State of the World’s Fisheries

Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003. 28:359–99 doi: 10.1146/annurev.energy.28.050302.105509 c 2003 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved Copyright ° First published online as a Review in Advance on August 18, 2003 STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. Ray Hilborn, Trevor A. Branch, Billy Ernst, Arni Magnusson, Carolina V. Minte-Vera, Mark D. Scheuerell, and Juan L. Valero School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington, Box 355020, Seattle, Washington 98195; email: rayh@u.washington.edu, tbranch@u.washington.edu, biernst@u.washington.edu, arnima@u.washington.edu, cminte@u.washington.edu, mark.scheuerell@noaa.gov, juan@u.washington.edu Key Words fishery, catch, exploitation, management, marine, ecosystem, humans ■ Abstract The total world catch from marine and freshwater wild stocks has peaked and may be slightly declining. There appear to be few significant resources to be developed, and the majority of the world’s fish stocks are intensively exploited. Many marine ecosystems have been profoundly changed by fishing and other human activities. Although most of the world’s major fisheries continue to produce substantial sustainable yield, a number have been severely overfished, and many more stocks appear to be heading toward depletion. The world’s fisheries continue to be heavily subsidized, which encourages overfishing and provides society with a small fraction of the potential economic benefits. In most of the world’s fisheries there is a “race for fish” in which boats compete to catch the fish before a quota is achieved or the fish are caught by someone else. The race for fish leads to economic inefficiency, poor quality product, and pressure to extract every fish for short-term gain. A number of countries have instituted alternative management practices that eliminate the race for fish and encourage economic efficiency, use lower exploitation rates that deliberately do not attempt to maximize biological yield, and encourage reduced fishing costs and increased value of products. In fisheries where this transition has taken place, we see the potential for future sustainability, but in those fisheries where the race for fish continues, we anticipate further declines in abundance, further loss of jobs and fishing communities, and potential structural change to marine ecosystems. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON IMPACTS OF HUMANS ON FISH STOCKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Harvesting and Sequential Depletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pollution and Introduction of Exotic Species . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inland Fisheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1543-5938/03/1121-0359$14.00 360 363 363 364 367 367 368 359 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 360 HILBORN ET AL. STATUS OF FISHERIES AND ECOSYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stock Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discarding and Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Habitat Impacts of Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Extinction and Ecosystem Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF FISHERIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE SCIENCE OF SUSTAINABLE HARVESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Single-Species Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Multispecies and Ecosystem Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE BEHAVIOR OF FISHING FLEETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . METHODS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Institutional Structure and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Allocating Fish Among Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Illegal Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Solutions: The Precautionary Approach and Marine Protected Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . WHAT DETERMINES SUCCESS AND FAILURE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE FUTURE OF WORLD FISHERIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368 368 370 372 373 375 375 377 379 381 382 382 384 386 387 387 390 INTRODUCTION The collapse of the Newfoundland cod stock and closure of the fishery in 1992 illustrates the crisis facing the world’s fisheries. Before Columbus came to America, Basque fishermen were sailing to the Grand Banks to fish for cod; indeed, the cod fishery was the reason for the settlement of Newfoundland. The fishery was sustainably harvested for 500 years, but in a few decades beginning in the 1960s, several million tonnes of fish stocks were reduced to a small remnant that shows no sign of rebuilding (Figure 1). The cod collapse caused enormous social upheaval: 20,000 people were put out of work, the economy of Newfoundland was severely damaged, Canadian taxpayers paid over Can$1 billion per year to support unemployed fishermen, and the whole culture of an island built on cod fishing was shaken (1). The cause of the cod collapse was clearly overfishing because the fish were harvested too hard and too young (2, 3). Modern fishing vessels pursued the cod over their entire range onto their spawning grounds, instead of only fishing when the cod came inshore. The destruction began with large foreign fleets moving onto the Grand Banks, was temporarily stopped in 1977 when Canada declared a 200-mile limit that excluded most foreign fishing, and then continued with the building of Canada’s own offshore fleet, a fleet that was much too large based on overly optimistic scientific assessments of long-term sustainable yield. Ultimately, it was the Canadian fleet, with Canadian scientists providing advice and Canadian managers in charge, that led to the demise of this fishery. In theory, this was a management system the world could admire, with modern research surveys, stateof-the-art computer models to assess stock status, and extensive peer review by experts. Yet it failed totally. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 361 Figure 1 Catches of Newfoundland (northern) cod since 1850 in thousands of tonnes. Catches are for statistical areas 2J and 3KL. Data taken from (155). The failure of the fishery was not simply a failure of the cod to reproduce. Although the value of groundfish (with cod being the most important) declined dramatically, an increase in shellfish (lobster, shrimp, and crab) more than made up—in economic value—for the loss of groundfish (Figure 2). By 1996, the value of Newfoundland fisheries landings was greater than it had been before the Figure 2 The economic value of landings for groundfish (mainly cod) and shellfish (lobster, shrimp, and crab) in Newfoundland from 1989 to 1996. Pelagic species and other species are minor and shown as smaller contributors. Source (5a). Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 362 HILBORN ET AL. cod collapse. The same is true for eastern Canada as a whole. Moreover, this is not a simple case of the fishing fleets moving from cod onto shrimp, lobster, and crab. Rather, a substantial increase in the abundance of shellfish coincided with the groundfish collapse. Considerable evidence suggests this was because of reduced groundfish predation (4, 5). The important point is that during the 1990s there was a reasonably continuous stream of income available to sustain fishing communities. In fact, communities were not sustained. The fishermen and plant workers who relied on cod remained unemployed and received part of the Can$1 billion annual payments (much greater than the economic value of the fishery), while fishermen who held shellfish licenses became wealthy. Prior to 1950, fishing communities had a mixed fishing pattern, with individuals fishing cod, lobster, crab, shrimp, and seals. If this structure had been in place in the 1990s, the economic impacts of the collapse of cod would have been largely ameliorated by the increased income to the fishermen from increased take of shellfish. However, during the 1960s and 1970s, Canada instituted programs to restrict entry into fisheries, forcing individuals to specialize. When the cod collapsed in 1991, cod fishermen were therefore not allowed to switch. The collapse of the cod stock was clearly due to overfishing. But the collapse of the Newfoundland fishery was due primarily to an institutional structure that forced specialization, which reduced the ability of fishermen to adapt to change. The Newfoundland cod collapse illustrates the interaction between marine ecosystems and their products, humans who exploit the fish, the social and economic fabric of communities and markets, and the governmental institutions that regulate the fisheries. Is this the future, or indeed the present, for the world’s fisheries? There is no shortage of evidence that fishing fleets are too large, science too imprecise, and management institutions too ineffective to prevent the Newfoundland cod story from being repeated again and again, as indeed it has been since humans first acquired the technology to exploit the resources of the sea. Nonetheless, there are signs of hope. Fisheries have been and can be managed sustainably. It has become clear that the greatest mistake in understanding fisheries systems is to think of fish as their centerpiece. In fact, society seeks to maintain sustainable fisheries, not just fish. People want sustainable ecosystems, sustainable communities, and sustainable economic activity. As we will show, most of the world’s fisheries are intensively exploited, and many may indeed be going the way of the Newfoundland cod. If the fish were the only important component of the system, society could simply stop fishing. This, however, would often destroy the fishing communities that are the principal reason that most people care about the existence of fisheries. In this review, we explore the state of the world’s fisheries, including the fish, the people who harvest them, and the institutions that regulate them. We use the term fisheries to refer to the natural and human system and fish stocks to refer to the species and the ecosystems in which they live. We use the terms fisherman and fishermen throughout the report because this is how practitioners of fishing (both male and female) tend to refer to themselves in the United States. We will seek examples of management solutions that ensure the sustainability of STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 363 all of these components. We include in “the world’s fisheries” the fisheries that harvest wild stocks of marine and freshwater fish, invertebrates, and mammals. We specifically exclude aquaculture and will treat freshwater and recreational fisheries only slightly. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON IMPACTS OF HUMANS ON FISH STOCKS Fisheries have played a significant role in human history. The search for cod led to much of the early exploration of North America (6); the trade in cod and whales was a major component of European economic activity in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries, and fluctuations in herring stocks in Scandinavia shook local economies (7). In the twentieth century, the collapse of the Peruvian anchovetta stock rocked the Peruvian economy, and the economy of Iceland was dominated by fish products. Therefore the interaction between society and fish stocks has been and continues to be important to hundreds of millions of people and national governments. This explains, to a great extent, the worldwide publicity that many recent fishery crises have received and the widespread public interest in the status of fisheries and in particular how human activity has impacted fish stocks. The impact of mankind on marine ecosystems has long been a subject of controversy. In the late nineteenth century it was still possible to argue “that the cod fishery, the herring fishery, the pilchard fishery, the mackerel fishery, and probably all the great sea-fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say that nothing we do seriously affects the number of fish” (8) quoted in (9). Other scientists, however, have long expressed the view that fishing would inescapably degrade fish populations. “We have . . . to face the established fact that the bottom fisheries are . . . in rapid and continuous process of exhaustion; that the rate at which sea fishes multiply and grow, even in favorable seasons, is exceeded by the rate of capture” (10) quoted in (9). Harvesting and Sequential Depletion The exhaustible nature of fish stocks was firmly demonstrated by “The Great Fishing Experiment,” also known as World War I, which halted fishing in the North Sea for five years. When fishermen returned after the war, they found that fish had increased dramatically in size and abundance (9). This was clear evidence that the abundance of the stocks had been reduced before the war by fishing. It is now widely accepted that fishing can and does seriously affect fish stock abundance, in the same way that whaling was responsible for the sequential depletion, and in some cases destruction, of cetacean populations worldwide. By the twentieth century, southern right whales were almost wiped out, and modern whaling fleets were embarking on huge harvests of large cetaceans in the Southern Hemisphere, Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 364 HILBORN ET AL. focusing on less and less valuable species: humpback, blue, fin, sperm, and sei whale populations were sequentially depleted (Figure 3). Southern Hemisphere whales are only the most recent of a long series of groups of aquatic organisms that have suffered substantial depletion. Formerly widespread salmon are now absent from most European rivers (11), and marine mammals like seals and sea lions were hunted to near extinction worldwide (12). Sea otters in the North Pacific were formerly abundant from California to the tips of the Aleutian Islands before unrestricted fur hunting reduced them to near extinction at the start of the twentieth century. The International Fur Seal Treaty then afforded them protection, and many areas managed to repopulate and recover to their former densities. In most natural ecosystems, large consumer species like whales, manatees, turtles, and monk seals were rapidly wiped out by intensive hunting. Species in similar trophic levels then took over the roles of the missing top consumers until they in turn were overfished or depleted through disease or other natural causes (13). Sometimes, decades or even centuries after the original consumer species were eliminated, the entire ecosystem collapsed, as happened to western Atlantic coral reefs. These reefs suffered massive mortality in the 1980s when they were smothered by seaweeds (13). The too-obvious cause of the algal profusion was the loss of an abundant sea urchin species, but the ultimate reason was the fishery caused depletion of herbivorous fish at the start of the twentieth century, which left the sea urchin as the sole algal control agent protecting the coral reefs. These changes, often taking centuries, alter human perception of what is natural or desirable. Fishery scientists of each generation accept the natural state of fisheries as being the stock levels when their careers started and neglect the fact that stocks may have declined before they started working. This has been termed the “shifting baseline syndrome” (14) and Pauly has argued that this leads fishery managers to progressively accept degraded systems as the target they would like to achieve, because they have no understanding of the real natural condition that may have existed decades or centuries before. Climate Not all changes in marine fish stocks are due to fishing pressure. In many fish stocks, climate change and long-term natural fluctuations also play an important role (7). Reconstructions of Bristol Bay salmon abundance over the past 2200 years show a pattern of high natural variability (Figure 4) (15, 16). At the decadal scale, changes appear to be related to climate changes and are asynchronously linked to changes in far-flung systems like sardine and anchovy populations in California. At the level of centuries, this synchrony breaks down, but there are long-term underlying patterns of low salmon abundance from 100 BC to 800 AD, and high salmon abundance from 1200 to 1900 AD. Long-term records show that other species also vary naturally over one or two orders of magnitude (17–19). Climate variability can simultaneously contribute to increases in some stocks at the same time it helps to bring about decreases in others. In the most recent century, global 365 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES Figure 3 Southern Hemisphere catches of different species of large cetaceans showing the pattern of discovery, exploitation, and subsequent collapse of each species (C. Allison, International Whaling Commission, personal communication, December 2002). Southern right whales (not shown here) were already severely depleted by the mid-1800s. Catches dropped nearly to zero during World War II. HILBORN ET AL. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 366 Figure 4 Reconstructed abundance of fish species off the northeastern Pacific Ocean over the past 2200 years, repeated with permission from (16). (a) Sockeye salmon abundances in Karluk Lake reconstructed from δ 15N (‰) sediment series (16). (b,c) Northern anchovy and sardine scales (per 1000 cm2 per year) from sediments off Santa Barbara, California, smoothed by a 50-year running average (17). STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 367 catches demonstrate striking asynchronous periods of success and failure of sardine and anchovy species (20, 21). Climate clearly has strong impacts on fish abundance and caused “crashes” in fish stocks long before humans had any impact on them. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. Pollution and Introduction of Exotic Species Pollution from human industry and agriculture (22) is an additional impact on fish stocks. Persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT, PCBs, and heavy metals may disrupt the immune and reproductive systems of organisms, particularly those that feed high in the food web like marine mammals and humans (23). Concentrations of these chemicals are much higher in the Northern than in the Southern Hemisphere, because of greater human population densities and their associated impacts (24). Oil spills have been decreasing over the past 30 years, but they continue to be more devastating than oil exploration due to their intensity (23), and the ecological damage from the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill is widely considered the worst ever (25). Nutrients from agricultural and livestock production, sewage discharge, and the combustion of fossil fuels have essentially “fertilized” many coastal ecosystems throughout North America, Europe, and Asia (26–29). In some cases, excessive nitrogen and phosphorus have increased primary production and subsequent decomposition enough to deplete the oxygen levels in the water (30). These hypoxic areas can be extensive, covering over 20,000 km2 in the Gulf of Mexico and the Black Sea and up to 70,000 km2 in the Baltic Sea (30), with important economic and ecological implications (31). Historically, chemical and nutrient pollution has interacted with overfishing to impact coastal ecosystems and their associated fisheries (32, 33). These effects persist today and will likely continue into the future. Introduction of exotics is another form of “pollution” affecting marine fish stocks, particularly in coastal ecosystems. Native species in many of the world’s estuaries have been replaced by exotic introductions, and with increasing world trade, the frequency of introductions is almost certainly going to grow (34, 35). Inland Fisheries Fishing, climate, and pollution have had similar, if not stronger, impacts on inland fish stocks. Exploitation by recreational fisheries has led to collapses of freshwater stocks in Canada and is probably occurring elsewhere across the globe (36). As in marine ecosystems, climate change, eutrophication, pollution, dams and diversions, habitat destruction, and overexploitation all threaten the well-being of freshwater fisheries (37). One of the most important issues is that of introduced species, which in the United States have resulted in large-scale homogenization of fish faunas, particularly in the western continental states (38). Introduced species often cause extinctions among endemics (39) and can lead to either severe economic losses (40) or to the development of valuable fisheries based on the exotic species. For example, in Lake Victoria the exotic Nile perch and Nile tilapia have caused mass extinctions among the incredibly diverse native fish species (41), but they have also led to a fourfold increase in overall fishery yield (42). A similar increase 368 HILBORN ET AL. in yield was obtained when the North American Great Lakes were stocked with exotic Pacific salmon in the 1970s and 1980s to control booming populations of introduced alewife and improve recreational fishing (40). These exotic salmonids now support a US$3–5 billion recreational fishing industry annually (43). Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. Summary For centuries ecosystems and fish stocks have been affected by harvesting, pollution, climate, and introduction of exotics. Recent attention on fisheries has focused on harvesting, both because harvesting pressure grew enormously in the twentieth century and because it is the one human activity that is most easily regulated. Having seen how these multiple factors can affect fish stocks, we now look at the current status of fish stocks, fisheries, and marine ecosystems. STATUS OF FISHERIES AND ECOSYSTEMS In the last decade the general public has been bombarded with stories about the collapse of the world’s fish stocks. United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) estimate that “75% of the world’s fisheries are fully or overexploited” has been widely quoted (44). Considering that being fully exploited is the objective of most national fishery agencies (and therefore not necessarily alarming), of more concern is the estimate that 33% of the U.S. fish stocks are overfished or depleted (45). The historical catch trends in Figure 5 show very little if any decline in world catch and are therefore surprising. The state of the world’s fisheries is extremely difficult to assess. Shepherd, an English fisheries scientist, once said “Counting fish is just as easy as counting trees, except they are invisible and they move.” Nevertheless, a number of methods have been tried including (a) trends in catch (46), (b) stock-by-stock classification based on assessment of current stock size in relation to historical stock size (45), (c) trends in the trophic level of catches (47), and (d) trends in catches for individual stocks (44). Each of these approaches has its limitations. Trends in total yield suggest stability (Figure 5B) and therefore sustainability at current levels, but these may mask a sequential depletion of individual stocks, so that the apparent stability may be a precursor to terminal decline as the last accessible fish stocks are depleted. Stock Status Stock-by-stock classifications are probably the best approach but are data intensive and available only in a few countries. Where they are possible, such classifications may be misleading. For instance, in the United States, 33% of the fish stocks that have been classified are “overfished or depleted” (45), but the vast majority of these resources are still producing considerable yield, and many stocks are classified as overfished even if rebuilding. Assuming that the sustainable yield from overfished Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES Figure 5 (A) Historical world fisheries catches redrawn from (115). (B) Recent catches based on FAO catch statistics, which exclude aquaculture production (48). Catches from China are excluded because of concerns about overreporting in recent years (45a). 369 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 370 HILBORN ET AL. stocks is only half of the potential yield if they were not overfished, the U.S. production would be at 84% of maximum, a picture far different from that implied by the often-used figure of 75% overfished or fully exploited. Indeed, many stocks in the United States may be legally classified as overfished even if they are at a stock size that will produce maximum possible yield—the distinction between legal and biological classifications can be considerable. Analysis of trends in landings for individual stocks is widely applicable because landing data are easily available. As an example, of the six largest fisheries in Australia, four are stable (the two lobster fisheries, whiting, and Australian salmon), whereas the other two (southern bluefin tuna and orange roughy) have both shown considerable declines in catch (48) because early high landings during the fishingdown phase have reduced fish stocks, sometimes rapidly, to long-term sustainable levels. We can use these data to measure the stock status by dividing current landings by the maximum historical landings after using a five-year running average to smooth the data. For the two lobster fisheries, Australian salmon and whiting, the stock status estimates are 100%, 61%, 87%, and 53%, respectively; yet for orange roughy and southern bluefin tuna, they are 47% and 30%, respectively. The unweighted average stock status among Australian major fisheries is thus 63%. This does not imply that the current yields are 63% of maximum potential because the catches for orange roughy and southern bluefin tuna were far in excess of sustainable levels as the fisheries developed. When the 495 largest fisheries (those with cumulative catches ≥100,000 t from 1970 to 2000, excluding Chinese fisheries) in the FAO database (48) are analyzed in the same way, we see that many of the world’s fisheries are near their peak production, with a wide range in production levels among the other fisheries (Figure 6). Considerable care is needed in interpreting these results; many fisheries that are at or near maximum historical production may be currently fished far above sustainable levels. In contrast, many of the fisheries with low current yield may reflect the reduction of yields from high nonsustainable levels to lower sustainable levels, or changes in access, particularly in association with the expansion of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to 200 miles. If we extend this analysis to individual countries, we see that many developing countries have fisheries that are new and growing and hence still have landings near their short-term historical maxima, yet countries such as Japan and South Korea suffered the closure of many fisheries when they lost access to distant water fishing grounds (Figure 7). It would be most interesting to know, on a stock-by-stock basis, where the sustainable yield is in relation to the maximum sustainable yield, but this analysis has only been attempted in a few countries such as the United States (45). Discarding and Waste Discarded fish are a major issue in fisheries. The most recent survey available shows 26% of the world’s catch is discarded annually (49). Discarding is usually caused by economic or regulatory constraints. Economic discards include catch Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 371 Figure 6 Current yield divided by maximum historical yield for 495 of the world’s major fisheries. Each fishery is a unique species-area combination, as defined in the FAO database (48). Numbers at top of bars show number of stocks represented in each category. Catches from China are excluded because of concerns about overreporting in recent years (45a). that is unwanted because the fish are too small, or the species is unmarketable. Regulatory-induced discarding involves catch of species, or size of fish, in excess of that which a particular fishery is allowed to retain (50). Bycatch (the unintended catch of nontarget species) can be an important management concern for many reasons. 1. It can be a substantial component of fishing mortality. 2. It may aggravate overfishing. 3. It may impact other highly regulated fisheries. 4. It may have undesirable impacts on a particular nontarget species or group of species. 5. It is a waste of important natural resources. 6. It may cause allocation conflicts between competing socioeconomic interests (50). Discards are highest in shrimp and prawn trawl fisheries that discard an average of 5.2 kg (and a maximum of 136 kg) for every kg of landed catch (49). The greatest total discards are in the northwest Pacific, a region where shrimp fisheries discards account for 50% of the total discard by all fisheries. Most discards in shrimp fisheries are finfish and other crustaceans that do not attract public attention as much as large charismatic animals like dolphins. Public activism over high dolphin bycatch in tuna fisheries in the 1980s (133,000 dolphins were killed in 1986) translated into consumer avoidance of tuna products and made fishermen aware Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 372 HILBORN ET AL. Figure 7 Current yield divided by maximum historical yield for some major fishing nations, averaged across their major stocks. The EU label pools the member countries of the European Union. that their practices had to change if they wanted to remain in business. Solutions came from the fishermen themselves, highly motivated by the need to survive, who managed to reduce dolphin bycatch to just 1877 by 1998 (51) by reducing the bycatch per unit of effort (52). Another way to control the problem of bycatch is reducing the total effort, as happened in the case of long driftnets that were banned by a UN treaty as a result of increased public awareness caused by a coalition of governments and private conservation groups. As a result, more than 15,000 people lost their jobs in the participating countries (51). Bycatch problems have also been addressed in other ways. In Norway, fishermen are obligated by law to land all their bycatch (51, 53). Naturally, the success of a program like this will depend largely on enforcement, but there is at least a clear incentive toward research on bycatch reduction gear, behavioral changes, and the reduction of waste, with a possible downside—the development of markets for undersized fish (51). Habitat Impacts of Fishing The act of fishing can have wide-ranging, negative impacts on ecosystems (54, 55). Bottom trawling, dredging, and trapping often reduce hard substrate and simplify the bottom topography, which results in coral destruction and the leveling of seamount tops (56, 57). In other cases, heavy doors on bottom trawls can leave large furrows in the sea floor (58). In regions of the ocean with soft sediments, Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 373 fishing practices disturb the sediments with mixed effects on benthic invertebrates (59). In Australia, trawling reduced the density and biomass of soft-bodied, immobile taxa by more than 80% (56), but less than 5% of the disturbed biomass was typically retained in the trawl gear (60); this makes it difficult to assess the impact of trawling from what is seen on the surface. In the Bering Sea, similar reductions were found in small benthos, but larger organisms such as crabs and sea stars had a mixed response (61). In the Grand Banks, large species such as crabs and urchins suffered severe declines, whereas smaller sediment-dwelling organisms were relatively unaffected (62). While targeting shellfish in estuaries along the Atlantic coast of the United States, fisherman also greatly reduced the extent of important seagrass beds (63). However, these various effects of physical disturbance may be relatively short lived. Several studies suggest that trawl fisheries mimic natural disturbances and that their negative effects persist for less than a year (59, 64, 65). Clearly any physical effects of a fishery will vary with geographical region, fishing intensity, and the gear used. The spatial extent of impact of trawl gear on the sea floor was reviewed for the United States (66), but the report did not address whether these impacts had a positive or negative effect on fish production. It seems quite likely that some important commercial species may benefit from these impacts, while other species may be harmed, but there is no substantial data available at present. Extinction and Ecosystem Impacts The extinction of marine fish, invertebrates, and plants may seem unlikely, given that most marine species produce such prolific quantities of eggs and are spread so widely over such diverse habitats. However, well-documented cases of extinction from natural causes include the eelgrass limpet, Lottia alveus, which was eliminated when disease wiped out suitable eelgrass habitat (67), and the Galapagos damselfish which disappeared after the 1982–1983 El Niño (68). Extinctions can also be caused directly by fishing pressure. The California white abalone, formerly