretary (William Walker, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London/UK). With respect to ICGNE members, these parent institutions included the Imperial College of Science and Technology (UK) and the Secretariat for Future Studies (Sweden). ICGNE members took part strictly in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their parent organizations or countries. These members reflected a wide diversity of approaches, interests and attitudes and technical expertise with respect to the relevant issues. The members of the ICGNE were experts from fifteen countries. As of November 1978, the German member of the ICGNE was Prof. Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts (Chairman of the Board of Management, *Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*). Other ICGNE members came from Western Europe (including Spain, France, Sweden, the UK), Latin America (including Argentina, Brazil), North America (including Canada, Mexico and the US (Dr. Mason Willrich, Director for International Relations, Rockefeller Foundation)), Asia (including Iran, Pakistan, India and Japan (Dr. Ryukichi Imai, General Manager for Engineering, Japan Atomic Power Company)), Australia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (based in Austria). I think the ICGNE was relatively small, with about 15-20 members.

<sup>196</sup> Birrenbach took part in the meetings of the DGAP Research Institute's project group on "The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Proliferation." On 21 May 1981, Birrenbach would take part in an *Energie Forum* in Berlin. Due to another engagement, Birrenbach was unable to take part in the *Fachgespräch*/meeting on 24 June 1981 on questions of energy supply and the use of nuclear energy in the *Erzbischöflichen Haus* (Cologne) to which he had been invited by (at least formally) Joseph Cardinal Höffner.

<sup>197</sup> These nuclear/energy contacts included: Prof. Dr. Dr. Eh Heinrich Mandel (VS member of the *Rheinisch-Westfälischen Elektrizitätswerkes AG* (I think Essen); as of April 1977-August 1978); Dr. Dipl.-Phys. Günter Hildenbrand (*Kraftwerk Union AG* (Erlangen), Abt. RB; as of March-November 1977); Rudolf von Bennigsen-Foerder (Chairman of the VS of the *VEBA AG* (I think Düsseldorf); as of October 1977-August 1978); Günther Scheuten (Chair of VS, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH* (I think Hannover); as of April-August 1978; facilitated by Prof. Mandel, chairman of the AR); Prof. Dr. Wolf Häfele (Deputy Director, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Schloss Laxenburg (Vienna), Program (Department) Leader/Director, Energy Systems (Energy Planning); as of August-October 1977); Prof. KH Beckurts (*Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH*; as of 1980); Dr Günter Wirths (Chair of the *Geschäftsführung* of the *NUKEM GmbH*, Hanau/Main; as of March 1977; who was himself in contact with Prof. Beckurts and Dr. Hildenbrand); J. Szekessy (*Geschäftsführer* of the *Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH*; as of August 1979). Birrenbach appears to have thought highly of Prof. Weizsäcker with respect to nuclear energy issues though I don't think he was a real nuclear energy contact.

information, analysis, proposals, reports and other materials, including those about and emerging from the nuclear-themed functions (among them papers of a confidential nature).<sup>198</sup> Birrenbach reciprocated with relevant materials, papers, information and analysis of his own, whether it be warnings about the proposals of the Carter administration, impressions based on his trips to the US or updates on his efforts and findings with respect to important German politicians.<sup>199</sup> While these German contacts at least ostensibly generally supported Birrenbach in his views and goals, Birrenbach

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<sup>198</sup> These materials also included a number of published ICGNE working papers. Birrenbach's *Nachlaß* contains a draft of a working paper of an MIT project (MIT Energy Lab in cooperation with the Center for International Studies, sponsored by the US Department of Energy) on the Determinants of Nuclear Fuel Assurance and Strategies for Assured Supply of Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel, 22 December 1977. On 30 November 1979, there was a *Vortrag* on the occasion of the *Beirat*-meeting of the *Dresdner Bank* in Hannover on "The Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuels as Economic Task," given by Dr. Walter Schüller (*Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH*), which was in Birrenbach's *Nachlaß*. In January 1977, Birrenbach received the exposé "On the Overcoming of the Nuclear Controversy in Germany" by and from Hermann Josef Werhahn, in the firm Wilh. Werhahn, Neuss am Rhein, *Bankhaus*. As of June 1978, Birrenbach's *Nachlaß* contained the *Vortrag* (I believe pro-nuclear energy) "Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: Chances and Risks" given by Prof. Dr. CF von Weizsäcker in the Bonn *Wissenschaftszentrum*. As of October 1977, it appears that Mandel was involved in the COGEMA negotiations. As of February 1978, Birrenbach hoped to talk to Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein about nuclear energy issues, something which Gottstein reciprocated (but not sure if this was or became a real contact or not). As of 27 June 1977, there had been a symposium in Dr. Spethmann's house in which Mandel had taken part (Birrenbach thanked Mandel for this). The ICGNE generated working papers by individual authors (writing in their personal capacities; including Beckurts) on specific problem/topic areas, studies based on the policy research of its members or outside experts (research promoted by (under the auspices of) the ICGNE; benefiting from ICGNE discussion), that were regularly circulated and discussed within the group (internal use). The ICGNE (the Rockefeller Foundation/Royal Institute of International Affairs) published some of the working papers (and planned to publish a public collective report covering the full scope of its discussions in January 1980 (end of ICGNE?)) in an effort to encourage and inform a wider and more responsible debate on international nuclear energy policy. Prof. Dr. Klaus Gottstein (*Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt*) sent Birrenbach the reports on the MPI-ACG conferences written by himself and others, with Birrenbach passing at least some of them on to Szekessy and Narjes. Birrenbach was familiar with the INFCE report/conclusion.

<sup>199</sup> The materials provided to Birrenbach by his contacts included circulars, articles, analyses, papers, memos, talks/speeches, documents, evaluations (including confidential German government opinions). Here, Birrenbach perhaps sought to defend the interests of German industry even more than that industry itself, with the German nuclear/electricity *Wirtschaft* seeking to take part in sensitive nuclear facilities to overcome the current obstacles to the further construction and operating of reactors (e.g. regarding the COGEMA agreement). As of November 1977, Birrenbach was informing three leading personalities of German industry related somehow to the COGEMA negotiations about the results of his efforts. To top it off, Birrenbach was also astonished at the politically and economically unacceptable financial conditions the French offered and the German industry (German nuclear/electric *Wirtschaft*) by April 1978 accepted for reprocessing German material at the new French "multinational" nuclear reprocessing plant/company (Le Hague by Cherbourg (the COGEMA project)), with the Germans not even getting a share in the enterprise for their considerable investments/financing of installations (billions of DM as of April 1980).

simultaneously enjoyed contacts with some of the most prominent American figures in the field of nuclear energy, among them Gerard Smith, Henry Owen and McGeorge Bundy, all three of whom supported Carter's policy.<sup>200</sup> Ultimately Birrenbach's German and American contacts crucially influenced his thought on matters related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, enabled him to grasp the technological developments in this field, offered him a much coveted insight into the policies and views of expert German, European and American personalities in government, parliament, the reactor industry and *Wissenschaft* and, especially as a number of them also took part themselves, provided an indirect *entrée* into the goings-on in the world of the nuclear energy infrastructure.<sup>201</sup>

Birrenbach's efforts highlight the role of the overall economic and energy context during this period in certain trans-Atlantic disputes. From the mid-1970s well into the 1980s, the United States and Western Europe were wracked by economic recession and financial difficulties, characterized by inflation, unemployment, budget deficits and currency instability and chaos. These phenomena were accompanied by and were, in part, the result of gaps in the energy supply, largely due to persistent oil shortages since

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<sup>200</sup> For instance, Birrenbach's German contacts in this field stressed the immediate need for the construction of independent German nuclear facilities and for continued pursuit of nuclear technologies. Birrenbach's nuclear contacts stressed the need to continue pursuing their nuclear technologies and (e.g. with regard to Albrecht) the need for the construction of nuclear power plants and a German reprocessing/disposal capacity/facility (with the energetic support of the public hand), preferably immediately, and saw a possible reprocessing agreement with COGEMA or BNFL (with France) as at best a temporary over-bridging (a better over-bridging was the immediate approval and construction of an external central *Zwischenlager* or even the *Eingangslager* of the German reprocessing/disposal facility; prefer no further contracts with COGEMA, which meant high costs; remove arguments against the construction of further nuclear power plants). At least some foresaw that the EVUs and the DWK (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH*, Hannover) would be responsible for the erection of the center in *Niedersachsen*. They opposed what they considered a long-run untenable dependence of the German disposal on the abroad, including France, which they believed would also have serious consequences for the export capability of the German reactor industry. Birrenbach conducted correspondence with McGeorge Bundy (President of the Ford Foundation) as of April 1977-February 1978.

<sup>201</sup> Among the US materials that Birrenbach acquired from his German nuclear/energy contacts was a document from the Office of Technology Assessment (US Congress) of April 1977 on "Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards" (also a report from SCIENCE). On 22 March 1978, Mr. Yager (Brookings Institution) passed on to Birrenbach(?) acts of Congress regarding nuclear proliferation.

1973. For Birrenbach, this represented a full-blown economic crisis that, at least in the Federal Republic (e.g. unemployment), was largely a long-term structural problem and that threatened the very basis of their societies. In the face of such adversity, he was spurred on in his informal lobbying on behalf of the crisis-plagued steel industry, interventions most explicitly directed at influential CDU personalities (including Chancellor Kohl as well as those involved in drawing up the party's *Grundsatzprogramm*).<sup>202</sup> However, this dire situation impacted not only on the purely economic aspects of his activities, including as we have seen fund-raising in the *Wirtschaft*, but also undermined the crucial economic preconditions of many Atlanticist measures he deemed necessary. This included hindering increases in the US and European defense budgets as well as the unification of Europe, the latter by encouraging the “renaissance of a nation-state” and the priority of national interests in most European countries and by rendering more difficult joint solutions and policies.<sup>203</sup> Ultimately, many of the controversial measures and efforts of Birrenbach, and the FRG, whether the promotion of trade with the USSR, the German-Brazilian nuclear deal or the peaceful use of nuclear energy, testified to a greater self-assertiveness stimulated by the economic and

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<sup>202</sup> These conditions persisted in Western Europe (e.g. France, Britain, Italy), including the Federal Republic at least until 1984 and in the US at least as of 1982. The United States also endured financial problems. The FRG economic difficulties included the current account [*Leistungsbilanz*] and loss of reserves. As of October 1982, Birrenbach urged Kohl to consult first forces of the *Wirtschaft* to improve his economic program. As of April 1983, Birrenbach suggested to Kohl as neutral advisors on the steel issue either the WVES and/or the steel moderators. As of April 1983, Birrenbach had spoken in depth with the steel moderators about the steel situation and advocated at least some of their recommendations. As of December 1982, Birrenbach suggested that Kohl should personally talk to and listen to the views of the three steel advisors of the federal government.

<sup>203</sup> It was in this context that Birrenbach occasionally cited the saying of Talleyrand to the effect that “on ne peut que faire la politique de ses moyens” (e.g. KB to Rostow, 26 March 1982). For Birrenbach on a European “renaissance of a nation-state,” see KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 17 August 1977.

energy situation in the FRG and the West as a whole and the desire to overcome and consolidate it.<sup>204</sup>

At the same time, Birrenbach bemoaned the West European contribution to such trans-Atlantic difficulties. The individual nations, including the Federal Republic, found themselves in deplorable overall domestic conditions, suffering from alarming political and economic troubles. These included the deep political divisions manifested in the disputes surrounding European and Atlantic questions (especially the former in France and Britain, the latter in France and the Federal Republic) as well as in the Euro-Communism in France and Italy during the late 1970s.<sup>205</sup> Meanwhile, in foreign policy, Britain and perhaps most of all France, deluded by a nostalgia for their vanished historic pasts, but also to some extent the Federal Republic unconstructively focused on national sovereignty and their own diverse national interests, exhibited a tendency to operate between the fronts and mustered only inadequate defense efforts.<sup>206</sup> In part due to statements made to him personally by French figures, most notably Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues already in 1976, Birrenbach saw a recalcitrant France, long after de

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<sup>204</sup> Birrenbach criticized the Western energy policy.

<sup>205</sup> The conditions of Britain, France and Italy were perhaps even worse. For Birrenbach's recognition of an "astonishing phenomenon" in the meeting between the European members of the Trilateral Commission and the European Commission in Brussels in late May 1977, namely the downplaying by "[t]he representatives of all Latin states, starting with Belgium, France, Italy," of the potential impact on Europe and NATO of a future entrance of the Communist Party into the French or Italian governments, see KB to Prof. Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, ACDP K141/1.

<sup>206</sup> In November 1978, Birrenbach referred to the "incomprehensible" and "idiotic answer of the Europeans regarding the neutron bomb." (KB to Schaetzel, 20 November 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach remained, perhaps increasingly, concerned about British-EC relations. Problems between Britain and Europe (probably France) included the British contribution to the European budget (including I think particularly the agriculture question; a question on which Birrenbach did sympathize with the unjustly treated British). Birrenbach hoped the problems could be resolved via compromises. For instance, he was pleased by the compromise of Fontainebleau in 1984. Birrenbach seems to have considered Ireland and Denmark also part of Europe. Insufficient defense efforts included for instance insufficient defense budgets as of 1977-85 and criticism and opposition to the deployment/hosting of gray zone weapons and the neutron bomb. The tendency to operate between the fronts included e.g. the gas-pipeline deal, wavering, hesitant, unreliable policies and the response to the Iran and Afghanistan crises. At least in the British case, there was the memory of empire. Birrenbach did find the British more pro-Atlantic (dynamic) than the Germans.



Gaulle's departure, continuing in the "*Colbertschen*" and Gaullist traditions, stressing anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism, France's *gloire*, and a claim to hegemonic leadership in Europe.<sup>207</sup> Looked at as an international whole, Europe comprised merely a group of weak, unstable, loosely linked, heterogeneous, contentious (e.g. budget/agriculture) states exhibiting little prospect of unification or Atlantic integration.<sup>208</sup> With Europe in such a sorry condition, incapable of functioning as a

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<sup>207</sup> Sauvagnargues indicated to Birrenbach that France was by nature not *integrierbar* (due to its being a nuclear power). Similar statements had come from other French ministers, though I am not sure if they were made to Birrenbach personally or not. As of April 1977, Birrenbach saw France also assuming a special position in the framework of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (not entered EURATOM and had recently not signed/ratified the verification/control agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA (Vienna)). As of August 1980, Birrenbach argued that to strengthen France's special/privileged (continental I guess) political position by giving them also a continental monopoly for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (Britain was more cautious) would endanger the still uncertain future of Europe (damage European interests), damage German interests, and lead in the long run to a conflict with France (endanger the Franco-German friendship in energy). Birrenbach occasionally saw glimmers of hope with respect to France. The *Colbertschen* tradition centered on an economic policy of state intervention (e.g. economic planning in the national interest; protectionism; subventions, including in steel). The French stress on independence rather than integration was revealed for instance in matters of defense/security (e.g. defense of the hexagon, not forward defense of Germany (Elbe) and other European states, including strategic nuclear defense/power). In November 1979, Birrenbach bitterly remarked on the "disturbing" character of the French attitude on defense for those who had the "pleasure" (FRG and US) of protecting "the grand empire." (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 20 November 1979). France's tendency to operate between the fronts revealed itself in a variety of ways (e.g. semi-neutrality; perhaps détente over military balance; stress on its "privileged relations" with the USSR; *Osthandel*, e.g. by offering special interest rates to the USSR and refusing to impose certain limits on credits and supplies; conclusion of the gas-pipe deal six weeks after 13 December 1981 whereas the FRG had done it on 19 November 1981). The anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism of French policy revealed itself in a number of ways (e.g. neutral or negative, along with several other countries, towards US initiatives like SDI; not station TNF in France). It appears that Birrenbach wanted Europe to follow the German lead [*Führung*]. Birrenbach believed that France lacked the necessary substance for its hegemonial claim. As Birrenbach could personally ascertain three weeks ago in Paris (presumably AI), France was not ready to enter into NATO. (KB, currently in Freiburg in the hospital, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Helmut Schmidt, MdB, Bonn, 25 July 1984, K033/3).

<sup>208</sup> On British "imperial thinking," see KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984. Birrenbach saw widespread negative British attitudes towards the EC/European idea under both Labour (as of 1979-80) and Conservative parties and governments (e.g. Thatcher), with the possible exception of the insignificant Labour (Liberal?) Party. As of June 1984, Birrenbach found that "the lady" is really difficult. As of April 1984, I believe Birrenbach had "experienced [*erlebt*]" Thatcher "multiple times [*mehrfach*]" and was not surprised by her unconstructive attitude. Birrenbach did agree with Thatcher's views on the deployment of nuclear weapons/cruise missiles (I guess in Britain). Birrenbach saw British attitudes reflected in insufficiently diplomatic behavior in the EEC Councils. At times (e.g. 1980, 1984), he even feared Britain might leave the EC. As of May 1979, Birrenbach referred to a reluctant Britain as "only a half-hearted partner in Europe." As of February 1978, Birrenbach believed that the British relationship with continental Europe seemed to be similar to "a couple immediately before the divorce. The behavior of the British... was as negative as arrogant." As examples of Britain still thinking in terms of empire or Commonwealth, Birrenbach pointed to trade and to the Falklands. With respect to the 1982 Falklands War, Birrenbach

genuine partner and evincing no great desire to be defended, Birrenbach feared that, like the French in 1939, the discouraged Americans would one day ask themselves in a crisis “*Pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?*”<sup>209</sup>

Alarmed by the repeated warnings, criticism and appeals emanating from the US, including from his own contacts (e.g. Strausz-Hupé, McCloy), Birrenbach continued in later years to urge the European states, including the FRG, to make greater efforts to improve the condition and reputation of Europe. Such measures included a greater solidarity with the US, as demonstrated for instance in policies regarding defense budgets, military strength and security issues; arms control negotiations, *Osthandel*; Third World issues and crises and European integration.<sup>210</sup> With respect to the latter,

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believed that Britain had committed a fundamental mistake in not accepting during the previous seventeen years of negotiations a lease-back treaty with Argentina (also Lord Carrington had not taken Argentina's war preparations seriously enough). Birrenbach found that the European mood that had once existed, for instance during the time of the Monnet Committee, was no longer present. “The spirit of Monnet is not visible any more.” (KB to McCloy, 10 July 1985). As of June 1984, Birrenbach found Europe “in a severe [*schweren*] identity crisis.” (KB to Kohl, 14 June 1984). Birrenbach always stressed the need for action rather than just resolutions and speeches to solve problems. As of September 1979, Birrenbach was outraged about the attitude of the European powers, “who all sit around the fireplace [*Kamin*]...and at the same time say nice words to one another without proceeding to joint acts” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 September 1979). As of October 1979, Birrenbach insisted that “Europe cannot defend Europe, certainly not this Europe.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979). As of 1984, Birrenbach argued that a Central Europe without US (nuclear support) would be in a situation like Poland, since the British and French weapons did not suffice to offset the USSR nuclear potential. At the Brussels meeting, Birrenbach had been told from a most competent side that at the two summit meetings nothing at all could have been noticed of Europe as a unit. (KB to Professor Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, K141/1).

<sup>209</sup> As of September 1977, Birrenbach saw a “half-hearted participation” from the British in the EC. (KB to Aron, 22 September 1977). As of October 1978, Birrenbach saw many of the British civil servants in Brussels as the “most arrogant” representatives of the EC. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). As of 1977-78, the anti-EC/European mood in Britain (“anti-marketeers”) included a large minority of the Labour Party, a small wavering group of the Conservatives and most of the trade unions (e.g. men like Michael Foot, Wedgwood Benn and Enoch Powell). In Britain there was a focus on the Common Market, not political and economic union/integration and not on federation. As Birrenbach put it in December 1979, “Europe is not any more Europe.” (KB to Rostow, 13 December 1979).

<sup>210</sup> With regard to the East-West *Osthandel*, this included as of June 1983 imposing limits on and not making concessions in the USSR trade; not undertaking new extensive deals as of 1980 and 1983; imposing limits on credits and supplies and offering no special interest rates to the USSR. With respect to defense budgets and security issues, this included increasing the European nations' (including the FRG's) defense budgets in real terms and (conventional) armed forces and military power, including an adherence to and execution of those various plans to do this, e.g. the recommendations of the Brussels NATO summit conference (as of October 1977), the NATO resolution of December 1978 and the Rogers Plan as of 1982-85, and the NATO double-track rearmament decision of December 1979; paying for and carry out the

Birrenbach's notion of Atlantic Partnership required to the end a united, ideally federated, Europe with strong authorities and institutions, coordinated policies, speaking with one voice in economic, monetary, and ultimately (foreign) political and security affairs (EC/EEC/EU).<sup>211</sup> While Birrenbach continued to advocate constructive European reforms in this direction,<sup>212</sup> he continued to oppose the enlargement of the EC beyond

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infrastructure program on German soil; an acceptance of SDI and a certain participation/connection in principle in the US SDI plans/program. With respect to arms negotiations, this included staying tough and not insisting on further US INF negotiating proposals in 1983-84. General Rogers was the US High Commander of NATO in Europe. The NATO resolution of December 1978 pertained at least to the European nations (also to the US?). An exception was Birrenbach's displeasure as of 1979 that all the West European states had accepted SALT II without reservation. The Federal Republic cooperated with the United States to stop the development of nuclear weapons in other states, including in the Third World. (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1). The Federal Republic would cooperate with the United States to eliminate all the dangers resulting from the abuse of the plutonium technology. But the United States could not expect more from us. (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1). The Federal Republic would develop all the necessary safeguards (regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy). (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1). The Federal Republic would try and was ready for a cooperation in the future for a non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1).

<sup>211</sup> KB to McCloy, 19 August 1977. Birrenbach advised Kohl in his discussion with the US President to make clear the fundamental German attitude that an Atlantic Partnership in the widest sense was "indispensable." That presupposed however in Europe a coordinating of heterogeneous interests, which the FRG would try to carry out. There were limits to achieving this goal. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, personal, confidential, 10 November 1982, K029/2). Birrenbach described European unification as "a historic necessity." (KB to Gerard Smith, 1 October 1980). The countries of Europe would seek common solutions.

<sup>212</sup> For instance, Birrenbach welcomed the founding of the European summit (as of July 1978); the creation of a European Monetary System (new as of December 1978), in which Schmidt and d'Estaing/France appear to have been very involved; the intensification of joint defense measures (e.g. common arms projects, 1984). As of 1977-78, Birrenbach advocated/welcome a directly elected European Parliament with effective additional rights/prerogatives and thus with the respect and participation of the electorate and a democratic legitimizing function vis-à-vis a workable executive (European institutions). As of September 1977, Birrenbach saw an effective European Parliament as "the last instrument which could serve to revitalize the European idea." (KB to Aron, 22 September 1977). However, as of July 1979, Birrenbach saw the start of the European Parliament as "almost a comedy" and something that could not be considered a new beginning (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2). As of 22 November 1984, Birrenbach was not happy with the result of the European elections and believed the next ones could turn out even worse if the development went on. As of 18 July 1978, with respect to the EMS, Birrenbach warned, as he had in the times of Triffin, that a monetary/currency system of this kind would work in the long run only on the basis of a coordination of European economic, fiscal, finance, currency and energy policies. Among those reforms Birrenbach advocated were improving the decision-making process in Brussels by eliminating the Luxembourg Compromise of 1965-66 and reestablishing majority decisions in the Council of Ministers and the newly created European Council (i.e. a restoration of and complementing of the original solution of the Treaty of Rome); as of 1984-85 reform of the CAP (EC budget, enormous agrarian subsidies; agreed with Thatcher/Britain), which excessively favored France and inexcusably took up 60% of the EC budget and subsidized 8-9 million European farmers (took funds away from the difficult military and economic situation); as of January 1984, an end of the subvention policy (codex of 1981) that was fatal for steel;

Britain, pointing to the resulting heterogeneity and the related integration, coordination and decision-making problems.<sup>213</sup> Though Birrenbach continued to see France as the FRG's most important European partner and the most important friend after the US, he continued to reject an isolated Franco-German axis against Britain.<sup>214</sup> Urging an accelerated process of European unification in stages in the face of a lack of political and economic homogeneity and goodwill with a minority of members/nations that could not or would not follow the lead of the more effective ones (impede), Birrenbach embraced from the mid-1970s onward ideas involving core powers, including that of a transitory construction of Western Europe on a two-tier system ("*à deux vitesses*"; nucleus of power).<sup>215</sup> As Birrenbach put it, "We cannot wait for the last ship in the European

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solve its economic and financial problems; as of 1984 strengthen and institutionalize the European political cooperation/consultation (EPC); the carrying out of a regional policy (as Prof. Priebe said) aimed at the lagging areas of the EC). As of July 1983, Birrenbach was upset about the negative impact of the acceptance by earlier German governments of "massive" (European) agrarian expenditures (KB to Kohl, 7 July 1983). As of 1984, Birrenbach saw the CAP bringing them into conflict with the US, in the budget question with the FRG's own financial interests, with Britain and important developing countries. In later years, Birrenbach consistently insisted on the principle of "do ut des," for instance with regard to France. As of March 1978, Birrenbach claimed that the Commission was working very slowly and without major authority. For Birrenbach's hopes for the European Parliament, see KB to Schaezel, 13 February 1979, ACDP K098/2.

<sup>213</sup> Birrenbach found all this making it more difficult to manage affairs and pointed to stagnation and endangered substance. Birrenbach pointed with disapproval to the three Mediterranean countries. As of June 1984, Birrenbach saw Papandreou and leaders of similar states as obstacles to genuine European integration. As of April 1984, Birrenbach argued that Britain had not yet been digested and that Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Denmark were not real European partners (KB to Haig, 5 April 1984). As of May 1977, Birrenbach quoted approvingly de Gaulle's reference to the "grand large." Birrenbach believed that the new entrants/members into the EC were economically backward compared to the core countries.

<sup>214</sup> For instance, Birrenbach argued that demands or attacks vis-à-vis Britain (e.g. regarding the budget question as of 1984) should be presented in a larger framework, including the overwhelming majority of EC states. As of 1984, Birrenbach advocated Franco-German coordination and cooperation (e.g. military/defense; peaceful use of nuclear energy). As of October 1980, Birrenbach claimed that the German-French relations were better than they had been in the last 20 years.

