Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves... more Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves of undue colonial influences, but his descriptions of this process are either unrelated to divesting or work quite generally, and not in favour of an African point of view. Wiredu’s approach to decolonisation appears to be largely indistinguishable from the business of philosophy.
In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation... more In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy.
I have tried to write a book that is both independent-minded and collaborative—a document that ex... more I have tried to write a book that is both independent-minded and collaborative—a document that expresses a personal understanding of Socrates and also contributes to a body of scholarship. This aim has shaped the work and its central ideas, as I explain in what follows.
In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek ... more In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek to elicit, not contradiction in belief, but irony. Lear's interpretation is difficult and profound, but can Socrates' notorious "logic chopping" really be understood in this way? I believe that it can be, though work must be done to clarify the terms in which it is expressed, and some objections do need to be overcome. This paper contributes the clarification by working through the details of Lear's account and proposes a correction by looking at the relationship between irony and aporia. Lear does not pay attention to this relationship and, for this reason, does not account for the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The irony in aporia is that one recognises that one does not know one's life's principle by grasping what it is.
In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek ... more In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek to elicit, not contradiction in belief, but irony. Lear's interpretation is difficult and profound, but can Socrates' notorious "logic chopping" really be understood in this way? I believe that it can be, though work must be done to clarify the terms in which it is expressed, and some objections do need to be overcome. This paper contributes the clarification by working through the details of Lear's account and proposes a correction by looking at the relationship between irony and aporia. Lear does not pay attention to this relationship and, for this reason, does not account for the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The irony in aporia is that one recognises that one does not know one's life's principle by grasping what it is.
Scholarly attempts to understand Plato’s distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically c... more Scholarly attempts to understand Plato’s distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically concentrate on explicit thematic discussions or on dialogues in which primary characters are well known sophists or rhetoricians. By contrast, this paper elucidates the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one really thinks about virtue. Socrates’ elenchus is then interpreted as an attempt to penetrate Nicias’s dialectical defences in order to reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which philosophy must take root.
Why does Socrates favour definitional speech over discussion of virtue's instances and attributes... more Why does Socrates favour definitional speech over discussion of virtue's instances and attributes? Why does he take such a dim view of applied ethics? In this paper, I criticise the received answers to these questions and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates favours definitional dialogue because it actualises knowledge that the logic of his argument shows to be essential to virtue. By leading the interlocutor to a paradoxical definition of virtue as knowledge, Socrates engenders this knowledge in his soul.
The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instanc... more The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instances or attributes of a universal because of their inability to give a satisfactory definition. I argue that Socrates does not make this inference. Instead he interprets definitional failure as indicating that the interlocutor has not stated his knowledge. Moreover, I argue that Socrates’ commitment to the necessity of definitions of universals for knowledge of particulars reduces to the claim that a person who knows something about virtue has the ability to speak the whole of it. This is, I suggest, not so much a ‘style of mistaken thinking’ as a profound affirmation of the possibility of philosophy.
This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens through which to consider the question of whether a Sou... more This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens through which to consider the question of whether a South African citizen should emigrate from South Africa. While this question is not exactly parallel to that of whether the condemned Socrates should flee Athens, it has much more to do with justice than is commonly thought. For in order for one to know whether one has an overall duty to remain in or leave South Africa, one must determine what one owes to one's country and compatriots, one's community, one's family, and oneself.
Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constr... more Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constructed in Plato's Republic. In this paper I show that they are wrong. On the view I shall defend, the dialectic of Plato's civic architecture is centred on an account of justice as geometrical equality. The first city expresses this account by assigning social roles on the basis of τέχνη. The second city disrupts the geometrical schema in order to accommodate the human desire for greatness and self-knowledge, with the third city re-establishing the geometrical pattern by means of poetic catharsis, a noble lie, and the placement of an armed camp.
Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the
concept of male spiritual preg... more Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the
concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically
understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory
or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is
the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely
accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’
midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy,
the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation
says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true
spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual
pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes... more In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes an attempt to reconstruct it in speech. His attribution of knowledge to Laches controls his discursive behaviour in the dialogue, requiring him to withhold judgements of error, construe apparent error as a failure of speech rather than knowledge, and search for the deeper truth underlying the overt content of Laches’ utterances. Socrates’ method in this elenchus can be described as a kind of ‘epistemic exegesis,’ which aims to draw out and give discursive shape to knowledge of virtue that it assumes that the interlocutor already possesses.
Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference
to an authoritative author ... more Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered. According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or, even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains surprisingly elusive.
In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, 1 Reza Hosseini approaches the question ... more In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, 1 Reza Hosseini approaches the question of life's meaning from a perspective inspired by Wittgenstein [see esp. 2]. Whereas standard analytical inquiries into the meaning of life treat their question as an ordinary first-order-even scientific-question along the lines of 'what is water?' [cf. 6], thus searching for necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term 'meaningful life', 2 Hosseini's late Wittgensteinian approach is resolutely anti-theoretical: it does not attempt to find an essence.
It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato's definitional dialogues is an arguer, that is, s... more It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato's definitional dialogues is an arguer, that is, someone who argues, or presents arguments. This conception of Socrates is so entrenched in the scholarship that it is built into the best English translations of Plato's texts, which render the Greek word 'logos' – a word with a bewilderingly large number of possible meanings – as 'argument' in contexts in which this is highly disputable. This essay explores the relation between questioning, assertion, and argument, and advances some reasons for supposing that Socrates practices a genuinely interrogative method.
In his influential article, “Toward an African Moral Theory”, Thad Metz argues for a theory of ri... more In his influential article, “Toward an African Moral Theory”, Thad Metz argues for a theory of right action that “rationally reconstructs ... those values associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’ and cognate terms that are prevalent among sub-Saharan Africans”. In this paper, I apply Metz’s ethical methodology to the ancient Greek ideal of σωφροσύνη in order to raise certain questions about the satisfactoriness of his theoretical reconstruction. I shall suggest that Metz’s project requires, at least, a clearer account of the conceptual role of ubuntu in African moral thought.
In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’... more In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’ courage is not that of the martyr, grounded on a belief in divine reward; his is the courage of the philosopher who knows that he does not know. In his self-reflexive striving to be a person who strives for wisdom, Socrates dissipates the fear of death by dissolving the presumption on which this fear is based, and reframing death as an opportunity for knowledge. Socrates’ courage is therefore founded on an epistemic hope that is embodied in the very activity of philosophy.
Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves... more Kwasi Wiredu defines conceptual decolonisation as an activity in which Africans divest themselves of undue colonial influences, but his descriptions of this process are either unrelated to divesting or work quite generally, and not in favour of an African point of view. Wiredu’s approach to decolonisation appears to be largely indistinguishable from the business of philosophy.
In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation... more In its attempt to deflate of the pretensions of ‘Western knowledge’, the epistemic decolonisation movement carries on the work of Socrates, who sought to persuade those who thought that they were wise but were not, that they were not. Yet in its determination to recover and elevate indigenous systems of thought, decolonisation seems opposed to this very work, which is always corrosive of inherited belief. Decolonisation both expresses and contradicts the spirit of Socratic philosophy.
I have tried to write a book that is both independent-minded and collaborative—a document that ex... more I have tried to write a book that is both independent-minded and collaborative—a document that expresses a personal understanding of Socrates and also contributes to a body of scholarship. This aim has shaped the work and its central ideas, as I explain in what follows.
In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek ... more In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek to elicit, not contradiction in belief, but irony. Lear's interpretation is difficult and profound, but can Socrates' notorious "logic chopping" really be understood in this way? I believe that it can be, though work must be done to clarify the terms in which it is expressed, and some objections do need to be overcome. This paper contributes the clarification by working through the details of Lear's account and proposes a correction by looking at the relationship between irony and aporia. Lear does not pay attention to this relationship and, for this reason, does not account for the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The irony in aporia is that one recognises that one does not know one's life's principle by grasping what it is.
In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek ... more In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek to elicit, not contradiction in belief, but irony. Lear's interpretation is difficult and profound, but can Socrates' notorious "logic chopping" really be understood in this way? I believe that it can be, though work must be done to clarify the terms in which it is expressed, and some objections do need to be overcome. This paper contributes the clarification by working through the details of Lear's account and proposes a correction by looking at the relationship between irony and aporia. Lear does not pay attention to this relationship and, for this reason, does not account for the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The irony in aporia is that one recognises that one does not know one's life's principle by grasping what it is.
