America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has le... more America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009-10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles that assessed India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support US goals visa vie China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” Another author, David Scott called the policy “India’s Extended Neighborhood Concept.” Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III in his article, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo-Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect US reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident. Six years have passed since those claims were made and, therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies. Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit. The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has le... more America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009-10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles that assessed India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support US goals visa vie China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” Another author, David Scott called the policy “India’s Extended Neighborhood Concept.” Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III in his article, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo-Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect US reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident. Six years have passed since those claims were made and, therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies. Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit. The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has le... more America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009-10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles that assessed India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support US goals visa vie China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” Another author, David Scott called the policy “India’s Extended Neighborhood Concept.” Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III in his article, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo-Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect US reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident. Six years have passed since those claims were made and, therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies. Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit. The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has le... more America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009-10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles that assessed India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support US goals visa vie China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” Another author, David Scott called the policy “India’s Extended Neighborhood Concept.” Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III in his article, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo-Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect US reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident. Six years have passed since those claims were made and, therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies. Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit. The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Papers by Chris Budihas
Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit.
The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit.
The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit.
The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit.
The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.