The Spirit of Marikana
The Spirit of
Marikana
The Rise of Insurgent Trade Unionism
in South Africa
Luke Sinwell
with Siphiwe Mbatha
First published 2016 by Pluto Press
345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright © Luke Sinwell 2016
The right of Luke Sinwell to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by
him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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iv
Contents
Glossary of South African Organisations
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
List of Leaders
Timeline of Key Events
Acknowledgements
Maps:
1 Approximate location of South Africa’s platinum deposits
and mines
2 South Africa, with a focus on the North West
1 Introduction
vi
xiii
xv
xxi
xxvii
xxviii
xxix
1
2 The Spark Underground
19
3 The Spirit of Marikana is Born
38
4 Amplats Carries the Torch
70
5 The Rise of the amcu and the Demise of Worker Committees
112
6 Insurgent Trade Unionism and the Great Strike of 2014
142
Postscript
163
Appendices:
A
Interview Methodology
167
B
Workers’ Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting with Karee
Management, 21 June 2012
170
C
Memorandum From Khuseleka 1 and 2 to Management
171
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index
173
195
199
v
1
Introduction
Mgcineni ‘Mambush’ Noki, who became known as ‘the man in the
green blanket’, is an iconic figure of the contemporary South African
strike wave at the three international platinum mining giants – Amplats,
Impala and Lonmin.1 After being attacked on 11 August 2012 by members of the then dominant union at Lonmin mine, Mambush and others
armed themselves with traditional weapons and fled to the now infamous mountain at Marikana to wait for their employer to address them
about their wage demand of R12,500 per month. (This was equivalent to
about $500 at the time.2) Mambush’s family later recalled that he always
made peace at his rural village in the Eastern Cape whenever there was a
quarrel, but now he had been pushed into an all-out war. A rock drill operator (rdo) with a penetrating voice and a wide frame, he was selected
to be on the militant, and at the same time defensive, worker committee.
When the workers in Marikana effectively removed negotiations from
the offices to the mountain, Mambush acted as their spokesperson.
Embodying the uncompromising characteristics of a warrior, he
became a hero practically overnight. Yet almost as quickly as he became
a recognised leader, he was targeted by police, who shot 14 bullets
into his body. I could not interview him or tell his story comprehensively.3 Fortunately, however, Mambush was just one among many in the
platinum belt. He represented the unflinching determination of mineworkers to engage with management not only for themselves and their
families, but for future generations of exploited and oppressed people
across the world.
The case study which this book showcases is a testimony to what
scholar-activist Frances Fox Piven has tirelessly demonstrated in her eminent work: that when ordinary people organise collectively, outside of
1
The Spirit of Marikana
the framework of elites and mainstream political authorities, progressive
changes in the structures of society become possible.4 Drawing primarily
from original interviews with the individuals who led the strikes at
Amplats and Lonmin, this book details how mineworkers united with
each other, and in some cases died, while fighting for basic dignity. It
illuminates the micro-processes through which the idea of a ‘living
wage’ of R12,500 and then R16,070 first emerged from conversations
between two sets of workers in changing rooms at each mine, and then
spread like wildfire across the industry. It soon shook an entire nation.
Mineworkers, through their ad hoc independent worker committees,
challenged what they considered to be the ‘pocket unionism’ exemplified
by the National Union of Mineworkers (num), bringing a new radical
political culture to the mines – one based on worker needs rather than
bosses’ interests, and informed by notions of direct democracy.5
At Amplats and Lonmin in particular, worker committees galvanised an innovative conceptualisation and expression of power. If the
culture and forms of power that they exhibited were not qualitatively
new, they were far more strident than anything that had been witnessed
in the recent past. When we comprehend more completely what transpired during and ahead of the 2012 unprotected strikes at Amplats and
Lonmin, it becomes apparent how and why the first half of 2014, under
the banner of the upstart Association of Mineworkers and Construction
Union (amcu), witnessed the longest strike in South African
mining history. Yet despite the overwhelming significance of worker
committees, they have been given very limited scholarly attention.
