Experiences of Gender Studies Scholars in Turkey
C E N K Ö Z B A Y and I L K A N C A N I P E K C I
Gender studies and its professors are attacked and oppressed by patriarchal,
masculinist, antifeminist, and anti-LGBTI discourses and institutional practices. This trend is
not limited to white- and/or Christian-majority countries, as the literature has documented
thus far. Antigender campaigns can easily infiltrate Middle Eastern and/or Muslim-majority
contexts in which feminists and queers have long struggled to transform societies, cultures,
and states. In Turkey a state-led antigender movement has been unfolding, with burdensome
outcomes for women and sexual minorities as well as activists and faculty members. The most
recent step taken in the state-led antigender turn was Turkey’s withdrawal from the Council of
Europe’s Istanbul Convention Action by a precipitous presidential decree. Drawing on thirtythree interviews with gender studies scholars, this article documents their ambivalent and
perturbing connection with the state. The recent antigender atmosphere may make them feel
downtrodden, silenced, and vulnerable in personal and professional domains, while it rejuvenates their resilience, renders their ongoing feminist/queer struggles meaningful and passionate, and cultivates an air of hope and optimism. To fight ostracism by public institutions
and to attain their academic rights, the respondents use their empowering feelings, hope, and
commitment against patriarchal and homophobic state forces.
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
antigender politics, the state, Islamism, university, Turkey
ow do gender studies scholars deal with the current antigender politics? This
article seeks an answer to this question by examining the narratives of women’s,
gender, feminist, sexuality, queer, and LGBTI studies (hereafter gender studies)
scholars. Although we focus on the recent Turkish case, antigender movements are
H
JMEWS • Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies • 20:1 • March 2024
DOI 10.1215/15525864-10961794 • © 2024 by the Association for Middle East Women’s Studies
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State-Led Antigender Politics, Islamism,
and the University
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gaining ground virtually everywhere. Thus this article is part of an attempt to
respond to increasingly global questions, such as whether it is possible not to be
affected by the antigender campaigns when one works in gender studies at academic
institutions or how meaningful and promising it can be to do gender studies while
“gender ideology” is systematically demonized (Graff and Korolczuk 2022; Kuhar
and Paternotte 2017). The faculty members we talked to practice gender studies visà-vis hostile state discourses and institutions at the intersection of affective, social,
institutional, and political fields at various costs. Their accounts shed light on the
ways that conservative, Islamist, neoliberal, and authoritarian politics reproduce
patriarchy and maintain hegemony across public and private spheres in an increasingly polarized and politicized society (Arat and Pamuk 2019; Çelik and Göker 2021;
Özbay and Soybakis 2020).
In Turkey a state-led antigender campaign has been unfolding since the early
2010s with burdensome outcomes for women and sexual minorities as well as
feminist/queer activists and faculty members. This backlash does not easily fit into
the convoluted process of modernization and gender relations in the country after
more than a century of collective movements, dedicated struggles, and the impact
of inspirational pioneers (Bora 2018; Kandiyoti 1997; Sancar 2011; White 2003).
The prevailing moment is radically different from both the 1920s’ and the 1930s’
reformist and modernist, family-centered “state feminism” (inspired by first-wave
feminism) and the diversified grassroots feminisms of the 1990s (spurred by the
third wave) (Diner and Toktaş 2010). Hence the feminist agency of gender studies
scholars has been set apart from the modernist-Enlightenment early republican
subjectivity as well as the dissident, postmodern identity that focused on differences, social movements, and activism, backed by globalization and transnationalism (Göker et al. 2018; Saygılıgil and Berber 2020).
Recent scholarship on Turkey includes an impressive number of studies on
issues of gender inequality, gendered violence, feminist theory and grassroots movements, and LGBTI-queer cultures. Although there are significant and groundbreaking
works among them, this dominant interest and orientation of analysis have obfuscated alternative probes regarding professional and academic practices in institutions of higher education and gender studies professors’ entanglements with the
state and political structures. Feminist/queer faculty members have always had an
ambivalent and perturbing connection with the state. The recent transformation of
the state toward an unblinking misogynist entity (Sarıoğlu 2022) and a homophobic
one (Özbay 2022) has repositioned these scholars as agents of a new, existential
form of resistance and struggle. Here we aim to show the contours of these professors’ fight for a sense of control in institutional settings and meaning in their lives
as the grounds that have made them legitimate, significant, and convincing shift
historically.
In this conundrum, gender studies scholars’ troubling relationship with the
Turkish state is the organizing principle that would enable them to construct their
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Transnational Situation: Gender Studies in Affliction
As a composite field of study and an interdisciplinary academic unit, gender studies
has had multilayered issues regarding organizational matters, institutionalization,
professionalization, and pedagogy since its inception (Drew and Canavan 2021;
Eddy, Ward, and Thawaja 2017; Griffin 2005, 2006; Henderson 2019; Pereira 2015;
Saraceno 2010). To make things more striking and complicated, the emergent logic
of the neoliberal university threatens gender studies as it disrupts other programs
in the social sciences and humanities. The marketization and financialization of
higher education, the ascendant competition-based academic capitalism (i.e., publish or perish), the domination of human resources departments in universities’
treatment of faculty members (i.e., performance-based evaluations), and principles
of remuneration (i.e., the number of tangible outcomes per year) contribute to this
deepening tribulation. In this perspective, gender studies does not stand out as a
profitable, functional, or investment-worthy area with lucrative collaborations with
STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields or with markets
and industries based on empiricism, experimentation, technology development, and
design, knowhow, and innovation (Connell 2013; Ergül and Coşar 2017; Hark 2016;
La Paglia, Nash, and Grant 2021; Morley 2016; Slaughter and Rhoades 2009).
