Managing the insolvable limitations of costbenefit analysis: results of an interview
based study
Niek Mouter, Jan Anne Annema & Bert
van Wee
Transportation
Planning - Policy - Research - Practice
ISSN 0049-4488
Transportation
DOI 10.1007/s11116-014-9539-0
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DOI 10.1007/s11116-014-9539-0
Managing the insolvable limitations of cost-benefit
analysis: results of an interview based study
Niek Mouter • Jan Anne Annema • Bert van Wee
Ó Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014
Abstract Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been an important tool for transport planners
for several decades. Despite its popularity it has often been criticized for several reasons,
amongst other things, because the tool has some insolvable limitations when it is applied in
practice. In this paper we examine and scrutinize the perceptions of 86 key actors in the
Dutch appraisal practice for spatial-infrastructure projects with regard to three insolvable
CBA limitations: (1) CBA is always incomplete; (2) Effect estimations are always
uncertain; (3) Effects that are difficult to estimate have a relatively weak position. We
conclude that Dutch key actors were not only able to point out these three CBA limitations
and the bad management of these limitations, but they were also able to propose several
(pragmatic) solutions to improve the management of CBA limitations. This paper discusses
how the proposed solutions relate to solutions addressed in the literature. Moreover, we
provide recommendations for further research and discuss policy recommendations that
transpired from the results.
Keywords Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) Transport appraisal Transport planning
Decision-making process
Introduction
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been an important tool for transport planners for several
decades, in particular for evaluating and ranking transport infrastructure investments (e.g.
Eliasson and Lundberg 2012; Grant Muller et al. 2001; Hayashi and Morisugi 2000; Odgaard
et al. 2005). Despite its popularity CBA has often been criticized for several reasons, most of
N. Mouter (&) J. A. Annema B. van Wee
TU Delft’s Transport and Logistics Group, Delft, The Netherlands
e-mail: N.Mouter@tudelft.nl
B. van Wee
TRAIL Research School, Delft University of Technology’s Transport and Logistics Group, Delft,
The Netherlands
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them related to the insolvable limitations when it is applied in practice. For instance, estimations of future project effects are inherently very uncertain (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al. 2003,
2005; Naess 2006; Naess and Strand 2012; Salling and Banister 2009). Moreover, there is an
extensive body of literature (e.g. Ackerman and Heinzerling 2004; Atkinson and Mourato
2008; Boadway 2006; Kelman 2002; Martens 2011; Sen 2000; van Wee 2012) that states that
the focus of CBA (and the moral view on which the method is based: utilitarianism) on the
benefits and the costs that accrue from the project is insufficient as a moral view. Some
projects whose costs exceed their benefits may be morally right and, contrarily, some decisions where the benefits are greater than the costs may be morally wrong. For instance,
Atkinson and Mourato (2008, p. 328) state that: ‘given that equity and justice concerns often
dominate discourse about social decisions, it has often struck critics as bordering on the
perverse that CBA has chosen to focus its attention so squarely on efficiency’.
In a previous phase of our research program, we found that a very large majority of key
actors in the Dutch appraisal practice for spatial-infrastructure projects participating in our
study thinks that—in spite of the insolvable limitations of the method—CBA should be used in
the decision-making process for spatial-infrastructure projects (Mouter et al. 2013b).1 In our
research, as well as holding in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 86 key actors, we also asked
them to fill out a written questionnaire. 74 key actors responded and 73 made clear that in their
view CBA should play a role in the appraisal process for spatial-infrastructure projects.
In this paper we examine and scrutinize the perceptions of key actors in the Dutch
appraisal practice for spatial-infrastructure projects (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the Dutch
practice’’) with regard to insolvable CBA limitations, the problems these limitations lead
to, and solutions to manage these problems in the decision-making process. In the in-depth
interviews with the 86 key actors in the Dutch practice we pursued these three topics
specifically. In our view, analyzing key actors’ perceptions of solutions that aim to manage
(the problems that are a consequence of) insolvable CBA limitations is scientifically relevant in itself because, to the best of our knowledge, this focus on the perceptions of actual
CBA actors regarding solutions has never been carried out before. The societal contribution of this paper is that the proposed solutions can be used to enhance the management
of insolvable CBA limitations in the decision-making process. Finally, the proposed
solutions can be used as inspiration for further research.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: ‘‘Research methodology’’ section
presents the research methodology. ‘‘Results: insolvable CBA limitations’’, ‘‘Results: when
and why do respondents perceive that insolvable CBA limitations are problematic?’’and
‘‘Results: respondents’ perceptions of how to manage insolvable CBA limitations’’ sections present the results. Finally, ‘‘Conclusion and reflections’’ section provides concluding
remarks and reflections.
Research methodology
The research on which this paper is based was carried out as part of a larger research
program, which aspires to improve the appraisal of spatial-infrastructure projects using
CBA in the Netherlands and simultaneously aims to contribute to the scientific CBA
literature. In this research project the intention was to interview the entire population of
1
This paper defines spatial-infrastructure projects as both the classic infrastructure projects such as
‘highways’ and ‘railroads’ and spatial projects such as ‘integrated land use and transportation projects’ and
‘flood protection projects’.
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key actors that had an explicit and recognizable role in the Dutch practice in the last
decade. To identify the key actors in the Dutch practice, we used a three-stage method (see,
Mouter et al. 2013a for a more detailed elaboration of the three-stage method).
In the first stage, 30 key actors were interviewed (consultants, policy makers, scientists
and politicians with an important role in the Dutch practice in the last decade). We asked
these 30 respondents which people, in their view, were paramount—besides the people that
were already interviewed—to be certain that we interviewed the full Dutch population in
this area. Based on these suggestions, in the second stage, 42 additional respondents were
interviewed. In the third stage, the list of the 72 interviewed respondents was presented to
four respondents that were often mentioned as key actors in the Dutch practice during the
interviews. These respondents were asked to add the names of the people that needed to be
interviewed to the list in order to make sure that all of the key actors in the Dutch practice
were interviewed. In this third stage, 14 additional respondents were interviewed.
Thus, in total, we managed to interview 86 key actors in the Dutch practice (see
Appendix 1 for a list of the respondents). Fifteen other people were also approached for an
interview but they were not able to, or were not interested in participating in the research.
Thus, we did not manage to interview the entire population as intended and the 86
respondents must be considered as a selection of the entire population of key actors.
Moreover, we think that it is possible that although we consider the three-stage method as a
comprehensive way to identify the key actors in the Dutch appraisal practice for spatialinfrastructure projects it is possible that we missed a few key actors. In the interviews,
amongst other things, we asked the respondents to mention the most important advantages,
disadvantages, problems and limitations they experience with the CBA methodology and
when using CBA in the decision-making process. Moreover, we asked them to mention the
solutions they perceive for minimizing or managing the limitations and problems they
identified.
We used content analysis to analyze the interviews. Content analysis is defined as a
systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content
categories based on explicit rules of coding and categorizing (Weber 1990). We coded the
respondents’ quotes as a perception of an insolvable CBA limitation when the respondent
stated that he/she perceives the limitation as insolvable.2 We also coded the respondents’
perceptions of problems that are the result of the insolvable CBA limitations and their
perceptions of solutions to manage these problems. The content analysis resulted in 79
perceptions of insolvable CBA limitations, 95 perceptions of related problems and 159
perceptions of solutions to manage the problems that are a result of CBA limitations.
