zy zyxwvu BACK HOME: PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE EXILES’ RETURN TO ARGENTINA Hector Maletta Frida Szwarcberg Rosalia Schneider Much of the literature on return migration focuses on the material aspects of resettlement and reintegration (Kubat, 1984; Rogers and Pessar, 1987). In this study of repatriation to Argentina, we explore another, inadequately treated, dimension of return migration: the psychosocial readjustment of the repatriate. Drawing on our case studies of Argentines who have returned from political exile, we present a series of hypothetical propositions about exile and return. These propositions are informed by psychoanalytical and psychosocial thinking on exile, identity, and stigma. Before presenting these propositions, we will provide some background material on the estimated numbers of Argentine emigrants and returnees. We will also briefly review the political and economic conditions that promoted these population movements. Finally, we will present some background material on the returnees who were included in our study. In the middle of the 198Os, almost one-half million Argentines were residing outside of the country in different parts of the world. More than half had emigrated after 1970 (Bertoncello et al., 1985). A part of this population was comprised of political exiles pushed out by the violence and repression that ruled the country in the 1970s. The-socioeconomic composition of the emigrant population includes a high proportion of technical and professional persons (See, Oteiza, 1971; Houssay, 1966; and Marshall, 1987). The majority of the emigrants travel in search of better economic and professional opportunities. A high proportion lives in the United States whose 1970 census registered 70,000 Argentines. Argentine consulates registered more zyxwvu z zyxwvut WHENBORDERSDON’TDIVIDE 179 than 500,000 persons living abroad in 1982; this figure probably involves a degree of exaggeration, since some who returned to Argentina or moved to another country remain registered at the consulates. This may explain why, for example, the consulates’ figures show more Argentines in the United States than were registered by the U.S. census (Gurrieri, et al., 1983). This, however, is partially balanced by emigrants not caring to register at Argentine consulates. The true figure was probably a little below 500,000 in the early 1980s. There are no reliable statistics on the return rate of migrants to Argentina, but some estimates can be inferred from the 1980 Argentine census. Data on those persons who were living abroad five years before the census show that between 1975 and 1980 approximately 4,000 per year returned to Argentina.’ This represents an annual rate of return of 1.5 percent relative to the Argentine population residing abroad in those years. The normal rate of return, over the period 1970-1983, is probably greater, as return was discouraged by the political situation in the country from 1975-1980. The number of persons who emigrated for political reasons is difficult to estimate, but it is probably a small part of the total. This figure can be deduced from the increase of the Argentine population since 1975 in places where exiles most frequently resided (Latin America, Spain, France, and Scandinavia), which leads us to estimate that the number of political exiles was about 30,000-50,000. Apart from the lack z * The estimate is based on the census taken on October 22, 1980. The data used herein refer exclusively to the resident population in the country at the time, excluding persons who habitually resided abroad. The data were taken from census data, especially from tables which present migration statistics. The following data and calculations are essential: A. Persons residing five years or more in the country, who, five years earlier (ie., Oct. 22, 1975) were residing abroad - 128,375. B. Persons born abroad, residing in the country, who arrived after January 1, 1976 and before the census of October 22. 1980 - 114,659. C. Persons born abroad, residing in the country, who are between 0-4 years of age 11,119. D. Persons born abroad, 5 years of age or more, residing in the country and arrived between Jan. 1,1976 and Oct. 10,1980 (D=B-C) - 103,540. E. Persons born abroad, 5 years of age or more, residing in the country and arrived between Oct. 10, 1975 and Oct. 22, 1980 (estimate)- 109,787. F. Persons born in Argentina who resided in the country in 1980, 5 years of age or more, who, on Oct. 22, 1975 were residing abroad (F=A-E) - 18,588. G. Persons born in Argentina who on Oct. 22, 1975 were residing abroad and returned to Argentina before the census (includesan estimate of those who died after returning but before the census) - 19,255. The last figure does not include Argentines residing in the country on Oct. 22, 1975 who emigrated after that date and returned before the 1980 census. Nor does it indude the census error (approximately 3 percent). Therefore, the result should be consideM as a conservativeestimate. It represents about 1.5 percent per year relative to total Argentine population living abroad (average 1975-80, estimated from data in Bertoncello et d., 1985). zyxwvut 180 zyxw zyxw WHENBORDERS DON'T DIVIDE of statistical data, the uncertainty of the estimates stems from the fact that most of the exiles did not formally assume the status of refugee. T h e flow of political emigrants began in 1974. At this time, left-wing militants suffered serious persecution at the hands of death squads formed with the support of the extreme right wing of the government of Isabel Peron. T h e majority of the political exiles, however, emigrated after the March 1976 coup which developed an extremely repressive regime. The full force of repression was felt between 1976-1978; the characteristics of this period will be analyzed in the next section. T h e crisis of the military regime, which began in mid-1982 after the unfortunate war in the South Atlantic, saw a slow opening of the political system. This process culminated in the 1983 election of the democratic government of Raul Alfonsin. T h e continual process of democratization promoted the return of political exiles which reached a peak in the first half of 1984. At that time, a program established at the request of the Argentine government and financed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) provided for the return of thousands of political exiles from different parts of the world. Many of these returnees did not even have the formal status of refugees. There are no available quantitative data on the exiles since many returned of their own accord without resorting to international assistance. A prudent estimate is that the total number of returning exiles and their families could have reached 20,000-30,000 around the end of 1984. As there are no realistic figures on the total number of exiles from 1974-1983, it is not easy to authenticate this return estimate, but there are various indications that a high proportion of the exiles chose to return, probably one-half to twothirds. This chapter is based on a 1985 survey of 134 exiled families who returned to Argentina and 86 families who returned, but did not originally emigrate for political reasons. The principal objective of the survey was to determine the problems encountered by the migrants after they returned. T h e problems were envisioned as both material (job, housing, etc.) and psychosocial (adaptation and social integration into the national environment).2 T h e results of the survey showed that economic motivations did not play a relevant part in the decision to return. This was true not only for the exiles, but also, surprisingly, for those who emigrated for apolitical * The survey questionnaire was quite extensive with some '30 questions- most of which were open-ended. Moreover, twelve families with exiles were studied with greater depth through even more extensive interviews. See, the methodologies and quantitativeresults in Maletta and Szwarcberg (1985). zy z zyxw zyx zyx zy WHENBO~DERS DON’T DIVIDE 181 reasons. The basic reasons for returning to Argentina involved the need of 6migrCs to rediscover the country and their own identities. At the same time, expectations of economic difficulties after return did not seem to have been a disturbing influence. The repatriates were affected by the problems of reentering the national environment - for example, their perception of indifferent attitudes or hostility on the part of their compatriots, or their own rejection of authoritarian elements in daily life. Economic hardship at home only mattered in cases of lprolonged unemployment, which in some cases brought about plans to emigrate again. Therefore, this chapter concentrates on psychosocial aspects of return migration more than on the pragmatic problems of employment or income. In spite of the serious economic difficulties that affect Argentina, few of the returnees complained about them. The majority already knew the problems beforehand, and economic problems did not diminish their will to return. Rather, the returnees appear to be affected by other factors which leave some partially reintegrated into the country, while others experience rejection or at least a more difficult readjustment into national life. The dozen in-depth interviews alone were much more important for constructing an analysis of these factors than were the quantitative results of the survey; nevertheless, the latter do provide a reference point for the analysis of the psychosocial adjustment of the returnees. zyxwv zy Characteristics and Context of Exile In the sample of 134 families of political repatriates, almost 70 percent left Argentina between 1976-1978. Another 12 percent emigrated before the 1976 coup, that is, after 1974. The rest departed between 1979 and 1980. Most had remained in exile an average of six years. When the survey was conducted, the majority had returned for an average of 18 months, although the date of return varied from the middle of 1982 (after the Malvinas War) until the beginning of 1985. A few returned between 1980 and 1981. At the time of the survey, two-thirds of the families consisted of a married couple with one or more children. Some 13 percent were divorced or without spouse and had children in their care. About 21 percent were single persons. Most were young at the time of exile: The average age was 27; about one-fourth were between 20 and 24; a few were barely adolescents. Many of the exiles were students, but more than three-fourths of the total were working prior to their departuke. Of those who were working, only 14 percent had manual or low-skilled jobs; more than one-third had high-skilledjobs. 