The EXTINCTION IMAGE
Bryan Norton
Abstract This essay explores the artist Gregory Chatonsky’s
development of a new type of image — the extinction image. Emerging
as a by-product of new technologies such as deep learning and neural
nets, this nonoperative image is typified by a painstaking attempt to
come to grips with the current threat of human extinction. It arises as
a symptom of numerous crises endemic to the Anthropocene, providing
a speculative tool for planetary thinking to develop alternatives in and
through what has been called postcinema by scholars such as Steve
Shaviro and Shane Denson. For Chatonsky, the Earth itself must now
be imagined as a disarticulate user of postcinematic media, producing
images that display a stunning indifference to the presence or absence
of the human species. Close examination of Chatonsky’s work will
reveal a radical ecopolitics defined by a concern for what Alexander
Galloway has called whatever being. Urging us to think carefully about
the planetary emergency presented by climate change and geopolitical
unrest, the extinction image serves as a reminder that the future of life
on Earth is not a foregone conclusion.
Keywords Gregory Chatonsky, Harun Farocki, operative image,
Alexander Galloway, Bernard Stiegler, Benjamin Bratton, planetary
design
Extinction or Interaction?
n his recent book, Uncomputable: Play and Politics in the
Long Digital Age, Alexander Galloway (2021: 236) identifies
what he calls a “tragedy of interaction” endemic to contemporary computational environments. Rather than realizing an
emancipatory politics through the creation of a digital commons, personal computers, smart phones, and the internet are
used to exploit, extract, and surveil their users. As described
I
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Cultural Politics, Volume 19, Issue 3, © 2023 Duke University Press
DOI: 10.1215/17432197-10819437
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by the likes of Shoshanna Zuboff (2019)
and Bernard Stiegler (2019), computational
technology has become synonymous with
financialization and control, overshadowing previous dreams of liberation from
industrial discipline through networked
modes of becoming. For visual culture, the
birth of surveillance capital coincided with
the artistic and theoretical interrogation
of images deemed operational by media
scholars and artists such as Harun Farocki
(Hoel 2018; Pantenburg 2017). The explosion of drone footage and surveillance
images onto TV and computer screens
during the Gulf War led to the realization
that images served no longer to just represent reality. They started acting on it in
astounding ways. Images began “recognizing and tracking targets,” an intertitle from
Farocki’s Eye/Machine I (2001) explains, as
drone missiles are guided on the battlefield
with surgical precision. While the everyday
circulation of machinic images serves to
invoke “empathy for the technology of
war” and capitalist production, Farocki
imagines a mode of counteroperation that
would provide increased transparency and
participation for inhabitants of new media
environments (Eye/Machine II, dir. Farocki, 2002). Highlighting the ways in which
relations between image and world might
be reorganized through a manipulation of
the interface, Farocki captures an approach
to artistic production and critique that
emphasizes connectivity, interaction, and
participatory design (Schittstelle/Interface,
dir. Farocki, 1995). Such connectivity, as
Galloway explains, is no longer viable.
Engagement on screens now exposes
users to endless layers of control, surveillance, and exploitation on a level that
seemed unimaginable a few decades ago.
In light of this “tragedy of interactivity,”
what possibilities for image production
remain?
This article discusses the emergence
of a new type of image that is neither
operative nor counteroperative. It is distinctly nonoperative, and I propose calling
it the extinction image. Exemplified by
the work of artist-theorist Gregory Chatonsky, the extinction image is created
in and through the artistic exploration of
automated modes of visual production
enabled by state- of-the- art tools such as
neural nets and the DALL- E 2 artificial
intelligence (AI) system (fig. 1). Bypassing
the human as the privileged site of artistic
production, the extinction image appears
at first glance to be nearly identical to the
operational image. Both operative and
extinction images emerge as products of
machinic perception, on the one hand, and
each inhabits a world appearing hostile
to human presence. On the other hand,
while Farocki’s operational image confronts us with the possibility of a devastating “war without humans” that results
from advanced military technology (Eye/
Machine I), Chatonsky’s art confronts
us with the endgame of human activity
as a whole during the Anthropocene: a
world without us, in which we have gone
extinct. Leaning into the surrealist trope
of the machine- artist, Chatonsky develops
an image- making practice he refers to at
times as a “planetary surrealism” (Broeckmann 2019). The extinction image, as we
will see, aligns the machinic perspective of
the algorithm with the inhuman perspective of the planet. While provoking affective responses to such perceived indifference to the viewer, the extinction image
presents a rare glimpse of our own planetary crisis from the imag(in)ed perspective
of the Earth itself. Rather than attempting
to organize and reorganize human perception, the extinction image forces its
viewers to begin wondering how a world
without human modes of perception might
The EXTINCTION IM AGE
Kant and the Tragedy of Interactivity:
From the Imagination to the Technic
of Nature
I first experienced Chatonsky’s work in
person during a visit to his studio in 2022.
He showed me his latest sculptures, a
new 3D printer, and a book of images he
produced using a method he playfully calls
“recursive cinema” (Chatonsky 2022a).