We use the Netherlands as a case study because we are Dutch researchers and we know
the Dutch community and procedures better than those of other countries. We think that the
Dutch practice can give useful international insights for other CBA practices because of the
extensive use of CBA in the Netherlands over the last 13 years. Mackie and Worsley
(2013) state that, along with the UK and Scandinavia, the Netherlands has been a leading
country in the international CBA practice for four reasons: (1) it has a strong tradition of
doing transport project appraisal; (2) it has guidance manuals which constitute a clearly
defined framework for appraisal which is to be followed throughout the project cycle; (3) it
2
Besides insolvable CBA limitations, respondents addressed the fact that a limitation of the CBA is that it
does not take other elements in the decision-making process into account, other than project effects and
efficiency, such as public support and political support issues. We did not consider these issues in this study
because we think they are not related to ex-ante evaluation of project effects but to the decision-making
process in general.
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has a framework populated with measures and values of the impacts, which are based on
evidence generated from research studies (4) the Netherlands has a policy whereby the
intention is that the results of appraisal work should have a significant influence on the case
for investment and on prioritization within programs. Since 2000, around 110 CBAs for
candidate transport policies became publicly available on a very broad range of topics
(such as new roads, new railroads, tunnels, sea port extensions, airport extensions, pricing
policies, speed policies, and so forth). Moreover, the projects are both on a national as well
as a regional level (so, CBAs are made for projects ranging from large, national, multibillion euro projects to relatively small, multi-million, local projects). Important effects
considered in the Netherlands practice are: direct transport benefits (such as travel time
savings and reliability effects), wider economic impacts, and all kinds of external impacts
such as environmental and safety impacts (see Mackie and Worsley 2013 for a more indepth discussion of effects that are considered in Dutch CBAs). The official Dutch CBA
Guideline (OEI-Manual, Eijgenraam et al. 2000) states that CBA practitioners should aim
to monetize effects as much as possible. In addition, the guideline states that specific
effects (such as effects on unique landscapes) cannot be monetized in an objective way and
should be expressed in the CBA report in a quantitative or qualitative way.
In this paper we discuss the 132 perceptions of solutions for managing insolvable CBA
limitations which we consider to be internationally relevant. In a Dutch language report
(Mouter et al. 2012) we elaborate on all of the solutions mentioned in the interviews by key
actors. In the next sections we do not present the number of respondents that mentioned a
particular solution because one of our main aims is to generate interesting solutions for
managing insolvable CBA limitations. In our view ‘interesting’ does not depend on the
number of times a solution is given. Just one person can have the ‘brilliant’ solution.
Nevertheless, to get an impression of the number of respondents that mentioned a solution
we provide an overview of these frequencies in see Table 2 in Appendix 2
Results: insolvable CBA limitations
Our results show that key actors perceive three main insolvable CBA limitations (Fig. 1):
incompleteness, uncertainty and the relatively weak position of effects that are difficult to
estimate. This section discusses how these three categories can be decomposed (based on
the content analysis of the interviews) and describes how the respondents specifically
define these limitations. We also give briefly the views on these specifically defined
limitations found in international literature (if available).
CBA studies are always incomplete
One insolvable CBA limitation that respondents mention is that CBAs are always
incomplete, because in their view it is inevitable that relevant welfare effects are overlooked in CBA studies or that it is not possible to include some welfare effects in a CBA
(sometimes even not in a qualitative way) because it is not possible to estimate these
welfare effects with sufficient reliability. The respondents label these types of effects as
intangible effects (Fig. 1). Respondents define intangible effects as (a) effects for which it
is unknown whether the effect will accrue at all; (b) effects for which it is difficult to
determine the causality between the project and a claimed effect, and/or; (c) effects for
which it is difficult to determine the extent to which the effect is additional or nonadditional to the national welfare. Most respondents labeled an effect as ‘intangible’ when
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Fig. 1 Insolvable CBA limitations perceived by respondents
it complies with only one of the three conditions. An example of an effect that complies
with the three conditions is the often claimed effect of an ‘enhanced business climate’ as a
result of a spatial-infrastructure project. Other intangible effects mentioned by respondents
are: effects on the image of the country, positive knowledge spillovers, effects on ‘regional
identity’, agglomeration effects, positive effects of innovative projects and effects on the
quality of life.
Respondents’ perceptions are confirmed in scientific literature. For instance, Ambrasaite
et al. (2011), Odgaard et al. (2005) and Mackie (2010) conclude that the ideal of CBA
studies to take into account all the welfare effects in the study is unrealistic because it is not
possible to estimate some welfare effects in a sufficiently reliable way. Börjesson et al.
(2013, p. 3) state that: ‘it is uncontroversial that investment CBAs do not capture all
possible relevant effects or considerations. For example, some costs and benefits cannot be
accurately valued or measured.’
Another incompleteness issue mentioned by respondents is that CBA studies exclude
project effects that have no effect on the welfare of a country3 but should still be evaluated
in the ex-ante evaluation process, in their opinion (Fig. 1). Respondents discuss three
examples of such effects. Firstly, in CBA, poor people count less than rich people because
poor people’s willingness to pay is, generally, relatively low. Secondly, they perceive that
the CBA is incomplete as a result of the anthropocentric perspective of the method. The
CBA determines negative effects of biodiversity by the value humans assign to the loss of
biodiversity as a result of a project. Biodiversity in itself has no value in the CBA. One
respondent states that the CBA is not sustained on the principle that one needs to give
something back to the planet when one takes something from it and perceives it as a
limitation of the CBA that the method does not consider this approach at all. Thirdly,
respondents perceive that the perspective of CBAs applied in practice is incomplete
because CBAs predominantly tend to scrutinize the costs and the benefits of a project for a
specific country. These respondents perceive that it is incorrect when CBAs in the Dutch
practice only include welfare effects for the Netherlands and therefore communicate a
positive message when the project results in a net positive welfare effect for the Netherlands although the project has very negative effects for other countries.
3
The OEI-Leidraad (official Dutch CBA Guideline) defines welfare effects of a project as: ‘all financial
and non-financial effects of a project for Dutch residents’. Project effects on safety and the environment are
used in the guideline as illustrations of non-financial welfare effects.
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In conclusion, Dutch CBAs evaluate the effects of a project on the welfare of the
country; however the evaluation of specific types of distribution of welfare (between rich
versus poor people, humans versus nature and Dutch residents versus non-Dutch residents)
is often neglected both in Dutch CBA studies and the wider ex-ante evaluation process of
spatial-infrastructure projects.
Martens (2011), Rietveld et al. (2007), Thomopoulos et al. (2009) and van Wee (2012),
amongst others, also discuss that the distributional effects of a project tend to be underexposed in CBA studies.
Outcomes of welfare effect estimations are always uncertain
Respondents also mention—as an insolvable limitation of the CBA—that estimations of
welfare effects of a project in a CBA are very uncertain (Fig. 1, middle box). The first main
reason mentioned is that consultants who carry out ex-ante CBAs need to make assumptions for the unknown future when they want to estimate effects. Secondly, in practice,
consultants do not have the time and money to estimate all the effects of a specific project
from scratch, and as a result they have to use shortcuts, national standard numbers and
rules of thumb to estimate the effects of a specific project, which leads to uncertainty.
The inherent uncertainty of ex-ante effect estimations in CBA studies is also abundantly
addressed in scientific literature (e.g. Beattie 1995; Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; Nicolaisen 2012;
Self 1970).