182 zyxwvuts zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE T h e departure from Argentina was preceded and accompanied in many cases by traumatic circumstances related to the Argentine political situation. It is difficult to capture the nature of the decision to become an exile without considering the situation that existed at the time. Argentina experienced a fierce political battle characterized by guerrilla activity and repressive violence in the first half of the 1970s. In the economic arena, the demands of the popular sectors (principally industrial workers faced with the continual decline in employment and income) clashed against a stagnant and dependent economic system. The dominant economic groups not only failed to attend to these pressures, but also demanded a “rationalization” of the productive forces and greater “labor discipline”. These objectives were very difficult to establish within the democratic framework existing in Argentina at that time. In March 1976, the civilian government was deposed by a military coup which established a harsh dictatorship that lasted until 1983 under several military juntas. This authoritarian regime proposed and executed an economic plan based on financial deregulation and the abrupt opening of the economy after decades of strong protectionist policies. T h e plan greatly damaged the industrial sector that was established by way of import-substitution after World War 11. The military regime also chose state terrorism to carry out the so-called “eradication of subversion” which was meant to include not only guerrilla rebels but also union protest and all expressions of dissent against the central program of the regime. State terrorism, which was applied to its maximum between 1976 and 1978, was characterized by a widespread show of repression which extended throughout the society. It considered subversive all ideological activities or positions that the military perceived as leftist o r simply not overtly supportive of their self-appointed government, even when the people involved were clearly opposed to any revolutionary o r guerrilla actions. In the majority of cases, persons considered subversive were arrested by military forces acting in a paramilitary fashion. They became the “disappeared ones” and were taken to secret prisons and torture areas. In most cases, they were killed. The details of the repressive program have been examined carefully by the 1984 National Commission on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP). They were also probed in 1985 by the court empowered to try members of the military juntas for homicides, tortures, and other crime^.^ T h e key elements in this repressive pro- zy zyxwvu s The details of the trial, including a transcription of the testimony and the sentences can be found in successive issues of El Diurio del Juicio published in Buenos Aires from the middle of 1985 until January 1986. Several former Junta members got heavy sentences, including life terms for Gen. Videla and Adm. Massera. zyxw zy zyxwvu zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE 183 gram were the arbitrariness of repression, the uncertain future of the disappeared, and the repression extended to relatives of the presumed subversives - including the elderly and children This environment of terror reached wide sectors of society, particularly those most likely to oppose the military: workers, students, intellectuals, political activists, etc. Some of the exiles managed to leave the country after having experienced some form of repression, that is, for example, after they were fired, threatened, blacklisted, or detained for a while. However, the majority chose exile as a way to escape immiaent repression following the arrest or disappearance of family, friends, or colleagues. Many who left the country avoided obtaining passports from police authorities; rather, they preferred to leave by going to a border country such as Brazil, where they needed only their identification card to enter. From there, they could renew their passport at consulates or request refugee status and assistance. Others had obtained a passport in Argentina before they had drawn the attention of the repressive state. The climate of uncertainty and terror was an essential component in the repressive program. It extended a cloak of darkness and fog over the fate of the diappeared and, at the same time, over the precise legal status of the exiled, or for that matter, of anyone else. No one could be certain if he or she was a suspect. The mere act of beginning an inquiry about such a matter might create a dangerous suspicion best to avoid. Those who had left the country for fear of being subjected to repression and those who chose “internal exile” by hiding in other parts of the country could never ascertain whether or not there was a clear danger, whether they could return, or what the extent of the charges were against them. These repressive policies influenced the very nature of the exile and indirectly the conditions for return. The act of leaving the country was not a feasible option for all who were threatened by repression. Generally, it was an available option for the middle class and was not as feasible for workers and low-income sectors. In practice, intellectuals, professionals, and academics represented a high proportion of the emigrants not so much because of the social selectivity of the repression - which was much more indiscrixhinate - but because it was easier for them to leave the country. The high cost of traveling was prohibitive for the poorer classes of society, especially when all the neighboring countries were dominated themselves by military dictatorships which did not welcome Argentihe exiles. Furthermore, the middle class was already imbued with a migratory culture since most of their ancestors arrived in Argentina from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of World War 11. Many of them also had relatives or friends abroad. zy 184 zyxwvuts zyxwv zyxw zyx zyxwv WHENBORDERSDON’TDIVIDE It is fitting to recall that, for those choosing exile, terror was notjust a theoretical possibility or merely part of the social climate. Many of the exiles personally suffered from extremely traumatic experiences before they left the country. These experiences - assassinated family members, disappeared school or work colleagues, torture suffered personally or applied to relatives in their presence, long periods of solitary confinement or precarious, clandestine hiding - all indelibly marked the memory of the exiles during their period outside of the country and influenced the conflicts that arose when they considered the possibility of returning to Argentina. Some Facts About Exile and Return Migration Many of the persons interviewed experienced important changes in their lives while in exile. A high proportion (55 percent) continued their education; some began new careers which implied, upon returning, the need to enter a new professional community without relying on contacts that otherwise would have facilitated their professional success. Onethird of those who were married when they emigrated were divorced, and half of these married again abroad (with Argentine and foreign spouses in equal proportions). Of those who were not married when they departed, two-thirds got married or formed free unions. One-third of these marriages or unions ended eventually in divorce or separations, which is remarkable, as the time span involved is relatively short. Upon returning, the profile of the migrants had changed significantly in more than one respect. The average age was now 35; many had changed their marital status; many had had new children abroad; more than half had a higher level of education and often a new profession. The decision to return sometimes generated conflicts in the families of the exiles. Such disputes occurred among 26 percent of the couples; disputes also arose among other couples once they had returned to Argentina. Children - especially teen-agers - frequently rejected the plan to return. For them, return represented a true exile to a country they did not know or that they no longer remembered. Some families broke up when their adolescent children (and in one case, a spouse) refused to return. More than 60 percent returned without a formal job or a sure offer of employment. Nevertheless, they knew that the economic situation was difficult, and that finding a job would be a difficult affair; most consider, in retrospect, that they were not unduly optimistic. Approximately 40 percent had made exploratory visits prior to their return. Some 57 percent of those surveyed returnees relied on financial assistance through UNHCR, ICM, or other institutions. It must be WHENBORDERS DON'TDIVIDE 185 zy zy zyxwv added, however, that the real proportion that sought such assistance must have been much less since our sample was strongly biased toward cases contacted through assistance agencies. Two-thirds of the migrants shipped their personal belongings to the country; one-third came only with baggage. Of those who shipped cargo, one-third had their goods damaged or robbed or experienced customs