Using a neural net to create text descriptions of iconic works from the history of
art and cinema, Chatonsky employs a
modified version of the DALL- E 2 system
to produce new images based on the initial
picture’s description. As I flipped through
the book of uncanny reinterpretations
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actually appear. Refracted through the lens
of computational tools, these images present nothing short of a demand, simply put,
for the planet to be let be as humans try to
survive the end of the Anthropocene.
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Figure 1 Gregory Chatonsky, Landfill 2 (2022). Digital print produced by a neural net, http://chatonsky.net/landfill-2/.
Br yan Norton
of Max Ernst paintings and Alfred Hitchcock stills, the inhuman nature of these
machinic visions struck me as cold and
distant. The neural nets that had created
these images provided no resting point
for my eyes. No recognizable distinction
between foreground and background
provided orientation or perspective. I
could not dissociate figure from ground.
As Chatonsky began showing me more
of his work, our conversation turned to
something wholly unexpected: the Kantian
faculty of the imagination. In what was
perhaps the first modern theory of the
interface, Immanuel Kant ([1781] 1998:
225) suggested in the first edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason that a spontaneous capacity for raw expressivity might
be key to closing the loop between the
faculty of empirical observation (sense
intuition) and the faculty responsible for
producing concepts and knowedge (the
understanding):
There are, however, three original sources
(capacities or faculties of the soul), which
contain the conditions of the possibility of all
experience, and cannot themselves be derived
sense, imagination, and apperception. On these
are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold
a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this
manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the
unity of this synthesis through original apperception. In addition to their empirical use, all
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from any other faculty of the mind, namely
of these faculties have a transcendental one,
which is concerned solely with form, and which
is possible a priori.
Fearing creation without representation,
Kant famously removed this discussion of
the imagination in the second edition. This
disavowal of the imagination created two
distinct problems that Kant ([1790] 1987)
would try to solve later on, particularly
in the Critique of Judgment: how do we
account for the apparent freedom and
spontaneity of organic life, which appears
in excess of mechanical determination?
Similarly, how do we build political community around a common understanding of
the world, while also acknowledging divergences of opinion? (Arendt 1989; Förster
2009). What did the Kantian imagination
have to do with these images? I wondered
as I continued talking with Chatonsky in his
studio.
In recent years, scholars of digital
media have turned their attention to the
ways in which the “tragedy of interactivity” in contemporary media environments
forces a return to the core questions posed
by German idealism: namely, what is the
connection between the spontaneity of
consciousness and the passive receptivity
necessary for experience of the world?
What is the relationship between part
and whole in art, political community,
and nature? And, most pressingly, what
effect does new technology have on these
organic, social, and ethical processes?
(Denson 2023; Žižek 2020). “Whether
or not critique remains viable,” Galloway
(2021: 225) explains, “one must still
ponder the original Kantian question: is
thought as such dictated by the regularity
of an inherited structure, or is thought only
possible by virtue of an asymmetrical and
autopositional posture vis- à-vis the object
of contemplation? Having inherited the
future, are we obligated to think with it?”
To formulate adequate responses to these
questions, we must understand the crucial
moment in which Kant reintroduces the
problems he attempted to solve with the
imagination in his exploration of the mode
of Wechselwirkung, or reciprocity, in the
Critique of Judgment. The mode of reciprocity plays a central role in Kant’s ([1790]
1987: 272) attempt to settle a dispute
The systems that deal with the technic of
nature, i.e., with nature’s power to produce
[things] in terms of the rule of purposes, are
of two kinds: one interprets natural purposes
idealistically, the other realistically. The idealistic
interpretation maintains that all purposiveness
of nature is unintentional, the realistic interpretation maintains that some of this purposiveness
(the purposiveness in organized beings) is
intentional, from which we could then infer, as
a hypothesis, the consequence that the technic
of nature is intentional, i.e., a purpose, even as
concerns all other products of nature in their
relation to the whole of nature.
This reformulation of the imagination as a
potentially externalized technic of nature
will serve as an aid in thinking through the
pressing issues concerning the relation
between computation and ecology in the
face of current threats to human existence. As Chatonsky’s work suggests, the
possibilities for a nonhuman, machinic sort
of spontaneity opened up by new media
technology play a central role in determining how human beings respond to the possibility of a world without us in the middle
or even near-term future (Chatonsky 2018).
Often translated as interaction by
scholars of computation and digital art,
the mode of reciprocity offered by Kant is
a delicate compromise between thinkers
who ascribe spontaneity to external phenomena, such as organic life, and those
who see such claims as mere projections
of human freedom onto the external world
(Kwastek 2013). While reciprocity is initially
presented as an isolated feature of consciousness, Kant’s description of aesthetic
experience in the Critique of Judgment
shows that its operations lead to wideranging material consequences for politics,
ethical life, and the entire planet. Mediating
between part and whole, the mode of
reciprocity articulates the complex balance
between self and community defining the
sensus communis (Arendt 1989). This
mediation provides the basis for what Yuk
Hui (2019, 2021) has called cosmotechnics in recent years, using Kant’s mode of
reciprocity to call attention to the relationship between the material operations of
technology and the production of cultural
identity and difference. Galloway’s tragedy
of interactivity, on the one hand, details the
tragedy of a particular dream of networked
digital community resulting from certain
types of reciprocal relations (Turner 2008).
