Public Disclosure Authorized
Public Disclosure Authorized
POLICY RESEARCH
WORKING
PAPER
2708
Accountabilityand
The resultsof a cross-country
Corruption
politicalinstitutionsare
empirical analysis suggest
that
extremely important in
Political Institutions MN4atter
determining the prevalence
of corruption:democracy,
Public Disclosure Authorized
Public Disclosure Authorized
parliamentary systems,
Daniel Lederman
Norman Loayza
political stability, and freedom
Rodrigo Reis Soares
with lower corruption.
The World Bank
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
Office of the Chief Economist
November 2001
of the press are all associated
U
POLIcY RESEARCH WORKING
PAPER
2708
Summary findings
Using a cross-country panel, Lederman, Loayza, and
Soares examine the determinants of corruption, paying
particular attention to political institutions that increase
political accountability. Previous empirical studies have
not analyzed the role of political institutions, even
though both the political science and the theoretical
economics literature have indicated their importance in
determining corruption.
The main theoretical hypothesis guiding the authorsi
empirical investigation is that political institutions affect
corruption through two channels: political accountability
and the structure of the provision of public gc ods.
The results suggest that political institutiom are
extremely important in determining the prevalence of
corruption: democracy, parliamentary systemi~,political
stability, and freedom of the press are all associated with
lower corruption. In addition, the authors show that
common findings of the earlier empirical literature on
the determinants of corruption6related to openness and
legal tradition6do not hold once political variables are
taken into account.
This paper-a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and the Caribbean Region-is par- of a larger
effort to conduct research on pressing policy issuesin the region. Copies of the paper are available free from the W arld Bank,
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Patricia Soto, room 18-018,telephone 202-473-78':', fax 202522-7528, email address psotokworldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Wclr at http:,/
econ.worldbank.org. The authors maybe contacted atdlederman(@worldbank.orgor nloayza(Fworldbank.org. November
2001. (37 pages)
The Policy Research WlorkingPaper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas aooiut
developmient issues.An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickli, even if the presentations are lessthan fully polished. 'ibhe
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The finzdings,interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarilyrepresent the viewi}of the W'orldBank, its Executive Directors, or The
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination Center
Accountability and Corruption:
Political Institutions Matter
Daniel Lederman,*Norman Loayza,*and Rodrigo Reis Soares*
World Bank
- University of Chicago
*
I Introduction
Corruption is popularly regarded as one of the most serious obstacles to
development. Recent econometric studies show that indicators of corruption are
negatively correlated with important economic outcomes. Mauro (1995) and Burki
and Perry (1998) claim that corruption reduces economic growth, via reduced private
investment; Kaufman et al (1999) find that corruption limits development (per capita
income, child mortality, and literacy); and Bai and Wei (2000) argue that corruption
affects the making of economic policy. Even though specific methodologies may
raise doubts about issues of causation, it is true that corruption is indeed negatively
correlated with several crucial economic variables and, despite the presence of
feedbacks, corruption seems to have independent effects of its own. Consequently,
there is a real economic return to understanding and fighting corruption.
This study examines empirically the determinants of corruption, paying
particular attention to political institutions that help determine the extent to which
policymakers can be held accountable for the actions of their staff. Previous empirical
studies have not analyzed the role of political institutions, even though both political
science and economics theoretical literatures have indicated their importance. One of
the main contributions of this paper is to show that the role of political institutions is
indeed extremely important, and eclipses the effects of some variables that have
received considerable attention in the previous empirical literature. In addition, this
study uses a panel data set, which is also new in the literature.
The main theoretical hypothesis guiding our empirical investigation is that
political institutions affect corruption through two channels: political accountability
and the structure of provision of public goods. Political mechanisms that increase
political accountability, either by encouraging punishment of corrupt individuals or
by reducing the informational problem related to government activities, tend to
reduce the incidence of corruption. Also, institutions generating a competitive
environment in the provision of public services tend to reduce the extraction of rents,
therefore reducing corruption.
3
The results show that political institutions seem to be extremely important in
determining the prevalence of corruption. In short, democracies, parliamentary
systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower
corruption. Additionally, we show that common results of the previous empirical
literature on the determinants of corruption - related to openness and legal tradition do not hold once political variables are taken into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the nature of
corruption by, first, distinguishing corruption from other types of crimes, and, second,
by characterizing corruption as a political phenomenon. Section 3 presents the data on
corruption, discusses its potential limitations, and describes the empirical approach
and selected variables. Section 4 discusses the specification of the model and the
results. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing its main contributions to the
empirical literature on the determinants of corruption.
2 The Nature of Corruption
2.1 Corruption as a Crime
There is no question that corruption is, before anything else, a type of crime.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that factors determining the incidence of
common crimes should also play an important role in determining the incidence of
corruption, thus making corruption and other types of crimes highly correlated.
Surprisingly enough, this is not the case. While the different types of "common"
crimes are highly correlated across countries, none of the common crimes are
significantly correlated with corruption. Table 1 shows the pair-wise correlation
between crime rates, taken from the International Crime Victimization Surveys, and a
corruption index, taken from the International Country Risk Guide, which are
discussed in section 3 below. While the pair-wise correlations among rates of thefts,
burglaries, and contact crimes are all positive and significant at the 1% level ranging from 0.55 to 0.76 - the correlations among the corruption index and the crime
rates are quite small and never significant, being even negative for thefts.
4
Table 1: Correlation Between a Corruption Index and Crime Rates
Corruption
Corruption
Burglary
Theft
Cont. crimes
Burglary
Theft Cont. crimes
I
0.12
42
-0.12
42
0.22
42
1
0.58*
45
0.76*
45
1
0.55*
45
1
Notes: * - Significant at 1%. Number of observations below the correlations.
Corruption index from the ICRG, 1999. Crime rates from ICVS, average for
all years available.
This evidence suggests that factors distinguishing corruption from the other
crimes, related precisely to its connections to government activities and authority,
play an important role, which makes corruption a different phenomenon with its own
characteristics and determinants. This was noticed as long ago as 1907, when Francis
McGovern (1907, p266) wrote that
"Its [corruption's] advent in any community is marked by the
commission of bribery, extortion and criminal conspiracies to defraud
the public, without a corresponding increase in other unrelated crimes.
Its going, likewise, is accompanied by no abatement in the usual grist
of larcenies, burglaries and murder. It is, indeed, a unique and highly
complex thing; an institution, if you please, rather than a condition of
society or a temper or tendency of any class of individuals."
To analyze the determinants of corruption, thus, we have to concentrate
precisely on its "institutional" features. The political dimension of this point is
immediately obvious. Political institutions, by determining the environment in which
the relations between individuals and the state take place, are extremely important in
determining the incidence of corruption. Ultimately, the political macrostructure related to the political system, balance of powers, electoral competition, and so on determines the incentives for those in office to be honest, and to police and punish
5
misbehavior of others, such that the effects are propagated throughout the system to
the lower levels of government.
2.2 The Political Determinantsof Corruption
The theoretical literature on the determinants of corruption has experienced a
boom in the last decades, accompanying the increased interest in the topic in the
media. A large part of this literature has concentrated on the impact of different
institutional designs on corruption levels and on the political nature of corruption.
Here, we selectively review this literature, with the goal of setting up a theoretical
background to guide our empirical investigation. A broad review of the literature on
corruption is contained in Bardhan (1997).
The problem of corruption in the public sphere is almost a natural
consequence of the nature of government interventions. Transactions within the
government always imply some asymmetry of information between the parts
involved, and governments intervene precisely in situations where there are market
failures, such that private provision is not a good alternative (Banerjee, 1997). In this
context, corruption arises spontaneously as a consequence of the existence of rents
and monitoring failures. The possibility of rent extraction and the precise nature of
the informational problem depend on the political institutions, which determine the
incentives facing individuals dealing with and within the state. Ultimately, these
determine the responses of the political actors to corruption, and, thus, the
equilibrium level of corruption.
