China's Economic Globalization through the WTO, 2017
Introduction, Ding Lu, Guanzhong James Wen and Huizhong Zhou Economic globalization and developme... more Introduction, Ding Lu, Guanzhong James Wen and Huizhong Zhou Economic globalization and development of China's foreign economic cooperation and trade, Zheng Zhihai Transformation of thinking and adaptation to new environments - a discussion of the influences on China from its participation in the WTO, Liang Yanfen China's WTO accession and state sector reform, Carsten Holz and Tian Zhu Domestic banking under financial liberalization: lessons for China as a member of the WTO, Wenyan Yang The joy and sorrow of capital inflow: are the lessons of Mexico relevant to China?, Xun Pomponio How does inward FDI interact with regional economic growth in China?, Kevin H. Zhang and Shunfeng Song Closing the productivity gap: the role of globalization in Shanghai's economic transformation, Kevin H. Khang China's health care system reform under globalization, Ling Li and Peter Yuen Where will China's internet regulation go after WTO accession?, Qingjiang Kong Challenges and opportunities for China's agriculture after its WTO accession, Guanzhong James Wen Recent claims of China's economic exceptionalism: reflections inspired by WTO accession, Wing Thye Woo Appendix: Challenges and implications of China joining the WTO: what WTO accession means, Richard Eglin.
This forward-looking volume offers insights into the globalization of the Chinese economy and its... more This forward-looking volume offers insights into the globalization of the Chinese economy and its accession to the WTO. The contributors provide updated accounts of recent developments in the Chinese economy and examines the implications of China's accession for the rest of the world.
Abstract The chronic coexistence of taut planning and hidden reserves in CPEs can be explained by... more Abstract The chronic coexistence of taut planning and hidden reserves in CPEs can be explained by the planner's reliance on the firm's private information and his inability to commit in dynamic planning. A two-period Bayesian game is developed to show that taut planning and hidden reserves coexist in equilibria where the static incentive scheme fails to induce complete revelation. In the absence of commitment, the planner will use the revealed information to revise the plan against the interest of the firm. Therefore, the firm may choose to conceal its productivity by requesting more inputs. This gives rise to hidden reserves. In response, the planner will set the plan tauter by cutting back the allocation to the firm. By so doing, the planner does not only correct the distortion caused by concealment to improve current efficiency, but also squeezes out information to improve future efficiency.
Feed-in tariff (FIT) and tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes are studied in a formal model a... more Feed-in tariff (FIT) and tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes are studied in a formal model and numerical example using the UK data. We find that if the markets were perfectly competitive, then feed-in tariff and the certificate price would be the same. However, when the markets are imperfect, they are generally different. While both the tariff and certificate price fluctuate
Employees do play a role in corporate governance as important stakeholders of modern enterprises.... more Employees do play a role in corporate governance as important stakeholders of modern enterprises. In the absence of financial and managerial labor markets in centrally planned economies (CPE), the owner of state enterprises (SOEs) has no effective mechanisms to discipline management. Therefore, the role of employees in corporate governance becomes much more important in SOEs than in the typical capitalist private firm. We posit that low wages and generous benefits in SOEs provide incentives for employees to monitor management. Other employment arrangements, especially lifetime job security and centralized wage scale, are also conducive to the monitoring of management by employees. A formal model shows that benefits tied to firm performance, designed properly, induce employees to monitor management. It also suggests that the existence of a market for managers tends to undermine this mechanism.
China's Economic Globalization through the WTO, 2017
Introduction, Ding Lu, Guanzhong James Wen and Huizhong Zhou Economic globalization and developme... more Introduction, Ding Lu, Guanzhong James Wen and Huizhong Zhou Economic globalization and development of China's foreign economic cooperation and trade, Zheng Zhihai Transformation of thinking and adaptation to new environments - a discussion of the influences on China from its participation in the WTO, Liang Yanfen China's WTO accession and state sector reform, Carsten Holz and Tian Zhu Domestic banking under financial liberalization: lessons for China as a member of the WTO, Wenyan Yang The joy and sorrow of capital inflow: are the lessons of Mexico relevant to China?, Xun Pomponio How does inward FDI interact with regional economic growth in China?, Kevin H. Zhang and Shunfeng Song Closing the productivity gap: the role of globalization in Shanghai's economic transformation, Kevin H. Khang China's health care system reform under globalization, Ling Li and Peter Yuen Where will China's internet regulation go after WTO accession?, Qingjiang Kong Challenges and opportunities for China's agriculture after its WTO accession, Guanzhong James Wen Recent claims of China's economic exceptionalism: reflections inspired by WTO accession, Wing Thye Woo Appendix: Challenges and implications of China joining the WTO: what WTO accession means, Richard Eglin.
This forward-looking volume offers insights into the globalization of the Chinese economy and its... more This forward-looking volume offers insights into the globalization of the Chinese economy and its accession to the WTO. The contributors provide updated accounts of recent developments in the Chinese economy and examines the implications of China's accession for the rest of the world.
Abstract The chronic coexistence of taut planning and hidden reserves in CPEs can be explained by... more Abstract The chronic coexistence of taut planning and hidden reserves in CPEs can be explained by the planner's reliance on the firm's private information and his inability to commit in dynamic planning. A two-period Bayesian game is developed to show that taut planning and hidden reserves coexist in equilibria where the static incentive scheme fails to induce complete revelation. In the absence of commitment, the planner will use the revealed information to revise the plan against the interest of the firm. Therefore, the firm may choose to conceal its productivity by requesting more inputs. This gives rise to hidden reserves. In response, the planner will set the plan tauter by cutting back the allocation to the firm. By so doing, the planner does not only correct the distortion caused by concealment to improve current efficiency, but also squeezes out information to improve future efficiency.
Feed-in tariff (FIT) and tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes are studied in a formal model a... more Feed-in tariff (FIT) and tradable green certificate (TGC) schemes are studied in a formal model and numerical example using the UK data. We find that if the markets were perfectly competitive, then feed-in tariff and the certificate price would be the same. However, when the markets are imperfect, they are generally different. While both the tariff and certificate price fluctuate
Employees do play a role in corporate governance as important stakeholders of modern enterprises.... more Employees do play a role in corporate governance as important stakeholders of modern enterprises. In the absence of financial and managerial labor markets in centrally planned economies (CPE), the owner of state enterprises (SOEs) has no effective mechanisms to discipline management. Therefore, the role of employees in corporate governance becomes much more important in SOEs than in the typical capitalist private firm. We posit that low wages and generous benefits in SOEs provide incentives for employees to monitor management. Other employment arrangements, especially lifetime job security and centralized wage scale, are also conducive to the monitoring of management by employees. A formal model shows that benefits tied to firm performance, designed properly, induce employees to monitor management. It also suggests that the existence of a market for managers tends to undermine this mechanism.
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