present in densities of 1/m2 from Point Conception, California, to Baja California, was the target of a fishery in the early 1970s, which peaked at 65 tonnes in 1972. The population was rapidly reduced below densities that could produce sufficient sperm concentrations to ensure fertilization during broadcast spawning, although disease may have also contributed their decline. The last major recruitment event occurred in the late 1960s, and white abalone populations have declined ever since. Although for economic reasons, commercial fishing is unlikely to target a species once it reaches very low densities, many fish species are caught as bycatch in fisheries that are directed at other species. The target fishery can be maintained while nontarget species decline due to a lower intrinsic rate of increase or because they are more readily caught than the target species. Sharks in the northwest Atlantic have declined by 50%–90% in the past 15 years because of bycatch in the tuna and swordfish longline fisheries (69). At least two other widely distributed species have been brought to the brink of extinction in this manner: so-called common skates in the Irish Sea and barndoor skates, the largest skates in the northwest Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 374 HILBORN ET AL. Atlantic (70, 71). In the skate examples, near extinction occurred without fanfare, so it is likely that other fish species could disappear in the same way. Fisheries’ exploitation often leads to dramatic changes in the size structure and abundance of targeted species, as well as shifts in the overall fish assemblage (72). This fishing pressure may reduce the mean trophic level of the fish community (47, 73) due to greater declines in larger, slow-growing species relative to smaller, faster-growing species (74). In a review of 45 years of global fishery landings, Pauly et al. (47) found a dramatic decrease in the mean trophic level of harvested fish in both marine and inland ecosystems (Figure 8). They argue that their observed shift in landings from larger piscivorous fish toward smaller planktivorous fish and invertebrates reflects direct effects of the fishery on ecosystem structure. These results were challenged by Caddy et al. (75, 76) who raised several objections regarding the methods and interpretation of Pauly et al. (47) including taxonomic resolution, use of fishery landings data, development of aquaculture, bottom-up effects of eutrophication, technological improvements, market forces, and longterm environmental change. Nevertheless, other techniques have also demonstrated similar declines in the mean trophic level of fishery landings for specific regions such as the Gulf of Thailand (77), the Celtic Sea (78), and on both coasts of Canada (79). This shift toward exploitation of lower trophic-level fish combined with their already decreasing stock sizes may signal future fishery collapses and changes in ecosystem structure (23). However, declining trends in average trophic levels are also the natural consequence of fisheries developing to a sustainable level and may not be a precursor of ecosystem change or collapse. In the Mediterranean Sea, an area that has been heavily exploited for a very long time and one where the mean trophic level is very low, there is little evidence of ecosystem collapse or declining trophic levels. In Figure 8 Change in the mean trophic level of global fisheries landings for marine and inland areas. Redrawn from (47). STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 375 fact, productivity has continued to increase, perhaps because of increased nutrient enrichment from human activities (80). The current trends in the Mediterranean may suggest that (a) intense fisheries low on the food chain may be sustained, (b) ecosystem collapse (13) is not a necessary consequence of intense fishing, and (c) declining mean trophic level (47) is not necessarily a precursor to disaster. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF FISHERIES Fish stocks are only one component of fisheries, and we are equally interested in the social and economic health of fisheries. No national or international agencies attempt to define or summarize economic health; the only statistics available are on employment, income, exports, and subsidies. We saw earlier that the economic value of the Newfoundland fishery increased after the groundfish closures; this emphasizes the fact that economic statistics may not well reflect the health of the fishing communities. Fisheries constitute a highly variable portion of national exports: less than 1% for countries such as Korea and the Netherlands; under 10% for most countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Norway, and China; but represent 16% of Peru’s exports and 64% of Iceland’s. These statistics provide an indication of the importance but not a real index of the economic health of the fishery in each country. Subsidies may constitute a better indication of economic health. Fisheries are often subsidized to maintain economically fragile industries. The total expenditure on fisheries subsidies worldwide is estimated to be US$14–21 billion per year (81). At least half of these subsidies come from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Table 1) (81, 82). Other sectors which exploit natural resources are also heavily subsidized, such as forestry (US$35 billion) and mining (US$30 billion) (46). Perhaps nothing reflects the poor economic health of the world’s fisheries than the fact that subsidies for OECD countries constitute 17% of the landed value. Estimates of profitability made by the FAO indicate that 97% of the 108 types of fishing vessels studied had a positive gross cash flow (83). However, if subsidies had not been in place, most vessel types would have reduced earnings, and some would lose money. Subsidies encourage vessel construction, retention of economically inefficient harvesting, and overcapitalization of the harvesting industry. While subsidies do stimulate employment and thus contribute to one of the common goals of national fisheries policy, subsidies are widely regarded as having a negative impact on the sustainability of fisheries by encouraging overcapitalization (84). THE SCIENCE OF SUSTAINABLE HARVESTING For the last 100 years scientists have been studying the biology of fish and how to sustainably harvest them, and there is a well-developed body of knowledge under the general title of fisheries stock assessment (85, 86). For many populations 376 HILBORN ET AL. TABLE 1 Estimates of government fisheries subsidies from OECD countries in 1997. These countries account for at least half of the world total of US$14–20.5 billion a year (81). Partial subsidies = direct payments + cost-reducing transfers. Total subsidies also include general services (82) Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. Subsidies (US$ millions) Direct payments Cost-reducing transfers Subsidies (% of landed value) General services Total Landed value Partial Total Australiaa 5 7 11 23 259 5 Belgium 0 3 2 5 99 3 5 252 18 135 405 1,621 17 25 Canada Denmark 9 20 0 62 82 521 4 16 Finland 3 2 21 26 29 18 90 France 22 14 104 139 756 5 18 8 3 52 63 194 5 32 Greece 12 0 38 50 387 3 13 Iceland 0 18 18 36 877 2 4 Ireland 5 3 96 104 220 3 47 Germany Italy 24 5 64 92 1,749 2 5 Japan 25 22 2,899 2,946 14,117 <0.5 21 Korea 7 30 59 253 342 4,929 2 Mexico 0 0 17 17 1,017 0 1 Netherlands 4 0 32 36 466 1 8 New Zealand 0 0 17 17 475 0 4 Norwayb 3 62 98 163 1,343 5 12 Poland Portugal Spainc 0 0 8 8 215 0 4 32 <0.5 34 66 319 10 21 205 81 59 345 3,443 8 10 Sweden 9 0 45 54 129 7 42 Turkey 0 1 27 29 212 1 13 23 4 101 128 1,012 3 13 United Kingdom United States 21 194 662 877 3,644 6 24 European Uniond 366 358 710 1,434 9,324 8 15 OECD Total 702 740 4,856 6,298 38,032 4 17 a Commonwealth fisheries only. b Landed value for Norway based on 1996 data. c Landed value for Spain does not include national landings in foreign ports. d European Union (EU) values are the sum of all EU Member State values. The exception to this is cost reducing transfers, i.e., payments for access for third country waters are not allocated among each Member State. Instead, the value is added to the EU total figure. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 377 the factors affecting birth and death rates are understood, and harvest guidelines that lead to long-term sustainability are easily calculated. The key to sustainable harvesting is being able to measure the trend in population abundance and having the institutional capability to regulate harvest (87). If Canadian scientists had known the true trend in stock abundance in the 1980s, the Newfoundland cod collapse would probably not have happened. If the abundance trend is known then, in theory, catch can be reduced until the stock stops declining. This guarantees that the stock will not collapse, but it does not insure that the yield is maximized. However if maximum yields are desired, then the relationship between population size and sustainable harvest needs to be understood, not only to insure the stock does not collapse, but to identify and reach the population size that provides maximum harvest. This requires a much more detailed understanding of fish biology. Single-Species Sustainability A key lesson from the collapse of the Newfoundland cod fishery, and indeed many other stock declines and collapses, is that harvest rates were too high. In some years, over 50% of the fish large enough to be captured in the fishing gear were harvested. Overfishing is caused by taking too large a fraction of the population each year. The question is what fraction is too large? To understand the basic elements of single-species sustainability, we need to define some basic terms and concepts. Figure 9 shows the idealized relationship between population size (X axis) and sustainable yield (Y axis). Another word for sustainable yield is “surplus production,” which is how much the population would grow in the absence of harvesting. If the population remained unharvested for many years, it would increase to the point where competition for food, space, or some resource was limiting. There Figure 9 The relationship between spawning stock biomass and sustainable yield. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 378 HILBORN ET AL. would be no surplus production, and the population would stop growing. This point is called virgin biomass, carrying capacity, or simply Bzero. When there are no fish in the population, the surplus production would also be zero. By definition at some point between zero biomass and Bzero, the surplus production, and therefore sustainable yield, will be maximized. The yield at this point is called maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and the stock size that produces it is referred to as BMSY. The traditional fisheries policy from the 1950s until recent years was to manage populations for MSY. Although MSY is often regarded as an outmoded concept (88), it remains a central element of many national fisheries law including the Magnusson-Stevens Act. The ratio between MSY and BMSY is the fraction of the population that would be harvested at MSY and is roughly the exploitation rate that fishery managers try to achieve. In the last decade, general rules of thumb have evolved regarding which levels of exploitation are sustainable (89, 90). One key determinant of sustainable exploitation rate is the natural mortality rate of mature individuals. Long-lived animals have low natural mortality and can sustain low fishing mortality, and conversely, populations with higher natural mortality rates can generally sustain higher fishing mortality rates. A second key determinant is the intrinsic rate of increase of the population at low densities. Populations that are in good habitat, with consequent high survival in the early life history, must by definition be capable of sustaining a higher harvest rate than those populations that cannot increase rapidly. Within the United States and Canada, a form of fisheries management has evolved in which target exploitation rates are tied to the estimated stock size in relation to virgin biomass. Such a rule is used by the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) in the United States (91). When the stock is above 40% of virgin biomass, then a target exploitation rate is set that is related primarily to the natural mortality rate. As the stock drops below 40% of virgin biomass, the target exploitation rate is decreased until it is zero at 10% of virgin biomass. The PFMC has adopted a rule so that once a stock drops below 25% of virgin biomass the stock is officially listed as overfished, and new rules, called “rebuilding plans,” must be put in place that provide for the stock to rebuild to 40% of virgin biomass in a specified time. The values of 25% as overfished, and 40% as rebuilt are known as reference points. The rebuilt value is chosen as a ruleof-thumb where MSY could be achieved, and the overfished level as a threshold below which there are serious risks of reduced recruitment and possible stock collapse. The example of the PFMC’s management rules are typical of those adopted in a wide range of management arenas and are characterized by target and limit reference points. Targets are stock sizes or exploitation rates that the agencies try to achieve, and limits are those they try to not exceed. For the PMFC, 40% of virgin biomass is the target, and 25% is the limit. Although many institutions chose targets and limits based on estimates of virgin biomass, this approach has been criticized because virgin biomass is very difficult to determine Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 379 (91), and setting reference points in relation to virgin biomass is not a universal practice. While long-term sustainable yield is maximized in theory at BMSY, the biology of most fish stocks produces yield curves similar to that seen in Figure 9 in which the sustainable yield is similar over a reasonably large range of stock sizes, which constitute roughly the area between points A and B. Managers and scientists have generally moved to higher stock sizes than BMSY to achieve multiple objectives including (a) larger stock sizes provide a better buffer for environmental variation and insurance against dropping to low stock sizes, (b) at higher stocks sizes the catch rate and therefore economic performance in the fishery is better, and (c) at higher stock sizes there is less impact on other components of the ecosystem (84). Many of the current controversies in fisheries management occur when the stock size is low, as at point B, and managers want to move to point A. This is a rebuilding plan. Points A and B have similar yield on the Y axis, but they are reasonably far apart on the X axis and moving from B to A involves more than doubling the population size. To move from B to A requires significant reductions in catch, and yet promises reasonably little, if any, increase in long-term catch. It is little wonder, therefore, that commercial fishing groups tend to resist these rebuilding plans. The theory of single-species management is well refined, and many of the success stories of fisheries management (87), such as West Australian Rock Lobster, Pacific Halibut, and Alaskan Salmon, are places where the theory has been effectively implemented. Increasingly, however, single-species management is running into major obstacles. There are two potential limitations in single-species management theory and practice. First, many fisheries catch a wide range of stocks, and it is often impossible to manage stocks separately. Managers cannot achieve the target exploitation rate or stock size on multiple species simultaneously. While it has long been known (92) that maximization of yield from these multispecies fisheries will lead some of the species to be overexploited and some underexploited, the trend in the United States, at least, is to avoid overharvesting any stock, which thus requires substantial loss in yield from the mix of stocks (93, 94). The second limitation of single-species theory is that it ignores ecosystem interactions. This is covered in the next section. Multispecies and Ecosystem Analysis It is now widely argued that single-species management is insufficient for longterm sustainability, and a broader recognition of ecosystem concerns needs to pervade fisheries decision making (13, 95). Some point to a number of significant ecosystem changes caused by fishing (66), such as when elimination of the sea otter through most of the northeast Pacific led to loss of the kelp forests and establishment of sea urchin dominated barrens. However, the examples of major ecosystem shifts caused by fishing are cases that good single-species management would have avoided. Sea otters were hunted below 1% of their original numbers, Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 380 HILBORN ET AL. whereas single-species management for marine mammals would prescribe a level in excess of 50% (96, 97). Thus although the call for ecosystem management is predicated on the failure of single-species management, it is not clear that singlespecies management, if properly applied, would have failed. Nevertheless, there is growing effort to incorporate ecosystem concerns in the management process. Ecosystem interactions are usually omitted in stock assessment models due to the demands such models place on data and biological understanding. However, there has been recognition that species interactions, particularly predator-prey interactions, have an important role in the dynamics of target species and exploited ecosystems. For example, in the North Sea this recognition resulted in the creation of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) multispecies assessment group and in the application of multispecies virtual population analysis (MSVPA) (98). An international effort was made to analyze species diet during the “year of the stomach” (99). MSVPA includes the dynamics of several species, linking them through predation mortality. Another modeling approach that includes trophic interactions is the mass balance model ECOPATH (100–103), which assumes that after perturbations the ecosystem will eventually return to its original state (104). There are over 150 published ECOPATH models (www.ecopath.org) that are gaining importance in understanding ecosystem structure. ECOPATH models have been used to calculate that 8% of oceanic primary production is required to sustain global fisheries and up to 25%–30% on continental shelves (105). Those two approaches are the most popular among many other models (106). Multispecies models provide an opportunity for including more biological realism, but it is not clear that this will generate better advice for management. Their roles seem to be in improving estimates of natural mortality, promoting better understanding of spawner-recruit relationship and variability in growth rates, providing alternative views on biological reference points, and creating a framework for evaluating ecosystem properties (106). Conventional fisheries assessment and management approaches assume that fish comprise a single mobile stock, that their dynamics are spatially homogeneous, and that local fishing effects are diluted in the larger pool of fish. Fisheries dominated by spatial heterogeneity due to limited mobility of organisms and habitat differences do not fit the assumption of spatial homogeneity. Strong spatial effects on growth, reproduction, recruitment, and fishing may lead to sequential depletion of stocks on small spatial scales as fishing effort moves farther and farther from the initial discovery of the resource (107). Sedentary stocks such as benthic invertebrates are typically structured as metapopulations, in which subpopulations of relatively sedentary adults are interconnected through larval and/or juvenile dispersal (108). Spatial heterogeneity substantially increases the dimension of the problem in terms of data requirements, analysis, and traditional implementation of management measures, especially in already data-poor or management-troubled fisheries. Alternatives to single stock management such as spatially explicit strategies (rotation of areas or reserves) has proven successful, with the Chilean benthic fisheries as the best documented (109, 110). STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 381 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. THE BEHAVIOR OF FISHING FLEETS A central lesson from 100 years of fisheries management is that fishermen respond to the economic opportunities of fishing and to regulation (84, 111, 112). If new markets develop or new stocks are discovered or become available to a new technology, fishermen will pursue the economic potential of these resources. If management agencies limit the number of boats, then fishermen will build larger boats. If the boat length is limited, the boats become wider, higher, and have larger engines. While individual motivation may vary, the behavior of fishing fleets can be understood by simple economic optimization; if money is to be made, some element of the fleet will figure out how to do it, and others will follow. The economic behavior of fishing fleets leads directly to one of the basic truths of fisheries: In unregulated fisheries, fishing effort increases until all profit is consumed (113). The natural dynamic of fish-fishermen interactions is to move to the point where an additional unit of effort would prove unprofitable, and this point, the so-called bionomic equilibrium, may leave the stock lightly exploited, overexploited, or commercially extinct (114). If costs of fishing are low and prices are high, then fishermen can take nearly the last animal as happened with North Pacific sea otters, many fur seals and sea lions, and almost happened with the great whales before bans on whaling (115). The natural dynamic of fisheries is to deplete a stock as far as the technology and markets will allow, and then move onto the next stock, which generates the all too familiar pattern of sequential depletion shown in Figure 3. The