Since the burgeoning of trade unions internationally from the mid
to late 1900s until the present, they have been the preferred topic of
scholarly work by labour historians.6 Industrial sociology in postapartheid South Africa has also been dominated by investigations into
formalised unions which operate within the framework of the tripartite
alliance.7 Sakhela Buhlungu in particular has noted the anti-democratic
nature of unions, the tendency for shop stewards to drift away from
workers and become part of the bureaucracy, rather than to represent
them, as well as the discontent that has resulted from this. He has also
called the victory of 1994 – in which the federated Congress of South
African Trade Unions (cosatu) gained great influence as a partner with
the ruling African National Congress (anc) – A Paradox of Victory.8
cosatu and its affiliated unions were largely institutionalised by capital
2
Introduction
and its allies in the ‘class compromise’ which resulted from the transition
to democracy. cosatu had major achievements after its establishment in 1985, and played a key role in formulating the people-centred
Reconstruction and Development Programme (rdp) – only to see it
jettisoned in the name of market principles and international investors
under the Growth Employment and Redistribution (gear) policy document of 1996.
The num, which once courageously backed the blacks oppressed
in the struggle for liberation from white apartheid rule,9 became a
pocket union. Its former general secretaries, political heavyweights including former deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe, general secretary
of the anc Gwede Mantashe and deputy-president of the anc Cyril
Ramaphosa, a billionaire who sat on the board of directors at Lonmin
at the time of the Marikana massacre, lambasted rather than defended
the strikes of 2012 and 2014. The num’s close ties to big business and
the ruling party, and primarily its failure to respond to the concerns of
ordinary workers at the local branch level, became its Achilles heel. The
union is now virtually defunct in the platinum belt, with one leader in a
play on words calling it the ‘National Union of Management’.
The tendency of social scientists to focus on formalised structures
in the workplace and elsewhere has meant that they pay little attention
to ‘informal’ worker organisations – in this case worker committees.
Independent worker committees are arguably the most neglected features
surrounding the Marikana massacre, an event that is likely to become
as important symbolically as the Soweto uprisings and the Sharpeville
massacre, as a turning point in South African history. According to
Philip Frankel, author of the authoritative text on the Sharpeville massacre, ‘Marikana has [already] become a moral barometer against which
future developments in mining and wider South Africa will be measured
for many years to come.’10
Worker committees are fundamental for understanding the strike
wave along the Rustenburg platinum belt, where these independent
organisations at one time asserted an overwhelming degree of power.
Only empirical research can uncover the hidden details which shed
light on the nature of these committees and their political trajectory. At
this stage, scholars and the general public know very little about them
or their relationship to unions. The Marikana Commission of Inquiry,
initiated to unpack the causes of the events between 9 and 16 August
3
The Spirit of Marikana
2012 in Marikana, also proved inadequate to explain the role of these
committees, in part because of the limited period within which it
sought to understand and explain the strike and the immediate events
surrounding the massacre itself.
The formation of independent worker committees, and the strikes
they helped organise and sustain between 2012 and 2014, were by no
means isolated events. They are a reflection of ongoing contestation over
union representation at the platinum mines which dates back at least
to the early 1990s. Moreover, the num’s services to its members in the
Rustenburg region had consistently been rated by researchers as among
the worst in the country.11
Inequalities between the rich and the poor, unemployment and poverty did not end in 1994, but arguably became more deep-seated than
they had been under the apartheid government.12 Subsequent to the
democratic transition in the 1990s, which saw unions like the num incorporated into the tripartite alliance, employer and employee relations
tended to be characterised by the idea of corporate or ‘pocket’ trade
unionism. The disempowerment of the num during the period following
the transition to democracy paralleled what scholars and commentators
have called ‘the death of labour and class-based movements’.13
However, these movements were soon revived on an international
level. With the deepening crisis of capitalism epitomised by the world
economic crisis from 2008, something had to change. In response to the
crunch of the drained economy and the increasingly precarious nature
of working-class jobs, labour discontent began to spread. Beverly Silver,
who has undertaken extensive investigations into the relationship between the shifts in globalisation and worker’s movements since the late
19th century, noted that in 2010, ‘the world’s major newspapers were
suddenly filled with reports of labour unrest around the world’.14 This
was followed by unprecedented protests against austerity internationally, and mass uprisings in Egypt against authoritarian rule. By 2011 the
so-called ‘Arab spring’ seemed to offer hope that ordinary people could
transform politics, society and labour relations through mass action.
Later that year, the Occupy movement took hold in the United States,
and in the state of Wisconsin, public sector workers organised en masse
to demand that the bargaining rights of unions be re-established.15
New forms of workers’ power were beginning to take shape during
this period, as we witnessed the unravelling of the trade unions founded
4
Introduction
on the events of the Durban strikes of 1973 and the emergence of
black trade unions throughout the 1980s. As a response to the events
surrounding the Marikana massacre, South Africa found itself at a crossroads of trade unionism. In the Western Cape, farm workers initiated
unprecedented unprotected strikes in 2012 to demand higher wages.
amcu soon became the most obvious example of the rupture inside
the trade union movement, dethroning num in the platinum belt and
creating circumstances that led to the National Union of Metalworkers
of South Africa (numsa) emerging as the largest trade union in the
country.