These effects of political institutions on corruption work mainly through two
channels. The first one is related to political accountability: any mechanisms that
increase political accountability, either by encouraging punishment of corrupt
individuals or by reducing the informational problem related to government activities,
tends to reduce the incidence of corruption. The other one is related to the structure of
provision of public goods: institutions generating a competitive environment in the
provision of the same public service tend to reduce the extraction of rents, therefore
reducing corruption via a straightforward economic competition mechanism. The
following discussion further explores these two points.
6
Political Accountability and Corruption
The political science and economics literatures have extensively discussed the
role of political accountability in generating good governance practices, and,
particularly, in reducing corruption (see, for example, Fackler and Lin, 1995; Linz
and Stepan, 1996; Nas et al, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; Persson et al, 1997;
Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Djankov et al, 2001; and Laffont and Meleu, 2001). The
central argument is that accountability allows for the punishment of politicians that
adopt "bad policies," thus aligning politicians' preferences with those of the
electorate. The degree of accountability in the system is determined, in turn, by the
specific features of the political system. Three main features can be identified in this
respect: the degree of competition in the political system, the existence of checks and
balances mechanisms across different branches of government, and the transparency
of the system.
The first point - political competition - has long been recognized as an
important factor determining the efficiency of political outcomes (Downs, 1957). In
brief, the simple existence of fair elections guarantees that politicians can, to some
extent, be held liable to the actions taken while in public office (Linz and Stepan,
1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Any institution that strengthens the harm imposed on
politicians by the loss of elections will, therefore, enhance the force of this reward
mechanism to control politicians' behavior. Rules (or institutions) that lengthen
politicians' time horizons increase the force of elections as a reward device. The more
the system biases politicians toward long-term goals, the higher are their incentives to
stick to good governance. For example, political systems that allow for executive reelections, or that make parties relatively stronger vis-a-vis candidates, should have
fewer myopic politicians, and, therefore, less corruption (Linz, 1990; Linz and Stepa,
1996; Bailey and Valenzuela 1997; and Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
The second point relates to the existence of checks and balances mechanisms
across different branches of power. Generally speaking, separation of powers,
together with checks and balances mechanisms and the right incentives design, help
prevent abuses of power, with different government bodies disciplining each other in
7
the citizens' favor (McGovern, 1907; Persson et al, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and
Laffont and Meleu, 2001). This can be true regarding the relations among the
executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and also regarding the relations among
different levels of the executive power. For example, parliamentary systems allow for
a stronger and more immediate monitoring of the executive by the legislature, which
should increase accountability and, therefore, reduce corruption (Linz, 1990; Linz and
Stepan, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997). As long as it is not in the interest of one
of the government branches to collude with the other branches, separation of powers
creates mechanisms to police and punish government officials that misbehave, thus
reducing the equilibrium level of corruption. Moreover, developing adequate checks
and balances for particular contexts may take time, either as a result of an institutional
learning process or because of some inertial feature of corruption (Tirole, 1996;
Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; and Treisman 2000). Political stability, in this case, is
also an important factor determining the efficacy of the checks and balances
mechanisms and the level of corruption.
The final point is related to transparency, which also increases the
accountability in the system. Transparency depends crucially on the freedom of press
and expression, and on the degree of centralization in the system. Freedom of press,
so that right- and wrong-doings on the part of the government can be publicized,
tends to reduce the informational problem between principals (citizens) and agents
(governments), thus improving governance and, particularly, reducing corruption
(Fackler and Lin, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Djankov et al, 2001). Evidence
on the real importance of freedom of press for political outcomes is presented, for
example, in Peters and Welch (1980), Fackler and Lin (1995), Giglioli (1996), and
Djankov et al (2001). Transparency can also be affected by decentralization, since
informational problems are smaller at the local level, which makes monitoring easier.
Smaller constituencies facilitate the monitoring of the performance of elected
representatives and public officials, and additionally reduce the collective action
problems related to political participation. Thus, in this sense, decentralized political
systems tend to have stronger accountability mechanisms and lower corruption (Nas
et al, 1996; and Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
8
Structure of Provision of Public Goods
Corruption usually represents the extraction of a rent by someone who is
vested with some form of public power. The political structure, besides determining
the incentives for politicians to fight corruption, also determines the "market
structure" of the provision of public goods, which determines the capacity of public
officials to extract rents from citizens. These are constraints that the institutional
design of the government imposes on officials and that affect the level of corruption
in a strictly economic way, which is equivalent to the effect of market structure on
price in a given industry.'
When several government agencies provide exactly the same service, and
citizens can freely choose where to purchase it, competition among agencies will
reduce corruption. In the limit, competition may drive corruption to zero, just as
perfect competition among firms drives price to marginal cost. This is the case of
different bureaucracies providing substitute services, and without any control over
each other or over the services provided by each other (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993;
and Weingast, 1995).
The other extreme is when different government agencies provide
complementary services. This occurs, for example, when different licenses have to be
obtained to perform the same job, or different spheres legislate over the same activity.
In this case, power is shared among different bureaucracies that extract rents from the
same single source, without taking into account its effects on the others. This
institutional set up increases corruption and the inefficiency of the system (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993).
These two structures can be associated with different types of decentralization
of power. The first one refers to situations where, for example, several offices
compete to issue the same license, so that each agency has lower monopoly power
over "license emissions", and, thus, corruption is lower. In its more intricate form,
competition among public services providers refers to situations where different
agencies compete for the same citizens or factors of production, and therefore their
Therefore, the term "industrial organization of corruption" sometimes applies to this kind of analysis.
9
ability to extract rents is reduced by the possibility of migration of these constituents
to other jurisdictions. The second structure, characterized by different agencies
providing complementary services, can be produced by decentralization when
different spheres of government are able to impose additional legislation on areas
already legislated by each other, thus increasing the number of bureaucracies that
citizens have to deal with to obtain a certain service.2
Decentralization will thus reduce corruption as long as power is decentralized
into units that can substitute (or compete with) one another and that do not have
overlapping responsibilities. In practice, political decentralization, in the sense of
enhancing the autonomy of local (or provincial) governments, tends to bring together
these two effects. On the one hand, it increases the ability of states to compete against
each other for citizens, and, on the other hand, it allows states to increase regulation
over areas already covered by the central government. Which effect predominates is
an empirical question.
Existing Empirical Evidence
The goal of this paper is to analyze how important these political institutions
are in determining perceived corruption. The point of departure is that the political
macrostructure determines the incentives facing politicians and high-level officials,
and their reaction to these incentives propagates the effects throughout the lower
levels of governrnent. The incentives are, therefore, reflected on the behavior of all
those who represent the state.
This question has not been analyzed by the existing empirical literature on the
determinants of corruption. This literature can be divided into two strands. One
correlates corruption with a large set of variables, and searches for the significant
2As pointed out by Ahlin (2001), this apparent contradiction in results does not really indicate a
theoretical indeterminacy in relation to the effects of decentralization on corruption. It indicates that
different types of political decentralization will have different effects on corruption. This point is
implicit in the discussion in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and is explicitly analyzed in Ahlin (2001). In
brief, political decentralization meaning that different bureaucracies/politicians compete for the
provision of the same "good" to citizens - be it a license or a place to live and work - will lead to
lower corruption; and political decentralization meaning that different bureaucracies provide
complementary goods - such as different agencies overlapping in the regulation of the same activity will lead to higher corruption.
10
coefficients, as in Treisman (2000). The other strand looks at specific policies and
analyzes their effects on corruption. These analyses of the more proximate
determinants of corruption have mostly concentrated on the effects of relative public
wages (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) and trade policies (Ades and di Tella,
1994; Laffont and N'Guessan, 1999).
None of these studies have asked the question that we propose here, and none
have analyzed the role of political variables.3 The main contribution of this paper is
its search for the ultimate determinants of corruption, in the form of the political
institutions that determine specific policies as well as political outcomes.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Indicators of Corruption
The greatest problem in the empirical analysis of corruption is the fact that,
for obvious reasons, there is no directly observable indicator. Any study of the subject
inevitably relies on some sort of survey. This would not be a problem if objective
data, such as from victimization surveys, were widely available. But victimization
surveys related to corruption are not so widespread as to allow the analysis of crosscountry variations in the incidence of corruption. Hence, existing studies rely on
subjective evaluation surveys, based on opinions of international businessmen, of
countries' citizens themselves, or of experts on country risk analysis.