<sup>215</sup> Birrenbach embraced such ideas since a few months as of July 1975 until at least as late as June 1984. Far from being an original idea of Birrenbach's, as of July 1975, this idea ("*à deux vitesses*") had been previously raised by Brandt on German TV a year ago (when he reported on the last summit meeting) and in the 1960s by some of Birrenbach's friends in his party and as of July 1975 had been much talked about during the meeting of the EC heads of government in Brussels and had been proposed in the report about the European Union to the Council of Europe presented by Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans in December 1975. At their December 1974 meeting in Paris, the heads of government of the Nine had given the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans the task of putting together a report for them on the future realization of the European Union. A former member of the Action Committee for the United States of

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Europe, Tindemans (Christian-Social Party of Belgium) first presented his idea to the members of the Monnet Committee in Brussels, and his report to the Council of Europe (Brussels) was dated December 1975. The solution of the institutional problems of the EEC was not possible so long as the economic problems in the agrarian, finance, and trade area, which were the subject of the Fontainebleau summit, were not settled in a lasting, effective, constructive way, which was only possible on the basis of the creation of a system *à deux vitesses*. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, confidential, 10 September 1984, K029/2). Birrenbach saw no alternative for a European unification. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1). The survival of Europe as an active and influential [*mitentscheidender*] factor of world *Politik* was only thinkable if Europe united into a *Gemeinschaft*. Birrenbach used the word *Gemeinschaft* and still not *Bundesstaat* or even *Staatenbund*. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1). Therefore, Birrenbach doubted that precisely in the current moment, where it would be especially urgent to create a European unity, such a striving would be feasible. If one tried to set through plans which from historical reasons were not feasible in the short term, one would fail, and this setback would make the continuation of the struggle for the unity more difficult. Therefore, Birrenbach believed that the moment for a constitutional arrangement was premature. Not premature, rather even extraordinarily pressing, was progress in integration, both in the economic as well as in the political area. However, for this, a complete constitutional draft would be no basis. Unfortunately, the European parliament, without sufficient functions, would achieve by the next election only a relatively low election participation. Therefore, a planned, stage by stage setting-in process would be better than a fundamental new beginning. A unity of Europe would be more necessary than ever. If you however look at the French attitude to NATO, the development of protectionism and subventionism in the EC in all its imbalances [*Einseitigkeiten*] and also consider that the newly joining nations have pursued only half-heartedly the path to Europe, then Birrenbach found it obvious to go a more pragmatic way. Self-evidently, the *Politik* would have to be included in the stepwise integration process. Without this step, a deepening of the overall integration process would not be possible. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1). Today, it would be important: 1) to give back the Commission the functions which it had before the crisis in the middle of the 1960s; 2) to again carry out the majority right in the Council of Ministers with the exception of clearly vital problems; 3) to give the European parliament additional functions; 4) to solve the budget problem under the change, not abolition, of the agrarian market conditions. Other areas of the community required at least the same amount of help as the agrarian market. This would bring us in the long run into conflict with the US and Britain. It was not acceptable in its current form. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1). With respect to the taking up of new partners in the EC, Birrenbach pointed out what had happened with Norway, the negative mood in Denmark and what the taking up of the three southern countries meant for the EC budget (but not only that). A *Gemeinschaft* would have to consist essentially of homogeneous states. However, the three southern countries were not that. To fully digest them financially and politically would not be simple. Therefore, Birrenbach had always supported the introduction of a “two-tier system,” as also had been proposed by Minister President Tindemans. Such a system did not mean a slighting of the new applicants. On the other hand, the love to the EC was not so great by any of these southern countries that they could not accept a varying treatment in accordance with their performances and their ability to integrate. As soon as they are fully willing and able to integrate, they would have the immediate right of becoming a full member of the EC. That was Birrenbach’s opinion at the time. In the case of Ireland, Birrenbach was not entirely sure. Since Ireland did not belong to NATO, it was in so far a certain “alien body [*Fremdkörper*].” A community that excluded itself from a crucial area always had a defect. But Ireland was small and in so far no obstacle. However, the problems which we will have with the southern countries are difficult, and the original French idea, thereby to strengthen the Latin area, was certainly today no longer shared in the hearts of many, who thought it at the time, alone from *agrarpolitischen* viewpoints. The other states were in the first line concerned about the budget question, the Italians and French about the agrarian question. That meant that this expansion meant at the moment still no deepening of the community. Birrenbach had always believed that the European political cooperation was an entirely crucial element of the EC and that there should be means and ways to link it organizationally in any case indirectly with the EC. Finally, the lack of this cohesion was one of the reasons why the EC today was no longer as popular as it once was. The lacking popularity of the EC also resulted from the fact that on one hand the organization did not function

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“properly [*sachgerecht*].” Without a certain limitation of the sovereignty via a genuine exercise of the majority right, in any case in not clearly vital questions, a *Gemeinschaft* of this type was not capable of action. It also appeared over-bureaucratized to Birrenbach. Even more important however was the homogeneity of the interests of the individual partners. Therefore, Birrenbach would welcome it if considerable progress were made in the question of the European Political Cooperation during the presidency of Britain. (KB to British Amb. Sir Jock Taylor, Bonn, 25 September 1981, K068/2). Birrenbach shared Aron’s skepticism regarding the possibility of the creation of a *Europe à deux vitesses*. This also meant that Aron did not consider possible the elimination of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1965/66. The present European institutions were practically not able to act. The stagnation was evident since the decision-making process no longer functioned in a satisfactory way. This was already true for the Europe of the Nine. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), President, to Prof. Raymond Aron, *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie Historique*, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1). The current conditions could not remain. The agrarian and budget policy would explode if the EC expanded and it did not come to a *Europe “à deux vitesses,”* which Tindemans had also mentioned in his report at the time, to which Birrenbach fully subscribed. Unfortunately, in Europe one had proceeded in the question of expansion too “tumultuously [*stürmisch*].” There were substantial reasons for it. However, it would only be a constructive element of the European *Politik* if the decision-process in Brussels was improved to an extent not at all foreseeable at the moment. Therein lay Birrenbach’s deep worry. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Leo Tindemans, Minister President (aD), Brussels, 10 April 1980, K074/2). If the direct election of a European parliament in 1978 (or 1979) “would not make much difference to the state of Europe, at least for quite a few years,” and you “don’t see any prospect of a decisive move toward political integration within the next few years... and nothing or very little will happen in the field of monetary and economic integration,” then the same impression had been the principal reason for the preoccupation expressed to Marjolin in Birrenbach’s letter. The question raised under these conditions was what would be the consequence of such an evolution. If, in answer to Birrenbach’s question, Marjolin did not see either the possibility of a *Europe à deux vitesses* or the elimination of the Luxembourg Compromise, which Birrenbach had mentioned in the same context, then the new enlargement of the EC would practically block and not only slow down the whole decision-making process in Brussels, which had been stagnating for many years. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Robert Marjolin, *Université de Droit, d’Économie et de Sciences Sociales de Paris*, 14 September 1977, K074/1). Birrenbach agreed that the further enlargement of the EC was politically unavoidable. Otherwise the Mediterranean states would be pushed either into a dependence upon the Soviet bloc or a kind of non-aligned situation which would not permit the US and European navies to operate in the Mediterranean. But the result of that enlargement would be, to quote de Gaulle, “le grand large.” We need a European power nucleus. It could be created within that “grand large” only on the basis of an *informal* two-tier system similar to that of the monetary snake which could be joined at any moment by every member if it wished to do so. This would not affect the community as such. To a certain degree this system existed in the form of representation of Europe in the summit conferences. Nobody could say that this meant the creation of a Europe of two classes of members. Therefore, the French term of “une Europe à deux vitesses” seemed more adequate. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP, President, to Rt. Hon. Mrs. Shirley Williams, MP, Secretary of State for Education and Science, London, 1 April 1977, K074/1). Since the compromise of 1965-66, the influence of the commission had regrettably increasingly declined. Furthermore, the chair of the European Council of Ministers changed every six months. Birrenbach could not imagine how the commission, under these circumstances, could exercise a stronger decision power. It would not only be a question of goodwill since there would be states that, by best will, could not. Therefore, a non-discriminating, two-tier system had certain advantages vis-à-vis the total reestablishment of the majority right. Here, Birrenbach had the thought in the back of his mind that, in vital questions, he would currently hesitate to subject the Federal Republic to a majority decision of the EC. The definition of what was vital was naturally very difficult but worth the pondering. If Europe still lacked the political will then one had to say with Rueff, but in another sense as/than above mentioned, “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas.” Certainly the secular idea of European unification via the currency union alone could not be carried out because this was not possible without the other precondition. (KB to Helmut Haeusgen, Member of the VS of the *Dresdner Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 5 December 1977, K141/1). The currency union as it had been conceived at the time by the Werner Committee could only function if it were accompanied

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by a clear coordination and harmonization of the economic and fiscal policy of the EC member states. This presupposed however a higher degree of political integration than today existed. The nations were not ready to orient their budgets according to the interests of the community if the political goals of the members were not identical. In spite of the relatively good functioning of the European Political Cooperation in the foreign policy area, which unfortunately did not stand in any connection with the EC, the political integration in recent years had made no genuine progress. Recession had extraordinarily impaired, even if not made impossible, the attempts around the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s to coordinate the economic and social policy. Not even the currency snake functioned in the framework of the EC. Since the Luxemburg Compromise of 1965/66, the initiative right, which was due to the European Commission on the basis of the Rome Treaties, had been substantially limited to the benefit of the Council of Ministers. In the Council of Ministers almost only the national standpoints were represented. Decisions were made almost only on the basis of the lowest denominator. The creation of the European Council had changed nothing decisive in that. A union, of whatever type, presupposed however a functioning decision mechanism. Since the Luxemburg Compromise had essentially abolished the majority voting right, there no longer existed in view of the re-nationalization of the economies the chance to set through an effective coordination and harmonization of the economies of the EC partner states. The recession had shown how heterogeneous the economic structures of the individual states were. In the crisis, each nation thought only of itself, and since a political union did not exist and there also was no prospect for this at the moment, the fundamental preconditions for an economic and currency union were not present. If Jacques Rueff, whom Jenkins cited, had said in 1949, "L'Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas," then this standpoint was perhaps understandable from the view of a pure finance expert, but was unrealistic from political perspectives. The experiences with the proposals of the Werner Committee had shown that clearly. Monetary means alone could not solve the problem in Europe. What would be necessary to come to a similar solution? This question was all the more justified as the widening of the EC to twelve member states would further sharpen the existing stagnation within the EC. All three states (Spain, Greece and Portugal) were still not ripe to become full members of the community, in fact neither politically nor economically. How could a coordination be possible of these economies with the Nine, which functioned neither at the time among the six nor today among the nine member states? If one on the other hand considered the attitude of Britain to the EC and knew that France, exactly as in the last twenty years, still insisted on total independence, then how could one imagine the functioning of a currency union in view of the extraordinary divergence of the inflation numbers, of the high unemployment, of the structural differences of the individual economies and of the special needs of the three Mediterranean states. For a Europe of the six or seven, including Britain, a real chance would exist in the repeal of the Luxemburg Compromise to master these problems in the long run. In the process, however the question had to be asked whether a majority decision on the basis of an application of the Commission, which the special situation of the individual countries already drew in view, could at all be carried out, if for instance the trade unions in England, France or Italy did not play a part in the wage question. Then, the majority decision would come to nothing and would be unrealizable. The readiness for mutual aid had its limits since all the states were in a crisis and had large budget deficits. With each majority decision, the Federal Republic would be again challenged. If this would happen beyond an acceptable extent, which was today certain, also the Europe-friendliness, which still existed in the Federal Republic, would be very strongly reduced. There would still be a second solution, a "Europe à deux vitesses." That would be therefore perhaps in Britain in 1980 the case. But then would again emerge the problem whether these states would submit at all to a majority decision, also only of a core Europe. (KB to Helmut Haeusgen, Member of the VS of the *Dresdner Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 5 December 1977, K141/1). The extraordinarily large structural differences between the various countries of the European continent and the astonishing phenomena that in spite of the USSR this danger was no longer recognized as a *Fédérateur* made Birrenbach extremely concerned. The decision-process in Brussels no longer functioned at all, even less in case of a renewed widening. In France and Britain, Birrenbach had ascertained in many places that a rescinding of the Luxemburg Compromise or the accepting of a "Europe à deux vitesses" as a remedy was only with difficulty acceptable. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). Like Guth, Birrenbach considered pure fantasy Jenkins' ideas to make a currency union without a clear coordination of the economic and fiscal policy, which presupposed for their part in turn a high degree of political integration. Jenkins did not even accept the re-establishment of the majority voting right in the EC or a "Europe à deux vitesses." (KB to Dr. Wilfried Guth, *Vorstand* member of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, K153/1).

convoy.”<sup>216</sup> All this was intended to increase the American interest in a long-run partnership with Europe and to facilitate closer trans-Atlantic relations.

However, even as Birrenbach insisted that he remained a staunch friend of the US, he continued to attribute to it a sizeable role in the trans-Atlantic difficulties. True, from at least the late 1970s on, Birrenbach generally preferred Republicans to Democrats, seeing them contributing to a much-needed *Trendwende* in the US with respect to foreign and military, as well as economic, policy. In 1982, facing imminent Democratic electoral victories, he remarked, “To imagine that Ted Kennedy would become President... would induce me almost to emigrate a second time in my life.”<sup>217</sup> That said, Birrenbach did not

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Birrenbach pointed to the system of the currency snake as an application of this principle (“à deux vitesses”) that could be studied and applied to other political situations. In supporting such ideas, Birrenbach recognized the difficulties involved in the foreseeable future (e.g. including getting the consent of all the members of the community), not least due to the doubts, skepticism and rejection expressed by the majority of leading West European personalities with whom Birrenbach had had contact, but also rejected the notion that such an approach was discriminatory and would create two classes of members, arguing that each member invoking the veto right would later be able to follow the general political trend. At least with respect to the Atlantic framework, Birrenbach saw this as consisting of France, Britain and the FRG. Sensing the potential dangers (hinder; potentially destructive crisis) to NATO and the EC (process of European unification), at least in the Atlantic framework, Birrenbach promoted an informal, non-institutionalized approach. To the very end, though he continued to favor good Franco-German relations/cooperation, Birrenbach continued to oppose purely Franco-German initiatives or any semblance of Franco-German union, since they could split Europe (frighten the English and continental states) and Europe from the US. As of July 1984, Birrenbach rejected the plan for the creation of a joint Franco-German military cooperation involving 30 divisions of both states. The situation in Europe, including a deep rift (difficult relations) between France and Britain during the 1980s, prevented such ideas from ever being really possible for the time being. As of September 1984, in perhaps a related (same?) suggestion, Birrenbach proposed the creation of a US-European Strategic Council that would involve secret negotiations of the representatives of the government chiefs about the overall strategy/policies to be applied towards the USSR (caucus of power). As of July 1979, Birrenbach saw the attitude of a series of European countries presenting obstacles to European integration. Birrenbach continued to believe in the concept of “interdependence” between the West European powers.

<sup>216</sup> KB to Monnet, 13 February 1976. As he insisted to Monnet, “[w]e cannot wait in Europe until the last partner has begun to understand in what a dangerous situation we are.” (KB to Monnet, 22 July 1975). As Birrenbach put it, “We cannot wait forever.” (KB to Monnet, 13 February 1976).

<sup>217</sup> For the Ted Kennedy emigration quote, see KB to Haig, 30 June 1982. To Birrenbach, Mondale was “the embodiment of the American freeze movement.” (KB to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2). As of October 1984, Birrenbach found Weinberger too hawkish and believed that, together with the two undersecretaries of state (Iklé and Pearl), he had attained a power position that was too strong. As of June 1979, Birrenbach believed that “with embracements you cannot solve the problem, neither in the Middle East, nor in the SALT negotiations.” (KB to Ball, 27 June 1979). Birrenbach advocated tough US measures/threats against Iran if it did not release the US hostages. As of 2 April 1980, Birrenbach believed Carter’s letters to Banisadr and Khomeini were “foolish.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980). Birrenbach



consider either Carter or Reagan a real statesman, rather incompetent figures exhibiting grave personality and character flaws and a distinct lack of judgment, experience, knowledge and understanding of the complexities of federal and international affairs.<sup>218</sup> As Birrenbach put it, “neither [Reagan] nor his predecessor have been real presidents.”<sup>219</sup> Meanwhile, both administrations featured dysfunctional power structures and policy-making processes, populated by foreign and defense policy advisors of remarkably poor quality and composition, in many cases suffering the same defects as the presidents.<sup>220</sup>

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seems to have applauded the courage of hostage rescue efforts (Teheran, Entebbe, Mogadishu). As of 30 January 1978, Birrenbach argued one should not leave decisions about weapons deployments to timid and naive people. Birrenbach seems to have recognized a cooling off of tensions by the mid-1980s. As of October 1986, Birrenbach did not expect a difficult international crisis. (*Notizen zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, and *Anhang*, 15 October 1986, by KB). One can extend the concept of hawkishness to include Birrenbach’s insistence as of December 1977 that with respect to nuclear energy questions “we need hardness externally as well as internally.” (KB to Haunschild, 20 December 1977). In the economic respect, Birrenbach credited Reagan with the courage to cut the budget (social expenditures) and apparently to cut taxes. Birrenbach did complain about the composition of Reagan’s defense budget and also criticized certain elements of Reagan’s economic plans since they were not differentiated enough. Birrenbach professed a recognition of Carter’s character, firmness and high intelligence. With respect to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach did complain at least about the time lost in solving the problem of sheltering the MX (maybe also other arms programs). Birrenbach preferred a Reagan administration to the various Democratic presidential possibilities (e.g. Carter, Ted Kennedy, Mondale/Ferraro, Gary Hart).<sup>218</sup> Birrenbach believed they also lacked an understanding of economics issues. Echoing what the Americans said, Birrenbach argued that Reagan was more a “communicator” or “performer.” On Reagan being “a communicator,” see KB to McCloy, 9 January 1986. On Reagan as a “performer,” see KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983. Birrenbach viewed Carter as remarkably obstinate and as someone who did not listen to his advisors or genuinely discuss the issues prior to making decisions. Perhaps hinting at the same traits, Birrenbach argued that Reagan could not be influenced rationally. With regard to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach complained about the dominance of the White House, which did not accept the advice of really competent political personalities, and the too small role of the State Department. Among the personal flaws Birrenbach detected were irrationality, emotionalism and a reliance on mere intuition.

<sup>219</sup> KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 29 June 1982. Summing it up to an American contact, Birrenbach remarked, “You have no real President.” (KB to Bowie, 3 April 1980). In some instances, Birrenbach saw the US trying to carry out policies though lacking the necessary means.

<sup>220</sup> Birrenbach saw divisions among the close foreign and defense policy advisors and multiple centers of authority producing multiple voices attempting to speak on foreign policy. Birrenbach complained that the Carter administration was addressing too many complicated matters on all the continents at the same time rather than focusing the entire attention of the cabinet on each. In the Reagan administration, Birrenbach saw differences between the groups centered on Meese, Weinberger (defense policy) and Haig (foreign policy) and stressed the need to bridge these differences. Birrenbach also complained that there were too many personalities with influence with Reagan. The differences between the three groups in the Republican Party, of the right-wing, of the personalities from the American West and of the Ford-Kissinger group had not been overcome and played a large role with respect to the new occupation of posts. (KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1). With respect to the Carter administration, Birrenbach was very critical in these regards of Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, Secretary

Whereas the Carter administration conducted a weak, irresolute, passive foreign policy, overstressing morality and human rights, the Reagan administration engaged in an extreme, reckless, confrontational policy and rhetoric (e.g. the USSR as “evil empire”) in thrall to an insufficiently nuanced East-West worldview.<sup>221</sup> However, both carried out irrational, disoriented, unpredictable, flawed foreign policies and practices in a variety of

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of the Treasury Blumenthal, the NATO Ambassador, Warnke (appointed for SALT II), Hamilton Jordan (on the White House staff), Sorensen, Duncan (Brown’s deputy), Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State) and the UN Ambassador (Andrew Young). While not going into detail, Birrenbach was clearly not impressed with the personalities from other areas, for instance Lance or the Attorney General. While Birrenbach was pleased that Schlesinger had become Secretary of Energy, this also indicated that his influence on the President in foreign policy questions had clearly declined. Birrenbach’s criticisms of particular personalities sometimes came in spite of his recognition of their positive qualities in other respects. Thus, Birrenbach never doubted that Vance was a good man, only that he was no Acheson or Marshall or Ball, particularly in so far as Birrenbach feared that reaction from Vance that solely followed the attitude of his President. Likewise, Birrenbach had no doubt that Brown was a brilliant technologist and *Wissenschaftler*. However, he doubted whether Brown was just as brilliant a politician and administrator, as evidenced by the unconvincing degrees of his overreaction in the Vietnam War and his active regret later on. While Birrenbach personally liked Brzezinski very much and considered him a brilliant thinker, who was also more skeptical regarding détente than many others, Birrenbach doubted that he was just as good an “operator” and could think in power-political categories. With respect to the strength of personalities, Birrenbach complained that Vance only did what the President wanted, while Brzezinski at least tried to take a stronger position. Also of importance to some extent for Birrenbach were those personalities that were dropped. For instance, as of January 1978, Carter had dropped Arthur Burns of whom Birrenbach thought highly. For an extended version of Birrenbach’s critiques of Carter’s advisors (e.g. “not the *non plus ultra* of possible personnel decisions”), see KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 January 1977, K100/1. Birrenbach seems to have had a varied amount of personal relationship with the Carter and Reagan advisors and cabinet members. Birrenbach had known Brzezinski for years and enjoyed a particularly personal relationship to him. Through Ball, Birrenbach had met Mondale two years ago (I think as of January 1977) and spoken with him. Birrenbach claimed to know Blumenthal, though he did not know Carter’s Secretary of Commerce and does not appear to have known Charles Schultze (had heard much about him). Oddly enough, at some point, Birrenbach did praise the composition of the economic part of Carter’s cabinet (Blumenthal and Schultze). With respect to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach generally liked Secretary of State Haig but criticized the presence of Weinberger, Carlucci (Deputy Secretary of Defense), Donald Regan and Ken Adelman (Rostow’s successor in the State Department). In general, Birrenbach argued that the Reagan cabinet had too many professional *Wirtschaftler* (pure laymen like Weinberger and Carlucci) and not enough *Politiker*. Birrenbach criticized certain Reagan administration cabinet members as too hawkish (i.e. Weinberger). These power structures and policy-making processes were defective, flawed, confused, haphazard and uncoordinated. With respect to power structures and policy-making processes, Birrenbach referred to the White House, the executive, the US and the cabinet. Birrenbach found the advisors insufficiently strong (at least in the Carter administration) and too right-wing (in the Reagan administration).

<sup>221</sup> Birrenbach complained about the Carter administration’s unilateral concessions to the USSR in the hopes of future reciprocation and its (related?) annulling/delaying of key weapons systems. With respect to unilateral concessions to the USSR, Birrenbach pointed to the withdrawal of the neutron bomb proposal in the hopes of some form of reciprocation in the US-USSR SALT II negotiations. Among those weapons systems annulled/delayed were the B-1 bomber, neutron bomb, MX missile and Trident submarine. Birrenbach referred to the Carter administration’s human rights campaign as a “daring exploit [*Husarenstreich*].” The Reagan administration tended to view situations solely in East-West terms rather than truly seeing their different facets (e.g. the Near/Middle East conflict, with stress on the Persian Gulf).

issue areas (e.g. security, economics, energy) and regions (e.g. trans-Atlantic relations, East-West relations, Third World).<sup>222</sup> Though aware of certain strengths of these administrations, Birrenbach argued that especially, but not only, with respect to foreign policy “Reagan is, all told, as much a failure as Carter, only in the reversed sense.”<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> With respect to the Carter administration and the Third World, Birrenbach criticized its policies with respect to Iran (including the risky/hopeless and “tragic” failed hostage rescue effort in 1980), Afghanistan and Africa (including the Horn of Africa and South Africa). Birrenbach argued that the Iran hostage rescue effort had no chance of success in the midst of a city like Teheran that was not Mogadishu or Entebbe. He saw the Carter administration attaching too much importance to the Third World and enormously stoking the North-South conflict through the unwise treatment of the threshold countries of the Third World with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy (e.g. German-Brazil treaty). Birrenbach argued that the Carter administration’s ultimatum regarding the Olympic boycott had too short a term. With respect to the Reagan administration, Birrenbach criticized US Latin America policy and argued as of January 1982 that the Reagan administration had not fully understood the dangerous Third World crisis after the increase of oil prices. Birrenbach considered the foreign policy of these administrations in this period emotional, inconsistent, and unclear.

<sup>223</sup> KB to Kohl, 31 January 1983. Birrenbach also applied this verdict to economic policy. As of February 1985, Birrenbach considered it a pity that neither Carter nor Reagan followed Theodore Roosevelt’s admonition “to speak softly but carry a big stick.” (KB to Ball, 25 February 1985). At least to US contacts (e.g. McCloy), Birrenbach did admit Reagan had some merits (charismatic; correct general direction of policy, e.g. vis-à-vis the USSR; gave back courage and self-confidence to the American people (recover from Watergate and Vietnam); somewhat restored the strength of the US economy; somewhat rearmed the US). (e.g. KB to McCloy, 8 November 1984). Birrenbach ridiculed William Clark’s (Deputy Secretary of State) lack of foreign experience, “except three days in Santiago” (KB to McCloy, 4 February 1981). At one point, Birrenbach questioned with perhaps some sarcasm the possibility of learning the complex problems of foreign policy “even for a former member of the High Court of California.” (referring to William Clark here, in Birrenbach’s view somebody who had Reagan’s special confidence (cronyism?)). (KB to McCloy, 9 August 1983). Birrenbach seems to have had that European tendency, at least in later years, to simultaneously be concerned about the US being too resolute or too weak. In April 1980, upon hearing that Vance had just resigned, Birrenbach remarked “I would have done the same thing already years before.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 28 April 1980). As of October 1979, Birrenbach found the American leadership to be “nil [*gleich Null*].” The American government power [*Gewalt*] currently showed “chaotic traits.” (KB to Schmidt, 26 October 1979). In July 1979, examining the difficulties in carrying out the US energy program, Birrenbach remarked sarcastically, “[p]erhaps Hamilton Jordan will solve the problems!!” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 24 July 1979). As of April 1980, Birrenbach found the situation in the US “frightening [*beängstigend*].” The Carter administration “reaches in its vacillating [*schwankenden*] decisions the border of disgrace [*Blamage*].... We have not had a situation like this since more than a quarter century.” (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 2 April 1980). As of March 1980, Birrenbach remarked that “the problem Carter is *sui generis*.” (KB to Prof. Beckurts, 18 March 1980). Birrenbach was part of an international/foreign/world sentiment that disliked Carter and his policies in so far as they impacted on their own security. Birrenbach remarked about Carter, “[t]he man goes all-out [*aufs Ganze*] in all things and will with it fail.” (KB to Dr. Karl-Heinz Narjes, MdB, Kiel, 5 April 1977). Birrenbach’s criticism of the Carter administration ignored the fact that the administration steered the alliance to major accomplishments (agreement on the Long-Term Defense Program, the decision to increase real defense spending by three percent, and the approval for a major theater nuclear force initiative involving both arms control and modernized deployments). Birrenbach pointed with approval to James Reston having referred to Carter’s talkativeness [*Redseligkeit*] in the difficult Near East policy as the “open mouth policy.” (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1). As of August 1978, Birrenbach considered Carter an “emotional [*gefühlsgeladenen*] President, who thinks more in moral than

To the end, Birrenbach entertained many of the same fears with even increased intensity. Particularly after the “trauma” of Watergate and Vietnam, he was haunted by an incipient American isolationism/”introversion” (withdrawal to a “Fortress America”; less universal foreign policy; lack of engagement in Europe).<sup>224</sup> Such fears were piqued by his view of the reduced value of Europe as a glacis against the USSR since the 1950s and 60s, US inactivity (defeats) as of 1978-80 in areas like the SALT negotiations and the Third World, and the “neo-Mansfield” proposals even as of the mid-1980s in Congress and elsewhere by pro-European personalities like Kissinger and Senator Sam Nunn for a reduction of US troops in Europe and a limited separation of the US and Europe.<sup>225</sup>

Alluding to Raymond Aron, Birrenbach repeatedly complained that after Vietnam and Watergate the United States, no longer exercising the necessary leadership as in past

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in political logic.” (KB *Aktennotiz*, 8 August 1978). While Birrenbach acknowledged the importance of morality in the world of states, he argued that “it is not easy to confront men like Brezhnev and Amin on the basis of morality alone” and also doubted that a completely open foreign policy would be possible towards adversaries of this type (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 8 July 1976). Birrenbach even referred to “the problem Carter” (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1).

<sup>224</sup> In later years at least, Birrenbach worried about the US commitment to free trade (including with respect to steel) and saw an increasing threat of US protectionism. As of May 1977, Birrenbach believed that the US commitment to free trade was no longer as intense as in the 1950s and 1960s. He pointed to the electoral groups that had elected Carter and a series of stagnating economic branches in the US and the fact that the US had in recent months violated its obligation regarding high-grade steel [*Edelstahl*]. (KB to Prof. Walter Hallstein, Stuttgart, 31 May 1977, K141/1). As of December 1978, Birrenbach’s concern about trans-Atlantic relations was increased by the abandonment [*Fallenlassen*] of Taiwan (in spite of all correctness of the China decision). As of 1979-February 1980, Birrenbach found the US and US foreign policy incalculable [*unübersehbar*] at the moment and in the long-term. As of October 1979, Birrenbach found the American mood “indefinable.” On the “introvertedness” of the US Congress, see KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, Washington DC, 17 April 1979, ACDP K098/2.

<sup>225</sup> Such defeats for/failures of US policies in the Third World included Africa (e.g. Angola and Mozambique; Horn of Africa; Ethiopia), Asia (e.g. Taiwan, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, also mentions Korea), the Caribbean Sea (e.g. Cuba) and the Near/Middle East (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan; South Yemen). As of April 1977, Birrenbach considered the US attitude in Zaire pretty dangerous. In criticizing any isolationist tendencies in US policy, Birrenbach (perhaps simply agreeing with Zbigniew Brzezinski) cited in October 1979 Wendell Willkie’s declaration in 1944 that they lived “in one world” and argued that “[w]e cannot escape our destiny.” (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2). Apparently also Haig had made such proposals. With respect to “neo-Mansfield” proposals, see KB to Lord Carrington, 5 November 1984. With respect to Congress, as of February 1984 there had been since months a motion in the Congress to reduce US forces in Europe and as of July 1985 there was the Nunn Amendment. To the end, Birrenbach also opposed measures that would have reduced British troops on the continent and wanted British forces stationed there. Nunn was a Democrat.

decades and aimlessly adrift, was no longer an “imperial power” as it had still been in the 1960s.<sup>226</sup> Meanwhile, Birrenbach feared an American bilateralism that focused on improving the relations and addressing the mutual interests of the superpowers while ignoring the interests of and relations with the European allies. For instance, in surveying détente, including the various arms control negotiations (e.g. SALT II; Carter), as well as the structure of the US nuclear build-up, Birrenbach came to fear the prospects of a theater war (nuclear conflict) limited to Europe while sparing the territorial *Sanktuaria* of the two world powers.<sup>227</sup> As of 1979, Birrenbach complained about doubts among

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<sup>226</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 19 March 1980, ACDP K209/2. Unfortunately, everybody knew that “America is no longer the Imperial Republic, as Raymond Aron has once called it.” That manifested itself especially also in the economic area. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to *Ministerialdirektor* Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1). At the time (I think middle of the 1960s), the US was still, as Raymond Aron had designated it, an “*imperiale Macht*.” After Vietnam and Watergate under Carter, they no longer are, as was shown almost daily. (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3). From their own interest, the Americans would not act as they would have when they were still an imperial power. They are no longer that today in the same sense. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2). A European unification, step for step, was today more necessary than ever, since to a great extent the US was no longer the “*puissance impériale*” that it had been in the past years since the entrance into WWII. Could you imagine Carter on the throne of Louis XIV? I lack all the imagination necessary for it. But that could be a mistake on my part. Birrenbach had foreseen the situation in America since years. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2). Birrenbach believed that without the creation of a European power center things simply would not work out in view of the dubiousness [*Zweifelhaftigkeit*] of the American posture [*Haltung*] vis-à-vis the conflict points in the world. For instance, the British fleet had left the Persian Gulf. How did it look there now? The withdrawal [*Rückzug*] of England from the world was almost as disastrous [*verhängnisvoll*] as the current American policy of President Carter, which could be foreseen from the first second of his entrance in the primaries. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Ralf Dahrendorf, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 16 February 1979, K068/2). Some declarations by the last American president and experiences with American policy after Vietnam and Watergate made many people in many nations doubt whether the United States would still be the imperial power as Raymond Aron called it in his book that appeared in 1973 about the foreign and military policy of the United States. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). The USSR was an imperial power and did not think in terms of arms control. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). As of June 1978, Birrenbach moaned that neither an “imperial presidency” nor an “imperial republic” were currently recognizable (KB to *Ministerialdirektor* Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1).

