This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Author's personal copy
Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
Recognition of disgust is selectively preserved in Alzheimer’s disease
Julie D. Henry a,∗ , Ted Ruffman b , Skye McDonald a , Marie-Andree Peek O’Leary a ,
Louise H. Phillips c , Henry Brodaty d,e , Peter G. Rendell f
a
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
b Department of Psychology, University of Otago, New Zealand
c School of Psychology, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom
d Primary Dementia Collaborative Research Centre, School of Psychiatry,
University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
e Memory Disorders Clinic, Prince of Wales Hospital, Sydney 2031, Australia
f School of Psychology, Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia
Received 19 August 2007; received in revised form 16 November 2007; accepted 14 December 2007
Available online 23 December 2007
Abstract
The neural substrates that subserve decoding of different emotional expressions are subject to different rates of degeneration and atrophy in
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and there is therefore reason to anticipate that a differentiated profile of affect recognition impairment may emerge.
However, it remains unclear whether AD differentially affects the recognition of specific emotions. Further, there is only limited research focused
on whether affect recognition deficits in AD generalize to more ecologically valid stimuli. In the present study, relatively mild AD participants
(n = 24), older controls (n = 30) and younger controls (n = 30) were administered measures of affect recognition. Significant AD deficits were
observed relative to both the younger and older control groups on a measure that involved labeling of static images of facial affect. AD deficits
on this measure were observed in relation to all emotions assessed (anger, sadness, happiness, surprise and fear), with the exception of disgust,
which was preserved even relative to the younger adult group. The relative preservation of disgust could not be attributed to biases in the choice
of labels made, and it is suggested instead that this finding might reflect the relative sparing of the basal ganglia in AD. No significant AD effect
was observed for the more ecologically valid measure that involved dynamic displays of facial expressions, in conjunction with paralinguistic and
body movement cues, although a trend for greater AD difficulty was observed.
© 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Emotion recognition; Facial affect recognition; Basal ganglia
1. Introduction
In the neuropsychological literature, considerable emphasis has been placed on the potential role of dissociable neural
substrates in recognizing specific emotions (Adolphs, Tranel,
Damasio, & Damasio, 1994; Calder, Keane, Lawrence, &
Manes, 2004). For instance, when it comes to facial expressions, the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventral striatum have been
particularly linked to decoding expressions of anger (Blair &
Cipolotti, 2000; Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999;
Fine & Blair, 2000; Iidaka et al., 2001; Sprengelmeyer, Rausch,
Eysel, & Przuntek, 1998), the amygdala (Adolphs & Tranel,
∗
Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 2 9385 3936; fax: +61 2 9385 3641.
E-mail address: julie.henry@unsw.edu.au (J.D. Henry).
0028-3932/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.12.012
2004; Blair et al., 1999; Breiter et al., 1996; Lennox, Jacob,
Calder, Lupson, & Bullmore, 2004; Yang et al., 2002), fusiform
gyrus (Surguladze et al., 2003, 2005), and the anterior cingulate cortex (Blair et al., 1999; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004;
Lennox et al., 2004; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002)
to sadness, and the basal ganglia and insula to disgust (Calder,
Keane, Manes, Antoun, & Young, 2000).
In Alzheimer’s disease (AD), prominent atrophy and tau
deposition is observed in limbic regions (including the amygdala), as well as temporal and frontal neocortices with
subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia typically less
affected until later in the disease process (Boller & Duykaerts,
2003; Braak & Braak, 1991; Delacourte et al., 1999; Hyman
& Gomez-Isla, 1998). Thus, because the neural substrates that
subserve decoding of different emotions are subject to different
rates of degeneration and atrophy in AD, a differentiated profile
Author's personal copy
1364
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
of affect recognition impairment may be anticipated. In support
of this prediction, Rosen et al. (2006) found that poor recognition of anger, sadness and fear in a mixed dementia sample
was associated with specific regional grey matter shrinkage in
areas of the temporal lobes. Although this study does not provide direct evidence for such a link in AD in that Rosen et al.’s
sample included heterogeneous dementia diagnoses, it does provide grounds for thinking that a differentiated profile of affect
recognition might exist in AD due to different rates of brain
change.