problems upon entering the country. Some lost all of their belongings (sent as cargo), including many irreplaceable goods. For them, these losses added to the psychosocial strains associated with return. More than 40 percent were housed with friends and relatives immediately upon returning to Argentina. At the time of the survey, when an average of 18 months had elapsed since their arrival, 45 percent were living in their own houses; 29 percent were renters; and 26 percent continued living with relatives and had not resolved their housing problem. Eight percent of the heads of households and 15.9 percent of their spouses were unemployed. Both rates were well above the national rate of open unemployment. A contingent of repatriates survived with precarious and marginal jobs or received as their only income modest financial assistance from humanitarian organizations. Although the jobs they were able to obtain were in many cases satisfying, in general, they were paid very low salaries. This was due ta the decline in real wages throughout the economy, but often contrasted with the pay they had been earning abroad. If the occupations carried out abroad and those obtained upon returning are grouped in three categories (high, middle, and low)) some 16 percent had moved up in category while 20 percent had descended. Those who ascended in level were mostly those who had a mid-level job abroad and occupied a high-level position when they returned. However, many of these high-level positions, such as scientific researcher or public official, currently pay low salaries. Those who dropped in occupational level were those who had a high level position abroad (international official, scientific research) and accepted mid-level positions (non-managerial public official or small business job) when they returned. The amount of time that elapsed since returning did not influence the possibilities of ascending or descending in category, except for those who had low-level jobs abroad. While few migrants actually had lowlevel jobs abroad, two-thirds of that group obtained a mid-level position ' zyx zyxwv The high level includes highly skilled occupations, such as administrators and managers as well as businessmen, scholars, ctc. The mid-level corresponds to non-mqnual, medium-skilledjobs, mainly clerks or small shopkeepers. The low-level includes manual jobs and low-skilledjobs in general. 186 zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE less than one year after returning. This figure approaches 80 percent for those who had been in the country for more than two years. While the possibility of living near relatives and friends was mentioned as an important factor among the motives influencing our informants’ decision to return, no more than 57 percent indicated maintaining good relations with their families in Argentina; only a small proportion indicated those relations to be strong or satisfactory. Also, some 30 percent said that their current friends were principally other repatriates whom they met abroad o r after having returned. Only onefourth maintain a close relationship with friends they had before migrating. T h e rest maintain new friendships with persons who were not exiled o r have groups of friends in which neither category predominates. Nine out of ten respondents who mentioned social relations among the areas in which they noticed changes, indicated that these relationships generally have deteriorated from the time before they were exiled until now. T h e most frequently cited problems were aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and the lack of solidarity. Finally, while the majority considered that returning was the correct decision and appeared to be basically content in having taken that step, about 40 percent declared a desire or intention to emigrate again when the opportunity presents itself. This does not include those who would migrate only in the case of a new military coup. Having presented some of the basic characteristics, motivations, and intentions of the returnees in our sample, we can move on to develop an appropriate framework to interpret the reentry of the exiles. This framework takes into account the most important psychological and psychosocial factors involved in the process of return migration. Toward an Interpretive Framework zy zy T h e literature on return migration largely considers economic and demographic implications rather than psychological and psychosocial aspects. A good example of the dominance of economic and demographic studies is the collection of works included in Kubat (1984). These studies were originally presented at the First European Conference on International Return Migration. Very few studies presented at the conference addressed non-economic factors within a theoretical framework. T h e study on Dutch return migration by Blauw and Elich (1984), for example, has some relevance to our analysis, even though it does not develop an appropriate theoretical framework. T h e Dutch who returned from Australia and New Zealand cited reasons that the authors zyxw zyx WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE 187 group into two categories: cultural shock and personal problems. The former include aspects perceived as negative in the receiving society (vandalism, crime, and discrimination against women) as well as the difficulty in making friends, notwithstanding the cordiality exhibited by the local population. This is the common complaint from other migrants in different areas. Among the personal problems, the primary one mentioned was nostalgia for one’s country in terms of family ties and familiar haunts. This category also included unemployment, dissatisfaction with work, and the breakup of marriage. After they had returned, the majority of the migrants maintained contact with the previous host country where they had friends and relatives; very few said they regretted migrating; only one-fifth regretted having returned home; and some wanted to re-emigrate. “Before they returned, many held idealized images of Holland, its friendly people, its warm social relations. After they returned, the picture was not as rosy as they had imagined” (Blauw and Elich, 1984:232). The authors summarized their interpretation about the reasons for return migration in terms of the incapacity of the migrants to adapt to culture shock in the receiving country which reached a peak about two years after they had emigrated: “The economic reasons came to be much more secondary relative to the other reasons for emigrating or for returning. It is difficult to place these motives in a framework that makes economic motivations the primary cause of migration” (Blauw and Elich, 1984:232). As can be seen, these authors clearly show the presence of non-economic subjective factors, but they refrain from elaborating a more detailed alternative interpretation. A study in the same book by Richmond (1984) tries to analyze the possible explanatory factors for return migration with few encouraging results: “The empirical studies on return migration have not managed to identify any consistent pattern that distinguishes migrants who remain and migrants who return” (Richmond, 1984:270). In reviewing some empirical studies, Richmond suggests that pull factors seem to be stronger than push factors (something that is confirmed in this study) and that the level of education also can influence the decision to return. Richmond also cites Glaser (1978) on the return of foreign students from industrialized countries. In this case, return migration is caused by family and peer pressure as well as by patriotic feelings, rather than by other factors such as success in school or the temporary nature of their migration. The more capable and successful students are not more or less inclined to return than their colleagues. Many students who decide to remain abroad were originally temporary migrants. With respect to exiles, Richmond points to the existence of an almost universal desire to return, what he calls “an ideology of return”, although in practice these aspirations are often utopic. 188 zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE zyx Richmond concludes with an attempt to formulate general tendencies. First, he maintains that the dominant method of adaptation is “transilience”: T h e migrant is integrated economically and has a high level of cognitive acculturation, but has little identification with the society in which he or she resides. This coincides with our findings. We observed that the problem of societal identification - tied to the migrant’s own identity - seems to be a fundamental factor in the decision to return. Second, Richmond maintains that return migration will tend to increase when the host country experiences problems that affect upward social mobility or when these problems improve in the country of origin. In our study, the data do not seem to show a causal relationship between return migration and labor and social factors. This is the case for both exiles and non-political migrants (Maletta and Szwarcberg, 1985). Finally, Richmond indicates that there will be greater probability for return when the host country is more similar in language and culture to the country of origin and when communication is stronger between the two countries. This hypothesis, however, does not seem to have a sound basis. Indeed, we find in the case of some very similar countries neighboring Argentina that the geographical vicinity and socio-cultural similarity appear to have reduced problems of adaptation. For example, these problems may be mitigated by frequent visits to the place of origin which short distances make easier. Contrary to Richmond’s last proposition, our study discovered many cases of return migration from countries very different from Argentina. The reasons cited for return migration were the desire to recover inherent aspects of the country of origin (non-existent in the