Strategies for Developing a Proficient Army in Somalia Mohameddeq Ali Abdi Expert Political Somalia mdek1200@gmail.com 1. Introduction There are several dogmas about Somali politics and security. First, the civil wars that have ravaged and partitioned Somalia severely weakened the authority of the central government and allowed armed Islamist groups to control huge chunks of the country. Second, despite the formidable multinational AMISOM forces, the Reese has failed to restore the sovereign government's authority in central and southern Somalia and failed to degrade armed groups to the Dutch and Babini coastal urban areas. Those dogmas have a known projection that Somalia's armed forces are insufficiently trained, lack unity and mutual trust, and on their own cannot protect the PLA. Specifically, the president's administration led by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has designed a ten-year capacity development plan to build a 30,000 strong standing army as well as paramilitary and other security forces. The intent is to create a united and competent force that can lead and support multinational forces, security operations and security reform in the context of the transition in 2021– 2024. In the first of a series of papers on security capacity building in Somalia, assess the context in which the rebuilding force was attempted and suggest that five viable strategies are pursuing this purpose. In the first paper, places more emphasis on the development of an SNA and experts for national security decision-making with a homepage interest in the development of Somalia's national constitution. The two papers provide a unique basis for selections and rewards for those involved in military, police, intelligence, customs and counter-terrorism programs, but with a broad spectrum of roles and backgrounds. 2. Historical Context of the Somali Armed Forces The Somali Armed Forces (SAF) were established when the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which used to be termed as the Northern Army of Somaliland, and the former Italian Somaliland Trust Territory were joined during independence in 1960. The SAF's origin can be traced back to 60 tribal and colonial battalions that were grouped as the six main companies of the Somali Police Forces trained by the British and Italian colonial masters. With fairly independent chiefs during the colonial period, "the tribal army was currently under the supervision of the District Commissioner, but with influential chiefs like Sultan Karanle or Sultan el Daar. The British and the Italians already used to recruit, equip, and drill semiprofessional policemen and guards". The six main companies could mount to more than 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers and as "the RTC (The Royal Training Centre) trained platoon commanders in Southern Somalia; in the North Liberia, and British West Africa, enlisted men and NCOs were also recruited and officers from Somaliland had been sent to Sandhurst and to the Military Academy at Modena to receive professional training". Att. Col. Aden Mohammed Gabose, Deputy Commander of the Somali Armed Forces at the time of civilian regime, explained how the soldiers in the six main companies have been chosen and trained. Despite the disarmaments by the colonial authorities and the dismantling of the tribal army's bases prior to independence, he remained confident that the tribe could have rallied 60,000 tribes' ammunition and shoot. The SAF, with a personnel of 18,000-22,000 under civilian President Abdillahi Yussef (1967-68) and "SAF (was) the largest employer of salaried labor in the country" with the highest education and skills, "was mostly responsible for border surveillance, guards all the population centres, large convoys etc.", whilst the Police Forces "(was) responsible for keeping the law and order which was its easier job". 3. Challenges Faced by the Somali Armed Forces The Somali Armed Forces have historically not been known for their proficiency and effectiveness. This is despite the fact that, post-civil war, several foreign missions have been tasked with establishing and forming a functioning state military in the war-torn country. Several factors contribute toward the lack of quality represented by the military. Internal factors include, but are not limited to, rapid turnover in government, the pervasiveness of corruption, limited infrastructure, and a stressed economy. External factors may not be immediately controllable by the government as they require the combined influence of the international community to limit or remove. This includes a heavily invested influx of foreign fighters, weaponry, and even an extension of an extremist group into the political scene. A pervasive civil war from the title-regime exit engendered a consequent absence of a nation-to-weapons state leverage and control programs. As in many countries, once war is over, immense years of resources are dedicated to rebuilding trust among society. Intense violence that occurred in the country has left a generation desensitized to such brutal and overwhelming death: this means that when something detrimental happens, that violence is normalized to that society and creates a passivity toward inequalities and injustices. Proliferation of light weaponry could be due to theft, loss, or purposeful sale of military-owned weaponry. The cost is another aspect to consider in the purchase of light weaponry as it is relatively cheaper to purchase an AR-15 than it would be a heavy projectile machine (e.g., GPMG). Light weaponry are dangerous in their own right as they are easily manipulated and concealed. This allows the possibility of collateral damage to increase due to the transport of such relatively small arms - especially given the terrain: a place wrought with explosive devices, caravans, and thousands of civilian major cities. In an effort to combat extremism, foreign counter-extremist agencies had targeted and killed primary and second-line terrorist generals. 