ORIGINAL ARTICLES
A Response to a Nonresponse to Criticisms of a Nonstudy
One Humorous and One Serious Rejoinder to Slater
Scott O. Lilienfeld, PhD,* Robert L. Spitzer, MD,† and Michael B. Miller, PhD‡
L
auren Slater is a creative and imaginative writer. We were
initially uncertain how best to respond to her witty reaction to our paper questioning the reported results of what she
now describes as a nonstudy. Ultimately, we elected to begin
our rejoinder with a bit of tongue-in-cheek humor of our own.
A TERRIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING
It appears that there has been a terrible misunderstanding! Now that Dr. Slater has provided a full explanation of
why she did not respond to our requests for documentation of
her nonstudy (although her attorney was kind enough to
respond to these requests by warning us promptly of potential
legal action), we now feel obliged to apologize publicly to
her. She seems to be correct after all: there was no study and,
therefore, no evidence to document one.
What led us astray was that the events reported in her
chapter certainly looked like a study: there was an important
research question, a method for collecting data, a description
of the results, and a set of conclusions. What further confused
us were Slater’s own words from her chapter:
“‘I’m going to try it,’” I say 关to my husband兴. “‘Repeat
the experiment exactly as Rosenhan and his confederates did
it and see if I get admitted.’” (p. 81)
关To Spitzer兴 “‘So what do you predict would happen if
a researcher were to repeat the Rosenhan experiment in this
day and age?’” I ask. (p. 89)
“‘Okay,’” I say 关to Robert Spitzer兴. “‘Let me tell you,
I tried this experiment. I actually did it.’” (p. 89)
These quotations suggest that Slater did conduct a
study—specifically, a replication of Rosenhan’s (1973) well
known pseudopatient study. She also explained to Spitzer the
implications of her results: “. . . the zeal to prescribe drives
diagnosis in our day, much like the zeal to pathologize drove
diagnosis in Rosenhan’s day, but either way, it does seem to
be more a product of fashion or fad” (p. 90). We hope that we
and other readers can be forgiven for regarding her work as a
study.
*Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; †New
York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, New York; and ‡University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Send reprint requests to Scott O. Lilienfeld, PhD, Department of Psychology,
Emory University, 532 N. Kilgo Circle, Atlanta, GA 30322.
Copyright © 2005 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
ISSN: 0022-3018/05/19311-0745
DOI: 10.1097/01.nmd.0000185884.74792.6d
Slater’s response suggests another question: did she
even perform her nonstudy in the first place? She does not
provide readers with evidence that it ever took place. By
“nonstudy,” does she mean only that her hospital observations were unsystematic or unscientific? Or does she also
mean that the events she described were fictional?
Finally, we hope we can be forgiven for mistaking
Slater for a serious science writer rather than, as she maintains, almost exclusively a writer for fashion magazines. In
fact, she has written nine articles on the science of psychology for the New York Times, was an MIT Science Journalism
Fellow, and described her book as an exposition of “great
psychological experiments” (Slater, 2004, p. 2).
ON A MORE SERIOUS NOTE
Slater’s comment on our paper raises several deeply
troubling questions. First, she seems to want to have things
both ways. In her book (Slater, 2004), she explicitly describes
an attempt to “repeat the experiment” (p. 81, 89) that Rosenhan conducted. Then, on the basis of her results, she concludes that Rosenhan’s central claim—that psychiatric labels
“rise and fall depending on public perception” (p. 91) and lie
more in the eye of the beholder than in patients themselves—
still stands after 3 decades. Yet when criticized, she backpedals and now insists that her “study” was not really a study.
If so, how can she draw conclusions from it? Like Saturday
Night Live’s Miss Emily Litella (portrayed by the late Gilda
Radner), who famously said, “Never mind,” whenever she
was corrected, Slater’s defense appears to be, “Never mind. It
wasn’t a study after all. Scientists have no right to criticize
it.” Yet she does not renounce her all-encompassing conclusions regarding the implications of her findings for psychiatric diagnosis. How can Slater claim not to have performed a
study and then proceed to base conclusions on it? She may be
correct that a postmodern game is being played here, but she
is wrong about the player.
Second, Slater claims erroneously that our findings
actually corroborate hers. She writes, “More than half of the
respondents to Spitzer et al. gave the character in the vignette
a diagnostic DSM code for some sort of psychosis, NOS or
otherwise. I would say that finding goes a long way toward
validating the original Rosenhan study and casting credibility
on my chapter.” Not at all. Whereas she claims that she was
“not given a deferred diagnosis” and that “almost every time
I am given a diagnosis of psychotic depression,” the psychiatrists in our study avoided a specific diagnosis in 80% of the
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease • Volume 193, Number 11, November 2005
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Lilienfeld et al.