Scholarly attempts to understand Plato’s distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically c... more Scholarly attempts to understand Plato’s distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically concentrate on explicit thematic discussions or on dialogues in which primary characters are well known sophists or rhetoricians. By contrast, this paper elucidates the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one really thinks about virtue. Socrates’ elenchus is then interpreted as an attempt to penetrate Nicias’s dialectical defences in order to reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which philosophy must take root.
Why does Socrates favour definitional speech over discussion of virtue's instances and attributes... more Why does Socrates favour definitional speech over discussion of virtue's instances and attributes? Why does he take such a dim view of applied ethics? In this paper, I criticise the received answers to these questions and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates favours definitional dialogue because it actualises knowledge that the logic of his argument shows to be essential to virtue. By leading the interlocutor to a paradoxical definition of virtue as knowledge, Socrates engenders this knowledge in his soul.
The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instanc... more The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instances or attributes of a universal because of their inability to give a satisfactory definition. I argue that Socrates does not make this inference. Instead he interprets definitional failure as indicating that the interlocutor has not stated his knowledge. Moreover, I argue that Socrates’ commitment to the necessity of definitions of universals for knowledge of particulars reduces to the claim that a person who knows something about virtue has the ability to speak the whole of it. This is, I suggest, not so much a ‘style of mistaken thinking’ as a profound affirmation of the possibility of philosophy.
This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens through which to consider the question of whether a Sou... more This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens through which to consider the question of whether a South African citizen should emigrate from South Africa. While this question is not exactly parallel to that of whether the condemned Socrates should flee Athens, it has much more to do with justice than is commonly thought. For in order for one to know whether one has an overall duty to remain in or leave South Africa, one must determine what one owes to one's country and compatriots, one's community, one's family, and oneself.
Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constr... more Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constructed in Plato's Republic. In this paper I show that they are wrong. On the view I shall defend, the dialectic of Plato's civic architecture is centred on an account of justice as geometrical equality. The first city expresses this account by assigning social roles on the basis of τέχνη. The second city disrupts the geometrical schema in order to accommodate the human desire for greatness and self-knowledge, with the third city re-establishing the geometrical pattern by means of poetic catharsis, a noble lie, and the placement of an armed camp.
Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the
concept of male spiritual preg... more Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the
concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically
understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory
or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is
the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely
accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’
midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy,
the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation
says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true
spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual
pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes... more In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes an attempt to reconstruct it in speech. His attribution of knowledge to Laches controls his discursive behaviour in the dialogue, requiring him to withhold judgements of error, construe apparent error as a failure of speech rather than knowledge, and search for the deeper truth underlying the overt content of Laches’ utterances. Socrates’ method in this elenchus can be described as a kind of ‘epistemic exegesis,’ which aims to draw out and give discursive shape to knowledge of virtue that it assumes that the interlocutor already possesses.
Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference
to an authoritative author ... more Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered. According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or, even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains surprisingly elusive.
In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, 1 Reza Hosseini approaches the question ... more In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, 1 Reza Hosseini approaches the question of life's meaning from a perspective inspired by Wittgenstein [see esp. 2]. Whereas standard analytical inquiries into the meaning of life treat their question as an ordinary first-order-even scientific-question along the lines of 'what is water?' [cf. 6], thus searching for necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term 'meaningful life', 2 Hosseini's late Wittgensteinian approach is resolutely anti-theoretical: it does not attempt to find an essence.
It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato's definitional dialogues is an arguer, that is, s... more It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato's definitional dialogues is an arguer, that is, someone who argues, or presents arguments. This conception of Socrates is so entrenched in the scholarship that it is built into the best English translations of Plato's texts, which render the Greek word 'logos' – a word with a bewilderingly large number of possible meanings – as 'argument' in contexts in which this is highly disputable. This essay explores the relation between questioning, assertion, and argument, and advances some reasons for supposing that Socrates practices a genuinely interrogative method.