In spite of their weakness, these subjective indicators have several positive
features. First, the results from surveys with very different methodologies are highly
correlated. This point is discussed in some detail in Treisman (2000), who explores
the correlation among several corruption indices. In Table 2, we follow his strategy
and calculate the pair wise correlation among a somewhat different group of
corruption indices for 1998.
use one core variablethat also appears in Treisman (2000),but our interpretationis quite
different.
3We
11
Table 2: Correlation Among Different Corruption Indices
ICRG
WDR
GALLUP
GCSI
GCS2
CRR-DRI
ICRG
I
WDR
0.58*
65
0.71*
43
0.64*
75
0.64*
53
0.63*
100
1
0.72*
25
0.78*
44
0.75*
31
0.75*
57
GALLUP
GCS I
GCS2
CRR-DRI
1
0.78*
35
0.83*
33
0.70*
41
1
0.90*
53
0.81*
64
1
0.79*
51
1
Notes: * - Significant at 1%. Number of observations below the correlations. Indices refer to 1998;
definitions contained in the Appendix.
These indices can be briefly described as follows: the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) measures corruption in the political system as a threat to foreign
investment; the World Development Report (WDR) measures corruption as an
obstacle to business; the GALLUP measures the frequency of cases of corruption
among public officials; the Global Competitiveness Survey (GCS) indices measure,
respectively, the frequency of irregular payments connected with imports, exports,
business licenses, police protection, loan applications, etc (GCS1), and the frequency
of irregular payments to officials and judiciary (GCS2); and the Country Risk Review
(CRR-DRI) measures corruption among public officials and effectiveness of
anticorruption initiatives. A more detailed description of these indices is contained in
the Appendix.
All the correlations are positive and significant at 1%, and with one exception
they are all above 0.6. The table suggests that the different indices are indeed
measuring something very similar. But in regard to exactly what they are measuring,
there is nevertheless the possibility that all the methodologies share the same bias.
This could be the case if the bias is caused by the use of subjective evaluation
methodologies. Since opinions expressed about corruption can be influenced, for
example, by the overall economic perfonnance of a specific country, the indices
could be partly capturing economic outcomes rather than corruption. Fortunately, this
does not seem to be the case. The correlation between the ICRG corruption index and
12
the growth rate of per capita GDP is very low and not statistically significant. If we
regress the ICRG on a constant and the growth rate, the coefficient on the growth rate
is -0.0098, with a p-value of 0.110.4 Although this evidence indicates that the indices
seem to be a reasonable measure of corruption, it is important to keep in mind their
potential limitations when interpretingthe results.
Besides this measurement problem, there is an issue of how to interpret the
indices themselves. Is the ordering of countries the only real meaning of the indices,
or is there some cardinal value attached to them? The question can be rephrased as
follows: if all countries achieve a low level of corruption, will all of them be assigned
the same value, or will different values yielding a raking of countries still be used?
We try to keep these issues in mind when choosing the estimation strategies and
interpreting the results.
From the indices discussed in Table 2, the analysis will concentrate on the
ICRG, which is the only one covering a reasonable time span (from 1984 to 1999 in
our data set). Even though the time variation in the corruption index tends to be small,
the period of the sample includes significant regime changes in some political
systems - Latin America and Eastern Europe for example - that can help us identify
the effects of the variables of interest. The use of a panel to analyze the determinants
of corruption is another original contribution of this work. Our corruption variable
(corruption) is constructed directly from the ICRG index, and varies discretely from 0
to 6, with higher values indicating more corruption.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical background that guides the estimation is an economy where
the political institutions are given, and, within this structure, policy and economic
decisions are made. The institutional design of the political system is the ultimate
determinant of corruption, because it shapes the incentives facing government
officials. Our set of core variables is related to these factors and tries to capture the
If country fixed effects are included, or lagged values of the growth rate are used, the same result
holds. If we estimate the relation using an ordered probit, the p-value is slightly lower (0.086), but the
coefficient remains quantitatively small. These results should not be interpreted as evidence that
corruption does not matter for economic development, because they do not provide estimates of the
true partial correlation.
4
13
main political issues discussed in section 2.2. To this set of variables, we add
sequentially controls that try to account for the effects of factors that might be
correlated with both political institutions and corruption.
The first set of additional control variables includes factors exogenous to
political structure and corruption that might simultaneously determine both. These
factors could generate a spurious correlation between corruption and political
institutions that we would interpret as a causal relationship, if we did not take them
into account. What we have in mind here are the popular accounts of corruption as
being largely determined by culture, traditions, etc. In principle, these cultural aspects
- related to natural characteristics, climate, region, and colonial heritage - may
determine both the prevalence of corruption and the political institutions in a given
society. If this is the case, the popular view that certain people and cultures are
intrinsically more corrupt is correct.
The other set of controls tries to account for the fact that policy is not
determined exclusively by political structure, and different policy choices may end up
having independent effects on corruption. This is clearly the case in relation to public
wages and trade policies, which have direct effects on the costs and benefits of
engaging in corrupt activities. These factors have been analyzed elsewhere - see Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) on public wages, and Ades and di Tella (1994) and
Laffont and N'Guessan (1999) on openness and competitiveness - but we introduce
them in our empirical analysis as additional controls for possible determinants of
corruption that may be correlated with political institutions. This is also the case for
the size of the government and the distribution of resources across the different levels
of government, which can be seen as affecting the total amount and centralization of
the rents that tempt public officials.
Finally, there is the possibility that corruption control is simply a normal
good, in the sense that when countries develop, corruption naturally falls. If certain
political institutions are correlated with development, this could bias the results by
assigning to political institutions effects that are actually caused by development
alone.
14
We classify these three sets of controls as, respectively, cultural, policy, and
development controls. In the estimation, we include first the cultural controls, which
represent structural factors, as country-group common effects.5 In turn, we include
separately the policy and development controls, and analyze whether and how the
results concerning the main variables of interest change. The empirical specification
is discussed in section 4.1.
3.3 Variables
Political Variables
With the exception of freedom of press, the political variables used here are
constructed from the data contained in Beck et al (2001). This study presents a
database covering several countries in the period between 1975 and 1999.
The political variables are defined in the following way (more precise
definitions of all the variables discussed in this section are contained in the
Appendix):
- Democracy (democ): dummy variable with value 1 if the country is democratic;
- Presidential democracy (presid): dummy variable with value I if the country is
democratic and has a presidential system;
- Reelection (reelect): dummy variable with value 1 if the country is a presidential
democracy and head of the executive can run for multiple terms;
- Democratic stability (dstab): time of uninterrupted democratic regime;
- Closed lists (lists): dummy variable assuming value 1 if country is democratic and
there are closed lists in the election of the legislature;
- State government (state):variable assuming value 0 if there are no local government
elections, value 1 if state legislature is locally elected but the executive is not, and
value 2 if both legislature and executive are locally elected;
- Executive control (control): dummy variable with value 1 if executive's party has
control of all relevant chambers of the legislature; and
A lot of the variation in political variables comes from cross-country differences, so we opted not to
include fixed effects in the analysis.
5
15
- Freedom of press (press): constructed from the freedom of press index from
Freedom House, with values ranging between 0 and 100 (with higher values
indicating more freedom).
Some of these variables are defined as subgroups of others. So, for example,
presidential system actually identifies the presence of a presidential system within a
democracy, or reelection is measuring the possibility of executive reelection within a
presidential democracy. The effect of these variables has, thus, to be interpreted as
conditional on the effect of the preceding one, as in "the effect of presidential system,
given that the country is democratic", and so on. This structure derives from our view
of the sequence of relevant choices in terms of political institutions. This view is
illustrated in the decision tree in Figure 1.