<sup>227</sup> With regard to SALT II, for instance, Birrenbach was upset about the limited range of cruise missiles and the prohibition on the transfer of certain (weapons) technology and cruise missiles themselves from the US to Europe/NATO. Birrenbach seems to have seen détente as consisting of compromises and understandings to settle conflicts.

Europeans, including himself, about the lack of US leadership due to recent events.<sup>228</sup>

Birrenbach also feared American unilateralism, repeatedly expressed in hasty actions carried out without proper consultation or coordination with the European powers on issues like the neutron bomb as well as trade with and sanctions against the East.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Without clear American leadership, NATO would never function, by which Birrenbach meant military as well as political and perhaps economic leadership. Only American leadership and clear readiness to act would awaken a series of European nations. (KB to Haig, US Army, SACEUR, 22 March 1979, K153/1). Strong US leadership would be able to overcome the spirit of successive weakening that could be observed everywhere (I believe in Europe). (KB to Schaezel, 20 November 1978, K098/2). All this should be done without a too strong rhetoric and be accompanied by moral demonstrations in the Western world. But would the Federal Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Britain and other countries be successful in this test, in spite of Soviet threats. The final success, relative as it may be, would depend on the credibility of American power and the American diplomatic attempts to hold together Western Europe. The future could not be foreseen today. Much would depend on American policy expressed with one voice. (KB to Haig, 18 January 1982, K146/2). We could only act if the United States, the strongest power, would lead and make it quite clear to your allies that one could not, acting in a reasonable way, reach peace without the readiness to take risks. Upon the answer to this question would depend the unity of NATO, the security of the West and also of the US. (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 15 October 1979, K098/2). Without a restoration of the authority of the US in the world, there would be no real peace in the world or solution of the Middle East problem. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). The increase of the budget accepted by Congress was a good symptom, and Birrenbach thought this all would influence the nations in Europe to strengthen their forces and try to think more in global terms than in the past. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). If the United States were still the strongest power in the West and if the decision-making process in the United States were convincing it would be easier to motivate the Europeans to hold the line in Europe with more proper forces. (KB to Nitze, 4 July 1980, K134/1). Only a strong US which exercised real leadership in the Western world could change the situation. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, Department of State, 17 April 1979, K098/2). Only if the US re-established its authority as the leadership power through it that it also had the means to intervene in an emergency for the protection of Europe would trust in Europe quickly appear again. (KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1). On account of the “unprevisibility” of the decision of the US leadership in recent years, the Europeans did not know in which situation they would be if they blindly followed the US lead. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). The present world was no longer that of the 1960s or start of the 1970s. Think only of the danger of an energy crisis or the blockage of raw material or the closure of sea lanes, and you will understand why the Europeans need an encouragement. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). If the US would not again take a really leading position in world politics, at least in essential parts of the globe, this situation would worsen and weaken the US’s European flank and also access to the most important raw material resources in the world. We are facing not only an East-West conflict, but also a North-South conflict. The combination of both could be of a disastrous consequence for all of us. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). The administration and Congress were big obstacles to overcoming the difficulties the US was facing now and which were weakening its international position as a leader of the West. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1). The leadership failed. Therefore, there was no clear line in the strategy deliberations of the alliance. That was not surprising because on the one hand the US itself was now deadly vulnerable and on the other hand the military defensive power [*Abwehrkraft*] of the European nations was subjected to an increasingly strong “process of contraction [*Schrumpungsprozeß*]” due to the welfare-state thought and in view of the critical economic situation (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).

<sup>229</sup> As of January-March 1982 regarding threat/imposition of sanctions on the USSR/Poland regarding Poland (Reagan). As of September 1982, the US had not expressed its opinion regarding the gas-pipeline deal to the federal government clearly and early enough. Birrenbach argued that only sanctions (including

In this context, Birrenbach had a mixed attitude in later years towards the phenomenon of a surging, institutionalised neo-conservatism in the United States. On the one hand, he saw the unilateralism espoused by some neo-conservatives, for instance Irving Kristol, as part of a reversion in the West into “national-state thought” and feared that it threatened “fatal consequences.”<sup>230</sup> On the other, in analyzing the strategic situation during the Carter years, especially the US-USSR military balance and SALT II, Birrenbach embraced and came under the influence of the efforts of the alarmist/militarist Committee on the Present Danger. Founded in November 1976, this private action committee, based in Washington, DC, aimed to dramatically alter American foreign and defense policy, especially recommending the need for a military build-up directed against the USSR.<sup>231</sup> Its members, all of them Americans, included a number of Birrenbach’s most respected contacts, including Eugene Rostow (Chairman of the ExComm) and Paul Nitze (Chairman of Policy Studies).<sup>232</sup> Birrenbach relied greatly on the information,

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grain and modern technologies) that were supported by all the NATO/Western countries (not just the US) would be effective (influence the USSR to abandon its present intentions; be useful in solving the Polish problem). With respect to the neutron bomb, this had happened on at least two occasions as of February 1981, including in 1977 regarding its construction.

<sup>230</sup> On the “fatal consequences” of such unilateralism, see KB to Rostow, 2 October 1984. Among the neo-conservative institutions was the Committee for the Free World, founded in 1981 by American and European neo-conservatives. This committee, in which Irving Kristol, John Podhoretz, Vladimir Bukovsky, Sidney Hook, Richard Burt and Eugene Rostow and the prominent neo-conservatives of multiple generations (including many intellectuals) were involved, held annual two-day conferences and debates (on the State of the Nation), including in Washington DC (in the modest function room of the Washington Hyatt) in May or June 1984. Neo-conservatism was characterized by the grandiosity of its views and its perception of a favorable American cultural condition compared to that of a declining Europe.

<sup>231</sup> The CPD was not an Atlanticist institution *per se* since it was also interested in Far East questions.

<sup>232</sup> The CPD billed itself as “a non-profit, non-partisan educational organization of private citizens devoted to the Peace, Security and Liberty of the Nation.” As of 1978, the CPD was intentionally a small group rather than one with a mass of members and had about 150 directors and several hundred non-voting members. The co-chairmen of the CPD were Henry Fowler (Goldman, Sachs & Company, NYC), Lane Kirkland and Hon. David Packard (Hewlett-Packard Co., Palo Alto, CA). The Treasurer of the CPD was Charles E. Walker, its Counsel was Max Kampelman and the Director was Charles Tyroler II. The CPD had a Board of Directors (from all around the country), which held annual meetings/dinners in DC (with discussions). Members of the CPD ExComm included, among others, Richard Allen, Richard Pipes, Prof. Dean Rusk (University of Georgia), and Elmo Zumwalt. The CPD apparently had a staff. Strausz-Hupé might also have had some links to the CPD. The CPD still existed as of 1984. The CPD was a harsh,

analyses and other products generated and issued by the CPD, which he received from his CPD contacts (especially Rostow), sometimes even disingenuously presenting their arguments as his own.<sup>233</sup> Seen as a whole, Birrenbach's relationship with the CPD

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(Cold Warriors), hard-line neo-conservative organization (e.g. anti-SALT II, anti-McGovern, anti-Carter ("a secret McGovernite" as Rostow referred to him, Rostow to KB, 11 May 1978); anti-Carter administration, anti-USSR, anti-Kissinger, pro-military buildup, pro-Reagan). The CPD had a number of goals: to preserve (world) peace and halt a slide to war (approaching general war); preserve the balance of power vs. the USSR; to restore US military strength (rearmament; increased military budget; conventional and strategic); to preserve freedom; to defend the US (and the non-communist world) and its security and interests vs. USSR expansion. At least sometimes on behalf of the CPD, CPD members contacted and sought to influence the President (Carter; Brzezinski; administration; officials of the Executive branch) and individual cabinet members (Brown) and Congress people (e.g. Sen. Jackson) and US Presidential candidates (Nitze and Rostow with Reagan and his foreign policy team) and testified before Congress (key Congressional Committees like the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) and sought to influence US public opinion throughout the country (lectures; appeared on big Sunday talk shows; press conferences; participated in and talked at conferences; speaking and writing; reprinting, quoting, digesting, summarizing of CPD statements in press and other media). The CPD manifested all the trappings of neo-conservatism (the love of Senator Jackson; false historical (especially WWII-era) analogies, such as comparing the current situation to that of the 1930s and comparing the USSR with Hitler, appeasement, comparisons to the days before Pearl Harbor; the superficial veneration of Churchill (as of November 1979, Rostow had even come to imitating Churchill's habit of taking a real nap each day); the labeling of opponents as "defeatists" and "appeasers" and "McGovern Democrats" and "isolationists" and comparing themselves to the anti-appeasers and "troublemakers"; the sense that their opponents were awake or subject to illusions; the delusions of grandeur (e.g. in battle); the unnecessary allusions to classical literature and philosophy; crisis-mongering; the silly admiration of Russian dissidents like Solzhenitsyn, at least some of whom would only have contempt for such neo-cons; the shameless fear mongering regarding opposition (USSR) (military) strength, skill/intelligence and expansionist intentions). Rostow seems to have realized that he was virtually delusional, remarking to Birrenbach that "You and I are sons of Don Quixote, so we shall never really give up tilting at windmills [e.g. of orthodoxy]." (Rostow to KB, 4 September 1979). Did he know what this meant? Birrenbach seems to have been also taken in by other CPD scares, being as of October 1979 very concerned about the Cuba brigade and "the Cuba crisis." The CPD represented the phenomenon of civilian militarism and also a change of mood in the US. Rostow was still chairman of the ExComm as of September 1979. As Chairman of Policy Studies as of 1978, Nitze directed (provided, prepared) the various CPD analyses (studies). The CPD also claimed to try to influence economic policy and to revitalize the solidarity of the US alliance system.

<sup>233</sup> These circulated products also included policy statements, brochures, studies, reports, testimony and speeches. Birrenbach's reports on the state of the SALT II negotiations were based on extensive, secret, detailed, original, US material on this theme from a competent US side (CPD?). Birrenbach seems to have viewed the up-to-date materials provided to him by his CPD contacts as the product of the most important American arms experts (competent/prominent/leading US personalities). Birrenbach gave Guth Birrenbach's situation report about SALT. In the last two or three years post-*Bundestag*, Birrenbach's American friends had always made the secret SALT papers available. Birrenbach had then made these available, completely reworked, to the Chancellor, foreign minister, defense minister and Carstens. (KB to Dr. rer. pol. Wilfried Guth, *Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 5 July 1979, K034/3). Birrenbach's last letter to Schmidt had been on 14 March, with which Birrenbach had sent Schmidt his secret report about the state of the SALT negotiations at the end of last year. This had been based on original American figures given to Birrenbach. (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3). Birrenbach had gotten a series of evidence on the SALT agreement in the English text. Birrenbach had expressed his opinion on the whole SALT question clearly to a very representative figure that stood close to Birrenbach among the attestors. (KB to Dr. Werner



suggests a broader trans-national, largely civilian, phenomenon during this period in both the US and Europe focused on talking down the Western defense capacity and strategy.<sup>234</sup>

Indeed, given his anti-Carter efforts in the Federal Republic, which were facilitated and encouraged by the CPD, with regard to issues like SALT II and the neutron bomb,

Birrenbach informed Rostow that he even considered himself “an associated member of your group.”<sup>235</sup>

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Marx, MdB, Chair of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 27 August 1979, K034/2). Yesterday evening, Birrenbach had gotten the original text of SALT. (KB to Gerard Smith, Ambassador at Large, State Dept., 27 June 1979, K098/2). Birrenbach had studied the SALT treaty very thoroughly in the course of the negotiations since he got much information, including of a secret character. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). Birrenbach knew roughly Carter’s fallback position for the SALT negotiations on the basis of a discrete message passed on to Birrenbach from a reliable source. (KB to Carstens, President, German *Bundestag*, 12 May 1977, K151/2). Birrenbach had studied very thoroughly (private studies) and reached conclusions on the whole SALT complex on the basis of first-hand reports. Birrenbach wrote about it, of course without mentioning the names, to the Chancellor and German President. (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). Birrenbach could not make available to Gillessen the reports that he, after his last US trip, had presented to the Chancellor, foreign minister and defense minister about the SALT conceptions of the US administration and had discussed with them. (KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, 153/1). Rostow sent Birrenbach his talk on “SALT II-A Soft Bargain, A Hard Sell: An Assessment of SALT in Historical Perspective,” by E. Rostow, Sterling Prof. of Law, Yale Law School, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Chairman, ExComm, Committee on the Present Danger, DC; a talk presented at a Conference on US Security and the Soviet Challenge, 25 July 1978, Hartford, CT. Birrenbach saw the CPD as part of a subtle trend to the right in the US population, which included a belated reaction to the USSR Africa policy and the resistance of influential groups against the conclusion of the SALT II treaty in the form planned by the Carter administration (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, K098/2). Meanwhile, Birrenbach simply dismissed as counterproductive any (US) expert analysis that suggested that perhaps there was not such a disequilibrium of power as he insisted (KB to Gerard Smith, Amb. at Large, State Dept., 8 June 1979, K098/2). As of August 1979, *Orbis* had published an alarming article (sent to Birrenbach by Kintner) by Ori Even-Tov on NATO Conventional Defense. In later years, Birrenbach claimed that numerous American friends of his, including those in high positions, understood and approved of his views on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposed US policy in this regard and encouraged him to speak out clearly on this issue. Among those items Birrenbach passed on to Chancellor Schmidt, the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister Leber was his secret SALT report. Birrenbach also passed on information (e.g. regarding SALT) to the Undersecretary of State in the German Foreign Office for Nuclear Affairs (at the request of the Foreign Minister). For instance, Birrenbach pointed to the secret, detailed, original US materials he received pertaining to SALT II and the information he received (am informed) on the state of the SALT II negotiations (including the US attitude) from US sources.

<sup>234</sup> Another element of the CPD functioning in a transnational manner was that CPD members traveled all over the world (e.g. Europe, Iran and China) to talk to responsible government and military leaders (and members of the foreign offices and the leaders of foreign affairs institutes).

<sup>235</sup> KB to E. Rostow, 15 December 1977. Due to its potentially self-fulfilling nature, Birrenbach’s “poor-mouthing” of US strategic forces, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent and the strategic situation irritated some of his foreign and German contacts (e.g. Brzezinski, Gerard Smith, McCloy, Helmut Schmidt). Schmidt was also particularly disturbed about Birrenbach’s CPD links and the fact that Birrenbach often expressed himself on DGAP letterhead as the DGAP President, thus creating false

While highly critical of the Carter and Reagan administrations (the quality of US leadership), Birrenbach perceived, more importantly, systemic problems in the US that seriously impaired American foreign policy.<sup>236</sup> By 1976 and thereafter, he was

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impressions. In May 1978, Brzezinski believed that they would be greatly helped if people like Birrenbach would help reinforce in Europe the message of US commitment to Europe (Zbigniew Brzezinski to KB, 13 May 1978). In August 1979, Gerard Smith insisted, perhaps in a subtle hint to Birrenbach, that “[w]e must not let ‘poor-mouthing’ of our strategic forces unnerve us.” (Gerard Smith to KB, 20 August 1979). Given his talking down, Birrenbach appears to have often claimed that he shared McCloy’s opinions even when he apparently did not. As of February 1981, Birrenbach claimed to share McCloy’s opinion that the skepticism, suspicions and doubts prevalent in Europe regarding the stability and reliability of the US as an ally in the East-West struggle were not justified. He claimed to be fully aware that the Carter era had ended. As of 1983, Schmidt did not believe that the military equilibrium had substantially deteriorated to their disadvantage over the last 15 years. With a letter of 30 October 1979, Chancellor Schmidt informed Birrenbach that he was sure that many members of the DGAP would not share Birrenbach’s negative assessment of SALT II. His letter to the USA could therefore evoke a false impression. (Schmidt to KB, 30 October 1979). Schmidt had the firmness to tell Birrenbach off. Chancellor Schmidt was critical of some of Birrenbach’s activities in later years. Chancellor Schmidt was critical of Birrenbach’s relationship with the anti-SALT II and anti-President Carter lobby in the US (e.g. CPD) which strengthened that lobby. Schmidt viewed this as potentially “catastrophic [*verhängnisvoll*]” (Schmidt to KB, 22 March 1979). As of November 1979, Schmidt expressed concerns regarding the attitude of Birrenbach’s US friends and their impact on Birrenbach’s understanding of German-US relations (KB to Schmidt, 2 November 1979). Birrenbach and Schmidt seem to have openly differed in their assessments of the SALT II treaty. Birrenbach also seems to have openly disagreed with Brzezinski in their assessment of the SALT II treaty. As of June 1979, Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing had issued a declaration favoring ratification of SALT II. Such talking down helped undermine the message of a US commitment to Europe and the credibility and deterrence of the alliance. The phrase “poor-mouthing” comes from Gerard Smith to KB, 20 August 1979. In later years, Birrenbach’s hard-line views brought him into disagreement with certain personalities of the *Wissenschaft* like Adolf Butenandt (regarding nuclear weapons in Europe/the West) and Hans Merkle (vs. SDI). Helmut Schmidt was Vice President of the DGAP throughout Birrenbach’s presidency, and as of December 1979, Schmidt had had a long-years intensive connection with the DGAP and as of December 1985, Schmidt took part in DGAP meetings.

<sup>236</sup> Birrenbach saw Reagan as not being up to people like Truman, Eisenhower or Ford (KB to Kissinger, 25 October 1984). From the start, Birrenbach had said that Carter was an amateur. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to *Ministerialdirektor* Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1). Birrenbach showed particular worry about the American situation. “The main problem is naturally the President [Carter], if one can refer to him as such.” (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3). Carter cannot stand in such positions people who would say “no” to a demand from him. However, this American could and had done that in a world historical situation and drawn from it the consequences. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3). When in July 1978 the American President had personally answered Birrenbach’s question when the West would be in a position to offset the military imbalance by saying that there existed an American superiority both in conventional, tactical-nuclear as in the inter-continental area, this sentence required no comment. It illuminated the situation. (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, confidential, 26 March 1979, K033/3). The seriousness of the situation was compounded by the fact that a completely “*unstaatsmännische*” personality was the leader of the American nation, who even-“*terribile dictu*”- had the chance of becoming his own successor. (KB to Dr. Werner Marx, MdB, Chair of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 27 August 1979, K034/2). Birrenbach was “upset [*bestürzt*]” about Reagan’s careless, imprecise expressions and the stuttering answers to the questions of journalists. Birrenbach had the impression that as a coordinator for the foreign policy Reagan lacked in the foreseeable time the sufficient knowledge of the details. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von

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Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2). The situation in the United States had worsened. The president did not have control since he had no experience. Birrenbach feared that a key figure in this framework could fall. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2). Birrenbach had already told Kohl repeatedly that Reagan was not Birrenbach's case. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2). In the past year, Birrenbach had asked the President when he believed that it would be possible to come to a balance on the European continent. The President had answered that there existed no imbalance in any of the three sectors of the triad. "What is one supposed to say to that?" (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Dr. Werner Marx, MdB, Chairman of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, confidential, 13 August 1979, K034/2). Birrenbach believed that President Carter answered his oblique question in the context of I think the June 1978 TC on the neutron weapon evasively. Birrenbach referred to Carter's statements at Notre Dame University, which bordered on the "laughable [*Lächerlichkeit*]." If one tried in this way, with "decency [*Anstand*]" and "optimism," to dominate [*dominieren*] the challenge of history, the result was today already clear. The facts of this administration, which Brzezinski counted up, were only in part of real historical and lasting value, therefore no "real and concrete achievements." (KB, Berliner Allee, Düsseldorf, to Dr. Werner Marx, MdB, Chairman of the AK V of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, confidential, 13 August 1979, K034/2). Birrenbach never considered correct the rhetoric of the Reagan administration. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the *MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV*, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1). Furthermore, the American rhetoric used in the course of recent years à la Orlando would make it hard for European parliaments to approve larger contributions to their defense. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 November 1984, K074/1). The new US administration for several reasons had no clear orientation. It was unpredictable. This was a problem of great importance. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Adenauerallee 133, Bonn), President, to Prof. Raymond Aron, *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Centre Européen de Sociologie Historique*, Paris, 22 September 1977, K074/1). You can imagine what Birrenbach thought about Reagan's speech at Orlando, his joke in Los Angeles or the remark of a crusade against the Soviet Union two months ago. Weinberger was an inflexible hawk. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2). A result could not be reached with a rhetoric à la Orlando. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984, K160/2). Birrenbach had not yet arrived at a definite conclusion regarding what would happen in the next years. When he knew Carter's choices for Secretaries of State and Defense, he would know more concretely what Carter would do in the future. Birrenbach did not have the impression that Ball or Brzezinski would be appointed for this position. Birrenbach doubted that men who were as strong as Schlesinger or Nitze would become the head of the Pentagon. The new President had only limited experience in foreign affairs and wanted to be his own foreign secretary. Therefore, Birrenbach had a feeling of uncertainty, which was serious. (KB to Sen. Javits, 18 November 1976, K100/1). Like Birrenbach, many people in the Federal Republic had no confidence in the present American leadership. (KB to McCloy, 27 May 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach referred to the fear in the Federal Republic (among prominent German personalities) that the personality of the US President and Congress did not assure them that a change in mood of the US (the abandoning of the post-Vietnam and Watergate attitude) would lead to real American action in the present crisis. (KB to McCloy, 19 February 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach did not believe in the capacity of the US President. The US President had told Birrenbach personally, etc. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). The President spoke as either a dreamer or a convinced pacifist who could not lead in the world of today the biggest Western military power. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). President Carter was intelligent and strong-willed but without any foreign policy and federal political experience and filled by an almost "messianic hubris." His main collaborators in the foreign- and defense-political field were not personalities of outstanding format. Carter would not be a Truman because he neither surrounded himself with strong personalities in the foreign policy area nor would listen to their advice in an emergency since he wanted to be his own foreign secretary. (KB to Carstens, 19 April 1977, K151/2). Birrenbach's general negative impressions about the US president had been confirmed after he had met Carter himself (I think within the context of the TC meeting in Washington DC of June 1978). (KB to Kohl, Chairman of the *Unionsfraktion*, 19 June 1978, K153/1). With greatest care, the choices (regarding the cabinet) had so been carried out that none of the candidates was in the situation to thwart [*in den Arm zu fallen*] the inexperienced President, if he would take a decision. (KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 January

convinced that the US presidential/constitutional/executive system no longer functioned effectively in this regard (since almost a decade as of 1982). The principles for selecting the US executive (electoral system; political leadership) had been devised at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century when the US was still a territorial state and was inappropriate for the present needs of a global superpower. Birrenbach often referred with approval to Lord Acton's 1894 "Lectures on Modern History," where the British historian argued that the constitution's rules regarding the election of the president and vice-president were "a total failure."<sup>237</sup> Furthermore, Birrenbach continued to be concerned about the substantial development of Executive-Legislative relations (power shift), believing that following Watergate and Vietnam, the executive had become too dependent on the consent of Congress in foreign policy (e.g. War Powers Act; abolition of the seniority

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1977, K100/1). The main problem was in Carter's personality. (KB to Amb. Berndt von Staden, DC, 24 January 1977, K100/1). Birrenbach had concerns regarding Carter. Already since June 1976, Birrenbach had repeatedly said that Carter would not be a Truman, as was often asserted, because he neither surrounded himself with strong personalities in the foreign policy area nor would listen to their advice in an emergency, since he desired to be his own foreign secretary. Vance would not be able to set himself through against Carter. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1). A President (Carter) who had no foreign affairs experience and was so deeply convinced that he was right in all he said was a certain risk. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*, 10 January 1977, K100/1). The composition of the cabinet had confirmed what Birrenbach had told Bundy in his letter of 8 November. In some aspects, Carter's cabinet was better than could be foreseen, especially with respect to the realm of finance and economics. But in the field of foreign affairs and defense, Birrenbach was not fully satisfied. Vance was a good choice, but he was not an Acheson, Marshall or Ball. A very competent US friend had told Birrenbach that he was a first-class second man. Christopher's experience for the position of Deputy Secretary of State did not seem overwhelmingly great. Brzezinski would be a brilliant thinker, but Birrenbach doubted he was able to think in terms of power politics. The new American ambassador in the UN was surely no expert in this field. The same applied to Sorensen who would become director of your intelligence service in the CIA. As Birrenbach had foreseen, Carter did not surround himself in the vital field of foreign and defense affairs with really strong men, and this would distinguish him from Truman. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*, 10 January 1977, K100/1). For Birrenbach, it was essential that an American president was ready to make good people his collaborators (e.g. Schultz and Richard Allen) and to follow their advice (in contrast to Carter). (KB *Aktennotiz*, 18 June 1980, ACDP K134/1). Carter had responded to Birrenbach's question when the balance in the various forms of the triad could be re-established in June 1978 that in all areas the US was leading. Birrenbach answered that he had never heard that from anybody. Asked then by Birrenbach, one of the President's collaborators had said that that was "baloney." (KB *Aktennotiz*, 18 June 1980, ACDP K134/1).

<sup>237</sup> KB to Henry Kissinger, 15 April 1980. In support of Acton's argument, Birrenbach pointed to the rise of men to the presidency like Harding, Coolidge, Nixon and Carter (KB to *Ministerialdirektor* Berndt von Staden, BKA, Bonn, confidential, 18 June 1980, K034/1).

rule/system (constitutional change) making it more difficult for the President to exercise his influence in Congress via a few personalities; too much power for Congress; weak and incapable of acting; hampered US power and predictability; also regarding US energy program as of 1979). While recognizing that the US constitution was a kind of “sanctum,” Birrenbach urged his US contacts to take measures to solve these problems.<sup>238</sup> He urged “a return to the Hamilton constitutional methods.”<sup>239</sup> Birrenbach even suggested the creation of a cabinet system with a Prime Minister under the leadership of a President elected according to the present election rules.<sup>240</sup> At times, Birrenbach was so distraught that he contemplated the need for constitutional changes in the FRG.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>238</sup> KB to Rostow, 8 August 1984. As of March 1980, Birrenbach wondered about the possibility of amending the Constitution to provide for an indirect election (with this security clause) in which the Congress would propose several men for the definite decision of the US. (KB to McCloy, 3 March 1980, ACDP K134/1).

<sup>239</sup> KB to Rostow, 2 October 1984. As of April 1980-November 1984, Birrenbach also argued that the US lacked the decision-making process in recent years required to deal with the problems it constantly confronted (e.g. wavering and unpredictable). Ironically, as of December 1977-1979, Birrenbach looked to the Senate (Congress) to block/modify a bad SALT II treaty. Birrenbach believed that Carter had only limited authority in his own party with respect to SALT. As of July 1985, Birrenbach complained that the US executive was weaker now than in recent years. As of June 1978, Birrenbach was very concerned about the constant conflict between President and Congress. As of June 1978, Birrenbach saw the US Congress resisting the President (especially in the question of the raw oil tax) and thus making very difficult the solution of the US energy problem (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 17 June 1978, K098/2). As of April 1977, Birrenbach disliked the US attitude in Angola which he saw as due to the intervention of Congress. As of April 1980, Birrenbach disliked the attitude of the US Congress. Birrenbach was very critical of President Carter’s role/responsibility in the constant President-Congress conflict. In several points, the President had backed down [*zurückgesteckt*], more due to the resistance of the Senate than of his collaborators. In that was a, limited, consolation. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1). Fortunately, the nuclear debate had for the time being come to a standstill. Otherwise, the impossible Warnke would never have come through in the Senate. The blocking minority in the Senate (40) would hopefully protect us from worse. (KB to State Secretary Dr. Paul Frank, *Bundespräsidialamt*, Bonn, 27 April 1977, K141/1). There were differences between the administration and Congress. (KB to William Diebold Jr., 14 March 1980, K134/1).

<sup>240</sup> Possibly KB to Eugene Rostow, 2 March 1979, ACDP K212/1.

