zyxwvu Corporatism, Pluralism, and Swedish Interest Group Influence in Social Welfare Policymaking RICHARD HOEFER* Corporatism and pluralism predict different characteristics of interest groups; their environments are important in understanding the level of influence that these groups have. This article describes variables related to these theoretical approaches and tests them as determinants of two operationalizations of interest group influence, one objective and one reputational. Results of these tests on Swedish interest group information indicate that, although Sweden has usually been considered a model corporatist political system, the situation is more complicated, with some pluralist factors being quite important. The study suggests that interest group influence may be more objectively determinable than is usually believed. One of political science‘s bedrock questions is ”Do interest groups really have much of an impact on the political process?” While some work has been done to answer this question, this topic remains unsettled. There are several reasons why this is true. Some people are skeptical that interest group influence can be measured. One particularly lyrical doubter likened the search for interest group influence to “a blind man searching for a black cat in the coal bin at midnight” (Loomis 1983, 184). This pessimism discourages researchers from even addressing the issue. Another reason for avoiding this subject is common to all studies of ”power” of one sort or another. There is the fear that no matter what results one finds, skeptics will attempt to show that the study lacks convincing proof of causality because of a ”second face of power” argument. While some groups may be so powerful as to be able to control things from behind the scenes, there are many contentious issues that do work their way onto the public agenda. These questions of policy have real consequences for many people and can be hotly debated. This is especially true for social welfare policy. It is important to understand the dynamics of these situations, even if other issues are left unstudied. While there is probably an underlying agreement on what the term “interest group influence” means, there is little agreement on how it is best measured. This article describes and tests concepts relating to interest group zyxwv * University of Texas, Arlington z zyxwvu zyxwvut Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. Vol. 7 , No. 2, April 1994 (pp. 165-181). 0 1994 Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 IJF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895 166 RICHARD HOEFER influence from the two main models of interest group and government relations, corporatism and pluralism, using Sweden as the location. Two different measures of influence, one reputational and one objective, are used as the dependent variables. The effort is quite useful, despite difficulties in operationalizing some of the concepts, to push theorists into becoming more specific and to encourage other researchers to explore and collect data regarding interest group influence. First, this article describes the traditional role of interest groups in Swedish policymaking. Second, the types of policy that interest groups attempt to affect is examined. Third, previous efforts at measuring interest group influence are detailed, with a short summary of the empirical results found in earlier studies. Fourth, the methods used in the study and the dependent variables used in the study are detailed. Next, the independent variables associated with interest group influence under corporatism and pluralism are presented. Sixth, the results of the tests are displayed, and, finally, the implications of the research are explored. INTEREST GROUPS IN SWEDISH POLICYMAKING There are many interest groups in Sweden, and they readily express their opinions on issues of importance to them. They also typically spend a good portion of their time trying to influence governmental policy. The median amount of time spent in influence activities in 1986 was 30%; nearly a quarter of the groups surveyed indicated they spent more than one-half of their time trying to influence government policy. Further, this level of effort had increased since 1981: close to one-half of the groups surveyed indicated that they had increased their efforts to influence policy, while fewer than 10% had decreased their efforts. It is not immediately clear how much fruit interest groups actually harvest from their labors. Some authors would have us believe that only those groups closely connected to the Social Democratic party (such as the large labor confederation, LO) had much influence at all prior to recent years (Castles 1978; Korpi 1980). Esping-Anderson and Korpi, for example, argue that “the relative power position of wage-earners has been of central significance for the development towards an institutional type of social policy” (1984, 205). This view is at least partially contradicted by three factors. First, research indicates that there has been continual formation of new groups trying to influence social welfare policy. About 7% of the responding groups in our survey of Swedish groups active in social welfare policy began in the first half of the 1980s. It is hard to believe that groups would still be forming in Sweden, one of the worlds most organizationally rich countries, if these groups were not achieving something of importance to their leaders and members.’ Second, some observers believe that an expanding number of interest CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE zyx 167 groups have been able to become influential. Meyerson (1985, 15), for example, notes a trend which occurred in the 1970s: zyxw Because a growing proportion of decision-making has been moved from the market to the political and bureaucratic systems, it has also become increasingly important for various pressure groups to influence the handling of those issues in which they have a stake. More and stronger special interest organizations have been built into the Swedish welfare society. This impression is bolstered by Petersson, et al., who, as part of a large study of political power in Sweden, state that new social movement types of groups, such as peace, environment, and women’s groups, are very influential (1989, 115-116). Unfortunately, no methodology is described, nor data presented as evidence, for this conclusion. Third, even if the rise of the welfare state can be attributed to the Social Democrats and their interest group allies, the maintenance of the system through recent adversity is more complicated. Johansen notes the resilience of welfare policy in Scandinavian countries even in difficult economic times, when one would expect a decrease in funding, and during the 1970s when Social Democratic parties were either out of power or ruling with a smaller than usual majority. He argues that the matter of social welfare policy cannot ”simply be reduced to a question of Social-Democratic strength, or partisan politics” (1986, 148). The Swedish political scene is changing rapidly and interest groups may have become too prominent for this current system to continue. During its successful efforts in the 1991 election and since, the Conservative party has advocated a “New Start for Sweden,” which includes lessening the power of interest groups in shaping public policy. A March 1993 report of .The Economic Commission to the Minister of Finance, for example, proposed that ”Interest groups should not be involved in decision-making. . . . By consequence, organizations should not have representatives in the boards of decision-making public sector agencies” (Swedish Institute, 1993, 11). It is unclear whether this new outlook will prevail. Because the data presented here are from an earlier period, they paint a picture which may already be fading, but provide a good image of what the Swedes are now reacting against. zyxwv Focus of Interest Group Influence Efforts Groups are faced with many opportunities to try to influence policy. It is of considerable interest to discover when they use their always limited resources and whatever types of issues are important to groups. Table 1 indicates the percentage of groups that considered four different potential foci of efforts “most” or ”often” important to influence. Three of the four foci are of much the same importance to Swedish zyxwv RICHARD HOEFER 168 zyxwv TABLE 1 Types of Policy Which Groups Attempt to Influence (Often or Most Often) Category of Group Policy Type All Groups (n = 59) Organizations (n = 23) Individuals (n = 36) Prob. Laws Regulations Member Benefits Group Funding 58% 52% 57% 24% 75% 75% 39% 17% 53% 39% 72% 25 % 0.05 0.05 0.05 ns Note: The significance test is a X-square test of the difference between interest groups made up only of organizations and interest groups made up only of individuals. TABLE 2 Types of Policies Where Influence is Attempted (n = 52) Policy Area Percent Groups Try to Influence Mean Success Rate Social Insurance Health Other Social Policy 71% 58% 69% 26% 29% 29% groups. Laws, member benefits and regulations are all considered important to over half of the respondents. Group funding, on the other hand, is important to only one-fourth of the groups. Comparing the results between peak organizations (associations of organizations) and organizations of individuals shows three significant differences. Groups comprised of organizations are more likely to try to influence laws and regulations than are groups of individuals. This latter category of group, however, is more likely to try to obtain member benefits. Neither category of group is more likely to try to influence funding for the group. This information indicates that peak organizations are probably more likely to be seen as ”heavy hitters” since they are trying to affect policy which extends beyond matters directly affecting their members. This is not to say that groups of individuals do not also try to affect laws or regulations, but the frequency with which they do so is considerably less. If practice makes perfect, or even if trying often leads to more successes, peak organizations are probably going to be more influential. The information in Table 1 represents one way of categorizing the focus of interest group activity. Table 2 shows more specifically the zyxw CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE 169 policy areas within the general field of social policy and the amount of success which groups feel they have in their influence efforts. Nearly three-fourths of the groups try to have an effect on social insurance policy, more than half on health policy, and two-thirds on other types of social policy. The mean success rate for all groups is similar across policy areas. Influence efforts are seen to be successful a bit more often than one time in four. This rate, surprisingly, is not significantly different for peak groups or groups made up of individuals. Measuring Interest Group Influence zyx Methods used to study interest group influence2 are analogous to the methods employed to research interpersonal influence. These can be broken into three basic categories of measurement style: enumerating influence attempts, reputational studies (including self-reports) and objective measures of interest group impact (March 1955). The first of these types of efforts, enumerating influence attempts, helps us understand what tactics are used to influence policy and how often they are used (Herring 1929. Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1967). An example of this approach is shown in Table 1. While interesting information in itself, such data do not address the question of whether these efforts ”make a difference.” Reputational studies go a step further in their efforts to understand which groups are important in shaping policy by asking respondents directly how much influence they and other interest groups have (Milbrath 1963; Presthus 1974; Knocke and Wood 1981; Whiteley and Winyard 1983). The logic behind this approach is that interest group leaders are expert witnesses and should know which groups are powerful. Clearly, there may be differences in opinion and differences between the perception of the respondents and “objective reality” (although the two are often hard to extricate from each other). This problem probably is especially great in the case of self-reports. The information in Table 2 is an example of these first two types of approaches. The last type of study uses objective measures of interest group impact. There are relatively few of these, but their findings have perhaps the greatest weight, if the objective measure is aptly chosen (Culhane and Hacker 1988; Meier and Van Lohuizen 1978).3 Summary of Empirical Results Much has been written on the determinants of interest group influence from an implicitly pluralist perspective. Even after reading all this, however, we are stuck between not knowing for sure whether interest groups have any effect to speak of, as several authors contend, (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1967; Meier and Lohuizen 1978; Milbrath 1963; Wilson 1973) and the impression that, under some conditions, interest groups 170 RICHARD HOEFER are likely to be effective (Greenwald 1977; Herring 1929; Knocke and Wood 1981; Whiteley and Winyard 1983; Ziegler 1964). Important variables internal to the groups may include the type of group members (Greenwald 1977; Walker 1983; Ziegler 1964), size and dispersal of the membership (Greenwald 1977; Herring 1929; Milbrath 1963), the amount of other organizational resources (especially funding) (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1967; Greenwald 1977; Herring 1929; Knocke and Wood 1981), the degree of access to decision-makers (Greenwald 1977; Culhane and Hacker 1988), nature of the organization’s goals (Greenwald 1977; Ziegler 1964), the amount of information a group can offer decision-makers (Meier and Lohuizen 1978; Milbrath 1963; Whiteley and Winyard 1983), and the type of strategy used by the group (Gais and Walker 1983). Important external variables may include the type of issue (Greenwald 1977), the predispositions of the decision-makers (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1964; Culhane and Hacker 1988; Herring 1929; Whiteley and Winyard 1983) and the place of the group in the interorganizational system (Greenwald 1977; Knocke and Wood 1981; Ziegler 1964). All of these research efforts emerge from a pluralist perspective in countries such as the United States and Britain. The elements of potential power in a corporatist system noted by Cawson (1986) (discussed below) have not been tesearched. zyxw zyxw z Methodology and the Dependent Variables This study tests the relative importance of variables derived from the corporatist and pluralist models, using two dependent variables: a reputational measure of influence and an objective measure of influence. Data on the study’s independent variables were gathered through a mail survey from 68 Swedish interest groups active in the field of social welfare policy in the early 1980s. These groups were identified by examining which groups replied to requests for comments regarding Royal Commission reports (i.e. used the remiss system, described below). The reputational dependent variable data were collected from this same survey, with the responses being made on a 4-point scale (1 = very ineffective; 4 = very effective). In the interest of a manageable survey instrument, data were gathered for only 21 groups. These groups, however, are primarily the largest and most active in the policy process. The mean score is 2.94, indicating that, on average, groups are considered basically effective. Groups were also asked to rate themselves on this same scale. The average score of this variable is 2.87, indicating that groups tend to rate themselves as being about equal to most other groups in their effectiveness. The objective variable data were gathered by conducting a content zy zyxw CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE 171 analysis on government documents. A bit of background is needed to understand this measure. The Swedish policy process relies heavily on the use of Royal Commissions, which are committees specially appointed to study issues (often for several years) using commissioned research and to propose legislative changes to enact new policies. Once a Commission report is published, it is available to the public and other government agencies. Comments are solicited, especially from interest groups active in the policy area. This is called the remiss process. All remiss comments received are read and summarized by the government ministry which would implement the proposal, if adopted. The ministry also chooses which suggestions for change are accepted and which are rejected. Most Commission reports have many ideas in them and there can be several different issues or points of disagreement within any single report. The universe of groups for this study is all groups which responded to any of the 25 social welfare-related Commission reports taken up by the government during the years 