The variables democracy, reelection, and closed lists try to capture features of
the political system associated with electoral competition and the strength of political
parties, which tend to make elections a more effective instrument for distributing
political rewards. Democracy is the most basic measure of electoral competition, and
both reelections and closed lists are institutions that tend to increase the horizon of
politicians, thus increasing accountability. Reelections have a straightforward effect
in this direction, while closed lists make parties stronger, which in turn bias
politicians toward long term goals and increase the concerns about reputation. In
other words, the use of closed lists in legislative elections creates incentives for
individual politicians to worry about the reputation of the party as a whole, and thus
we expect lists to have a corruption reducing effect (Linz, 1990; Linz and Stepa,
1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Garman et al, 2001).
Presidential system, executive control of houses, and democratic stability are
variables determining the presence of checks and balances mechanisms in the system.
Presidential systems and executive control of the legislative houses make the
executive more independent and less subject to checks from other powers, thus
reducing accountability. Time of democratic stability allows for institutional learning
and development of checks and balances mechanisms adequate to the particular
culture and political tradition, thus increasing accountability, besides giving time for
other political institutions to have its effects completely felt (Linz, 1990; Linz and
16
Stepa, 1996; Tirole, 1996; Bailey and Valenzuela, 1997; Rose-Ackerman,
1999;
Garman et al, 2001).
Figure 1: Political Tree
Choiceof System
Democracy
Parliamentary
Autocracy
Presidential
Reelection
ClosedLists
No Reelection
No ClosedLists
ChoicesRegardingState/LocalElectionsand Freedomof Press
Freedom of press captures the transparency of the system. By increasing
transparency, freedom of press reduces the informational problem in the political
system, and increases accountability (Peters and Welch, 1980; Fackler and Lin, 1995;
Giglioli, 1996; and Djankiv et al, 2001).
State autonomy tries to capture the decentralization of the political system. As
mentioned, decentralization affects several different aspects of the political system.
First, decentralization tends to increase accountability via easier monitoring of
governments at the local level. Second, decentralization affects the structure of
17
provision of public goods, possibly simultaneously increasing the competition among
states and establishing overlapping bureaucracies from local and central governments.
These two forces have opposite effects on corruption, and which one predominates is
an empirical matter (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Weingast, 1995; Nas et al, 1996; and
Rose-Ackerman, 1999; and Ahlin, 2001).
These are the political variables that try to capture the aspects of political
institutions discussed in section 2.2. They constitute our main interest and the core
variables in our empirical investigation.
Control Variables
As mentioned, our control variables are classified into three groups: cultural,
policy, and development controls. The cultural controls include a large set of
variables related to climate, region, and ethnic characteristics of the countries. The
goal is to include a set of human and geographic variables as broad as possible, to
account for all the possible determinants of cultural traditions that may affect
simultaneously political institutions and the incidence of corruption. The variables
chosen are the following:
- Variables for natural conditions: region dummies (reg_*); landlocked country
dummy (landlock); longitude and latitude position of the country (longit and latit);
size of the country (area); tropical area dummy (tropic); and British legal tradition
dummy (leg_brit); all these variables are taken from the World Bank's Global
DevelopmentNetwork Growth Database; and
- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (elf): index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
from Collier and Hoefler (1998).
These variables try to capture natural factors that may directly or indirectly
affect a country's traditions, determining, for example, its "intrinsic" propensity
towards openness (landlock), or its colonization history (tropical, leg_brit, longit, and
latit). Additionally, other aspects of the country's history that may affect its human
and cultural compositions are considered, via its legal tradition and ethno-linguistic
fractionalization.
18
The policy controls concentrate on government wages, openness, and size and
composition of the government. These variables are represented by the following
series:
- Relative government wages (wages): government wages in relation to
manufacturing sector wages, from Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001);
- Economic openness (open): imports as a share of GDP, from the World Bank's
World Development Indicators;
- Size of the government (govrev): total government revenue as a share of the GDP,
from the IMF's GovernmentFinancial Statistics; and
- Expenditures decentralization (transfi: transfers from central government to other
levels of national government, as percentage of GDP, from the IMF's Government
Financial Statistics.
These variables try to control for aspects that elsewhere have been found to
affect corruption, such as government wages and openness, and for the size and
composition of the rents available for extraction (Ades and di Tella, 1994; Laffont
and N'Guessan, 1999; Treisman, 2000; and Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
The last set of control variables is related to development, and tries to capture
unspecified dimensions of development that may directly affect corruption. We
choose income and education measures as indicators of development levels. They are
defined as follows:
-
Income (lngdp): natural logarithm of the per capita GDP (PPP adjusted), from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators; and
- Education (tyrl5): average schooling in the population above 15, from the Barro and
Lee dataset.
19
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable
N Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
corruption
2082
2.67
1.40
0
6
democ
presid
2486
2490
0.49
0.21
0.50
0.41
0
0
1
1
reelect
2490
0.14
0.34
0
1
dstab
state
list
2275
1863
2367
12.66
0.75
0.22
19.63
0.83
0.41
0
0
0
68
2
1
control
2439
0.73
0.44
0
1
press
wages
open
govrev
transf
2237
436
2183
1217
1214
51.74
1.12
40.18
26.43
3.30
24.78
0.52
24.80
11.07
3.21
0
0.10
1.35
0.03
0
95
6.06
199.82
81.54
17.13
reg_eap
reg_eca
Reg_mena
2766
2766
2766
0.14
0.15
0.12
0.34
0.36
0.33
0
0
0
1
1
1
Max
reg_sa
2766
0.05
0.21
0
1
reg_ssa
2766
0.27
0.44
0
1
1
reglac
2766
0.17
0.37
0
landlock
2766
0.21
0.41
0
1
longit
latit
area
2606
2606
2606
18.45
17.56
178377
63.91
24.03
233792
-172.43
-36.89
105
177.97
63.89
977956
leg_brit
2622
0.32
0.47
0
1
0.50
0
1
2766
0.51
1968
41.89
29.45
0
93
Ingdp
2162
8.17
1.09
5.77
10.42
tyrl5
913
6.04
2.54
0.90
11.94
Notes: Variablesdefined in section 3.3, and explainedin detail in the Appendix.All
observationsavailablein the period1984-99usedinthe calculations.Regiondummiesreferto:
East Asia and Pacific,East Europeand CentralAsia,MiddleEast and North Africa,South
Asia,Sub-SaharanAfrica,andLatinAmericaandCaribbean.
tropic
elf
Descriptive Summary of the Data
Table 3 presents summary statistics of all the variables discussed above. Table
4 decomposes the standard deviations into within and between components, for those
variables that change across countries and time. The variables related to ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elj) and freedom of press (press) are country specific in
our sample due to data limitations.
20
Table 4: Between and Within Variation in the Data
Variable
N Countries
Std. Dev. of Country
Means (Between)
(1)
Mean of Country Std.
Deviations (Within)
(2)
(1)/(2)
(Btw/Wth)
0.52
2.30
0.20
0.15
0.13
2.39
0.07
0.08
0.11
0.14
7.42
2.77
0.89
0.20
0.28
2.09
2.26
2.02
7.86
11.58
4.66
3.53
3.32
3.14
3.89
3.21
5.33
9.14
corruption
146
1.20
democ
179
179
179
179
157
178
178
62
164
112
102
154
83
0.41
0.33
0.26
18.76
0.80
0.37
0.39
0.46
23.28
10.78
2.84
1.06
2.54
presid
reelect
dstab
state
list
control
wages
open
govrev
transf
lngdp
tyrI5
Notes: Variables defined in section 3.3, and explained in detailed in the Appendix. All observations available in the
period 1984-99 used in the calculations.
Despite the usual claim that corruption does not vary at all within a country,
Table 4 shows that the ratio of between to within variation for the corruption index is
actually lower than the same ratio for most of the explanatory variables, besides the
political variables. Although this is probably caused partly by the discrete and limited
nature of the variable itself, it shows that there is some time variation to be explored
in the corruption index. Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting the evolution of the
corruption index through time by regions of the world (simple averages for the
countries belonging to the respective region). Although there seems to be some comovements of the series across the different regions, there are also some independent
patterns. For example, as Latin America and South Asia experienced a decline in
corruption since the late 80's, Western Europe and North America experienced a
slight increase during the same period. Hence, the time dimension of the data seems
to present enough variation to justify its exploration.