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own muhalif (opponent, dissident) subjectivity, which is articulated with the existing nonconformist public that emerged against the historically makbul (acceptable,
respectable) citizenship (Üstel 2004) in the eyes of the statesmen. This political
subjectivity presupposes a critical distance from the self-justifying nationalistic,
racist, and statist narratives about the state and listening to these official reiterations
with suspicion. It provides a crucial lens in their collective attempt to decipher how
state authority is defined and exercised in a fashion that legitimizes and reproduces
patriarchy, heterosexism, misogyny, and homophobia. The respondents’ constitutive standpoint on what they deem as wrong with the state discourses and institutions (and the state’s ruthless attacks on multiple fronts against the gains, purposes,
and ideals of gender equality) informs the boundaries, commitments, and capacities
of the field of gender studies and its practitioners’ understanding of resistance
in Turkey. The recent antigender atmosphere may make them feel downtrodden,
silenced, and vulnerable in personal and professional domains, while it simultaneously rejuvenates resilience, renders their ongoing feminist/queer struggles
meaningful and passionate, and cultivates an air of hope and optimism.
Below, we outline the debates about gender studies’ overlapping difficulties in
protecting its position in the higher education system and the most recent political
campaign that targets “gender ideology” as well as the academic discipline, its ideals,
and its members. Then we present the Turkish case. After the methodological explanation, the article proceeds with two sections on the resistance and hope of the academic staff we interviewed.
JMEWS • Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies • 20:1 March 2024
The Context: Gender Studies in Turkey
Turkey has had a strong feminist and women’s movement since the late 1980s
(Saygılıgil and Berber 2020). This wave of grassroots organizations has called for
the state to face up to ubiquitous masculine domination, paved the way for gender
reform in political structures and language, and brought about a transformation in
the legal codes toward a more gender-neutral and less sexist composition (Arat and
Pamuk 2019; Diner and Toktaş 2010). Meanwhile, the LGBTI and queer associations began to emerge in the 1990s, striving to change public discourse and institutional practices toward a less homophobic, transphobic, and heterosexist tone
(Özbay and Öktem 2021; Savcı 2021).
Even though there have been interactions between feminist/queer social
movements and scholarly discussions, as many respondents of this study explained,
it is difficult to argue that there has been impactful synchronicity and mutually
rewarding connection between gender/sexual activism and the academic priorities
and agendas of gender studies faculty. One reason for this lack of engagement and
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There have also been political challenges and attacks against gender studies
from the Far Right, neoconservative, populist, and fundamentalist groups in many
transnational contexts (Dahl and kennedy-macfoy 2020; Kuhar and Paternotte
2017; Martinsson 2020). These attacks and similar burgeoning hostile discursive
movements focus on the very concept and “ideology of gender” as well as its articulations in the academic institutions that explore gender critically, the theorists and
researchers who verbalize feminist/queer theory, the dissemination of knowledge,
and the policies that aim to mainstream gender equality and sexual diversity (Graff
and Korulczuk 2022; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). Such antigender campaigns
are explored mostly in the Central and East European contexts through emergent
cases in Hungary, Poland, and Russia (Dietze and Roth 2020; Edenborg 2021;
Krizsán and Roggeband 2019), in addition to the rest of Europe and the Americas
(Case 2019; Hennig 2018; Verloo 2018), while Middle Eastern and Muslimmajority countries are underrepresented in recent feminist/queer analyses of these
mobilizations.
Gender studies as an academic institution seems troubled by the antigender
and antifeminist campaigns. It is condemned and stigmatized as an improper,
unscientific, nonacademic, useless, antistate, immoral, ineligible, or unprofitable
enterprise by different authoritarian, neoliberal, patriarchal, and conservative hegemonic powers that are influential at universities and across societies around the
world (Redden 2018). The vilified discipline appears challenged and unsettled,while
its engaged public feels increasingly defensive and insecure. This unfolding situation
has severe political, practical, and affective consequences for those who commit their
lives and careers to the cause of gender equality, justice, and sexual democracy amid
heightened animosity, uncertainty, and precariousness.
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congruity might be the universities’ highly bureaucratic, traditionalist, and statecentric nature, which actively supports an apolitical reticence about social issues
and conflicts—especially those in which the state participates. Some of the faculty
members we talked to mentioned that the volunteers from feminist/queer social
movements accuse them of being elitist, passive, and fearful. They also noted that
some of them find these activists to have an anti-intellectual, impetuous, and exaggeratedly aggressive mood incompatible with the ideal qualities of a scholar.
In Turkey public and private universities have been heavily supervised by the
National Council of Higher Education (YÖK) even though the constitution guarantees the autonomy of universities. Following the 1980 coup d’état, the military
government established YÖK to control and depoliticize youth through higher
education. Since 2016 President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has directly appointed university rectors without election or consultation with academic units. The increasingly
authoritarian state institutions shape and govern university administrations and
social and physical spaces within campuses through ideological, political, and often
partisan interventions (Abbas and Zalta 2017; Gambetti and Gökarıksel 2022;
Vatansever 2020).
As of January 2021, academic staff employed in universities at all ranks
numbered 176,044; of these, 45 percent were women and 55 percent men (YÖK
2021). However, there is a direction of change toward more women being employed
in academe than men because while there is one female full professor for every two
male full professors, younger women have outnumbered younger men among the
junior faculty. Despite this inclination toward gender equality in academic employment, currently only 4 percent of administrative positions at universities (deans,
rectors, school managers) are held by women (Sevgi 2021). This small proportion of
women in power at institutions of higher education denotes the existence of a glass
ceiling for women in academe. There is much to do to push the university toward a
more inclusive, just, and gender-equal future (Göker et al. 2018).