In his influential article, “Toward an African Moral Theory”, Thad Metz argues for a theory of ri... more In his influential article, “Toward an African Moral Theory”, Thad Metz argues for a theory of right action that “rationally reconstructs ... those values associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’ and cognate terms that are prevalent among sub-Saharan Africans”. In this paper, I apply Metz’s ethical methodology to the ancient Greek ideal of σωφροσύνη in order to raise certain questions about the satisfactoriness of his theoretical reconstruction. I shall suggest that Metz’s project requires, at least, a clearer account of the conceptual role of ubuntu in African moral thought.
In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’... more In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’ courage is not that of the martyr, grounded on a belief in divine reward; his is the courage of the philosopher who knows that he does not know. In his self-reflexive striving to be a person who strives for wisdom, Socrates dissipates the fear of death by dissolving the presumption on which this fear is based, and reframing death as an opportunity for knowledge. Socrates’ courage is therefore founded on an epistemic hope that is embodied in the very activity of philosophy.
Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the
concept of male spiritual pregn... more Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’ midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy, the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek ... more In "The Socratic Method and Psychoanalysis", Jonathan Lear argues that Socrates' discourses seek to elicit, not contradiction in belief, but irony. Lear's interpretation is difficult and profound, but can Socrates' notorious "logic chopping" really be understood in this way? I believe that it can be, though work must be done to clarify the terms in which it is expressed, and some objections do need to be overcome. This paper contributes the clarification by working through the details of Lear's account and proposes a correction by looking at the relationship between irony and aporia. Lear does not pay attention to this relationship and, for this reason, does not account for the epistemic dimension of Socrates' method. The irony in aporia is that one recognises that one does not know one's life's principle by grasping what it is.
This article discusses the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur in light of the distinction between l... more This article discusses the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur in light of the distinction between labyrinth and maze. According to the myth, Ariadne helped Theseus to escape from a labyrinth by giving him a ball of string. But if the labyrinth, unlike the maze, presents no choices to the wanderer, then why did Theseus need a clue? Though this question has not been systematically addressed in the scholarship, two basic answers can be identified. First, some scholars maintain that the "labyrinth" in the myth must be a multicursal maze, for otherwise the story would make no sense. Secondly, others hold that they can make sense of the myth even if the labyrinth has but one path. I argue against both positions in favour of an account of the positive role of not-making-sense in myth.
Socrates seems to think that somebody who could speak the nature of virtue would be virtuous. The... more Socrates seems to think that somebody who could speak the nature of virtue would be virtuous. The power to give a sufficient definition would ensure goodness of soul. This is hard for contemporary readers to accept. We tend think that someone might be able to give a definition without being virtuous, and might be virtuous without being able to give a satisfactory account.
The present article aims to shed light on Socrates’ position by consideration of Plato’s Laches. I argue that Socrates focuses his discourse on the “what is x” question because he wants to develop his interlocutor’s capacity for wisdom. Socrates believes that somebody who could give an account of virtue would be virtuous because they would be capable of wholeness of vision and act.
To misquote the greatest of Plato’s students: to love Plato is to love truth more.1In this extrao... more To misquote the greatest of Plato’s students: to love Plato is to love truth more.1In this extraordinary book, Laurence Bloom takes the fundamental principle of discursive reasoning as a ‘springboa...
Socrates is likened to a bull in the moments before his death (Phd. 117b5). This bull simile is n... more Socrates is likened to a bull in the moments before his death (Phd. 117b5). This bull simile is not adequately rendered in the majority of English translations and is largely overlooked in the scholarship. The present paper argues that Socrates is being depicted as a bull going willingly to the sacrifice.
Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constr... more Some scholars maintain that there is no logical progression between the first three cities constructed in Plato's Republic. In this paper I show that they are wrong. On the view I defend, the dialectic of Plato's civic architecture is centred on an account of justice as geometrical equality. The first city expresses this account by assigning social roles on the basis of τέχνη. The second city disrupts the geometrical schema in order to accommodate the human desires for greatness and self-knowledge, with the third city re-establishing the geometrical pattern by means of poetic catharsis, a noble lie, and the placement of an armed camp.