21
Figure 2: Evolution of Corruption by Regions of the World, 1984-99
4.5
3.5
=
2
1.5
10,5
0
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
year
| * EastAsia and Pacific
x SouthAsia
-- 0-Latin America and Caribbean
+East
Europe and Central Asia
West Europe and North America
I
Middle East and North Africa
Su-SaharanAfrica
We also try to summarize here the simple pair-wise relation between the
corruption index and the main explanatory variables. For the dichotomous political
variables, Table 5 presents the mean of the corruption index for mutually exclusive
categories, and indicates for which cases the difference between the means is
statistically significant.
The simple difference in means goes generally in the expected direction:
democracy, the possibility of reelection, and the existence of local elections are
associated with lower corruption, while presidential system and government control
of all houses are associated with higher corruption than their respective control
groups. Closed lists do not appear to be significantly correlated with corruption.
Table 6 presents the correlation of the other main explanatory variables with
the corruption index. Most of the correlations also have the expected sign: democratic
stability, freedom of press, relative wages in the public sector, economic openness,
transfers from central to other levels of government, income level, and education are
associated with lower corruption, while ethno-linguistic fractionalization is associated
with higher corruption. The correlation between government revenues as a share of
22
GDP and corruption is surprisingly negative and significant. Some endogenous
response of government expenditures to the level of corruption is probably at work
here, so that less corrupt governments end up having higher revenues as a share of
GDP.
Table 5: Mean of the Corruption Index across Different Political Institutions
Group
democ*
0
presid*
0
1
1
reelect*
0
state*
control*
0
1
0
list
0
1
1
1
N Obs
802
972
538
434
197
238
543
801
543
1200
435
468
Mean
3.25
2.11
1.58
2.76
2.97
2.58
3.01
2.03
1.72
3.02
1.98
2.09
Std. Err.
0.0409
0.0447
0.0613
0.0497
0.0681
0.0689
0.0619
0.0452
0.0595
0.0358
0.0693
0.0629
Notes: * - Difference between group means is statistically significant at 1%.
Value I indicates that the observation is included in the respective categoTy.
For presidential system and closed lists, averages calculated only on the subsample of democratic countries. For reelection, averages calculated only on
the sub-sample of presidential democratic countries. For state elections, group
I defined as to include groups 1 and 2 definedbefore.
Table 6: Correlation between Corruption Index and Explanatory Variables
Variable
dstab
press
wages
open
govrev
transf
elf
Ingdp
tyrl5
Correlation with
Corruption Index
-0.6465*
-0.5727*
-0.2335*
-0.0977*
-0.4820*
-0.4215*
0.3235*
-0.5991*
-0.6471*
N Obs
1752
1711
369
1670
1035
697
1705
1624
835
Notes: * - Significant at 1%. Correlations calculated
using pooled data.
The political variables time of democratic stability and freedom of press are
very strongly related to corruption in the pooled data. This is also true for the simple
cross sectional relation based on country averages. Figures 3 and 4 plot the within
country averages of dstab and press against the within country average of corruption,
23
and fits a linear regression to each of these cross-sectional relations. The negative
correlations between these two variables and corruption are clear.
Figure 3: Cross-sectional Relation between Democratic Stability and Corruption,
Country Averages
6
5 l
4 WxKx
x
xx
x
x *x
n 3
x
x
x1)
~*
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
yearsof democraticstability
At a superficial level, most of the selected variables have a relation with
corruption that is similar to what is theoretically plausible. Accountability has a
strong negative correlation with corruption, which suggests that political variables
may be in fact important in determining the prevalence of corruption. Whether this is
a causal relationship or a spurious correlation is the question that we try to address in
the remaining sections of the paper. In what follows, we discuss the specification
adopted in our multivariate analysis of the political determinants of corruption, and
discuss the results.
24
Figure 4: Cross-sectionalRelation between Freedom of Press and Corruption,
Country Averages
6
0
~~~~~~~~~~~0
5
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4
$
0
o
T~~~~~~~~~~
-u
0
i~~0
0
0~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~00
08
0
00
60
70
0~~~~~~~
2o0
o
0~~~~~~~~~~
0
10
20
30
40
50
80
90
100
freedomot pressindex
4 Specification and Results
4.1 Specification
The ICRG corruption index varies discretely between 0 and 6. Strictly
speaking, it cannot be treated as a continuousvariable. With this in mind, we estimate
the model using ordered probit and simple OLS techniques, following the approach of
Dull (1999). The ordered probit allows for a dependent variable in which the actual
values are irrelevant, except that higher values correspond to higher outcomes. Given
that the precise meaning of the cardinal values in the corruption index is unclear, this
is another feature of this class of models that is adequate for our purposes (for details
on ordered probit models, see Maddala, 1983).
25
Table 7: Results: CorruptionRegressions
democ
(1)
-0.1580
reelect
dstab
state
list
control
press
0.3149
0.0000
1.0367
0.4324
1.2732
1.1194
0.1030
0.0000
0.2028
0.0330
0.3340
0.0000
0.2710
0.0000
-0.2244
0.0429
-0.3354
0.1375
0.1810
0.2929
0.1030
0.8130
-0.0340
0.0024
0,0000
(8)
-0.6140
0.9261
0.3591
0.7589
0.8403
0.0907
0.0000
0.1679
0.0330
0.2237
0.0010
0.2150
0.0000
-0.3062
-0.2329
0.0385
-0.1668
-0.2676
0.2609
0.1254
0.1477
0.2153
0.2149
0.2520
0,2410
0.0630
0.7940
0.4390
0.2140
-0.0423
-0.0410
-0.0453
-0.0272
-0.0307
-0.0234
-0.0284
0.0032
0.0055
0.0049
0.0019
0.0022
0.0033
0.0035
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0968
0.1525
0.4359
0.1625
-0.1039
0.0828
0.1693
0.0759
0.0425
0.0543
0.1015
0.0768
0.0370
0.0407
0.0618
0.0557
0.0230
0.0050
0.0000
0.0340
0.0050
0.0420
0.0060
0.1730
-0.1654
0.0426
-0.0817
0.3171
-0.1553
-0.0018
-0.0501
0.1937
0.0860
0.1035
0.1733
0.1472
0.0683
0.0689
0.0904
0.0909
0.0550
0.6810
0.6370
0.0310
0.0230
0.9790
0.5800
0.0330
0.1628
-0.0574
-0.4270
-0.1001
0.1419
-0.0413
-0.3092
-0.0667
0.0955
0.0880
0.1068
0.5910
0.1864
0.0220
0.1429
0.4830
0.0825
0.0860
0.0808
0.6090
0.1112
0.0060
0.1028
0.5170
-0.0113
-0.0056
-0.0210
-0.0014
-0.0099
-0.0043
-0.0152
-0.0006
0.0022
0.0031
0.0061
0.0043
0.0020
0.0024
0.0042
0.0033
0.0000
0.0690
0.0010
0.7500
0.0000
0.0740
0.0000
0.8500
open
0.1195
0.0820
OLS
(6)
(7)
-0.4598 -1.2111
0.2009
0.0000
transf
0.2368
0.0030
(5)
-0.2078
0.1227
0.0000
govrev
0.0389
0.0239
0.0098
0.0000
0.0065
0.0000
-0.0632
-0.0184
0.0221
0.0110
0.0040
0.0950
0.0000
-0.0015
0.0030
0.9930
0.0019
0.4510
lngdp
tyrS5
0.1870
0.0010
-0.1826
-0.1940
0.1412
0.1960
0.1056
0.0670
-0.1090
-0.0469
0.0443
0.0140
0.0304
0.1230
0.2598
0.3293
0.6279
0.1518
0.1735
0.3470
0.1122
0.0210
0.2510
0.1900
0.1672
0.0000
0.0844
0.0730
0.1485
0.2430
0.1216
0.0040
0.0123
0.0210
0.0109
0.0100
0.0132
0.0103
0.0021
0.0040
0.0029
0.0016
0.0024
0.0020
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
1158
0.24
1010
0.33
490
0.45
605
0.38
1158
0.57
1010
0.70
490
0.79
605
0.74
leg brit
elf
period dummies
reg/nature vars
N Obs
Pseudo R2/R2
(4)
-0.7097
0,1547
0.0010
0.1302
0.2250
presid
Ordered Probit
(2)
(3)
-0.5238 -1.8054
Obs.: Std errors and p-values below coefficients. Dep var is ICRG corruption index, (0 to 6, higher values more corruption). Ind
vars are (d for dummy): democracy d, presidential d, possibility of reelection d, time of democratic stability, indicator of local
gov
elections for state govs, gov control of legislative d, freedom of press index, gov revenues (% GDP), transfers from central
to other levels (% GDP), openness to trade (imports as % GDP), In of per capita GDP, avg schooling in the pop above 15, British
legal tradition d, index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, period d's, region d's (E Asia and Pacif, E Eur and C Asia, M East
and N Afr, S Asia, Sub-Saharan Afr, and L Am and Carib), and nature variables (landlock d, area, tropical d, long, and lat).