Effects that are difficult to quantify/monetize have a relatively weak position
Some respondents state that an insolvable limitation of CBA is that effects that are difficult
to quantify/monetize—such as effects on biodiversity—per definition, have a relatively
weak position in CBA reports4 (Fig. 1, right) compared to impacts that are easy to
quantify/monetize, such as construction costs and transport benefits. Because project
effects on biodiversity are difficult to quantify/monetize, consultants that carry out CBAs
frequently decide to include them in a non-monetized way, which gives these welfare
effects—according to some respondents—a relatively weak position in the CBA report
compared to monetized effects. Respondents state that this relatively weak position cannot
be rectified by monetizing the effects, for two reasons. Firstly, they state that monetization
leads to the risk that—as a result of quantification and monetization problems—only a part
of the effects on biodiversity are monetized and taken into account in the CBA report,
whilst the reader thinks that the total effect is included. Secondly, some respondents
oppose the monetization of effects, like effects on biodiversity and traffic casualties,
because they think it is incorrect to transfer these types of effects into the same unit as
effects like travel time savings and construction costs.5
Existing literature (e.g. Mackie and Preston 1998; Mishan 1988) also mentions this
limitation. Mishan (1988) addresses this insolvable limitation as follows: ‘if you take one
horse and one rabbit, no matter how you combine them the taste of horse dominates the
4
There is no clear consensus in the Dutch practice that this is an insolvable CBA limitation. Some
respondents perceive that this is an insolvable limitation; others perceive that it is currently-or will in the
near future be - possible to quantify and monetize all effects that are included in a CBA study equally well.
For example, with a more frequent use of insights obtained from experimental economics and behavioral
economics.
5
This position of respondents is more extensively discussed in Sect. 5.
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stew. Similarly, if you take one set of quantifiable impacts and one set of non-quantifiable
impacts in an appraisal, one set will dominate’.
Results: when and why do respondents perceive that insolvable CBA limitations are
problematic?
In the interviews, respondents frequently mentioned that the fact that CBA is a tool with
insolvable limitations is not problematic in itself. According to the respondents, problems
only arise when insolvable limitations are not managed properly. Respondents perceive
that, as a result of bad management, actors might use or position the CBA as an instrument
with too many or too few limitations and attribute an incorrect value to the CBA (either too
much or too little value). Below, we will discuss this respondents’ position in more depth
and, again, we also give views taken from existing literature on the positions discussed.
Why are insolvable limitations problematic?
Figure 2 displays the lines of reasoning used by the respondents to explain why they think
that the insolvable CBA limitations can be problematic in this respect. The respondents’
arguments frequently had different steps to them. The different steps are depicted by the
arrows and characters in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Problems resulting from the perceived insolvable limitations according to respondents
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More detail will now be given about the two most important observations that can be
derived from Fig. 2.
Imperfect presentation of CBA limitations leads to assigning incorrect value to CBA
The first observation is that respondents perceive that—as a result of imperfect presentation of CBA limitations in the CBA report—readers find it very difficult to understand the
limitations of the CBA sufficiently. One respondent states: ‘how is it possible for a politician to know that assumptions are very contestable when the CBA report does not
communicate this explicitly in the executive summary of the report?’ Respondents observe
that the chance that users understand the CBA limitations in an insufficient way as a result
of an imperfect communication of CBA limitations in the CBA report is especially high
when users have limited time to read the report. Here, respondents emphasize that especially politicians—who are important users of CBA studies—have limited time to read a
CBA report and frequently only read the summary of a CBA report, whilst summaries
especially tend to neglect the communication of limitations.
Figure 2 shows that respondents perceive that, as a result of the imperfect presentation
of CBA limitations, some actors might assign too much value to the CBA (a–b in Fig. 2),
but others might assign too little value (a–c in Fig. 2). They state that some actors in the
Dutch practice (unintentionally) assign too much value to the CBA because they are not
aware of CBA limitations and, as a result, use it as a holy grail (‘‘we decide positively only
if the benefit-cost ratio is above 100 ). On the other hand respondents state that a lack of
communication of CBA limitations enhances suspicion by skeptical actors, which leads to
a situation where these actors assign too little value to the CBA (‘‘I don’t trust instruments
that produce false certainties and are not honest about the limitations of the results’’).
The fact that CBA reports tend to communicate limitations of the study insufficiently is
endorsed in the literature. According to Welsh and Williams (1997), CBA outcomes are
usually presented as if they are endowed with considerable accuracy, even though estimations of traffic models, for instance, are very uncertain. Naess and Strand (2012) state
that the high degrees of uncertainty are often not displayed in cost-benefit analyses. From
an analysis of decision support documents for 78 Norwegian and Danish road projects,
Nicolaisen (2012, p. 7) finds that: ‘‘uncertainties are often toned down or ignored in the
decision support prepared for policy makers. This neglect makes impact appraisals appear
more accurate than warranted, which causes distrust towards the results among policy
makers’’. Out of an evaluation of the Dutch practice in 2002 (BCI, 2002) it could be seen
that, although effect estimations in CBA studies are very uncertain, CBA reports present
the outcomes of CBA studies as exact truths.
Strategic use of CBA limitations leads to assigning incorrect value to CBA
The second main observation related to Fig. 2 is that respondents perceive that CBA
limitations are also used in a strategic way by actors in the Dutch practice. To illustrate
this, a respondent states that: ‘‘if the outcome of the CBA does not support the political
interest of an actor, the actor emphasizes the limitations of the method, and when the
outcome of the CBA supports the political interest of an actor, the actor ignores its
limitations.’’ Hence, respondents perceive that as a result of strategic use of CBA limitations, some actors might assign too much value to the CBA by neglecting the limitations
(d–e in Fig. 2), but others assign too little value to the CBA by overemphasizing the
limitations (d–f in Fig. 2).
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In addition to the respondents’ perceptions, de Jong and Geerlings (2003) discuss that
strategic behavior is interrelated. They conclude that when people assign absolute value to
the CBA in a discussion, other people in that discussion—who are more skeptical about
CBA—will be prone to marginalize the value of CBA as a reaction.
Why is assigning an incorrect value problematic?
In ‘‘Why are insolvable limitations problematic?’’ section we discussed the different causes
respondents perceive for assigning an incorrect value to the CBA in the decision-making
process. Now, we discuss why respondents perceive attributing an incorrect value (too
much or too little, Fig. 2) to CBA as being problematic? They mention several reasons.
Firstly, they state that the quality of discussions among key actors in decision-making
processes on the usefulness, necessity and design of a new spatial-infrastructure project
could deteriorate. Respondents state that the contemplation, discussion and decisionmaking on the usefulness, necessity and design of a spatial-infrastructure project are not
enhanced when frustrations about the perceived incorrect use of CBA dominate the debate.
Secondly, they perceive it as undesirable when (other) key actors attribute marginal value
to the CBA in the decision-making process for spatial-infrastructure projects because
attributing a marginal value to CBA will lead to a marginal utilization of the advantages of
the use of CBA in the decision-making process.6
A third and final reason mentioned is that using the CBA as a ‘holy grail’ (too much
value, i.e. when the CBA outcome is positive, a project should be developed; when the
CBA outcome is negative, a project should not be developed) leads to four different
problems. A first problem related to using CBA as a ‘holy grail’ perceived by respondents
is that effects which are not or are not taken well into account in a CBA, are erroneously
neglected or have a relatively weak position in the decision-making process (‘‘if you assign
absolute value to the CBA in the decision-making process, you neglect other effects that
are important in the decision-making process and then your ally becomes your enemy’’).
Secondly, respondents state that experts know that there is hardly any difference between a
benefit-cost ratio of 1.1 and a benefit-cost ratio of 0.9. However, in practice, respondents
find that the former project is marked as a fantastic project and the latter project is
considered as a bad project, which they perceive as problematic. Thirdly, they state that
using CBA as a ‘holy grail’ catalyzes manipulation in regard to effect estimations in CBA
studies (‘‘carrying out a CBA is useless when the initiator of a project only receives
financial resources when the CBA score is positive, so the initiator of the project adjusts
the effect estimations until the CBA score is positive’’). Fourthly, attributing absolute value
to the CBA is seen as problematic because respondents perceive that assigning absolute
value to a tool with major limitations will eventually lead to the collapse of the instrument
in the long run (one respondent denotes this as ‘overshoot and collapse’).
