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BACK HOME: PSYCHOSOCIAL
ASPECTS OF THE EXILES’
RETURN TO ARGENTINA
Hector Maletta
Frida Szwarcberg
Rosalia Schneider
Much of the literature on return migration focuses on the material
aspects of resettlement and reintegration (Kubat, 1984; Rogers and
Pessar, 1987). In this study of repatriation to Argentina, we explore
another, inadequately treated, dimension of return migration: the psychosocial readjustment of the repatriate. Drawing on our case studies of
Argentines who have returned from political exile, we present a series
of hypothetical propositions about exile and return. These propositions
are informed by psychoanalytical and psychosocial thinking on exile,
identity, and stigma.
Before presenting these propositions, we will provide some background material on the estimated numbers of Argentine emigrants and
returnees. We will also briefly review the political and economic conditions that promoted these population movements. Finally, we will
present some background material on the returnees who were included
in our study.
In the middle of the 198Os, almost one-half million Argentines were
residing outside of the country in different parts of the world. More
than half had emigrated after 1970 (Bertoncello et al., 1985). A part of
this population was comprised of political exiles pushed out by the violence and repression that ruled the country in the 1970s.
The-socioeconomic composition of the emigrant population includes
a high proportion of technical and professional persons (See, Oteiza,
1971; Houssay, 1966; and Marshall, 1987). The majority of the emigrants travel in search of better economic and professional opportunities. A high proportion lives in the United States whose 1970 census
registered 70,000 Argentines. Argentine consulates registered more
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than 500,000 persons living abroad in 1982; this figure probably involves a degree of exaggeration, since some who returned to Argentina
or moved to another country remain registered at the consulates. This
may explain why, for example, the consulates’ figures show more Argentines in the United States than were registered by the U.S. census
(Gurrieri, et al., 1983). This, however, is partially balanced by emigrants
not caring to register at Argentine consulates. The true figure was probably a little below 500,000 in the early 1980s.
There are no reliable statistics on the return rate of migrants to Argentina, but some estimates can be inferred from the 1980 Argentine
census. Data on those persons who were living abroad five years before
the census show that between 1975 and 1980 approximately 4,000 per
year returned to Argentina.’ This represents an annual rate of return
of 1.5 percent relative to the Argentine population residing abroad in
those years. The normal rate of return, over the period 1970-1983, is
probably greater, as return was discouraged by the political situation in
the country from 1975-1980.
The number of persons who emigrated for political reasons is difficult to estimate, but it is probably a small part of the total. This figure
can be deduced from the increase of the Argentine population since
1975 in places where exiles most frequently resided (Latin America,
Spain, France, and Scandinavia), which leads us to estimate that the
number of political exiles was about 30,000-50,000. Apart from the lack
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* The estimate is based on the census taken on October 22, 1980. The data used herein
refer exclusively to the resident population in the country at the time, excluding persons
who habitually resided abroad. The data were taken from census data, especially from
tables which present migration statistics. The following data and calculations are essential:
A. Persons residing five years or more in the country, who, five years earlier (ie., Oct.
22, 1975) were residing abroad - 128,375.
B. Persons born abroad, residing in the country, who arrived after January 1, 1976 and
before the census of October 22. 1980 - 114,659.
C. Persons born abroad, residing in the country, who are between 0-4 years of age 11,119.
D. Persons born abroad, 5 years of age or more, residing in the country and arrived
between Jan. 1,1976 and Oct. 10,1980 (D=B-C) - 103,540.
E. Persons born abroad, 5 years of age or more, residing in the country and arrived
between Oct. 10, 1975 and Oct. 22, 1980 (estimate)- 109,787.
F. Persons born in Argentina who resided in the country in 1980, 5 years of age or
more, who, on Oct. 22, 1975 were residing abroad (F=A-E) - 18,588.
G. Persons born in Argentina who on Oct. 22, 1975 were residing abroad and returned
to Argentina before the census (includesan estimate of those who died after returning but
before the census) - 19,255.
The last figure does not include Argentines residing in the country on Oct. 22, 1975
who emigrated after that date and returned before the 1980 census. Nor does it indude the
census error (approximately 3 percent). Therefore, the result should be consideM as a
conservativeestimate. It represents about 1.5 percent per year relative to total Argentine
population living abroad (average 1975-80, estimated from data in Bertoncello et d.,
1985).
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of statistical data, the uncertainty of the estimates stems from the fact
that most of the exiles did not formally assume the status of refugee.
T h e flow of political emigrants began in 1974. At this time, left-wing
militants suffered serious persecution at the hands of death squads
formed with the support of the extreme right wing of the government
of Isabel Peron. T h e majority of the political exiles, however, emigrated
after the March 1976 coup which developed an extremely repressive
regime. The full force of repression was felt between 1976-1978; the
characteristics of this period will be analyzed in the next section.
T h e crisis of the military regime, which began in mid-1982 after the
unfortunate war in the South Atlantic, saw a slow opening of the political system. This process culminated in the 1983 election of the democratic government of Raul Alfonsin. T h e continual process of democratization promoted the return of political exiles which reached a peak in
the first half of 1984.
At that time, a program established at the request of the Argentine
government and financed by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) provided for the return of thousands of political exiles
from different parts of the world. Many of these returnees did not even
have the formal status of refugees. There are no available quantitative
data on the exiles since many returned of their own accord without resorting to international assistance. A prudent estimate is that the total
number of returning exiles and their families could have reached
20,000-30,000 around the end of 1984. As there are no realistic figures
on the total number of exiles from 1974-1983, it is not easy to authenticate this return estimate, but there are various indications that a high
proportion of the exiles chose to return, probably one-half to twothirds.
This chapter is based on a 1985 survey of 134 exiled families who returned to Argentina and 86 families who returned, but did not originally
emigrate for political reasons. The principal objective of the survey was
to determine the problems encountered by the migrants after they returned. T h e problems were envisioned as both material (job, housing,
etc.) and psychosocial (adaptation and social integration into the national
environment).2
T h e results of the survey showed that economic motivations did not
play a relevant part in the decision to return. This was true not only for
the exiles, but also, surprisingly, for those who emigrated for apolitical
* The survey questionnaire was quite extensive with some '30 questions- most of which
were open-ended. Moreover, twelve families with exiles were studied with greater depth
through even more extensive interviews. See, the methodologies and quantitativeresults in
Maletta and Szwarcberg (1985).
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reasons. The basic reasons for returning to Argentina involved the need
of 6migrCs to rediscover the country and their own identities. At the
same time, expectations of economic difficulties after return did not
seem to have been a disturbing influence. The repatriates were affected
by the problems of reentering the national environment - for example, their perception of indifferent attitudes or hostility on the part
of their compatriots, or their own rejection of authoritarian elements in
daily life. Economic hardship at home only mattered in cases of lprolonged unemployment, which in some cases brought about plans to emigrate again.
Therefore, this chapter concentrates on psychosocial aspects of return
migration more than on the pragmatic problems of employment or income. In spite of the serious economic difficulties that affect Argentina,
few of the returnees complained about them. The majority already
knew the problems beforehand, and economic problems did not diminish their will to return. Rather, the returnees appear to be affected
by other factors which leave some partially reintegrated into the
country, while others experience rejection or at least a more difficult
readjustment into national life. The dozen in-depth interviews alone
were much more important for constructing an analysis of these factors
than were the quantitative results of the survey; nevertheless, the latter
do provide a reference point for the analysis of the psychosocial adjustment of the returnees.