Importantly, differential difficulty recognizing specific emotions has been observed in normal aging and has been linked
to brain changes (e.g., Calder et al., 2003; Sullivan & Ruffman,
2004a; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b). In a meta-analytic review
of this literature, Ruffman et al. (in press) concluded that the
predominant pattern across all emotions and modalities was
of age-related decline, that recognition of anger and sadness
was particularly impaired, but that older adults may be better
at recognizing facial expressions of disgust compared to young
adults. Age-related neural volume loss occurs earliest and most
rapidly in frontal and temporal lobe structures (Allen, Bruss,
Brown, & Damasio, 2005; Grieve et al., 2005; Raz, 2000), with
the orbitofrontal cortex experiencing particularly rapid decline
(Convit et al., 2001; Lamar & Resnick, 2004; Raz et al., 1997;
Resnick, Pham, Kraut, Zonderman, & Davatzikos, 2003), and
the anterior cingulate cortex also experiencing consistent decline
(Convit et al., 2001; Garraux et al., 1999; Ohnishi, Matsuda,
Tabira, Asada, & Uno, 2001; Pardo et al., 2007; Petit-Taboué,
Landeau, Desson, Desgranges, & Baron, 1998; Resnick et al.,
2003; Tisserand et al., 2002). There are also consistent volume
reductions in temporal areas such as the amygdala (Allen et al.,
2005; Grieve et al., 2005; Mu, Xie, Wen, Weng, & Shuyun,
1999; Tisserand, Visser, van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000; Wright,
Wedig, Williams, Rauch, & Albert, 2006; Zimmerman et al.,
2006). Ruffman et al. (in press) therefore related age-related difficulties identifying anger to changes in the orbitofrontal region,
sadness to changes in the anterior cingulate cortex and temporal areas such as the amygdala, and fear to changes in the
amygdala. In contrast, the relative sparing of some structures
within the basal ganglia are argued to underlie the absence of
deficits recognizing disgust (Calder et al., 2003; Williams et al.,
2006).
Only three studies have assessed how AD affects recognition of each of the six basic emotions relative to age-matched
controls (Burnham & Hogervorst, 2004; Hargrave, Maddock, &
Stone, 2002; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, & Van der Linden,
1999). Whilst the results for individual emotions were generally
inconsistent, only deficits recognizing fear and sadness were
identified in more than one study, providing some support for
the notion that different emotions may be subject to differential rates of decline in AD. In terms of potential reasons for the
inconsistencies, these AD studies used a variety of facial affect
recognition stimuli. Since Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) Pictures
of Facial Affect are the most widely used stimuli, Edwards,
Jackson, and Pattison (2002) advise that facial affect recognition
studies should use these stimuli to increase the comparability of
their results. However, Hargrave et al. (2002) used photographs
from a different stimulus set. This study also included a relatively small predominantly female control sample (n = 14), and
a larger, but predominantly male AD sample (n = 22). Whilst
Lavenu et al. (1999) used Ekman and Friesen’s stimuli, only
four exemplars of each emotion were shown, and again, a relatively small control sample (n = 12) was used. Burnham and
Hogervorst (2004) also used Ekman and Friesen stimuli, but
again, a relatively small number of participants were sampled
(13 AD and 13 controls). Thus, it seems likely that prior inconsistencies may reflect artefactual variance, but also substantive
differences in terms of the nature and number of stimuli used.
The present study was the first to use the well validated
Ekman 60 Faces Test (Young, Perret, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, &
Ekman, 2002) to index facial affect identification in an AD population. The images in this measure are taken from the Pictures
of Facial Affect and consist of 10 models expressing each of the
six basic emotions. Further, in addition to age-matched controls,
the present study was the first to also include a younger control
group. This provides a unique point of comparison by assessing how difficulties decoding specific emotions vary across AD,
older and younger groups. Of particular interest is whether the
AD and younger groups differ with regard to the recognition of
disgust, given the noted relative preservation of the basal ganglia
in AD, which has been argued to underpin intact (and possibly
even enhanced) disgust recognition in older adulthood (Ruffman
et al., in press).
Finally, virtually all studies to date that have investigated
affect recognition in relation to AD have used static stimuli.