This final statement from the respondents is endorsed in the literature. According to De
Jong and Geerlings (2003), the use of the CBA in an absolute way will lead to the
resistance of other actors, which can become so strong that at a certain point CBA will lose
the necessary political support.
6
Perceived advantages of key actors in the Dutch practice are discussed in Mouter et al. (2013b).
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Results: respondents’ perceptions of how to manage insolvable CBA limitations
Respondents perceive that the fact that CBA is a tool with insolvable limitations is not problematic in itself. According to the respondents, problems only arise when actors use or position
the CBA as an instrument with too many or too few limitations as a result of bad management of
these insolvable issues. This section describes the solutions proposed by the respondents for
managing the perceived problems that result from the insolvable CBA limitations.
Table 1 gives an overview of these solutions and shows that some proposed solutions
aspire to minimize insolvable CBA limitations, whereas other solutions aspire to manage
the insolvable CBA limitations and stimulate a ‘correct’ use or ‘subtle’ use of the CBA in
the decision-making process.7 Table 1 also shows that for some proposed solutions there is
controversy among respondents with regard to the ‘best solution’ and for others no contradicting remarks were found in the interviews.8
Below, we first discuss the proposed solutions that aspire to minimize perceived
insolvable limitations. According to the respondents, minimizing the insolvable CBA
limitations could possibly downsize the problems that result from CBA limitations. Next,
we discuss the proposed solutions that aspire to manage the problems that result from the
insolvable CBA limitations.
‘Actor participation’ as a solution—to take more welfare effects into account (solution
1 in Table 1)
One solution that respondents propose is to organize ‘effect survey meetings’ (Effect
Arenas) preceding a CBA study to take into account as many welfare effects as possible in
the CBA study and, as a result, minimize the limitation that CBA studies are always
incomplete. They state that all relevant actors affected by the project should be invited to
this meeting. The purpose of this meeting is that all actors should get the opportunity to
articulate which effects they think will accrue as a result of the project. To be clear, only
effects that increase national welfare are included in the CBA (the idea of the Effect Arena
is that the CBA analysts can clarify to other actors why the non-welfare effects will not be
included in the CBA report). Respondents perceive that, as a consequence of such a
meeting, effects that would be overlooked without an Effect Arena will now be included in
the CBA study. One respondent states that he experienced in practice that the efficiency of
these ‘effect survey meetings’ could be optimized when the people responsible for the
organization of the meeting communicate to the invited actors, in advance of the meeting,
that this meeting will be the only opportunity to articulate the project effects that will be
scrutinized in the CBA study. Moreover, respondents state that an additional benefit of
‘effect survey meetings’ with actors might be that public support for the use of CBA to
appraise spatial-infrastructure projects will increase.
7
Mouter et al. (2012) denote the ‘subtle’ use of the CBA, based on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea:
‘virtuous use of the CBA in the decision-making process for spatial-infrastructure projects’. Aristotle defines
acting ‘virtuously’ as acting at the balance point between two non-virtuous extremes. Like acting ‘bravely’
is the balance point between acting ‘cowardly’ and acting ‘recklessly’, attributing a ‘virtuous’ value to CBA
in a decision-making process is the balance point between assigning absolute value to the CBA and
marginalizing the value of CBA.
8
We cannot say that there is consensus because we have not confronted all actors with all solutions.
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Proposed solution to manage incorrect use of CBA
Which limitation does the solution
aspire to minimize or manage?
Does the solution aspire to minimize or
manage the CBA limitation?
Is there controversy on the ‘best
solution’ among respondents?
1. Organize effect survey meetings
Incompleteness
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
2. Provide high quality qualitative information with
regard to intangible effects
Incompleteness
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
3. CBA reports should be supplemented with an
analysis of distributional effects
Incompleteness
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
Uncertainty
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
5. Monetize as much as possible
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
Controversy
6. Use indicators other than money to express effects
that are difficult to monetize
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
Controversy
7. Monetize effects in CBA studies whenever possible.
However, when monetizing leads to severe criticism
and frustrations one should not monetize
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
Controversy
8. Referent assesses the position of effects that are
difficult to monetize in the CBA report
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
9. Explicitly discuss the way monetized and nonmonetized effects relate to each other in the summary
of the CBA report
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
10. Implement a ‘showstopper’ procedure in the CBA
analysis for effects that difficult to monetize and that
are irreversible
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Minimize
No contradictory remarks
11. Enhance communication about the incompleteness
in CBA reports
Incompleteness
Manage
No contradictory remarks
12. Enhance communication about the uncertainty in
CBA reports
Uncertainty
Manage
Controversy
13. Estimate the project effects for at least one flexible
investment strategy in a CBA study
Uncertainty
Manage
Contradictory remarks
14. Communicate the fact that readers should also take
into account the effects that are difficult to monetize
Relatively weak position of effects that
are difficult to monetize
Manage
No contradictory remarks
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Table 1 Proposed solutions for managing problems that result from the insolvable CBA limitations
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Fig. 3 Erasmus bridge in Rotterdam, example of an architectonical innovative bridge
Try to provide high quality qualitative information with regard to intangible effects
(solution 2 in Table 1)
Respondents state that CBA analysts should not decide too quickly that it is not possible to
take intangible welfare effects into account in a CBA study because it is not possible to
estimate the welfare effect with sufficient reliability. They propose that analysts should
strive to provide high quality objective information with regard to these effects. For
example, one respondent states that if decision makers believe that a new bridge will
contribute to a positive image of their region (such as the Erasmus bridge in Rotterdam, see
Fig. 3), then the CBA should provide qualitative information regarding ‘the effect of
architectonically innovative bridges on the image of the region’. This could be carried out
by addressing what the success and failure factors of architectonical innovative bridges on
the image of the region are and what the potential benefits of a successfully ‘image
enhancing bridge’ are. According to the respondent, the specific CBA should discuss the
extent to which the identified success and failure factors are entailed in the specific bridge
under scrutiny in the CBA study.
Supplement CBA reports with an analysis of distributional effects (solution 3
in Table 1)
Dutch CBAs evaluate the effects of a project on the welfare of the country. However,
information regarding the distribution of welfare is often underexposed or even neglected.
Respondents propose minimizing the underexposure of distributional effects by including a
discussion on the relevant distributional effects in the CBA report. According to these
respondents, CBA studies do not have to exclude a discussion of distributional effects. The
respondents state that CBA analysts should display separate ‘balance sheets’ for relevant
stakeholder groups besides the national CBA results (for instance, a separate CBA for relevant regions, interest groups, income classes). The respondents emphasize that including a
‘distributional analysis’ in the CBA report ensures that the CBA study can be used by
politicians because politicians are interested in the distributional effects as well as the effects
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of a project on national welfare. One respondent states that Dutch CBA guidelines should
prescribe supplementary distributional analyses in a more compelling way.
Carry out ‘ex-post’ analyses to diminish uncertainty with regard to effect estimations
(solution 4 in Table 1)
As a strategy to diminish uncertainty with regard to effect estimations, respondents propose
establishing an obligation within Dutch planning guidelines to carry out ex-post analyses to
verify the ex-ante estimations of project effects in the CBA. Respondents think that ‘expost analyses’ could help by improving models, rules of thumb and standard national
numbers that are used to estimate project effects for specific CBA studies, which could
help to reduce uncertainty by improving models.
This is confirmed in the literature (e.g. Salling and Banister 2009; Nicolaisen 2012).
Moreover, one respondent states that an additional benefit of institutionalizing ex-post
analysis might be that the trust in government decision making would be enhanced because
the government shows that it really does check the quality of the information it uses in
decision-making processes.
Controversy about the ‘best strategy’ for taking into account effects that are difficult
to monetize in a CBA study (solutions 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in Table 1)
Respondents concede that effects that are difficult to monetize should be discussed in the
CBA analysis. However, they disagree to a great extent when answering the question about
how to minimize the relatively weak position of effects that are difficult to monetize in a
CBA study. Respondents mentioned six different solutions. The first three solutions (5, 6
and 7) focus on the question about whether or not monetization of effects that are difficult
to monetize helps to minimize the relatively weak position of these effects in CBA studies.
The last three solutions discuss other solutions (7, 8 and 9). Below, we firstly discuss
solutions 5, 6 and 7. In a broad sense, two of these three solutions can be labeled as
extreme positions: ‘monetize as much as possible’ (solution 5) and ‘use other indicators
than money to express effects that are difficult to monetize’ (solution 6), and the other one
is a middle position (solution 7). Next we discuss the three positions in more depth.
The first group of respondents emphasizes that it is important to monetize effects as
much as possible, for two reasons. Firstly, they perceive that monetizing an effect in a
CBA study is the only way to guarantee a serious position for the effect in the decisionmaking process because they perceive that there is a very high risk that decision makers
will, in the end, only look at the monetary figures that are presented in the CBA report.
Secondly, they state that an important benefit of the CBA is that studies provide insight
into the order of magnitude of different welfare effects and the ratio of costs versus benefits
of a project and that this benefit can only be utilized in an optimal way when one tries to
monetize as many effects as possible. These respondents argue that new research could
improve valuation methods and standard numbers that can be used to monetize effects in
CBA studies. This group of respondents believes that it will eventually be possible to
monetize all welfare effects equally well—for instance with a more frequent use of
experimental economics and behavioral economics—which implies a rectification of the
limitation that some effects are more difficult to monetize than others.
The second group of respondents states that some effects (e.g. the effects on traffic
casualties and the effects on biodiversity) should not be transferred into monetary terms
because they are incommensurable, which implies that the nature of the effects resists
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transferring them into a common unit with other effects, such as travel time savings.
According to the respondents, transferring incommensurable effects into a common unit in
the CBA report erroneously communicates to decision makers that it is feasible to outweigh negative effects on biodiversity, for instance, and positive effects on travel time
savings, for instance. The respondents accept that, as a result of taking into account the
effects on biodiversity in non-monetary terms in CBA studies, these effects can have a
relatively weak position in the decision-making process. As an alternative for monetization, this group of respondents proposes using a ‘nature value indicator’,9 which measures
the effects of a project on biodiversity in weighted hectares. The weight is determined by
the ecological quality of the area and the degree of threat of the ecosystem(s). The indicator
proposed is called T-EQA, an acronym of Threat-weighted Ecological Quality Area. This
T-EQA (Sijtsma et al. 2011; Sijtsma et al. 2013a) aims to measure the effect of a project on
biodiversity from an ecological perspective (what is the effect of a project on the biodiversity in the Netherlands?) using a standardized ratio scale measurement. The ‘nature
value indicator’ aims to measure project effects on biodiversity as objectively and rigorously as possible and aggregates this evaluative information in one indicator (T-EQA). Its
relation to welfare economics is subtle. Instead of being from the perspective of welfare
economics (what is the effect of a project on the welfare of Dutch citizens?) it uses a
‘mere’ ecological perspective. On the other hand it can be argued that biodiversity preferences concern citizens’ (non-consumer) preferences (Sijtsma 2006). Or, in Maslow
terms, they concern the higher order needs (Sijtsma et al. 2013a). T-EQA then measures
the size of something relevant to well-being or welfare, without giving an a priori weight or
fixed monetary value per unit (Sijtsma et al. 2013a).
A third group of respondents can be positioned in the middle of the two groups of
respondents described above. This group perceives that initiators of CBAs and CBA
analysts should base their decision about monetizing or not monetizing effects in CBA
studies on pragmatic reasons. More specifically, the respondents state that one should
monetize effects in CBA studies when possible. However, when initiators and consultants
feel that monetizing effects will give rise to severe criticism by important actors in the
decision-making process, and when this will lead to a situation in which frustrations
regarding monetization of the effect will dominate the debate, one should not monetize the
effect.
Next, we discuss the three other solutions (8, 9 and 10 in Table 1). The first solution
proposed by respondents suggests that a more equal position for effects that are difficult to
monetize can be safeguarded when an independent referent assesses in a draft version of
the CBA report whether the position of effects that are difficult to monetize in the report is
strong enough.10 The second solution entails that the position of effects that are difficult to
monetize in the decision-making process can be improved when CBA practitioners
explicitly discuss the way monetized and non-monetized effects relate to each other in the
summary of the CBA report. The respondent illustrates his suggestion as follows: ‘CBA
practitioners should, for instance, divide the net present value (NPV) of all monetized
effects by the number of hectares of nature that are sacrificed as a result of the project.
Hence, one can provide the decision maker with the ‘value of a sacrificed hectare’, for
instance, 50,000 euros NPV per hectare. This enhances the attention for non-monetized
effects.’ The third solution suggests implementing a ‘showstopper’ procedure in the
decision-making process for spatial-infrastructure projects for effects that are difficult to
9
10
Natuurpunten (in Dutch).
The respondent did not discuss this solution in more depth during the interview.
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monetize and that are irreversible (for instance, the effects of the project on endangered
species). According to the respondents, the CBA report should explicitly address whether
the non-monetized effect exceeds an ‘environmental constraint’. When this environmental
constraint11 is exceeded, the project cannot be developed in spite of a positive welfare
effect. This solution is implemented in the German appraisal practice for infrastructure
projects (Mackie and Worsley 2013).
Enhance communication of incompleteness in the CBA report (solution 11 in Table 1)
Respondents propose enhanced communication about the incompleteness of CBA studies
in the CBA report as a solution to manage the inherent incompleteness of CBA reports.
They emphasize the benefits of prominent communication about incompleteness in the
summary of the CBA report. Respondents perceive that, as a result of articulating
incompleteness in a prominent way in the CBA report, actors in the Dutch practice are less
prone to attribute absolute value to the CBA in the decision-making process. Moreover,
respondents perceive that the explicit communication of the elements and effects that are
not considered in the CBA study will diminish the tendency of some actors to marginalize
the value of CBA in the decision-making process because they feel that the CBA is honest
about its limitations.
Enhance communication about the uncertainty of effect estimations in the CBA report
(solution 12 in Table 1)
Respondents propose a variety of methods to communicate uncertainty in CBA reports
(e.g. presenting bandwidths instead of point estimates, carrying out more sensitivity
analyses, using more future scenarios, articulate uncertainties in an explicit and prominent
way in the summary of the CBA report, for instance by discussing the assumptions that
need to be made to change the sign of the outcome of the CBA12). One respondent takes it
a step further and states that the most effective way of communicating uncertainty is by
carrying out a large amount of sensitivity analyses on the most important assumptions in
the CBA study and, subsequently, presenting the outcomes of these sensitivity analyses in a
scatter plot. Moreover, respondents state that CBA analysts should—as a result of the
severe uncertainties—restrict themselves to present the effect estimations and never make
suggestions in regard to the possible consequences of the results for the decision-making
process. One respondent states that the passage: ‘the outcome of the CBA score is negative,
thus the development of the project will have a negative effect on the welfare of the
Netherlands’ is already a bridge too far, given the uncertainties.
Mouter et al. (2013b) conclude that another group of Dutch key actors suggests that one
must be cautious about communicating CBA limitations in a way that is too prominent.
Some even perceive that a too prominent communication of uncertainties will lead to ‘the
collapse’ of the instrument in the decision-making process. Below, we discuss two risks
that they perceive that are related to a too prominent communication of uncertainties.
Firstly, respondents state that politicians prefer certain, plain and easy to comprehend
information over uncertain and nuanced information. One respondent states that:
11
The respondent did not discuss precisely which constraints he had in mind.
12
One respondent suggests communicating in a specific CBA in which the effects of a new rail connection
and a spatial planning project were assessed, that the BCR ratio will only be positive when one assumes that
housing prices in the project area will increase by 20,000 euros as a result of the new rail connection.
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‘politicians desire a study that reports only one figure in the conclusion, which communicates whether or not the study supports the project’. Another respondent perceives that
politicians’ preference for certain information over uncertain information could be
explained by a specific inclination that politicians have of making some decisions during
their term of office. The respondent states that research reports which communicate
uncertainty, in most cases lead to a delay in the decision-making process and that this delay
can be very undesirable for politicians. Moreover, respondents perceive that politicians
will not consider a CBA report that communicates an uncertain message as a solid base for
decision making. According to the respondents, this might eventually lead to a situation in
which the use of CBA in the decision-making process will be abandoned. Secondly, some
respondents perceive that prominent communication of uncertainty in CBA reports will
lead to more strategic use of the CBA in the decision-making process, which they feel
would be undesirable.
Estimate the effects of at least one flexible investment strategy in a CBA (solution 13
in Table 1)
A group of respondents thinks that one should manage uncertainty regarding estimations of
project effects by estimating project effects for at least one flexible project alternative
alongside the non-flexible project alternatives.13 For instance, in a CBA effects are estimated for a new railroad which connects cities A, B, C and D (non-flexible project
alternative). Here, the idea is to include a project alternative in this CBA in which a new
railroad connects cities A and B and additional busses connect cities B, C and D. When the
railroad between A and B is a success, the line can be extended to cities B, C and D (this is
the flexible project alternative). Hence, for the flexible project alternative it is assumed that
the project is planned in an incremental way. The group of respondents is in favor of this
idea because only the elements of the project are developed for which it is to some extent
certain that the benefits will very likely be higher than the cost. Respondents label these
elements as ‘no regret’ elements. If the future develops in a favorable way for the project,
the other elements can be built as well. When there is an unfavorable development, the
other elements are not developed or alternative elements are developed.
With real option analysis it is possible to assess the costs and benefits of a flexible
investment strategy against the strategy to develop the whole project in one go (see, for
instance, Reuer and Tong, 2007 for a discussion regarding the merits of this method).
Respondents perceive as a potential benefit of a flexible strategy the fact that one can adapt
the design of the project to the way the future unfolds, especially when the future unfolds
in a different way than expected. They perceive as a potential downside of such a strategy
the fact that residents will live for years in uncertainty as to whether the second part of the
project will or will not be built. According to respondents, a flexible strategy might also be
disadvantageous when the specific transport market is characterized by a so-called ‘first
mover advantage’. For example, when newly developed large container vessels can only
call at one Northern European harbor, it is very likely that this harbor will capture all the
benefits of large container vessels. In that case, an incremental planning process where the
expansion of a harbor starts after the large container vessels are on the market might have
its downsides. Respondents perceive that real option analysis can assist with outweighing
13
For some types of projects it might be very difficult to design a flexible investment strategy (for instance,
bridges). For other types of projects it might be easier to develop flexible investment strategies (for instance,
airport and harbor extensions).
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the benefits and the costs of a flexible investment strategy compared to a non-flexible
investment strategy.
Some respondents also discuss the downsides of using real option analysis for evaluating flexible investment strategies. These respondents doubt whether it is possible for
decision makers and other users of CBA reports to understand the results of the analysis.
Moreover, for the application of real option analysis it is necessary to determine the
probability that the different futures included in the analysis will unfold. Respondents think
that it is problematic to convince users of CBA reports that it is possible to determine these
probabilities.
Communicate non-monetized effects in a prominent way (solution 14 in Table 1)
Respondents propose that the summary of the CBA report should communicate to the
readers of the CBA report in a very prominent way that they should take into account both
monetized and non-monetized effects. Respondents emphasize that it is important to
manage the way non-monetized effects are taken into account in the CBA report in order to
make sure that their position in the decision-making process is as equal as possible
compared to monetized effects because they perceive that actors in the Dutch practice use
this lack of balance as the main argument to oppose the use of CBA.
Conclusion and reflections
Although we did not manage to interview the entire population of key actors in the Dutch
appraisal practice for spatial-infrastructure projects—fifteen people approached were not
able to or were not interested in participating in this research—we are confident that it is
possible to make a general conclusion by stating that most key actors in the Dutch practice
acknowledge insolvable CBA limitations, but perceive the CBA—in spite of these limitations—as a useful instrument.14 A large proportion of the respondents think that
insolvable CBA limitations can be managed and were able to come up with several
pragmatic solutions. We think this is an interesting conclusion because it contrasts with the
conclusions of some publications (e.g. Naess 2006; Kelman 2002) that take the insolvable
CBA limitations as an argument to oppose the use of CBA in the decision-making process
at all.
We can also conclude that the key actors perceive that if the insolvable CBA limitations
are not managed properly, decision makers might attribute an incorrect value to the CBA
results (either too much or too little value). Furthermore, we can conclude that, although
some of the proposed solutions have already been addressed in scientific literature, several
of the proposed solutions, to our knowledge, add to the literature (solutions 1, 2, 8, 9, 11,
14 in Table 1), and may inspire other CBA practices in the world to make improvements.
Naturally, some proposed solutions might already be implemented in other countries. It is
out of the scope of this study to scrutinize solutions to manage insolvable CBA limitations
in other countries in an extensive way and relate these to the Dutch practice. However, this
study could be a building block for ‘the superior international CBA model’, suggested by
Hayashi and Morisugi (2000). They state (p. 87) that ‘by conducting a careful study on the
components of the different models, it would be possible to come up with a superior model
14
In Mouter et al. (2013b) we discuss empirical results on which we sustain our claim that Dutch key actors
perceive CBA as being a useful instrument in the decision-making process.
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by integrating all the good components of the existing models. This is a simple case of
learning from each country’s experience’. A suggestion for generating more building
blocks is to replicate this research in other CBA practices and review the solutions
implemented in other countries to manage insolvable CBA limitations.
The remainder of this section discusses the specific proposed solutions. We discuss,
amongst other things, how the proposed solutions relate to solutions addressed in the
literature. Moreover, we provide recommendations for further research and discuss policy
recommendations that ensue from the results.
Key actors in the Dutch practice agree that ‘incompleteness’ is an insolvable CBA
limitation. Whether incompleteness is truly insolvable is debatable because it is conceivable that knowledge developments in the more distant future will make it possible to take
into account (far) more of the welfare effects of a spatial-infrastructure project compared to
the current practice. However, nobody can foresee when and whether it will be possible to
measure project effects on ‘regional identity’, for instance, with sufficient reliability in the
distant future. Therefore, we think that the seemingly non-controversial solutions proposed
for managing the incompleteness of welfare effects (such as: organizing effect survey
meetings; providing high quality qualitative information about intangible effects) are
interesting extensions to the existing literature. Nevertheless, for the proposed solution to
‘enhance communication of incompleteness in CBA reports’, we recommend further
research about the way incompleteness should be communicated in CBA reports in
advance of an implementation decision, because—even though the key actors interviewed
did not mention this—there might be a possible hazard that a too prominent communication of incompleteness would lead to ‘the collapse’ of the CBA—as would a too
prominent communication of uncertainties. We believe that the proposed ‘Effect Arena’
solution can potentially add value to CBA practices. This solution will not necessarily lead
to a situation where all the welfare effects of a project are included in the CBA study.