The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease • Volume 193, Number 11, November 2005
cases and diagnosed psychotic depression in only 6% of the
cases. In fact, the substantial majority of physicians in our
study offered diagnoses of psychotic disorder not otherwise
specified, a residual category that clinicians typically use to
defer a diagnosis on patients whose psychotic symptoms
necessitate more thorough follow-up assessment. Surprisingly, Slater neglects to mention that our findings—which
revealed that only 34% of clinicians suggested medication
prescriptions, none of which were antidepressants (as Slater
claims she was given)—run counter to her overarching conclusion that diagnostic decisions are driven by a “zeal to
prescribe.”
Third, Slater argues that our study neglects to take into
account findings such as those of Milgram (1974), who
reported that a group of Yale University psychiatrists massively underestimated the level of subjects’ obedience to
authority in his classic shock study. Slater’s invocation of
Milgram in this context is a striking non sequitur. Milgram’s
survey findings are a potent illustration of the fundamental
attribution error (Ross, 1977): the fact that individuals tend to
underestimate the impact of situational factors on others’
behavior. The relevance of these findings to a vignette study
in which overpowering situational pressures (e.g., a whitecoated authority figure commanding a subject to administer
electric shocks) are largely or entirely absent is dubious at
best. Slater is of course correct that our vignette study does
not fully reproduce the diagnostic decision-making processes
that occur in real-world settings (a point which, contrary to
her assertion, we acknowledged explicitly). A fundamental
problem is that without any documentation information (e.g.,
hospital record evidence demonstrating that she received the
diagnoses and medicines she claimed to have received)—
which Slater declines to produce—there is no way to ascertain whether this is a difference that makes a difference.
Fourth, Slater neglects to note that this is not the first
time that others have raised serious questions concerning the
accuracy of her reporting and her blurring of the lines
between fact and fantasy. For example, in a review of Slater’s
book, “Lying: A Metaphorical Memoir,” New York Times
critic Rebecca Mead (2000) conducted some detective work
and discovered that the “Professor of Philosophy at USC, Dr.
Hayward Krieger,” who presumably wrote a lavish introduction to the book, never existed and was a fabrication of
Slater’s imagination. Mead notes how Slater informed her
editor of her intention “. . . to ponder the blurry line between
novels and memoirs. Everyone knows that a lot of memoirs
have made-up scenes; it’s obvious. And everyone knows that
half the time at least fictions contain literal autobiographical
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truths. So how do we decide what’s what, and does it even
matter?” There is of course no way to know for certain
whether Slater ever conducted the present nonstudy, but her
nonresponse to our requests for corroborating documentation
is hardly reassuring.
Inexplicably, Slater neglects to inform readers of The
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease of the genuine
reasons for the outcry that followed the publication of her
book. In particular, she neglects to mention that a chorus of
prominent critics, including psychologists Elizabeth Loftus
and Jerome Kagan, psychiatrist Robert Spitzer, and Deborah
Skinner Buzan (B. F. Skinner’s daughter), all insisted that
they were seriously misquoted or misportrayed in her book
(Lee, 2004; see also Wade and Tavris, 2006). Slater portrays
herself as the innocent victim of a vigilante mob of angry
academics. In fact, the true victims are Slater’s readers, many
of whom may have been duped into taking the findings and
conclusions of her study, which she only now informs us was
not actually a study, seriously.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, if anything constructive has come of this
strange interchange between Slater and ourselves, it is that
readers may now safely disregard the nonfindings of Slater’s
widely read nonstudy. Rosenhan’s (1973) poorly supported
conclusion that most or all psychiatric diagnoses are invalid
products of the social context can again be safely put out to
pasture (Ruscio, 2004; Spitzer, 1975). We can therefore sum
up our bottom-line conclusion regarding Slater’s chapter and
its implications for psychiatric diagnosis in two words:
“Never mind.”
REFERENCES
Lee FR (April 12, 2004) Book’s critique of psychology ignites a torrent of
criticism. New York Times. Late ed, Section E:1.
Mead R (July 16, 2000) Stranger than fiction. New York Times. Late ed,
Section 7:11.
Milgram S (1974) Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row.
Rosenhan DL (1973) On being sane in insane places. Science. 179:250 –258.
Ross L (1977) The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions
in the attribution process. In: L Berkowitz (Ed), Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology (Vol 10, pp 173–220). New York: Academic Press.
Ruscio J (2004) Diagnoses and the behaviors they denote: A critical evaluation of the labeling theory of mental illness. Sci Rev Ment Health Pract.
3:5–22.
Slater L (2004) Opening Skinner’s Box: Great Psychological Experiments of
the Twentieth Century. New York: WW Norton.
Spitzer RL (1975) On pseudoscience in science, logic in remission and
psychiatric diagnosis: a critique of Rosenhan’s “On being sane in insane
places.” J Abnorm Psychol. 84:442– 452.
Wade W, Tavris (2006) Psychology (8th ed). Upper Saddle River (NJ):
Pearson.
© 2005 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins