Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.
To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to upgrade your browser.
2023, Russia.Post
After Russia’s war against Ukraine escalated in February 2022, most members of the Russian Orthodox Church, including its clergy and hierarchs, supported it. There were two “tracks” of such support: active and passive. The leader of the former is the Moscow Patriarch Kirill. Since the first days of the “special military operation,” he has been its most vocal proponent and advocate, setting the pace for those following the active track. Indeed, many Russian hierarchs, clergymen and laymen do.
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Przegląd Zachodni, Journal of the Institute of Western Affairs in Poznań, Special Issue, 2019
The aim of the article is to analyse the place and importance of the Orthodox Church in the society and political culture of Ukraine after 2013. The new political realities following the Revolu-tion of Dignity, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas created new challenges for the Or-thodox Church in Ukraine. Particularly important is the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church’s authority over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.At the turn of 2018 and 2019, by a decision of Patriarch Bartholomew I and with the support of the Ukrainian political authorities, a new reality became fact in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. However, the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (as a metropolis) does not mean that the split has been overcome. There will be two hostile, equal and comparably strong structures in Ukraine, politically backed by Ukraine and Russia, and this will draw those countries into conflicts over their religious structures and the wealth that their communities possess. At this stage, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine will rely primarily on the potential of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, and this fact in turn will hinder the transfer of bishops and priests associated with the Moscow Patriarchate. The rift will be difficult to repair.
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2022
This paper examines the enactment of soft/sharp/evil power by the Russian Orthodox Church and its leaders during a month before the major exertion of hard power by the Russian military and one month after the invasion of Ukraine. In the period from January 25 until March 25, 2022, 27 messages of the leading actors in the Church–Patriarch Kirill and Metropolitan Hilarion, head of the Department of External Church Relations (DECR)–are closely examined. The results are presented and discussed in four thematic sections: 1) soft power: the religious approach to the Russian World; 2) Sharp power: the territorial expansion of the Church with the help of the Russian state; 3) Evil power: Church leaders on war and peace; 4) Comparison with the messages of Russian political leaders (President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov). The soft power the Russian Church exercises for the benefit of Russian foreign relations is manifest in the strong emphasis on the spiritual unity of Russian and Ukrainian people within the religious narrative of the Russian World. This soft power takes the form of sharp power vis-à-vis the Ukrainian invasion and vis-à-vis those, who recognize the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The influence of the Russian Church in support of the Russian government’s invasion has also a dimension of evil power, that is, power exercised in service to immoral or unethical state actions such as the unwarranted invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces. Finally, both religious and political leaders are similar in denying the agency (including autonomous existence) of the nation-state and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, they consider both the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and post-2014 Ukrainian government to be tools of outside forces (be it the West, the United States, or the Ecumenical Patriarch), and they threaten and attempt to punish everyone who supports those whom they have selected out as targets.
In July 2009 Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Rus' paid a visit to Ukraine with ostensibly spiritual concerns to celebrate the anniversary of the baptism of St Vladimir and Rus' and the 450th anniversary of the gift of the Pochaiv icon of the Mother of God. In this article we argue that the visit was, however, of more than just pastoral significance: it served both symbolically and realistically as a means to shore up the relationship between the Ukrainian Orthodox and Russia, reinforcing the religious and political ties between the two countries. We also argue that in backing up these ties, Kirill will not allow the formation of an independent and unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the motherland of Russian Orthodoxy, thus perpetuating the schism that exists between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). As a result, Ukraine is left without a unified church to promote union among the people, Russians and Ukrainians, something which was desired by President Viktor Yuschenko. This strategy by Kirill may cause further complications in inter-Orthodox relations, especially with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which desires a resolution to the non-canonical situation in Ukraine.
Fr. Dr Daniel Payne’s contribution examines the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church under the leadership of Patriarch Kirill has drawn upon its understanding of canonical territory, spiritual security, and the Russkiy Mir to promote an ideology uniting the Russian world and those of traditional religious belief. Vladimir Putin has capitalized upon the Russian Orthodox Church's religious understandings of Russkiy Mir and has utilized these understandings to promote his foreign policy in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. While it is not the sole rationale for Putin's actions towards these nations, the critical influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on his foreign policy should not be underestimated.