Why does Socrates favour definitional speech discussion of virtue’s instances and attributes? Why... more Why does Socrates favour definitional speech discussion of virtue’s instances and attributes? Why does he take such a dim view of applied ethics? In this article, I criticise the received answers to these questions and offer a different view. I argue that Socrates favours definitional dialogue because it actualises knowledge that the logic of his argument shows to be essential to virtue. By leading the interlocutor to a paradoxical definition of virtue as knowledge, Socrates engenders this knowledge in his soul.
British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2019
ABSTRACT The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know an... more ABSTRACT The Socratic fallacy is the supposed mistake of inferring that somebody does not know any instances or attributes of a universal because of their inability to give a satisfactory definition. I argue that Socrates does not make this inference. Instead he interprets definitional failure as indicating that the interlocutor has not stated his knowledge. Moreover, I argue that Socrates’ commitment to the necessity of definitions of universals for knowledge of particulars reduces to the claim that a person who knows something about virtue has the ability to speak the whole of it. This is, I suggest, not so much a ‘style of mistaken thinking’ as a profound affirmation of the possibility of philosophy.
Scholarly attempts to understand Plato's distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically c... more Scholarly attempts to understand Plato's distinction between philosophy and sophistry typically concentrate on explicit thematic discussions or on dialogues in which primary characters are well known sophists or rhetoricians. By contrast, this paper elucidates the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one really thinks about virtue. Socrates' elenchus is then interpreted as an attempt to penetrate Nicias's dialectical defences in order to reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which philosophy must take root.
Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the concept of male spiritual pregn... more Socrates’ midwife metaphor in Theaetetus depends logically on the concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speech-world. Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’ midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy, the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitali... more A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina e UC Impactum, pressupõem a aceitação plena e sem reservas dos Termos e Condições de Uso destas Bibliotecas Digitais, disponíveis em https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/termos. Conforme exposto nos referidos Termos e Condições de Uso, o descarregamento de títulos de acesso restrito requer uma licença válida de autorização devendo o utilizador aceder ao(s) documento(s) a partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso.
σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens thr... more σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή This article uses Plato's Crito as a lens through which to consider the question of whether a South African citizen should emigrate from South Africa. While this question is not exactly parallel to that of whether the condemned Socrates should flee Athens, it has much more to do with justice than is commonly thought. For in order for one to know whether one has an overall duty to remain in or leave South Africa, one must determine what one owes to one's country and compatriots, one's community, one's family, and oneself.
In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes... more In Plato’s Laches, Socrates ascribes knowledge of courage to his eponymous interlocutor and makes an attempt to reconstruct it in speech. His attribution of knowledge to Laches controls his discursive behaviour in the dialogue, requiring him to withhold judgements of error, construe apparent error as a failure of speech rather than knowledge, and search for the deeper truth underlying the overt content of Laches’ utterances. Socrates’ method in this elenchus can be described as a kind of ‘epistemic exegesis,’ which aims to draw out and give discursive shape to knowledge of virtue that it assumes that the interlocutor already possesses.
Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference to an authoritative author ... more Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered. According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or, even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains surprisingly elusive.
1. In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, Reza Hosseini approaches the question... more 1. In his beautiful book, Wittgenstein and Meaning in Life, Reza Hosseini approaches the question of life’s meaning from a perspective inspired by Wittgenstein [see esp. 2]. Whereas standard analytical inquiries into the meaning of life treat their question as an ordinary first-order—even scientific—question along the lines of ‘what is water?’ [cf. 6], thus searching for necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term ‘meaningful life’, Hosseini’s late Wittgensteinian approach is resolutely anti-theoretical: it does not attempt to find an essence. One of Hosseini’s basic Wittgensteinian convictions is that discourse about life’s meaningfulness should pay attention to the ‘grammar’ of the question, that is, the circumstances in which a human being actually experiences the meaningfulness of life as a question [119]. In this respect, Hosseini suggests that questions of meaningfulness arise, or tend to arise, when a person becomes distanced from the ‘surrounding circumstances of ... life’ [54]. He writes:
The genre of philosophical commentary is characterized by an attitude of textual deference, or wh... more The genre of philosophical commentary is characterized by an attitude of textual deference, or what I call a principle of authority. To read in conformity with the authority principle is to forego the prerogative to judge that the author has made a mistake. This article offers a defense of the principle of authority as hermeneutical precept by showing that it facilitates the practice of philosophy as care of the self. When its function is so understood, the authority principle turns out to be compatible with a substantial degree of intellectual autonomy and is also epistemically benign.