Although the global scale of computational media provides the infrastructure
necessary for the construction of a more
sustainable sensus communis, digital tools
are used instead to spread hate and misinformation and to accelerate the breakdown
of existing social structures. On the other
hand, this contemporary situation presents yet another iteration of the dilemma
already posed by Kant between idealism
and realism: as consciousness peers out
onto the world, it is ultimately left unable
to decide if nature’s perceived spontaneity
is a projection of its own felt agency (idealism), or if spontaneity might exist outside
this mode of spectatorship (realism). The
chasm identified by Kant at the beginning
of the Critique of Judgment between reason, acting as its own lawgiver, and understanding, which aims to grasp “nature as
an object of the senses,” is left fully intact
(Guyer 2003; Kant [1790] 1989). Is Kant not
describing our own lives in digital environments, where any desire to distinguish
the real from the virtual is just an instance
of the inability to grasp the thing- in- itself?
Do philosophers not ask these same
questions of artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and neural nets?
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between realism and idealism in what he
calls the technic of nature:
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Scholars such as Luciana Parisi (2013)
have drawn careful attention to the remarkable similarity between the status of spontaneity within computation architecture
and the Kantian architecture of the understanding. “Computational aesthetics,”
Parisi explains, “is the manifestation of
an elegant compression of complex data,
which coincides with the synthetic point
of perception (or the subjective synthesis)
of random information. In other words,
this model of computational aesthetics is
defined by an act of cognition, the compression of data through perception” (69).
It is now more pressing than ever to reconsider the status of nature itself within this
technic of nature. What is the relationship
between spontaneous uncomputability
and the increasingly unstable activity of the
Earth? While thinkers such as Benjamin
Bratton (2019) have likened the relationship
between technology and nature to a new
planetary state of emergency, Galloway
suggests that it is first and foremost
the survival of disarticulate whateversingularities that is at stake in this crisis.
Do we use digital tools to completely redesign life on Earth from the ground up, as
Bratton urges, or do we “let beings be,” as
Galloway (2021: 240) suggests? Although
at first glance, the proposal to simply care
for the disarticulate nature of whateversingularities appears inadequate in the face
of the threat of extinction, the next section
will highlight the ways in which the incomputable basis of survival or extinction unexpectedly offers a new point of entry into
the active role played by the Earth itself
in this emergency. By urging humans to
care for disarticulate singularities, Galloway
leans into the undecidable character of
Kant’s technic of nature, drawing attention
away from human judgment and toward
the alterity of the planet itself.
Reciprocity and the Ecopolitics of
Whatever-Being
Care for what Giorgio Agamben ([1990]
1993: 87) calls “whatever- singularities”
emerges as a vital component of Galloway’s politics of uncomputability:
“Whatever singularity, which wants to
appropriate belonging itself, its own
being- in- language . . . rejects all identity
and every condition of belonging.” The
mode of resistance provided by whateversingularity will prove central to the aesthetics and ethics of indifference provoked
by the extinction image’s development.
Already in The Interface Effect, Galloway
(2012: 143) begins suggesting a mode of
disarticulated presence as an alternative to
the optimistic engagement of interaction,
which he likens to the defeatism of simply
playing the game as it is presented through
the black boxes of computational capital.
In terms of visual production and design,
the counteroperations that Farocki and
others proposed at the interface level have
become little more than thinly veiled operations of surveillance and control. In light
of the plea for a return to Kant in the face
of this “tragedy of interactivity,” it might
be possible to say that the singularity of
whatever- being presents what German
idealists called the point of spontaneous
production — that ineffable quality of life
existing in excess of receptivity and causal
determination (Pippin 1989). As ever more
of the lifeworld becomes overdetermined
by the operations of digital media, spontaneous expression retreats. Just as it
mattered greatly for idealists whether the
spontaneous operations of the technic of
nature belonged exclusively to ourselves
as human actors (Johann Gottlieb Fichte),
or whether this movement of reciprocal
relations between part and whole can be
attributed to organic nature as a whole
(Friedrich Schelling), it makes a vast
technic of nature. The analogy between
the uncomputable and Kant’s technic of
nature looks drastically different when we
turn our attention away from the post- 9/11
sovereign state of exception haunting
the politics of Agamben and toward the
more pressing emergency facing human
life today: the threat of extinction resulting from climate change or geopolitical
catastrophe. In the face of the dual threat
of biosphere collapse and infrastructural
breakdown, how do human beings, simply
put, survive? While this situation seems to
no longer concern the abstract philosophical question of the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the world, the
temporal urgency with which this situation
appears provides the basis for a new
planetary sensus communis constituted
by affective relations that the extinction
image provokes (Denson 2020: 194). Chatonsky’s artistic and theoretical work reintroduces the vital issue of the imagination
to discussions of planetary- scale design,
for one. What I am calling the extinction
image in the work of Chatonsky emerges
as a wedge between the appearance of a
threat to this community and the thing- initself of the planetary crisis’s actualization.