3.1. Internal Conflict and Political Instability Internal conflict and political instability have been two of the main impediments to developing a proficient army in Somalia. Amidst the political behest, SNA came into existence as a clan-based army and subsequently developed into a fighting force essentially serving the interests of the ruling elite. Unlike other stable countries, the view of the military was aimed more at ensuring regime protection and perpetuation in power than governance and security provision to the public. According to Menkhaus, the national political leadership (in Mogadishu) after independence in 1960 linked the promotion of a national way of life closely to the leadership's self-interest, pursued clandestine business and political connections, used the increasing fraction of military expenditures as an alternative patronage tool to manage the obstructive, indigenous leadership, while at the same time distancing them from British influence in the northern areas and access to the southern ports. By the latter years of the 1980s, the Somali landscape of governance, specifically under the framework of the political economy of violence, had been altered to a greater extent. The recourse to military power and military organization as a universal conflict-resolution tool replaced customary conflict-management techniques and existing indigenous legal mechanisms. The end result after more than two decades of conflict turmoil and reconstitution is a society with the armed trading state (and hence a militarized society) making significant progression. In such a societal setting, the military was most often identified as the central locus driving the dynamics, functioning as a state-society disconnect. In agreement with Aristide Zolberg, the army as an organization, along with its internal and external auxiliary and opposing forces, was immediately engrossed in the rivalries of the political class as well as in the quest for socio-economic and political gains. 3.2. Lack of Resources and Infrastructure Lack of resources & infrastructure: This is one of the greatest challenges for the Somali National Army if Interior Minister's declaration and the information on the Somali government portal are to be believed. This is also strongly supported by the Strategic Tactical Rides management report, "Diagnostics Study Of The Security Sector, Somalia National Security Forces" published in November 2010. According to the STC RE report, the customary physical requirements have not been adequately addressed by the international donors over the past two decades or more. The infrastructure component includes the development and implementation of facilities and installations that provide essential services to support combat, and service and support operations at various different levels within the force. The infrastructure failures include things like poor maintenance and lack of reliable water, power, communications, transport, security, accommodation, dining and toilet facilities, and other such basic essentials for personnel in the field of operations or on a national basis. Of particular note is funding for the army chain of command. There are inadequate numbers of senior military staff even though money is there because those claiming to provide it are spending that money that they are not reporting but come up with first-hand advice on how the SNA should run. Without good strong effective, efficient, trained and professional military leadership and direction, capable to command who is trained and developed in military command style, dominate, lead, inspire, manage expectations and gel the force together, a military force cannot be victorious in its operations as targets set can be unachievable. Lack of modern equipment is what is left behind person will be technically and materially up to date enough for a soldier to use. Moreover, those that are there are no more serviceable. This leaves less equipment because the Somali Military now was formed up by such material. The entire inventory is WW II tank, truck and any piece of equipment brought to Somalia while Catering and Medical supplies are some of the problems the SNA is facing. Troops deployed are kept on salt fish and never see meat for months because of poor maintenance of the meat supplies. Troops are not having medical recourse and fall sick due to that, worse case scenario is when MP help them to receive medical attention and how to get hold of the sick by organizing them in queue in order to board. 3.3. External Interference and Influence 3.3. External Interference and Influence Given the clear evidence of the existence and participation of both Kenyan and Ethiopian forces in Somalia, it further complicates the internal political and military environment and exacerbates the challenges faced in developing proficient security forces. The extended tensions between Somalia and Kenya that recently boiled over resulted in Kenya's Public Accounts Committee exposing corruption in Kenyan peacekeeping supply chains. These claims have been either denied or deflected. Somalia's response was to expel the Kenyan ambassador and recall its own. Similarly, there is tension between Somalia and Ethiopia. In addition to historical grievances and the contested border tensions, Ethiopia was also the country pursuing US self-interest in the negotiations to have Villa Somalia transferred from U.S. to UK influence after Villa Somalia was vacated by U.S. forces as part of Operation Restore Hope in late 1992. This largely internal political tension is reflected on the military level by reports of armed skirmishes and the entry of Ethiopian forces to secure the outskirts of a town approximately 100km from the border along the Djibouti road. These are two manifestations of the overall political crisis in Somalia which impact directly on the security sector development environment. Efforts to train and embed foreign troops into the Somali process somewhat mirror the problems experienced with UN deployments in post-conflict situations. Unfortunately, those forces are unlikely to disappear until U.S. interests are secured. Bearing in mind that active onsite conflict is likely to persist for some time, one option would be to engage in serious long-term dialogue with them. It is envisaged that other countries may also endeavor to enter into these debriefings. Iran and Sudan have been linked to Somalia in various ways. The