The primary function of the Platonic dialogue is not the communication of philosophical doctrines... more The primary function of the Platonic dialogue is not the communication of philosophical doctrines but the transformation of the reader's character. This article takes up the question of how, or by what means, the Platonic dialogue accomplishes its transformative goal. An answer is developed as follows. First, the style of reading associated with analytical philosophy is not transformative, on account of its hermeneutical attachment and epistemic equality in the relationship between reader and author. Secondly, the style of reading associated with the genre of commentary is transformative because it is governed by a principle of authority. When the commentary model is applied to the Platonic dialogue, it can be seen that the dialogue mimics the function of the authority principle in transforming the reader into a commentator, that is, someone who reads from a position of detachment and accepts responsibility for himself as moral and epistemic agent.
Abstract In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. ... more Abstract In Phaedo, Plato shows the grace of a true courage which can affirm life even in death. Socrates’ courage is not that of the martyr, grounded on a belief in divine reward; his is the courage of the philosopher who knows that he does not know. In his self-reflexive striving to be a person who strives for wisdom, Socrates dissipates the fear of death by dissolving the presumption on which this fear is based, and reframing death as an opportunity for knowledge. Socrates’ courage is therefore founded on an epistemic hope that is embodied in the very activity of philosophy.
According to Phaedo Socrates spent a long time in prison after his trial because no executions co... more According to Phaedo Socrates spent a long time in prison after his trial because no executions could be carried out during the time of a religious festival. This festival had its origins in the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur. The Athenians had vowed to Apollo that if Theseus and his companions were saved 'they would send a mission to Delos every year' (58b2-3). What is the relevance of the myth of Theseus and the Minotaur for an interpretation of Phaedo? This paper argues that the dialogue evokes three different re-enactments of the Theseus myth. The first is the Athenian delegation to Delos (58a). The second is the trial and execution of Socrates. The third is Socrates' struggle against the fear of death. Each of these re-enactments can be understood as an attempt at spiritual purification. Both Socrates and the Athenians are in different ways purifying themselves by re-enacting the myth of Theseus. These different modes of catharsis are implicitly evaluated by the eschatological myth which Socrates presents just before his death.
Although the stated objective of Gorgias' Encomium of Helen may be doubted 1-to free Helen from b... more Although the stated objective of Gorgias' Encomium of Helen may be doubted 1-to free Helen from blame for leaving her home and husband to go to Troy with Paris (2)-it surely contains a serious point. The speech seems more accurately an encomium of the logos, than Helen, leading Charles Segal to conjecture that it 'may even have served as a kind of formal profession of the aims and the methods of his art' (1962:102). Some regard it as one of our best insights into the state of late fifth century rhetorical theory (Kerferd 1981:78). The present essay aims to reconstruct the rhetorical theory described in and exemplified by Encomium of Helen. This reconstruction is offered as an alternative to the seminal and still orthodox interpretation developed by Charles Segal in 1962. Although Segal's account is extraordinarily comprehensive, it will be shown that it fails to satisfactorily accommodate the essential doxastic element in Gorgias' analysis of persuasion. Gorgias' rhetorical theory may be analysed into three components: a theory of the soul; a theory of the logos; and an account of the relation between logos and soul. This bare analytical framework is developed in the essay as follows: §2 analyses the psychological concepts in terms of which Gorgias develops his rhetorical theory; §3 discusses Gorgias' conceptualisation of the logos, and argues that Segal's explanation of its persuasive mechanisms is incomplete; §4 offers an alternative account, and §5 outlines and responds to an objection to the proposed interpretation. 2 Although the Helen does not present an explicit theory of the soul-it is, after all, an epideictic encomium, and not a psychological treatise-some elements of what may be a broader psychological theory can be extracted from the speech. Gorgias' treatment of the soul is given in terms of two 'physical' metaphors which are juxtaposed and interwoven in the text (Segal 1962:104). The first of these compares the character and affectations of soul to those of the body: just as different kinds of drugs produce different effects on the body, so too different sorts of logoi have different effects on the soul (14). The second physical metaphor 1 Gorgias describes the speech as a παίγνιον (21), a word which suggests 'play'. http://akroterion.journals.ac.za CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Abstract It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato’s definitional dialogues is an arguer, t... more Abstract It is widely assumed that the Socrates of Plato’s definitional dialogues is an arguer, that is, someone who argues, or presents arguments. This conception of Socrates is so entrenched in the scholarship that it is built into the best English translations of Plato’s texts, which render the Greek word ‘logos’ – a word with a bewilderingly large number of possible meanings – as ‘argument’ in contexts in which this is highly disputable. This essay explores the relation between questioning, assertion, and argument, and advances some reasons for supposing that Socrates practices a genuinely interrogative method.