For advocates of planetary design such
as Bratton, the possibility of extinction is
opened up to highlight a gap between the
actuality of the planetary emergency and
the structure of possibility we inherit from
this emergency. Either humans redesign
the planet or go extinct, Bratton (2019: 22)
urges in Terraforming (see also Gill 2020).
Like the self- positing I of Fichte, we must
embrace the operational aspects of computational media and geoengineering in
order to feed-forward our survival (Bratton
2019: 59).
A remarkable statement made by
Chatonsky (2021) in his introduction to
the French translation of Terraforming
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difference whether we locate the unpredictable contingency of the uncomputable
in the material operations of computational
media, the presence of users, or the activity of the Earth (Hegel [1801] 1977). For
Chatonsky, there exists a vital link between
the incalculable activity of digital media
and the uncomputable productivity of the
planet itself. Operating above and below
the mesoscopic scale of the human sensorium, geological processes and planetaryscale computation appear to be conspiring
together to make the human obsolete.
In light of the controversy surrounding Agamben’s paranoid response to
the COVID-19 pandemic, we might first
begin by asking whether the singularities
embraced by Galloway will not lead us
back to a form of entrenched political conservatism: doesn’t mourning the “tragedy
of interaction,” after all, shield passive
subjects from active engagement in the
world? (Berg 2020; Bratton 2021). While at
first glance this seems to be the case, it is
important to further extrapolate the analogy that has begun to take shape between
the disarticulate singularity of nonindividuated beings and the dilemma between
realism and idealism Kant associates with
the technic of nature. Both situations pose
questions that seem to have no possible
answer. They impose themselves on
consciousness in the form of decisions
that are necessary but impossible to make.
While for Kant, the mode of reciprocity
allows for a permanent state of indecision
between realism and idealism in aesthetics
and the philosophy of nature, Galloway
puts forward the rough outline for a politics
and ethics of care for singularity in the face
of automated decisions that are constantly
made for subjects on their own behalf. In
this way, care for the future of whateverbeing presents itself in the form of anxiety
around the possibility of a contemporary
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sheds a different light on the relationship
between computation, ecology, and the
indecision at the heart of the Kantian
technic of nature. In the face of planetary
catastrophe, should we not simply “watch
our coming extinction like we watch the
black hole through the Earth- camera” (30)?
Rather than trying to feed-forward our
survival by forcing a new collapse of possibility and actuality, Chatonsky urges us to
return to the Kantian imagination in order
to envision a strange, uncanny world that
is bereft of our species. Producing a sort
of photographic negative of the intellectual
intuition, we are confronted with an image
of our own absence, rather than traces of
our ongoing presence. In referencing the
Event Horizon Telescope, Chatonsky also
provides two important reflections on the
relationship between his own work and
the project of planetary design. As the
disarticulate site of its own spontaneous
production, the planet presents itself as
the indifferent host of our extinction. Chatonsky perspicaciously aligns the cause
of “whatever- being” with the activity of
the planet itself, drawing attention to the
medial and technical conditions underwriting the shift in environmental consciousness Bratton sees as prerequisite for
planetary design (Groo 2021). The project
of terraforming, as explained by Bratton,
requires a turn away from seeing the globe
as a holistic and all- encompassing totality,
a view symbolized by the famous Blue
Marble photograph from 1972 and the
ecological movement it inspired (Bratton
2019: 16). We should instead imagine the
Earth as a giant, cosmic camera, like the
Event Horizon Telescope, a foreign entity
that careens through the universe like a
floating, sensing spaceship. “The Black
Hole image is a kind of ‘world picture’
that is crucially not a picture of our Earth,
but rather a picture taken by the Earth of
its surroundings — for which we served
as essential enablers” (18). This shift in
perspective is enabled only by state- ofthe- art digital media, however, as the
Event Horizon Telescope employs radio
telescopes and computational tools that
have been called postcinematic by scholars
such as Steve Shaviro (2010). Appearing in
excess of any indexical relation between
world and image, the fragile and inhuman
sensing provoked by the operations of the
Earth camera necessitates careful reflection on the possibility of human absence.
In a recent exhibition at the Cité des
Sciences in Paris, Chatonsky portrays
three possible scenarios for the future
of life on Earth. Three screens dispersed
throughout the gallery space’s long,
narrow hallway reveal three digital avatars
of the artist in different stages of life.
On the first screen, an aged Chatonsky
speaks of a distant future in which human
beings have abandoned the Earth and
live on Mars. In this version of the future,
the tech oligarchs who bear so much
responsibility for trashing the planet have
achieved a sort of Kurzweilian singularity.