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Characteristics and Context of Exile
In the sample of 134 families of political repatriates, almost 70 percent
left Argentina between 1976-1978. Another 12 percent emigrated before the 1976 coup, that is, after 1974. The rest departed between
1979 and 1980. Most had remained in exile an average of six years.
When the survey was conducted, the majority had returned for an
average of 18 months, although the date of return varied from the
middle of 1982 (after the Malvinas War) until the beginning of 1985. A
few returned between 1980 and 1981.
At the time of the survey, two-thirds of the families consisted of a
married couple with one or more children. Some 13 percent were divorced or without spouse and had children in their care. About 21 percent were single persons. Most were young at the time of exile: The
average age was 27; about one-fourth were between 20 and 24; a few
were barely adolescents. Many of the exiles were students, but more
than three-fourths of the total were working prior to their departuke.
Of those who were working, only 14 percent had manual or low-skilled
jobs; more than one-third had high-skilledjobs.
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T h e departure from Argentina was preceded and accompanied in
many cases by traumatic circumstances related to the Argentine political
situation. It is difficult to capture the nature of the decision to become
an exile without considering the situation that existed at the time.
Argentina experienced a fierce political battle characterized by guerrilla activity and repressive violence in the first half of the 1970s. In the
economic arena, the demands of the popular sectors (principally industrial
workers faced with the continual decline in employment and income)
clashed against a stagnant and dependent economic system. The dominant economic groups not only failed to attend to these pressures, but
also demanded a “rationalization” of the productive forces and greater
“labor discipline”. These objectives were very difficult to establish within
the democratic framework existing in Argentina at that time.
In March 1976, the civilian government was deposed by a military
coup which established a harsh dictatorship that lasted until 1983 under
several military juntas. This authoritarian regime proposed and executed an economic plan based on financial deregulation and the abrupt
opening of the economy after decades of strong protectionist policies.
T h e plan greatly damaged the industrial sector that was established by
way of import-substitution after World War 11. The military regime also
chose state terrorism to carry out the so-called “eradication of subversion” which was meant to include not only guerrilla rebels but also
union protest and all expressions of dissent against the central program
of the regime. State terrorism, which was applied to its maximum
between 1976 and 1978, was characterized by a widespread show of repression which extended throughout the society. It considered subversive all ideological activities or positions that the military perceived as
leftist o r simply not overtly supportive of their self-appointed government, even when the people involved were clearly opposed to any revolutionary o r guerrilla actions.
In the majority of cases, persons considered subversive were arrested
by military forces acting in a paramilitary fashion. They became the
“disappeared ones” and were taken to secret prisons and torture areas.
In most cases, they were killed. The details of the repressive program
have been examined carefully by the 1984 National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP). They were also probed in 1985 by the
court empowered to try members of the military juntas for homicides,
tortures, and other crime^.^ T h e key elements in this repressive pro-
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s The details of the trial, including a transcription of the testimony and the sentences
can be found in successive issues of El Diurio del Juicio published in Buenos Aires from the
middle of 1985 until January 1986. Several former Junta members got heavy sentences,
including life terms for Gen. Videla and Adm. Massera.
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gram were the arbitrariness of repression, the uncertain future of the
disappeared, and the repression extended to relatives of the presumed
subversives - including the elderly and children
This environment of terror reached wide sectors of society, particularly those most likely to oppose the military: workers, students, intellectuals, political activists, etc. Some of the exiles managed to leave the
country after having experienced some form of repression, that is, for
example, after they were fired, threatened, blacklisted, or detained for a
while. However, the majority chose exile as a way to escape immiaent
repression following the arrest or disappearance of family, friends, or
colleagues.
Many who left the country avoided obtaining passports from police
authorities; rather, they preferred to leave by going to a border country
such as Brazil, where they needed only their identification card to enter.
From there, they could renew their passport at consulates or request
refugee status and assistance. Others had obtained a passport in Argentina before they had drawn the attention of the repressive state.
The climate of uncertainty and terror was an essential component in
the repressive program. It extended a cloak of darkness and fog over
the fate of the diappeared and, at the same time, over the precise legal
status of the exiled, or for that matter, of anyone else.
No one could be certain if he or she was a suspect. The mere act of
beginning an inquiry about such a matter might create a dangerous suspicion best to avoid. Those who had left the country for fear of being
subjected to repression and those who chose “internal exile” by hiding
in other parts of the country could never ascertain whether or not there
was a clear danger, whether they could return, or what the extent of the
charges were against them. These repressive policies influenced the
very nature of the exile and indirectly the conditions for return.
The act of leaving the country was not a feasible option for all who
were threatened by repression. Generally, it was an available option for
the middle class and was not as feasible for workers and low-income
sectors. In practice, intellectuals, professionals, and academics represented a high proportion of the emigrants not so much because of the
social selectivity of the repression - which was much more indiscrixhinate - but because it was easier for them to leave the country.
The high cost of traveling was prohibitive for the poorer classes of
society, especially when all the neighboring countries were dominated
themselves by military dictatorships which did not welcome Argentihe
exiles. Furthermore, the middle class was already imbued with a migratory culture since most of their ancestors arrived in Argentina from the
end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War 11. Many of
them also had relatives or friends abroad.
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It is fitting to recall that, for those choosing exile, terror was notjust a
theoretical possibility or merely part of the social climate. Many of the
exiles personally suffered from extremely traumatic experiences before they left the country. These experiences - assassinated family
members, disappeared school or work colleagues, torture suffered personally or applied to relatives in their presence, long periods of solitary
confinement or precarious, clandestine hiding - all indelibly marked
the memory of the exiles during their period outside of the country and
influenced the conflicts that arose when they considered the possibility
of returning to Argentina.
Some Facts About Exile and Return Migration
Many of the persons interviewed experienced important changes in
their lives while in exile. A high proportion (55 percent) continued their
education; some began new careers which implied, upon returning, the
need to enter a new professional community without relying on contacts
that otherwise would have facilitated their professional success. Onethird of those who were married when they emigrated were divorced,
and half of these married again abroad (with Argentine and foreign
spouses in equal proportions). Of those who were not married when
they departed, two-thirds got married or formed free unions. One-third
of these marriages or unions ended eventually in divorce or separations,
which is remarkable, as the time span involved is relatively short.
Upon returning, the profile of the migrants had changed significantly
in more than one respect. The average age was now 35; many had
changed their marital status; many had had new children abroad; more
than half had a higher level of education and often a new profession.
The decision to return sometimes generated conflicts in the families
of the exiles. Such disputes occurred among 26 percent of the couples;
disputes also arose among other couples once they had returned to Argentina. Children - especially teen-agers - frequently rejected the
plan to return. For them, return represented a true exile to a country
they did not know or that they no longer remembered. Some families
broke up when their adolescent children (and in one case, a spouse)
refused to return.
More than 60 percent returned without a formal job or a sure offer of
employment. Nevertheless, they knew that the economic situation was
difficult, and that finding a job would be a difficult affair; most consider, in retrospect, that they were not unduly optimistic.
Approximately 40 percent had made exploratory visits prior to their
return. Some 57 percent of those surveyed returnees relied on financial
assistance through UNHCR, ICM, or other institutions. It must be
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added, however, that the real proportion that sought such assistance
must have been much less since our sample was strongly biased toward
cases contacted through assistance agencies.