host country) or to be closer to the extended family. Yet even in neighboring countries, identification eludes the migrant. This theme is tied to the migrant’s own identity and does not appear to be related to cultural similarities between the two countries. For example, a recent study on Uruguayan immigrants in Argentina by Szwarcberg and Hensel(l985) showed that despite great similarities between these sending and receiving societies, Uruguayans demonstrated a strong need to return to Uruguay because the latter is their own country, and Argentina is not. The Uruguayans feel in Argentina exactly how Argentines felt in other countries, and they expressed this sentiment often with the same words. Richmond’s conclusions about the relationship between similar cultural traits and return migration do not appear to play a prominent role here. Rosemarie Rogers (1984) classifies possible reasons for return migration in various categories according to events that a) maintain ties with the guest country o r country of origin; b) are produced at the macro o r WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE 189 zy zyx zyxwv micro level; and c) are related or not to the original reason to migrate. This typology is useful in showing the diversity of reasons behind the decision to return, but it is not based on an explanatory framework. It is merely a taxonomy that does not allow for any one variable to assume a privileged analytical position within the framework. A Psychoanalytical Approach to Migration, Exile, and Return An interesting effort to address the problems of migration and exile psychoanalytically is found in the work of Le6n Grinberg and Rebecca Grinberg (1984). The two researchers have worked for twenty years on the topics of migration, identity, and change. They adopt a psychoalialytical perspective which is influenced in particular by the writings of Klein (1952). They consider migration, even voluntary migration, to be a traumatic situation; this crisis, they maintain, produces a feeling of “abandonment”, a feeling that would be related to the “loss of a protective mother”, “to the loss of the containing object according to the terminology of Bion” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 198424-25). The Grinbergs illustrate their work with clinical cases and with cases drawn from psychoanalytical literature. They attempt to relate latent aspects of the migratory process with certain “myths, which express sentiments crucial to the migratory experience” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 14-21). An example is the loss of Paradise in the biblical account of the origin of mankind. A chapter of their work is dedicated to exile as a specific type of migration. Various features of exile are mentioned. First, there is a frequent absence of “good-byes” - a ritual that migrants could use to “protect” themselves when they leave, and which is often infeasible when one must flee suddenly and in danger: To all of their anxieties is added an anguish provoked by the lack of a formal or explicit good-bye, which makes them feel that their departure is like crossing the border between the kingdom of the living and the kingdom of the dead ...All of the loved ones to whom they have not been able to say farewell and whom they fear they will not see again become dead persons with whom they feel unable to part satisfactorily . . . (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:189). Secondly, the exile is marked by the impossibility of returning, at least while the reasons for leaving persist: Many of them can also suffer from the “survival syndrome” which has been studied in prisoners of Nazi concentration camps who managed to survive while their family and friends were tortured or exterminated. . . . The exiles can feel crushed by the guilt they zyxw 190 zyxwvutsrq zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE experience from having seen their companions fall o r having heard their terrible cries from nearby cells. This state of mind is fertile ground for scepticism or disillusion, if not despair (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 190). T o integrate oneself totally in the receiving society and above all renounce a return is equivalent to “breaking the ’sacredness’ which some attribute to exile and is felt as a loss of the identity that defines them” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 190-191). Their relationship with the country of refuge is complex; they did not come “to” it but rather fled “from” their own country. This marks their relationship with the place where they dwell but in which they do not “live” in the fullest sense of the word. Their stay in the country of refuge is lived as a mere waiting period between their previous (often retrospectively mystified) life and their future life. This future life is represented by the illusion of being able to return, “an illusion all the more idealized, the greater the impossibility to attain it” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 191). With respect to return migration, the Grinbergs indicate foremost that “to return is hard”. It is a conflict even for those who during their exile lived in a state of waiting for the possibility of returning. T h e key idea here is that, in spite of everything, ties have been created in the host country even beyond the consciousness of the migrant. In testimony cited by the authors, some exiles confess: “I feel that I am neither from here nor there” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:220). Another feature of the Grinbergs’ analysis is the contention that “return is a new migration” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:222). N o one exists who truly returns; everyone goes, enters something new, even when attempting to reincorporate into a known reality. zyxwv [The exile returns] with expectations of recovering all things that were longed for ...But the reality confronted by the migrant can be different. T h e acknowledgement of changes in persons, things, customs, habits, homes, streets, relations, and affections will make the exile feel like a stranger. N o r will the language sound the same; colloquial expressions will have changed; understandings that have mounted on so many words with implied meanings like winks of complicity between the initiated (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984:222). And again: “What is unavoidable is that no return is only a return; it is a new migration, with all the losses, fears, and hopes that are inherent in it” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 251). With its many insights notwithstanding, the Grinbergs’ work does not pay detailed attention to the specifics of return migration. It also does not study in sufficient depth the relationship between exiles and return zyxw zy zyxwvu WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE 191 migration. Their return observations, based on empirical evidence and case studies cited in the literature, are always sharp and revealing, but they do not have in this regard a sufficiently systematic theory or approach - a defect that lamentably will continue to be seen in the present study. A word may be added here on the practical implications of studying return migration from a perspective rooted in psychology and psychoanalysis. The exploration of exile and return from this perspective can appear inadequate when the purpose is to develop state policies, or when the migrants show more urgent primary needs such as housing or food (which is the case for many streams of refugees all over the world). Yet in the Argentine case -which is probably repeated in other groups of exiles from Chile, Uruguay, and other parts of the world - the psychosocial problem occupies a prominent place when it comes to interpreting the situation of the exiles, their possible return, and its practical consequences. Here, the psychosocial approach has immediate application for mental health policy. Human rights organizations that have worked with exiles who returned to Argentina have had valuable experiences dealing with their clients’ psychosocial and psychological problems. In working with this population, human rights personnel have developed various therapeutic strategies and services. A similar case holds for exiles who have returned to Chile (FASIC, 1982). An outstanding example is the establishment of individual and group therapy services for maladjusted children in the exiles’ families. Obviously, the emphasis on psychological aspects is not meant to exclude other sociological or economic factors. As a matter of fact, all these psychological interpretations are based precisely on considering the psychological implications of experiences as directly tied to the social, political, and economic milieu. The type of identities that exile and return put into crisis are those that are tied to objects in the country of origin - one’s family, profession, or political stand - those that are incomprehensiblewithout reference to the macro-social reality that gave rise to them. Even economic reality is constantly present though not in a mechanical or linear manner; the subjects do not react necessarily to market indicators (especially in the labor market) by applying some conventional economic calculations, but rather mix economic forces with other motivations. It is certain that if one adopted a neoclassical economic framework, such motivations could also receive an economic evaluation and treatment as in ordinary economic analysis of migration in terms such as human capital. However, such a treatment would probably trivialize the analysis without adding specific meaning. zyxw 192 zyxw zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE zyx zyx zyxw Amid terror, uncertainty, assassinations, disappearances, and reprisals against family members - exile represents a traumatic cut o r wound in the lives of the individuals affected, a