dominant focus of fisheries management has been to try to prevent this pattern and restrict exploitation so that individual stocks are not depleted. Although the natural dynamic of a fisherman as a hunter is sequential depletion of the resources, markets want a stable supply of products. In unregulated fisheries, market considerations enter only in what price the fisherman will get for his product and whether it is still profitable to chase the prey. The fisherman maximizes his income by catching as many fish as fast as possible, with little attention paid to quality. When the race for fish is removed, fishermen improve their incomes by improving quality. Boom and bust fisheries, short fishing seasons, and highly fluctuating yields all detract from the potential to maximize revenue from the fish. Finally, in many fisheries there is a significant effect of supply and demand. Years of large catch often lead to lower price, and similarly reduced catches are often compensated to some extent by higher prices (116). Recognizing that fishing is largely an economic activity, it is surprising how little attention is paid to the economics of fisheries sustainability. Almost all intellectual and political energy has gone into the biological aspects of sustainability. For half a century, economists have pointed out that the economic optimum yield from a fishery will almost always occur at larger stock sizes and lower fishing efforts than the biological optimum yield, yet invariably the dynamics of fish, fishermen, and fisheries managers has led to us pushing the limit of biological sustainability, far beyond any sensible level of fishing effort based on economics (84, 117). In fisheries where various forms of regulation have solved the Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 382 HILBORN ET AL. race for fish, fishermen concentrate on economic maximization. For example in the cooperative fisheries for pollock and hake in the western United States, in the halibut and sablefish fisheries of the West Coast of the United States and Canada, and in the fisheries of New Zealand, most of the energy of the fishing industry is devoted to quality improvement and reductions in the costs of fishing (116). In a number of fisheries, including the Tasmanian abalone fishery and the New Zealand rock lobster fishery in Gisborne, fishermen have volunteered to accept catch reductions knowing it would lead to higher prices and lower costs of fishing (118, 119). For economic, biological, ecosystem, and social reasons, society should manage fish stocks toward the higher end of abundance rather than the lower end. This is undisputed. Yet in the majority of the world’s fisheries, stocks are at low levels of abundance (fully or over-exploited), and indeed fisheries targets of the last 50 years have been toward the biomass that produces MSY, below that which produces optimum economic yield. Further, stocks may be at low abundance for reasons of climate change or random environmental variation. Given that stocks are often below the biomass that will produce maximum economic yield, how do managers move the stocks to the more desirable state of high abundance and is it even worth the cost of making this transition? The only tool available to managers to move stocks from low abundance to high abundance is by reducing exploitation rates, with the commensurate cost of reduced yield. Whether such loss of yield is worth the cost is a much harder question. In the major fishery for snapper in New Zealand, a court case was fought over a proposed rebuilding plan that would have involved a 40% reduction in catch for 20 years to double the stock size. The scientists estimated this would have produced an 8% increase in biological yield (120). Few individuals would consider an 8% increase in income an adequate compensation for a 40% reduction in income for 20 years. Admittedly there would be additional benefits of larger stock size (such as lower fishing costs), but this does illustrate the high potential cost of making the transition from low stock size to high. METHODS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT Institutional Structure and Governance Fisheries management acts directly by regulating fishing activity and involves two basic processes: allocating the fish among users and determining the allowable harvest. These decisions are imbedded in institutional systems, and there is growing recognition that the institutional structure, sometimes known as governance system, and the incentives it provides are the primary determinants of the success or failure of fisheries (117, 121). The major issues in fisheries governance are (a) who makes decisions about allocation and harvest, (b) are such decisions made by executive fiat, majority voting, or consensus, (c) how allocation among users is related to determining allowable harvest, (d) the role of science in setting catch levels, and (e) how can decision making about harvest levels be made less political. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 383 Responsibility for regulatory decision making takes many forms. Most commonly a governmental official, often a Minister of Fisheries, has ultimate responsibility but takes advice from government staff and stakeholders. In some countries, decision making is devolved to a commission or board, perhaps in an attempt to remove the heat of politics from elected officials. The U.S. fisheries management councils have such a system, and decisions are made by majority vote. International Commissions almost universally have ultimate decision making vested in the members of the commission, who are appointed by the national member governments. The major difference between commissions is whether decisions are made by consensus, majority, or super-majority and whether decisions are binding on the members. Because fisheries management frequently involves trade-offs between assured short-term reductions in catch against uncertain long-term consequences in stock size and future catch, there are always strong arguments from fishermen to not reduce catches. Management systems that require consensus have much more difficulty in accepting catch reductions than systems by majority vote or executive fiat. When allocation among competing users is not separated from process of setting allowable harvests, all harvest decisions have allocation implications and conservation often suffers (122). These two types of decisions need to be separated to achieve the social, economic, and biological objectives of most fisheries systems. Systems that regulate number of boats, fishing season, and gear efficiency do not provide formal allocation among users; other allocation systems discussed below, such as individual quotas and territorial fishing rights, do distinguish between allocation and harvest decisions. Some jurisdictions recognize the clear distinction between scientific advice on the status of the stocks and consequences of alternative regulations and the decision-making process, which involves weighing trade-offs in the consequences. In these systems, scientists make no yield recommendations, and the decision makers directly confront the trade-off between biological risk and expected yield. In other systems, scientists are asked to both estimate stock status and recommend catch levels, usually on the basis of harvest strategies. The harvest strategies themselves are often developed by the scientists and then approved by the decisionmaking body, which means in the end that scientists made the decisions about the trade-off between short- and long-term yield and the trade-off between biological risk and economic return. There are frequent pleas for harvest decisions to be science based (indeed the best available science is enshrined in the MagnussonStevens Act), but such calls fail to recognize that science cannot provide advice on catch levels without unambiguous determination of management objectives from managers (123), and these objectives are rarely if ever stated explicitly. Because setting annual catches involves major economic consequences, it is not surprising that it has become highly political and frequently is the subject of court action. To avoid the problems of determining annual catch quotas in a highly political environment, a number of jurisdictions are moving to a much more formal Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 384 HILBORN ET AL. automated process known as “management procedures” that completely specify (a) what data will be collected, (b) how the data will be analyzed, and (c) how the catch regulations will change in relation to the analysis (124, 125). When a management procedure is in place, the annual cycle of decision making is automatic, the data collected automatically determine what the catch level will be, there are no scientific or political decisions to be made, and they are incorporated as part of the management procedure. Once the decision makers adopt a management procedure, it runs automatically. Formal management procedures have many advantages to managers, scientists, and fishermen. The advantages include the transparency of decision making to users, the ability to evaluate the consequences and risks for any hypothesized ecosystem behavior, the elimination of arbitrary decisions on how to determine stock status, which removes politics from the annual decision making cycle, and significant cost savings because the expense of annual meetings and scientific work on stock status are eliminated. Many of the most successful fisheries, e.g., the West Australia rock lobster, Bristol Bay salmon, and Pacific halibut, all involve single-species management by single agencies. Single-species fisheries are much easier to manage than complex mixed stock fisheries, and it is no surprise that many successful fisheries target single species. A simple institutional structure may be another great advantage, and there are few examples of fisheries successes among the international fisheries agencies that involve multiple countries. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find any agreed metric of fisheries success in order to compare institutional complexity and successful management, but we believe this relationship is widely accepted among practicing fisheries professionals. Allocating Fish Among Users Throughout most of the twentieth century, distant water fleets from any country could fish in most areas, except for a narrow strip usually within 3–12 nautical miles from land. This era of open access ended abruptly in the 1970s with the worldwide expansion of EEZs to 200 nautical miles, which gave countries the legal authority to prevent overfishing in their territorial waters (117). Most countries therefore scrambled to build up domestic fishing capacity through massive direct and indirect subsidies; this reduced fishing costs and ultimately often increased total fishing capacity well above the levels that would be needed to harvest their fish stocks. It soon became obvious that an open-access policy in territorial waters would lead to the destruction of most fish stocks. Limits on fishing gear, seasonal closures, and restrictions on fishing effort were all imposed with varying degrees of success. Limited-entry programs followed to restrict not only fishing power, but the number of vessels in the fishery. However, unless individual catches are restricted, a limit to the total catch merely results in increased fishing power in whichever way they are allowed to increase. Fish stocks continued to be depleted and potential economic gains dissipated because there were no incentives for fishermen to conserve the Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 385 resource or to increase their income, except by competing frantically with each other to catch a limited total number of fish (84, 117, 122). Long before the advent of the 200 mile EEZ, economists and political scientists were addressing the problem of economic efficiency and regulatory structures in fishing fleets (113, 114). These authors recognized that the fisheries problem was too many boats fishing for declining fish populations, and economic efficiency could only be achieved by reducing the fishing pressure to the level stocks could sustain. Potential methods of control fall into two basic classes. First are those that limit the amount of fishing (called input controls) and include gear restrictions, limited fishing seasons, closed areas, and limiting the number of vessels. Most regulated fisheries followed this sequence in adopting increasing levels of restriction. Second are measures that specifically regulate the number of fish caught and include setting a total allowable catch for the fishery (usually called TAC) and assigning specific catch limits to individual fishermen or fishing vessels [commonly called individual quotas (IQs) or individual vessel quotas (IVQs)]. IQ rights are generally allocated based on historical catch records but can also be allocated by auction. Economists have almost universally favored output controls (116, 126, 127), and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many fisheries moved to IQs. Some countries, notably Australia, Iceland, and New Zealand, adopted IQ systems for most of their fisheries and often moved a step further by giving fishermen a share of the total catch in perpetuity and allowing them to buy, sell, and transfer their quota share. This system became known as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Those allocated ITQs gained an asset of considerable value and in general became wealthy. The introduction of ITQs resulted in greater efficiency in fishing fleets, more involvement of fishermen in research spending and decision making, higher product prices, and greater safety (116). For example, the Alaskan halibut fishery is worth about US$160 million per year (116). It was closed to foreign vessels in 1978 but remained open to all domestic vessels until 1995. Total catches were limited, and effort was regulated by season and gear restrictions. As thousands of vessels queued to catch their share of the lucrative fishery, the season length was continually reduced, falling from more than 100 days in the early 1970s to 2–3 days or shorter by the late 1980s. This excessive harvesting capacity resulted in a glut of fish being processed, lower returns to fishermen, fishing in dangerous conditions, loss of gear that continued to “ghost fish,” overspending on equipment to maximize catching and processing power, and many other problems. To solve these problems, ITQs were approved in 1991 and implemented in 1995, with quota shares allocated to 5484 vessel owners. Fishermen are allowed to transfer their quota to other fishermen, but there are limits (generally 1% of the total quota) on how much quota any individual may own (128). Changes in the fishery have been dramatic. The season length is now 245 days; this improves the availability and quality of halibut product and allows the fishermen to maximize the value of the product. Fishing mortality from abandoned gear has decreased 75%, and discards of halibut bycatch reduced by 80% (128). The number of vessels in the fishery has decreased by 50%, and the Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 386 HILBORN ET AL. number of Coast Guard rescue missions required for the fishery was a third of the pre-ITQ levels (128). ITQ systems have been the subject of much controversy (18, 116, 127). The concerns raised include (a) equity of allocation of valuable rights to vessel owners, with consequent negative impacts on crew members and processors and no direct revenue benefit to the public; (b) the growth of shore-based ownership of the fishing rights and subsequent lack of ownership of these rights by active fishermen; and (c) incentives for ITQ owners to sort through their catch for the fish that are most valuable per unit of ITQ fishing right. An alternative to allocating fishing rights to individuals is to auction fishing rights with the government receiving the auction fee (127). Such a system was proposed for almost all Canadian west coast fisheries in 1981 (90), but it received no support from the fishing industry and was never implemented. New Zealand’s ITQ system initially included auctioning of new quota (129). The harvest rights in Falkland/Malvinas Island squid fishery are auctioned each year; the geoduck fishery in Washington state is run on a similar basis (130). ITQs are auctioned in some Chilean fisheries (131), and many Russian fisheries have moved to auctions. Auction systems have been strongly opposed by existing fishermen and have not been actively considered as management options within U.S. fishery management councils. Two additional management systems have emerged that are variations on the traditional input and output controls. The first is fishermen’s cooperatives; fishermen agree among themselves how to partition the TAC and form informal IQ systems. This has happened in the very large factory trawler fleet for pollock in the Bering Sea, the factory trawler fleet for hake on the West Coast of the United States and the salmon fishery in Chignik, Alaska. Cooperatives are able to achieve the economic efficiency of IQ systems without the legal difficulties of implementation. Territorial fishing rights are another management system that has been effectively implemented in Chilean artisanal fisheries (109, 110) and have been proposed as widely applicable to sedentary species (119). Illegal Fishing Illegal fishing is a growing problem in many parts of the world (132), particularly for high-value species such as lobster and abalone. In Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, high-value lobster and abalone are almost impossible to find anywhere near major cities, and substantial undercover work suggests that extensive rings of illegal fishing operate broadly (133). The Chilean fishery for loco was almost totally dominated by illegal catch; this forced the complete closure of the fishery twice in the last 15 years (110). Few fisheries agencies can field the resources necessary to monitor and prevent illegal fishing. Local cooperation and control is the appropriate approach. Chile solved their illegal fishing problem by granting ownership of the fishing beds to local cooperatives that police and protect their fishing grounds (109). Territorial fishing rights have also been shown STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 387 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. to provide significant protection from unauthorized fishing in traditional Pacific Islands (134). The problems of illegal fishing and by-catch discards by licensed commercial fishermen at sea are even more difficult, but some fisheries, e.g., the British Columbia groundfish fishery, have implemented 100% coverage of all vessels by observers to address this problem (135). New Solutions: The Precautionary Approach and Marine Protected Areas Concern about the failure of traditional management systems has led to increasing calls for completely new methods to manage fisheries (95). Two ideas have emerged from this concern and discussion, the precautionary approach (136) and the use of marine protected areas (137). In this review, we briefly discuss the primary components of these two approaches and point readers to the extensive literature on each. The precautionary approach is built around the concept that managers should not wait until they have unequivocal evidence that fishing effort needs to be reduced before acting, and it is intended to protect fisheries from overexploitation in the face of uncertainty. There are several ways the precautionary approach could be implemented: (a) No fishing is allowed if the harvest policy has not been demonstrated to be sustainable (136), (b) cautious harvest levels are adopted and guided by biological reference points, and (c) institutional arrangements are changed to ensure fisheries monitoring, feedback to regulations, and effective implementation of those regulations (138). In the United States, the precautionary approach is often identified with the biological reference points. Moving target reference points from BMSY to biomasses higher than BMSY, and similarly more conservative reference points have become the key elements of precaution with U.S. fisheries policy (138). Marine protected areas (MPA) are the other recent concept being advocated as a solution to the concerns about overexploitation or marine fisheries. The concept is simply to set aside areas of marine habitat that are protected from fishing. Although some areas have been protected in the past, MPA advocates generally argue to protect approximately 20% of habitat from fishing (137, 139). It seems clear that the abundance of fish in protected areas is higher than outside protected areas (140), but whether MPAs will help improve fish harvests is subject to considerable controversy (141–143). WHAT DETERMINES SUCCESS AND FAILURE? Fisheries success can be defined in at least two ways: Biological success is the maintenance of healthy stock size near or above the levels that produce maximum harvestable surplus, and economic success could in theory be measured by profitability of the fishing industry. Other performance measures might include Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. 