There have been significant developments in the institutionalization of feminism and gender studies in universities over the last three decades. There are
ninety-seven women’s and/or gender studies research centers at Turkish universities. Numerous undergraduate minor degrees and MA and PhD programs are also
offered (Parmaksız 2019). However, as Deniz Kandiyoti (2010) notes, these high
numbers can be illusional, given that most of these centers and programs cautiously
position themselves far from transformative feminist/queer politics. The conservative, neoliberal, and Islamist approaches to gender studies departments and
faculty members have intensified alongside political and organizational interventions to impose a series of imagined “local and familial” (antifeminist and antigender) traditions and values in the last decade (Acar and Altunok 2013; Arat and
Pamuk 2019; Cindoğlu and Unal 2016). The construction and circulation of these
discourses mark a transition from a “modernist-republican” gender order to an
“Islamist-traditionalist” one (Özbay and Soybakis 2020) through reifying and
consolidating heterosexism and patriarchy at the hand of the state.
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On 18 July 2010, Erdogan held a meeting with women’s NGOs. . . . [There] the PM
interjected: “I do not believe in the equality of men and women. I believe in equal
opportunities. Men and women are different and complementary (mütemmim).” Turkey’s signatory status to CEDAW notwithstanding, the PM had nodded in the direction of the Islamic concept of jitrat ( fıtrat) as his point of reference. The reactions of
the participants were reported in the press as “utter shock,” “having the effect of a cold
shower,” “total astonishment,” and “deep disappointment.” The real question to ask here
is why exactly this comment, coming from a PM who had never made a secret of his
conservative Islamic leanings, caused so much consternation.
Since this declaration at the most unexpected time and place, the state-led antigender campaign has continued to escalate—in parallel with “the incremental nature
of the backsliding process” (Arat 2021: 912) in all democratic institutions — and
manifests itself in numerous social situations. These include the violent reaction
against the Gezi protests in 2013, the banning of women’s (feminist) demonstrations and celebrations of the March 8 International Women’s Day, the government’s diminishing dialogue with the feminist and women’s rights organizations,
the not-so-implicit proscription of abortion, the expressed desire to raise a pious
generation (Arat 2021; Arat and Pamuk 2019; Erkmen 2020; Koyuncu and Özman
2019; Lüküslü 2016; Özyegin 2015b), and the prohibition of the Istanbul LGBTI
Pride Parade and other queer cultural activities (Özbay and Öktem 2021).
The most recent step taken in the state-led antigender turn was Turkey’s
withdrawal from the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention Action (against gendered and domestic violence) by a precipitous presidential decree. Feride Acar, an
emeritus professor of political science and a former chairperson of the CEDAW
Committee, says that the marginal Islamist circles and sects demanded the state
pull out of the convention because they claimed and seemingly were successful in
persuading the president that the convention harmed the cohesion of the Turkish
family and legitimized the public presence of LGBT groups:
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The State-Led Antigender Campaign in Turkey
The shift from an aspirational secular, modern, democratic sociopolitical climate
to an Islamist, ultranationalist, and authoritarian one with certain anti-Western
sentiments can be traced to the gender and sexuality politics of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) governments (Acar and Altunok 2013; Arat and Pamuk
2019; Cindoğlu and Unal 2016). Kandiyoti (2010: 173–74) underscores the “first
moment” when the public in Turkey encountered Erdoğan’s disavowal of the idea
of gender equality in a meeting with representatives from feminist and women’s
associations:
I cannot believe the point that we have arrived at. Can a state that respects human
rights discriminate against people because of their sexual orientation, let alone permit
violent attacks on them? . . . According to our law, having a different sexual orientation
is not a crime. Why is it deemed unacceptable to safeguard people with different sexual
Method and Participants
Data for this article come from a collective qualitative research project that aims
to explore the experiences of academic staff who have expertise in gender studies
and work in higher-education institutions. The research team consisted of a professor and six graduate students. We conducted twenty-five interviews via Zoom in
November and December 2020; then Cenk Özbay conducted eight in-person interviews in June and July 2021. We combined the techniques of “snowball” sampling (to
reach out to participants) and “maximum-variation” sampling (to vary respondents).
We took the existing differences within gender studies faculty, such as gender, age,
experience and rank, race and ethnicity, and location, into account to have an intersectional lens that highlights specificity and commonality across experiences. All
interviews are semistructured, Zoom- or tape-recorded, and transcribed verbatim.
We changed all the names to protect the respondents’ anonymity.
The interviewees (n=33) are all gender studies scholars with PhDs. Five
individuals declined to participate because they did not think they were “entirely” or
“truly” committed to gender studies, although some of their work could be considered
to align with this field. Despite a positive approach, we could not meet with three
other people in person or online due to scheduling problems.
Twenty-six respondents identify as women, six as men, and one as nonbinary.
Twelve are full professors, seven are associate professors, and twelve are assistant
professors, while two work as instructors. Among them, five listed masculinity
studies and four listed queer studies as their primary specialization within gender
studies, and twenty-three of them told us that they were mostly engaged with
women’s and feminist studies—although, in each group, a few individuals said all
of the subfields had similar levels of importance to them. Six participants work in
provincial or small cities in Turkey, while the rest are employed in Istanbul and
Ankara, and three were working in the United States during the time of the
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Acar’s words confirm that the affective state of puzzlement and disappointment
persists—perhaps even in an intensified state —more than a decade after Erdoğan’s
rejection of gender equality, as Kandiyoti recounts above.1 Feminist/queer gender
studies professors have conducted research, taught classes, and striven to transform
society within this political climate of hostility and instability with their limited
emotional, social, and economic resources.