Where AD deficits have been reported in relation to other emotion cues such as auditory and paralinguistic cues (Allender
& Kaszniak, 1989; Bucks & Radford, 2004; Koff, Zaitchik,
Montepare, & Albert, 1999; Testa, Beatty, Gleason, Orbelo, &
Ross, 2001), different emotion cues were presented in isolation
of one another. Thus, the final aim was to test how AD impacts
on affect recognition using a more ecologically valid measure
that integrates different affective cues. In addition to being
of theoretical interest, assessment of this issue has potentially
important practical implications since such stimuli represent a
better approximation of real-life emotion recognition processes.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Eighty-four community dwelling adults in Sydney participated, 24 of whom
met DSM-IV and NINCDS-ADRDA criteria for AD, 30 of whom were older
adults matched demographically to the AD participants, and 30 of whom were
younger adults. Demographic characteristics for all three groups are presented in
Table 1. The AD participants were recruited via geriatricians based at hospitals
in Sydney. The older control participants were either partners of the AD participants, or volunteers recruited from the general community, and did not differ
significantly in age, t(52) = 0.51, p = 0.61, or years of education, t(52) = 0.51,
p = 0.62, from the AD participants. Some of the younger control participants
were recruited from the general community, and others were undergraduate students who took part in return for course credits. The three groups did not differ
significantly in gender (50, 53 and 43% male, respectively). Exclusionary criteria
for all participants were the presence of uncorrected hearing or visual loss, psychotic symptoms, and a history of substance abuse. An additional exclusionary
criterion for the older control participants was a Mini-Mental State Examination
(MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) score of less than 27. For the AD
Author's personal copy
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
Table 1
Characteristics of the younger controls, older controls, and participants with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD)
Younger
Age (years)
Education (years)
MMSE
Older
1365
than measures relying on static visual displays, and has been shown to have
excellent test-retest, and alternate forms reliability, as well as convergent validity
with other measures of social perception (McDonald et al., 2006).
AD
M
S.D.
M
S.D.
M
S.D.
19.4
13.6
–
2.50
1.31
–
76.9
12.3
28.8
7.08
3.03
1.09
78.0
11.9
24.2
7.58
2.41
3.56
Note: MMSE refers to the mini-mental state examination.
participants, it can be seen in Table 1 that MMSE scores indicated that most
patients presented with a relatively mild level of dementia (M = 24.2).
2.2. Procedure and measures
Ethics approval was obtained from Northern Sydney Central Coast NSW
Health and South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service—Eastern Section. All
participants gave informed consent and then completed a brief demographics
form, which was then followed by the emotion and facial affect recognition
measures, which were presented in a counterbalanced order. All older control
and AD participants additionally completed the Australian version of the Revised
Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE-R; Mathuranath, Nestor, Berrios,
Rakowicz, & Hodges, 2000).
The ACE-R assesses six cognitive domains; orientation, attention, memory,
verbal fluency, language and visuospatial ability, and thus quantifies general
cognitive status. The ACE-R has been shown to have high reliability, construct
validity and sensitivity to the presence of dementia (Mathuranath et al., 2000).
Scores range from 0 to 100, with a score of 83 or less (out of 100) suggestive
of potential cognitive deficits. The ACE-R Total score (which represents an
elaboration of the MMSE) was used to provide an estimate of overall cognitive
functioning (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004).
To index perceptual difficulties, and specifically, more generalized impairment recognising components of facial processing, the Benton Test of Facial
Recognition (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983) was used to index
facial identity recognition. In this task participants are shown a photo of a target face, along with six other faces. In the first part (slides 1–6) the participant
must identify which one of the six faces is the same person as the target face.
In the second part (slides 7–13) the participant must identify which three of the
six faces is the same person as the target face. The dependent measure is the
number of correct identity recognitions made.
Two different measures were used to assess affect recognition. The Ekman
60 Faces Test from the FEEST (Young et al., 2002) was used to measure facial
affect identification. In this computer task a total of 60 photos of faces are
presented in a random order for five seconds each, with 10 photos for each of
the six basic emotions from the Ekman and Friesen (1976) series (happiness,
surprise, fear, sadness, disgust, anger). Participants are required to choose the
label that best describes the emotion displayed by each face. The FEEST has
been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of emotion recognition (Young
et al., 2002).