<sup>241</sup> In Carstens’ term as *Bundespräsident*, he had understood not only to assume throughout a completely *überparteiliche* attitude, which had brought him the sympathies of the entire *Volk*. Birrenbach always wondered whether it was not possible that a *Bundespräsident* of Carstens’ capacity could have intervened more actively in political events. He admitted that Carstens was right to distance himself. Otherwise his *Überparteilichkeit* would have been endangered. In this regard, Chancellor Adenauer had overestimated the office possibilities of a *Bundespräsidenten* and therefore also taken distance from the candidacy for this office. Birrenbach argued that the American system created at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century for a territorial state, may have been suitable at the time. Today, it was not the suitable basis for the selection of the highest executive of the United States as a superpower in a world crisis. Birrenbach today preferred the

At least in later years, Birrenbach was also disturbed by post-war demographic trends in the United States. These included dramatic transformations in the composition and character of the population and especially the unprecedented and deleterious role played by ethnic minorities.<sup>242</sup> Birrenbach was particularly troubled by the enormous influence of the Jewish lobby, reflected for instance in US policy towards both Germany

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French system, which showed that in spite of the separation of executive and legislative the president disposed of full powers, which allowed him to almost independently influence the *Politik* of his country. Of course, de Gaulle had utilized this independence. However, since de Gaulle was in certain respects a unique personality and his life had given him an authority, which went beyond the constitution of the 5<sup>th</sup> Republic, through the crucial role which he had played in the war for France, he could be seen as the exception. His successors Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing had played a mediating role, which went beyond that of an *überparteilichen* President. Birrenbach wondered therefore whether the position of *Bundespräsidenten* in the West German constitution should not be expanded. The party disputes in the Federal Republic today assumed such diffuse proportions that one could rightly wonder whether it would not mean an adequate improvement of the stability of the Federal Republic if the President, possibly elected with a qualified majority, disposed of higher political authority. He would then be the crucial mediator between the parties. Birrenbach believed that it might then have been possible to better contain the wave of irrationalism than was currently the case. However, none of Carstens' predecessors could have successfully played such a role. Their country had therefore missed this chance. This was a historical period that appeared to become extremely difficult with continuing problems. Birrenbach did not doubt the *Überparteilichkeit* of Carstens' successor. But he wondered whether *Überparteilichkeit* sufficed in the long run to master the crisis that possibly stood before them. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, *Bundespräsident*, Bonn, 22 May 1984, K030/1). Birrenbach may also have been hinting to Weizsäcker about the need for a modification of the position of the *Bundespräsidenten*. (KB to Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin, 24 May 1984, K031/2).

<sup>242</sup> Ethnic minorities played a role they had never played in the past so American policy was no longer as predictable as it had been in the fifties or sixties. (KB to Haig, 23 July 1980, K146/2). The author (Pfaff?) said that on the two sides of the Atlantic, the societies were now rather remote from one another and that the US today was perhaps even more distant from West Europe than it was in the isolationist 1920s and 1930s. The influence of European ideas on the US had decreased in the meantime. The US did not any more feel itself to be essentially a European society. Non-European sources and your non-European quality had created a less homogeneous national culture. You are more preoccupied with your own national life. (I believe these are Pfaff's ideas though not entirely sure) (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach admitted that the interest of the US in Europe was less strong than it had been in the past. One of the basic reasons for this was that the US was no longer the melting pot it had been in the past. "The WASPs are not any more the clearly dominating element in your country. The ethnic minorities play now a role they have never played in the past. I refer only to the Jewish lobby, the Polish or the Spanish influence, and of other minorities. They do not create any more the same national background which existed in the time of Woodrow Wilson." A German national ethnic group did not exist in spite of almost 20 percent of the people being of German origin. America's interests were now less concentrated on Europe than on other regions in the world on account of a completely changed political, cultural and economic development. The European civilization no longer influenced in the same way the American way of life as in the past. The young generation no longer had the same tradition as our generations had during the last world wars and before. Therefore the US did not think any more in the same terms as Europe, apart from certain differences of interest. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach criticized Carter's "konzeptlose" Africa policy, which on top of it still a man represented (Andrew Young) who operated from racial feelings but not from clear world political perspectives. (KB to Carstens, 19 April 1977, K151/2). Birrenbach pointed to this as a reason that US policy was no longer as predictable as in the 1950s or 60s. (KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 22 July 1980).

(e.g. the hard US reaction to Bitburg) and the Middle East.<sup>243</sup> Furthermore, he continued to bemoan the shift in power towards personalities and regions located outside the Northeast (East Coast; e.g. South, West, Midwest), which he invariably considered provincial, with distorted perspectives, lacking in pragmatism and the necessary understanding and judgment of the complexities of foreign policy and global/world affairs and ignorant of concepts like balance of power and power politics.<sup>244</sup> Alluding to the Southern origins of personalities in the Carter administration and their “inexcusable” South Africa policy, Birrenbach mused about mix-ups [*Verwechslungen*] between

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<sup>243</sup> KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, 14 September 1983. As of June 1978, Birrenbach believed that the Turkish embargo demonstrated Carter’s limited authority even in his own party. According to Birrenbach, an event like that in Verdun was not possible in America since “[c]ertain minorities are too strong in the United States.” (KB to Kohl, 2 May 1985). Birrenbach was very critical of the influence of the Jewish minority in the United States in preventing pressure on Israel. The passive American attitude to the Palestine problem had been discernible since the non-carrying out of the second part of the Camp David agreement of 2 December 1978. Reagan had especially failed to pressure Israel to settle the Palestine question. In 1983, the United States had concluded with Israel a strategic agreement in order to secure the Straits of Hormuz. This decision was also impossible. It was taken from the East-West perspective. The Americans had not taken the importance of the Palestine problem seriously enough. The pressure of the Jewish minority in the USA had played and still played hereby a role. The Americans had deviated in the last months slightly from the one-sided perspective, but remained reserved in the solution of the Palestine problem, especially in the election year. The criticism of Reagan in this question was great among well-versed personalities in the United States. Birrenbach had responded to Kohl’s speech in Eichholz that the minorities (meant here was especially the Jewish one) had an influence that would have been still “inconceivable” in 1950. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 14 February 1984, K029/2). As of April 1985, Birrenbach believed that the Jewish lobby in the US would be very difficult to influence/convince with respect to the Bitburg affair. As of April 1985, Birrenbach believed that certain minorities in the US were too active for there to be a US gesture à la Verdun. As of 1985, Birrenbach may have seen the Jewish lobby in the US making a moderate solution to the Palestine conflict difficult/impossible. The US Congress may have voted with respect to Bitburg in a way that Birrenbach did not like as of May 1985.

<sup>244</sup> On such regional deficiencies, see for instance KB to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 20 January 1982. Regarding the US Africa policy, especially South Africa, Birrenbach would have to use a stronger term. The declarations by Young were “irresponsible” and those by Vice President Mondale were “ununderstandable.” “South Africa is not Atlanta.” Birrenbach was no friend of a colonial system. But the problem was more complex than both politicians saw it. (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2). Rhodesia and Namibia were not identical with “Atlantica [Atlanta].” (KB to Brzezinski, National Security Advisor, 17 April 1978, K098/2). Some personalities from the West Coast did not understand well enough what was happening in Europe. (KB to McCloy, 24 June 1981, K178/2). The Woodrow Wilson Center had approached Birrenbach to create contacts with personalities of the West Coast and Germans in my country. Birrenbach was awaiting their proposal. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). As of 1980, Birrenbach had started an initiative with respect to the United States that had been offered to him by one of the most qualified personalities in the USA that there was and that he knew. On the virtues of East Coast personalities and the deficiencies of those from other regions, see KB to Strausz-Hupé, 16 March 1978. As of July 1978, Birrenbach approved in certain limits Carter’s “human rights” policy because one could thus more easily integrate contemporary America (South, West and Mid-West) than with Kissinger’s pragmatic (balance of power) policy. (KB to Schmidt, 12 July 1978).

Georgia and Transvaal and pointed out that “Pretoria does not lie that close to Atlanta!”<sup>245</sup> Likewise, with respect to the West Coast background of many key Reagan administration advisors (cabinet members, policy makers), Birrenbach remarked that “the Polish crisis...is more complex than one thinks in Los Angeles.”<sup>246</sup> Such systemic and structural problems contributed to faulty American analyses (understanding, perspectives) of situations and more specifically to the declining American understanding and closeness to European/FRG situations, interests and thinking with respect to military, economic and political affairs, to unfortunate US views and policies towards Europe and ultimately to the problems in European/German-American relations and rendered Birrenbach pessimistic that particular US election results/candidates would rectify the situation.<sup>247</sup>

At least in later years, even as Birrenbach continued to see the US as the most powerful country in the West, indeed the West’s lone true *Großmacht* and world power, he also saw it as a nation/power in relative decline from the position of superiority (predominance) it had enjoyed in the first decades after the war.<sup>248</sup> Though the US

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<sup>245</sup> KB to Pauls, 6 March 1978. Birrenbach also remarked, “I remember that Stettinius didn’t know where Trieste was.” (KB to Pauls, 6 March 1978). Birrenbach referred to the “incomprehensible” attitude of men like Mondale and Young on South Africa (“one man, one vote”).

<sup>246</sup> KB to Rostow, 26 March 1982. Within the Reagan administration, Birrenbach apparently saw Haig (East Coast, more understanding for European interests than Weinberger or Meese) battling personalities of the West Coast (KB to McCloy, 15 March 1982).

<sup>247</sup> As of October 1980, Birrenbach claimed that the next election results in the US would in any case be “painful.” (KB to McCloy, 23 October 1980). The understanding for European problems in the US was not comparable with that of the 50s and 60s. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Lord Carrington, Secretary General of NATO, Brussels, 5 November 1984, K074/1). As of September 1979, Birrenbach was concerned about “the drifting apart” of Europe and the US (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 September 1979). As of November 1981, Birrenbach had the impression that Europe and the US did not see the world from identical perspectives. As of 4 September 1979, Birrenbach believed “the American and the German nation no longer have the feelings of common ground as in the 1950s and 60s.” That was however at least as true and perhaps more so with regard to France, England and other European countries. (KB to Strausz-Hupé, 4 September 1979). As of August 1982, Birrenbach argued that the US in its present mood was no longer understood in Europe (apparently including the FRG), neither historically nor currently.

<sup>248</sup> As of March 1981, Birrenbach remarked, “I rarely have returned from the US so full of uncertainties.” (KB to McCloy, 30 March 1981). Birrenbach also seems to have seen a Britain in decline. As of



weapons potential was considerably superior to that of all the other Western nations, it found itself in relative decline militarily vis-à-vis the USSR, now the leading military power to which it had lost its earlier superiority (the other *Großmacht*). While it still enjoyed an enormous industrial/production capacity, the US found itself in relative decline economically vis-à-vis Western Europe and the world, having lost its economic superiority since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.<sup>249</sup> More subtly, the United States had seen its moral authority seriously undermined, mainly due to the Vietnam War.<sup>250</sup> He was relentlessly negative and critical about the condition of the United States, whether referring to its political, economic or energy situation. While Birrenbach could put a positive spin on some of these developments, for instance pointing to the economic advances of Western Europe and the resulting increased claim to US-European consultations, this relative decline ultimately had dangerous consequences for Europe and the world.<sup>251</sup> In line with his often Conservative mode of

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December 1981, Birrenbach believed that events in Britain had led to it in the last fifteen years that in many economic areas they had a lower level. As of January 1977, Birrenbach saw a structural, economic and political crisis in Britain.

<sup>249</sup> As of August 1981, Birrenbach saw the US GNP per capita as lower than that of the citizens of the EC. The American economic development created doubts all over the world which also had consequences in America's international security relations. (KB to McCloy, 25 March 1980, K134/1). There was disappointment in the Federal Republic that the US had not been able to get the oil crisis under control. (KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2). Birrenbach had dealt in-depth with the tax plans of the new government. (KB to Hermes, 18 May 1981, K134/1). As of August 1978, Birrenbach found the US helplessness in regard to the dollar crisis "disturbing [*beunruhigend*]" since it represented a general symptom and not only a "critical" failure at a certain point. (KB to Schmidt, 24 August 1978). As of December 1978, Birrenbach's concern about trans-Atlantic relations was increased by the dollar crisis. During the Carter administration, Birrenbach saw in the US inflation and a dollar decline (due principally to the energy question?).

<sup>250</sup> KB to McCloy, 29 September 1980, K178/2.

<sup>251</sup> As of 1977, Birrenbach pointed to the advances of the Europe of the Nine and the Six (EC) in absolute terms and relative to the US with respect to GNP and world trade. For the resulting increased claim of the European states to US-European consultations, see KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1. American monetary issues were also of great concern to the Europeans. Preoccupying for all Europeans, and not only for them, was the question of the American dollar. We had discussed this problem many years ago before your home in Brussels after the Connally coup in 1971. Schaezel had disagreed with Birrenbach then, but Birrenbach had told Schaezel that the American benign neglect would have serious consequences. It had. The present state of the dollar was due not only to the American oil import, deficit with Japan, inflation,

thought, Birrenbach suggested that this regrettable decline of the United States as a world power was due primarily to idealistic rather than materialistic factors, or as he put it in July 1979, “It is perhaps more a moral problem than a technological one.”<sup>252</sup> As Birrenbach put it in 1977, “I still believe in the United States... but my belief is not anymore as deep as it has been over many years.”<sup>253</sup> Birrenbach considered this “sad... for a man who has been for all his life a great admirer of your country [USA].”<sup>254</sup>

In a related trend, Birrenbach increasingly saw a decline in the American military effectiveness in defending Europe. In particular, as of at least 1977-84, Birrenbach

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lack of preparedness to increase your export at all cost (which would have been easy), but also to psychological reasons. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach did not understand Blumenthal’s policy regarding the exchange rate of the dollar. In this way, the United States would not be able to solve the economic crisis in the world. This did not mean that the United States was guilty for the present situation. (KB to Schaetzel, 9 August 1977, K100/2). Not all that shined was gold. The Federal Republic also had very serious problems. Birrenbach could not see a reduction of unemployment and was very worried about the development of our foreign trade due to the general situation on the world market. Our foreign trade constituted 27% of our GNP. A breakdown of this part of our GNP would have very serious consequences, particularly if there were a strong wave of protectionism. German wages were enormously high. But we reinforced our efforts to push our exports in view of the stagnation of the internal market. To push our public expenditure more would endanger our inflation rate, which was low on account of the experiences of two total inflations in the past. (KB to Robert Schaetzel, DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2). In spite of everything, we would remain a faithful supporter of your currency. But you have to try to stop the decline of the dollar. The principal cause of the American deficit in the trade balance and current account balance was the energy factor. Our Common Market was not in a very good condition, you still had a clear surplus in your exports to the European continent in spite of all its internal and economic difficulties. The efforts we made in the export business were enormous. Since Birrenbach had worked in a US company he knew how “graciously” you sell your goods and how tough we were working in that business. We export everything we produce. The constant decline in the dollar was a very serious sign which was destabilizing the whole world economy and created difficulties for other countries. This could not be a healthy relation for the biggest export-import country in the world. (KB to Robert Schaetzel, DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2). In explaining the sorry condition of the world economy, Birrenbach acknowledged the negative impact of economic conditions and policies in the US. Enormous deficits and high interests in the US had negative effects on the world economy. (KB to Bowie, 28 September 1984 K160/2). Birrenbach was concerned about the state of the US economy as of the late 1970s and early 1980s (as of 1979 the constant decline of the dollar and the inflation).

<sup>252</sup> KB to Gerard Smith, 27 July 1979. At the same time, Birrenbach argued that “[t]o be a world power is to a certain degree a destiny. It is difficult to avoid it and easy to lose its strength.” (KB to Gerard Smith, 27 July 1979).

<sup>253</sup> KB to McCloy, 5 August 1977. As of June 1980, Birrenbach saw this change in the US-European relationship being expressed in the interest situation of Europe vis-à-vis the US being no longer the same. The European states had “come of age [*mündig*].” This type of maturity was expressed in an autonomy in their judgement vis-à-vis the actions of the US to a previously not present extent, with the exception of France. Even the FRG was among those national states oriented in various directions (previously only France). (KB *Aktennotiz*, 16 June 1980, K134/1).

<sup>254</sup> KB to Eugene Rostow, 2 March 1979, ACDP K212/1.

bemoaned the dangerous erosion in recent years of the survivability and credibility “*in extremis*” of the extended nuclear deterrent, due to the shifts in the US-USSR nuclear balance, the unprecedented sacrifices and physical vulnerability of the US in a conflict with the USSR and the related decline in the will to risk using these weapons. This concern was reinforced by public debates in the US regarding the relevance of nuclear weapons, including certain attitudes of and statements by President Carter and prominent members of his administration on the senselessness of nuclear war, the unlikelihood of the use of nuclear weapons barring a direct threat to the US and proposals for their elimination on all sides.<sup>255</sup> Birrenbach also criticized the epiphenomenon of a non-credible area covering nuclear strategy and force structure (based on inaccurate SLBMs) that represented a return to a variation (*Abart*) of Dulles’ massive retaliation, which would destroy cities, industrial complexes and civilian facilities, killing millions and presenting the alternative of capitulation or total war and mutual assured destruction. Instead, Birrenbach (still as of 1981) advocated more credible counterforce strategies and force structures of flexible response and limited war directed against select military and economic targets (based on a US nuclear superiority, particularly in secure, accurate land-based inter-continental nuclear weapons/rockets), especially the strategy of selected

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<sup>255</sup> With respect to the expressions of the Carter administration, Birrenbach feared the US would thus tempt the Russians to test American credibility, citing parallels with expressions/debates during the first stage of the Kennedy administration following which the Russians had tested the US readiness to fight (credibility) in the second Cuba crisis (KB to Amb. Robert Strausz-Hupé, US Mission to NATO, Brussels, 25 April 1977, K100/1). Birrenbach feared the new Carter administration’s statements would undermine the important element of tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO military doctrine/strategy of flexible response, consisting in the triad of conventional, tactical nuclear and inter-continental strategic nuclear weapons, and indeed the entire strategy itself. (KB to William Bundy, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*, 10 January 1977, K100/1). In later years, Birrenbach saw the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a key element in the large US deterrence.

strikes proposed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1975.<sup>256</sup> Birrenbach's concerns with regard to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence also took on a retrospective cast, both in identifying its origins and the timeline of erosion.<sup>257</sup>

Ultimately, such worries were closely connected to the overriding sense of the systemic difficulties and relative decline of the United States.

#### D. Public Relations: Atlanticist Retrospective Activities

In later years, public relations continued to constitute an important element of overall German-American relations. As before, the Atlanticists continued their efforts to influence German and West European/foreign commentators, for instance via meetings.

While Birrenbach was critical of the Carter administration's stress on public openness in

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<sup>256</sup> In comparison to the vulnerable, thickly populated US East Coast, Birrenbach contrasted the less vulnerable USSR spatially and according to population density. (KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2). As of 1977, Birrenbach complained that since years the US sought to set the nuclear threshold higher and higher and to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a stage in the chain of escalation if possible, something that Birrenbach feared would eliminate the deterrent factor. As of 1977, Birrenbach seems to have recognized that Carter's statements that the use of nuclear weapons was only imaginable if US security were in question was understandable from the US perspective though undesirable from the European perspective. As of 1985, it appears that the US strategy, at least in name, was flexible response. Birrenbach disliked certain passages of PRM-10.

<sup>257</sup> Birrenbach saw the decisive beginning of this process (with its objectionable consequences) with McNamara's (administration's) incomprehensible halting of the Minuteman III production (big, land-based, inter-continental nuclear missile and set hope in SLBMs) in 1968 (also pointed to the neglecting of the nuclear protection of the gray zone since 1958 (in that year, Gen. Norstad had proposed the Europeans be able to "desanctuarize" the USSR by their Euro-strategic weapons) and the abandoning of the IMRBMs after the second Cuba crisis and the concentration on improved technology in single items like MIRVs, I think this is what he means when he refers to modern weapons development). As of April 1979, Birrenbach seems to have been doubting, in retrospect at least, whether the Americans in the Kennedy epoch would have responded with inter-continental weapons to an overwhelming USSR attack in Europe. As of April 1978, Birrenbach claimed that just since the Kennedy era, he had observed first light doubts in discussions with personalities in the US and Europe regarding the US use of nuclear weapons *in extremis* (KB to Brzezinski, 17 April 1978, K098/2). The need to maintain deterrence also fed into Birrenbach's support for a forward defense strategy in Europe. As of 1977, Birrenbach argued that the immediate and voluntary giving up (by the US) of a large part of terrain on the Eastern border would bring about an almost immediate collapse of the Western/European defense and that it would no longer be believed that the West was ready for the utmost (undermine the subjective element of deterrence). (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). As of 1979, Birrenbach claimed that "I still believe in the United States" (I think referring specifically to US nuclear weapons credibility, but could be interpreted more broadly) but confessed that he had had some doubts (only doubts) since 1961 and now these doubts were approaching certainty (KB to Professor William Kintner, FPRI, 14 August 1979, K098/2). As of August 1979, Birrenbach pointed to the MLF story as evidence that many people had doubted the US nuclear deterrent during the John F. Kennedy administration. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2).

foreign policy, he continued to be concerned with and to take into account the psychological elements of international relations, the importance of public relations and the broad and significant elements of public opinion, the impact of events on it and its potential impact on policy, the Federal Republic's international (trans-Atlantic, European) relations and issues.<sup>258</sup> Naturally, the potentially crucial moods and attitudes of the American press and population, for instance isolationist sentiment in this period and including with respect to the FRG, remained a key concern to be monitored by Birrenbach. He welcomed efforts in the FRG to influence this public opinion, including the various initiatives planned and carried out in the FRG regarding the US bicentennial and the components of the German participation in the tricentennial celebration in the US in October 1983.<sup>259</sup> Within the Federal Republic and Western Europe as a whole (the Western countries), Birrenbach remained particularly concerned about the apparent success of a Soviet anti-American propaganda that sought to encourage the development of the pacifist/neutralist movement, prevent the deployment of INF weapons in Europe and to undermine the trans-Atlantic alliance, in part by presenting the United States as the

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<sup>258</sup> It was necessary to analyze the psychological situation of many European countries. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). Prolonging negotiations would increase the fear in the European region. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). The psychological question had an entirely crucial share of the dollar's slide. (KB to Dr. Wilfried Guth, *Vorstand* Member of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, K153/1). During this period, Birrenbach perceived an extremely sensitive psychological situation in Europe (especially northern Europe). Birrenbach detected a loss of sympathy for Reagan.

<sup>259</sup> Though Birrenbach believed there had been an insufficient public echo to the visit of the Federal President and his outstanding speeches. (KB to Kohl, 14 October 1983). As of April 1982, Birrenbach seems to have been pleased that the CDU/CSU would organize great demonstrations for the alliance in Bonn and Munich on 5 June (I believe while or around the time Reagan was in the FRG). (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2). The feeling in the Federal Republic towards the US was manifested by the fact that there were 4,000 private bicentennial celebrations in the Federal Republic in last year. (KB to McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, 27 April 1977, K100/1). In assessing why he considered even the German celebrations of America, particularly for the bicentennial in Frankfurt in the *Römer* and the *Paulskirche*, as inferior to what had come before, such as the Kennedy function of 1963, Birrenbach argued, "[t]hat was due to the composition of the participants" (KB to Staden, 29 June 1976). At the invitation of the Chancellor, Birrenbach took part in the official tricentennial meetings/functions organized in Washington DC and Philadelphia from 2-7 October 1983.

prime instigator of the arms race.<sup>260</sup> At the same time, Birrenbach was alarmed to find that elements of the mass media were also playing a propagandistic role with respect to the peace and alternative movements (nuclear question) in the FRG. Birrenbach's concerns were particularly strong due to his conception of a fearful, irrational and ignorant Western European population.<sup>261</sup>

Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists confronted a number of difficulties in their efforts abroad in this field. Birrenbach continued to detect intense anti-German sentiment and attitudes in American and European (especially French) public opinion, both in the press and broader populations. Fed by historical experiences (e.g. the NS-regime), deep misunderstandings/misinterpretations (including between the US and the FRG; including of the FRG's fundamental system and ideas) and envy of the FRG's disproportionate power and economic development, such suspicions abroad flared up in connection with the FRG's efforts surrounding the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the wave of terrorism in the FRG and the government's efforts to combat it during the late 1970s, the public anti-American activities, proposals, policies and expressions of left-wing politicians and personalities (e.g. SPD left-wing, Greens, Brandt) and peace movement in the Federal Republic (especially potential violence against American soldiers and missile sites) and the Bitburg episode in 1985 (US) and reminded Birrenbach of the time before 1914.<sup>262</sup> Birrenbach was particularly concerned about the

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<sup>260</sup> On the alleged success of USSR propaganda, see KB to Kohl, 11 August 1981, K032/1.

<sup>261</sup> On the nature of the West European population, see KB to Brzezinski, 7 December 1982, K132/2.

<sup>262</sup> For the analogy to the pre-1914 period, see KB to Robert Schaezel, DC, 11 January 1978, K100/2. On "*Neidkomplexe*," see KB to Kohl, 26 May 1983. As of December 1978, Birrenbach argued that in view of the envy and other anti-German feelings, it was necessary that the FRG act under the old Prussian principle "*mehr sein als scheinen*" (KB to Schmidt, 21 December 1978). As of September 1977, Birrenbach saw the French *front commun* (French Left) combining anti-American and anti-German feelings with potentially serious consequences for the international situation. As of February 1984, Birrenbach did detect a more positive French attitude/mood towards the FRG and the German people. As of September 1977,

psychological impact of such phenomena (e.g. peace demonstrations and left-wingers) on the “extremely sensitive” Americans, both the general population (nation) as well as prominent personalities (e.g. Congress), including visitors to the FRG (e.g. President Reagan in June 1982, Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Haig, McCloy).<sup>263</sup> In May

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Birrenbach was upset about the anti-German journalistic/press outbreaks in neighboring countries. As of November 1977, Birrenbach seems to have detected anti-German attitudes in the Latin states in Europe (e.g. part of French public opinion, e.g. a series of *Le Monde* articles). As of November 1977, while Birrenbach disliked it that a British author had referred to the German terrorists as “Hitler’s Children,” Birrenbach was particularly upset about the “impossible and scandalous” anti-German reactions to the German terrorism (and the FRG fight against it) in the European left-wing press (e.g. in France *Le Monde* and some others (but apparently not *Le Figaro*), and a radio station), political groups/parties and intellectuals, especially in the Latin countries (Italy and France) but also in Scandinavia and the Netherlands and in part Britain. (KB to Bowie, 4 November 1977). As of April 1985, Birrenbach believed that the memory of the National Socialist regime was still too deep in the US (public opinion?) for there to be a US gesture à la Verdun. As of July 1983, Birrenbach believed that the development of the steel crisis demonstrated the unjust attitude of the European partners (in the EC, including France) to the FRG. Basing his judgment of the situation on his having observed the development of National Socialism in Germany in the 1920s and 30s, Birrenbach insisted that the FRG was in fact a permissive society that would not and could not pursue a Hitler policy. Birrenbach argued that if the FRG were actually a repressive state based on an exaggerated concept of law and order, the German police would not be so helpless in pursuing the terrorists. (KB to Aron, 22 September 1977, K074/1). As of August 1977, Birrenbach argued that more dangerous than a National Socialist revival was the growth of a radical left-wave, a danger also in other West European states. Birrenbach was also critical of the “irresponsible” comments of certain parts of the radical “intelligentsia” in Germany with respect to the German terrorism and FRG response (KB to Marjolin, 14 September 1977, K074/1). In later years, French policy sought to prevent a too strong German army.

<sup>263</sup> Birrenbach admitted that the United States, in spite of its relative upswing, had not solved its economic crisis and that the United States had still not set up an adequate weapon program. However, in any case in the substance, the United States was still ready to defend the continent [*für den Kontinent einzustehen*]. However, Birrenbach considered it “extremely doubtful” whether it still would be tomorrow by possible demonstrations against Reagan or a hesitation on our part in 1983. Then it would come to a withdrawal [*Rückzug*] of the United States to the “Fortress America.” A demonstration in Berlin against Reagan would have “profound [*tiefgreifende*]” consequences. Birrenbach saw all that in danger and was therefore “deeply troubled [*zutiefst beunruhigt*].” (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to *Bundespräsidenten* Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1). Europe still had chances. But the pacifist wave had to be somehow stopped, hard as that was. It required a full commitment of the leading personalities, because they would otherwise have to reckon with consequences, namely possibly with a withdrawal of the United States to the “Fortress America.” (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Berndt von Staden, State Secretary of the AA, Bonn, 11 November 1981, personal-confidential, K033/2). In Birrenbach’s letter to the foreign minister, he had said that after the “Berlin Weeks” in New York, which in Birrenbach’s view had been very little impressive, one could not be surprised if the Americans, to say nothing of the Europeans, one day by a military endangering in Berlin asked, “*Pourquoi mourir pour Danzig?*” (KB to Lübke, 15 August 1977, K171/1). As of June 1982, Birrenbach also referred specifically to “the extremely sensitive American President [Reagan].” (KB to Chancellor Schmidt, 2 June 1982). As of June 1982, Birrenbach also bemoaned the murder attempt on General Kroesen. Birrenbach’s US friend (Kissinger at least) was upset about the possibility of anti-American demonstrations in the FRG on Reagan’s June 1982 visit. Some of Birrenbach’s US contacts visited the FRG. As of November 1984, Birrenbach feared that if Brandt (the leader of the opposition) on the occasion of an upcoming meeting of the peace movement in Bonn again criticized the US policy and compared the American measures in Nicaragua with the USSR

1982, such fears took personal shape at a small, intimate Berlin dinner and conversation for Kissinger to which Birrenbach had been invited (and attended) and at which Bahr's expressions regarding the United States and the NATO double-track resolution led to "alarmed and embittered" reactions among "our US friends" present (including Kissinger and Doty) that Birrenbach described as "dismaying."<sup>264</sup>

Faced with such obstacles, Birrenbach pushed on in the field of Atlanticist public relations and public opinion actions directed at a German and foreign (especially American) audience. At least in the first years after leaving the *Bundestag*, he continued his journalistic activities, publishing several analytical articles on foreign affairs in outlets such as *Der Welt* and *Orbis*.<sup>265</sup> Birrenbach also maintained contact with members of the German press, gave a few speeches in the FRG and the US and once, in November 1982, even gave an interview on relevant questions broadcast on nationwide radio in the US.<sup>266</sup>

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war in Afghanistan, this along with other statements of prominent Social Democrats would further stimulate "concern [*Sorge*]" for the alliance in the US. As of 1981, Birrenbach fumed that certain irresponsible circles in northern Europe (including responsible politicians in the FRG) made the US out to be the warmonger (started the arms competition with the rearmament decision and not ready to negotiate with the USSR about the rearmament decision) and the USSR the defensive power (KB to Kohl, 11 August 1981). This falsification had to be contradicted.

<sup>264</sup> On the "dismaying" reaction [*bestürzend*], see KB to Schmidt, 2 June 1982; on "alarmed and embittered" reactions, see KB to *Bundespräsidenten* Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1.

<sup>265</sup> See: "Grenzen amerikanischer Außenpolitik sind in der Ära Carter enger geworden," by KB, *Die Welt*, 20 October 1977; "Angst im Ausland" (*Leserbrief*; *WamS*, 30 October 1977); "Friedenschance verpaßt," FAZ, 30 January 1978 (letter to the editor; on Israel and the Middle East); a large technical/non-popular three-part article (series) in *Der Welt*, 3-5 April 1978 on "Die europäische Sicherheit" ("Widersprüche schwächen die Schutzgarantie Amerikas," 3 April 1978; "Der Schutz des eigenen Landes hat für die Supermächte Vorrang," 4 April 1978; and "Europas Sicherheit ist nicht nur Aufgabe der Amerikaner," 5 April 1978) that, at the request of US friends (maybe Strausz-Hupé?), was then also published in English (somewhat modified) as "European Security: NATO, SALT and Equilibrium" in *Orbis* (Volume 22, Number 2, Summer 1978, on The Many Faces of Nuclear Policy); (title?), *Die Welt*, 5 June 1980. As of 20 August 1979, Birrenbach had published a piece in *Orbis* (when?, Summer 1978?). Birrenbach saw that his products received considerable distribution among prominent personalities and beyond. Birrenbach continued to distribute his publications to his contacts and to alert his contacts to them (including foreign contacts). As of July 1979, Birrenbach, in response to a query, placed in prospect the writing of an article again for the *Deutsche Zeitung* (editor-in-chief Ludolf Hermann), Bonn.

<sup>266</sup> With respect to Birrenbach maintaining contact with personalities of the German press, see for instance KB to Dönhoff, 10 June 1977, K151/2 and KB to Dr. Günther Gillessen, FAZ, 23 January 1978, K153/1. As of June 1979, Ludolf Hermann (*Deutsche Zeitung* editor-in-chief) had received in the past year advice and help from Birrenbach. As of July 1978, Birrenbach was pleased that such a constructive cooperation



Meanwhile, he welcomed US efforts aimed at the German population, including visits to Europe and the FRG by the President and other prominent Americans.<sup>267</sup> Birrenbach also

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had come about with Wilfried Hertz-Eichenrode (*Die Welt* editor-in-chief). They planned to talk (also with Cramer) about the situation in the Middle East, maybe in Bonn. In July 1979, Birrenbach sent his Weimar/FTS introductory speech to Ludolf Hermann (*Deutsche Zeitung* editor-in-chief). On Birrenbach's radio interview (apparently conducted in the FRG), see KB to Kohl, 22 November 1982. As of May 1977, Birrenbach had expressed his opinions in *Vorträgen* given in recent months in Germany (e.g. in the Redoute in Bad Godesberg/Bonn on 22 February 1977 on "The Relationship between Europe and the United States: Today and Tomorrow" at the invitation of the *Vorstand* of the *Deutschen Bank AG* before a group of US bankers, industrialists and members of different US departments (before the Presidential Executives Federal Sector)). As of 26 September 1977, Birrenbach would soon fly to the US where he would give in Washington DC a *Vortrag* about the relationship of Europe to the US under the simultaneous treatment of the nuclear problem, at the request of Gerard Smith. Birrenbach had given a talk in Washington (DC) during his last stay. (KB to Dr. Wilfried Guth, *Vorstand* Member of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt, 29 March 1978, K153/1). As of July 1980, there was or would soon be a publication of Birrenbach's expositions on the occasion of the anniversary in the DGAP. Birrenbach also may have made use of television for public relations purposes (or was this strictly for retrospective purposes?). Heinz Grosch (no date but almost certainly first half of the 1980s) referred to the TV broadcast in which Birrenbach answered questions but which unfortunately was not broadcast at a more favorable time, limiting the audience circle.

<sup>267</sup> Birrenbach hoped that the new American ambassador would be able to make the situation of the United States and its problems understood to also a larger part of the population. (KB to Haig, 24 June 1981, K146/2.) Birrenbach urged the US to eliminate the idea that the US wanted superiority in the military realm. (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). The rhetoric of the American announcement of the change in American policy had not been diplomatic enough in view of the sensibility of the morally weakened population in the north of Europe. Exposed suddenly to the reality of the world situation a part of the youth, especially of the SPD, the left-wing of the FDP and certain church youth groups, had initiated a campaign for peace with undertones against the style of the new administration in the US. One or other psychological mistakes had been committed by the United States. (KB to Haig, 17 September 1981, K146/2). The psychological way in which the US introduced the neutron bomb had disturbed many people in Europe. The US should have introduced this weapon step-by-step, slowly, preparing public opinion. Europe was sensitive in nuclear questions. (KB to Schaezel, 9 August 1977, K100/2). It would be useful in the next critical months if the US administration asked American personalities, politicians and perhaps also scientists to discuss the problems of peace (I think in the German press/media) in response to the peace demonstrations in Germany and a pacifist development in certain parties. It would help make the deployment of Euro-strategic weapons on German soil easier. The Reagan speech had had a positive effect on the situation in West Europe. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). All speeches of American representatives should avoid the mention of limited nuclear war in Europe. This was in the American interest, and that of the Federal Republic and Europe. (KB to McCloy, 30 November 1981, K132/2). As of November 1981-April 1982, Birrenbach was hoping and suggesting to Haig that in response to the peace demonstrations in the FRG and a pacifist development in certain parties the US administration would encourage prominent American personalities (e.g. politicians and perhaps scientists) to speak on German and European (i.e. British, French, Belgian, Dutch and Italian) TV about the problems of peace, the situation, the Geneva and START negotiations, and the US acceptance of the Harmel doctrine of 1967 (defense and simultaneous negotiations with the USSR) and attached great importance to Reagan's upcoming *Bundestag* speech in June, which he hoped would stress the importance of arms control. Birrenbach hoped such efforts would help the European statesmen combat the peace movement and dispel left-wing efforts in Germany to portray the Americans as intent on gaining a superiority in nuclear arms. (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2). As of 2 June 1982, McCloy's statement (I think something to do with anti-US peace demonstrations and/or the Reagan visit) had been published on Tuesday in *Der Welt*, apparently to Birrenbach's pleasure. As of 30 November 1981, Birrenbach was pleased that Weinberger had recently given an interview on German television. With respect to US visitors, for instance, as of 14

promoted attempts to squelch the left-wing movements and anti-American criticism in the FRG. On one hand, he looked to the *Politik* and *Wissenschaft* for a media campaign of education and enlightenment of the German people, even urging that Chancellor Schmidt give a Churchillian “blood, sweat and tears” address on television in favor of nuclear energy.<sup>268</sup> On the other, in part due to his own experience of anti-American demonstrations in Krefeld, Birrenbach urged the federal government to get the demonstrations under control by force if necessary and advocated a sharpening of the relevant laws.<sup>269</sup> Concerned about fears expressed by his foreign contacts, Birrenbach

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June 1982, Reagan’s visit and speeches in the FRG, London and Paris and, as of February 1983, the visit of Vice President George Bush, I think to Europe/the FRG.

<sup>268</sup> KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Bonn, 11 August 1981, K032/1. For an explicit reference in this context to Churchill and “*Blut und Tränen*,” see KB to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, 23 April 1981, K032/1 and KB to Beckurts, 18 March 1980. For an explicit reference in this context to Churchill’s “blood, sweat and tears,” see KB to McCloy, 4 February 1981. Up to 1977, the “enlightenment” work in the nuclear energy question had been carried out, ineffectively, by the *Deutschen Atomforum*. Therefore, it is no surprise that, as of March 1977, Birrenbach was pleased that a *Zentrum für Energienachrichten* had been created and would soon begin its work. This was intended to correct the inaccurate assertions of the nuclear energy opponents in the public. However, the center also was an easy target for nuclear energy opponents and correspondingly lost in effectiveness since the industry itself had decided on its creation (with the *Kraftwerk Union* as the driving force) and paid its costs. As of December 1977-June 1978, Birrenbach was receiving and reading the pro-nuclear energy papers/circulars/publications/materials of the *Informationskreis Kernenergie* sent by Dr. Günter Brück (of that organization), a self-described effort to intervene “*sachlich*” and without emotion in the discussion about the peaceful use of nuclear energy (e.g. disposal) and thus to close the information holes among the citizens. It does not appear that Birrenbach was actually in contact with Brück.

<sup>269</sup> Birrenbach appears to have gotten some negative feedback from his US contacts. For instance, McCloy appears to have been upset and expressed disappointment to Birrenbach about the wave of pacifism in the FRG and about neutralist and anti-US views. As of July 1983, in the question of the demonstration law/right, Birrenbach thought like Strauß and appears to have disagreed with FDP demands on this issue. As of April 1982, Birrenbach complained that the social-liberal coalition had overly stressed the right to demonstrate as a symbol of liberty (KB to Haig, 5 April 1982, K146/2). With respect to demonstrations, Birrenbach himself repeatedly argued that genuine freedom had natural limits (e.g. in the law and also in the form; not force [*Gewalt*] in this form). As of March 1983, with respect to the demonstration right, Birrenbach argued that disguised demonstrations could not lead to the determining of violent perpetrators and were as such unacceptable in a liberal [*freiheitlichen*] *Rechtsstaat* (KB to Kohl, 22 March 1983). Birrenbach believed the development of a plebiscitary democracy, as manifested by the large demonstrations (organized groups of the peace movement), undermined the state authority and weakened the German position in the alliance and even in the EC. The echo from the US, France and Britain was especially negative since they feared that the Federal Republic was endangered as the forward glacis of the alliance by the Soviet threats. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Honorary President of the *MPG zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV*, Munich, 9 February 1984, K030/1). Among the items Birrenbach pushed for was a prohibition against disguises in the new demonstration

sought to shore up their confidence and sow goodwill abroad by refuting perceptions of the FRG as a nationalist, repressive police state hungering for nuclear weapons and experiencing a renaissance of deep-rooted National Socialism, instead depicting it as a respectable democracy, an overly permissive society that, in spite of the shameful demonstrations, was robustly Atlanticist (political elites and vast majority of people).<sup>270</sup> This was part of his efforts to downplay anti-Americanism and stress overwhelmingly pro-American public opinion in Europe. Finally, while nothing seems to have materialized, Birrenbach was, as of November 1981, about to form with Ellsworth, at the latter's request, a German-American group to discuss the problem of the peace movement.<sup>271</sup>

While Birrenbach did not devote himself solely to contemplation, in later years, he, along with the Atlanticist movement/infrastructure as a whole, did shift to some extent into a more retrospective mode/phase.<sup>272</sup> Birrenbach looked back with a considerable sense of success and satisfaction on his life, efforts and achievements. With respect to his own life, Birrenbach stressed “that I have gone this path practically alone

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criminal law [*Strafrecht*]. Birrenbach had observed the Krefeld demonstrations as of 28 June 1983, I think surrounding a function with Vice President Bush.

<sup>270</sup> Regarding the Bitburg affair, Birrenbach attempted damage control by explaining to his US contacts the realities (e.g. regarding the non-political, non-NS nature of the Waffen-SS (and the German Army) as of 1944; the non-SS nature of the cemetery) and to defend Kohl (did not know the SS graves were in the churchyard). Birrenbach also argued to his foreign contacts that the FRG had exemplary social conditions.

<sup>271</sup> For Birrenbach hoping that McCloy, chairman of the American Council on Germany (1972-87), would be “able to support the project” Birrenbach had “offered” Ellsworth (we needed an answer by 7 December at the latest when we would have a/the meeting of the AB), see KB to John McCloy, 30 November 1981, ACDP K132/2.

<sup>272</sup> Birrenbach looked back on the last thirty years to draw conclusions. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Prof. Dr. Walter Lipgens, Saarbrücken, 5 November 1982, K036/1). Without de Gaulle we would perhaps have reached the goal of a political union. Perhaps we have missed in the 1960s a decisive moment in history on this issue. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Hon. Mrs. Shirley Williams, MP, Secretary of State for Education and Science, London, 25 July 1977, K074/1).

without any support under often extremely difficult circumstances.”<sup>273</sup> Admittedly, the course of his life [*Lebenslauf*] had been tumultuous [*wirr*], “[b]ut I believe from unfavorable [*ungünstigen*] positions, with own efforts [*Kräften*], something [*einiges*] from it to have made.”<sup>274</sup> Among other things, he was deeply proud of his role in the creation and development of the Atlanticist institutions/infrastructure, of his membership and work in them (e.g. Action Committee for the United States of Europe, DGAP, FTS) and of their functioning/activities (e.g. functions and publications). However, Birrenbach insisted in later years that “The most beautiful experience of my life has been the contact with outstanding men in many countries in politics, economy and science.”<sup>275</sup>

In later years, Birrenbach basked in the public (and private) recognition of his achievements. Some Atlanticists (e.g. Monnet) enjoyed honors from governments. As of February 1977, Birrenbach was especially pleased that Monnet’s image would appear on a German stamp (which were published by the German postal and telecommunications minister), the first foreigner to do so.<sup>276</sup> In later years, there emerged a series of Atlanticist-minded awards (or at least European-minded). As of 1985-86, M. Alfred Toepfer and the *Stiftung Johann Wolfgang von Goethe* in Basel had created along with the University of Lausanne the Jean Monnet Prize (*Prix Jean Monnet*), which was awarded every two years in the University of Lausanne in the presence of numerous

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<sup>273</sup> KB to Dr. Gerd Tacke, Member of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the *Siemens AG*, Munich, 8 March 1979.

<sup>274</sup> KB to Ernst Plesser, 2 March 1979.

<sup>275</sup> KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977. Birrenbach’s contact with the great FTS *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat* had been one of the most important satisfactions in Birrenbach’s life. “I see the main profit [*Hauptgewinn*] of my life in it, in three areas with leading personalities in the world an in part even friendly contact to have found, in the area of the *Politik*, the *Wirtschaft*, but also the *Wissenschaft*.” In this context, Birrenbach was always especially happy about the “great concord [*Einvernehmen*]” that had existed between him and Butenandt. (KB to Professor Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2).

<sup>276</sup> Birrenbach congratulated Monnet on this and claimed this demonstrated that the Germans recognized Monnet’s contributions to their continent. In 1975, Monnet got the Gold Medal from the European Parliament.

personalities close to the European idea. This prize appears to have also been somehow related to the FJME (received radiance from this giving).<sup>277</sup> As of November 1977, the Aspen Institute (Berlin?) gave a Statesman-Humanist Award at an Aspen Award dinner in which the recipient said some words after a *Laudatio*.<sup>278</sup> As an artisan of the European construction, Birrenbach was invited (though he could not attend due to what he claimed was bad health), along with numerous other such personalities from the Europe of the Nine, to take part in May 1977 in the ceremony surrounding the planting of the Tree of Europe (a lime tree from Monnet's garden in Houjarray) in Sophia Antipolis.<sup>279</sup>

Even in earlier years, Birrenbach was not unaccustomed to receiving various honors, the granting of which was often the occasion for ceremonies/receptions as well as celebratory speeches by both the bestower (presenter) and Birrenbach himself. Already

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<sup>277</sup> The awarding of the Monnet Prize was decided by a jury presided over as of 1986 by the French statesman M. Alain Poher. The 1985 recipients of the *Prix Jean Monnet* were Bernard Clappier and Etienne Hirsch. As of 1985, there was a *Prix Balzan* (not sure exactly what that is).

<sup>278</sup> As of November 1977, McCloy would receive this award.

<sup>279</sup> Pierre Laffitte (President, Association Sophia Antipolis, Paris) seems to have been in charge of this. Monnet was also invited but declined due to health. Alain Poher (I think former president of the European Assembly) had accepted to give his patronage to the ceremony. This all was a supplementary gauge of the European sense. Independent of Birrenbach's role, over the years (as of 1980), Birrenbach's foreign contacts received numerous awards, orders and honorary doctorates. In Monnet's case, this included the Freedom Award (1963); the Family of Man Award at the New York Hilton at an annual dinner chaired by George Ball (November 1967; given by the Society for the Family of Man); the *Médaille d'Or* from the European Parliament for his contribution to European unification (as of October 1975); and nomination by the Council of Europe as the first honorary citizen of the united Europe (as of April 1976). In McCloy's case, this included the honorary citizenship of Rothenburg ob der Tauber, which he had saved from bombardment in Spring 1945; as well as the Lucius D. Clay Medal, which he had been awarded in Karlsruhe (I believe in May 1980) in a ceremony at which Genscher had spoken, at least in part in appreciation of his historic role in creating a new Germany; and the first *Prix Monnet*, awarded by the Monnet Foundation (October 1981). In the case of Kohnstamm, this included as of 1977 the Wateler Peace Prize, given in the Hague (apparently a Dutch prize) based on the decision by the board of the *Carnegie Stichting* (invitations from Dr. JH van Roijen, the President of the Board of Directors of the Carnegie Foundation) and due at least in part to his work in the ECSC, later in the Monnet Committee and as President of the European University Institute in Florence. Other awards included the gold medal of the Association of Friends of President Robert Schuman, the first one of which was given on 2 July 1966 to Konrad Adenauer in Montigny-lès-Metz with an address given by Monnet; the Paul G. Hoffman Award Fund, intended to recognize individual achievements in the advancement of important development interests; and the Paul-Henry Spaak Memorial Fellowship, the first one of which had been recently received by Dr. Gerhard Mally as of July 1973. The German Marshall Fund of the United States funded awards (the Paul G. Hoffman Award Fund (one-time grant)).

in October 1965, in the *Amerika-Haus* in Munich, Birrenbach had received the *Columbus-Medaille* from the *Columbus-Gesellschaft* (Munich) for his services in the cause of German-American relations.<sup>280</sup> In July 1966, the Medical Faculty of the University of Düsseldorf awarded him an honorary doctorate (in medicine). In June 1967, shortly before Birrenbach's 60<sup>th</sup> birthday, the President of the *Bundestag* (in the name of the Federal President) granted him the *Große Bundesverdienstkreuz* of the *Verdienstordens* of the Federal Republic. In March 1976, Birrenbach had received the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Arabian Republic of Egypt.

This overall process continued in the later years of Birrenbach's life. In June 1977, as Birrenbach's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday approached, the President of the *Bundestag* (Carstens) bestowed upon him the state's highest decoration/order, the *Große Bundesverdienstkreuz mit Stern und Schulterband*.<sup>281</sup> Shortly thereafter, in July 1977 (I think in Bonn), Prof. Karl Kaiser, Prof. Hans-Peter Schwarz and Amb. von Walther presented Birrenbach with a "*Festschrift*" dedicated in his honor, entitled *Amerika und Westeuropa*. Prepared and published in the Federal Republic by the DGAP Research Institute (in fact edited by Kaiser and Schwarz), this birthday *Festschrift* enjoyed an excellent reception in the German press and, after a lengthy delay, also appeared in 1979 in an American edition.<sup>282</sup> In June 1981, at the Hotel Excelsior in Cologne, the *Max-*

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<sup>280</sup> This decoration was bestowed upon Birrenbach by Hermann Proebst (president of the *Gesellschaft* and editor-in-chief of the *Süddeutschen Zeitung*).

<sup>281</sup> Carstens gave a speech for the awarding of the *Großen Verdienstkreuz* to Birrenbach on 20 June 1977, and Birrenbach gave an answer.

<sup>282</sup> For the press reception in the Federal Republic, see KB to Bowie, 16 June 1978. To Birrenbach's great pleasure, this volume/collection of important essays featured an introduction by McCloy (an offer made to him by the editors). Birrenbach thanked McCloy for the introduction "which has been the most valuable gift I have received on that day." (KB to McCloy, 24 March 1980). According to Birrenbach, Schaetzel had induced McCloy to write the forward (KB to Schaetzel, 29 August 1977). Clearly pleased with the contributions, Birrenbach described the *Festschrift* as "magnificent [*glänzend*]." (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1). At the time the book appeared, Karl Kaiser was the Director of the DGAP

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Research Institute and a Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne and Hans-Peter Schwarz was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne and Acting Chairman of the Directorate of the Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies. The contributions to the volume *Amerika und Westeuropa* (I think the sub-title was *Present and Future Problems*) offered a variety of viewpoints and came from a group of distinguished experts on trans-Atlantic relations functioning as a working group that, under the aegis of the DGAP Research Institute, had discussed and thoroughly analyzed the pressing and future problems facing the countries of North America and Western Europe (Birrenbach had not seen any of the texts beforehand). These contributors (including many Birrenbach contacts) were: François Bondy; Robert Bowie; William Diebold Jr. (on reforming the international economic system); Peter Dobell; François Duchêne (The EC and its Global Responsibilities); Wilhelm Grewe; William E. Griffith; Pierre Hassner; Martin Hillenbrand; Karl Kaiser (two articles, including “Amerika und Westeuropa” and a concluding article); Norbert Klotten; Ulrich Littmann; John McCloy; Uwe Nerlich; Henry Owen; Wilhelm Rall; Klaus Ritter; Benjamin Roberts; Robert Schaetzel; Hans-Peter Schwarz; Andrew Shonfield; Raymond Vernon; and Wolfgang Wagner. The book analyzed a number of themes (and their impact, e.g. on trans-Atlantic relations), among them: various aspects of the Western economic system, basic questions of security policy, the conflicts inherent in Euro-communism, the concept of the international system as a whole (with special attention given to the inclusion of Japan and Canada in the solution of important problems), the European Community as a regional system and special problems of German-American relations. The book started from the premise that the relations with North America remained the central concern of Western Europe and that it was essential to determine the form and content of those relations. It demonstrated that there were no basic differences between the viewpoints of America and Europe with respect to the need for and means of developing a foreign policy partnership. The preconditions for such a foreign policy partnership were examined and used in the analysis of current problems. (Some sort of promotional material for this book, K106/2). In explaining the agonizing, frustrating, lengthy and embarrassing delay of the appearance of the US edition to his American friends, Birrenbach absolved himself and pointed to his efforts to accelerate the process (vis-à-vis the *Belser Verlag* and the DGAP) and blamed accidents and others for their mistakes and the “scandalous” and “unbelievable” mishandling of the matter (enormous obstacles and problems): the German publisher (the *Chr. Belser AG für Verlagsgeschäfte & Co. KG (Belser Verlag)*, Stuttgart-Zurich (responsible to the DGAP; negotiated badly, inexperienced in international negotiations)), the American publisher (Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company (neighboring publishers), Lexington, MA; incomprehensible delays, worked extremely slowly; sent the book for printing at a lower price to England; thanks to the efforts of Kaiser), the British printing house (the large, renowned, high-quality firm William Clowes (International Ltd; Printers and Bookbinders; London); had been the victim of a lengthy strike), the DGAP (had used second-class translators whose work had to be re-done; vacations from July-September; personnel changes; Kaiser had misinformed Birrenbach about the procedure/state of publication of the book) and the publisher Alfred A. Knopf Inc. (New York; originally foreseen as the publisher but then gave a belated and unfair rejection, claiming that they preferred to publish works by single writers), all the mistakes made in the course of the production/printing/publishing/translation process. Birrenbach concluded that the publishing industry in the US was in bad shape. The American edition was entitled *America and Western Europe: Problems and Prospects*. Our friend Kaiser was more a man of political science than the right negotiator with publishers. (KB to Schaetzel, 6 October 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach sent the volume *Amerika und Westeuropa* to Coing. (Prof. Dr. iur. Helmut Coing, Director of the *Max-Planck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte*, Frankfurt, to KB, 20 September 1977, K106/2). The American edition of the *Festschrift* of the DGAP had been sold and a second edition was now published. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). Birrenbach wanted the book published in English in the US, believing they owed this to McCloy (and I assume all the American contributors). As of February 1979, Birrenbach claimed that the German edition of the *Festschrift* had been a success in Germany (in what sense?). An apologetic, even ashamed Birrenbach, appears to have been considerably more concerned than the US/foreign contributors about the delays. Available on the market (at least in the US), Birrenbach’s *Festschrift* seems to have achieved at least adequate sales. As of August 1979, the inventory of the US edition had recently sold out, and the publisher had decided to print a second unchanged edition (Kaiser to KB, 23 August 1979). As of September 1978, the 1,219 hardcover copies of Birrenbach’s *Festschrift* had already been sold. Of the 3,700 paperbacks, 2,011 had been sold, so that 1,689 copies were still by the publisher, and the sales were currently accelerating (Re: phone call from Trebesch on 19 September 1978). As of September 1977, all

*Planck-Gesellschaft* awarded Birrenbach the rare and prestigious *Adolf von Harnack-Medaille*, one of the highest *wissenschaftlichen* honors in the Federal Republic, for his merits to the *Wissenschaft* as President of the *Fritz Thyssen Stiftung* and as a member of the MPG-Senate.<sup>283</sup> Finally, in August 1982, Birrenbach received a “Certificate of Honor” from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on behalf of the university’s president (Prof. Avraham Harman) in appreciation and gratitude for his assistance to that institution’s work of teaching and research (services for the research in Israel).<sup>284</sup> This realm of prizes, honors and awards also saw Atlanticists lobbying/facilitating for one another, with for instance Birrenbach as of January 1984 hoping/sought that Rieben would offer George Ball a prize (Monnet Prize?) in honor of his great services for Monnet and European unification and the relationship to the US in the 1950s and 60s.<sup>285</sup>

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that Birrenbach had heard from competent readers of his *Festschrift* was very positive. As of September 1978, a hardback copy of Birrenbach’s *Festschrift* cost DM 22,80 (Re: phone call from Trebesch on 19 September 1978). The FTS helped by paying the *Belser Verlag* for copies of Birrenbach’s *Festschrift* both for Birrenbach himself as well as for the DGAP, at least some for free disposal (as of 19 September 1978, approximately eighty copies for Birrenbach and fifty for the DGAP). Of course, the DGAP used its means to assist in the shipping/distribution. As of November 1978, it was planned that the German Information Center in NY would buy about 200 copies of the Birrenbach *Festschrift* (Kaiser to KB, 14 November 1978). Birrenbach saw to it that his *Festschrift* was distributed to his contacts and contributors (including delivered by the publishers but also seems to have sent it to some himself, including the English version; including Americans and foreigners; the DGAP was also involved in this, for instance also identifying Germany-experts in the USA that should receive it).

<sup>283</sup> This medal had been created by the *Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft* in 1923 (also the year of that society’s founding). According to Birrenbach, the medal had been awarded to that point to only about 23 or 30 impressive personalities, among them seven Nobel Prize winners, two Federal Presidents, first-class researchers and at least (perhaps only?) three *Wirtschaftler*. Birrenbach attributed his reception of this medal to his role as president of the FTS (activity in the FTS) and a member of the MPG. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2). During those years (turn of the 1920s up to the end of the 30s), Birrenbach had himself “experienced [*erlebt*]” a series of personalities to whom the AHM had been given. The granting of the medal to Birrenbach was based on a unanimous decision of the MPG-Senate. Prof. Reimar Lüst (President of the MPG) gave the medal and a speech, and Birrenbach also gave a speech.

<sup>284</sup> This Certificate of Honor was sent to Birrenbach by the European representative of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Dr. Ephraim Lahav).

<sup>285</sup> Likewise, Birrenbach’s contacts sometimes facilitated his receiving such awards. In July 1967, Birrenbach thanked Barzel for the advocacy of the giving of the *Großen Bundesverdienstkreuz*. As of August 1982, Birrenbach believed that with respect to the certificate of honor he had gotten recently of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem that Keynan (vice president of the HUJ) had worked behind the scenes and



The Atlanticists also had their life work recognized on their birthdays in various celebrations. On one hand, Birrenbach was invited to attend the birthday celebrations of others (e.g. McCloy).<sup>286</sup> On the other hand, in addition to his private birthday celebrations and as with the other celebrations and honoring of Birrenbach's career, Birrenbach's special/important birthdays (e.g. his 65<sup>th</sup> and 70<sup>th</sup>) were the occasion for various celebratory/honoring social functions.<sup>287</sup> Staged in a variety of venues (e.g. the *Hotel Breidenbacher Hof* and the Park Hotel, both in Düsseldorf) by a variety of entities (most notably the Thyssen *Gesellschaften*), Birrenbach's birthday celebrations/functions were characterized by dinners, special meetings and speeches/laudations delivered by Birrenbach and others as appreciations of Birrenbach's person, life and achievements in the FRG and beyond and attended (invited by Birrenbach) by illustrious personalities/men in the Federal Republic from the worlds of *Wirtschaft*, *Wissenschaft* and *Politik* as well as by Birrenbach's foreign/US contacts, personalities that he was personally close to as well as representatives of the groups with whom he had worked with.<sup>288</sup> Indeed, in July 1977, Birrenbach joked with pleased relief that he had now

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induced the members of the board of the university to honor Birrenbach thus and that he owed this honor to Keynan's friendly intervention in his favor.