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orientations or to say that the state must protect these people’s rights? (Independent
Türkçe 2021)
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The Patriarchal State Merges with Islamist Conservatism
All the faculty members participating in this study mention their troubling
encounters with entrenched patriarchy in different institutional settings. They
explain their growing concern with the approach that the oppressive political
regime in the country has taken against gender equality and sexual rights. Most
underline the increasing level of conservative thinking, discourses, and social actions
that have become hegemonic in the last decade. Fatma, for example, describes the
status of gender studies as a “minefield” and says that an overarching antigender
culture, which silences all alternative voices, is traceable through the platforms of
knowledge- and discourse-production, including the media and online forums. Berk
agrees, saying: “Universities suffer from an intense form of conservatism, and the
radical questions that gender studies would ask will please no one in this context.”
Sabite expounds on the evolving state patriarchy and its relation to the emergent Islamist-conservative framework:
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The state was always patriarchal, even when suffrage was granted to women during the
state feminism of the 1930s. Despite its wishes, this Islamist government cannot erase
women from the public sphere. So, instead of acting like women don’t exist as full
citizens, they have adopted this version of conservative patriarchy which claims that
women and men aren’t equal, by God’s creation, and thus they should be treated differently, and women should take care of children and families.
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interview. One interviewee is teaching part-time, and six are retired—including
three professors who were forced to retire because they signed a peace petition.
In 2016, more than a thousand academics signed a petition for peace titled
“We will not be a party to this crime” regarding the human rights violations of
Kurdish citizens in Turkey. Erdoğan called the signatories “terrorists,” and YÖK and
public prosecutors started legal and administrative investigations (Abbas and Zalta
2017; Biner 2019; Vatansever 2020). Hundreds of academics were forced to resign
or retire; the rest were dismissed from universities and migrated to other countries
to work as part of a transnational solidarity network (Korkman 2022; Özdemir,
Mutluer, and Özyürek 2019). However, the Constitutional Court of Turkey in 2019
ruled that signing the petition was part of exercising free speech, a legal right in
Turkey. Local courts started to acquit the signatory academics. The case of Academics for Peace destroyed the existing academic autonomy, culture, and traditions (as imperfect as they were). It once again demonstrated the state’s inimical
power over dissident scholars and critical scholarship in Turkey by rendering the
positions of the remaining faculty members more vulnerable, precarious, and
insecure, as our respondents articulate below.
The next section documents the plight of gender studies faculty vis-à-vis the
state institutions in three interconnected sections. The last section before the conclusion explores their resilience and resistance against oppression.
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Although a collectively imagined “deeply patriarchal” Middle Eastern culture
(Joseph and Slyomovics 2000; Kandiyoti 1996; Özyegin 2015a) was occasionally
referred to during the interviews, a comparison with the recent authoritarian
conservatism of Poland and Hungary (Graff and Korulczuk 2022) surfaced more
frequently. Serap expands this trend to the Trump and Bolsonaro administrations:
“We used to connect [the problem of] gender inequality with the late-modernizing
countries, but now conservatism is on the rise everywhere in the world. You can
see [it in] Hungary, Brazil, or the United States. Unfortunately, we live in this era.
Feminism and the women’s movement were bolder and freer when we were younger. Now [they are] oppressed and threatened.” Like Serap, most of our interlocutors told us they feel oppressed, threatened, and suffocated. The ultraright political
dynamics, the actions of state organs, and the speech acts by the Islamist politicians
complement this affect of subjugation and insecurity.
Participants who identify themselves with the leftist, socialist, peripheral,
and/or critical political traditions put the notion of the state, with its oppressive and
masculinist capacities, at the center of their analyses. They agree with the opinion
that political Islam undermines the ideals of gender equality and sexual democracy.
Still, they believe that we need to look at the not-so-hidden mechanisms of the state
in Turkey to understand the emergent antigender movements. Sevim says: “You’re
always fragile in front of the state. A huge power waits there to threaten you. People
would think, ‘Oh, I will have trouble again.’” This kind of perturbation and anxiety,
Sevim and others believe, makes the feminists and other critical agents of gender
studies potentially and inevitably political (in a muhalif way of being) even when
they strive to remain neutral. Sevim refers to the aphorism “Gender is political” and
continues: “But in contexts like Turkey, it is political in terms of opposition to the
state policies and most of the political parties. It is not only a professional or a
technical issue.” This line of thinking puts the focus on the state and deemphasizes
the activities and plans of the current Islamist government. In this picture, political
Islam is yet another factor exacerbating the situation, not the sole actor. Murat
maintains that “we have been living under this Islamist regime, and it has made
everything worse. However, it would be too quick and easy to think that everything
would be nicer if a secularist government would rule the country.” Mediha reformulates the struggle’s target: “To blame political Islam would be extreme. I would
say a neoliberal, conservative gender and family policy defines the field [current
gender inequality] and governs the demographic trends.” Safiye thinks similarly and
claims that the Islamist practices have even triggered a form of countermovement
in society: “People became more responsive to gender issues because of the AKP
government’s attack on gender equality. The public doesn’t necessarily appreciate
what we do. If there were a more moderate government, they wouldn’t probably
care.” In this sense, the Islamist blitz against the “ideology of gender” pushes the
majority, which has been undecided, uncaring, silent about gender and sexual politics, to adopt an antigovernment, and hence progender and egalitarian, attitude.