govrev, transf, open, Ingdp, and tyrl15lagged. Regressions include all obs availablebetween 1984-97. Robust std errors used.
26
As discussed in se tion 3.2, four different specifications are adopted, to check
the robustness of the results to different alternative hypotheses. In brief, the first
equation contains only the core variables, the second specification contains the core
variables and the cultural controls, the third specification adds the policy controls, and
the last specification substitutes the development for the policy controls. In all
specifications, dummy variables for different sub-periods of the sample are included
(1987-90, 1991-94, and 1995-97), to account for possible spurious co-movements of
the corruption index across countries. Also, the economic variables (govrev, transf
open, lngdp, and tvrl 5) are included with a lag of one period, to account for potential
problems of endogeneity.
Table 7 presents the results of the regressions. Columns (1) to (4) present the
different specifications mentioned above for the ordered probit model, and columns
(5) to (8) present the same specifications for the OLS estimates. Since the qualitative
results are virtually the same across the ordered probit and OLS estimates, we
concentrate our discussion on the OLS results, which provide a more intuitive
interpretation of the coefficients. The variable relative to government wages (wvages)
is not presented in the table above because it enormously reduces the sample, but
likewise, we discuss its effect on the estimates. The following discussion also
mentions how certain results change when the models are estimated with different
samples.
4.2 Results
Political Variables
Table 7 shows that the most consistent results regarding the political variables
are related to democracy, presidential systems, time of democratic stability. and
freedom of press. The estimated coefficients in columns (4) to (8) imply the following
relations between these variables and perceived corruption: democracy reduces
corruption by 0.7 points; presidential systems in a democracy, as opposed to
parliamentary systems, increase corruption by 0.8 points; each additional 20 years ol
27
uninterrupted democracy reduce corruption by 0.5 points; and 50 points more in the
freedom of press index (as from the level of Turkey to the level of the United
Kingdom) reduces corruption by 0.5 points. These main results are robust to the
inclusion of the government wages variable in the right hand side, which typically
reduces the sample to less than 200 observations.
Using a common yardstick to translate these results into comparable units, and
looking at the average values of the coefficients in Table 7, we have that a one
standard deviation increase in the democracy variable, or a one standard deviation
reduction in the presidential systems variable, reduces the corruption index by
approximately 0.3. A one standard deviation increase in the time of democratic
stability reduces the corruption index by 0.54, while a one standard deviation increase
in the freedom of press index reduces it by 0. 19. If we restrict ourselves to the within
country variation in these variables, which probably gives a more accurate picture of
the extent of political changes typically happening in the short run, a one (within
country) standard deviation increase in these variables has the following effect on the
corruption index: a reduction of 0.12 for democracy, an increase of 0.11 for
presidential systems, and a reduction of 0.07 for democratic stability. Overall, time of
democratic stability seems to be the variable with the most important effect on
corruption, although if we look only at within country changes, democracy and
presidential systems become more important.
The effects of presidential system and democratic stability are reasonably
stable across all specifications. The effect of democracy starts being insignificant in
the simplest specification, and only becomes significant once controls are introduced.
There seems to be cultural factors that determine simultaneously democracy and
corruption, but democracy alone, once these natural factors are accounted for, reduces
corruption. With freedom of press, the case is the opposite. Freedom of press is
significantly related to less corruption in the first three specifications, but once
economic development is taken into account, its effect falls to close to zero, and is not
28
statistically significant anymore.6 The results suggest that freedom of press may be
actually capturing the effect of economicdevelopment on corruption.
Also worthy of note, but apparently less strong than the previous results, is the
effect of local government autonomy. It starts being negative and borderline
significant in the simplest specification, and becomes positive and significant (for
most of the cases) as additional controls are introduced. This means that cultural
factors correlated with decentralization are also correlated with less corruption: the
simple correlation between corruption and state autonomy is negative, but once these
cultural factors are accounted for, the independent effect of decentralization becomes
positive. This suggests that the congestion of different bureaucracies regulating the
same activities dominates the other potential effects of decentralization. However,
this result has to be interpreted with caution, because it is partly due to changes in the
sample. If we run the simplest specification in the smaller samples used in columns
(6) to (8), the effect of state autonomy becomes positive, although statistically
significant in only one of the cases.
Control Variables
As expected, size of the government (govrev) increases corruption, while
distribution of resources from the central government to other levels of national
government (trans]) reduces corruption. This last effect may be associated with the
fact that monitoring at the local level is easier than at the central level, so that more
resources used by local government translates into more resources falling under
closer control by citizens. Together with the state autonomy variable (state), this
variable may be decomposing different dimensions of decentralization: while state
captures the autonomy of the state to interfere on spheres already being partly
legislated by the central government (which might increase inefficiency and
corruption), transf captures the distribution of a given amount of resources between
central and local governments (which might increase accountability and reduce
corruption).
The behavior of the democracy and freedom of press coefficients is not due to changes in the sample
when new variables are included. They still hold when the different specifications are run with the
same restricted sample.
6
29
The effects of economic openness and British legal tradition do not agree with
commonplace results from the previous literature. Openness has no significant effect
here, while it was found to reduce corruption in Ades and di Tella (1994) and Laffont
and N'Guessan (1999). This difference is not spuriously generated by different
samples or statistics used: if we omit the political variables from our regression,
openness does show up as having a negative and significant effect on corruption.
The negative effect of British legal tradition on corruption, which is one of the
main results in Treisman (2000) via the variable history of British colonization, is
also absent here: British legal tradition usually appears as having a positive and
significant effect in our regressions. Again, this is not due to differences in the data
used: if we omit the political variables from our regression, British legal tradition
does show up as having a negative and significant effect on corruption.
In our view, these differences come from the distinct conceptual and empirical
approaches that we adopted. Political institutions are the main exogenous force
shaping the incentive structure that determines both corruption and the
implementation of specific policies. Thus, in our sample, openness is correlated with
democracy, parliamentary systems, freedom of press, and absence of corruption, but
the political variables seem to be determining openness and corruption, rather than
the other way around. In the vast majority of cases, political variables seem to be
clearly more exogenous than trade policies.
Also, rather than having a direct negative effect on corruption, British legal
tradition is strongly associated with democracy, stability, freedom of press, and
parliamentary systems, and these political variables tend to reduce corruption.7 Thus,
once the political system is taken into account, the culture associated with the British
legal tradition by itself seems in fact to increase corruption. Analyzed alone, the
informality of the British law, where practices are strongly based on unwritten rules,
Both openness and British legal tradition are significantly correlated to the abovementioned political
variables. For all cases mentioned, pair-wise correlations are statistically significant at 1%, apart from
freedom of press, for which correlations are smaller and only significant at the 5% level.
