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Mental Machinery and Active Powers from Hartley to Ward

Springer eBooks, 2022
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299 Chapter 16 Mental Machinery and Active Powers from Hartley to Ward Federico Boccaccini Abstract Since the time of Locke and Leibniz, a debate has taken center stage about the nature of the mind and its powers, focusing on whether the subject of experience is the result of all the senses or if the subject is actively producing our experience. It is widely accepted that the former provides a strong mechanistic explanation for mental activity based on the physiology of the nervous system and the psychological association of ideas — which are constituents of modern mecha- nism and materialism—thereby disentangling psychology from metaphysics. In the following, I will explore the transformation of the Newtonian view from its mechan- ical reductionist approach, which structured the Enlightenment science of mind in Britain, to that of the vitalistic autonomy of thinking matter. The reception of David Hartley’s (1705–1757) theory of vibrations and associations of ideas serves as a case study. The longevity of this model (a sixth edition of the Observations on Man was published in 1834) was particularly significant in Europe until the fall of the associationist school after James Ward’s (1843–1925) article "Psychology", for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1886), where Ward argues for the unity and continuity of active conscious life as opposed to the mechanical model of psychology. F. Boccaccini (*) University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil e-mail: federico.boccaccini@uliege.be © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C. T. Wolfe et al. (eds.), Mechanism, Life and Mind in Modern Natural Philosophy, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 240, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07036-5_16
Chapter 16 Mental Machinery and Active Powers from Hartley to Ward Federico Boccaccini Abstract Since the time of Locke and Leibniz, a debate has taken center stage about the nature of the mind and its powers, focusing on whether the subject of experience is the result of all the senses or if the subject is actively producing our experience. It is widely accepted that the former provides a strong mechanistic explanation for mental activity based on the physiology of the nervous system and the psychological association of ideas — which are constituents of modern mechanism and materialism—thereby disentangling psychology from metaphysics. In the following, I will explore the transformation of the Newtonian view from its mechanical reductionist approach, which structured the Enlightenment science of mind in Britain, to that of the vitalistic autonomy of thinking matter. The reception of David Hartley’s (1705–1757) theory of vibrations and associations of ideas serves as a case study. The longevity of this model (a sixth edition of the Observations on Man was published in 1834) was particularly significant in Europe until the fall of the associationist school after James Ward’s (1843–1925) article "Psychology", for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1886), where Ward argues for the unity and continuity of active conscious life as opposed to the mechanical model of psychology. F. Boccaccini (*) University of Brasilia, Brasília, Brazil e-mail: federico.boccaccini@uliege.be © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C. T. Wolfe et al. (eds.), Mechanism, Life and Mind in Modern Natural Philosophy, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 240, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07036-5_16 299