delivery of arms from Iran via Sudan also came as a surprise. So far, they were only known to provide the Somali people with funds, the latest of which came in the wake of the Meles Aweys mediated agreement. Although it has not been confirmed, Sudanese personnel are believed to be training parts of the Somali militia in the vicinity of Jowhar. Iran initially diplomatically supported Al-Itihad as a means of resisting the expansion of the Al-Itihaad. Their response was to form the Anti-Al-Itihadi militia in Ethiopia. Iran has been increasingly wary of Somali Islamist activity. Al-Shabaab is functioning as the primary Anti-Ethiopian military group inside Somalia. It is therefore logical that the Iranians would want to utilize their anti-Ethiopian narrative to create tension inside Ethiopia via its Somali region. With PM Meles's 7th July announcement that Ethiopian troops will take over from the Islamists in Baidoa, Skye on all high altitude airfields was closed to all but Ethiopian Airlines. 4. Analysis of Current Military Capabilities The Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) are the single largest provider of security in Somalia. At present, Somalia has five military commands which operate in different areas of the country. They are, in order of establishment: Hiran Region Command, Danab Brigade, Uganda/Amisom Contingent, Hirshabele State Command, and the Ethiopian Contingent. The federal government took initiative to develop these forces since 2009 when the Somalia Transitional Federal Government was reestablished, after the Ethiopian contingent left the country. These are two active military commands, three commands who operate on deck and development. Hiran Region Command and the Danab Brigade are operating effectively while the other three commands are still being developed. However, Somalia has many armed groups. They vary from the Al-Shabaab group, the Daesh faction of the Islamic State, ASWJ (Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jaamaca), the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaica, and more. They give the Somali National Armed Forces different kinds of challenges which threaten the security of the country. The Somali National Armed Forces are, therefore, capable of acquiring the highest level of fighting force complement. However, this force can be reached with good strategic advice in three phases. This will light the way for the commanders that will lead the army to higher professional capabilities. The strategies are tailored to the current primer and will not be open for others at this stage. 5. Lessons Learned from Past Military Interventions Historical experiences from previous military interventions can offer some essential lessons learned. Somalia is now facing its tenth intervention. These interventions offer an insight into outcomes that can be expected, based on the intents in family activity that was either successful or not. In this paper, we have extracted various lessons learned through the paper, which can move scholarly thinking and policy consideration forward. The interventions in Somalia have shown that force alone does not construct a stable nation. This is when military success did not result in political achievement. It was envisioned that the interventions would have contributed to building up an indigenous army and will likely serve as a background for conclusions on the strategies that are most effectual in this task. At the same time, the primary focus of the interventions was longitudinal rather than on the passing-out parades. The intent formulation of this work gives an insight into the character of the ongoing activities. If a military intervention engages in activities that supply protections, services, and assistance on which the people of the state rely for their peace and security, they are able to generate the obligation of gratefulness. These activities have been shown to be less likely if the incumbent regime faces losing control of the country. In stark contrast to these relationships is Rashid Abdi's analysis of the most recent militia in Somalia - a mix of AU-donor financed troops gainsay alset backed by warlords and self-proclaimed powers. Their general commitment to Somalia's peace and progress has been taken with skepticism; local Somalis seem to see some of these warriors as nothing but part of the problem, not a vital component for a strong Somalia. 6. Building a Professional Military Force Health is usually interpreted as a complete state of well-being. A lack of training, education, or success in a job does not necessarily imply a disability or a diagnosis of ill health. The most significant determinant of health is a high standard of living. More importantly, military forces should desist from those acts regarded as gross violations of human rights and consequences. It forewarns against severe penalties for those who defy an implied prohibition, regardless of the tenacity of combatants with distinct dominion from those who merely follow orders. Despite the fact that military operations are elaborate and variable, the pathway to remedy has been fairly consistent. It begins with enhancing interest, demand, and provisions to discourage combatants and trainers. Several factors are linked to the provision of professional military forces in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The information provided on the training, recruitment of new forces, development of leadership, and substituting aging personnel is axiomatically attempting to nurture a professionally vibrant military force in Somalia. Much of the emails and documents in the military tablet were about "developing robust leadership" in the Somalia forces for the governments. For example, on 15 August 2014, AMISOM Chief of Staff, Osman Siraj Fegessa, ordered that a "DFS motor vehicle" worth 40,000 USD meant for the newly appointed training manager of the Somali National Army (SNA) Human Resource Directorate, Col Celestine Ogwabiko, be handed over immediately. The email marked "restricted" from the African Union Mission in Somalia Force Headquarters (FC), Department of Logistics, Movement and Air to CS is a further illustration of the significant role the African Union (AU) has played in logistics management. 