However, the solution safeguards that all the welfare effects perceived by important
stakeholders are discussed in the CBA study (in the CBA report, besides the effects that
increase national welfare, CBA practitioners also discuss why effects which are perceived
as welfare effects by stakeholders do not add to the welfare and, as a result, are excluded
from the CBA score). An important benefit of conducting ‘Effect Arenas’ is that the
probability that on-going (and often unclear) debates about a CBA study being complete or
incomplete might diminish. We think that this solution is transferable to other CBA
practices as well because the incompleteness issue is raised in other countries that use CBA
(see for instance, Barfod et al. 2011; Eliasson and Lundberg 2012). Effect Arenas can help
with reducing this issue.
Related to the incompleteness issue, it indeed seems very important to discuss distributional effects in the CBA report, as the respondents remarked. Respondents suggest
displaying separate ‘balance sheets’ for relevant stakeholders. In the literature we find
guiding principles, which in essence resemble this solution as proposed by Dutch actors.
Nyborg (2012) and the review of the Norwegian CBA practice (Hagen 2012) state that
distributional consequences may be summarized as a list of winners and losers, supplementing the findings from a CBA. The goal of a distributional analysis is that decision
makers should receive information about which conflicts of interest the project gives rise
to, thus enabling them to evaluate for themselves how to address the resulting trade-offs.
Martens (2011) argues that the substance of the distributional analysis should depend on
the distributional concerns of decision makers and/or the wider public in a specific case. He
states that, firstly, the distributive concerns in a case should be specified before developing
an adequate methodology that can address these distributional concerns. In conclusion, the
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guiding principles mentioned by the respondents and stated in the literature for discussing
distributional effects within or alongside the CBA report are essentially the same; however
we observe minor differences. Respondents predominantly mentioned a specific distributive concern that should be addressed in CBA reports, such as distributions over regions or
income classes, whereas Martens (2011) states that CBA practitioners should firstly
scrutinize which distributive concerns are relevant in a specific case. We recommend
future research, studying which specification works best in practice. Which solution rectifies the underexposure of distributional effects in a CBA study in the most efficient way?
Besides the solutions to incorporate distributional effects in ex-ante evaluation mentioned
by the respondents, we also advise including other solutions proposed by the scientific
literature and other CBA practices in this study, such as ‘Incorporating distributional
effects in a CBA by distributive weights’ (e.g. Boadway 2006; Campbell and Brown 2003;
Mishan 1976), ‘Incorporating distributional effects in a hybrid model which combines
CBA and Multi-criteria analysis’ (e.g. Thomopoulos et al. 2009; Thomopoulos and GrantMuller 2013; van Wee, 2012) and the UK Department for Transport’s WebTAG guidance
on Social and Distributional Impacts (see www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/). Subsequent to this
study, we recommend considering the solution that minimizes the underexposure of distributional effects in the most efficient way in the Dutch practice, but also in other
practices.
Many respondents stated that institutionalizing systematic ‘ex-post’ analyses in the
Dutch planning and appraisal process for spatial-infrastructure projects might be an
effective solution to minimize uncertainty in CBAs. Internationally, we see that in some
countries ‘ex-post’ analyses are incorporated in the process (e.g. POPE Guidelines in the
United Kingdom), whereas in other countries this is not the case (such as the Netherlands).
We think it is interesting to study exactly how ‘ex-post’ analysis is institutionalized in
different countries, and more importantly, what are the most important success and failure
factors for institutionalizing systematic ‘ex-post’ analyses in the planning and decisionmaking process? Practitioners who aspire to institutionalize ‘ex-post’ analyses in their
practice could use the results of this study.
Key actors in the Dutch appraisal practice for spatial-infrastructure projects agree that
‘uncertainty’ is an insolvable CBA limitation. However, there is controversy among
respondents both in regard to ‘the best solution’ to enhance the communication of
uncertainty in CBA reports and regarding the graduation in which uncertainty should be
emphasized in CBA reports. We recommend further research that implies experimentation
with the different solutions proposed by respondents and different graduations in which
uncertainty is emphasized. We recommend including the solution ‘display the uncertainty
of effect estimations with Monte Carlo Analysis and interval results’ in this experiment.
This solution was not mentioned by Dutch respondents but is broadly discussed in recent
literature (e.g. Ambrasaite et al. 2011; Barfod et al. 2011; Salling and Banister 2009). From
de Jong et al. (2007) we derive that it is already possible to scrutinize the uncertainty in
traffic forecasts through Monte Carlo Analysis for the Dutch transport model, which is
used to estimate a project’s transport effects in a CBA. Mouter et al. (2013c) discuss that
the controversy between Dutch key actors regarding the graduation in which uncertainty
should be emphasized in the CBA report can be explained by the way their ‘cognitive
styles’ diverge. Cognitive styles are defined as individuals’ chronic motivations that
principally determine the initiation, course, and cessation of information seeking and
processing (e.g. Thompson et al. 2001). Mouter et al. (2013c), amongst other things,
discuss that individuals who are prone to process information in a ‘systematic’ way are
more prone to evaluate information that communicates an uncertain message as a useful
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input in the decision-making process than individuals who process information in a
‘heuristic’ way. We recommend a study of relevant findings from social psychological
scientific literature in research programs that focus on an optimal way to communicate
uncertainty in CBA reports.
The Dutch spatial-infrastructure planning practice focusses more and more on flexible
investment strategies. We recommend assessing the advantages and disadvantages of
scrutinizing both flexible investment strategies and non-flexible investment strategies in
real-world CBAs through real option analysis in the near future. It would be interesting to
monitor people’s experiences with this method. Is this an effective and efficient solution to
manage the insolvable limitation that project effect estimations in a CBA are uncertain?
When the experiences are positive this solution could be promising for other countries as
well.
Our empirical research shows that there is controversy in the Dutch practice regarding
the insolvability of the relatively weak position of effects that are difficult to estimate and
monetize. Respondents propose different solutions to minimize this limitation. Amongst
others, a group of respondents state that the relatively weak position of effects that are
difficult to monetize is not an insolvable limitation and CBA analysts should monetize
project effects as much as possible. Another group of key actors believes that one should
express effects that are difficult to monetize with indicators other than money because
these effects are incommensurable with travel time savings, for instance. We do not have a
final position in this debate and—although we are aware that this is a very pragmatic
position—we suggest sustaining the extent to which effects that are difficult to monetize
are monetized on two criteria. Firstly, the share of the effect that can be monetized.
Although we do not propose a sharp threshold value, if, for instance, only 10 % of the
effects on biodiversity can be monetized, we would advise against the monetization of the
effect because only a part of the effects on biodiversity are monetized and taken into
account in the CBA report, whilst the reader might think that the total effect is included.
Next, we think that the viewpoints of the relevant decision makers in a case should be
decisive for the decision to monetize or not. This is in line with the argument of Nyborg
(2012) who states that the more a CBA contributes to the decision makers understanding of
project consequences, the more successful it is. According to Nyborg monetary valuation
may help in achieving this goal when reported numbers are understandable and clarifying,
but hardly helps if monetary values are perceived as provocative and confusing. We
recommend future research into the extent to which this pragmatic solution has a positive
influence on the use of CBA in decision-making processes. Moreover, we recommend
research to evaluate the merits of expressing effects that are difficult to monetize in
indicators other than in monetary terms (such as the nature value indicator, Sijtsma et al.
2011). When monetizing is too problematic, these types of rigorous and informative
indicators might be good substitutes. Currently, in the Netherlands an indicator for measuring landscape effects has been developed: the Hotspot Monitor (Sijtsma et al. 2013b; De
Vries et al. 2013). We think that these methods are transferable to other countries and can
be promising solutions to settle the debate between fierce proponents and opponents of
monetization of biodiversity and landscape.