Two-thirds of the migrants shipped their personal belongings to the
country; one-third came only with baggage. Of those who shipped
cargo, one-third had their goods damaged or robbed or experienced
customs problems upon entering the country. Some lost all of their belongings (sent as cargo), including many irreplaceable goods. For them,
these losses added to the psychosocial strains associated with return.
More than 40 percent were housed with friends and relatives immediately upon returning to Argentina. At the time of the survey, when an
average of 18 months had elapsed since their arrival, 45 percent were
living in their own houses; 29 percent were renters; and 26 percent continued living with relatives and had not resolved their housing problem.
Eight percent of the heads of households and 15.9 percent of their
spouses were unemployed. Both rates were well above the national rate
of open unemployment. A contingent of repatriates survived with precarious and marginal jobs or received as their only income modest financial assistance from humanitarian organizations.
Although the jobs they were able to obtain were in many cases satisfying, in general, they were paid very low salaries. This was due ta the
decline in real wages throughout the economy, but often contrasted
with the pay they had been earning abroad.
If the occupations carried out abroad and those obtained upon returning are grouped in three categories (high, middle, and low)) some
16 percent had moved up in category while 20 percent had descended.
Those who ascended in level were mostly those who had a mid-level job
abroad and occupied a high-level position when they returned. However, many of these high-level positions, such as scientific researcher or
public official, currently pay low salaries. Those who dropped in occupational level were those who had a high level position abroad (international official, scientific research) and accepted mid-level positions
(non-managerial public official or small business job) when they returned.
The amount of time that elapsed since returning did not influence
the possibilities of ascending or descending in category, except for those
who had low-level jobs abroad. While few migrants actually had lowlevel jobs abroad, two-thirds of that group obtained a mid-level position
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The high level includes highly skilled occupations, such as administrators and managers as well as businessmen, scholars, ctc. The mid-level corresponds to non-mqnual,
medium-skilledjobs, mainly clerks or small shopkeepers. The low-level includes manual
jobs and low-skilledjobs in general.
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less than one year after returning. This figure approaches 80 percent
for those who had been in the country for more than two years.
While the possibility of living near relatives and friends was mentioned as an important factor among the motives influencing our informants’ decision to return, no more than 57 percent indicated maintaining good relations with their families in Argentina; only a small proportion indicated those relations to be strong or satisfactory. Also, some
30 percent said that their current friends were principally other repatriates whom they met abroad o r after having returned. Only onefourth maintain a close relationship with friends they had before migrating. T h e rest maintain new friendships with persons who were not
exiled o r have groups of friends in which neither category predominates.
Nine out of ten respondents who mentioned social relations among
the areas in which they noticed changes, indicated that these relationships generally have deteriorated from the time before they were exiled
until now. T h e most frequently cited problems were aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and the lack of solidarity.
Finally, while the majority considered that returning was the correct
decision and appeared to be basically content in having taken that step,
about 40 percent declared a desire or intention to emigrate again when
the opportunity presents itself. This does not include those who would
migrate only in the case of a new military coup.
Having presented some of the basic characteristics, motivations, and
intentions of the returnees in our sample, we can move on to develop an
appropriate framework to interpret the reentry of the exiles. This
framework takes into account the most important psychological and
psychosocial factors involved in the process of return migration.
Toward an Interpretive Framework
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T h e literature on return migration largely considers economic and demographic implications rather than psychological and psychosocial
aspects. A good example of the dominance of economic and demographic studies is the collection of works included in Kubat (1984).
These studies were originally presented at the First European Conference on International Return Migration. Very few studies presented at
the conference addressed non-economic factors within a theoretical
framework.
T h e study on Dutch return migration by Blauw and Elich (1984), for
example, has some relevance to our analysis, even though it does not
develop an appropriate theoretical framework. T h e Dutch who returned from Australia and New Zealand cited reasons that the authors
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group into two categories: cultural shock and personal problems. The
former include aspects perceived as negative in the receiving society
(vandalism, crime, and discrimination against women) as well as the difficulty in making friends, notwithstanding the cordiality exhibited by
the local population. This is the common complaint from other migrants in different areas. Among the personal problems, the primary
one mentioned was nostalgia for one’s country in terms of family ties
and familiar haunts. This category also included unemployment, dissatisfaction with work, and the breakup of marriage. After they had returned, the majority of the migrants maintained contact with the previous host country where they had friends and relatives; very few said
they regretted migrating; only one-fifth regretted having returned
home; and some wanted to re-emigrate. “Before they returned, many
held idealized images of Holland, its friendly people, its warm social
relations. After they returned, the picture was not as rosy as they had
imagined” (Blauw and Elich, 1984:232).
The authors summarized their interpretation about the reasons for
return migration in terms of the incapacity of the migrants to adapt to
culture shock in the receiving country which reached a peak about two
years after they had emigrated: “The economic reasons came to be
much more secondary relative to the other reasons for emigrating or
for returning. It is difficult to place these motives in a framework that
makes economic motivations the primary cause of migration” (Blauw
and Elich, 1984:232). As can be seen, these authors clearly show the
presence of non-economic subjective factors, but they refrain from elaborating a more detailed alternative interpretation.
A study in the same book by Richmond (1984) tries to analyze the
possible explanatory factors for return migration with few encouraging
results: “The empirical studies on return migration have not managed
to identify any consistent pattern that distinguishes migrants who remain and migrants who return” (Richmond, 1984:270). In reviewing
some empirical studies, Richmond suggests that pull factors seem to be
stronger than push factors (something that is confirmed in this study)
and that the level of education also can influence the decision to return.
Richmond also cites Glaser (1978) on the return of foreign students
from industrialized countries. In this case, return migration is caused by
family and peer pressure as well as by patriotic feelings, rather than by
other factors such as success in school or the temporary nature of their
migration. The more capable and successful students are not more or
less inclined to return than their colleagues. Many students who decide
to remain abroad were originally temporary migrants.
With respect to exiles, Richmond points to the existence of an almost
universal desire to return, what he calls “an ideology of return”, although in practice these aspirations are often utopic.
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Richmond concludes with an attempt to formulate general tendencies. First, he maintains that the dominant method of adaptation is
“transilience”: T h e migrant is integrated economically and has a high
level of cognitive acculturation, but has little identification with the society in which he or she resides. This coincides with our findings. We
observed that the problem of societal identification - tied to the migrant’s own identity - seems to be a fundamental factor in the decision
to return. Second, Richmond maintains that return migration will tend
to increase when the host country experiences problems that affect upward social mobility or when these problems improve in the country of
origin. In our study, the data do not seem to show a causal relationship
between return migration and labor and social factors. This is the case
for both exiles and non-political migrants (Maletta and Szwarcberg,
1985). Finally, Richmond indicates that there will be greater probability
for return when the host country is more similar in language and culture to the country of origin and when communication is stronger between the two countries. This hypothesis, however, does not seem to
have a sound basis.
Indeed, we find in the case of some very similar countries neighboring Argentina that the geographical vicinity and socio-cultural similarity appear to have reduced problems of adaptation. For example,
these problems may be mitigated by frequent visits to the place of origin
which short distances make easier. Contrary to Richmond’s last proposition, our study discovered many cases of return migration from countries very different from Argentina. The reasons cited for return migration were the desire to recover inherent aspects of the country of
origin (non-existent in the host country) or to be closer to the extended
family.
Yet even in neighboring countries, identification eludes the migrant.
This theme is tied to the migrant’s own identity and does not appear to
be related to cultural similarities between the two countries. For example, a recent study on Uruguayan immigrants in Argentina by
Szwarcberg and Hensel(l985) showed that despite great similarities between these sending and receiving societies, Uruguayans demonstrated
a strong need to return to Uruguay because the latter is their own
country, and Argentina is not. The Uruguayans feel in Argentina exactly how Argentines felt in other countries, and they expressed this
sentiment often with the same words. Richmond’s conclusions about the
relationship between similar cultural traits and return migration do not
appear to play a prominent role here.
Rosemarie Rogers (1984) classifies possible reasons for return migration in various categories according to events that a) maintain ties with
the guest country o r country of origin; b) are produced at the macro o r
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micro level; and c) are related or not to the original reason to migrate.
This typology is useful in showing the diversity of reasons behind the
decision to return, but it is not based on an explanatory framework. It is
merely a taxonomy that does not allow for any one variable to assume a
privileged analytical position within the framework.
A Psychoanalytical Approach to Migration, Exile, and Return
An interesting effort to address the problems of migration and exile
psychoanalytically is found in the work of Le6n Grinberg and Rebecca
Grinberg (1984). The two researchers have worked for twenty years on
the topics of migration, identity, and change. They adopt a psychoalialytical perspective which is influenced in particular by the writings of
Klein (1952). They consider migration, even voluntary migration, to be
a traumatic situation; this crisis, they maintain, produces a feeling of
“abandonment”, a feeling that would be related to the “loss of a protective mother”, “to the loss of the containing object according to the terminology of Bion” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 198424-25).
The Grinbergs illustrate their work with clinical cases and with cases
drawn from psychoanalytical literature. They attempt to relate latent
aspects of the migratory process with certain “myths, which express sentiments crucial to the migratory experience” (Grinberg and Grinberg,
1984: 14-21). An example is the loss of Paradise in the biblical account
of the origin of mankind.
A chapter of their work is dedicated to exile as a specific type of migration. Various features of exile are mentioned. First, there is a frequent absence of “good-byes” - a ritual that migrants could use to
“protect” themselves when they leave, and which is often infeasible
when one must flee suddenly and in danger:
To all of their anxieties is added an anguish provoked by the lack
of a formal or explicit good-bye, which makes them feel that their
departure is like crossing the border between the kingdom of the
living and the kingdom of the dead ...All of the loved ones to whom
they have not been able to say farewell and whom they fear they
will not see again become dead persons with whom they feel unable to part satisfactorily . . . (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:189).
Secondly, the exile is marked by the impossibility of returning, at least
while the reasons for leaving persist:
Many of them can also suffer from the “survival syndrome” which
has been studied in prisoners of Nazi concentration camps who
managed to survive while their family and friends were tortured
or exterminated. . . . The exiles can feel crushed by the guilt they
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experience from having seen their companions fall o r having
heard their terrible cries from nearby cells. This state of mind is
fertile ground for scepticism or disillusion, if not despair (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 190).
T o integrate oneself totally in the receiving society and above all renounce a return is equivalent to “breaking the ’sacredness’ which some
attribute to exile and is felt as a loss of the identity that defines them”
(Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 190-191). Their relationship with the
country of refuge is complex; they did not come “to” it but rather fled
“from” their own country. This marks their relationship with the place
where they dwell but in which they do not “live” in the fullest sense of
the word. Their stay in the country of refuge is lived as a mere waiting
period between their previous (often retrospectively mystified) life and
their future life. This future life is represented by the illusion of being
able to return, “an illusion all the more idealized, the greater the impossibility to attain it” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 191).
With respect to return migration, the Grinbergs indicate foremost
that “to return is hard”. It is a conflict even for those who during their
exile lived in a state of waiting for the possibility of returning. T h e key
idea here is that, in spite of everything, ties have been created in the
host country even beyond the consciousness of the migrant. In testimony cited by the authors, some exiles confess: “I feel that I am neither
from here nor there” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:220).
Another feature of the Grinbergs’ analysis is the contention that “return is a new migration” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:222). N o one
exists who truly returns; everyone goes, enters something new, even
when attempting to reincorporate into a known reality.
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[The exile returns] with expectations of recovering all things
that were longed for ...But the reality confronted by the migrant can be different. T h e acknowledgement of changes in
persons, things, customs, habits, homes, streets, relations,
and affections will make the exile feel like a stranger. N o r will
the language sound the same; colloquial expressions will have
changed; understandings that have mounted on so many
words with implied meanings like winks of complicity between the initiated (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:222).
And again: “What is unavoidable is that no return is only a return; it
is a new migration, with all the losses, fears, and hopes that are inherent
in it” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 251).
With its many insights notwithstanding, the Grinbergs’ work does not
pay detailed attention to the specifics of return migration. It also does
not study in sufficient depth the relationship between exiles and return
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migration. Their return observations, based on empirical evidence and
case studies cited in the literature, are always sharp and revealing, but
they do not have in this regard a sufficiently systematic theory or approach - a defect that lamentably will continue to be seen in the
present study.
A word may be added here on the practical implications of studying
return migration from a perspective rooted in psychology and psychoanalysis. The exploration of exile and return from this perspective can
appear inadequate when the purpose is to develop state policies, or
when the migrants show more urgent primary needs such as housing or
food (which is the case for many streams of refugees all over the world).
Yet in the Argentine case -which is probably repeated in other groups
of exiles from Chile, Uruguay, and other parts of the world - the psychosocial problem occupies a prominent place when it comes to interpreting the situation of the exiles, their possible return, and its practical
consequences. Here, the psychosocial approach has immediate application for mental health policy.
Human rights organizations that have worked with exiles who returned to Argentina have had valuable experiences dealing with their
clients’ psychosocial and psychological problems. In working with this
population, human rights personnel have developed various therapeutic strategies and services. A similar case holds for exiles who have
returned to Chile (FASIC, 1982). An outstanding example is the establishment of individual and group therapy services for maladjusted children in the exiles’ families.
Obviously, the emphasis on psychological aspects is not meant to exclude other sociological or economic factors. As a matter of fact, all
these psychological interpretations are based precisely on considering
the psychological implications of experiences as directly tied to the social, political, and economic milieu. The type of identities that exile and
return put into crisis are those that are tied to objects in the country of
origin - one’s family, profession, or political stand - those that are
incomprehensiblewithout reference to the macro-social reality that gave
rise to them.
Even economic reality is constantly present though not in a mechanical or linear manner; the subjects do not react necessarily to market
indicators (especially in the labor market) by applying some conventional economic calculations, but rather mix economic forces with other
motivations. It is certain that if one adopted a neoclassical economic
framework, such motivations could also receive an economic evaluation
and treatment as in ordinary economic analysis of migration in terms
such as human capital. However, such a treatment would probably trivialize the analysis without adding specific meaning.
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Amid terror, uncertainty, assassinations, disappearances, and reprisals against family members - exile represents a traumatic cut o r
wound in the lives of the individuals affected, a rupture that separates
their lives in t w o parts that they try to unite thereafter through several
means, including (when feasible) the quest for home, ie., return migration.
From a slightly different angle, return migration can be seen also as
an attempt to rebuild one’s own identity which was mutilated by events
immediately prior to exile and by exile itself. The return thus represents from this point of view an attempt to recover the previous spatial
environment that operated as a support for that identity. To return to
his or her country (a geographical movement) thus acquires a temporal
and social meaning in the migrant’s mind.
A third interpretation (that bears on and, thus, does not exclude the
other two views) emphasizes that exile is a forced migration, not one
that is chosen. Once the political conditions are adequate, return appears (for those exiles who decide to return) as a necessary movement
- an almost compulsive affirmation of the desire to live in one’s
country. Perhaps, more importantly, it is an affirmation of the freedom
to occupy again a place in the social, political, and emotional milieu that
had formerly expelled the migrant. Only after accomplishing that
movement, a new kind of freedom can emerge; now one is able to
choose between remaining in the country or departing again, without
the choice having been imposed. This would explain the high percentage of returnees who are content with their decision to return, yet
at the same time intend to migrate again.
Age and Exile
T h e idea of exile as a trauma, a cut, o r a wound acquires different
shades of meaning depending on the person’s age when exiled and his
or her stage in life. At one extreme would be the sudden exile of adolescents, such as one interviewed youth who had to leave quickly after several of his high-school classmates “disappeared”. He was sent by his
family to Israel alone, and found it very difficult to adjust there. Eight
years later he stated: “When one leaves, there is something that is cut,
something in me that is cut, something that was cut at the moment when
those tragic events occurred in the country”.
His formative adolescent years, mutilated by exile, continued in Israel
under conditions totally divorced from the previous situation in Argentina. Now he does not feel a part of either of the spheres of socialization: “My sense of belonging is not fundamentally in one place, for my
history was cut off at a certain moment”.
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The interview with this young man was very difficult, since re-living
the moments prior to his exile, speaking about his experience abroad
and his decision to return produced such an intense emotional state that
his ability to speak was completely blocked. A part of the terror which
motivated the exile, the “cut” to which he alluded, is permanently with
him. It prevents him from assuming Argentina as his own country, yet it
also ties him to it. He cannot free himself from the past that was interrupted when he had to leave at 16 years of age.
His return came about almost compulsively, “without knowing why”,
when he was about to be married in Israel. The date of his return not
only coincided with the reemergence of democracy in Argentina but
also with the war between Lebanon and Israel. The sudden decision to
return, not very well explained at the conscious level, was associated
with a definite identification with two situations of danger: one in Argentina in 1976, the other in Israel in 1983. Another influencing factor
was probably the coming need to commit himself in Israel through
marriage, a decision that could have been painful. Later, this young
man decided to return to Israel, and it remained clear in his answers
that he did not feel he belonged in either country and that he could not
easily commit himself to anyone or anything.
In the case of another young married couple, the woman had temporarily “disappeared and afterwards both emigrated to Brazil at age 18
when she was granted a precarious condition of freedom. Their s t o r y
expresses similar but less dramatic feelings: “We were nobody here in
Argentina once our entire horizon was upset; groups of friends, political activities - all of this did not exist anymore because people had left
or were dead. . . . Nor do we have an identity here at this time, except
for the family and a few things that one identifies with the country”. In
fact, their own “history” began in exile, when they decided to live together and started seekingjobs.
This couple also returned without knowing why, as a compulsion to
be reunited with the country they had left. The return marked for them
the end of a transitory state in Brazil which they saw as leading nowhere. Their return seems like an opportunity to feel a sense of belonging in their own country, to do things, to achieve, without having in
Argentina a specific environment that was waiting for them (except the
expectation of regaining their civil legal status, to be discussed in the
next section).
Ajournalist who was in exile for nine years said at age 35: “The factor
that weighed particularly heavy on me in returning was the need to
rebuild, to change the pattern of my life, to reconstruct it around a
social and emotional environment”.
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The differential impact of exile at different ages is seen clearly when
comparing these cases with those of older persons. A sixty-year-old man
remarked upon returning: “Here in Argentina I began to recognize my
entire life, which I recognize in small conversations, in the street, in the
way of living, in the market, on the bus. With time, everything that had
been cutoff was being reconstructed. , . . I only came back to visit and
see, but I’ve been carried away by things, . . . and now I am staying. I
feel my whole life here, where things and persons have meaning for me;
far away in exile I did not know the history”.
The contrast with the younger people is notable. For the Israel-bound
teen-ager, the break with Argentina happened before his entire universe of meanings was formed. To the older man, the country is so
familiar that upon recognizing it, he decides to stay. The former must
live forever with his biographical wound, while the latter observes that
“everything that had been cut off was being reconstructed”. It is worth
noting the frequent description of exile as a cut, a rupture, or a wound
in the spontaneous wording of the interviewed exiles.
Exile was a break, and they return to rebuild a sense of continuity.
The older one is, the greater the possibilities for a successful re-encounter and the more elements to mitigate the break. There is a sensation in younger persons of something beyond repair, a break with Argentina and now another break with the country where they concluded
their adolescence. A rupture of that import in the formative years could
do far more damage than in later stages of life.
For middle-age persons, not so young but yet not old, the past and the
future, the country of origin and the world abroad are all more available. The possibility exists not only to rediscover the past but also to
emigrate anew in search of a future project outside of the country. “My
father”, said a 45-year-old professional woman, “returned a short time
ago saying he was old, that he returned irrespective of any problem he
may encounter, to face things as they are. I also felt like coming here,
but we (she and her husband) didn’t come to stay irrespective of conditions. . . . We are very realistic”. This same woman showed her displeasure at the distrustful indifference of her professional colleagues who
had remained in the country. (“It seems I’m invisible”.) She ultimately
went abroad again. Meanwhile, her father remained in Argentina.
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Legality and Belonging
To return often implies recovering a legal status and the possibility of
re-integrating oneself into the pattern of social relations and institutions. The male member of the young couple who returned from Brazil
(referred to earlier) stated in this regard:
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The idea of recovering one’s legal status is important, for in Brazil
we recovered freedom without legality. We lived outside of the
law, with expired documents, for many years. We got tired of the
laborious process of renewing our visas each year and we simply
stopped. We always lived on the margin, without being recognized.
Here I feel recognition, although it is anonymous, for I have
papers, a social security number, etc. I function within a social
framework, 1 feel I belong to something. . . . When I get my salary
and I see my social security number, I really get emotional.
In an interview this same young man, now working at a weekly magazine in Buenos Aires, remembered the emotion he felt when he saw his
name on the list of union members. Having been exiled so young,
having lived without legal status or fixed jobs in Brazil, this young
couple had never seen their names written anywhere - not on a bank
account, a social security card, a union list. To return, for this couple,
was like returning from a “civil death”.
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Zdentity and Rediscovery
The break represented by exile can also be interpreted as a threat or
wound to the substance or integrity of one’s identity. Thus, Grinberg
and Grinberg (1984: 155) define “the feeling of identity as the capacity
of the individual to continue to feel oneself amid the succession of
changes” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 155). According to the authors,
this feeling of identity results from the interaction of three bonds of
integration: spatial, temporal, and social. The first refers to the ability to
perceive oneself as separate and distinct; the second refers to the capacity to perceive oneself as the same in the course of time; the third
refers to identifications between subject and external objects (either
persons or things).