Digital portraits of the likes of Jeff Bezos,
Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk line the
gallery wall, and we are told they have
“transferred their memories to an artificial intelligence in order for their avatars
to survive and keep alive what they once
were” (Chatonsky 2022b). Their consciousness has been uploaded to the cloud, as
their bodies live on for centuries in a mute
zombielike state (figs. 2 and 3). Chatonsky’s avatar tells a story of innovation
and optimism in the face of the planetary
crisis we call the Anthropocene. A much
different scenario is narrated on a second
screen, however, placing the spectator
firmly back on Earth. An adult rendition of
the artist describes an annihilated planet
exhumed by carbon emissions and toxic
lives on after the self- inflicted annihilation
of the human species. As the avatars’
narratives are rendered anew each time
by a neural net, visitors never know what
to expect from each instantiation. Spectral
portraits of the oligarchs of digital capital
still line the gallery walls, as the ghostly,
centuries- old faces of Zuckerberg and
Musk float softly by. On another wall, a
ravaged landscape speaks of inhuman
destruction of the planet. We are no longer
in the utopia of the third scenario, and our
visit to the site of edenic bliss was just a
temporary sojourn. What has happened
to the prospect of planetary design? What
are we to make of the dreams of singularity and transcendence realized in the first
scenario, the faces on the wall, glaring
hauntingly, or the obliteratred landscape,
so indifferent to our presence?
The whatever- being of the Earth
presents nothing less than a wholesale
rejection of the sovereign design imposed
on the viewer by digital interaction. Rather
than forcing a choice between the three
scenarios portrayed by the avatars, Chatonsky allows spectators to occupy multiple
points of view simultaneously. In this way,
Dysnovation stages what Galloway (2021:
57) calls the computational “view from
everywhere”: while “photography says
here is a view . . . computer vision says
there is no point of view because here are
all of them.” The radical redistribution of
sense enabled by computational media
provides the basis for a radical redistribution of the ways in which contingency,
virtuality, and reality can be conceived for
inhabitants of the late Anthropocene. Leaning into the future orientation of technical
media, the extinction image presents viewers with a horizon that is both open- ended
and fabricated, and in which no imagined
scenario is a foregone conclusion. Portraying mass extinction alongside planetary
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gases. “Aren’t we transforming the earth
by extracting materials in order to produce
waste that will be the only thing remaining
of us?” the avatar asks, entering a lengthy
monologue devoted to Jean- François
Lyotard’s concept of the differend and the
relationship between the observer and the
observed in systems theory. Turning to a
third screen, we see a digital rendering of
Chatonsky as a small child. He speaks of
a utopian future, one in which machines
communicate seamlessly with plant and
animal life (fig. 4). The opposition between
technē and physis has been overcome,
and the formerly antithetical relationship
between technology and nature has given
way to a dreamlike scenario wherein the
planet is no longer subordinated to the
capricious impulses of our species. Have
humans managed to terraform their way
out of the Anthropocene? Have we created
a more sustainable future through planetary design?
This seems to be the obvious conclusion to draw at this point. For a moment,
the extinction image seems to present a
successful counteroperation to the threat
of catastrophe in the spirit of Erkki Kurenniemi’s 2048. In this scenario, humans live
off- planet in a “digital format that takes
a curious place of extinction; extinction
becomes actually a threshold in the material form supporting so- called intelligent life
in this anthropocentric imaginary” (Parikka
2018). Intelligence has superseded the
biological constraints that are generally
associated with life on Earth, for Kurenniemi in his Documenta 2013 exhibition
(Krysa 2015). But this is not the case with
Chatonsky’s installation. When we take a
step back from this third screen, we hear
again those two other voices from the
other screens. Drowning out the child’s
voice, the other avatars tell us again about
a future life on Mars and of a universe that
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Figure 2 Digital portrait
of an aged Elon Musk in
Chatonsky’s Dysnovation
exhibition (2022) at the
Cité des Sciences in
Paris. Courtesy of the
artist.
Figure 3 Portrait of an
aged Mark Zuckerberg
in Chatonsky’s
Dysnovation exhibition
(2022) at the Cité des
Sciences in Paris.
Courtesy of the artist.
The EXTINCTION IM AGE
Planetary Surrealism; or, the
Postcinematic Technic of Nature
It is indifference, rather than indecision,
that constitutes the relationship between
the spectator and the Earth for the extinction image. As illustrated by Chatonsky’s
Dysnovation exhibition, the disarticulate
singularity of whatever- being presents a
necessary ecological supplement to Bratton’s project of planetary design, presenting what might be called a postcinematic
technic of nature. Just as Galloway’s computational view from everywhere presents
a planetary mode of imagination refracted
through digital tools, Chatonsky refers to
this situation as a “planetary surrealism,”
wherein a new relationship between technology and the Earth is opened up by the
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relocation, Chatonsky’s digital avatars
bear witness to the ways in which dreams
of utopian flourishing and nightmares of
dystopian despair coexist as by- products
of ubiquitous computation and its effect
on the imagination (fig. 5). The thread of
each narrative unfolds into dozens of other
emergent stories, each irreducible to a
master text or programmable source code.
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Figure 4 Avatar of the artist as a child in Dysnovation. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 5 The extinction image in Dysnovation (2022), provoking visitors to imagine a future in which humans
are no longer around on Earth. Courtesy of the artist.
suspension of human judgment (Hansen
2015: 33 – 81). Historically, surrealism has
evoked this suspension of judgment to
present the machine itself as a creative
agent capable of replacing the individual
artist (Broeckmann 2016: 9 – 11). Chatonsky, however, goes one step further. He
suggests that digital media are part and
parcel of a greater energetic productivity
attributable to the Earth itself. The planet
has now become an artist, and any distinction between ecology and computation is
no longer tenable.