JMEWS • Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies • 20:1 March 2024
Struggle as a Gender Studies Tradition
The academics in our sample delineate personal stories of how they come across
sexism, misogyny, patriarchy, heterosexism, and homophobia in different social
situations. They also share encounters that have been told to them by scholars of
previous generations. Taken together, these accounts constitute an oral tradition
and active social memory through which the respondents position themselves vis-àvis state patriarchy and homophobia. The stories also demonstrate how our interlocutors embody and exemplify gender/sexual justice and freedom in everyday
contexts. The feminist/queer scholars reshape their selves and the contours of the
collective struggle against the patriarchal state within a historical continuum that
spans the last forty years—with Islamism as the dominant factor in the second half
of this period.
This memory was told to Berk by one of his former professors, recalling how
feminism upset state officials even before the inception of feminism as a major social
movement in Turkey:
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On the other hand, participants who speak from a more liberal and/or centralleft political persuasion explicitly underscore the role of Islamism in the contemporary state-led antigender campaign. Berk, for example, elucidates that the biggest
hardship they experience is “the interpenetration of the state and religion. The state
speaks in the name of religion, and vice versa, and they are united against gender
equality.” Hamiyet notes that they are troubled with the “Islamist stance of the
government and nothing else. How does this Islamist structure perceive feminists
and gender equality? As if we [feminists and queers] were going to destroy the
family.” She thinks the emergent homophobic standpoint of the state in Turkey is
also related to political Islam. Uras connects this point to the painstaking censorship
and prohibition of course and thesis titles containing terms such as sexuality, LGBT,
sexual orientation, and homosexuality. He says scholars, even feminist ones, were
afraid of being targeted by the state, YÖK, the university, and their departments for
stepping into these “dangerous” fields. According to Hamiyet and Uras, the state
would not suddenly become a feminist or queer organization if political Islam were
erased. However, the latest antigender and antifeminist (and homophobic) constellation owes its existence first and foremost to the Islamists. Serpil also views
political Islam as solely responsible for the current predicament, and she notes the
“compulsorily dissident” (muhalif ) position of gender studies scholars: “For me, it
is impossible to analyze gender without being dissident. In such a tense and violent
context, if you work on human rights, women’s rights, or LGBT rights, you must be
oppositional. And then there is no funding or support for you. It’s the dark side of
the academy in Turkey.” However, this is not an entirely new situation, and the
seasoned gender studies faculty members in Turkey have thrived in difficult and
compelling circumstances.
It was probably the first meeting to discuss women’s problems, maybe in 1978, in
Ankara. Many men, state-employed, high-level bureaucrat listeners, came to hear what
the speakers, all women, were to say. At one point, my late professor pronounced the
word feminist without much consideration, like “I am a feminist woman” or “These are
very famous professor of political science, who is still alive, whispered to my professor
Like the memories narrated to recall the past turn of events, gender studies professors discuss their experiences with one another and add a comparative dimension
to their historical struggle. Sevim shows that Berk’s late professor’s line of thinking
and feeling is still prevalent among state bureaucrats today: “Gender scholars from
Ankara are more pessimistic and panicked than the rest of us, saying that we could
not even pronounce the word gender anymore. I don’t mean they’re exaggerating.
It’s just when you live in the capital city and constantly communicate with state
bureaucrats, you start to be enmeshed in that patriarchal logic and language which is
self-assuredly very antifeminist and antigender.”
Despite academe’s creation of a relatively protected and respected social space
in the countryside and smaller cities, everybody in our sample agreed that it would
be a harsher experience to teach gender studies outside the metropolis (Roberts and
Connell 2016). Decentering gender studies in Turkey seems like a consequential
project for the scholars we talked to, who express their belief and commitment to
destabilizing patriarchy and homophobia outside major urban centers. Hamiyet
maintains that the conservative antigender movement is felt more strongly in
provincial towns, where the ideological orientations of the state are communicated
and exercised more directly than in big cities: “University administrations in the
smaller cities refrain from appointing women to open positions: no female provost
or dean. They always talk about religion and tradition, and they even nominate men
to secretarial positions, which are culturally stigmatized as a women’s job.”
University Administrations versus Gender Studies
There are many subtle ways to diminish or belittle the work of feminist women. This
can be seen in the ways university administrations have treated gender equality as
an ineffective, unimportant cause (Griffin 2005). Samime recollects her feelings as
a feminist woman when she was dean and served as a member of the university’s
executive board: “You are the black sheep in these administrative platforms. They
make you understand that you are allowed to be there because they graciously let
you in. You’re represented as a child as if you weren’t capable and tolerated by these
grown men. It gets difficult to be there when your equals deem you worthless. You
are cornered by the power hierarchy.” Seyyal underlines the way the men with
administrative power underplay gender studies institutions and professors in similar ways to Samime’s experiences:
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that they should not have gone so far as to use the word feminist.
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feminist questions.” This triggered a shockwave among the audience. The organizer, a
We founded a center for gender studies. We were doing important activities, like
inviting respected people to workshops. We did not have any money, and the university
did not contribute at all. People attended the events, and we couldn’t even offer them
tea. Really shameful. So, we went to the rector’s wife for help. The rector never forgot
joke, hiding how despicable it was that we were without resources and how mistreated
JMEWS • Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies • 20:1 March 2024
we were.
Academic freedom is in great jeopardy in Turkey (Kandiyoti and Emanet 2017).
Guzide draws a line for similarities between Turkey and other contexts as well as the
peculiarity of their experience: “We have the same process as many other countries
with rising conservative authoritarianism. . . . And then the term gender has become
taboo. Maybe this isn’t unique to Turkey, but we seemingly have a greater impediment because academic freedom is also at risk here.” The intergenerational longevity of the fights for gender equality, the overburdening presence of patriarchal
and homophobic social dynamics in provincial towns, and powerful men’s conscious
(hetero)sexist performances against gender studies faculty members and institutions draw a gloomy picture and lay the groundwork for an affective state of precariousness, self-vigilance, and languidness despite our respondents’ unending selfmotivation and passionate commitment.
The Downtrodden Mavericks
One of the fired “peace academicians,” Serap elaborates on her activities as a feminist
scholar and her dismissal from the university by a presidential decree during the
state of emergency in 2017:
I was fired for allegedly “politicizing the university.” The peace declaration was just the
official reason. Before that, I was the director of the women’s issues research center. We
were doing “marginal” activities: Supporting the LGBTI Pride Parade, starting the
parade from the campus, collaborating with Kaos GL [a queer NGO], inviting politicians from the HDP [the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party]. Fundamentalist
newspapers referred to us as “pervert terrorists.” We used to receive warnings from the
rector’s office or somewhere even higher. So, we got sacked not only for being entangled
with politics but for engaging with a [subaltern] politics of rights, disseminating
100
gender studies, and doing activism.
Samime thinks in parallel with Serap on how the state deems gender studies
scholars an eccentric threat and handles them accordingly. She says: “I have retired
at a relatively young age for a scholar. This doesn’t happen for no reason. Because the
university became a place where it was really hard to stay.” She adds that, although
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this. Whenever he saw me, he pointed the finger at me and said cheerfully, “You’re doing
stuff behind my back.” He was making it look cute. As if it was a delightful dispute, or a
not make any move, anxiously waiting for bad news for the last two years. They could
have started investigating me or suspended my contract. I have never felt secure.
Students make recordings during lectures and complain about professors to the state.
They can do this to me as well. I am always worried that what happened to others can
happen to me.
The nuisance of recordings taken illegally during lectures and then leaked to progovernment newspapers and websites with the purpose of instigating a witch hunt is
a very serious, pressing issue for gender studies scholars, given that some professors
got fired because of these recordings in the past. Bulent talks about the pedagogical
consequences of this fear: “I used to teach a class on sexualities, and I used to show
movies as a part of that class. At one point, I thought what if somebody recorded
these and informed on me for showing pornography during the class? This happened to others before. So, I gave up on the class; I no longer teach it.” The sense
of self-vigilance for the reality of being recorded has intensified during officially
recorded online lectures during the COVID-19 pandemic. Füsun says when she
was about to criticize the state, she would pause for a moment and underscore
“how patriotic I was, and I exaggeratedly loved the president. Of course, the students laugh at me, but it is just a way to remind myself as well as them that we were
recorded.” Similarly, Leyla mentions that she was going to talk about Erdoğan’s use
of jitrat ( fıtrat) to elucidate how he disavows gender equality during a class. Then
she remembered that she was recording the class, which became an official requirement during the pandemic. “I noticed that I hadn’t pushed the button to start
recording. After I made my point about the president and gender, I started recording.” The moment Leyla experienced during the class demonstrates how selfvigilance and cautiousness interpenetrate with an implicit self-censorship and
limit academic freedom in Turkey.
Deniz works in a liberal, progressive academic atmosphere at a private university, and she has not been confronted personally with the risk of being dismissed.
However, she says she experiences the consternation and self-censorship that
engenders vigilance and a desire to play it safe:
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I still do have a job, but I am terrified when I think about when they would fire us. I did
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universities and progressive scholars had turbulent times in the past, this last wave
of dismissal was the hardest: “At the institution where I used to work, the number of
the dismissed scholars was equal to those who were able to stay. In such a world, you
cannot interfere with academic life.” Her and Serap’s words signify the structural
and institutional upper hand of the state when in conflict with gender studies
academic staff.
Emel is among those who kept their academic positions, but she also feels
uneasy and paralyzed in a different way:
We organized a workshop titled “imagining inclusive sports.” We aimed to talk about
women and queer athletes but could not explicitly say so. We tried to formulate a better
title or to name it just “queer sports,” but we couldn’t. Why? Because it will be a public
event and tomorrow you would see an Islamist, progovernment newspaper reporting
speculate about us.
Hamiyet, however, works at a university in a provincial town in which unrestrained
patriarchal and sexist tendencies are conveyed:
Let’s say a municipality invites me to give a public talk on gender. Later, they disinvite
JMEWS • Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies • 20:1 March 2024
me, saying that something went wrong and they needed to reschedule. Because after
102
inviting me, somebody warned them, or they dug out how oppositional a figure I was. If
I ever go somewhere, I always find out that the other speakers are from AKP or connected to the presidency. They balance my presence with politically engaged progovernment people. When I tell them, “Women and men are equal,” they would immediately oppose and say in panic, “No, the family is sacred.”
The most recent antigender discourses are not isolated incidents peculiar to state
patriarchy, homophobia, or the manifestations of political Islam. One of the examples Safiye recounted reminds us that capitalism and patriarchy work together to
subordinate women, although the capitalist professional classes act as if they are
the backbone of modernity and civil society in Turkey. Safiye attended a public event
titled “Towards Gender Equality,” organized by a major business association. During
her talk, she mentioned a boss who arranges a meeting at 7:00 a.m. or 9:00 p.m. for
their workers. Safiye maintained that such a boss did not consider the familial
responsibilities of their female workers simply because day-care facilities do not
work at these hours. She concluded that women were not promoted, not because
they were not ambitious or hardworking, but instead because of implicit patriarchal and sexist practices. Later she encountered an unexpected response: “The
chairperson, also the president of the organization, looked at me coldly and said
nothing. Then, he called a coffee break. I was surprised, expecting he would comment and say something like you’re right. Nothing. Later, his workers told me he
always calls for meetings at 7 a.m. So, even when you don’t exactly know, you know
men’s position and how patriarchy works.” Safiye’s experience with the president
of the leading business association (“the bosses’ club”), portrayed as one of the
main supporters of modernization, democratization, and globalization in the country, is not unique. Hence it represents a strong current of gender inequality and
sexism prevalent among the capitalist classes, in addition to the high-level state
bureaucrats and Islamist politicians (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014). Even though they
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on us, saying that sports were perverted at this university. They would aim at us,
The provincial president of the CHP [the central-left main opposition, Republican
People’s Party] in Diyarbakir is a woman. People within the party cadres criticized this,
saying having a woman leader wasn’t suitable for their culture. The president told the
press it was a “sexist attack.” Watch the terminology. It also reads as “If you’re against
AKP, which is sexist, you aren’t supposed to be so.” CHP has found itself in a situation
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Resilience, Hope, and Resistance
The scholars we talked to maintain their passionate resistance against oppressive
structures, such as the state and the neoliberalizing university, as well as an optimism for and devotion to feminist movements and queer politics and faith in the
younger generations despite the current disheartening and imperiling circumstances. Almost all of them think that the outcomes of the authoritarian tendencies
of the state and the conservative social forces that became hegemonic in the last
decade are twofold. The first outcome relates to the anger, exhaustion, worthlessness, strife, and inertia they feel, especially when they ask themselves reflexively
what they have been working for. This affect of ennui is stronger among the more
experienced scholars, as some of them mention their desire to quit immediately or
retire earlier than they might have. The second aspect relates to the persuasion that
oppression brings resistance, causes mobilization and politicization, bolsters grassroots movements, and triggers a bolder and richer front of action in academe and
other sociocultural spheres. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s famous words “Where
there is power, there is resistance,” the scholars imagine that the difficulties we
address above are somehow a required part of the historical process that cisgender
heterosexual women and queer groups must pass through and learn to navigate for
a brighter future that they all seem to imagine.
After emphasizing that the “real” struggle of feminist/queer politics must be
against the “deeper” mentality and not the current oppressive structures, Leyla says
she is hopeful for the future of gender studies: “Although we have lost many friends,
it will flourish again, like a tree which is pruned.” Fatma is in the same spirit as she
underlines the power of the “creativeness of the opposition” that engenders new
mediums (including social media campaigns and feminist blogs) to render gender
equality more visible and mainstream. Sevim shares similar views, reiterating that
the government’s disavowal of the ontological legitimacy of gender equality generates a countermovement through which people come to comprehend that they
need to embrace gender equality to distinguish themselves from the toxic effects of
political Islam. She gives an example:
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frequently feel suffocated and circumscribed under these conditions, our interlocutors show no sign of giving up on their continuous struggle against patriarchy,
heterosexism, and gender inequality.
where it had to embrace LGBT people as well. So, as the government makes itself
proudly sexist and homophobic, the opposition must transform itself to be more toler-
In the academic context, having a low profile and “going underground” are common
strategies among gender scholars as they walk through the transitional period that
will end with unseating the Islamist government.2 At least they hope so, in a shared
sanguineness. Serap states that scholars were exhorted to not offer gender studies
courses (and classes on sexuality, as Bulent mentions) and not approve graduate
theses about sexuality. The administrations think these actions would be risky and
harmful to their universities, yet she argues: “I think our friends keep working and
doing research without making it explicit. They will operate underground, without
support, until their reputation is restored and redeemed.” Muzeyyen thinks similarly: “Right now, I am evading a spotlight on my research. Eventually, things will be
more suitable for us; we’ll see a more tolerant and permitting period. Then, people
like me will be redeemed.” The shared optimism and belief that everything will be
better in the future stem from a reliance on the next generation’s noticeable openness to gender equality and sexual diversity as the youth express themselves in more
egalitarian and less (hetero)sexist ways. Another factor that reinforces the professors’ hopefulness is the general direction of the world, moving toward gender and
sexual modernity on a global scale despite certain local obstacles and distractions.
Many respondents informed us about the ways in which the European Union’s
policy change toward necessitating a gender dimension in funded research projects
has influenced universities to take this issue more seriously (Griffin 2006). Serpil
gives an example: “My university is a member of the United Nations’ Network of
Universities, which has certain criteria for gender equality. So, there is a motivation
for them to hire people who have expertise in gender. It justifies our presence.”
Semra thinks similarly:
Our universities are most scared of being ridiculed in the international arena. Today,
they count how many men and women they employ because if your institution is full of
male professors, you look like a remnant from the Middle Ages. Even ours would not
want that. Tomorrow, they will have to report something on LGBT issues. Only when
they understand that they can be ashamed in front of Westerners do they feel the need
to reform themselves. It is good that the world is a smaller place now.
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Mujde’s elaboration, “We are stuck between the anti-gender climate and the
funding centers’ generosity to back us,” is especially telling in this impasse. Professors conduct research on gender/sexuality and get funding in a clandestine manner, especially from transnational organizations. University administrators want
them to be present, productive, and representable under certain conditions (Drew
and Canavan 2021) and then to avoid attention and publicity, which would lead to
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ant and open. This gives a tactical departure point for future gender and sexual politics.
ÖZBAY and CAN IPEKCI • State-Led Antigender Politics, Islamism, and the University
Conclusion
Today it seems increasingly difficult to think about advancing democracy and laying the foundations of inclusive politics without taking gender and sexuality into
account. Simultaneously, political Islam, ultraright politics, and antigender movements turn their eyes to these arenas, vilify the concepts of gender and LGBTI
movements and actors, and fight against the gains of the last century. These are not
easy to ridicule or ignore. Their strengthening imperils not only gender equality and
sexual diversity but also the legitimacy of gender studies as an academic institution
and its practitioners. Hence it is a feminist/queer responsibility and requirement to
understand the ways these use coercion over gender studies and document scholars’
experiences, emotional dynamics, and strategies to cope with transnational demonization and repudiation.
This article demonstrates some of the ways the state-led antigender turn in
Turkey consolidates and justifies the authoritarian, conservative, and Islamist political swing. It has been harmful and exasperating for gender studies scholars, forcing
them to navigate social, economic, political, and affective domains with a sense of
insecurity, precarization, and self-vigilance. Given the antigender movement and the
most recent attack on LGBTI communities in the form of state homophobia (Özbay
2022) and hate discourses during the “profamily” public meetings against the possibility of same-sex marriage in Turkey, we may need different mechanisms and spaces
of knowledge production, alternative feminist/queer visions, and critical thinking
that not only question and challenge but also destabilize and threaten the ultraright,
state-led antigender and anti-LGBTI mobilizations (Martinsson 2020). Sharing
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Islamist attacks from state institutions or the press, recalling Deniz’s words above.
In the same manner, gender studies professors are explicitly discouraged from
challenging and contesting university policies and governmental practices. Still,
as long as they are able, they adopt a resilient and flexible attitude to sustain
their academic endeavors, and they wait for the right moment to surface again, as
Muzeyyen implies.
When we look closer at the field of gender studies and its representations in
cultural and political domains (Eddy, Ward, and Thawaja 2017), we can observe the
depth of the conflict between, on the one hand, the top-down state-led antigender
attacks alongside religious dogmas and ideological maxims, and, on the other, the
feminist/queer grassroots movements, knowledge production and scholarship, and
the funding support from regional and global structures. People from our sample try
to respond to and satisfy both directions, strategize their approach, negotiate the
contradicting demands to preserve their earned positions, invest in themselves, and
expand their influence when possible. Resilience, hope, determination, and passion
unite and jointly work in our respondents’ lifeworld and empower them in their
attempts to make the university a gender-equal place and actively contribute to the
production and circulation of knowledge on gender and sexuality.
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stories of, experiences with, and transformative imaginings of oppressive political
structures and forceful antigender campaigns is indispensable for feminist/queer
scholars. In the Turkish case, the organizing principle in scholars’ attempts to control
their lives and construct meaningful, self-possessed muhalif (opponent) feminist/
queer subjectivities is positioning themselves carefully vis-à-vis the state. This
anchor also affords the faculty members we talked with a zealous commitment to
resistance and fighting patriarchy, sexism, and homophobia, as well as a desire to
uphold the historical movement for gender equality.
Gender studies scholars are attacked and oppressed by the patriarchal, masculinist, antifeminist, and anti-LGBTI discourses and institutional practices around
the world. The narratives we present here demonstrate that this transnational trend
is not limited to white and/or Christian-majority countries, as the literature has
documented thus far. The Turkish case proves that antigender campaigns can easily infiltrate Middle Eastern and/or Muslim-majority contexts in which feminists
and queers have long struggled to transform societies, cultures, and states. It is an
ongoing, incomplete transformation that demands collective and individual efforts,
participation, and buoyancy. Hence our respondents feel empowered, worthy, and
hopeful through their commitment to the muhalif positionality against patriarchal and homophobic state organs. The ideals of gender equality and sexual democracy, the significant place they give to feminist/queer social movements and grassroots
activism, their optimism for the youth’s unbinding approaches to gender and sexuality,
and transnational support cultivate our respondents’ aspirational hope and make them
ardent strugglers, despite obstacles presented in the social, economic, political, and
emotional arenas.
As some of our interlocutors suggested, eliminating the authoritarian Islamist
government may not be enough to solve all the problems that gender studies and
its professors experience. Patriarchal, misogynist, and homophobic state logic and
practices will still prevail alongside the neoliberal precepts that govern the higher
education system, even when there is a government led by a secular political party.
Their understanding of resistance and hope should not close our eyes to the reality
that “millions of people in Europe and beyond have been mobilized against ‘gender
ideology’ and in support of what they call ‘family values’ ” (Graff and Korulczuk
2022: 3), and “sacred familialism” in Turkey (Akkan 2018). Therefore we need to
be concerned with the next set of questions, which focuses on the responsibility,
capacity, and role of gender studies scholars in the collaborative attempt to mainstream gender equality and sexual diversity in a post-Islamist sociopolitical order,
which might still be statist, racist, nationalist, and neoliberal. In this sense, social
change in and the emergent cultural politics of trans identity and genderfluidity,
cisnormativity and heteronormativity, intersectionality and intersectional activism,
homonormativity, and queer families need to be incorporated into gender studies’
public influence and self-reflexive accounts of its scholars.
CENK ÖZBAY is professor of sociology and gender studies at Sabancı University in
Istanbul. He is author of Queering Sexualities in Turkey: Gay Men, Male Prostitutes, and
the City (2017) and coeditor of The Making of Neoliberal Turkey (2016). Contact:
ozbay@sabanciuniv.edu.
Acknowledgments
We are deeply grateful to gender scholars in Turkey for their dedication and generosity. Thanks to our
research team members Yusuf Trasci, Dilara Afsar, Ceyda Altikardes, Baris Bilgit, and Begum Selici. We
are also grateful to the editors of JMEWS for their support.
Notes
1.
One anonymous reviewer has reminded us that Acar’s words might have a performative quality to
publicly express her views and demonstrate her (and other feminists’) political as well as emotional frustration with the circles against the Istanbul Convention. We also agree with this performative aspect and thank the reviewer.
2.
For a similar case concerning political scientists who strive to do political science without talking
about politics, see Ersoy and Karakoç 2021.
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