It is not within the scope of this chapter to analyze this or other concepts of identity. Rather, we intend to use the concept of identity heuristically in order to formulate some hypotheses.
It should be remembered that the concept of identity is virtually absent in Freudian vocabulary and that it has been imported into social
psychology by later psychological and psychoanalytical currents.
The very term Identitiit is not common in Freud’s work. It only appears in a letter he wrote to the B’nai B’rith in 1926. There, Freud used
it to refer to a typically social identity, that of the Jewish people: “The
clear conscience of an internal identity, the familiarity of possessing the
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same internal constr~ction’~.~
Here, identity has a relative sense and
points to a cultural identity. It has an ethnic, social identity based on the
similarities (“the same internal construction”) more than on individual
differences.
The concept of identity in Erikson’s work (1963) and Melanie Klein’s
corresponding concept of “the self” share an idea of “integrity”; the
subject continuously builds an integrated synthesis of his multiple identifications, and forms it through different stages (Klein, 1952).
For other psychoanalytical approaches, especially those stemming
from Lacan, the idea of an integrated identity is an illusion, a myth or
ideal pursued by the individual. In this view, there is a basic break or
split that never disappears and that forms a constituent part of the
person. This is a notion taken from Freud himself, who, at the end of
his work, wrote about the “splitting of the Ego”. The Ego pursues the
illusion of becoming a whole, of achieving a union of its basic division. It
places that illusion in goals that embody the ideal self that each individual pursues at a particular moment, without ever reaching that unity,
even though the goals that one transitorially pursues are attained. Depression resulting from achieving a goal, very often observed in clinical
experience, is seen as a manifestations of this duality: T h e goal
is achieved, but not the unity itself. The depression persists until
the person adopts a new goal. The concept of identity is thus tied to the
Ideal Ego and to the complex theme of “narcissism”.6
Voluntary emigration expresses precisely the attempt to reach a goal
(say, economic or professional success) which the individual pursues. In
exile, on the other hand, political persecution cuts or mutilates the individual and collective projects of political militants and their families, and
removes the material basis for the identity based on those projects.
Moreover, the specific type of persecution unleashed in Argentina
that massively struck circles of friends and family also violently broke
the deepest emotional ties amidst an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty that adds even greater anguish than is expected in exiles who fled
from other kinds of persecution.
In a normal migration, as the Grinbergs (1984: 189) indicate, the
ritual of farewell and subsequent communication (as well as the fact that
migration is connected to personal projects and does not represent a
break) put a strong protective mantle on departure and separation. By
Translated directly from the original German: “...die Ware Bewusstheit der inneren
Identiat, die Heimlichkeit der gleichen inneren Konstruktion”. See, Freud 1 9 4 1 , Vol.
XVI.
See, “The Splitting of the Ego in Melancholy”, “On Narcissism”,and “Ego and Id”, in
Freud (1941). See also, Lacan 1966.
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contrast, the exile often leaves without saying good-bye, has lost some
family or friends beforehand, does not know the whereabouts of others,
and does not know if he or she will ever see them again. Subsequent
communication is temporarily or definitely interrupted until the return,
or even after the return, when former relationships are dispersed or
disappeared.
The study of exile, return, and identity must also be enriched by
adding a temporal component which could be called “the disparity of
time”. The exile, like any emigrant, has been absent for a certain period
of time. This commonplace fact encompasses many levels of meaning.
On the one hand, events have continued in the exile’s absence; the
country has continued to exist and change without the exile (a clear
indication for the expatriate that his or her presence is not necessary).
This aspect of absence is one of the most anguishing for the exile, because it evokes and implies the most sinister idea in death: “The world
(viz, country) can continue to exist without me”.
Not only have things continued to happen, but they have modified
reality. Upon returning, the exile finds a different country to whose
changes he or she is foreign. The country is no longer his or hers since
the exile was not present, did not influence, nor was affected by the
events as they occurred (except affected indirectly upon learning about
them in newspapers, etc.)
The emigrant thus has not shared in events that occurred to his or
her compatriots. Meanwhile, some things also have occurred to the migrant that cannot be shared with others who remained in the country.
The exile changed, grew, and reoriented ideological preferences
(perhaps not in the same direction as hidher compatriots). The individual returned perhaps with a new profession or family, and hidher
appreciation of the home country is probably indelibly marked by the
experience abroad. This experience often leads one to compare and
relativize that which for others may seem obvious, natural, or inevitable.
Many of the persons we interviewed noticed these “differences”and
asked: “Am I the one who changed or is it the country? Is the country
only different from my ideals or is the country also different from the
one I left behind?” One individual mentioned:
a very ambivalent sensation: that of having recovered something I
desired for a long time and only to have lost it at the moment I
recovered it. Because I longed to return to Argentina, but to my
Argentina, and upon returning I notice that it does not exist anymore and will not exist forever; I do not even have here what I
had abroad: hope. . . . It’s like a mirage that disappears when you
touch it.
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In general, facing those changes makes one’s own country seem
strange and new. Those who return “in order not to feel like foreigners” feel different and, as one returnee put it, “a stranger in his own
country”. In other return migrations, the principal changes accrue to
the migrant, but in the last decade in Argentina, political, social, and
economic events have been so intense that it is also possible to register
macro-social changes that make identification difficult, not to mention
the micro-social changes that affect the immediate context (family, professional, emotional) of the migrant.
To analyze those macro-social changes is not within the scope of this
chapter. Nevertheless, some notions of change in the country come
from the exiles’ own words.
One of the most recurring topics aired is the deterioration of social
relations, conviviality, and solidarity. This observation could correspond
to the real changes that occurred in their absence. Argentina, and in
particular, Buenos Aires (where 70 percent of the families we interviewed resided) have always been tough and competitive places, but the
years of military dictatorship undoubtedly accentuated this characteristic.
Indiscriminate repression created fear of every association with
persons possibly dangerous to the regime o r perceived as a threat. Fear
created a tendency to take refuge in one’s privacy and family, in trivial
and apolitical matters, and in daily subsistence in order to forget about,
and keep aside from, social problems or ideological matters.
Together with fear went a stark economic reality. Argentina’s GDP
per capita in 1985 was lower than in 1975, and income distribution has
become even more unequal. The labor market shrunk, and a large fraction of the labor force maintained two jobs in a double workday, accepted jobs beneath their skill level, and received very reduced wages.
This added up to stress and reduced opportunities for leisure and
friendships.
T h e military regime established a fiercely speculative financial system
that appeared until the date of our survey as the only way to make
money. This occurred in the middle of an inflationary spiral that
reached 1000 percent a year, although it did decline drastically in the
second half of 1985. In an atmosphere such as this, the interviewed
returnees said that economic uncertainty and unending concern over
daily subsistence eliminate many possibilities of placing value on nonincome-producing activities; there is no free time, no spiritual tranquility to dedicate oneself to friendship or conviviality; one lives often in
a permanent environment of aggressiveness and ill-will.
Nonetheless, there is the possibility that the experience abroad has
sensitized the returning migrants to the lack of solidarity or to certain
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traits of intolerance and authoritarianism that perhaps existed in the
country at the moment they began their exile.
Moreover, the exiles are disturbed by the reception provided them.
They felt as if their compatriots would have preferred that they had not
returned. The exiles observed that people pretended to ignore the
causes which originally caused the returnees’ departure from the
country.