Russia Matters (Harvard University), 2018
While Poroshenko and Patriarch Bartholomew have cast the church split as a struggle against undue Russian influence in Ukraine, this simplistic narrative does not address either what critics describe as the president’s radical departure from Western notions of separation of church and state, or the consternation that the Ecumenical Patriarch’s actions have stirred up among the world’s other Orthodox churches.
Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy, (London: Routledge, 2018) pp. 217-232., 2018
The recent “conservative turn” in Russian politics has raised to new levels the role of spiritual and moral values in political discourse. The new partnership formed between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the state, a modernized version of the traditional Byzantine symphonia, has also affected Russian foreign policy. One notable example is the emergence of the “Russian World” as a key concept in Russia's relations with Ukraine and the rest of the CIS. Although the Church plays a subordinate role in this relationship, it is far from being merely the Kremlin’s puppet. By decentering the nation, this investigation seeks to shed light on the Church’s distinct approach to politics, and show where it draws the line on cooperation with civil authorities. Only by viewing the ROC as an autonomous political and eschatological actor, will we be able to appreciate how it influences Russian foreign policy.
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2022
The chairman of the Department for External Church Relations (DECR) of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) was dismissed from his office on the 104th day (June 7, 2022) of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Was Hilarion dismissed because of his ‘silence’ on the Russian invasion? We study the 104 ‘war days’ of Metropolitan Hilarion from four dimensions: leadership as position; leadership as process; leadership as result; and leadership as person. Our findings are multivocal: the Russian invasion of Ukraine did become a leadership challenge for Hilarion the way that previous military interventions (in Ukraine and Syria) and thorough broadening of the collaboration between the Church and the military in Russia during his 13 years as the Chairman of the DECR did not; Hilarion refrained from the rhetoric (religious demonization of the adversaries) and narratives (e.g. ‘spiritual brothers cannot be in conflict,’ labelling the conflict ‘an internecine strife’) used by Patriarch Kirill, but Hilarion still opted to leave his position of professor in Fribourg University instead of condemning (delegitimizing) the Russian invasion of Ukraine; Hilarion had contributed to Patriarch Kirill’s doctrine of the ‘Russian world’ since 2009 and did not revoke any of his related positions during the 104 days of war. As the ‘religious’ concept of the “Russian world” is the key narrative whereby religious leaders of the ROC have legitimated Russian imperialism over the territory and population of Ukraine, the key indicator for Hilarion’s assumed ‘silence’ should be the rejection of the Russian world doctrine, not his commitment to the principle “war is not a conflict solution method.” Finally, we observe his successor (Metropolitan Anthony) to be even less vocal than Hilarion on religious and geopolitical issues related to Ukraine. This period studied started with a secular critical juncture (start of invasion) and ended with a critical juncture in religious relations on Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation, when with the June 7, 2022, decision of the Holy Synod of the ROC to relocate dioceses of the Orthodox Church in Crimea into direct subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, the latter initiated cuius regio, eius religio paradigm in its relations with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of Moscow Patriarchate).
Marusiak O. Church War: Instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox Church against Ukraine // Безпекові студії: концепції, методологія, освіта: матеріали Міжнародної конференції (м. Острог, 30-31 жовтня, 2023 р.) / за ред. Едуарда Балашова. Острог: Видавництво Національного університету «Острозька академія», 2023. С. 25-27 Міжнародна конференція «Студії безпеки: концепції, методологія, освіта» була організована в межах проєкту Жана Моне «Саморегульоване вивчення гібридних загроз і європейської безпеки» (101081342 – EuroHybSec – ERASMUS-JMO-2022-HEI-TCH-RSCН), що реалізується Національним університетом «Острозька академія» за співфінансування Європейського Союзу
Boletín Aleo. Cofradía de Santa María de África.., 2024
American Anthropologist, 2008
Queer Reflections on AI Uncertain Intelligences, ed. by Michael Klipphahn-Karge, Ann-Kathrin Koster, Sara Morais dos Santos Bruss, London/New York: Routledge , 2023
Communications in Computer and Information Science, 2017
European Journal of Operational Research, 2012
European Urology Supplements, 2011
Biotecnia, 2018
Angiologia E Cirurgia Vascular, 2012
International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Research, 2023
Solid-State Electronics, 1997
SIGNOS - Investigación en sistemas de gestión, 2019