<sup>286</sup> Birrenbach regretted being unable to attend a birthday celebration for McCloy on 20 March 1985 (he had been invited) due to illness.

<sup>287</sup> In 1967, Birrenbach celebrated his birthday with his family in Münster in all seclusion, without presenting himself to the public. In 1979, Birrenbach interrupted his work and celebrated his birthday in Hannover with his children and grandchildren. In July 1983, Birrenbach celebrated his birthday peacefully at home. I think he celebrated his birthday in 1985 at home.

<sup>288</sup> Birrenbach's birthday celebrations/functions were staged in a variety of venues by a variety of entities: the Thyssen *Gesellschaften* (evening function/celebration/reception with a dinner in the Park Hotel in Düsseldorf on 5 July 1977); a *Herrenabend* in the *Hotel Breidenbacher Hof* in Düsseldorf (on 6 July 1972; also Thyssen *Gesellschaften*?); the TVV GmbH (in *Schloss Hugenpoet* in Kettwig/Ruhr on 4 July 1972); the *Aufsichtsrat* meeting of the ATH AG (on 7 July 1972); family celebration (in *Schloss Wilkinghege* in/by Münster/*Westfalen* on 2 July 1972). As of July 1979, the TVV celebrated Birrenbach's 25 years as its chairman. It was planned to hold a party in fall 1979 to celebrate in large circle Birrenbach's anniversary by Thyssen. As of July 1979, it was the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Birrenbach's taking up his activity in the Thyssen *Gesellschaften*. Carstens had gone into an invitation to Birrenbach's birthday. Birrenbach claimed that this invitation had happened without his knowledge. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Federal President Prof. Dr. Karl Carstens, Bonn, 27 May 1982, K033/1). Among those at the AHM

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dinner for Birrenbach would be Michael Hoffmann-Becking. Hase had been invited (had to cancel) by the MPG for Birrenbach's receiving of the AHM. Birrenbach celebrated his birthday privately on 2 July 1982. Those delivering speeches/*Laudationes* about Birrenbach at Birrenbach's various birthday celebrations included Prof. Dr. Robert Ellscheid; Dr. Julian Baron von Godlewski; Prof. Dr. Helmut Coing; Spethmann; Chancellors (aD) Prof. Dr. Erhard and Kiesinger; Dr. Sohl; and Birrenbach himself in conclusion (all on 6 July 1972 and/or 5 July 1977; Birrenbach would not leave it at a simple thanks but told his life story); Dr. Max Horst (VLR I. Kl. aD on 2 July 1972 at the family celebration and to Kurt and Ida on 2 July 1977); Dr. Jörg Bankmann (*Vorstand* Member of the TVV GmbH to KB and wife; 70<sup>th</sup> birthday); Dr. Fritz Wecker (*Vorstand* Member of the TVV GmbH on 4 July 1972); and Heinz Oskar Vetter (Chairman of the DGB, Deputy Chairman of the AR of the ATH AG; at the AR meeting of the ATH AG on 7 July 1972). By Birrenbach's 75<sup>th</sup> birthday in particular the then Federal President Prof. Carstens had paid tribute to Birrenbach. Those attending Birrenbach's birthday celebrations included a/the Chancellor (former?), President, State Secretaries, parliamentary colleagues and friends (all at the *Herrenabend* on 6 July 1972). Those attending Birrenbach's birthday celebration in 1977 included Ponto (and I think Carstens) and Julian Godlewski (5 July 1977). Those invited to and attending Birrenbach's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 included: Fritz Berg; Martin Hillenbrand (Director General, AIIA); Dr. Horst Keller (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Chancellor Kiesinger; Heinrich Köppler (CDU-*Landtagsfraktion* of NRW, Chairman); Dr. sc. Pol. Hanns-Jürgen Kunze (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG); Economics Minister Dr. jur. Otto Graf Lambsdorff (MdB); Paul Lichtenberg (*Aufsichtsrat* Chairman of the *Commerzbank AG*); Dr. Klaus Mangold; Dr. Siegfried Mann (*Hauptgeschäftsführer* and Member of the *Präsidium* of the BDI eV); the banker Alwin Münchmeyer; Hans Müser (Chair of the VS of the *Thyssen Draht AG*); Dr.-Ing. Rolfroderich KF Nemitz (Chair of the VS of the *Thyssen Schachtbau GmbH*); Pieter Sanders; Dr. Dieter Spethmann (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Rudi Schwabenthan (Teheran/Munich); Prof. HP Schwarz (*Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen* of the University of Cologne); Prof. Gustav Stein (BDI eV); Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Dr. Gerd Tacke (Member of the AR of the *Siemens AG*, Munich); and Trebesch (*Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender Präsident*, DGAP). Those men Birrenbach invited to his birthday celebrations included outstanding/leading personalities from *Politik* (representatives of the federal government; parliamentary colleagues (especially Chancellor Erhard)), *Wirtschaft* (from the *Verwaltungsrat* and VS of the TVV; the ATH VS and AR; from the *Vorständen* of the daughter companies of the Thyssen group; the banks of our group; leading personalities of the BDI), the *Wissenschaft* (belonging to the FTS *Wissenschaftlichen Beirat*), the Atlanticist organizations (members of the DGAP *Präsidium* and the SWP *Stiftungsrat*), as well as personal friends from Germany and abroad. Those invited to Birrenbach's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration (on 5 July 1977) included Hoffmann-Becking; the President of the *Landeszentralbank* in Baden-Württemberg (who could not take part); Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Düsseldorf; prevented on that day); Prof. Dr. Julius Speer (could not take part, sick); and Kohnstamm (by the TVV VS; could not attend). Those invited to Birrenbach's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 (not sure if attended) included Prof. Butenandt. Those invited to but unable to attend Birrenbach's 70<sup>th</sup> birthday celebration in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 included: Dr. Wolfgang Bernhardt (Deputy Chairman of the VS of *Korf-Stahl AG*); *Ministerialdirektor* Dr. Klaus Blech (AA); Carstens; Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (*Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*); Dönhoff; Dr. jur. G. Freiherr von Falkenhausen; Dr. Heinz Gehm; Prof. Dr. Günther Gillissen (*Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Institut für Publizistik*, Mainz); Dr. jur. Klaus Götte (Member of the VS of the *Allianz Versicherungs-AG*); Dr. Wilfried Guth (*Vorstandssprecher* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*, Frankfurt); Amb. (aD) Karl-Günther von Hase (the *Intendant* of the ZDF, AöR, Mainz); *Bundesgerichtshof* Vice President (aD) Dr. Fritz Hauß; Heck; the lawyer Hans Hengeler (Düsseldorf, actually not invited due to illness); Dr. Max Horst; Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Richard Jaeger (MdB); Prof. Dr. Norbert Kloten; Max Kohnstamm (European University Institute, President); Hans Mayr (Dep. Chairman of the *IG Metall*); Hans Merkle; Yohanan Meroz (Israeli embassy); Frau Lilo Milchsack; Dr. Karl Mommer; Robert Nyssen; Ernst Plessner (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*); Prof. Dr. Julius Speer; Gen. (aD) Hans Speidel (sick); Dr. jur. Wolfgang Schieren (Chairman of the *Vorstand*, *Allianz Versicherungs-AG*); Federal Judge (aD) Dr. Fabian von Schlabrendorff; Toni Schmücker (Chairman of the *Vorstand* of the *Volkswagen AG*); Georg Schröder; Gen. (aD) Johannes Steinhoff; Walter Stoessel Jr. (US ambassador, US embassy, Bonn); Prof. Shepard Stone; Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Chairman of the *Aufsichtsrat* of the *Deutschen Bank*; Düsseldorf); Heinz O. Vetter (Chairman of the DGB); Prof. Dr.

“survived” all that had been organized for him for his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday.<sup>289</sup> In addition to this, in his later years, Birrenbach’s life and career, including his behind-the-scenes participation and influence in *Wirtschaft* and *Politik*, were periodically honored in the German press, particularly on his major birthdays/departures (e.g. from the DGAP) announced in those pages.<sup>290</sup> In an exhibition of pride and vanity, Birrenbach at least at times had the speeches delivered on the occasions of his being honored (providing a picture of Birrenbach) printed up into brochures and then distributed them to numerous personalities.<sup>291</sup>

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jur. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum; Dr. Hellmuth Wagner; Richard von Weizsäcker (MdB); Prof. Dr. Stephan Waetzoldt (Gen. Director of the *Staatlichen Museen Preußischer Kulturbesitz*).

<sup>289</sup> KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977. For Birrenbach’s 70<sup>th</sup> birthday, there were five dinners or special meetings for him in July 1977. In July 1982, Birrenbach celebrated his 75<sup>th</sup> birthday with a great reception given to him in the *Gewölbe* of the St. Clara Cloister from the 13<sup>th</sup> century in Cologne. The reception and meal had been given (conducted) by the FTS (Board). The *Bundespräsident* (Carstens), Kohl and other prominent personalities from *Politik*, *Wirtschaft* and *Wissenschaft* had taken part in the reception. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2). Birrenbach had celebrated his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday in the first week of July in several functions. (KB to Lübke, 15 August 1977, K171/1). Birrenbach’s birthday festivities dragged on for almost over a week. “On the occasion of my birthday an appreciation [*Anerkennung*] beyond all expectations took place of my activity as a loner [*Einzelgänger*] in the past.” From the federal president through Prof. Carstens, the highest German order had been awarded to Birrenbach. Also several functions occurred for Birrenbach in whose course Birrenbach’s activity was paid tribute to in a way such that the closing speeches had become difficult for Birrenbach. (KB to Steinhoff, 12 August 1977, K173/1).

<sup>290</sup> For such biographical announcements of Birrenbach’s key birthdays/departures see, for instance, *Deutschland-Berichte* (I believe), July-August 1977, Nr 7/8, pp. 14-16; “KB-stets diskret,” *Die Zeit*, 3 July 1981; “Birrenbach 75,” *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, RP, 29 June 1982, K033/1; *Das Parlament*, 4 July 1987; *Welt am Sonntag*, 5 July 1987, KB, former CDU MdB, Düsseldorf, became 80 years old. The FAZ published a laudatory account of McCloy’s career on his 85<sup>th</sup> birthday in 1980. (FAZ, p. 4, 1 April 1980, John McCloy, 85). Birrenbach’s departure from his various offices was accompanied by *Laudationes* (by Dr. Wolfgang Wagner in the case of the DGAP in 1981) and congratulations (appreciative words) from numerous prominent personalities in writing or orally (e.g. regarding the DGAP).

<sup>291</sup> Those printed up into brochures included, for instance, those given by *Bundestagspräsidenten* Carstens (in the name of the Federal President) and Birrenbach on the occasion/dinner of the giving of the (*Großen Bundesverdienstkreuzes mit Stern und Schulterband* to Birrenbach in 1977; and those given for his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 as “Kurt Birrenbach zum 70<sup>th</sup>.” This printing up was carried out for instance by his office (for the two *Bundesverdienstkreuz*-speeches) with the costs of the publication at least sometimes being partially assumed by the Thyssen AG (half the costs of publication for the speeches given on his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday in the Park Hotel on 5 July 1977 thanks to Spethmann and Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz). Among those to whom the brochures were distributed were (at least some of whom had been invited to the celebrations themselves and who had been both able and unable to attend): Fritz Berg; (?), President of the *Landeszentralbank* in Baden-Württemberg; somebody in Wittlaer by Düsseldorf; Dr. Wolfgang Bernhardt (Deputy Chairman of the VS of *Korf-Stahl AG*); *Ministerialdirektor* Dr. Klaus Blech (AA); Prof. Dr. Gerd Brand; Prof. Butenandt; Carstens; Dr. F. Wilhelm Christians (Speaker of the VS of the *Deutschen Bank*

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AG); Dr. jur. Ernst Coenen; Dönhoff; Günther Drechsler (Thyssen Inc., New York City); *Bergrat aD* Prof. Dr. Otto Dünbier; Robert Ellscheid; Dr. jur. G. Freiherr von Falkenhausen; Ernst Feßler; Paul Frank; Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Hans Friderichs (Speaker of the VS of the *Dresdner Bank AG*); Dr. Heinz Gehm; Prof. Dr. Günther Gillesen (*Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Institut für Publizistik, Mainz*); Dr. Alfons Gödde (Speaker of the VS of the *Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG*); Dr. jur. Klaus Götte (Member of the VS of the *Allianz Versicherungs-AG*); Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Johann Baptist Gradl (MdB); Amb. Prof. Dr. Grewe; Dr. Helmut Gschwend (VS member of the *Thyssen Handelsunion AG*); Dr. Wilfried Guth (Speaker of the VS of the *Deutschen Bank AG, Frankfurt*); Amb. (aD) Karl-Günther von Hase (the *Intendant* of the ZDF, AöR, Mainz); *Bundesgerichtshof* Vice President (aD) Dr. Fritz Hauß; Heck; the lawyer Hans Hengeler (Düsseldorf); Walter Henkels; Dr. G. Henle; *Oberstadtdirektor iR* Walther Hensel; Dr. Alfred Herrhausen (Member of the VS of the *Deutschen Bank AG*); Ludolf Herrmann (editor-in-chief of the *Deutschen Zeitung, Bad Godesberg*); Prof. Dr. Karl Hettlage; Dr. Franz Heubl (President of the Bavarian *Landtag*); Oskar Heumüller; Martin Hillenbrand (Director General, AIIA); Federal Minister (aD) Hermann Höcherl; Dr. Max Horst; Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Richard Jaeger (MdB); Dr. Horst Keller (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Kerscher (Member of the FTS VS); Dr. Andreas Kleffel (Member of the VS of the *Deutschen Bank AG*); Chancellor Kiesinger; Prof. Dr. Norbert Kloten; Dr. Herbert W. Köhler (MdB; *Geschäftsführendes Vorstandsmitglied, WVES*); Heinrich Köppler (CDU-*Landtagsfraktion* of NRW, Chair); Max Kohnstamm (European University Institute, President); Dr. Herbert Kremp (PA AA, *Kurierabt.*, Embassy Peking, was as of February 1979 no longer in the Federal Republic and therefore the contact had been cut off); Dr. Hans-Helmut Kuhnke (Chair of the VS of the *Stifterverbandes für die Deutsche Wissenschaft eV*); Dr. sc. Pol. Hanns-Jürgen Kunze (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG); Economics Minister Dr. jur. Otto Graf Lambsdorff (MdB); Paul Lichtenberg (Chairman of the AR of the *Commerzbank AG*); Dr. Guillermo Linck (Buenos Aires); Prof. Dr. Reimar Lüst (President of the MPGFW); Prof. Dr. Heinz Maier-Leibnitz (President of the *Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft*); Gen. (aD) Ulrich de Maizière; Dr. Klaus Mangold; Dr. Siegfried Mann (*Hauptgeschäftsführer* and Member of the *Präsidium* of the BDI eV); Hans Mayr (Dep. Chairman of the *IG Metall*); Hans Merkle; Yohanan Meroz (Israeli embassy); Frau Lilo Milchsack; Dr. Karl Mommer; the banker Alwin Münchmeyer; Hans Müser (Chair of the VS of the *Thyssen Draht AG*); *Landesminister aD* Dr. KH Narjes (MdB); State Sec. (aD) Dr. Fritz Neef; Dr.-Ing. Rolfroderich KF Nemitz (Chair of the VS of the *Thyssen Schachtbau GmbH*); *Ministerialdirigent* Hans Neusel (leader of the *Präsidialbüros* in the *Bundestag*); Robert Nyssen; Ernst Plessler (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the *Deutschen Bank AG*); Thorwald Risler; Pieter Sanders; Sohl; Prof. Carl Spannagel (Münster); Prof. Dr. Julius Speer; General (aD) Hans Speidel; Dr. Dieter Spethmann (Chair of the VS of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Prof. Dr. Theodor Schieder; Dr. jur. Wolfgang Schieren (Chairman of the VS, *Allianz Versicherungs-AG*); Federal Judge (aD) Dr. Fabian von Schlabrendorff; Dr. jur. Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen (MdB, Vice President of the *Bundestag*); Toni Schmücker (Chair of the VS of the *Volkswagen AG*); Federal Minister (aD) Dr. Gerhard Schröder (MdB, Chair of the *Bundestag* Foreign Affairs Committee); Rudi Schwabenthan (Teheran/Munich); Prof. HP Schwarz (*Forschungsinstitut für politische Wissenschaft und europäische Fragen* of the University of Cologne); Georg Schröder; Hans-Jürgen Schwepcke (VS member of the *Allianz Versicherungs-AG*); Prof. Carl Spannagel (Münster); Prof. Gustav Stein (BDI eV); Gen. aD Johannes Steinhoff; Dr. Jürgen Steinmetz (*Generalbevollmächtigter* of the Thyssen AG, formerly ATH); Walter Stoessel Jr. (US ambassador, US embassy, Bonn); Prof. Shepard Stone; Dr. Gerd Tacke (Member of the AR of the *Siemens AG, Munich*); Trebesch (*Geschäftsführender Stellvertretender Präsident, DGAP*); Franz Heinrich Ulrich (Chair of the AR of the *Deutschen Bank, Düsseldorf*); Heinz O. Vetter (Chair of the DGB); Prof. Dr. Jur. Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum; Rolf Vogel; Hermann Volle (editor-in-chief, *Europa-Archiv*); Dr. Hellmuth Wagner; Amb. (aD) Dr. Gebhardt von Walther; Richard von Weizsäcker (MdB); Dr. Hans Georg Willers (Chair of the VS, *Thyssen Handelsunion AG*); Prof. Dr. Stephan Waetzoldt (General Director of the *Staatlichen Museen Preußischer Kulturbesitz*); Dr. jur. Hans Wuttke (Member of the VS, *Dresdner Bank AG*); and Prof. Dr. jur. Johannes Zahn (Chairman of the *Verwaltungsrates* of the *Bankhauses CG Trinkaus & Burkhardt*). Birrenbach distributed in printed version the speeches given on his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday exclusively to a very small circle of family members and friends (10-12 persons; I think he distributed this to a much wider circle).

Another element of the retrospective outlook in later years was that many of the organizations of the Atlanticist infrastructure Birrenbach was a part of celebrated important anniversaries in *Festakten* (e.g. the DGAP celebrated the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its founding on 20 May 1980 in the DGAP; the AI planned to celebrate its 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary in Brussels at some point between 21-24 October 1981, 22-24 October 1981, Thursday to Saturday). Birrenbach often played an important role with respect to planning (also the DGAP *Präsidium* as a whole) and participation in these celebrations (e.g. delivered one of the two speeches, the other one by Genscher, at the DGAP celebration; planned to attend the AI celebration in October 1981).<sup>292</sup> By these later years, the Atlanticist institutions (e.g. DGAP, AI), thanks not least to the crucial efforts of Birrenbach (as officer, fund-raiser and promoter) and personalities like him, had achieved considerable respect, importance and renown (at least among the initiated) in the national and international framework.

In his final years, Birrenbach also took part to varying extent in a variety of retrospective Atlanticist organizations exploring and propagating the memory, ideas and work (vision) of key personalities. Birrenbach was a founding member of the *Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung*, located in Bonn and in existence as of December 1974, and remained involved with its work through at least his goodwill and advice.<sup>293</sup> At Monnet's personal invitation, Birrenbach also became a member of the *Conseil* of the *Fondation Jean*

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<sup>292</sup> Birrenbach had not been able to take part in the celebration of the 70<sup>th</sup> birthday of the *Kaiser-Wilhelm/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft*. (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2). Genscher spoke at the DGAP event since Schmidt had declined the request to give a speech due to work. On 10 October 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke to the Chairman and the Ladies and Gentlemen at the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary (annual) assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Organization (Association?) at Loy Henderson Auditorium at the State Department (DC).

<sup>293</sup> Birrenbach was still a member of the LES as of July 1981. Karl Hohmann, with whom Birrenbach was involved, was the chairman of the LES, a position he still held as of July 1985. I believe that Hohmann was also a member of the DGAP.

*Monnet pour l'Europe*, created in October 1978 by Monnet and based in Lausanne, Switzerland.<sup>294</sup> In fact, Birrenbach rarely took part in the FJME functions and meetings in Lausanne, repeatedly pleading other obligations.<sup>295</sup> While admittedly not an Atlanticist organization, Birrenbach also became a member in 1977 of the *Beirat* of the *Stiftung-Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer Haus*, based in Bad Honnef-Rhöndorf, and was elected [*gewählt*] in 1980 to the chairmanship of that *Beirat*.<sup>296</sup> Directing their various

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<sup>294</sup> The FJME held its constituting meeting on 9 November 1978 in Paris (*Banque de France*). Its president was Henri Rieben (Professor of History at the University of Lausanne and from the start the director of the very closely linked *Centre de Recherches Européennes*). As of 1985, the FJME *Conseil* consisted of 183 members. Notable members of the FJME *Conseil* at times included Prof. Curt Gasteyger (Geneva); Hans von der Groeben (Rheinbach); Dr. Fritz Hellwig (Bonn); Winrich Behr; Max Kohnstamm; Pierre Uri; and Prof. Jerzy Lukaszewski (Rector of the College of Europe, Bruges). I do not believe Birrenbach ever became a member of the executive council. The FJME had a *Stiftungsrat* and (*wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter*). I think Rieben had been involved with Monnet even back in the late 1940s. In some ways, it is probably best to consider the FJME and CRE as a whole. The farm of Dorigny (Lausanne) housed both the *Centre de Recherches Européennes* and the FJME. Given that the city and university of Lausanne had some tradition in promoting the European idea, it was no surprise that Monnet chose Lausanne as the seat for his foundation. Already in 1957, the university had set up the first chair in the world for European integration and, with Monnet's influence/support, created (also in that year) at the university the CRE, which as of 1984 employed a small team of about ten collaborators of which several were employed on a voluntary basis. The FJME had statutes. The FJME was associated with the Swiss confederation, the state of Vaud, the city and the university of Lausanne and a number of Monnet's friends. Although based in Switzerland, the FJME clearly sought to impact in the German-language area. As of 1984, it appears that the FJME had become well-known in Western Switzerland but wanted to make itself and its activities and its archive better known also in German-Switzerland and in the German-language abroad. For this purpose, a slideshow [*Tonbildschau*] in German was commissioned and would be shown for the first time in April 1984 in Lucerne on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Lucerne section of the *Europa-Union Schweiz*. The FJME impacted in Europe and the US (and on personalities who came from all over the world). This was Monnet's personal appointment (elected?). The *Conseil* was the equivalent of a *Kuratorium*.

<sup>295</sup> Such FJME functions and meetings included the annual meetings of the *Conseil* at the *Ferme de Dorigny* (at the University of Lausanne). Birrenbach did not even attend the constituting meeting itself and as of February 1980 had still never seen [*erlebt*] the FJME president, Henri Rieben. The sole exception to my knowledge was his attendance on the "wonderful" evening of 24 October 1981 in Lausanne when the Monnet Foundation awarded McCloy the first *Prix Monnet* (Monnet Award), McCloy had given a speech on this occasion and been elected into the foundation's Committee of Honor. Only a fraction (less than a third) of the members of the FJME *Conseil* appear to have attended the annual meetings. As of November 1984, Birrenbach claimed that he had taken part in several functions of the FJME. As of 5 March 1985, Birrenbach hoped to be able to take part in the celebration for Prof. Carstens (I think having to do with the FJME).

<sup>296</sup> As of 1984, Birrenbach still held this chairmanship. As of October 1979, Birrenbach had gotten Abs to give a *Vortrag* in April 1980 on the reestablishment of the German credits after 1945 (I guess in the SBKAH). I think Osterheld was also part of this Rhöndorf *Stiftung*. Particularly with regard to the SBKAH, Birrenbach had to learn that, whatever his overall perspective on the old chancellor, it was not always tactful to speak openly about his views regarding Adenauer's attitude with regard to the United States.

activities at personalities in *Politik, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft* as well as interested individuals from the general public, these organizations set up, maintained and made accessible *Gedenkstätten* and archival and research material (including *Nachlässe*); staged scholarly conferences and *Vorträge*; preserved and extended the links between those personalities seeking to realize similar ideals; promoted research and provided scholarly support to students; and produced and published high-quality materials and analyses on contemporary affairs.<sup>297</sup> The financing for these activities came from a variety of sources, with Birrenbach seeing to it that the FTS provided project funding to the FJME/CRE, specifically for the preparation of the Monnet archives and as of November 1976 had induced the BDI to address a number of large firms from all parts of the Federal Republic to contribute to the LES, resulting in DM 70,000.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> The SBKAH memorial sites included house, garden and pavilion. On the SBKAH, see ACDP K168/2. Since 1957, the CRE/FJME produced/published a series of brochures (*rote Hefte*) on relevant themes, including in 1986 one by Karl Carstens (former FRG President) entitled *Un souffle de renouveau en Europe* (Environ, 50 pages). It published certain parts of Monnet's archives (e.g. correspondence with Robert Schuman). As of March 1985, Birrenbach had promised Rieben (at the latter's request) he would write a red brochure on Monnet (on the European question) but he would not be able to do this in the foreseeable time (months) due to health. In December 1985, Rieben remarked to Birrenbach that the latter's *Europa*-work about the negotiations since the times of Monnet until today made progress. On his state visit in Switzerland in August 1982, Federal President Karl Carstens visited the farm and gave to the archive a copy of the West German archive material on the coming about of the EC. The FJME saw itself in a good location for impacting particularly on the young and also the larger public. The Monnet Foundation was charged with the organization of Monnet's *Nachlaß*. Such documentation collections were expected to be used by researchers on the university level.

<sup>298</sup> The financing/capital of the FJME came from various public and private contributions (including donations collected from numerous contributors by the CRE), subventions, gifts, bequests and contributions (including from the canton Vaud; the city and university of Lausanne; European organizations; the governments of France and Luxembourg). After being originally housed in the premises of the University of Lausanne on the grounds of Dorigny, the FJME later moved in the old farm by Lausanne made available by the canton Vaud and specially restored for this purpose with money of the Canton and *Bund*. Rieben asked Birrenbach regarding the possibility of the FTS financing various projects of the FJME/CRE and for advice on the procedure. As of 1985, the CRE applied to the FTS for financing (e.g. for its research program). As of February 1986, the FTS bodies had rejected the CRE/FJME application (Prof. Rieben; DM 61,100) of October 1985 and the CRE was trying to reformulate the application and reduce the financing needed to no more than DM 50,000. This funding had to do with the efforts of the FJME/CRE to arrange (*wissenschaftliche* preparation and analysis of) the Monnet Archive, specifically in this case the part of the Monnet archives/documents dealing with the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. A central instrument in the FJME efforts, the Monnet Archive (supplemented by gifts from other European personalities) was seen as indispensable/crucial to contemporary historical research/understanding of the

Part of the German Atlanticist retrospective efforts, including those of Birrenbach, consisted of initiatives to defend the reputation and preserve the memory of foreign Atlanticist contacts. McCloy, in particular, came under what Birrenbach considered unjustified, politically motivated public attacks in the United States in later years regarding his role in a number of episodes during World War II when he had served as Assistant Secretary of War (the failure to bomb the National Socialist extermination camps and the internment of Japanese-Americans) and following the war as US High Commissioner in Germany (the pardoning in January 1951 of Alfried Krupp and the Krupp directors). These attacks levelled by certain groups, including (student) groups at Harvard, in the House of Representatives and in the *Washington Post*, were largely triggered by Harvard University's honoring of McCloy in 1983 through the naming of a German-American scholarship program after him (the McCloy/Volkswagen Fund, itself a retrospective activity).<sup>299</sup> Ultimately, Birrenbach believed that the German Atlanticist efforts to defend the beleaguered McCloy, including his own sending in August 1983 to an appreciative McCloy (at the latter's request) several relevant analyses of the Krupp judgement of 1948, proved effective in helping McCloy refute the accusations against

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construction/development of the European community. The FTS bodies' decision of 30 January 1982 made available the financing for the preparation of the section of the Monnet archive dealing with the ECSC. Monnet's extensive archives, containing all Monnet's plans and records since WWI, all the materials about his ideas on the construction of a united Europe and the entire documents about his committee, were among the most important collections of a European statesman, and Monnet himself made use of them in writing his memoirs. As of June 1975, Monnet was trying to figure out what to do with this archive, and the most important libraries and universities in France, England and the US were interested in (having) this archive. Both Monnet and Stone agreed that this archive should not go to America since Monnet was so closely connected with Europe. On Birrenbach's BDI-LES efforts, see KB to Dr. Karl Hohmann, 4 November 1976, ACDP K190/2.

<sup>299</sup> Alfried Krupp had been convicted of war crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunals (US Military Tribunal) on 31 July 1948. The pardon resulted in the release from prison of Alfried Krupp and the Krupp directors and the elimination of the confiscation of his assets.



him and justify his decisions.<sup>300</sup> While Birrenbach was probably motivated in these interventions to some extent by a sense of personal obligation and a desire to defend the German *Wirtschaft* against the arbitrary actions of the US/Allied Military Tribunals, Birrenbach also saw, given McCloy's services to the Federal Republic, "a national obligation."<sup>301</sup> Incidentally, as of February 1980, Birrenbach also found himself

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<sup>300</sup> Most notably, Birrenbach sent McCloy a judgment he had composed about the Krupp affair/case based on his own personal experience, essentially his own personal impressions of Alfried Krupp's personality, and what Birrenbach considered a "convincing"/"brilliant" expert legal judgement he had the well-known/first-class Düsseldorf lawyer Dr. Michael Hoffmann-Becking draw up on the Krupp judgement/trial of 1948. Birrenbach knew Hoffmann-Becking, who may even have been Birrenbach's own lawyer. This expert legal judgement was drawn up by Hoffmann-Becking without any compensation. Berthold Beitz, chairman of the *Kuratorium* of the *Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung* (Essen), had had the translations of these reports done by the translation office of his concern at Birrenbach's request since Birrenbach could not have it done at Thyssen for reasons of discretion. As of 5 August 1983, Birrenbach had gotten useful documents from the helpful Prof. Dr. Jochen Abr. Frowein (Director at the *Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*, Heidelberg) regarding Birrenbach's Krupp paper (actually I think Hoffmann-Becking's examination of the Krupp judgment) and would answer Birrenbach's questions. Birrenbach may also have sent McCloy at this time the personal impressions of other objective personalities in Germany regarding the personality of Alfried Krupp. Birrenbach had personally met and known (made the acquaintance of) Alfried Krupp (son of Gustav Krupp) in the late 1930s (1938 or 1939) in Berlin when the firm *National-Krupp GmbH* had been one of his client firms that he advised in financial and currency questions (the owners of the capital in that firm had been the National Cash Register Company and *Fried. Krupp AG*; Birrenbach claimed to have conducted a series of negotiations at the time with Alfried in an affair of the National Cash Register Company and the National City Bank). As of 1983, Birrenbach claimed that Alfried had been a young man, reluctant, not very capable, had no authority whatsoever, was not even an *Unternehmer* in the true sense of the word, his political engagement had been extremely limited and he had certainly not been a National Socialist in the proper sense of the word. After his father's illness, he had been simply substituted by the Allied military tribunal and accused. Of all the so-called crimes, hardly a single one had been assigned to him. Another example of German Atlanticist efforts in this vein was Eric Warburg's defense of McCloy in May 1983 (regarding Auschwitz bombing) with a letter to the editor to the *Washington Post* in response to two of its articles about McCloy. In 1983, Thomas Schwartz (graduate student in the Harvard history department writing a thesis about McCloy and the origins of the German-American alliance) wrote a letter to the *Harvard Crimson* defending McCloy. Birrenbach welcomed any book that defended/supports McCloy.

<sup>301</sup> KB to Prof. Dr. Jochen Abr. Frowein, 5 August 1983. Not just Alfried Krupp but also other German industrialists had been convicted by the US Military Tribunal in 1947-48. Also, in connection with his and Birrenbach's efforts of Summer 1983, Hoffmann-Becking had recently (as of October 1984) published/made a similar speech on the Krupp judgment of 1948 in the Rotary Club Düsseldorf before prominent/interested personalities of the German *Wirtschaft*. Birrenbach, and maybe also Hoffmann-Becking, had distributed this speech (and also Birrenbach's own earlier 1983 Alfried Krupp expositions) among several important industrialists and politicians (including McCloy; Berthold Beitz, Chairman of the *Kuratorium* of the *Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung*, Essen; Sohl; Spethmann; Gehm(?); Egon Overbeck; Dr Hans-Helmut Kuhnke (Am Thyssenhaus 1, Essen); and Berthold v. Bohlen und Halbach, member of the AR of *Bohlen Industrie AG*, Essen) so that there would be no doubt regarding the innocence of Alfried Krupp. Hoffmann-Becking's speech also threw some side glances at the two parallel trials in the affairs Flick and IG Farben. Birrenbach also made it clear during this 1983-84 period that he agreed with other past actions of McCloy. For instance, Birrenbach also claimed to agree with and admire McCloy's futile efforts in World War II to get Truman to terminate the war without dropping nuclear

defending his own past actions, he believed successfully, in a retrospective dispute with Bahr, not explicitly Atlanticist in nature but supplementing their larger policy disagreements, regarding the insight into the protocols, a dispute that played out via correspondence and possibly even some formal proceeding.<sup>302</sup>

Birrenbach was also involved in the financing of certain retrospective Atlanticist activities and works. An important example of this during the first half of the 1980s was the money collected/raised by Birrenbach and Abs as of June 1982 from German firms in the Federal Republic that had taken part in the Marshall Plan aid (close to having been raised as of July 1980). This sum was a grant to the George C. Marshall Research Foundation (Lexington), with the principal amount intended as financial aid for the GCMRF itself and a partial amount (half) providing the financing of a historical book project on the Marshall Plan that was planned/led by the GCMRF.<sup>303</sup> Proposed to Hadsel (GCMRF) by Birrenbach and Abs, this book explored the Marshall Plan's economic and political impact (with respect to US-German reconciliation and European unification) and stressed Marshall's achievements as Secretary of State and Defense for the Federal Republic and Europe. Aside from the prominent, first-class authors (including US historians; diplomatic/political and economic historians), the key personalities in bringing this project to fruition included, on the German side, Birrenbach and Dr. Abs

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bombs on Japan. Truman had not followed McCloy's advice. As of December 1984, Birrenbach also claimed to agree more with McCloy than with Oppenheimer and his colleagues in the controversy over the building of the first atomic bomb. Birrenbach claimed that he and Hoffmann-Becking were "deeply upset" when they had read the court decision in Nuremberg (Krupp case), with Birrenbach believing that it was "really second class from the legal point of view, and not objective at all.... This is not a decision taken by objective and independent judges." (KB to McCloy, 12 August 1983). Birrenbach insisted (I think to McCloy) that nobody in the FRG, including himself, doubted McCloy's attitude or his conduct in the Krupp case.

<sup>302</sup> This was apparently not nearly as publicized as the McCloy episode. In 1979, Birrenbach quickly established contact with Cornides (Thomas?), the publisher of the *Historischen Zeitschrift*. As of 1970-71, Karl von Cornides (father?) was based in Vienna.

<sup>303</sup> This project included no scholarly work by the GCMRF. It did include at least one related conference.

(Birrenbach's main colleague in this endeavor) and, on the US side, Dr. Hadsel (GCMRF Executive Director) and Harvard history professor Charles Maier (editor of the volume), while Birrenbach also brought in McCloy (to judge potential American authors) and Bowie (as an intermediary between and advisor to both sides, for instance regarding/identifying potential scholarly authors; including vis-à-vis Maier). Birrenbach saw this work as being of practical significance, considered the themes treated in it to be currently of "extreme interest" and hoped it would find interest in a circle beyond just a few industrialists and politicians.<sup>304</sup>

In addition to its retrospective qualities, this Marshall Plan book project also demonstrates the still uneasy relationship within Atlanticism between *Politik* and *Wissenschaft*. Birrenbach and Abs, stressing their responsibility and obligations to the donors/sponsors (including informing them), remained in contact with the various key principals involved (including for instance the GCMRF/Hadsel and Maier; including through meetings in Germany, for instance Frankfurt) and were heavily involved in planning the project. They played a significant role in imparting a broad focus to the book that comprised not just economic but also especially political elements (since many other publications had already made the economic information well-known in the Federal Republic); in identifying, meeting/discussing in the FRG with and passing judgement on numerous potential German and American authors; and in ensuring a sufficient role for German historians in the project.<sup>305</sup> During the course of this project (e.g. 1983),

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<sup>304</sup> Birrenbach's support of this project and the GCMRF might also be linked to the fact that McCloy was a GCMRF trustee who supported the project (and was informed by Hadsel and Birrenbach of its progress) and explicitly appreciated Birrenbach's support of it (McCloy to Birrenbach, 29 June 1982).

<sup>305</sup> They initially wanted German historians involved in authoring the book with US historians and later insisted instead on giving an American author an advisory committee on which German historians would be represented.

Birrenbach and Abs had frustrating difficulties with Maier (and the GCMRF/Hadsel in some regard to the handling of the project; “incomprehensible”), with Maier clearly uneasy about and sometimes even attempting to resist their interest and involvement in the program and problems to be addressed in the project and the approaches to be taken.<sup>306</sup> Similarly, as of Spring 1984, Birrenbach found himself in a months-long dispute with Prof. Wolfgang Mommsen (head of the German Historical Institute in London) with respect to the FTS Prussia lectures. This revolved around Mommsen’s speech for the summing-up meeting, whose text Birrenbach complained “corresponded to the view of Disraeli, presented by Tony Benn,” and an article Mommsen published in *Der Zeit* criticizing the entire endeavor.<sup>307</sup> Birrenbach’s activities continued to reveal the problems/tensions inherent in the financing of the *Politik-Wissenschaft* relationship.

All sorts of Atlanticist-minded retrospective and historical works were written and ultimately published, including a considerable number of memoirs (e.g. Monnet’s memoirs as of 1976; Ball’s memoirs as of 1983).<sup>308</sup> Birrenbach not only read this Atlanticist memoir literature with great interest and pleasure (usually received from the author or the publisher at the author’s request), but also encouraged the writing of such literature (e.g. McCloy with respect to his memoirs/autobiography) and even cooperated at times in the production of such retrospective works. Recommended by various people

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<sup>306</sup> As of June 1984, Birrenbach remarked, “I tell you frankly that I do not understand Prof. Maier.” Earlier, Birrenbach had remarked, “[a]s President I would not nominate Hadsel as intermediary between the Near East nations.” (KB to McCloy, 17 August 1982). Roskamp was mentioned early on by Hadsel as a potential author though Birrenbach disliked Roskamp’s exclusive focus on economic issues (Roskamp was dropped pretty early on). Prof. John Gimbel (Humboldt State University, Arcata CA) was another name mentioned early on as an author (proposed by Thompson; he was unknown to Birrenbach and Abs). As of December 1981, Birrenbach and Abs considered Prof. Forrest Pogue’s (the Marshall biographer) introduction/part/interpretation essential.

<sup>307</sup> KB to Amb. Wechmar, 5 April 1984. Mommsen and Prof. Koselleck (Bielefeld) had been recommended to Birrenbach for this speech. Birrenbach claimed the Mommsen article would not have appeared in *Der Zeit* if Marion Dönhoff or Helmut Schmidt had been there.

<sup>308</sup> Ball’s memoirs were entitled *The Past has Another Pattern*.

(e.g. in the US) as a person whose perspective was of substantial interest, Birrenbach crucially assisted his fellow Atlanticists and others (*Wissenschaftler*/historians) working on memoirs, biographies and theses of/about the key Atlanticists, most notably McCloy and a series of scholars dealing with him around 1983-84 (including Thomas Schwartz, Max Holland and Kai Bird).<sup>309</sup> This involved, for instance, partaking in lengthy face-to-face talks and interviews, the answering and discussing of questions, the citing and provision of copies of key documents and the making available of personal materials, accounts and analyses, all aiming to provide relevant information on particular themes.<sup>310</sup> Beyond this, Birrenbach sometimes sought to encourage/assist in the publication and spread of particularly important Atlanticist retrospective works in the Federal Republic (e.g. Monnet's memoirs) by helping resolve problems, for instance by recommending good translators to the authors.<sup>311</sup> In so far as foreign works in this vein (Atlanticist retrospectives) also appeared in German editions (e.g. Monnet's memoirs in 1978 in Munich), attracted attention and generated important articles in the press, including the

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<sup>309</sup> As of 1983, Thomas Schwartz was of Harvard's Center for European Studies.

<sup>310</sup> Duchêne may have helped in Monnet's memoirs being a success in general. Schwarz visited Birrenbach in Summer 1983. As of November 1983, Holland was in the Federal Republic. As of December 1983, McCloy appears to have been working on his memoirs though I don't think these were ever completed/published. The DGAP Research Institute made a small office there available to Max Holland (and it appears to Thomas Schwartz, too) when he was in the FRG (1984?). As of December 1983, it looks like Prof. Ernest May was also involved in some way in McCloy's memoirs or some McCloy project. As of November 1983, Max Holland and his colleague Kai Bird were researching the first independent biography of McCloy, being written under contract to Simon & Schuster publishers (New York). As of 1984, Bowie had recently met two young men doing a biography of McCloy. As of September 1983, Birrenbach had also given Schwartz the discussion he had drawn up of the Krupp case. As of July 1985, Birrenbach (and Abs) had been asked by McCloy for an evaluation of McCloy's past activity.

<sup>311</sup> Birrenbach recommended to Monnet (as a good translator) Hermann Kusterer (AA, *Sprachendienst*) for the translation of Monnet's memoirs. There is no indication that Monnet actually made use of Birrenbach's offer of assistance, rather it seems he ignored it.

German press, such Atlanticist retrospectives also potentially impacted directly in the Federal Republic.<sup>312</sup>

Even prior to leaving the *Bundestag*, Birrenbach envisaged producing in the future major publications dealing with trans-Atlantic relations once he had reduced his extensive obligations.<sup>313</sup> At the latest by Fall 1977, Birrenbach was contemplating a variety of major retrospective publications encompassing also his own activities, including the possibility of the publication of his correspondence, the publication of his US reports (with an introduction about US policy over the past twenty-five years), a publication describing his missions and even a full-blown Birrenbach biography. In such matters, Hans-Peter Schwarz acted as his principal consultant/advisor with other assistance coming from Prof. Dr. Klaus Ritter, Spethmann, Carstens and Prof. Coing (e.g. regarding the potential legal restrictions of the 30-year rule; proposing and contacting potential authors for a biography, including Prof. Dr. Arnulf Baring, Golo Mann and Prof. Repken).<sup>314</sup> As part of his role in these retrospectives, Birrenbach himself produced a number of retrospective works in a variety of forms, including some that related his own experiences in a public manner. Among these was a number of published retrospective newspaper articles and book contributions dealing with themes like Adenauer's relationship to the United States, Jean Monnet and his crucial contribution to

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<sup>312</sup> As of July 1978, Birrenbach had both the French and German editions/versions of Monnet's memoirs. The first important article about Monnet's memoirs appeared on 14 September 1978 in the FAZ. As of August 1978, Birrenbach pleaded with Monnet to understand that he had not written an essay about Monnet's memoirs due to health. (KB to Monnet, 15 August 1978).

<sup>313</sup> In July 1975, Birrenbach declined an offer from Jeute and Dr. von Wehrenalp of the *Econ Verlagsgruppe* to publish a book in the *Econ Verlag* in 1976 (for the US bicentennial) to be written by Birrenbach (proposed by Jeute as the best for the task) about America (especially US-German political relations). However, Birrenbach was clearly interested and honored by this offer and believed he could write important things on this theme in coming years after he left the *Bundestag* at some point and had the time to produce a book of the "format" he desired.

<sup>314</sup> As of December 1977, Hans-Peter Schwarz was a historically interested and trained political scientist at the University of Cologne. As of 1978, Birrenbach considered Schwarz an excellent man. At the time, Baring was in the *Bundespräsidialamt*, and Mann declined due to current obligations.

Europe's objectives, and particular political missions that Birrenbach himself had undertaken.<sup>315</sup> Birrenbach also offered up autobiographical narratives (for instance about his life in politics) in a number of interviews intended to appear in publication/print and in the broadcast media.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> In 1973, Birrenbach published "Die Schatten der Vergangenheit-Der Staat der Juden besteht 25 Jahre" (DZ/CW, 4 May 1973). In 1974, Birrenbach published "Ein Amerikaner für Deutschland-zum Tode von Christopher Emmet in New York" (*Rheinischer Merkur*, 1 March 1974). Birrenbach accepted a request and wrote "Die Aufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Israel" in the volume *Ludwig Erhard-Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie, Festschrift zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. Minister (aD) Dr. Gerhard Schröder, State Sec. (aD) Prof. Alfred Müller-Armack, Dr. Karl Hohmann, Johannes Gross, Dr. Rüdiger Altmann (*Propyläen-Verlag*, Berlin, 1972, pp. 363-382). This was the first time (1972) that Birrenbach had published an article (contribution, work, report) about (the events of) his 1965 Israel mission. In 1976, Birrenbach made a contribution to a *Sammelbuch* appearing for Adenauer's 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary/birthday: "In politischer Mission für Konrad Adenauer in den USA" in *Konrad Adenauer 1876-1976* (edited by Helmut Kohl, Stuttgart and Zurich, 1976). In 1976, in another such *Sammelbuch* published on behalf of the KAS for Adenauer's 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary, Birrenbach, at the request/offer of the KAS, contributed the essay "Adenauer und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Periode seiner Kanzlerschaft" in the *Adenauer-Festschrift, Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit-Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers* (Editors: Prof. Dr. Dieter Blumenwitz (Augsburg), Dr. Klaus Gotto (Bonn), *Staatsminister* Prof. Dr. Hans Maier (Munich), Prof. Dr. Konrad Reppen (Bonn), Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Cologne); *Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt*: Stuttgart, 1976; on Adenauer's relationship to the US). This was an account of Adenauer's relationship and attitude to the US in his government time. He distributed at least one of these two Adenauer articles to Alexander Böker (Amb. of the FRG by the *Heiligen Stuhl*) and Amb. of the FRG Sigismund Freiherr von Braun and Dr. Fritz Hauß (Vice President, *Bundesgerichtshof*). In 1978, on the occasion of Monnet's 90<sup>th</sup> birthday, Birrenbach wrote and published a two-part article on Monnet that appeared in the *Deutschen Zeitung/Christ und Welt*: "Jean Monnet-auf dem Wege nach Europa" (*ein ungewöhnlicher Mann in seiner Zeit*; DZ, Nr. 47, p. 13, 17 November 1978) and "Jean Monnet und seine Zeit (II)-Meister in der Krise" (DZ, Nr. 48, p. 13, from 24 November 1978) ("Jean Monnet aura 90 ans le 9 November... l'histoire du monde"). He sent this article to Chancellor Schmidt. Through an oversight of the *Redaktion*, the article did not go early enough in the printer, so that it could not appear in the 10 November edition (therefore on time for Monnet's birthday). This article trumpeted Monnet's decisive historical merits in helping Europe attain its first objective. There had been a translation of this (into French?). Birrenbach's plans to write an essay about McCloy and his importance for the Federal Republic and to write a small book about Monnet (at the request of the Monnet Foundation) never came to fruition (during the period 1983-85), at least in part due to health problems. As of December 1985, Birrenbach had been writing since September 1985 about the negotiations about the unification of Europe (is this the Monnet book?). As of 30 September 1976, Birrenbach had occupied himself with Adenauer on his 100<sup>th</sup> birthday.

<sup>316</sup> For Birrenbach's autobiographical retrospective narratives of his life, see Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Werner Hill, "Zeugen der Zeit," broadcast on 27 December 1979, recorded on 20 October 1979, K213/1 and Dr. Kurt Birrenbach im Gespräch mit Dr. Wolfgang Bergsdorf und Henning Röhl, recorded on 28 May 1980 and broadcast on "Zeitgenossen" on 7 September 1980, *Südwestfunk*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Programm, K213/1. In October 1979, Birrenbach had given an interview to the NDR that had been broadcast in December 1979 in the *Dritten Fernsehprogramm (Norddeutschen bzw. Westdeutschen Fernsehen)* that as of February 1980 had been in part overtaken by Löwenthal in the ZDF. (KB *Aktennotiz*, 16 June 1980, K134/1). As of February 1981 (at least once on 13 November 1980), Birrenbach had given Vogel two interviews, one about his negotiations in Israel in 1965 and one about his ideas after the 1965 mission (dated 4 February 1981), interviews that would be printed/utilized in Vogel's soon to be printed book.

However, Birrenbach's most significant retrospective work was *Meine Sondermissionen: Rückschau auf zwei Jahrzehnte bundesdeutscher Außenpolitik*, "a kind of *mémoires*" published in (March?) 1984 by the *Econ-Verlag*.<sup>317</sup> Approximately six hundred pages long, this book was the product of several years of intensive effort conducted under difficult conditions, including not only his other activities (e.g. work, travel) and illnesses but also the lack of an assistant and Birrenbach's sheer inability to limit what he wrote.<sup>318</sup> Dedicated to Monnet and McCloy, these memoirs eschewed a broad account of Birrenbach's life and activities and instead, as the title indicated, centered on his special missions (based very closely, often verbatim, on Birrenbach's own reports of his talks on such trips), of which he had always been particularly proud. Birrenbach supplemented these accounts with depictions of other key episodes (e.g. preamble to the 1963 Franco-German Treaty) and embedded them in extensive descriptions of the background against which these missions had been carried out as well as discussions of the relevant key events/developments in those theme areas to the present day (e.g. Israel), thus lending some credence to the book's claim of exploring the previous two decades of German foreign policy.<sup>319</sup> Although undoubtedly due at least in

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<sup>317</sup> KB to Butcher, 4 March 1985.

<sup>318</sup> As of October 1980, Birrenbach had gotten from his publisher now a deadline to present the text of his planned books. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU-*Deutschland*, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1). The writing of the book also involved Birrenbach in efforts to acquire insight into the relevant materials from government archives (e.g. the AA political archive) which ran into resistance with respect to still-classified materials due to the strict rules governing the federal ministries in such matters. As of April 1979, Birrenbach hoped that *Ministerialdirigent* Dr. Jürgen Ruhfus (BKA) could get Birrenbach access to the paper about the Erhard meeting with Johnson of 20-21 December 1965. If Kant insisted that "sometimes less is more," Birrenbach adhered to the rule that "if you cut something out, you might leave out something important." As of February 1981, Birrenbach planned to later write and publish a book (apparently dealing at least in part with his negotiations in Israel in 1965 and his ideas after the 1965 mission).

<sup>319</sup> It appears that originally a broader work in which we might have learned more about Birrenbach himself (the man) was originally also planned but never came into being. Indeed, as of October 1980, Birrenbach had two books planned, one that became *Meine Sondermissionen* and a second one about the



part to Birrenbach's self-promotion and his influence with friends in press and academia, *Meine Sondermissionen* does seem to have enjoyed positive reviews. In any case, Birrenbach himself was quite pleased with the final product and naturally distributed the book to various German and foreign personalities/contacts (at least sometimes with sections of interest translated into English by an expert) and relished what he considered the "universal recognition" (positive reaction) it received in all fields (politics, *Wissenschaft* (including history) and *Wirtschaft*) in both the FRG and abroad (particularly the US and even partially Israel).<sup>320</sup>

While certainly not devoid of valuable information for researchers and others interested in contemporary history from the Berlin Wall to the present, Birrenbach's retrospective works (e.g. MS), aside from potentially suffering from Birrenbach's admittedly faulty memory on occasion or the perils of improvised interviews, suffered to some extent from his perceived virtues.<sup>321</sup> For one, Birrenbach's stress also in later years on respect for the rules of secrecy and the need to uphold his own word of honor considerably circumscribed his accounts of themes like the content of the protocols into

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entire work that he had conducted in the last twenty years. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chairman of the CDU-*Deutschland*, Chairman of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1).

<sup>320</sup> Among those Birrenbach distributed the book to were Kohl, Nitze, Lord Carrington, Wechmar, Beitz, the Israeli ambassador (who had already bought a copy himself), and Teddy Kollek (Mayor of Jerusalem). Despite Birrenbach's stated intention as of August 1984 to try to get somebody who could edit *Meine Sondermissionen* in English (something he himself would not be able to pay for) (KB to Rostow, 8 August 1984), it was never actually translated into English. Among those many Americans who had written to him in an extremely positive and appreciative way on his book were men like McCloy, Bowie, Nitze and Kissinger. Among the Germans were Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker and Weizsäcker's two predecessors. Former Chancellor Schmidt (MdB) had expressed understanding in 1984 for Birrenbach's book. According to Birrenbach, the reaction to his book had been "really first-class." (KB to McCloy, 25 June 1984). As of February 1985, Birrenbach had received a series of letters (perhaps on *Meine Sondermissionen*?) from high standing personalities in Israel like Teddy Kollek, Asher Ben Natan, Gideon Rafael and in a cautious way also Prime Minister Shimon Peres.

<sup>321</sup> *Meine Sondermissionen* was the first time that Birrenbach had revealed his trip to the United States prior to his Israel mission and its importance for that mission. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl, Bonn, confidential, 13 January 1984, K029/2). Birrenbach's retrospective works provided insight into the opinions of Birrenbach's foreign/US contacts on various issues.

which he had received insight and the negotiations/events of his 1965 Israel mission. Furthermore, Birrenbach's desire to preserve discretion in such works led him to render the publication of certain details/elements strictly reliant on his discussing these points with and ultimately securing the authorization of his contacts (e.g. McCloy; pertaining to what they had told or written Birrenbach) and in general to depict some things, including his personal and secret talks, in a very cautious, abstract, covered form.<sup>322</sup> Finally, Birrenbach's striving for his ideal of objectivity encouraged him to remove himself and his feelings from much of his accounts, at times imparting to his retrospective works a rather mediocre, cold, incomplete and distorted version of events.

True, Birrenbach always expressed surprise and claimed that he had never expected to be thus positively recognized and sometimes at least ostensibly doubted whether he actually deserved the particular and various celebrations, awards, honors, recognition, appreciation, laudations, praise, and positive echo that he received in his later years from all sides, both national and international (including Americans), in each of the realms in which he worked: *Politik*, *Wirtschaft*/industry and *Wissenschaft*.<sup>323</sup> This was especially the case since Birrenbach believed he had practiced the old Prussian

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<sup>322</sup> Birrenbach showed Shepard Stone and McCloy certain parts (e.g. pertaining to McCloy) that he wanted to publish in *Meinen Sondermissionen* and they discussed certain points.

<sup>323</sup> Birrenbach also enjoyed the recognition over the years from foreigners for his Atlanticist efforts. One of Birrenbach's proudest episodes of recognition of his accomplishments occurred in the start of October 1983 during the 300-year celebration in the US. Having traveled to the US for the tricentennial celebrations in October 1983, Birrenbach was very pleased that Secretary of State George Shultz had in the framework of the tricentennial celebrations in his speech on the occasion of a/the official luncheon that he had given to the Federal President Carstens and the German delegation (*Staatsminister* Dr. Philipp Jenninger and I think Klasen were also part of this German delegation) had remarked/mentioned and thanked Birrenbach since his predecessors had reported to him that Birrenbach had worked hard (dedicated) for decades for the improvement of German/European-American relations and was a real friend of the US. Federal President Carstens had introduced Birrenbach to President Reagan in the same way. At Reagan's request, Birrenbach had then depicted his contacts since more than twenty-five years with the top-ranking figures of the US administrations. Birrenbach reveled in the praise given to him by others (e.g. by Ronald Reagan as of June 1984).

“*Leitmotiv*”: “*mehr sein als scheinen*” (to mean more than to appear).<sup>324</sup> Nevertheless, as a fundamentally insecure man, he always sincerely, even embarrassingly appreciated and took pride in (even boasted of) such recognition whether it be of a public nature in front of many others of high qualification or otherwise, for instance through mere words or the astonishing floods of (e.g. birthday) letters/telegrams and gifts.<sup>325</sup> On a personal level, Birrenbach saw these recognitions/honors marking his person, offering him symbols of his political legitimation, offering him “a beautiful compensation for the strain [*Anstrengung*] which he imposed on himself,” and crowning, confirming and recording for history his long, diverse, often little-known activities, work, services and achievements in each of these realms, including German foreign policy, especially the cause of trans-Atlantic cooperation/relations.<sup>326</sup>

However, beyond merely personal gratification, a pleased Birrenbach also saw the various Atlanticist retrospectives in which he and others engaged as an important factor in the struggle to secure the future of Atlanticism. Whatever their form, such retrospectives provided in their accounts of contemporary modern (postwar) history key Atlanticist political perspectives, themes (e.g. German-American relations), analyses, lessons and recommendations hopefully of some influence on contemporary politicians, issues and policy.<sup>327</sup> At the same time, they offered deserved recognition to the political

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<sup>324</sup> KB to Bowie, 18 July 1977. Birrenbach also believed that it was appropriate in German foreign policy to adhere to the old Prussian saying “*mehr zu sein als zu scheinen*.” (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Prof. Dr. Hermann Lübke, Birchli, Haus Claudia, Switzerland, Einsiedeln, 23 April 1981, K032/1).

<sup>325</sup> Birrenbach claimed that he had been overwhelmed with several hundred letters, telegrams and birthday gifts in July 1972 and for his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday (between 400 and 500 letters in July 1972). For his 75<sup>th</sup> birthday, Birrenbach received an astonishing flood of high quality letters and gifts.

<sup>326</sup> For the “beautiful compensation,” see KB to Trebesch, 4 July 1979.

<sup>327</sup> This was the case for instance with *Meinen Sondermissionen* in which Birrenbach detailed Western attitudes at the time regarding the Brandt *Ostpolitik* and Western détente as a whole (not only the distressingly positive but also the criticisms that had been leveled by prominent American personalities like

giants of the Atlanticist movement, including Birrenbach's foreign contacts like Monnet and McCloy, recording and highlighting their ideas, activities, careers and achievements (including with respect to the FRG).<sup>328</sup> As a man always conscious of the judgment of posterity, Birrenbach welcomed the opportunity to enhance his own stature in its eyes. However, as Birrenbach was well aware, the Atlanticist-minded retrospectives in which he and others engaged were of very real current and future importance in so far as they functioned in a larger sense to preserve the Atlanticist perspective, experience and memory.<sup>329</sup> Despite such efforts, yet in line with his generally gloomy tone in these years, Birrenbach ultimately feared that the Atlanticists were fundamentally losing the battle for public opinion in both Europe and the United States.<sup>330</sup>

#### E. Conclusion

By the late 1970s, as Birrenbach entered a new phase of his life and career, German Atlanticism had achieved status as a mature establishment phenomenon. In contrast to earlier periods, very little was undertaken with respect to the construction of new institutions, though the existing infrastructure continued to play a significant role, for instance in expanding the geographic extent of the Atlanticist network to include American personalities from beyond the traditional East coast and in mediating a process

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McCloy, Acheson and I think Kissinger) and sought to call the attention of the US administration to its policy vis-à-vis Israel.

<sup>328</sup> For instance, Birrenbach's own retrospective works bring out his impressions during his diplomatic missions to the US.

<sup>329</sup> For Birrenbach being very conscious of the need to keep alive the memory of the great Atlanticists in the countries of the Atlantic Community, see KB to Mrs. Herter, 1 June 1967.

<sup>330</sup> In later years, Birrenbach was concerned about the state of European public opinion with respect to Europe. As of March 1985, Birrenbach complained that feelings pressing from the population were hardly discernible with respect to European union. As of October 1980, Birrenbach complained that the citizens of the US and Europe mistakenly believed that each continent could live its own life and were no longer accustomed to think in global terms. In later years, Birrenbach believed that the US population was still not ready to see the realities of the changed world (e.g. isolationist tendencies). Birrenbach was pleased to note certain favorable signs in public opinion, as in March 1978 when he believed that the penetration of the Horn of Africa had made the US public opinion "more alert [*hellhöriger*]" than even months ago.

of generational succession. Each of the governing coalitions during this period, both Social-Liberal and Christian-Liberal, firmly espoused the Atlanticist concept. Though considerable opposition still existed in the Federal Republic, it was largely centered on extra-governmental left-wing politicians and movements. As personified by Birrenbach, a certain amount of tension also existed within German Atlanticism, not only with respect to issues like the proper posture towards Israel, but also regarding the correct approach to interacting with the USSR in a period of rather shaky *détente*, tensions reflected in serious fractures in the German Atlanticist network. On the international level, German Atlanticism continued its process of globalization, now accelerated due to the increasing vulnerability of energy sources and raw materials and the expanding, apparently worldwide, threat posed by the Soviet Union. Particularly disturbing was the condition of the United States, which appeared to be in a state of systemic dysfunction and relative decline. Having achieved a mature establishment position, German Atlanticism also evolved in the manner in which it presented itself to a larger public, now placing a greater stress on a retrospective outlook that celebrated the history and past achievements of its crucial personalities and institutions.

On a personal level, Birrenbach's final years were difficult ones. Like many elderly, he experienced increasing isolation as those with whom he had emotional links passed away, remarking "[this] happens to me about every week. My contemporaries [*Altersgenossen*] die, and that is naturally painful and slowly makes one lonely."<sup>331</sup> Developments in his own family contributed to his hardships. From 1979 on, Birrenbach's wife was incapacitated with a permanent illness, and as of 1984 he had been

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<sup>331</sup> KB to Balbine von Deist, 25 April 1979. As of Christmas 1978, Birrenbach's parents were also dead.

estranged for some time from his son, Thomas, who was living in the United States.<sup>332</sup>

Despite his myriad efforts (e.g. medication, drugs, pills, operations), Birrenbach was almost ceaselessly tormented by a variety of often lengthy illnesses and ailments, requiring him to spend extensive time, sometimes months, in hospitals, clinics and the like.<sup>333</sup> More so than before, such health issues, particularly heart problems, considerably

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<sup>332</sup> Birrenbach's wife required personnel to provide her with constant care at home outside Düsseldorf, though she was sometimes admitted to the hospital. This was yet another thing that connected Birrenbach with McCloy, whose wife was also seriously ill (completely incapacitated) in later years (empathy). Ida could no longer travel with him (e.g. to the US or potentially Russia). Birrenbach could not attend the 1982 KWC in London (Cambridge?) due to his wife's health. While Birrenbach could not really be considered a family man, family does seem to have mattered to him at least in the abstract.

<sup>333</sup> As of January 1982, he had still not entirely overcome (still in the middle of) his severe illness, but he still wanted to briefly answer Wätjen's card. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2). In the last year, Birrenbach could not take part in the function (German-English *Gespräch*) since he was in the hospital. Birrenbach had had repeated health problems, however could always solve them. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße 1, Düsseldorf, to Sir Siegmund Warburg, London, 24 September 1982, K068/2). Birrenbach could not accept Kollek's invitation to his speech in the *Paulskirche* in Frankfurt and his dinner invitation. Birrenbach had had to undergo an operation whose consequences he had still not overcome (cancer [*Karzinom*]; something to do with a cardiologist). (KB to Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, 25 November 1985, K094/1). Birrenbach (in May or June?) had been in the hospital because he had caught a virus infection during his vacation in Spain, so he had to undergo special treatment. (KB to Prof. Alex Keynan, Brandeis University, Rosenstiel Basic Medical Sciences Research Center, 6 July 1978, ACDP K092/2). Birrenbach had had the bad luck for several weeks to have had to stay in the hospital due to a severe pneumonia. Three weeks later, he had to have a second stay. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3). Birrenbach had not been able to take part in the last meeting of the MPG since he lay in the hospital. (KB to Prof. Dr. Ralf Dahrendorf, London, 1 August 1979, K034/3). As of 9 July 1984, Birrenbach had switched over from the clinic in Düsseldorf to the medical clinic in Freiburg. In Düsseldorf, the feverish virus Birrenbach had had since months had not been discovered. Only today, from Freiburg, did Birrenbach come to it to answer letters. He did this by dictating the letter through the phone to his office in Düsseldorf. (KB, currently in Freiburg in the hospital, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Helmut Schmidt, MdB, Bonn, 25 July 1984, K033/3). A prominent Israeli had recommended to Birrenbach that he travel to Israel (at least in part) to talk to Weizman and Ehrlich. Birrenbach had not done it because he had not felt well (I believe this had been within the past few months). (KB to Prof. E. Rostow, Yale University, 4 October 1978, K092/2). Birrenbach had invited Haig to speak in Bonn before the DGAP but Birrenbach had been in the hospital and could not chair the meeting. (KB to Prof. E. Rostow, Yale University, 4 October 1978, K092/2). Birrenbach had presented his ideas to Kohl from his hospital bed. Birrenbach was recovering from his illness [*Erkrankung*]. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, 28 June 1984, K029/2). Birrenbach had written his letter of 28 June to Kohl from the hospital. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Chancellor Kohl, confidential, 10 September 1984, K029/2). Birrenbach was not doing well since many weeks. Birrenbach was now the second time in the hospital. In recent days, he had had to undergo difficult procedures/operations in the hospital. Since eight weeks, he had had a daily 38 degree fever and in these 2 months had lost over 8 kilo. It was a matter of a to now unidentified virus. Nevertheless, Birrenbach continued to work large parts of the day. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Gottfried Spannagel, Buenos Aires, 22 June 1984, K031/1). Birrenbach had been in the hospital for many weeks and had left it uncured three days ago. This had made it impossible to give Rose his comment about Rose's book. Birrenbach was suffering from a feverish virus that could not be diagnosed. His physical state was weak after these difficult weeks. He planned to possibly visit the Mayo

hindered Birrenbach in certain activities, especially travel, including in so far as it made it inadvisable or even impossible for him to fly or to stay in extreme climates.<sup>334</sup> Therefore, despite his expressed desires, Birrenbach made his last “working” visit to the US in October 1983 and his final trip overall, a one-month stay at the Mayo Clinic (Rochester), in March 1985.<sup>335</sup> Birrenbach’s always fragile health declined particularly rapidly from 1984 on, and by the start of 1986 he lay in the hospital, his serious illnesses including

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Clinic in the US if nobody in the Federal Republic could find the cause of his illness. Birrenbach had read Rose’s book *Contre la stratégie des Curiaces* in the hospital together with Rose’s article in the Fall 1982 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, “Inflexible Response.” Birrenbach limited himself to a few remarks because the state of his health was so bad that he could not go into more details. As soon as he regained his health, he would discuss in detail with Rose the second part of Rose’s book. Birrenbach had to visit the hospital again, this time in Freiburg, because the state of his fever could not be maintained for a longer time. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Comte François de Rose, Paris, 9 July 1984, K074/1). Due to his hospitalization and following vacations, Birrenbach had not been able to answer Marjolin’s letter in concrete terms. (KB, Berliner Allee 33, Düsseldorf, DGAP (Bonn, Adenauerallee 133), President, to Robert Marjolin, *Université de Droit, d’Économie et des Sciences Sociales de Paris*, Paris, 14 September 1977, K074/1). Birrenbach got ill in July and was in the hospital more than two months. He had a back operation and was still not a hundred percent well because he suffered from constant pain and almost complete sleeplessness. Nevertheless, he worked as hard as in earlier times. (KB to Bowie, Deputy to the Director, National Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, DC, 21 November 1978, K098/2). Birrenbach could not attend the Tokyo meeting of the Trilateral Commission because he had been in the hospital at that time. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2). For Birrenbach not being able to carry out himself the introduction to Haig’s *Vortrag* in the DGAP since he was in the hospital (sick), see KB to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Bonn, 15 November 1978, ACDP K033/3.

<sup>334</sup> Birrenbach was exhausted after his illness and would therefore answer Smith regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy in the next letter. (KB to Gerard Smith, Amb. at Large, State Dept., 8 June 1979, K098/2). Birrenbach had had to postpone his America trip (originally set for 16 June) by three weeks (i.e. 6 July) because of a torn muscle. Therefore, he had been unable to see on the current trip several of the personalities addressed by him. (KB to Schmidt, 17 July 1980, K134/1). Last year, Birrenbach had been asked by a prominent Israeli personality to go to Israel and speak with Weizman and Ehrlich. A week later Birrenbach had had to have a back operation that made him stay in the hospital for 2.5 months. Then it had been too late to make this attempt, doubtful as it had been. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). Birrenbach had gotten a fever to his laryngitis, which made it impossible for him to dictate his proposed answer to Hengsbach in time. Birrenbach had still not overcome this condition and therefore limited himself to a short commentary to preserve his voice. (KB to Bishop of Essen Dr. Franz Hengsbach, 14 May 1981, K112/2). Such difficulties in flying also included to the US, requiring Birrenbach to call off US trips on certain occasions. Ill health played a role in Birrenbach’s canceling his trip to the IMEMO institute. Moscow winters would have been unreasonably cold for Birrenbach. As of March 1982, Birrenbach hoped to be able to take part in the conference in the US at the end of April 1982. Birrenbach could not chair the DGAP speech meeting in September 1978 because he was in the hospital.

<sup>335</sup> As of March 1985, having been ill for several months and with hospital/doctor treatments in the FRG proving ineffectual, Birrenbach admitted to McCloy that he was a “wreck.” (KB to McCloy, 5 March 1985). In June 1985, Trebesch remarked that Birrenbach had become “thin and pale.” (Trebesch to KB, 29 June 1985). This trip to the Mayo Clinic was a desperate and relatively fruitless effort to cure his insomnia. In defense of the Mayo Clinic, Birrenbach left prematurely after one month to be present at an important FTS conference. McCloy had proposed and arranged Birrenbach’s visit to the Mayo Clinic. Birrenbach does not appear to have dealt with his contacts on this March 1985 trip.

cerebral sclerosis and acute diabetes.<sup>336</sup> Even then, Birrenbach proudly flaunted his defiant contempt for his own well-being and worked as best he could from his sickbed well into 1986.<sup>337</sup> This overwrought activity exhibited not only a sense of duty, an inability to bid farewell to defining aspects of his life, and an element of escapism from the travails of this period, but also persistent traits of a disturbing pathological obsession.<sup>338</sup> Birrenbach finally passed away in 1987.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>336</sup> This cerebral sclerosis included bouts of dizziness. Birrenbach's diabetes mellitus required insulin. As of June 1987, Birrenbach was in particularly bad health and spent his 80<sup>th</sup> birthday in the hospital.

<sup>337</sup> As of November 1977, Birrenbach was concerned with McCloy's health and wanted him to put an end to the enormous stress involved in his professional and political life and live a calmer life. In this, Birrenbach ignored the advice, and sometimes unfortunate examples, of his friends and others and also refused to heed his own advice to them.

<sup>338</sup> As evidence of compulsion, Birrenbach was conscious to some extent of the correctness of the advice of others/friends to devote himself more to relaxation. With respect to his increasing loneliness, Birrenbach remarked, "[b]ut with work much is surmountable." (KB to Balbine von Deist, 25 April 1979). For continued activity as an "obligation [*Verpflichtung*]," see KB to Dr. Alois Mertes, MdB, 10 July 1981. As Birrenbach put it, "[y]ou see that I have still not withdrawn to the *Altenteil* [i.e. from public life]. I would not even know where that would be by me." (KB to Kohl and Zimmermann, 5 July 1979). As was his wont, Birrenbach continued to write from vacation and the hospital. For instance, Birrenbach acknowledged that "77 is not 55." (KB to Bowie, 14 January 1985). As of 30 August 1978, Birrenbach admitted that "[t]his time it has certainly gotten me badly [*allerdings schwer gepackt*]. I will not overcome this thing so quickly and I must draw from it certain consequences regarding the reduction of my work. I begin to realize that slowly." (KB to Rapacki, 30 August 1978). As of October 1980, Birrenbach had an invitation of the IMEMO institute in Moscow for the start of April 1981. Birrenbach had had to already put off this invitation three times, one time because he had prepared so much for it that he got heart troubles and the second and third time in that year because it did not appear to him to be feasible [*tunlich*] to accept this invitation (as FRG) in view of the international situation. As of October 1980, however, he had, also with the German ambassador over there, agreed to accept the invitation for April 1981. That would presuppose certainly again two months work/preparations, especially as these special discussions would be connected with *Vorträgen* that needed to be worked out on the basis of an exact knowledge of the material. (KB, Düsseldorf, August-Thyssen-Straße, to Dr. Helmut Kohl, MdB, Chair of the CDU-*Deutschland*, Chair of the CDU/CSU-*Bundestagsfraktion*, Bonn, 20 October 1980, K032/1). In January 1982, Birrenbach remarked that in the past year he had had to cancel three times a *Vortrag* for a conference in Moscow, the first time since he had so strained his heart with the preparations for this conference that he could not embark on the trip, the second time because of Afghanistan and the third time because of laryngitis, which he had contracted on the flight from Washington (DC) to Düsseldorf. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Eduard Wätjen, Ascona, Switzerland, 15 January 1982, K033/2). Four years ago, Birrenbach had been invited by the then-president of the IMEMO institute to Moscow. He had had to cancel, since he had prepared so intensively that he had ended up in the intensive care unit in Lübeck. The first invitation was for October 1980. The invitation was then for April 1981 renewed, but then it came unfortunately to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Birrenbach therefore had to cancel with the pretext of still being further sick. He was invited for a third time for February 1982. He had been beforehand in the United States and had had numerous discussions and conferences there and got laryngitis on the return flight, which continued over months and was even now still not entirely gone. Unable even to speak, he canceled for a third time. Birrenbach understood that he was not invited again. (KB, August-Thyssen-Straße, Düsseldorf, to Amb. Jörg Kastl, FRG Embassy, Moscow, c/o AA, Bonn, 8 February 1984, K030/2).



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Birrenbach could not attend the meeting of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Brussels because after several stays in the hospital, he took his vacation on 28 August to be able to follow a personal invitation of the IMEMO institute in Moscow on 1 October. (KB to Kissinger, 27 July 1979, K098/2). On 5 April, Birrenbach would fly for ten days to Moscow where he would now follow the third invitation of the IMEMO institute. (KB to Prof. Dr. Adolf Butenandt, Munich, 16 March 1981, K141/2). Birrenbach had been invited by the president of the IMEMO institute in Moscow to visit the USSR from 30 September-11 October. Birrenbach informed himself about all the possible subjects of discussion. (KB to McCloy, 24 August 1979, K178/2). As Birrenbach remarked, “you can no longer change the man [*den Menschen*] in my age.” (KB to Dr. Bruno Heck, Chairman of the KAS eV, 4 July 1979). Birrenbach claimed to feel obligated to act for “reasons of conscience.” (KB to Kohl, 31 January 1983). Birrenbach had a perverse compulsion.

<sup>339</sup> Birrenbach’s death triggered a number of laudatory newspaper articles on his career. There was a *Nachruf* for Birrenbach entitled “Dr. Kurt Birrenbach zum Gedenken,” (*Deutschland-Berichte*, edited by Rolf Vogel, Nr. 9, September 1989). Birrenbach was survived by his wife.

## **Chapter 10: Overall Assessment and Conclusion**

During the post-1945 period, German Atlanticism evolved from an “outsider” perspective into an establishment ideology. This transformation encompassed organizational forms, financing methods, network construction, public relations activities, thematic and geographic scope, the breadth of ambitions entertained as well as the specific policies advocated. The life of Kurt Birrenbach offers a revealing window into this German Atlanticist *milieu*. Following exile in Argentina during and after World War II, Birrenbach returned to a Federal Republic that in the 1950s was still under the widespread influence of a religiously rooted Conservative Occidentalism that persisted from the prewar era and, embodied in the political realm by Adenauer himself, fostered a profound suspicion of the Anglo-Saxon powers (the US and Britain) and influences. Representing a hybrid figure typical of the United States but still rather novel in Germany, Birrenbach almost immediately set about constructing what he cherished as a position of considerable personal independence and ultimately a career which simultaneously spanned the fields of politics (CDU MdB), business (the Thyssen firm), and philanthropic foundations (Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung). While the apparently existential Soviet threat and the desire for German reunification were the central factors, it was also not least due to his pre-war activity in international trade and finance, his perspective-broadening exile and his position with Thyssen, one of those many German firms now reliant on access to world markets and later to plentiful (nuclear) energy, that Birrenbach became probably “the key man” in the world of German Atlanticism during the 1960s and early 1970s, an insider engaged in virtually all its wide-ranging activities and projects.

In response to the daunting challenges of the 1950s and 60s, Birrenbach and his fellow German Atlanticists, along with counterparts abroad, actively constructed and participated in a private German and international infrastructure. This interlocking system of action committees (e.g. Monnet Committee), conferences (e.g. Atlantik-Brücke and Königswinter) and research institutes (e.g. DGAP, Atlantic Institute, SWP) was characterized by personnel overlap, mutual learning and functional support, and a sensitivity in form and content to larger developments in international relations. Given the diverse nature of his career and in his capacity as one of those gatekeepers controlling entry, Birrenbach was well suited to promote the fundamental principle of integration, a novel and important concept in the young FRG, as these institutions brought together Atlanticist-minded personalities from a variety of major professions, political parties, economic interests and geographical locations, the latter particularly significant for a country lacking a true capital. The wide geographic spread of these institutions, both at home (e.g. Bonn, Hamburg, Munich) and abroad (e.g. Paris), can be attributed to a number of factors, among them the desire to shape their relationships to governments and international organizations. Obstacles which had to be overcome included hostile attitudes in the FRG to the *Wissenschaft-Politik* nexus, a linkage that also generated tension internally between the quest for objectivity and Atlanticist propaganda goals, as well as various bureaucratic and financial hurdles erected by the government. All this represented a conscious process of Americanization of the instruments and practices of German Atlanticism. The upshot was a diverse infrastructure providing an institutional framework in which Birrenbach and other like-minded individuals could effectively cooperate in promoting the Atlanticist cause, not least by influencing government policy.

As a crucial figure in securing the necessary financing in the Federal Republic to sustain this Atlanticist infrastructure, Birrenbach found himself at the center of a system that tapped a number of sources, including at least elements of the federal government, political parties, labor unions and especially the Atlanticist-minded *Wirtschaft* (including the BDI and other major economic organizations and large business firms like Thyssen; links to Rhenish heavy industry). With respect to the latter, the German Atlanticists, aided by a Cold War stress on *Wissenschaft*, played a crucial role in promoting the previously stymied emergence and development in Germany of a network of large private philanthropic *Stiftungen*. Here, Birrenbach was central in the founding of the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung (1959), a milestone soon followed by the establishment of other private foundations along American lines. Though dwarfed by the American giants, German foundations like Thyssen, which Birrenbach chaired from 1965 on, proved effective in financing myriad components of the Atlanticist infrastructure. Meanwhile, Birrenbach and Atlanticist-minded personalities like John McCloy (US) and Giovanni Agnelli (Italy) successfully promoted the international integration of the foundation systems, including that existing in the FRG. While financial clout (not just a knowledge of Atlantic matters) was a considerable source of Birrenbach's personal influence on Atlanticist activities, such financial muscle, epitomized by a powerhouse like the Ford Foundation, proved in a broader sense to be an even more significant element of American power, including in relation to the Germans, within the Atlanticist context. Though essentially effective, the nature of Atlanticist financing at least potentially set the outer parameters of activity (e.g. pro-business) and at times explicitly raised the question (tension) of external influence (e.g. by governments) on ostensibly independent institutions.

The Atlanticist infrastructure, along with technological advances in transportation and communications, enabled Birrenbach (and other German Atlanticists) to avoid a potentially suffocating isolation by constructing and maintaining a broad trans-Atlantic network of prominent personal contacts, the two key individuals being McCloy and Jean Monnet. Such evolving transnational Atlanticist networks represented a structural change in international relations, considerably expanding the external channels of consultation constantly available to non-governmental figures in the trans-Atlantic area. These contacts were a central element in Birrenbach's political activities, whether trips and *Sondermissionen* abroad, parliamentary efforts or advising Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger. Indeed, many episodes from this period can only be properly understood by delving below the level of traditional great power politics and diplomacy and exploring the activities of this network (e.g. Franco-German Treaty of 1963, MLF). While Birrenbach exploited the very real possibilities vis-à-vis the US (and West Europe), the impact, largely reflecting America's dominant international role, was actually far greater on the FRG. This network proved essential in transmitting Atlanticist thought to Birrenbach and other Germans, including the ambitious American project of a close, cooperative Atlantic Community and a broad, institutionalized (integrated) Atlantic Partnership "among equals" between the US and an economically and politically united western Europe. It also played a primary role in increasing the independence and influence of the Bundestag, including that of Birrenbach as his *Fraktion's* Atlantic affairs expert, thus ushering in the end of Adenauer's *Kanzlerdemokratie*. On balance, Birrenbach and his network functioned as a crucial channel of foreign, primarily American, influence into the Federal Republic and its policymaking process.

While active at the level of small elite groups, Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists, existing in a democratic environment, also functioned in a broader, perhaps newer, dimension in aiming to sway a wide variety of domestic and foreign publics (including in the US). Such propaganda consisted of copious speeches, publications and interviews, with Birrenbach's book *Die Zukunft der atlantischen Gemeinschaft* (1962) his signature contribution, as well as the founding of a number of intellectual journals that served as outlets for scholarly research. Attempts were made to cultivate figures from the media world (e.g. journalists, publishers, editors), and German Atlanticism benefited considerably from such allies at home (e.g. Springer, Dönhoff) and abroad (e.g. Praeger). During the mid-1960s, Birrenbach also took part in several one-time public relations actions directed at least in part at Americans, including the Atlantik-Brücke's open letter in US newspapers (1963), fundraising for the Kennedy Memorial Library (1965) and chairing the board of trustees of the Twenty Years Marshall Plan (1967). In some cases, German Atlanticist propaganda specifically addressed key audiences, notably US soldiers and their dependents in the FRG as well as American Jews, part of larger efforts to nurture links with this influential minority. Though the plight of Berlin was utilized to arouse sympathy for the FRG among foreigners, the German Atlanticists also confronted imposing obstacles here, including vivid memories of the National Socialist past. Whatever the difficulties, the ability of Birrenbach and the German Atlanticists to establish such elaborate infrastructure, financing, networks and public relations actions, far more effective than anything created by their opponents, ultimately played a vital role in enabling them to supplant German Occidentalism (and Gaullism) in the political realm, a process manifested dramatically in Erhard's replacement of Adenauer as Chancellor.

However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, other challenges were emerging. In the Federal Republic, a new threat appeared, this time from a Left that ironically embraced tenets of *Abendland*, including an intense suspicion of America. This movement's composition impressed upon Birrenbach and other Atlanticists (themselves the earlier beneficiaries of generational change) the need for measures to counter generational and demographic trends (also in the US) and to ensure that younger leaders replenished the network. The internal world of Atlanticism had often been contentious, as reflected in disputes engaged in during the 1960s by German Atlanticists among themselves or with foreign counterparts (e.g. MLF, EEC expansion and majority voting, Atlantic Federal Union). Now, fresh tensions fissured the network as German Atlanticism, often prodded by the Americans, expanded thematically and geographically to address an altered world. New partners were identified, including the USSR, in the context of *détente*, and Japan, necessary to tackle recent trans-Atlantic economic and financial issues and integrated into the network by the founding of institutions like the Trilateral Commission. Meanwhile, the Marshall Fund funded Atlanticist projects in myriad hitherto unexplored fields (e.g. criminology). Even when approving and involved in principle, a hawkish Birrenbach saw this wider focus as corrosive of a special US-European relationship centered on crucial themes like security. Ultimately, Birrenbach's links with certain German Atlanticists were damaged by divergent views on the post-1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and, more seriously, the *Ostpolitik* initiated by the Brandt government. Birrenbach was also troubled by a US inadequately pursuing the arms race and simultaneously wracked by isolationism, foreign adventurism (Vietnam), economic

ills, and racial and student unrest. Finally, France, long after de Gaulle's fall, and Britain, even after entering Europe, continued to stress sovereignty rather than integration.

Despite such difficulties, as of the late 1970s and 80s, Liberal Atlanticism remained a dominant establishment ideology in the Federal Republic. In these years, its adherents largely repulsed a revived challenge from the Left, international in character and supported in some respects by the churches, that took the form of mass pacifist, environmental and trade union movements, party left-wings and acts of terrorism. Though Birrenbach himself sensed a certain allure of the East, he was alarmed by the USSR's development into a world power threatening access to energy and other resources around the globe. While this danger rendered the United States more crucial than ever, Birrenbach not only found himself openly at odds with particular American policies (e.g. nuclear energy, *Osthandel*) but also judged the US with growing skepticism as a nation afflicted by dire systemic flaws (e.g. geographic/demographic change) and in the throes of a broad relative decline. Still entertaining ideas of Atlantic Community and Partnership, he despaired about the prospects of actually realizing these revered blueprints and wallowed in a related cultural pessimism. While the Atlanticist infrastructure continued to function, persistent economic recession, impacting also the German steel industry, exposed the vulnerability of its financing. All this suggested a still-ascendant German Atlanticism, but one chastened by the events of the previous two decades, focused less on integrationist ambitions and more on practical trans-Atlantic coordination. Even after leaving the Bundestag, Birrenbach remained engaged in the Atlanticist world, now also partaking in a number of retrospective projects serving to buttress the dominant position of Atlanticism. Gradually, if not always willingly,



Birrenbach did reduce his role, his superseding by younger men a testament to successful generational transition and the continued vitality of the Atlanticist phenomenon.

The life of Kurt Birrenbach thus provides a unique window into the evolution of postwar German Atlanticism. The key trajectory of that evolution was the development of Liberal Atlanticism into a dominant establishment worldview, one featuring its own institutions, financing methods, multi-layered international networks, overarching projects, and public relations techniques. Over time, this ideology broadened its geographic perspective to include in one way or another Russia, Japan, the Middle East, indeed much of the globe in its area of interest, and its thematic purview to comprise not just security, politics, economics and finance, but also softer issues like energy, urban planning and environmentalism. All this represented a thickening of German Atlanticism in the post-1945 era, built on but far more extensive than anything found in trans-Atlantic relations during the interwar period. Whatever challenges it still faced, a somewhat sobered, perhaps more realistic, Liberal Atlanticism had by the mid-1980s succeeded, in part due to its relative effectiveness in the aforementioned activities, in supplanting the older Conservative Occidentalist vision of *Abendland* and in fending off the Left-wing movement that had first emerged in the late-1960s. For all the fascination with the Birrenbach mystique, this process was characterized even more by the exercise of *American* power and influence, facilitated by personalities in the FRG. These crucial allies consisted of parliamentarians, financiers, scholars, scientists, journalists and, as Birrenbach's story underscores, businessmen, including at least parts of Rhenish heavy industry that, in contrast to the interwar years, now promoted and shaped an Atlanticist (internationalist) outlook. Often conducted below but also impacting on the level of high

politics, the efforts of such figures, members of a newly created multi-national Atlanticist elite, are central to understanding change in postwar Germany and the firm integration of the Federal Republic into the American-led Western system.

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