6.1. Recruitment and Training Programs The recruitment of soldiers and officers to the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) has to be matched by a structured training program that will provide participating soldiers with a suite of relevant knowledge. Training programs are especially needed to adapt soldiers to the new organizational structures of the SAF. The human capacity of the SAF to conduct offensive independent operations is still limited. Thus, the SAF has to limit its expectations of conducting an independent military campaign to defeating Al-Shabaab, which is a challenging task in itself. Recruit Right: The Somali National Army currently faces reduced morale among their ranks. Therefore, it is key to have an onboarding process that guarantees dedication and motivation from the ranks. It is not yet clear what the political and military ties to further develop the brigades will be. When it comes to making a proper decision, knowing the political orientation of the units will dictate the kind of command to develop. However, the aerial delivery of courses should be designed as an offensive package in preparation for the outcome. The specialists of the brigades have to develop a quick training package. Yet the aerial insertion package could be coordinated as a part of the pre-basic training (PBT). Targets: The individuals who have been recruited in advance will have gone under basic training. The kit is now also designed to develop more specialist skills on a warfare package. The army will want to create and train a unit in Puntland to wrest control of the Central Region of this armed force. In terms of contract lengths, the trained soldiers may either sign on for another 2 years or serve an extra 2 years on security duties with the security company ArcMed. 6.2. Leadership Development Leadership, a significant component of an efficient organization, is important for the military. Such is the demand for leadership that to be effective in their endeavor, many defense organizations devote enormous amounts of money and time to their leadership growth programs. This part examines the procedures and devices necessary to build a proficient military with a strong leadership staff in the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF), a recently produced organization. The area begins discussing the definition and achievement of effective leadership in the armed forces. It then discusses the kind of training from which good leaders will profit and concludes by discussing leadership development systems. The growth of leadership is the method to make stronger leaders. Good leaders are born, so it has been said. There are some people who are born with a powerful set of leadership qualities. Some others have a natural presence that may make them healthy leaders. Because of their extraordinary management abilities, Dan Fulani, for example, has become a hero in many communities of the very poor in Africa. This statement, however, is not completely accurate. In most communities, leadership is a complex practice that demands proficiency in different fields. People may indeed be born with unique leadership traits like empathy, self-confidence, motivation, or fortitude which can make them more likely to succeed as leaders than most others. These we call the 'inherent characteristics' of the commander. A competent leader may, though, absorb the abilities and expertise. To be good, a leader may then be trained. Or it could be a blend of the two. 6.3. Logistics and Supply Chain Management Logistics and supply chain management play a vital role in operational readiness and contribute to the overall operational efficiency of the Somali Armed Forces in particular and other armed forces in general. Logistics refers to the comprehensive management of material, personnel, and services designed to support force generation, force projection, and sustainment. Supply Chain Management, on the other hand, refers to efficiencies, economies of scale, time and cost buffers, and benefits derived from the value addition processes in production, transportation, warehousing, inventory management, distribution, and facility location. Further to the above, the following are subscriber domains showing the relevance of supply chain management and logistics in military capabilities: - Force Protection: Efficient carriage of combat service support items; reduced response cycles, therefore, improved time utility (as in Time Value of Money theory) for strategic and tactical flexibility; timely support or readiness to operational forces, thereby increasing the combat force's lethality, endurance, and agility; quick and predictable deliveries; highly aggressive supply systems against aggressive armed opponents; cost savings as a result of optimized inventory levels and an economically operated supply chain system; forces can be moved systematically and in different directions; continuous readiness (in terms of visibility of material availability and readiness of the troops) on all levels; deployment of forces, systems, and weapons is possible at short notice to any place; and military supply chain management is more about responding than forecasting, and military forces cannot hold bulky stocks as commercial outfits do, hence the need for smoother and more accurate logistics and supply chain. 