In South Africa, the creation of independent committees in the platinum belt was a worker response to the shifting nature of the political
economy both nationally and internationally. The prices of platinum,
and commodities generally, boomed in the 1990s, but the gains went to
shareholders – many of whom are overseas – and not to workers. This
left mineworkers overstretched. They were digging out platinum from
underground, working overtime, while their wages remained largely
untouched.
In the lead-up to the 2012 strike wave, mining companies themselves
exhibited some of the most profound inequalities between employees
and chief executive officers (ceos), leading one political economist
to aptly describe the insurgency in the Rustenburg platinum belt as a
‘local battle in a global wealth war’.16 Economists at Labour Research
Services (lrs) conducted a survey on mining company ceo salaries in
2011, which found that the average ceo made R20.2 million per year, or
R55,000 per day. This made the worker demand for R12,500 per month
seem like a pittance. In 2011 the ‘wage gap between the ceo and the average worker in the mining industry was 390 to 1’.17
Inequality and tough working and living conditions are not in themselves an adequate explanation for a revolt by mineworkers. In fact,
another set of more immediate structural issues played a critical role in
harvesting the workers’ insurgency. In the two mines under consideration, the work process involved conventional rather than mechanised
mining. This means that the mines required drillers (and other categories of worker) to create the conditions for the removal of the platinum,
and gave workers including rdos more power in the workplace.18 Unlike
the gold and coal industries, managers at the platinum mines had also
5
The Spirit of Marikana
developed a tendency, going back to the 1990s, of engaging directly with
worker committees over wage demands.19
In 2011, for example, in an attempt to prevent the emergence of
further unprotected strikes, Lonmin initiated a policy whereby management could engage directly with workers outside of the formal
bargaining structures (see Chapter 2). By engaging directly with them,
management suggested to workers that they had power independently
from their trade unions. These decisions by management backfired, at
Lonmin and elsewhere. The following year witnessed the major wave of
unprotected strikes in 2012 which largely forms the basis for this book.
Workers formed independent committees at Impala in early 2012, and
these were very effective at obtaining concessions from the employer.
This led workers at Lonmin and Amplats to form worker committees which engaged directly with management and subsequently led
unprotected strikes (see Chapters 2 to 4).
In 2012, rdos were being paid $511 per month (about R5,000). Most
were the main wage earners in their families, responsible for up to 15
dependants. When they fell into debt (as many did, not surprisingly),
there was extensive use of garnishee orders by debt collection agencies
to recover the money owed, which exacerbated their situation. The pay
for one of the most arduous and dangerous jobs on the planet was insufficient to say the least, and these ‘exploitative debt relations’ made things
even worse.
It would seem that the structural conditions existed for mass mobilisation. The workers digging out metal in the mineshafts were ready
to erupt. But the structural conditions in late 2011 and early 2012 can
only partially explain why people embarked on unprotected strikes in
exceptional numbers. ‘Someone had to blow the whistle,’ in the words of
one activist. No observer or participant could have predicted the spirit
and sheer magnitude with which mineworkers would come out to make
their demands over a sustained period of time in both 2012 and 2014.
an actor-oriented approach
Scholars have argued that the migrant labour system (see prelims)
– whereby most workers had homes and families elsewhere in rural
areas, and travelled long distances to the platinum belt for work – and
the social and economic position of rdos are (structural) causal factors
6
Introduction
requiring attention.20 These are valuable contributions and provide a
crucial starting point from which to understand the platinum belt strike
wave. However, considering these factors fails to address the role of locally specific factors and triggers. Existing approaches have fallen short
in revealing why the origins of the strikes can be traced back to certain
moments in time, and specific shafts of a mine and not others.