Chatonsky (2022c) casts this reciprocity between digital media and the planet
as a “desfactual” relation, wherein the
images produced by neural nets are both
“real” and “ideal” at once. While our current relationship to the planet is certainly
shaped by computation, planetary design
must come to terms with the ways in
which uncomputability provides a feature,
not a bug, of digital media. As an expression of the incalculability of the future,
the extinction image cannot be reduced
to the schematism of operation and
slippages, refusing calculation and control. Chatonsky (2017) presents the Earth
itself not as a body without organs but as
so many uncomputable “organs without
bodies.” The pictorial distinction between
subject and background is blurred, and we
begin to see the Earth imagining itself as
a powerful user of new media. Bypassing conscious reflection, the extinction
image provokes further engagement with
the role of the planet in the central line of
questioning for scholars of postcinematic
media technologies: what do concepts like
sensing and spectatorship mean when we
are dealing with technologies that operate automatically and at scales or speeds
that cut human cognition out of the loop?
(Denson 2020). No motion sensor is used
in Dsynovation to trigger new events or
turn screens off or on. No button can
be pressed to select a more favorable
scenario than the one we are currently
watching. The avatars relate orthogonally
to viewers, speaking from a distant future
that may or may not come to pass.
Here we see the political payoff of the
postcinematic technic of nature presented
by the extinction image. By decentering
the human viewer as an active participant
in the landscape, the extinction image
offers the unlikely possibility of survival in
and through the embodied act of spectatorship. While we watch our extinction
as it is presented through the planetary
telescope, we remind ourselves that we
are, despite it all, still here. At this point we
must nevertheless ask: what has happened to the sensus communis, that other
vital product of the imagination, over the
course of these transformations? The invocation of a planetary imagination throughout the extinction image’s development
must lead to a new type of sensus communis that might be organized around the
perceived threat of extinction. How do the
345
counteroperation presented by the interface. The desfactual relations produced by
these images, of course, also return image
production to the “mummy complex” that
thinkers such as André Bazin (1960: 8) see
as endemic to all visual culture. Only now,
humans strive for survival not just through
the “continued existence of the corporeal body” in virtual afterlives (Chatonsky
2022b). We hope for survival off- screen
as well, returning the cinematic index
back to its origin in the ontology of sense
(Cribb 2021). In this way, the extinction
image employs AI and deep learning to
produce an algorithmic archive that is both
speculative and irreducibly material and
political. Supplementing Bratton’s analysis
of the redistribution of sovereignty enabled
by computation, Chatonsky’s planetary
surrealism highlights a new relationship
between sense and index emerging
through postcinematic forms of reciprocity.
“Open the so- called body and spread out
all its surfaces,” writes Lyotard (2004: 1) in
The Libidinal Economy, “not only the skin
with each of its folds, wrinkles, scars,” but
each subsequent layer as well.
This unfolding of planetary layers into
further epidermic surfaces represents an
important shift in how we understand the
role of ecology in the extinction image
within and beyond what Bratton calls the
cloud polis (fig. 6). In Bratton’s (2015:
109 – 45) political treatise, The Stack, cloud
polis refers to a novel distributed form
of sovereignty enabled by computational
architecture, providing an outline for new
forms of political decision- making. By
refusing to portray the planet as a holistic
body, as in the Blue Marble photograph,
the extinction image envisions the Earth as
a series of dissimilating surfaces produced
in and through the indeterminacy of technical media. The extinction image, however,
consists in nothing less than surfaces and
CULTURAL POLITICS
The EXTINCTION IM AGE
Figure 6 Unfolding the skin of planet Earth in E-Phemeral Skin (2021), using a DALL-E 2 AI system to produce images
from the first sentence of Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy, http://chatonsky.net/ephemeral-skin/.
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Br yan Norton
operations of the cloud polis relate to this
community of sense, and what role does
image making play in its development?
Bernard Stiegler (2018b: 134), in a late
reflection on Bratton, begins laying the
groundwork for how we might conceptualize a planetary sensus communis, which
turns our attention from the cloud polis
and toward concern for what might be
called the cloud khôra, a mode of existence that exceeds computational sovereignty and control. In his “Five Theses on
Schmitt and Bratton,” Stiegler reminds
us that computational operations remain
in a necessarily parasitic relationship to
users of digital media. Making the familiar
gesture of extending Jacques Derrida’s
thesis on the production of difference in
The EXTINCTION IM AGE
writing to include all forms of technical
media, Stiegler argues that the incalculability of digital tools provokes a relationship
between politics and sensing that appears
slightly different from what Bratton proposes. Rather than forcing the creation of
a new political body through a fed-forward
emergency, the interrogation of the cloud
polis requires a supplemental account of
the “illegible secret” underwriting all forms
of community (134). The secret, we have
seen, is held by the Earth, as the extinction image is a product of the planetary
imagination. Stiegler’s five theses, in order
of their appearance, are as follows:
1. “The question of law is the question of the
regulation of relations between exosomatic
organisms.” (133)
As political relations are materialized and
operationalized through technical infrastructure, the development of platform
capitalism and the appearance of the cloud
polis have a profound impact on how we
approach questions concerning governance today, as Bratton’s work suggests.