1982 to 1986. This study’s objective measure uses those cases where there was at least one interest group supporting the Royal Commission’s report and one group objecting to it on at least one issue. For any interest group, on each issue there are four possible outcomes. First, the group can agree with the Commission and have the government ministry uphold the Commission. Second, it can disagree with the Commission and have the ministry overrule the Commission recommendation. Both of these represent cases where the interest group is on the ”winning” side of the issue: its position was adopted despite the opposition of other interest groups. Third, the interest group can agree with the Commission but have the ministry overrule the Commission recommendation. Fourth, the interest group can disagree with the Commission but have the ministry support the original Commission proposal. These last two cases represent ”losses” for the interest group because their position was not adopted in the face of opposition. The objective measure employed in this study is the ratio of the number of times a group was on the winning side of the clash versus the total number of issues it was involved in. This ratio is adjusted on a probit scale to take into account the different number of issues groups were involved in. In all, 328 issues were coded. Three groups which had no successes in their efforts (which, in each case, numbered fewer than three attempts) as well as other groups with fewer than six influence attempts over the four-year period of study were excluded from the analysis after their scores showed up as outliers in regression results. While this set of 24 groups is a fairly small number of organizations, they appear to be very similar in key ways to the larger sample of interest groups used in the study. In addition, these remaining groups, while only 26% of the total number of groups active in zy 172 zyxwvutsr RICHARD HOEFER social welfare policy, were involved in 86% of the 328 remiss issues studied during this project. The mean for all groups is 4.99 (on a scale of 0-10) which indicates that the typical group was successful in about one-half of its effort^.^ The correlation between these two influence variables is 0.758, which is significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, these two dependent variables, which theoretically should measure the same thing, empirically do seem to measure the same thing. zyxwvut zy The Independent Variables This study is conducted by creating a model of the most important variables affecting Swedish interest group influence. First we identify all of the variables which are theoretically important. Some of these variables are more closely related to a corporatist interpretation of policymaking and others are more closely related to a pluralist view. The Swedish system, while considered very corporatist, cannot be thought of as having no pluralist elements. Indeed, there is great discussion in the literature as to what corporatism is and whether it is really just a variant of pluralism (see, for example, Martin 1983; Panitch 1980; and Williamson 1989). We try here to better illuminate the actual mix of influences at work, rather than testing a more rigorous theoretical model of either corporatism or pluralism. This decision is necessitated by the lack of data to operationalize adequately some of the variables which would be part of more rigorous models. Despite this problem, however, there is much to be gained from beginning the process with the theory and data available, improving our efforts as we find the weak links in our chains of logic and develop better data. After identifying the many variables which are both theoretically important and operationalizable, we test a reduced model which includes only variables which are found to be significant predictors of the dependent variables. Corpovutist Variables Sweden is often considered one of the most corporatist countries in the world (Grant 1985; Lehmbruch 1984; Peterson 1977; Schmidt 1982; Schmitter 1981; Strich 1974; Ziegler 1988). While there are many schools of corporatist thought, in general the corporatist model suggests that the only groups of consequence for policymaking are those which are the peak organizations (organizations of organizations) deeply involved in the governmental system. While explicit discussions of the determinants of political power are not common in corporatist writings, Cawson (1986, 14) argues that CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE zyx 173 Corporatists identify organization and the mobilization of bias involved in organization as the most important phenomenon of power. Organizations achieve power by a process of social closure whereby they attain the status of monopoly representative of a particular category of functional interest. Two variables are available to operationalize social closure. First is the level of competition the group experiences for members and resources. A group which has successfully attained closure and a monopoly status should have little or no competition for resources or members. Our data indicate that most group leaders (54%) feel that their associations are competing only a ”little” for resources and members. Fewer than a quarter (22%) of respondents believe that there is ”much” competition and exactly one-fourth state that there is ”some” competition. The second variable concerns the predominant type of members the group has (organizations or individuals). It is easier for an association to achieve closure if its potential members are a relatively small number of organizations rather than a larger number of individuals. Most of our respondents were associations of individuals (61%), with the rest being associations of organizations (39%).5 Another concept important in testing corporatist theory regards group influence tactics. Influential groups in a corporatist system should use the “proper” corporatist methods available to them to affect government decisions. The potential corporatist tactics in Sweden are “Working on Royal Commissions,” “Working with Government Agencies,” and ”Submitting Remiss Responses.” Overall, these tactics are used by almost all Swedish organizations and a large number of the groups consider them most or often important (see Table 3).