Understanding these dynamics requires a sociological examination of
mineworkers centrally involved in the strikes. A primary step to piecing
together a narrative which helps explain the origins of the strikes is to
identify key leaders and to uncover hidden histories. This work lies
behind the development of the argument of this book. A great deal of selforganising from below has been underexplored; in effect, it is written out
of history. As the prominent historian Philip Bonner has noted in relation
to the study of social transformation more generally, ‘These bottom up
processes are generally subterranean, slow moving, and barely visible,
often only exploding after long periods of gestation into public view.’21
It is necessary to add here that structures, and indeed institutions and
more ephemeral patterns of social relations, are of course part of people’s
enactment of agency.22 Agency is not something which merely results
from structural factors, however, although agents obviously make history within a specific social and economic context over which they have
little control. This book takes as a starting point the ‘organic capacity of
the working class’, or ordinary people in the conscious process of what
Marx has described as ‘making their own history’. Colin Barker and his
colleagues captured the essence of this approach when they indicated that:
The very social relations of production are themselves the product of
ongoing agency, even if in alienating forms, on the part of those who
currently suffer their continuation …. There is no absolute line of
division between movements seeking ‘reforms’ within existing structures
and movements that threaten to surpass their limits. Rather, movements
operate on the boundaries between forms of opposition that remain
contained within the limits of the system, and those that potentially
transgress them.23
Another salient concern which emerged during the course of writing is
the tension between individual and collective agency. Without the unity
of a collective, the individual is virtually powerless in labour relations,
whereas without individuals’ motives, energy, experiences, creativity
7
The Spirit of Marikana
and dreams – in short, their agency – the collective also cannot exist.24
The book focuses on individuals and their relationship to the collective
in an attempt to uncover the leadership practices of a few key organic intellectuals who played a significant role in the development of the 2012
and 2014 strikes, and perhaps more crucially, in the events immediately
prior to them.
As ‘organic intellectuals’ in the Gramscian sense these individuals
developed counter-hegemonic ideologies rooted within the material
conditions and discourses of their fellow workers. According to the
Italian Marxist revolutionary Antonio Gramsci, ‘all men [sic] are intellectuals’.25 Of specific interest in the pages that follow are ‘articulate
knowledge specialists who are found in all sectors of society’.26 More
specifically they can be described as ‘framing specialists: women and
men who develop, borrow, adapt, and rework interpretive frames
that promote collective action and that define collective interests and
identities, rights and claims’.27
At the core of an organic intellectual’s ability to be effective at
achieving counter-hegemony, and therefore also unity among the
working class, is arguably the notion of ‘leadership’. In part because of
attempts to avoid ‘great man’ theories of history, leadership has tended
to be neglected in the study of collective mobilisation, and more
specifically of social movements.28 Barker and colleagues point out that:
Few academics want to revive conservative ‘agitator’ theories which imply
that there would be no strikes, no militant movement activity, were it not
for the malign trouble-makers who cause them. We must, it is argued,
pay proper attention to the real grievances motivating movements, just
as we must avoid treating movement members as nothing but mindless
sheep.29
Regardless of scholars’ emphasis, however, labour and other movements are inextricably intertwined with leadership which conceptualises
a common set of demands, unites sympathisers and exerts power in
solidarity.
While the dominant perception of the strikes of 2012 and 2014 is that
they were spontaneous uprisings which involved employees who used
primarily violent techniques and intimidation to maintain solidarity
(among other employees or non-strikers), the pages that follow should
indicate to the reader that something very different may have been far
8
Introduction
more relevant. By this I mean democratic leadership and the element of
persuasion. ‘Persuasive argument’ is, according to Barker, ‘inherently “dialogical” in function, it seeks understanding and agreement. It presumes
that an initial proposal may be modified by the listener’s response. It
encourages the further critical self-development of the follower.’30 While
these workers (through their committees) provided the way forward,
they were led by (and directly accountable to) the rank and file. Referring
to Foucault’s conception of ‘pastoral leadership’, Dunbar Moodie
elaborated the way in which num stalwarts (including Ramaphosa)
applied this form of leadership in the mid-1980s:
the pastoral leader does not dominate. Instead, he gathers his followers
together, guides and leads them. This is fundamentally beneficent power,
directing the conduct of its followers, individualising them in a complex
mutual relationship of responsibility. For the pastoral leader, wielding
power is a duty, pursued with zeal, devotion and endless application,
offering care to others but denying it to oneself. Leadership is defined
not as an honour but rather as a burden and effort. The leader puts
himself out for, acts, works and watches over all his followers.31
Paradoxically, the failure of the num to apply this method in recent years
created the conditions for a new form of organisation of pastoral power
to emerge.
Existing accounts of the strike at Lonmin give precedence to
Mambush, and imply that he led the workers throughout, yet – as this
book shows – he was not one of the rdos who actually initiated it.32
While the initial involvement of many mineworkers sprang from the
moment, the involvement of a handful of those who became leaders
at various points before, during and after the strikes was anything but
spontaneous. Without their efforts to engage within (and where necessary create) informal networks for the mobilisation of the strikers, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that events would not have occurred at
the moment and in the manner in which they did. Without their strategic intervention, events might have shifted onto another track, taking a
different course.