30
seems to be more subject to corruption than other traditions, where rules are explicitly
defined. Therefore, our result should not be surprising.8 9
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the link between political institutions and corruption. We
show that the behavior of corruption is very distinct from the behavior of common
crimes, and argue that this indicates the relevance of explanatory variables that are
unique to corruption. These factors are mainly associated with the environment in
which relations between individuals and the state take place. Political institutions, by
determining this environment, are extremely important in determining the incidence
of corruption. Ultimately, the political macrostructure - related to the political
system, balance of powers, electoral competitiveness, and so on - determines the
incentives for those in office to be honest, and to police and punish misbehavior of
others, such that the effects are propagated throughout the system to the lower levels
of government.
We analyze the available data on corruption, and argue that, despite its
limitations, the evidence suggests that it measures something close to perceived
corruption. The empirical analysis using panel data based on the ICRG corruption
index indicates that corruption tends to decrease systematically with democracy,
8
Similar results are obtained when government relative wages are included in the regression. With a
more extendedset of "structural" independent variables, the effect of wages tends to be insignificant,
although even positive significant results sometimes emerge. When the political variables are excluded
from the regression, the effect of government wages becomes negative and borderline significant. But
in this case, due to the limited number of observations on wages, it is difficult to tell how much of the
result comes from the change in the sample, and how much comes precisely from the inclusion of
different sets of independent variables. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, all the main results on the
core variables survive to the inclusion of wages in the regression. For this reason, and because of the
instability of this coefficient across different specifications, we omit the regressions including wages in
Table 7.
9 In relation to the regional dummies, the most consistent results across the different specifications
refer to "East Europe and Central Asia" and "Latin America and the Caribbean." Both these regions
have higher level of perceived corruption than would be expected from the values of the other
independent variables. The estimated coefficients imply that, for constant values of the other variables,
"East Europe and Central Asia" and "Latin America and the Caribbean" have corruption indices
approximately I point higher than the control group (West Europe and North America). There seems to
be some truth to the popular belief that these places of the world have a particularly acute problem of
corruption.
31
parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press. We control for
different sets of variables that may determine simultaneouslypolitical institutions and
corruption, or that may be correlated with both. These controls include a large set of
cultural and natural factors (from region and climate, to legal tradition and ethnic
composition), a set of policy variables, and development variables. The inclusion of
such a large set of controls is possible due to the unprecedented use of a panel in this
type of analysis. Of the results mentioned before, all but the one related to freedom of
press survive the inclusion of the different sets of controls. Freedom of press seems to
be partially capturing the effect of economic development on corruption.
Another effect suggested by the empirical analysis, but that needs further
investigation to be confirmed, is the one related to decentralization. In accordance
with the theoretical literature, the analysis hints at the fact that different types of
decentralization may have different effects on corruption. Political decentralization in
the sense that states are more autonomous, potentially being able to legislate over
areas already covered by the central government, seems to increase corruption, while
decentralization in the sense that expenditures are more decentralized through the
different levels of national government seems to reduce corruption.
The inclusion of political variables in the empirical analysis of the
determinants of corruption turns out to be refreshing. Justifying all the attention given
by the theoretical literature to the institutional determinants of corruption (referenced
in section 2.2), our results indicate that political variables are indeed among the most
important determinants of corruption across countries and over time. After political
institutions are accounted for, variables usually found to be important determinants of
corruption - such as openness, wages i;l the public sector, and legal tradition - loose
virtually all their relevance. These results are robust to controls for regions of the
world, natural characteristics, economic development, ethnic composition, etc. In a
nutshell, political institutions really matter because they establish the monitoring and
accountability mechanisms, which in turn reduce the incentives for corruption by
public servants.
From a policy viewpoint, this study should raise the attention given to
accountability mechanisms more generally. For example, future research could
32
explore whether agencies subject to different accountability mechanisms (such as
transparency standards) within a given country also differ in terms of the corruption
they engender. Moreover, discussions of political decentralization should bear in
mind the distinct effects that different forms of decentralization might have. Efforts
should be targeted at creating competition in all levels of the political structure,
avoiding regulations in which different agencies - or levels of power - have
overlapping jurisdictions. Finally, although the effect of freedom of press in our data
might be the product of development, this finding should not deter efforts to
strengthen the ability of civil society to monitor the performance of the public sector.
Nevertheless, the results do indicate that political institutions matter, and that
some political systems are likely to be associated with lower levels of corruption over
time. Thus, anti-corruption efforts to be undertaken are likely to succeed more readily
in some systems than in others.
33
Appendix: Data
Name
Variable
Source
Description
Corruption
CRR-DRI Corrluption
GALLUP Corruption
Standardand Poor's
DRI'McGraw-Hill
Gallup International
.
Corruption among public officials, effectiveness of anticorruption initiatives.
Based onicountry analysts'oinion. Detailed in Kaufmaniet al (19991
Frequency of "cases of corruption"among public officials. Based on survey of
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~citizens.
DetailedinKaufmran
et a] (1999).
GCSI
Corruiption
Global Competitiveness
Survey
Irregular, additional paymentsconnected with import and export permits,
business licenises,excliangecontrols, tax assessments, police protection or loan
GCS2
Corrtiption
Global Competitiveniess
Survey
Intemational Country Risk
Guide
World Development Report
1997,
Frequency of "irregularpayments" to officials andjudiciary. Based on survey of
enterprises. Detailed in Kaufman et al (1999).
Indicator related to financial risk associated with this factor based on the
anialysisof worldwide network of experts. Detailed in ICRG (1999).
Corruptiolsas "obstacle to bissiness". Based on firms' survey. Detailed in
Kaufman et a[ (1999).
Beck et al (2001)
Political
Duinmy indicating whetlier executivehas control of all houses.
applicatioiis.
Basedonsurveyof enterprises.Detailedin Kaufmanet al ( 1999).
ICRG
Corrtiption
._________________________
WDR
Corruption
control
Executive Control of
Legislative Houses
Democracy
democ
Beck et al (2001)
Dtimmy for a regime with democraticcharacteristics, not run by a military
officer.
dstab
Tine of Democratic
Beck et al (2001)
Years of democratic stability
Beck et al (2001)
Beck et al (2001)
Beck et al (2001)
Beck et al (2001)
Dummy for existence of closed lists in a democraticregime.
Dummy foTa presidential democracy.
Dummyfor possibility of reelectioniin a presidential democracy.
Variable indicating the degree of state political autonomy(0 if there are no local
elections,I if legislature is locally elected, atid 2 if botli legislature attd
are locally elected).
WorldBasikGlobal
Development Network
Growth Database
Collier and Hoeffler (1998)
Counitryarea in square km's.
Stability
list
presid
reelect
state
_
Closed Lists
Presidential System
Reelection
State Autonomy
=_______executive
Controls
area
Area
elf
Ethno-liiguiistic
Fractionalization
Freepress index
frpress
FreedomHouse
_
gdppc
lincomc
World Development
Indicators
govrev
Size of the Government IMF FinanicialGovernment
Statistics
[landlock Latsdlocked
World Bank Global
Development Network
Growth Database
latitu[de Latitide
World Bank Global
Development Network
Growth Database
leg brith British Legal Tradition World Bank Global
Development Network
Growth Database
longitude Lonigitude
World Bank Global
Development NetwoTk
Growth Database
open
FradeOpenness
WorldDevelopment
tndicators
reg_'
Regionis
WorldBank Global
DevelopmentNetwork
Growth Database
tranisf
Expeniditure
IMF Financial Governiment
'Decentralization
Statistics
tropic
Tropical Climate
World Bank Global
Development Network
Growth Database
trI 5
Education
Barro and Lee
wages
Relative Government Van Rijckeghemand Weder
Wages
(2001) and ILO
burglary
BuirglaryRate
theft
Theft Rate
coit. crine Cotitact Crimes Rate
ItrternationalCrime
Victimization SLurveys
International Crime
Victimization Surveys
International Crime
Victimization Surveys
Ettsno-linguisticFractionalization Index: probability that any two random
citizens will be drawn fromndifferent ethno-linguistic grouns.