388 HILBORN ET AL. employment and amount of controversy over management actions (lawsuits for instance), but we do not attempt to address those issues. We postulate the following hypothesis. Fisheries management success depends on three primary elements: (a) the simplicity of the decision making system, (b) the method used to allocate catch and regulate yield and its incentives, and (c) the biology of the species and its relation to the scale of management. This hypothesis suggests that complex management institutions have difficulty reducing catches, and the complexity leads to indecision and ultimately poor results (144). Simpler management systems with fewer powerful actors are more likely to have a common objective and make hard decisions. Management systems that exclude fishermen from the decision making process are more likely to encounter resistance and opposition to change than those that actively involve fishermen. Second, governance systems that provide incentives to avoid the race for fish are more likely to avoid excess fleet capacity, which leads both to poor profitability and political pressure from fishermen to extract the maximum possible catch (117). Third, species that have very low rates of increase, low fecundity, or whose abundance are particularly difficult to measure are more prone to overcapitalization because of low sustainable yields in relation to virgin biomass (86) or of the difficulty in determining trends in abundance. Species that are highly sedentary need management systems that have small-scale spatial management structure. It would be desirable to compare a wide range of species on these three dimensions and to determine if they do indeed prove to explain much of the variability in fisheries success and failure. In the United States, data are available for the current status of most major stocks, but we found no reliable way of measuring economic success. Fisheries that closed or dramatically reduced catches to rebuild stock size are almost certainly economic failures, and as a surrogate we used the current catch in relation to maximum catch. A thorough study of this scale is beyond the scope of this review, and in lieu of this we present a list of some notable fisheries successes (Table 2) and failures (Table 3). For each fishery, the tables provide a measure of biological health (generally status in relation to BMSY) and economic health (current catch in terms of long-term maximum). Admittedly the lists in Tables 2 and 3 are short and not randomly selected, but they illustrate both the general elements of our hypothesis and some of the complexities. None of the successes is from a complex institution, but many of the failures are from simpler institutions. Only the Western Australian (WA) rock lobster fishery, among one of the successes, is one that has a race for fish. The WA rock lobster fishery has a very effective limit on the number of pots-per-boat that has consistently been reduced in order to prevent growth in fishing power. Among the abalone, only the Tasmanian fishery stands out as a success. The race for fish was stopped by an early ITQ program while the stock was still abundant, but perhaps more importantly the island of Tasmania is far from potential markets for illegal harvesting, and the licensed ITQ fishermen are actively on the water and on the lookout for poachers. The Canadian abalone fishery is also an ITQ fishery, but since it closed, there is little active protection from poaching. Orange roughy STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 389 TABLE 2 List of fishery management successes of different stocks of the world. Landing indicator is computed as the ratio of the current to the maximum catch in the catch history available to us Major regulatory implement Institutional complexity 0.77 Limited effort Single state agency (145) Near BMSY 0.61 ITQ Single state agency (146) Hoki (New Zealand) Near BMSY 0.86 ITQ Single national agency (147) Rock lobster (New Zealand) Near BMSY 0.45 ITQ Single national agency (148) Orange roughy (New Zealand area 3b) Near BMSY 0.28 ITQ Single national agency (149) Pacific halibut (United States/ Canada) Near BMSY 0.97 ITQ Two-country international agency (150) Pacific cod (Bering Sea, United States) Above BMSY 0.51 TAC Management council (151) Salmon (Alaska) Near BMSY 0.55 TAC Single state agency (152) Pollock (Bering Sea, United States) Above BMSY 1.00 TAC Management council (153) Ilex squid (Falkland/ Malvinas Islands) Abundant 1.00 Auction Independent management agency (154) Biological status Landings indicator Rock lobster (West Australia) Near BMSY Abalone (Tasmania) Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. Species Reference are a difficult species to manage because of their long life and the difficulty in measuring abundance. The major New Zealand orange roughy fishery (Area 3B) remains healthy because, in part, large amounts of money have been spent on measuring abundance. Whereas, the Challenger Plateau population is in poor state and has never had expensive trawl or hydroacoustic surveys conducted. Sharks have very low fecundity and are easily overexploited. We have learned that some of the basic assumptions and approaches of the past have been the causes of fisheries failures. These sins of the past include 1. freedom of the seas in which unregulated fishing was allowed until sufficient evidence 390 HILBORN ET AL. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. TABLE 3 List of fishery management failures of different stocks of the world. Landing indicator is computed as the ratio of the current to the maximum catch in the historical data Species Biological status Landings indicator Major regulation Institutional complexity Northern cod (Canada) Severely depleted 0.006 TAC Federal provincial committee (155) North Sea cod (Europe) Rebuilding 0.14 TAC Multicountry EU (156) Gemfish (Eastern Australia) Severely depleted Closed TAC Single national agency (157) Southern school sharks (Australia) Depleted 0.07 ITQ Single national agency (158) Orange roughy (New Zealand area 7) Depleted 0.11 TAC Single national agency (159) Abalone (British Columbia) Severely depleted Closed IQ Single national agency (160) Abalone (California) Severely depleted Closed Bag limits Single state agency (161) Abalone (Alaska) Severely depleted Closed Effort limitation Single state agency (162) Reference of harm accumulated; 2. large-scale management in which complex agencies attempted to collect data on, manage, and enforce regulations over large geographic areas and mixtures of stocks; 3. top-down control that does not provide incentives for fishermen to avoid the race for fish, prevent illegal fishing, and reduce pressure for overcapitalization and overexploitation; 4. maximization of yield in which managers attempted to squeeze every last bit of sustainable yield from stocks (because of overcapitalization) despite poor biological understanding; and 5. failure to separate allocation from conservation, which results in conservation goals being lost in allocation battles. THE FUTURE OF WORLD FISHERIES We see two very different paths fisheries may take in the future. One is that fishing pressure may remain high. Attempts to extract the maximum yield from fisheries will continue to lead to intense harvesting, and sequential depletion of major Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. STATE OF THE WORLD’S FISHERIES 391 fisheries will result. Economics will cause fishing pressure to move lower down the food chain, so that fish species that are currently largely discarded will dominate the catch. Alternatively, we envision a future in which the race for fish is eliminated by appropriate institutional incentives, fishing pressure is reduced, stock abundance generally increases, and most depleted stocks recover. Commercial fisheries will strive for stability and profitability rather than maximization of yield. These two possible futures are now taking place. In some locations (much of Africa and Asia, Argentina, New England, and Europe for example), the race for fish is in full swing, pressure to maximize yield continues to lead to intense fishing pressure, and the pessimistic future is developing. However, New Zealand, Chile, Australia, some Pacific Island countries, and some U.S. and Canadian fisheries have identified the problems and put in place appropriate incentives. In these places, the more optimistic future is unfolding. The race for fish has been halted, and economic and biological sustainability head the agenda. Ignorance is no longer an excuse; the question is whether regions, states, and communities can assemble the political will to choose the kind of fishery they want. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS T.A.B. was funded by NMFS grant NA07FE0473 and the South African National Research Foundation. C.V.M.V. was funded by CAPES/Brazil. The authors thank C. 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Counc., Ottowa, Can. Annual Review of Environment and Resources Volume 28, 2003 CONTENTS Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. I. EARTH’S LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS Climate Change, Climate Modes, and Climate Impacts, Guiling Wang and David Schimel The Cleansing Capacity of the Atmosphere, Ronald G. Prinn 1 29 Evaluating Uncertainties in Regional Photochemical Air Quality Modeling, James Fine, Laurent Vuilleumier, Steve Reynolds, Philip Roth, and Nancy Brown 59 Transport of Energy, Information, and Material Through the Biosphere, William A. Reiners and Kenneth L. Driese 107 Global State of Biodiversity and Loss, Rodolfo Dirzo and Peter H. Raven Patterns and Mechanisms of the Forest Carbon Cycle, Stith T. Gower 137 169 II. HUMAN USE OF ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES Dynamics of Land-Use and Land-Cover Change in Tropical Regions, Eric F. Lambin, Helmut J. Geist, and Erika Lepers Urban Centers: An Assessment of Sustainability, Gordon McGranahan and David Satterthwaite Water Use, Peter H. Gleick Meeting Cereal Demand While Protecting Natural Resources and Improving Environmental Quality, Kenneth G. Cassman, Achim Dobermann, Daniel T. Walters, and Haishun Yang State of the World’s Fisheries, Ray Hilborn, Trevor A. Branch, Billy Ernst, Arni Magnusson, Carolina V. Minte-Vera, Mark D. Scheuerell, and Juan L. Valero Green Chemistry and Engineering: Drivers, Metrics, and Reduction to Practice, Anne E. Marteel, Julian A. Davies, Walter W. Olson, and Martin A. Abraham 205 243 275 315 359 401 III. MANAGEMENT AND HUMAN DIMENSIONS International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Features, Formation, and Effects, Ronald B. Mitchell x 429 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 2003.28:359-399. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Access provided by 52.73.204.196 on 05/12/22. For personal use only. CONTENTS xi Tracking Multiple Pathways of Human Exposure to Persistent Multimedia Pollutants: Regional, Continental, and Global Scale Models, Thomas E. McKone and Matthew MacLeod Geographic Information Science and Systems for Environmental Management, Michael F. Goodchild 493 The Role of Carbon Cycle Observations and Knowledge in Carbon Management, Lisa Dilling, Scott C. Doney, Jae Edmonds, Kevin R. Gurney, Robert Harriss, David Schimel, Britton Stephens, and Gerald Stokes 521 Characterizing and Measuring Sustainable Development, Thomas M. Parris and Robert W. Kates 559 Just Oil? The Distribution of Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Production and Consumption, Dara O’Rourke and Sarah Connolly 587 463 INDEXES Subject Index Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 19–28 Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 19–28 ERRATA An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Environment and Resources chapters may be found at http://environ.annualreviews.org 619 649 653