Indeed, for socialist activists working closely with the workers in the
platinum belt, it appeared that the unprotected strikes of 2012 were the
pinnacle of resistance, and that a swift decline in mobilisation was likely
to follow as a result of workers’ and their leaders’ decision to join what
9
The Spirit of Marikana
appeared to be a top-down, authoritarian union. amcu was opposed to
the unprotected form of strike that worker committees led and sustained
in 2012. It seemed to many observers, myself included, that under the
banner of the new union, unprotected strikes were not an option, and
worker militancy would soon perish. Such assumptions conform to the
current Marxist critique of trade unions as ‘managers of discontent’, limited by their incorporation into bargaining structures and dependent on
management support.33
The empirical research provided below indicates, however, that the
core politics that underpinned the militant strikes of 2012 have remained constant over time, despite workers’ decision to join a union
and to engage primarily in protected strikes (hence the 2014 strike
which has been stronger and longer). Put in a different way, this study
demonstrates that when the rank and file takes on an insurgent character, the trade union’s bureaucratic or official power (at the national,
regional and branch level) becomes marginal, but only relatively so,
as the events reveal. Just as the exclusive nature of the num provided
the structural basis for new forms of organisation to emerge (that is,
worker committees), worker committees created the political space, or
at least the possibility, for the flourishing of an insurgent trade union
(amcu).34 The discourse in which various stakeholders sought to enact
their agency had shifted with the introduction of worker committees.
The new structural context constrained certain practices and ideas, and
enabled others. There had been a narrow arena in which workers reluctantly accepted that they should strike to demand a pay increase of about
10 per cent under the auspices of the num. The new politics now created
an open space to engage around what workers thought they needed in
order to live decently. In other words, instead of being based on what
management would likely consider rational, mineworkers based their
demands on the amount of money which they considered a living wage.
(They settled on R12,500.)
Gramsci’s analysis of the emergence of trade unions and their relationship to the mobilisation of rank and file workers is instructive in
terms of amcu’s burgeoning following workers’ resolve to fight for a
‘living wage’ in the Rustenburg platinum belt from 2012. He cogently
pointed out that ‘The trade union is not a predetermined phenomenon:
it becomes a determinate institution, that is, it assumes a definite histor-
10
Introduction
ical form to the extent that the strength and will of the workers who are
its members impress a policy and propose an aim that define[s] it.’35
amcu is the product of the militant labour struggles – in this case the
relatively short-lived but extremely potent worker committees – in the
platinum mines. Leaders of the worker committees at Amplats, Implats
and Lonmin organised independently from unions and embarked on
unprotected strikes. When these strikes ended, worker leaders, in dialogue with management, believed they needed a union to represent
them. They chose amcu. The union began to champion the radical wage
demand of R12,500, since rank and file workers had died on the mountain in Marikana waiting for their employer to come to negotiate for that
amount. Joseph Mathunjwa took the demand of R12,500 and made it
his union’s pillar. In a sense, amcu and Mathunjwa’s rise to prominence
in the platinum belt has been drawn out of the blood of the 34 mineworkers killed during the Marikana massacre. One prominent amcu
T-shirt proudly worn by mineworkers in the platinum belt reads, ‘Never
Forget: We Died for a Living Wage … The Struggle Continues.’
The analysis presented below indicates that amcu is neither the saviour nor the enemy of the working class. Rather, the union as an entity
in itself is riding on the wave of the insurgent fervour of the rank and
file. The fact that the dominant view of both the state and society at large
is that unprotected strikes are ‘illegal’ (or anarchic) leads us to delegitimise any organisation associated with this behaviour. The committees
did not need to sign a paper granting them formal collective bargaining
rights in order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of management (who negotiated directly with leaders of the committees during and after the
2012 strike) or the workers (who put their trust in them to negotiate
on their behalf). With the exception of some former members of the
committee, most workers did not see a firm break with the politics of the
worker committees, but rather viewed amcu (in particular its face and
spokesperson, Mathunjwa) as the embodiment of their struggle.
The concept of insurgent trade unionism assists us in analysing
the relationship between the past, when workers went on unprotected
strikes with their committee at the helm (2012), and the present, when
workers go on protected strikes under the amcu banner (2014). What
we witnessed in 2014 was not an ordinary trade union, but one that
came into power following a mass upheaval. The notion of insurgent
trade unionism both highlights the diversity of existing trade union ex11