rupture that separates their lives in t w o parts that they try to unite thereafter through several means, including (when feasible) the quest for home, ie., return migration. From a slightly different angle, return migration can be seen also as an attempt to rebuild one’s own identity which was mutilated by events immediately prior to exile and by exile itself. The return thus represents from this point of view an attempt to recover the previous spatial environment that operated as a support for that identity. To return to his or her country (a geographical movement) thus acquires a temporal and social meaning in the migrant’s mind. A third interpretation (that bears on and, thus, does not exclude the other two views) emphasizes that exile is a forced migration, not one that is chosen. Once the political conditions are adequate, return appears (for those exiles who decide to return) as a necessary movement - an almost compulsive affirmation of the desire to live in one’s country. Perhaps, more importantly, it is an affirmation of the freedom to occupy again a place in the social, political, and emotional milieu that had formerly expelled the migrant. Only after accomplishing that movement, a new kind of freedom can emerge; now one is able to choose between remaining in the country or departing again, without the choice having been imposed. This would explain the high percentage of returnees who are content with their decision to return, yet at the same time intend to migrate again. Age and Exile T h e idea of exile as a trauma, a cut, o r a wound acquires different shades of meaning depending on the person’s age when exiled and his or her stage in life. At one extreme would be the sudden exile of adolescents, such as one interviewed youth who had to leave quickly after several of his high-school classmates “disappeared”. He was sent by his family to Israel alone, and found it very difficult to adjust there. Eight years later he stated: “When one leaves, there is something that is cut, something in me that is cut, something that was cut at the moment when those tragic events occurred in the country”. His formative adolescent years, mutilated by exile, continued in Israel under conditions totally divorced from the previous situation in Argentina. Now he does not feel a part of either of the spheres of socialization: “My sense of belonging is not fundamentally in one place, for my history was cut off at a certain moment”. zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE 193 The interview with this young man was very difficult, since re-living the moments prior to his exile, speaking about his experience abroad and his decision to return produced such an intense emotional state that his ability to speak was completely blocked. A part of the terror which motivated the exile, the “cut” to which he alluded, is permanently with him. It prevents him from assuming Argentina as his own country, yet it also ties him to it. He cannot free himself from the past that was interrupted when he had to leave at 16 years of age. His return came about almost compulsively, “without knowing why”, when he was about to be married in Israel. The date of his return not only coincided with the reemergence of democracy in Argentina but also with the war between Lebanon and Israel. The sudden decision to return, not very well explained at the conscious level, was associated with a definite identification with two situations of danger: one in Argentina in 1976, the other in Israel in 1983. Another influencing factor was probably the coming need to commit himself in Israel through marriage, a decision that could have been painful. Later, this young man decided to return to Israel, and it remained clear in his answers that he did not feel he belonged in either country and that he could not easily commit himself to anyone or anything. In the case of another young married couple, the woman had temporarily “disappeared and afterwards both emigrated to Brazil at age 18 when she was granted a precarious condition of freedom. Their s t o r y expresses similar but less dramatic feelings: “We were nobody here in Argentina once our entire horizon was upset; groups of friends, political activities - all of this did not exist anymore because people had left or were dead. . . . Nor do we have an identity here at this time, except for the family and a few things that one identifies with the country”. In fact, their own “history” began in exile, when they decided to live together and started seekingjobs. This couple also returned without knowing why, as a compulsion to be reunited with the country they had left. The return marked for them the end of a transitory state in Brazil which they saw as leading nowhere. Their return seems like an opportunity to feel a sense of belonging in their own country, to do things, to achieve, without having in Argentina a specific environment that was waiting for them (except the expectation of regaining their civil legal status, to be discussed in the next section). Ajournalist who was in exile for nine years said at age 35: “The factor that weighed particularly heavy on me in returning was the need to rebuild, to change the pattern of my life, to reconstruct it around a social and emotional environment”. zyxw zyxwv 194 zyxwvut WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE zyxw The differential impact of exile at different ages is seen clearly when comparing these cases with those of older persons. A sixty-year-old man remarked upon returning: “Here in Argentina I began to recognize my entire life, which I recognize in small conversations, in the street, in the way of living, in the market, on the bus. With time, everything that had been cutoff was being reconstructed. , . . I only came back to visit and see, but I’ve been carried away by things, . . . and now I am staying. I feel my whole life here, where things and persons have meaning for me; far away in exile I did not know the history”. The contrast with the younger people is notable. For the Israel-bound teen-ager, the break with Argentina happened before his entire universe of meanings was formed. To the older man, the country is so familiar that upon recognizing it, he decides to stay. The former must live forever with his biographical wound, while the latter observes that “everything that had been cut off was being reconstructed”. It is worth noting the frequent description of exile as a cut, a rupture, or a wound in the spontaneous wording of the interviewed exiles. Exile was a break, and they return to rebuild a sense of continuity. The older one is, the greater the possibilities for a successful re-encounter and the more elements to mitigate the break. There is a sensation in younger persons of something beyond repair, a break with Argentina and now another break with the country where they concluded their adolescence. A rupture of that import in the formative years could do far more damage than in later stages of life. For middle-age persons, not so young but yet not old, the past and the future, the country of origin and the world abroad are all more available. The possibility exists not only to rediscover the past but also to emigrate anew in search of a future project outside of the country. “My father”, said a 45-year-old professional woman, “returned a short time ago saying he was old, that he returned irrespective of any problem he may encounter, to face things as they are. I also felt like coming here, but we (she and her husband) didn’t come to stay irrespective of conditions. . . . We are very realistic”. This same woman showed her displeasure at the distrustful indifference of her professional colleagues who had remained in the country. (“It seems I’m invisible”.) She ultimately went abroad again. Meanwhile, her father remained in Argentina. zy Legality and Belonging To return often implies recovering a legal status and the possibility of re-integrating oneself into the pattern of social relations and institutions. The male member of the young couple who returned from Brazil (referred to earlier) stated in this regard: zyxw zyx zy zyxw zyx WHENB~RDERS DON’T DIVIDE 195 The idea of recovering one’s legal status is important, for in Brazil we recovered freedom without legality. We lived outside of the law, with expired documents, for many years. We got tired of the laborious process of renewing our visas each year and we simply stopped. We always lived on the margin, without being recognized. Here I feel recognition, although it is anonymous, for I have papers, a social security number, etc. I function within a social framework, 1 feel I belong to something. . . . When I get my salary and I see my social security number, I really get emotional. In an interview this same young man, now working at a weekly magazine in Buenos Aires, remembered the emotion he felt when he saw his name on the list of union members. Having been exiled so young, having lived without legal status or fixed jobs in Brazil, this young couple had never seen their names written anywhere - not on a bank account, a social security card, a union list. To return, for this couple, was like returning from a “civil death”. zyxwvu Zdentity and Rediscovery The break represented by exile can also be interpreted as a threat or wound to the substance or integrity of one’s identity. Thus, Grinberg and Grinberg (1984: 155) define “the feeling of identity as the capacity of the individual to continue to feel oneself amid the succession of changes” (Grinberg and Grinberg, 1984: 155). According to the authors, this feeling of identity results from the interaction of three bonds of integration: spatial, temporal, and social. The first refers to the ability to perceive oneself as separate and distinct; the second refers to the capacity to perceive oneself as the same in the course of time; the third refers to identifications between subject and external objects (either persons or things). It is not within the scope of this chapter to analyze this or other concepts of identity. Rather, we intend to use the concept of identity heuristically in order to formulate some hypotheses. It should be remembered that the concept of identity is virtually absent in Freudian vocabulary and that it has been imported into social psychology by later psychological and psychoanalytical currents. The very term Identitiit is not common in Freud’s work. It only appears in a letter he wrote to the B’nai B’rith in 1926. There, Freud used it to refer to a typically social identity, that of the Jewish people: “The clear conscience of an internal identity, the familiarity of possessing the zy 196 zyxwvutsr zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE same internal constr~ction’~.~ Here, identity has a relative sense and points to a cultural identity. It has an ethnic, social identity based on the similarities (“the same internal construction”) more than on individual differences. The concept of identity in Erikson’s work (1963) and Melanie Klein’s corresponding concept of “the self” share an idea of “integrity”; the subject continuously builds an integrated synthesis of his multiple identifications, and forms it through different stages (Klein, 1952). For other psychoanalytical approaches, especially those stemming from Lacan, the idea of an integrated identity is an illusion, a myth or ideal pursued by the individual. In this view, there is a basic break or split that never disappears and that forms a constituent part of the person. This is a notion taken from Freud himself, who, at the end of his work, wrote about the “splitting of the Ego”. The Ego pursues the illusion of becoming a whole, of achieving a union of its basic division. It places that illusion in goals that embody the ideal self that each individual pursues at a particular moment, without ever reaching that unity, even though the goals that one transitorially pursues are attained. Depression resulting from achieving a goal, very often observed in clinical experience, is seen as a manifestations of this duality: T h e goal is achieved, but not the unity itself. The depression persists until the person adopts a new goal. The concept of identity is thus tied to the Ideal Ego and to the complex theme of “narcissism”.6 Voluntary emigration expresses precisely the attempt to reach a goal (say, economic or professional success) which the individual pursues. In exile, on the other hand, political persecution cuts or mutilates the individual and collective projects of political militants and their families, and removes the material basis for the identity based on those projects. Moreover, the specific type of persecution unleashed in Argentina that massively struck circles of friends and family also violently broke the deepest emotional ties amidst an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty that adds even greater anguish than is expected in exiles who fled from other kinds of persecution. In a normal migration, as the Grinbergs (1984: 189) indicate, the ritual of farewell and subsequent communication (as well as the fact that migration is connected to personal projects and does not represent a break) put a strong protective mantle on departure and separation. By Translated directly from the original German: “...die Ware Bewusstheit der inneren Identiat, die Heimlichkeit der gleichen inneren Konstruktion”. See, Freud 1 9 4 1 , Vol. XVI. See, “The Splitting of the Ego in Melancholy”, “On Narcissism”,and “Ego and Id”, in Freud (1941). See also, Lacan 1966. WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE 197 contrast, the exile often leaves without saying good-bye, has lost some family or friends beforehand, does not know the whereabouts of others, and does not know if he or she will ever see them again. Subsequent communication is temporarily or definitely interrupted until the return, or even after the return, when former relationships are dispersed or disappeared. The study of exile, return, and identity must also be enriched by adding a temporal component which could be called “the disparity of time”. The exile, like any emigrant, has been absent for a certain period of time. This commonplace fact encompasses many levels of meaning. On the one hand, events have continued in the exile’s absence; the country has continued to exist and change without the exile (a clear indication for the expatriate that his or her presence is not necessary). This aspect of absence is one of the most anguishing for the exile, because it evokes and implies the most sinister idea in death: “The world (viz, country) can continue to exist without me”. Not only have things continued to happen, but they have modified reality. Upon returning, the exile finds a different country to whose changes he or she is foreign. The country is no longer his or hers since the exile was not present, did not influence, nor was affected by the events as they occurred (except affected indirectly upon learning about them in newspapers, etc.) The emigrant thus has not shared in events that occurred to his or her compatriots. Meanwhile, some things also have occurred to the migrant that cannot be shared with others who remained in the country. The exile changed, grew, and reoriented ideological preferences (perhaps not in the same direction as hidher compatriots). The individual returned perhaps with a new profession or family, and hidher appreciation of the home country is probably indelibly marked by the experience abroad. This experience often leads one to compare and relativize that which for others may seem obvious, natural, or inevitable. Many of the persons we interviewed noticed these “differences”and asked: “Am I the one who changed or is it the country? Is the country only different from my ideals or is the country also different from the one I left behind?” One individual mentioned: a very ambivalent sensation: that of having recovered something I desired for a long time and only to have lost it at the moment I recovered it. Because I longed to return to Argentina, but to my Argentina, and upon returning I notice that it does not exist anymore and will not exist forever; I do not even have here what I had abroad: hope. . . . It’s like a mirage that disappears when you touch it. zy zyxw zyxwv 198 WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE In general, facing those changes makes one’s own country seem strange and new. Those who return “in order not to feel like foreigners” feel different and, as one returnee put it, “a stranger in his own country”. In other return migrations, the principal changes accrue to the migrant, but in the last decade in Argentina, political, social, and economic events have been so intense that it is also possible to register macro-social changes that make identification difficult, not to mention the micro-social changes that affect the immediate context (family, professional, emotional) of the migrant. To analyze those macro-social changes is not within the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, some notions of change in the country come from the exiles’ own words. One of the most recurring topics aired is the deterioration of social relations, conviviality, and solidarity. This observation could correspond to the real changes that occurred in their absence. Argentina, and in particular, Buenos Aires (where 70 percent of the families we interviewed resided) have always been tough and competitive places, but the years of military dictatorship undoubtedly accentuated this characteristic. Indiscriminate repression created fear of every association with persons possibly dangerous to the regime o r perceived as a threat. Fear created a tendency to take refuge in one’s privacy and family, in trivial and apolitical matters, and in daily subsistence in order to forget about, and keep aside from, social problems or ideological matters. Together with fear went a stark economic reality. Argentina’s GDP per capita in 1985 was lower than in 1975, and income distribution has become even more unequal. The labor market shrunk, and a large fraction of the labor force maintained two jobs in a double workday, accepted jobs beneath their skill level, and received very reduced wages. This added up to stress and reduced opportunities for leisure and friendships. T h e military regime established a fiercely speculative financial system that appeared until the date of our survey as the only way to make money. This occurred in the middle of an inflationary spiral that reached 1000 percent a year, although it did decline drastically in the second half of 1985. In an atmosphere such as this, the interviewed returnees said that economic uncertainty and unending concern over daily subsistence eliminate many possibilities of placing value on nonincome-producing activities; there is no free time, no spiritual tranquility to dedicate oneself to friendship or conviviality; one lives often in a permanent environment of aggressiveness and ill-will. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that the experience abroad has sensitized the returning migrants to the lack of solidarity or to certain zyx zyxwv WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE 199 traits of intolerance and authoritarianism that perhaps existed in the country at the moment they began their exile. Moreover, the exiles are disturbed by the reception provided them. They felt as if their compatriots would have preferred that they had not returned. The exiles observed that people pretended to ignore the causes which originally caused the returnees’ departure from the country. We interviewed a psychoanalyst who had lived ten years in exile. In referring specifically to his colleagues as a professional group, he said: The first thing to notice is their inability to talk about what happened, to avoid talking about recent political experience. Even when the past is approached, it is in a very banal and frivolous manner combined with amnesia. There is an extreme and persistent concern about money and economic survival. Our professional colleagues do nothing else but concentrate on their work, to try to defend their privileges which are scarcely defensible as they lose them day by day. . . . Then there is a sort of fragmenting of reality. There is a kind of ignorance not only about what happened but also about what is occurring to other social sectors. The middle class has managed to put on blinders in order not to see, understand, or know what is happening. The exile comes into this context with a critical view, willing to examine the dictatorship, review its economic results, and learn about social concerns, only to find that his or her colleagues do not listen. Thus, the exile is a voice from the past, incomprehensible and annoying for those who remained behind, in a country isolated behind barriers of ideological and cultural backwardness. Some exiles returned from countries where for years they felt foreign to their culture and customs. There they experienced an excessive individualism that contrasted to fantasies of solidarity and warmth they expected to find at home. “I left a united society when I went to exile, and I returned to a now cannibalistic society”, said a working-class woman after returning from exile. Perhaps this woman idealized the level of solidarity that existed before her exile. “We returned to the maternal womb, but it was dry and rotten”, was the metaphor of a professional who lived in Italy for several years. At the micro-social level, exile freezes the image the exile held of others who remained, and vice-versa. The return abruptly puts them face to face with the changes that have occurred in both. The duration of Argentine exile (an average of six to eight years) is long enough for significant changes to occur, but not so long as to avoid the illusory expectation that everything remains the same. zyxw zyxw 200 zyxwvut WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE One micro-social arena where changes are noticed immediately is in the family. “When I left, my parents were supporting me; now they are retired and ill and I must care for them”, was one answer expressed about changes in the family. Many exiles left at one stage in life and returned in another completely different one. Changes have occurred in the family setting; the parents may have died; siblings may have married or no longer live together. There are also seemingly trivial changes in the physical environment that cause strong emotional reactions. In some cases, the exile’s former house has been abandoned; furniture is no longer there; old china or wall decorations have been lost or replaced; the family library has been sacked by the repressive forces. Other changes are more subtle, such as a modification in the way of living or relationship with one’s parents. “It’s like coming home to find everything there, but with different places for the furniture; at each step one stumbles upon something that was not there before”. One returns to the familiar, the things that are known, but at the same time everything is different in a spatial environment that is not the same, just like the migrant who returns is not the same anymore. Apart from the changes in family and friends, the exile may suddenly perceive that he or she has also changed and is different than the others. People may tell the exile that he speaks with a new accent. The exile’s most trivial ideas can be shocking or novel to others. The exile’s point of view about the family, the profession, politics, and about himor herself may have changed. Some changes are visibly noticed: The exile may return with a new spouse, new children, or a new profession that involves a new identity unknown to friends and colleagues. Moreover, the mere fact of having lived abroad or having participated in another society makes the exile distance himself from some native things which, for others, are so immediate that they are indisputable; migrating is in a sense the “end of innocence”, the end of an immediacy with one’s country that will never be attainable again by the returning migrant. The returnee looks at the country with different eyes and relativizes it in comparisons that are impossible for others who did not migrate. Even the non-migrant’s occasional tourist excursions abroad do not allow for adequate knowledge of other realities, at least not enough to distance oneself from one’s own reality. The new things the exile brings, of course, also could be seen as positive contributions to enrich the national society. In fact, one of the exiles’ main motivations for return is that of “being useful and to contribute something to my country”. This desire to be useful, of inte- zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’T DIVIDE 201 grating oneself into the society can often be an attempt to generate a new goal, a support for the identity the exile wishes to rebuild. These expectations of being useful implicitly involve the assumption (often unwarranted) that people in the home country are actually willing to receive the contributions of those who return from exile. In fact, that idea was nourished by the official pronouncement of the new democratic government which called for the return of Argentines since late 1983, arguing that “the country needed them”. In many cases, however, a sense of frustration emerges, due to what is perceived as a cold indifference toward the possible contributions of those who return. Feelings of rejection are better treated under the “stigma of exile” - a topic which is discussed in the next section. Here, we want to mention only that rejection undermines the fantasies that nourish the self-image of the returning migrant and that maintain the expectations of rebuilding his or her identity. The one who comes back with the desire to “be useful” often finds a response of “disqualification”.Offering a contribution is interpreted by others as a request or demand rather than giving or sharing. Two examples of actual dialogue reported by persons interviewed will illustrate this point: Migrant (by telephone): “I would like to meet to talk after so many years and to tell you how it went for me”. Colleague (current director of an institution): “Before anything, I want to say that I cannot offer you a job here”. In another case, the migrant (a scientist) went to a research center in his field and spoke to a person he had not known previously: Migrant: “I am aware that the Institute has worked on the topic. I had valuable experience on the same topic in Europe, and I would like to exchange some ideas on it”. Colleague: “The library of this institution has all of the material we have produced on that theme; you can consult it there”. (The person also gave the migrant a book on the subject published by the institute; he did not show the least interest in listening to the migrant on the topic itself.) zyxwvu zyxwv In both cases, the migrants encountered responses that had a clear meaning: Your contribution is not needed. Before they can express themselves, they are placed in an inferior position with no evaluation of their experience or possible contribution. Obviously, these disqualifying responses (as they are defined in communication theory) form part of a defensive tactic by those who have not emigrated against someone who is seen as a competitor. WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE 202 The exile thus faces a panorama of indifference, not hostility. Instead of feeling welcomed “at home” and perceiving that his or her presence is desired and needed, the returnee finds that he is often viewed as almost an intruder. To recall Freudian terminology, this tactic is an attack on narcissism. In those individuals who have converted the need to be useful into a central part of their identity (according to the frame of mind that earlier carried them into political militancy and eventually into exile), this type of aggression produces a devastating effect. It must also be re-emphasized that this matter is tied to the general crisis of political identities in Argentina of the 1970s. That situation affected those who emigrated as well as those who remained in the country, but it prevented the exiles who returned from inserting themselves directly into a known sociopolitical environment. The opposite seems to have occurred for exiles who returned in recent years to Brazil, Uruguay or Chile, where old political alignments remain strong in spite of the changes. This contributes to undermining the mental state of the former exile and of the family group as a whole. In that context, the desire to emigrate again emerges very easily, above all when the economic reality does not add favorable arguments for remaining, but contributes even more to the existing anguish. zyxwv zyxwv The Stigma of Exile The fact of having been exiled can be a negative factor in the biography (the social identity) of the individual, for many reasons related to the specific context in which exile occurred and the form in which the dictatorship ended. One of the manifestations of the “stigma” is simply an ideological suspicion, which is not applied only to former exiles, but to all who, in one way or another, are suspected of an extremist political position. An exile for instance, can be seen as potentially dangerous by the personnel manager of a private company who tries not to hire troublesome persons, agitators, or subversives. In Argentina, the anti-subversive harangue of the military dictatorship made every protest evil to such an extent that even at the time of our survey (1985) there was a strong distrust of anyone associated with those persecuted by the military. During the years of dictatorship, those with clean conscience consoled themselves upon learning about a disappearance: “Surely”, they thought, “that person must have done