We interviewed a psychoanalyst who had lived ten years in exile. In
referring specifically to his colleagues as a professional group, he said:
The first thing to notice is their inability to talk about what happened, to avoid talking about recent political experience. Even
when the past is approached, it is in a very banal and frivolous
manner combined with amnesia. There is an extreme and persistent concern about money and economic survival. Our professional colleagues do nothing else but concentrate on their work, to
try to defend their privileges which are scarcely defensible as they
lose them day by day. . . . Then there is a sort of fragmenting of
reality. There is a kind of ignorance not only about what happened but also about what is occurring to other social sectors. The
middle class has managed to put on blinders in order not to see,
understand, or know what is happening.
The exile comes into this context with a critical view, willing to examine the dictatorship, review its economic results, and learn about social concerns, only to find that his or her colleagues do not listen. Thus,
the exile is a voice from the past, incomprehensible and annoying for
those who remained behind, in a country isolated behind barriers of
ideological and cultural backwardness.
Some exiles returned from countries where for years they felt foreign
to their culture and customs. There they experienced an excessive individualism that contrasted to fantasies of solidarity and warmth they expected to find at home. “I left a united society when I went to exile, and
I returned to a now cannibalistic society”, said a working-class woman
after returning from exile. Perhaps this woman idealized the level of
solidarity that existed before her exile. “We returned to the maternal
womb, but it was dry and rotten”, was the metaphor of a professional
who lived in Italy for several years.
At the micro-social level, exile freezes the image the exile held of
others who remained, and vice-versa. The return abruptly puts them
face to face with the changes that have occurred in both. The duration
of Argentine exile (an average of six to eight years) is long enough for
significant changes to occur, but not so long as to avoid the illusory
expectation that everything remains the same.
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One micro-social arena where changes are noticed immediately is in
the family. “When I left, my parents were supporting me; now they are
retired and ill and I must care for them”, was one answer expressed
about changes in the family. Many exiles left at one stage in life and
returned in another completely different one. Changes have occurred
in the family setting; the parents may have died; siblings may have married or no longer live together.
There are also seemingly trivial changes in the physical environment
that cause strong emotional reactions. In some cases, the exile’s former
house has been abandoned; furniture is no longer there; old china or
wall decorations have been lost or replaced; the family library has been
sacked by the repressive forces. Other changes are more subtle, such as
a modification in the way of living or relationship with one’s parents.
“It’s like coming home to find everything there, but with different
places for the furniture; at each step one stumbles upon something that
was not there before”. One returns to the familiar, the things that are
known, but at the same time everything is different in a spatial environment that is not the same, just like the migrant who returns is not the
same anymore.
Apart from the changes in family and friends, the exile may suddenly
perceive that he or she has also changed and is different than the
others. People may tell the exile that he speaks with a new accent. The
exile’s most trivial ideas can be shocking or novel to others. The exile’s
point of view about the family, the profession, politics, and about himor herself may have changed. Some changes are visibly noticed: The
exile may return with a new spouse, new children, or a new profession
that involves a new identity unknown to friends and colleagues.
Moreover, the mere fact of having lived abroad or having participated in another society makes the exile distance himself from some
native things which, for others, are so immediate that they are indisputable; migrating is in a sense the “end of innocence”, the end of an immediacy with one’s country that will never be attainable again by the
returning migrant.
The returnee looks at the country with different eyes and relativizes it
in comparisons that are impossible for others who did not migrate. Even
the non-migrant’s occasional tourist excursions abroad do not allow for
adequate knowledge of other realities, at least not enough to distance
oneself from one’s own reality.
The new things the exile brings, of course, also could be seen as positive contributions to enrich the national society. In fact, one of the
exiles’ main motivations for return is that of “being useful and to contribute something to my country”. This desire to be useful, of inte-
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grating oneself into the society can often be an attempt to generate a
new goal, a support for the identity the exile wishes to rebuild.
These expectations of being useful implicitly involve the assumption
(often unwarranted) that people in the home country are actually
willing to receive the contributions of those who return from exile. In
fact, that idea was nourished by the official pronouncement of the new
democratic government which called for the return of Argentines since
late 1983, arguing that “the country needed them”.
In many cases, however, a sense of frustration emerges, due to what is
perceived as a cold indifference toward the possible contributions of
those who return. Feelings of rejection are better treated under the
“stigma of exile” - a topic which is discussed in the next section. Here,
we want to mention only that rejection undermines the fantasies that
nourish the self-image of the returning migrant and that maintain the
expectations of rebuilding his or her identity.
The one who comes back with the desire to “be useful” often finds a
response of “disqualification”.Offering a contribution is interpreted by
others as a request or demand rather than giving or sharing. Two examples of actual dialogue reported by persons interviewed will illustrate
this point:
Migrant (by telephone): “I would like to meet to talk after so many
years and to tell you how it went for me”.
Colleague (current director of an institution): “Before anything, I
want to say that I cannot offer you a job here”.
In another case, the migrant (a scientist) went to a research center in
his field and spoke to a person he had not known previously:
Migrant: “I am aware that the Institute has worked on the topic. I had
valuable experience on the same topic in Europe, and I would like to
exchange some ideas on it”.
Colleague: “The library of this institution has all of the material we
have produced on that theme; you can consult it there”. (The person
also gave the migrant a book on the subject published by the institute;
he did not show the least interest in listening to the migrant on the topic
itself.)
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In both cases, the migrants encountered responses that had a clear
meaning: Your contribution is not needed. Before they can express
themselves, they are placed in an inferior position with no evaluation of
their experience or possible contribution. Obviously, these disqualifying
responses (as they are defined in communication theory) form part of a
defensive tactic by those who have not emigrated against someone who
is seen as a competitor.
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The exile thus faces a panorama of indifference, not hostility. Instead
of feeling welcomed “at home” and perceiving that his or her presence
is desired and needed, the returnee finds that he is often viewed as
almost an intruder. To recall Freudian terminology, this tactic is an attack on narcissism. In those individuals who have converted the need to
be useful into a central part of their identity (according to the frame of
mind that earlier carried them into political militancy and eventually
into exile), this type of aggression produces a devastating effect.
It must also be re-emphasized that this matter is tied to the general
crisis of political identities in Argentina of the 1970s. That situation affected those who emigrated as well as those who remained in the
country, but it prevented the exiles who returned from inserting themselves directly into a known sociopolitical environment. The opposite
seems to have occurred for exiles who returned in recent years to Brazil,
Uruguay or Chile, where old political alignments remain strong in spite
of the changes.
This contributes to undermining the mental state of the former exile
and of the family group as a whole. In that context, the desire to emigrate again emerges very easily, above all when the economic reality
does not add favorable arguments for remaining, but contributes even
more to the existing anguish.
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The Stigma of Exile
The fact of having been exiled can be a negative factor in the biography
(the social identity) of the individual, for many reasons related to the
specific context in which exile occurred and the form in which the dictatorship ended.
One of the manifestations of the “stigma” is simply an ideological suspicion, which is not applied only to former exiles, but to all who, in one
way or another, are suspected of an extremist political position. An exile
for instance, can be seen as potentially dangerous by the personnel
manager of a private company who tries not to hire troublesome
persons, agitators, or subversives.