‘jThe responses to the perceived usefulness of these individual tactics have been combined to form a “corporatist strategy use” index.7 zyxwvu zyxw Pluralist Variables Based on prior research, several variables are thought to be important in understanding interest group influence from a pluralist perspective. zyxwvu TABLE 3 Importance and Use of Influence Tactics by Swedish Social Welfare Interest Groups (n = 58) Tactic Remiss Responses Royal Commissions Government Agencies Most or Often Important Never Use 81 0 4 4 60 46 174 zyxwvutsrq zy RICHARD HOEFER zyxw Resources are the key in a pluralist system, according to Cawson (1986, 13), ”Pluralists argue that there is a wide variety of resources which can be used as the basis for exercising power, and that these resources are widely dispersed in capitalist democracies. Groups which do not have one type of resource (such as wealth) can offset that disadvantage by using another resource (many members, for example). While almost any type of resource is a plus for a group, two seem most weighty. First, a group’s membership size is important: the larger it is, the better. Second, a group should have a large budget to pay for staff and political contributions. Once again, due to data limitations, we must use a proxy variable instead of measuring the concept directly. In this case, we employ staff size because response rates were higher for a group’s staff size than its budget. The range of staff sizes among groups in Sweden is 0 to 3,900, with a mean of about 126 FTEs. Three other variables related to a pluralist view are also available. These are the level of ideological agreement between the group and the government in power, the level of conflict which group leaders perceive in their policy environment and the degree of centralization in the group’s structure. First, as a proxy for a direct measurement of ideology we include “Change in Cooperation between Government and Group” after the change in government in 1982 from Conservative to Social Democratic coalition (Table 4). The expectation is that the more the group felt the government shifted in its favor since 1982, the more influence the group had in 1986 when the survey was taken. Two-thirds of Swedish groups did not perceive a change in their relationships when the party coalition in power shifted from the right to the left. Of those which did, however, two-and-a-half times as many found relations better than worse. One-quarter of the respondents saw a better situation compared to one-tenth who experienced a worse state. I‘ zyxwv TABLE 4 Swedish Social Welfare Interest Groups’ Shift in Relationship with the Government After Change in Ruling Party (1982) (n = 65) Shift in Relationship Percent (%) Much Better Relations Better Relations No Change Worse Relations Much Worse Relations No Contact at time of shift 8 17 66 8 2 0 CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE zyx 175 Second, the level of conflict perceived in the environment is operationalized by an index of three variables called Extent of Conflict. Respondents were asked to react to three statements regarding the amount of conflict they experienced with other actors in the political system. The statements read, "Some [important elected officials/organized groups/important government agencies] oppose the policy aims of this association." Answers were summed up for the three statements and divided by three, so that scores on this conflict index range from 1, an environment with little conflict, to 5, a highly conflictual environment. The actual distribution has a mean of 2.61, with a minimum score of 1.00 and a maximum of 4.67. A majority of the groups (60%)fall below the theoretical half-way mark score of 3.00, showing that, in general, the Swedish system appears relatively non-conflictual to group leaders. One-fifth of the groups are seen to be in a highly conflictual environment with a score greater than 4.00. It is hypothesized that groups whose leaders feel that they are in a high conflict situation will be more influential. While somewhat counterintuitive, pluralist theory believes that groups are, in fact, in constant competition, no matter how they perceive their environment. Thus, groups which recognize their "true" situation can make plans to counter their opponents' efforts. In other words, "to be forewarned is to be forearmed. " The final variable concerns the level of centralization of the group. Following King and Walker (1989), groups can have several levels of centralization. An organization which is "fully decentralized" will have sub-organizations below the national level; these sub-organizations will have their own staff and own members (30% of Swedish groups). A group lacking all of these measures of decentralization is considered "fully centralized" (20%). Intermediate values are considered either "mainly" (23%) or "slightly" (27%)decentralized. The more decentralized a group, the more influential it should be because it can put pressure on more policymakers from a wider number of constituencies. With memberships to the local sub-organizations, groups probably receive a greater loyalty