This leads to a second thesis, however:
2. “Unlike Bratton,” Stiegler “argue[s] that this
question must be approached from a perspective that is not only negentropic, but neganthro-
3. “The juridical question and the economic
question are not separable, because, while the
law is what produces values beyond all calculation, the economy calculates values on the
basis of a standard that itself has no price, since
it constitutes the canon of any evaluation.” (134)
In this third thesis, Stiegler recalls the
passage from Timaeus where Plato (2008)
states that if everything were “made of
gold, the only thing that would be invisible
would be gold.” Not only would gold be
invisible, but it would also be devoid of all
value. The juridical operations of computational media, by analogy, are neither natural nor self- organizing. Digital environments
have been arranged for a specific political
economy of surveillance and profit and can
be rearranged toward different ends.
4. “To carry out such aims, we must profoundly
rethink the architectonics of digital networks,
both at the level of data formats and at the
level of the conditions for the building of social
networks.” (Stiegler 2018b: 135)
While the cloud polis articulates boundaries between inside and outside for the
computational state, a new planetary sensus communis must be organized around
the protection of the secret. To protect this
secret, Stiegler ultimately proposes
pological, and which requires a neganthropology.” (133)
5. “redefining computational processes and
ought never short- circuit deliberative processes. . . . They should never, in other words,
proletarianize decision- making.” (136)
To encourage participation in a political
project of planetary proportions, something
that the scale of computational media and
the climate crisis require, we must demarcate a new space that exceeds the bounds
of computational sovereignty. This outside,
347
Here we begin to see how the apparent
misanthropy of the extinction image
functions according to what Stiegler
(2018a), after Claude Lévi- Strauss, calls
neganthropy. It is neither operational nor
counteroperational, but nonoperational.
It reveals nothing, while “in a totalitarian
regime, transparency is required and the
secret is systemically eliminated” (Stiegler
2018b: 133).
CULTURAL POLITICS
technologies of scalability, such that they
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the cloud khôra, corresponds to the
position of the Earth itself. The planet not
only inhabits but also exceeds the frame
of digital environments. How can we hope
for survival without proletarianizing the
entire planet, subsuming it to processes
of surveillance and control as proposed by
advocates of planetary design?
The Planetary Sensus Communis: Five
Theses on the Cloud Khôra
By way of conclusion, I would like to
proffer five additional theses, which serve
as an ecopolitical supplement to Stiegler’s
own. Although highly speculative, these
theses will trace the contours of the cloud
khôra and its relation to the extinction
image, in an attempt to shed light on some
of the most pressing issues concerning
planetary politics in the late Anthropocene.
1. To redesign the cloud polis, we must care for
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the maintenance of its outside, the cloud khôra.
While this may seem obvious, it becomes
more crucial than ever to recall the necessity of this outside in the face of growing
calls to submit the planet to what Bruno
Latour (2017: 255) calls a “new nomos
of the Earth.” This thesis also cuts to the
heart of Bratton’s political philosophy as
it is articulated in The Stack, as his vision
for a more sustainable political architecture enabled by computational media is
grounded in an originary divide of political
geography into two types of space: the
polis and khôra. Following Carl Schmitt,
for whom the distinction between polis
and khôra presents a terrestrial spatialization of the existential difference between
friend and foe, Bratton (2015: 10) suggests that the modern state has been
upended by the operations of platform
capital and planetary- scale computation.
Political geography, as a result, needs
to be redesigned. A new cloud polis has
materialized from the distributed forms
of sovereignty enabled by computational
architecture. Emerging in and through what
Gilles Deleuze ([1990] 1992) called control
societies, this cloud polis is articulated
through the stack’s layers of distributed
agency. While Bratton briefly mentions
that the functionality of the stack is predicated on the existence of the khôra, he
leaves this outside overlooked and undertheorized. This outside remains one of the
most urgent aspects of planetary politics
today, however. For the Greeks, khôra
referred to the untamable ocean and the
layers of space enveloping the planet in
Plato’s demiurge mythology (Siegert 2015).
It continues to provide a substantial link
between phusis and technē, not from the
perspective of human extraction but from
the perspective of the Earth, a point of
contact through which a more sustainable
planetary community might be created
and maintained.
2. The cloud khôra puts image production by
the Earth- user at the forefront of cultural politics
in the late Anthropocene.
Chatonsky’s extinction image refuses
the feed-forward logic of hyperstition,
wherein the possibility of survival is
actualized through intentional design.
Rather than offering virtual alternatives to
the Anthropocene in order to find an exit
from the present moment of uncertainty,
the extinction image serves as a reminder
that planetary design will never operate
smoothly along a straight line. This indeterminacy of our planetary situation also
escalates the politics of image making,
creating an endless supply of automated
virtualities. A by- product of the planetary
state of suspension, the extinction image
presents a series of self- portraits created
The EXTINCTION IM AGE
regarding the planetary future to the suspension
of spectatorship by postcinematic media,
the Earth- user operates in and through the
interstitial space of surfaces.