Overall, we conclude that Dutch key actors suggest two types of strategies to manage
insolvable CBA limitations. The first type aspires to minimize insolvable CBA limitations,
whereas the second type entirely focuses on the management of the insolvable CBA
limitations. The leitmotif that can be distilled from the first type of proposed solutions is
that they predominantly focus on providing more comprehensive information regarding
project consequences compared to current Dutch CBA studies. This, in order to strengthen
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the usefulness of CBA in the decision-making process, for instance, by providing high
quality information regarding intangible effects and distributional effects. Key actors agree
that a CBA report should provide more comprehensive information regarding effects that
are difficult to monetize but disagree about whether to monetize these effects with
sophisticated valuation methods or providing alternative indicators (such as the nature
value indicator) is the best route to take for finding a solution. As a result, the comprehensive CBA report provides high quality information regarding non-quantified effects,
effects that are difficult to monetize and distributional effects alongside the monetized
effects summarized in a final indicator.
The second type of solutions’ leitmotif is to improve the communication of the existence of CBA limitations to non-expert users—for instance, decision makers who are
important users of CBA reports—to enhance their understanding of the limitations. The
proposed solutions urge CBA practitioners to be aware of the knowledge gap between them
and non-expert users of CBA reports. The CBA practitioner should inform the non-expert
user adequately in the CBA report about the incompleteness of the analysis, the uncertainties of effect estimations and the relatively weak position of effects that are difficult to
estimate. An adequate communication of limitations means that CBA practitioners must be
cautious about communicating CBA limitations in a too prominent way. Politicians will
probably not consider CBA reports that endlessly emphasize the limitations of a study as
useful information and certainly not as a solid basis for decision making. According to
some respondents, this might eventually lead to a situation in which the use of CBA in the
decision-making process will be abandoned. It is out of the scope of this paper to scrutinize
what communicating CBA limitations adequately exactly means. We recommend studying
this topic in further research. Based on this study we can conclude that the difficult task for
CBA practitioners is to bridge the knowledge gap between them and the users of a CBA
report in a ‘subtle’ way.
Acknowledgments The authors wish to thank the 86 respondents for their open-heartedness. Moreover,
we wish to thank four anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.
Appendix 1: Respondents and affiliation at the time of the interview
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Andre Belonje: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Kirsten van den Berg: Utrecht region
Peter van den Berg: Director, General Ministry of Finance
Luca Bertolini: Professor, University of Amsterdam
Luc Berris: Society for Preservation of Nature Monuments in the Netherlands
(Natuurmonumenten)
Peter Blok: Private Consultant, Rebelgroup
Martijn Blom: Private Consultant, CE Delft
Lauri de Boer: Private Consultant, LPBL
Will Clerx: Municipality of Rotterdam
Jasper Dalhuisen: Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation
Karen van Dantzig: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Marc Davidson: Private Consultant, CE Delft
Adri Duivesteijn: Alderman, Municipality Almere
Carel Eijgenraam: Researcher, Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis
(CPB)
Klaas van Egmond: Professor, Utrecht University
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16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Terri van Dijk: Researcher, University of Groningen
Henri Dijkman: Ministry of Finance
Rosemarie van den Eissen: Province of Gelderland
Paul Elhorst: Researcher, University of Groningen
Donne Engelen: The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment
Koen Frenken: Professor, Eindhoven University of Technology
Karst Geurs: Researcher, Twente University
Jaron Haas: Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Niek van der Heiden: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Bart van der Heijden: Municipality of Amsterdam
Wim Heijman: Professor, Wageningen University
Hans Hilbers: Researcher, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL)
Niels Hoefsloot: Private Consultant, Decisio
Arjen ‘t Hoen: Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis (KiM)
Edwin Huijsman: Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Toon van der Hoorn: Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Bert Hof: Ministry of Finance
Bas van Holst: Private Consultant, Drs. B
Walter Hulsker: Private Consultant, Ecorys
Ekko van Ierland: Professor, Wageningen University
Martin de Jong: Researcher, Delft University of Technology
Jarl Kind: Researcher, Deltares
Ursula Kirchholtes: Private Consultant, Witteveen & Bos
Henk Klaassen: Researcher, Erasmus University Rotterdam
Jeroen Klooster: Private Consultant, Arcadis
Maarten Koningsveld: Automobile Association (ANWB)
Carl Koopmans: Professor, University Amsterdam
Fokko Kuik: Municipality of Amsterdam
Wim Korver: Private Consultant, Goudappel/Coffeng
Sonja Kruitwagen: Researcher, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
(PBL)
Robert van Leusden: Utrecht region
Ronald van der Meijs: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Coen Mekers: Province of Gelderland
August Mesker: Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW)
Henk Meurs: Professor, Radboud University Nijmegen/Private Consultant,
Muconsult
Henk van Mourik: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Roland Nijssen: Researcher, Prorail
Michiel de Nooij: Private Consultant, SEO
Jan Oosterhaven: Professor, University of Groningen
Jan Peelen: Civil Servant, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Eric Pijnappels: Private Consultant, Goudappel/Coffeng
Paul Poppink: Transport and Logistics Association (TLN)
Bertus Postma: Municipality of Rotterdam
Aniel Ramawadh: Private Consultant, BCI Global
Emiel Reiding: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Gusta Renes: Researcher, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL)
Piet Rietveld: Professor, University Amsterdam
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63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
Sytze Rienstra: Private Consultant, Syconomy
Gerbert Romijn: Researcher, Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
Freddie Rosenberg: Private Consultant, RIGO
Elisabeth Ruijgrok: Private Consultant, Witteveen en Bos
Jan Sakko: Municipality of Rotterdam
Olaf Seinen: Private Consultant, Goudappel/Coffeng
Herman Stolwijk: Researcher, Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
Wim Spit: Private Consultant, Ecorys
Edward Stigter: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Lori Tavasszy: Professor, Delft University of Technology
Bart Teulings: Municipality of Almere
Pieter Tordoir: Professor, University of Amsterdam
Bas Turpijn: Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Hans ten Velden: Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Erik Verhoef: Professor, University Amsterdam
Erik Verroen: Private Consultant, Twynstra Gudde
Nol Verster: retired, former Private Consultant, Ecorys
Johan Visser: Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis (KiM)
Warren Walker: Professor, Delft University of Technology
Pim Warffemius: Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis (KiM)
Bart Witmond: Private Consultant, Ecorys
Dik Wolfson: retired, former member of the Upper House
Pauline Wortelboer: Netherlands Institute for Transport Policy Analysis (KiM)
Peter Zwaneveld: Researcher, Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
Appendix 2: Number of respondents that mentioned a solution
See Table 2.
Table 2 Number of respondents that mentioned a solution
Proposed solution to manage incorrect use of
CBA
Frequency of respondents that
mentioned a solution
1.Organize effect survey meetings
4
2.Provide high quality qualitative information
regarding intangible effects
9
3.Carry out ex-post analyses
9
4.Monetize as much as possible
17
5.Use indicators other than money to express
effects that are difficult to monetize
15
6. Monetize effects in CBA studies when
possible. However, when monetizing leads to
severe criticism and frustrations, one should
not monetize
6
7. Referent assesses the position of effects that
are difficult to monetize in the CBA report
1
8. Explicitly discuss the way monetized and
non-monetized effects relate to each other in
the summary of the CBA report
1
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Table 2 continued
Proposed solution to manage incorrect use of
CBA
Frequency of respondents that
mentioned a solution
9. Implement a ‘showstopper’ procedure in the
CBA analysis for effects that are difficult to
monetize and that are irreversible
1
10. CBA reports should be supplemented by an
analysis of distributional effects
8
11.Enhance communication of incompleteness
in CBA reports
9
12.Enhance communication of uncertainty in
CBA reports
39
13. Estimate the project effects for at least one
flexible investment strategy in a CBA study
8
14. Communicate that readers should also take
effects that are difficult to monetize into
account
5
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Jan Anne Annema is assistant professor Transport Policy at TU Delft’s Transport and Logistics Group. His
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