from the membership to be politically active and with local staff, the sub-organizations can more effectively coordinate political action. The data on level of centralization indicate that groups are fairly evenly spread across the various levels of centralization. Four-fifths of the groups are decentralized to some extent, but fewer than one-third are totally decentralized. zyxwv Results The objective and reputational measures of group influence are regressed on the corporatist and pluralist variables described above. Because of the high correlation between the two measures of influence, RICHARD HOEFER 176 zyxwv we expect the regression results to be similar. We also expect that the corporatist variables should perform better than the pluralist variables since we are looking at data from what is considered a corporatist sector of a corporatist country. When testing the independent variables’ effect on the dependent variables, it was not possible to use all independent variables in one equation because of the small number of cases. Using all of the variables at once would have attenuated the results by decreasing the degrees of freedom considerably. Thus, several test runs were used to weed out variables which did not show statistical significance or near significance for either the objective or the reputational dependent measure. Eliminated from the model in this way were level of centralization, level of group competition for members and resources, and use of corporatist tactics. Four variables (three pluralist and one corporatist) were retained: staff size, amount of conflict in the group’s political environment, level of cooperation, and type of association member. The results are reported in Table 5. Turning first to the results when using the objective influence dependent variable (Table 5, Col. l),we see that the adjusted R-square is 0.529 and two of the variables (Shift in Cooperation and Type of Member) are significant. The coefficients for each variable are in the expected direction. Thus, greater cooperation from the new administration led to higher scores on the objective influence measure. In addition, groups which are peak organizations are zyxw TABLE 5 Results of OLS Regression on Model of Interest Group Influence Objective Measure Independent Variable (n = 24) Reputational Measure (n = 19) Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized Shift in Cooperation Type of Member Staff Size ( X 100) Conflict Index Adjusted R-Square F Score .427 * (. 144) .588 * (.261) .020 (.013) .211 (. 124) .529 4.37 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < ,001 (Standard error in parentheses) .647 ,325 *** .750 ( .050) .488 .375 .351 .351 ** (. 106) .015 * ( .006) .111* (.052) .774 16.37 .386 .283 .248 CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE zyx 177 more influential than associations of individuals. Of these two significant variables, one comes from the list of pluralist variables and one comes from the corporatist list. The other two variables, staff size and level of conflict, have probability values of 0.12 and 0.14, respectively. While these are not statistically significant with this small set of organizations, it is encouraging to see the relatively good fit of these variables. A larger number (N) might show them to be significant. Column 2 shows the standardized beta coefficients. From this we see that each one point shift in improved cooperation by the government is more important in affecting the level of influence than is the difference between peak organizations and organizations which have individuals as members. Using the same set of independent variables, results were obtained for the reputational measure of influence (Table 5, Col. 3). Here we see that the adjusted R-square is 0.774 and that all four variables are significant. The coefficients are also in the expected direction. The standardized coefficients (Col. 4) tell the same story as with the objective measure: receiving increased cooperation from the government adds very much to a group’s reputation for being influential, nearly twice as much as being a peak organization. Having additional staff and perceiving a more conflictual environment are also associated with having a powerful reputation, but to a lesser extent. The results support one of the strongest tenets of the corporatist literature in general and the Swedish literature in particular. Peak organizations are more influential than associations of individuals. Nevertheless, several elements of the Swedish political system which affect group influence are what might be thought of as pluralistic. Organizations with more staff are more influential, organizations whose leaders perceive conflict in the environment are more influential, and, most importantly, organizations which ”get along” better with the administration are more influential. These findings all come directly from a pluralist view of the politics of group and government relations and are at variance to some extent with the basic corporatist view of the world. Given that Swedish politics has been consistently characterized as being consensual (Anton 1969; Anton 1980; Ruin 1982) and that corporatistic interests are supposed to transcend whichever administration is in power, the importance of these pluralistic, conflict-centered variables is surprising. One of the main points of contention in the literature concerning pluralism and corporatism is the relationship between the two systems. Some argue that the two are quite different while others believe that they are similar (see, for example, Grant 1980; Martin 1983; Panitch 1980; Schmitter 1974; Williamson 1989). The actual situation in Sweden is that elements of both ideal types are