Between living wound and postmortem
biopsy, the extinction image opens up
the skin of the planetary surface. Recalling the first lines of Lyotard’s (2004: 1)
Libidinal Economy, the deposits revealed
beneath the planetary epidermis suggest
an uncanny surrealism underlying claims
to cinematic indexicality. The differend
becomes a point of indeterminate anxiety
hovering between presence and absence,
survival and extinction. The ubiquity of
computation takes the ontology of sense
to an unforeseen planetary scale. Operating through sets of organs without bodies,
this medial cloud khôra presents a supplement to the self- articulation of the cloud
polis described by Bratton. The Event Horizon Telescope is turned around to examine
the Earth itself, creating a new type of
image irreducible to the blue marble or
black hole. Only ever seen from an angle,
the extinction image appears out of the
pharmacology of computation to produce a
negentropic state of suspension for human
beings. While this state of suspension may
4. The distinction between cloud khôra and
cloud polis is created in and through computational media.
The medial conditions of sovereignty have
been carefully examined by legal scholar
Cornelia Vismann (2008, 2013). But now,
rather than drawing a line on the ground to
create a terrestrial boundary on the planet’s surface, computational media operate
in an extraterrestrial manner to create and
maintain new divisions between polis and
khôra. Operating in the cloud and deep
underground, the ontology of sensing
enabled by planetary computation suggests a new type of medium neutrality:
technical media are entirely indifferent to
human existence. A politics geared for
survival must emerge in and through this
organology of inhuman sensing. Created
by the grammatological processualism of
computational media, the production of
difference extends into an endless play of
synthesis and bifurcation between khôra
and polis, absence and presence. For a
concrete politics of survival, this means
that it is very much beside the point to
declare ourselves free of the state or of
the planet, like PayPal founder Peter Thiel’s
delusional attempts to create “startup
governments” at sea, or to attempt to
launch humanity into outer space (The
First Seasteaders, prod. Seasteading
Institute, 2019). The extinction image
operates in liminal spaces that refuse this
reactivation of colonial dreams of freedom
through subordination. The extinction
image presents a new sense of neutrality
and an urgent call to care for the whateversingularity of the Earth, even if this means
CULTURAL POLITICS
3. Relating the suspension of judgment
be perceived as a threat, what is held in
abeyance through these unfolding surfaces
is nothing less than the sovereign status of
calculation itself.
349
by a cosmotechnical Earth. Like the myth
of the demiurges portrayed by Plato
(2008: 18 – 21) in the Timaeus, the cloud
khôra is embedded within an intricate
recursive process through which idea
and its material manifestation, planet and
creator, become conjoined terms in an
infinite series. Incalculability will never halt
the production of images by a neural net.
The Earth is embedded in the automated
recursivity of technical media, and khôra
presents the ongoing site of uncomputability that holds the future at bay.
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living with its stoic indifference to the
human species.
5. The postcinematic redistribution of sense
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creates a planetary ethics of indifference.
The ontology of sense inaugurated by
contemporary media environments
necessitates the articulation of a redistribution of postcinematic exposure following the new ontology of sense. Hinted at
by Corey P. Cribb (2021) with reference
to Jean- Luc Nancy, this postcinematic
exposure accomplishes two things. First,
by responding to the need for political
theorists and legal scholars to understand
how algorithms can “give an account of
themselves” and their decision- making
processes, the extinction image enables
the planet to bear witness to its ongoing
devastation while pointing to the anthropogenic nature of such destruction (Amoore
2020). The endgame of extinction or
survival is held in suspense, as a new play
of materiality and virtuality defies feedforward logic. Presenting a redistribution
of possibility and actuality, contingency
and virtuality, the extinction image portrays
a future that is both an open horizon and
a gaping wound. Most importantly, the
redistribution of sensing can help activate a
new ethics of planetary exposure following
from this redistribution of sense. A new
mode of exposure presents an ecological
supplement to the tragedy of interactivity.
It is the indifference of the Earth- user that
humans must ultimately face. This indifference to our species, as we have seen,
is aesthetically configured by the planet in
the extinction image.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Yves Çitton and the ArTec project
for hosting me during a wonderfully productive stay
at the University of Paris VIII during 2022, as well as
Gregory Chatonsky for the inspiring conversations.
Shane Denson and Andreas Broeckmann provided me
with invaluable feedback on earlier drafts, and I would
like to thank J. Makary and the Art History Graduate
Roundtable at Stanford for providing me with a forum
to workshop these ideas.
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Br yan Norton
Bryan Norton is a Mellon Fellow in the Humanities at Stanford University. He is currently
writing a monograph on ecology and technology in German romanticism, Planetary Idealism,
and coediting a volume on Bernard Stiegler, Negentropy and the Future of the Digital. Other
recent writings can be found in Aeon, Theory, Culture and Society, the Los Angeles Review of
Books, and the Journal of Visual Culture.