Abstract In this commentary, I suggest that Sam Vice’s exploratory and communicative goals in ‘Ho... more Abstract In this commentary, I suggest that Sam Vice’s exploratory and communicative goals in ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’ are not appropriately advanced by the form of her writing. In particular, her analysis and recommendations—which I regard as perceptive and profound—would have been better presented in a non-argumentative format, and by employing a less direct mode of communication.
Plato's early dialogues represent the failure of Socrates' philosophical programme. They depict S... more Plato's early dialogues represent the failure of Socrates' philosophical programme. They depict Socrates as someone whose mission requires that he make an intellectual and moral impact on those with whom he converses; and they portray him as almost never bringing about this result. One central problem, dramatised throughout the early dialogues, is that perceptual moral intuitions undermine the possibility of reason's making significant changes to a person's moral belief system. I argue that Republic presents a theory of education which aims to circumvent this problem by training people so that they become like Socrates. Socrates' status as ideal reasoner is tied to his love of argument (philologia) and his ignorance. The Republic offers an account of how these characteristics may be (non-argumentatively) instilled, which creates the psychological space for the possibility of abandoning one's basic moral beliefs, thus securing the possibility of moral improvement by argument.
Uploads
Published Papers by Dylan Futter
the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by
means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one really thinks about virtue. Socrates’ elenchus is then interpreted as an attempt to penetrate Nicias’s dialectical defences in order to reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which philosophy must take root.
concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically
understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory
or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is
the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely
accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’
midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy,
the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation
says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true
spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual
pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the
analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required
to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian
position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered.
According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or,
even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert
reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many
readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the
author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for
deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms
of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual
autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element
of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains
surprisingly elusive.
the nature of sophistical speech by means of an interpretation of Laches, a Socratic dialogue with two Athenian generals about courage. Textual argument is provided to show that one of the two primary interlocutors, Nicias, attempts to avoid refutation by
means of certain dialectical defence mechanisms. The nature of these defence mechanisms is analysed and shown to imply a form of discursive self-alienation, that is, an unwillingness to say what one really thinks about virtue. Socrates’ elenchus is then interpreted as an attempt to penetrate Nicias’s dialectical defences in order to reconnect him to a pre-theoretical self-understanding from which philosophy must take root.
concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically
understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory
or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is
the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely
accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’
midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy,
the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation
says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true
spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual
pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the
analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required
to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian
position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered.
According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or,
even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert
reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many
readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the
author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for
deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms
of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual
autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element
of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains
surprisingly elusive.
concept of male spiritual pregnancy. Male spiritual pregnancy is typically
understood as a process in which a young man develops in his mind a theory
or idea; a spiritual child is, on this view, a theory; and spiritual childbirth is
the painful movement of a developed theory from the mind into the speechworld.
Although this account of spiritual pregnancy and maieutics is widely
accepted in the scholarship, it cannot be upheld. The intelligibility of Socrates’
midwife metaphor requires the recognition of two different kinds of pregnancy,
the false and the true. The first and false kind is roughly as the standard interpretation
says that it is: a theory germinating in the mind; but Theaetetus’s true
spiritual child is not a theory of knowledge—it is wisdom in his soul; true spiritual
pregnancy is the actualisation of the soul’s potential for wisdom.
The present article aims to shed light on Socrates’ position by consideration of Plato’s Laches. I argue that Socrates focuses his discourse on the “what is x” question because he wants to develop his interlocutor’s capacity for wisdom. Socrates believes that somebody who could give an account of virtue would be virtuous because they would be capable of wholeness of vision and act.