something”. The same idea emerges upon facing a former exile whose need to leave the country can be attributed, in the mind of the other person, to having belonged to some terrorist organization or to having WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE zyx zy 203 zyxw at least supported an extremist ideology. Thus, an exile would be a “dangerous” person with whom one had to be careful, and whose ideas should still be distrusted. A sixty-year-old man who was a former exile sharply perceived this problem: “When I arrived it seemed that there were persons who did not know that I had been exiled...As if one had gone who knows where, as if one had disappeared like an angel and had returned. This is apart from those who thought that if I were in exile, there must have been a reason”. His friends accepted him again but distrusted his opinions and preferred to keep the years of exile in a shroud that was hardly mentioned: Some old friends from the school invited me to dinner; they had selected a speaker who did not show up; someone thought that I wanted to speak in his place and said to me: “Not you, you are forbidden to speak....They saw me arrive after seven or eight years....and no one asked me “Where were you? What happened to you?” It was understood that my exile was a shrouded time, and ....no further questions were asked. The origin of this attitude from his former colleagues seemed very clear to him: “Those of us university authorities who were in charge in 1973-1975 were masked, he said upon recalling his actions prior to the military coup. In 1985, on the other hand, the strength of democracy in Argentina was still precarious. Frequent political events reminded the citizenry that the repressive apparatus still existed and that another coup could be possible in the future. The distrust of many was also a precaution for that uncertain future. Since the middle of 1985, the feeling of mistrust has been muted somewhat. This is a result of the trials of the military junta as well as a consequence of democracy growing stronger. Testimony at those trials brought out more clearly in the public view the nature of the atrocities and the arbitrariness of the repression. Upon probing into the repressive aberrations of the regime, it was admitted that many had been innocent victims of the repression. But this process of clarifying the past, which is not yet complete (1986), had barely begun to unfold at the time of our survey. This contributed to the political prejudice against the exiles. Another dimension of the stigma appears among those ideologically closer to the exiles but who feel somehow threatened by their return. During the early part of 1984 the Argentine intellectual community debated over “those who went” and “those who stayed”. The debates produced a false dichotomy. The former feared being accused of coward- z 204 WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE zyxw ness, and having enjoyed a golden exile while their colleagues suffered. The latter feared being accused of collaborating with the regime. Each group perceived the other as a danger to their own legitimacy. That period of public debate was surpassed in a few months and was generally recognized as a mistaken way of approaching the issue. But, perhaps, it raised doubts and fears that still linger. Another side of the exile stigma is the sense of being the object of professional mistrust or misgivings - a stigma that arises in the context of a saturated labor market. This appears to hold especially in the social sciences,journalism, university teaching, theater, politics, and unions; in these fields the political legitimacy of one’s own position plays an important role in defining affiliations and opportunities for professional success. This aspect, related to competition in the professional marketplace, usually did not become explicit, nor even acknowledged, at least among “those who stayed”. However, the reticence to incorporate the exiles in various activities, or the belief that they were obtaining privileges because of their condition of having been in exile, appeared frequently in conversations with the exiles and with other informants. One of the most frequent manifestations was the indifference with which the exiles’ experience abroad was received. We alluded to this in the previous section. That indifference was reported mostly by professionals and by scientific researchers. There seem to be two origins of this attitude. The first is a professional jealousy in the face of dangerous competition in a reduced labor market for Argentine scientists. One tactic is trying to undervalue or ignore academic and professional credentials obtained abroad. A second tactic, most common in the field of social sciences, is to rationalize the matter by way of arguing against the relevance of other national experiences with respect to their usefulness in interpreting the Argentine case. This last contention, be it valid or not, is connected to the previous one because it helps to overvalue the professional experience in Argentina vis-a-vis that acquired abroad. The problem of stigma, and professional mistrust in particular, tends to disappear over time. This occurs as the former exiles are integrated in one way or another in their respective professions. With time the fear based on fantasies leads to a confrontation with reality in which the fact that a person was in exile loses relevance. Faced with these various instances of the exile stigma, many repatriates choose to hide their condition, as best as possible, in an attempt to submerge themselves in the mainstream and pass by unperceived. In one of the cases we studied, a young woman refugee who left the country as a primary school teacher succeeded in obtaining an advanced zyxw zyxwv zyx zyxw zyxwv WHENBORDERSDON’T DIVIDE 205 university degree in early childhood education in Sweden. In Argentina she found out that her Swedish degree was equivalent to a confession of her refugee status. She found it difficult to get a job in private education (oriented to the most affluent and conservative sectors of society) or in public education directed by a rigid and traditional bureaucracy. In an act that could be considered a classic Freudian slip, one fine day, this woman inadvertently lost her Swedish diploma. The End of Return When the phenomenon of the stigma is added to the preceding considerations about the meaning of return migration, it is fitting to ask how long the status of “return migrant” lasts? When does one stop being a returnee? We studied migrants who had returned between five months and five years prior to the interviews. The vast majority had returned between six months and two years before. The duration of return did not seem to be a very decisive factor in determining the nature of the exiles’ reinsertion into the labor market. However, it did influence the exile’s perception about his or her problems and position in society. What marks the end of return is the disappearance of the status of “returnee” as a significant element in one’s own definition and in the perception others have about the person. Some of those we interviewed were clearly in this stage. They did not attribute their economic problems to having been in exile but rather to the problems of the country. They had reconstructed a normal life in all respects, including some who had married or had children, or had begun successfully a new professional activity, perhaps different from that which they had before their exile. The survey was carried out between March and June 1985, a little more than a year after the installation of the democratic government. Those who returned earlier (for example, at the end of the 1982 war) had left many problems of re-insertion pending during the final period of the dictatorship; they only began to resolve these problems once the constitutional government was established. Therefore, perhaps this survey does not permit one to see clearly the theme of “the end of return” which would require more time to pass. Nevertheless, the responses obtained in this research suggest that the end of return could have been reached with relative speed in many cases. This is not incompatible with the fact that 40 percent of those interviewed showed an intention or readiness to emigrate again. To return, as was defined in this study, constitutes a way of affirming one’s zy zyxw WHENBORDERS DON’TDIVIDE 206 own freedom, of repairing the arbitrary will that expelled them from the country and prevented them from returning for many years. Once their identity is reconstructed in their own land and the wounds of exile are healed, there can be another decision to migrate. This time, however, it is the result of free choice tied to their own personal growth and it is a step that does not weaken the validity of the act of returning. The same feeling occurs among those who did not return. Although we do not know their number, it is estimated that perhaps between onethird and one-half of the exiles have not returned to Argentina. Many of these individuals remain abroad as a result of an internal conflict that implies changing their identity from political exiles to simple immigrants and abandoning a status with which they have lived for a long time. The decision to remain abroad, when it is correctly elaborated, is also a way to exercise freedom of choice, which is made possible by the existence of a democratic order, by the end of pditical and ideological persecutions, and by the end of fear. This occurs even when one has not passed over the stage - that others consider necessary - of facing return and rediscovering one’s own roots. zyxwv zyxw zyxw zyxwvutsrq zyxwvut zyxw REFERENCES Argentina - Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos 1983 C m o Mcional a2 p o b k i h y uivienda 1980. S& D-Poblocrh. Buenos Aires. Bertoncello, R.,A. Lattes, C. Moyano, and S. 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