In Argentina, the anti-subversive harangue of the military dictatorship made every protest evil to such an extent that even at the time of
our survey (1985) there was a strong distrust of anyone associated with
those persecuted by the military. During the years of dictatorship, those
with clean conscience consoled themselves upon learning about a disappearance: “Surely”, they thought, “that person must have done something”. The same idea emerges upon facing a former exile whose need
to leave the country can be attributed, in the mind of the other
person, to having belonged to some terrorist organization or to having
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at least supported an extremist ideology. Thus, an exile would be a
“dangerous” person with whom one had to be careful, and whose ideas
should still be distrusted.
A sixty-year-old man who was a former exile sharply perceived this
problem: “When I arrived it seemed that there were persons who did
not know that I had been exiled...As if one had gone who knows where,
as if one had disappeared like an angel and had returned. This is apart
from those who thought that if I were in exile, there must have been a
reason”. His friends accepted him again but distrusted his opinions and
preferred to keep the years of exile in a shroud that was hardly mentioned:
Some old friends from the school invited me to dinner; they had
selected a speaker who did not show up; someone thought that I
wanted to speak in his place and said to me: “Not you, you are
forbidden to speak....They saw me arrive after seven or eight
years....and no one asked me “Where were you? What happened
to you?” It was understood that my exile was a shrouded time,
and ....no further questions were asked.
The origin of this attitude from his former colleagues seemed very
clear to him: “Those of us university authorities who were in charge in
1973-1975 were masked, he said upon recalling his actions prior to the
military coup.
In 1985, on the other hand, the strength of democracy in Argentina
was still precarious. Frequent political events reminded the citizenry
that the repressive apparatus still existed and that another coup could
be possible in the future. The distrust of many was also a precaution for
that uncertain future.
Since the middle of 1985, the feeling of mistrust has been muted
somewhat. This is a result of the trials of the military junta as well as a
consequence of democracy growing stronger. Testimony at those trials
brought out more clearly in the public view the nature of the atrocities
and the arbitrariness of the repression. Upon probing into the repressive aberrations of the regime, it was admitted that many had been innocent victims of the repression. But this process of clarifying the past,
which is not yet complete (1986), had barely begun to unfold at the time
of our survey. This contributed to the political prejudice against the
exiles.
Another dimension of the stigma appears among those ideologically
closer to the exiles but who feel somehow threatened by their return.
During the early part of 1984 the Argentine intellectual community debated over “those who went” and “those who stayed”. The debates produced a false dichotomy. The former feared being accused of coward-
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ness, and having enjoyed a golden exile while their colleagues suffered.
The latter feared being accused of collaborating with the regime. Each
group perceived the other as a danger to their own legitimacy. That
period of public debate was surpassed in a few months and was generally recognized as a mistaken way of approaching the issue. But,
perhaps, it raised doubts and fears that still linger.
Another side of the exile stigma is the sense of being the object of
professional mistrust or misgivings - a stigma that arises in the context
of a saturated labor market. This appears to hold especially in the social
sciences,journalism, university teaching, theater, politics, and unions; in
these fields the political legitimacy of one’s own position plays an important role in defining affiliations and opportunities for professional
success. This aspect, related to competition in the professional marketplace, usually did not become explicit, nor even acknowledged, at least
among “those who stayed”. However, the reticence to incorporate the
exiles in various activities, or the belief that they were obtaining privileges because of their condition of having been in exile, appeared frequently in conversations with the exiles and with other informants. One
of the most frequent manifestations was the indifference with which the
exiles’ experience abroad was received. We alluded to this in the previous section.
That indifference was reported mostly by professionals and by scientific researchers. There seem to be two origins of this attitude. The first
is a professional jealousy in the face of dangerous competition in a reduced labor market for Argentine scientists. One tactic is trying to undervalue or ignore academic and professional credentials obtained
abroad. A second tactic, most common in the field of social sciences, is to
rationalize the matter by way of arguing against the relevance of other
national experiences with respect to their usefulness in interpreting the
Argentine case. This last contention, be it valid or not, is connected to
the previous one because it helps to overvalue the professional experience in Argentina vis-a-vis that acquired abroad.
The problem of stigma, and professional mistrust in particular, tends
to disappear over time. This occurs as the former exiles are integrated
in one way or another in their respective professions. With time the fear
based on fantasies leads to a confrontation with reality in which the fact
that a person was in exile loses relevance.
Faced with these various instances of the exile stigma, many repatriates choose to hide their condition, as best as possible, in an attempt to
submerge themselves in the mainstream and pass by unperceived. In
one of the cases we studied, a young woman refugee who left the
country as a primary school teacher succeeded in obtaining an advanced
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university degree in early childhood education in Sweden. In Argentina
she found out that her Swedish degree was equivalent to a confession of
her refugee status. She found it difficult to get a job in private education
(oriented to the most affluent and conservative sectors of society) or in
public education directed by a rigid and traditional bureaucracy. In an
act that could be considered a classic Freudian slip, one fine day, this
woman inadvertently lost her Swedish diploma.
The End of Return
When the phenomenon of the stigma is added to the preceding considerations about the meaning of return migration, it is fitting to ask how
long the status of “return migrant” lasts? When does one stop being a
returnee?
We studied migrants who had returned between five months and five
years prior to the interviews. The vast majority had returned between
six months and two years before. The duration of return did not seem
to be a very decisive factor in determining the nature of the exiles’ reinsertion into the labor market. However, it did influence the exile’s perception about his or her problems and position in society.
What marks the end of return is the disappearance of the status of
“returnee” as a significant element in one’s own definition and in the
perception others have about the person. Some of those we interviewed
were clearly in this stage. They did not attribute their economic
problems to having been in exile but rather to the problems of the
country. They had reconstructed a normal life in all respects, including
some who had married or had children, or had begun successfully a
new professional activity, perhaps different from that which they had
before their exile.
The survey was carried out between March and June 1985, a little
more than a year after the installation of the democratic government.
Those who returned earlier (for example, at the end of the 1982 war)
had left many problems of re-insertion pending during the final period
of the dictatorship; they only began to resolve these problems once the
constitutional government was established. Therefore, perhaps this
survey does not permit one to see clearly the theme of “the end of return” which would require more time to pass.
Nevertheless, the responses obtained in this research suggest that the
end of return could have been reached with relative speed in many
cases. This is not incompatible with the fact that 40 percent of those
interviewed showed an intention or readiness to emigrate again. To return, as was defined in this study, constitutes a way of affirming one’s
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own freedom, of repairing the arbitrary will that expelled them from
the country and prevented them from returning for many years. Once
their identity is reconstructed in their own land and the wounds of exile
are healed, there can be another decision to migrate. This time, however, it is the result of free choice tied to their own personal growth and
it is a step that does not weaken the validity of the act of returning.
The same feeling occurs among those who did not return. Although
we do not know their number, it is estimated that perhaps between onethird and one-half of the exiles have not returned to Argentina. Many
of these individuals remain abroad as a result of an internal conflict that
implies changing their identity from political exiles to simple immigrants and abandoning a status with which they have lived for a long
time.
The decision to remain abroad, when it is correctly elaborated, is also
a way to exercise freedom of choice, which is made possible by the existence of a democratic order, by the end of pditical and ideological persecutions, and by the end of fear. This occurs even when one has not
passed over the stage - that others consider necessary - of facing return and rediscovering one’s own roots.
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