present, according to our results. Given Sweden’s position as a “poster child” for corporatist theorists, zyx 178 RICHARD HOEFER this may be a bit unexpected. Yet it is also important to remember that Western-style democracies share much in common. The way that popular democracy is implemented varies, but the idea that larger groups of people should be more influential in the policy process than smaller groups is constant. It will be hard to find a political system where ideological friends of the administration do not have more influence than opponents. Finally, if conflict exists, as it surely does in all political systems, group leaders who are aware of it - and are prepared to act to counter it - will probably always be more influential than leaders who do not see and prepare for opposition. zyxw CONCLUSION Several key points can be summarized from this article. Most importantly, this study shows that it is possible to find a reasonable outcomebased measure of interest group influence, despite skeptics' doubts. The objective measure correlates highly with a reputational measure of influence, which, despite its well-known drawbacks, has the advantage of being easily understood and often-used. This is not to say that there are not arguments which can be made against the objective measure used in this study. Improvements in the measure should be made. But it is a step toward shedding light on the darkness which covers the topic of interest group influence. In addition this study operationalizes the determinants of interest group influence in Sweden suggested by corporatist and pluralist theory. The variables which prove to be significant are staff size, level of perceived conflict, type of member, and amount of cooperation on the part of government towards the group. We do not, however, answer the question "Is Sweden corporatist or pluralist?" The results indicate that Swedish interest groups' reputation and objective effectiveness can be explained by both corporatist and pluralist variables. The pluralist variables may be conceived of as operating within a corporatist environment where peak organizations are more influential than groups consisting of individuals. More research is needed on this point, however, for three reasons. The sample of groups reported in this paper is small. More importantly, one should consider the magnitude of the policies affected - an issue not addressed here. Results may also vary in other policy arenas. The results reported here should encourage comparative research. The pluralist model of interest group influence is based primarily on American and English research. Because several of the variables are significant in the Swedish context as well, we can plausibly hypothesize that interest groups function similarly in at least several Western countries, whether considered corporatist or not. Additional research should be undertaken to explore the degree of similarity and dissimilarity more closely. The examination of corporatist theory also points out the need CORPORATISM, PLURALISM, AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE zyx 179 for greater specificity regarding the determinants of interest group influence within a corporatist setting. With ingenuity, it may be possible to find situations in other countries where the same kind of objective influence measure can be developed. In the United States, for example, the regulatory arena offers a comparable process: bureaus offer proposed regulations for comment, interest groups make suggestions, and a final regulation is issued. At any rate, it is fairly easy to collect data concerning the reputation of groups, and work should continue to refine a model of interest group influence. Interest group studies in recent years have tended to study the relatively easily researched aspects of interest group structure without examining their impact. The numerous studies in American political science of Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions which m e focused on impact determination have offered contradictory results, due partially to a lack of agreement in defining the dependent variable. While this study does not answer all the questions related to interest group influence in Sweden, much less in the United States or elsewhere, it provides evidence that the subject of group impact is not impossible to measure and need not remain elusive forever. zy Acknowledgment The author would like to thank the Swedish Fulbright Commission and the American-Scandinavian Foundation for their financial support for this research, and the many Swedish interest group leaders for providing the information without which this article would not have been possible. Notes 1. It is the underlying assumption of this research that interest groups have as one of their major goals (although not necessarily their only goal) to influence public policy. 2. While many studies of interest groups deal with only one or a small number of associations, I am mainly interested in studies which draw on a larger data base for their conclusions. 3. A special sub-genre of this type of approach is the voluminous literature on American political action committee (PAC) spending. As these results do not seem to apply to other countries, however, I will leave their discussion to another author. 4. There actually were 29 groups which had at least one success in influencing government behavior and for which an objective influence score could be calculated. Five of them did not return the survey. The mean for all 29 groups is 5.01, which is hardly distinguishable from the 4.99 mean figure of the 24 groups with information on the independent variables. 5. 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