7. Security Sector Reform and Governance To sustain peace in Somalia and across Africa, and to combat or address armed conflicts, war, and underdevelopment, a security force must be established and be able to perform for enhancing state and human security. Effectiveness in the security and military performance not only requires a functional army and an enormous number of troops and military equipment but relies on many strategies, values, and principles for developing such a robust and proficient military to subdue the threats and risks to peace and stability. Therefore, the governance system and the related essential institutional setup should be put in place to construct the above-mentioned army and effective military power, as significant background factors to military reforms. This chapter will examine the fundamental issues of security sector reform and governance, based on an extensive literature review of these concepts as context trends of this work. The significance of effective governance in promoting security was already made clear in the literature. It sought new ways to respond to the collapsed security and military structures and forces requiring fundamental systemic changes to improve the military's capabilities and policing. Africa and Somalia required institutional rebuilding at all levels - from low politics and high authority, systemically and cumulatively. Effective governance is also essential for achieving other worthwhile objectives in the Horn of Africa: enforcing and facilitating the development-conflictbetter performance linkages in general and in specific Horn security sectors. It is above all an indigenous reformation process that requires nurturing and stimulating. Also, attempts to rebuild the society or the state from above and below from sites of power and in the macro-meso-micro levels are essential. It has to be substantially distinctive than prior system-building or state-making attempts in Africa. 8. International Partnerships and Cooperation The preferred outcome for this phase is to have a proficient army in four years. It is hard to bear a proficient army in a short period of time, but it is achievable if the Federal Government of Somalia, political leaders, the donor community, and all the stakeholders work together. There are ten major strategies that help the development of a proficient army in Somalia. One of the possible means of empowering the Somali Armed Forces is working closely with our international allies, organizations, and partners by exchanging support and cooperation. Therefore, this part discusses why international partnerships and cooperation are very essential for strengthening the capabilities of the Somali Armed Forces. The benefits and implications of working and collaborating with our international partners are further examined. 8.1 International Partnerships with Our Allied Countries and Other Partners The development of a trained army is not only a national affair but also an international issue, especially for Somalia, which freely receives support from many countries and partners. There is no national development in today's world of globalization. The development of a country or a nation cannot complement each other owing to its localization. There are a number of freely issued cooperation between Somalia and the international world. Somalis being members of the international community reveal that there are soft conditions to maintain the integration of countries. A part of this are: electing a seat at the United Nations, the cooperation and collaboration which exists between Somalia with other countries in the field of politics, economics, social culture, education, migration/internally displaced interventions, and even those regional partners and organizations such as the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, NATO, IGAD, and others. 9. Role of Technology and Innovation In principle, technology has the potential to modernize the Somali Armed Forces and pave the way for viable forward defense strategies. For this reason, it is not advisable to hold the opinion of others that they are an unnecessary cause. Technology and innovation have a variety of applications and benefits when it comes to army professionalism. Technology, when utilized, can have the transformative potential to modernize and update the Somali Armed Forces. Technical advancements are also included in the three most relevant initiatives that the Federal Authorities have agreed to reform the Somali defense. If planned and effectively coordinated, approaches to using technology in military development can be used to prosecute the war on the one hand and pave the way for viable forward defense strategies on the other. There are many areas in which the Somali state may concentrate its energies with its international partners. To begin with, a Somali-led action research strategy for military needs in the twenty-first century could be undertaken. Technical advancements and associated solutions can be developed and commercialized without the necessarily distinct agents knowing what they will access and when. At the same time, the armed forces are undergoing an in-depth review intended to modernize and enhance their capabilities. Defense planners should pick from those technological revolutions that have a realistic possibility of being robust military contributors in order to make preparedness investments. In that case, the defensive integrity of Somalia can be linked to the technological and innovative standards that the Somali National Army is acquiring. An acute focus on tech and innovation has the potential to build survivable regional security forces, but the downside danger of overreliance in the form of a faulty technique is catastrophic. 10. Conclusion and Future Outlook Building a proficient army in Somalia is not only essential for securing the peace, but it is also an investment in security and stability. The capacities of the Somali Armed Forces should be utilized for reducing the dependence on the African Union forces, targeting the threats of Islamic terrorism, and safeguarding the people as well as the property. This analysis has delineated ten scientifically rigorous strategies for employing actions with respect to developing the unknown and under-planned variables. Some of the most important findings have shown costs, core facilitations, and obstacles in developing the proficiency of the army in Somalia. The affordability and sustainability of the strategies have sufficiently been discussed in nine variables directly associated with the development of the dependent virtues. The future outlook is very promising because the field consensus is prospective in adopting the recommendations and findings. However, some problems are yet to be looked into. The most important is the affordability of the variables in a civil-war-hit country surviving through foreign aid. The willingness to implement the findings is also an area that requires attention because of the extended stakeholder network. 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