Freedom of press itidex obtained from the HDI. Based oti academic advisors, in-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~house
experts,publications,
andlocalcorrespondents.
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $).
Total government revenue as % of GDP.
Dummy for landlocked countries.
Country latittidein degrees.
Dummy for British legal tradition.
Coulitry latitude in degrees.
Imports as share of GDP.
Dtimmies for regions of thieworld.
Transfers from central government to other levels of national government as %
of GDP.
Dummy for tropical countries (absolute value of latitude less than or equal to
23).
Average Schooling in the population above 15.
Government wages relative to manifacturing wages.
Crime
Percentage of the populationvictim of burglaries.
Percentage of the populationvictim of thefts.
Percentage of the populationvictim of contact crimes.
34
References
Ahlin, Christian. 2000. "Corruption: Political determinants and macroeconomic
effects." Unpublished manuscript. Department of Economics, University of
Chicago, Chicago, IL.
Bai, Chong-En, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2000. "Quality of bureaucracy and openeconomy macro policies." NBER Working Paper 7766. NBER, Cambridge, MA.
Bailey, John, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1997. "The shape of the future." Journal of
Democracy v8, n4 (October 1997): 43-57.
Banerjee, Abhijit. 1997. "A theory of misgovernance." Quarterly Journal of
Economics vl 12, n4 (November 1997): 1289-1332.
Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. "Corruption and development: A review of issues." Journal
of Economic Literature v35, n3 (September 1997): 1320-1346.
Beck, Thorstenm, George Clark, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh.
2001. "New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political
institutions." World Bank Economic Review v15, nl: 165-176.
Bliss, Christopher, and Rafael Di Tella 1997. "Does competition kill corruption?"
Journal of Political Economy, v105, n5 (October 1997): 1001-1023.
Burki, Shahid, and Guillermo Perry. 1998. Beyond the Washington Consensus:
Institutions Matter. Washington DC: World Bank.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. "On economic causes of civil war." Oxford
Economic Papers, 50 (1998): 563-573.
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, and Andrei Shleifer. 2001.
"Who owns the media?" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2620.
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. "An economic theory of political action in a democracy."
Journal of Political Economy v65, n2 (April 1957): 135-150.
Dutt, Pushan. 1999. "The consequences of trade and industrial policies for
corruption." Doctoral Dissertation. Department of Economics, New York
University, New York, NY.
Fackler, Tim, and Tse-mim Lin. 1995. "Political corruption and presidential elections,
1929-1992." Journal of Politics v57, n4 (November 1995): 971-993.
Garman, Christopher, Stephan Haggard, and Eliza Willis. 2001. "Fiscal
decentralization - A political theory with Latin American cases." World Politics
53 (Januay 2001): 205-236.
Giglioli, Pier Paolo. 1996. "Political corruption and the media: the Tangentopoli
affair." International Social Science Journal v48 (September 1996): 381-394.
International Country Risk Guide - ICRG. 1999. "Brief guide to the rating system."
ICRG.
35
Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kray, and Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n. 1999. "Governance matters."
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper n2196. World Bank, Washington,
DC.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Mathieu Meleu. 2001. "Separation of powers and
development." Journal of Development Economics v64 (2001): 129-145.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Tchetche N'Guessan. 1999. "Competition and corruption
in an agency relationship." Journal of Development Economics v60 (1999): 271295.
Linz, Juan. 1990. "The virtues of parliamentarism." Journal of Democracy vi, n4
(Fall 1990): 84-92.
Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan. 1996. "Toward consolidated democracies." Journal of
Democracy v7, n2 (April 1996): 14-33.
Maddala, G. S.. 1983. Limited-dependentand Qualitative Variables in Econometrics.
Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
Mauro, Paolo. 1995. "Corruption and growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics vl 10,
n3 (August 1995): 681-712.
McGovern, Francis. 1907. "Legal repression of political corruption." Proceedings of
the American Political Science Association v4, n4 (Annual Meeting 1907): 266276.
Nas, Tevfik, Albert Price, and Charles Weber. 1986. "A policy-oriented theory of
corruption." American Political Science Review v80, nl (March 1986): 107-119.
Persson, Torstein, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabelini. 1997. "Separation of powers
and political accountability." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vl 12, n4
(November 1997): 1163-1202.
Peters, John, and Susan Welch. 1980. "The effect of charges of corruption on voting
behavior in congressional elections." American Political Science Review, v74, n3
(September 1980): 697-708.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences,
and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. 1993. "Corruption." Quarterly Journal of
Economics v108, n3 (August 1993): 599-617.
Tirole, Jean. 1996. "A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the
persistence of corruption and to firm quality)." Review of Economic Studies v63,
nl (January 1996): 1-22.
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study." Journal
of Public Economics 76 (2000): 399-457.
Van Rijckeghem, Caroline, and Beatrice Weder. 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and
the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how
much?" Journal of Development Economics v65 (2001): 307-331.
36
Weingast, Barry. 1995. "The economic role of political institutions: Marketpreserving federalism and economic growth." Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 11 (April 1995): 1-31.
37
Policy Research Working Paper Series
Title
Contact
for paper
Author
Date
DavidEllerman
October2001
B. Mekuria
82756
WPS2694FinancialDevelopmentand Financing Inessa Love
Constraints:InternationalEvidence
from the StructuralInvestmentModel
October2001
K. Labrie
31001
WPS2695Trade,Credit, FinancialIntermediary RaymondFisman
Development,and IndustryGrowth Inessa Love
October2001
K. Labrie
31001
WPS2696Firmsas FinancialIntermediaries:
EvidencefromTradeCredit Data
October2001
K. Labrie
31001
October2001
L. Tabada
36896
WPS2693 HelpingPeopleHelpThemselves:
Towarda Theoryof AutonomyCompatibleHelp
Asli Demirgoc-Kunt
VojislavMaksimovic
WPS2697RegionalIntegrationand Industrial
DorsatiH. Madani
GrowthamongDevelopingCountries:
The Caseof ThreeASEANMembers
WPS2698 ForeignBankEntry: Experience,
GeorgeClarke
October2001
Implicationsfor DevelopingCountries,RobertCull
and Agendafor FurtherResearch
MariaSoledadMartinezPeria
SusanaM. Sanchez
P. Sintim-Aboagye
38526
WPS2699 Benefitsand Costs of International Pierre-RichardAgenor
FinancialIntegration:Theoryand Facts
October 2001
M. Gosiengfiao
33363
WPS2700 BusinessCycles,EconomicCrises, Pierre-Richard
Agenor
and the Poor:Testingfor Asymmetric
Effects
October2001
M. Gosiengfiao
33363
WPS2701Tradeand Production,1976-99
AlessandroNicita
MarceloOlarreaga
November2001
L. Tabada
36896
WPS2702 Productivityversus Endowments:
A Study of Singapore'sSectoral
Growth,1974-92
HiauLooiKee
November2001
L. Tabada
36896
FionaWoolf
WPS2703 IntegratingIndependentPower
Producersinto EmergingWholesale JonathanHalpern
PowerMarkets
November2001
EnergyHelp Desk
30652
WPS2704RegulatoryGovernanceand Chile's
1998-99 ElectricityShortage
November2001
G. Chenet-Smith
36370
November2001
G. Chenet-Smith
36370
RonaldFischer
AlexanderGaletovic
WPS2705ConcessionContractRenegotiations:Antonio Estache
Some Efficiencyversus Equity
LuciaQuesada
Dilemmas
Policy Research Working Paper Series
Title
WPS2706HouseholdIncomeDynamics
in RuralChina
Contact
for paper
Author
Date
Jyotsna Jalan
MartinRavallion
November2001
C. Cunanan
32301
November2001
A. Yaptenco
38526
WPS2707FinancialIntermediaryDevelopment ThorstenBeck
and GrowthVolatility:Do
MattiasLundberg
Intermediaries
Dampenor Magnify
GiovanniMajnoni
Shocks?