To provide a more ecologically valid index of affect recognition, the Emotion
Evaluation Test from The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald,
Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2002) was used. This measure is presented on
video, and comprises 28 vignettes that are between 15 and 60 s long, in which
a professional actor portrays one of seven basic emotional states (happy, sad,
fearful, disgusted, surprised, angry, neutral). The professional actors were trained
in the ‘Method’ style, which requires the actor to elicit a real emotion in him
or herself. In each vignette, the actor is either engaged in an interaction without
dialogue (e.g., listening on the phone with the occasional “Uh Huh”), or with
dialogue using a script that is ambiguous and can therefore be interpreted in
a number of ways. In some scenes there is only one actor talking, either on
the telephone or directly to the camera. Other scenes depict two actors, but the
instructions clearly direct the participant to focus on one of them (the “target”
actor). The ability to correctly recognize emotional expression was assessed by
asking participants to decide which of the basic seven categories each emotional
expression represented. The TASIT is more naturalistic and ecologically valid
3. Results
Fig. 1 shows the percentage correct recognition for AD,
older and younger participants on the FEEST and the TASIT.
FEEST data were analysed with a 3 × 6 mixed ANOVA with the
between-subjects variable of group status (AD, older, younger)
and the within-subjects variable of emotion type (anger, disgust,
fear, sad, surprise, happy). These analyses indicated that there
was a main effect of group status, F(2, 81) = 10.9, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.21, and of emotion type, F(5, 405) = 84.6, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.51. Further, there was an interaction between group status
and emotion type, F(10, 405) = 2.7, p = 0.003, η2 = 0.06.
To further analyze the significant main effect of group, Tukey
tests were conducted. These analyses indicated that AD participants were impaired relative to both older and younger controls
on the FEEST, p = 0.005 and p < 0.001, respectively, but that the
younger and older groups did not differ, p = 0.32. Fig. 2 shows
the percentage correctly recognized for each of the six emotions in the FEEST. To analyze the interaction between group
and emotion type observed for the FEEST, tests of simple effects
were conducted. For five of the emotions, group was a significant
simple main effect: Anger, F(2, 81) = 8.39, p < 0.001; Sad, F(2,
81) = 4.44, p = 0.015; Fear, F(2, 81) = 7.47, p = 0.001; Surprise,
F(2, 81) = 3.39, p = 0.039; Happy, F(2, 81) = 6.51, p = 0.002. The
one exception was Disgust where group was not a significant
simple main effect, F(2, 81) = 1.30, p = 0.278. The three groups,
therefore, did not differ in accuracy of recognizing disgust.
Tukey tests of the five significant simple main effects (anger,
sadness, fear, happiness and surprise) were then conducted.
These results revealed that, relative to older adult controls,
the AD group had a significantly lower percentage of correct
recognition of fear (p = 0.017), anger (p = 0.046) and happiness (p = 0.043), and but not sadness (p = 0.111) or surprise
Fig. 1. Percentage correct on the FEEST and the TASIT for the younger controls,
older controls, and participants with Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
Author's personal copy
1366
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
Fig. 2. Percentage correct for each of the six basic emotions indexed by
the FEEST for the younger controls, older controls, and participants with
Alzheimer’s disease (AD).
(p = 0.970). Post hoc Tukey tests of the significant simple
main effects (anger, sadness, fear, happiness and surprise) also
revealed that the AD group had a lower percentage of correct
recognition of emotion than the younger group for all five emotions (all p’s < 0.05).
Further tests of simple effects revealed that emotion type
was a significant simple main effect within each group: AD
participants, F(5, 115) = 34.1, p < 0.001; older controls, F(5,
145) = 26.6, p < 0.001 and younger controls, F(5, 145) = 25.4,
p < 0.001. In terms of the pattern of these significant simple
effects, for the AD and older control groups there was the same
order with respect to the lowest to highest percentage of correctly recognized emotions; this can be seen in Fig. 2. Thus,
both AD and older controls had greatest difficulty recognizing
fear, followed by anger, sadness, disgust, surprise and happiness. For younger adults, a similar order of emotion difficulty
was observed, except that for this group, disgust was the second most difficult emotion to recognize, and anger was the third
easiest to recognize (specifically, greatest difficulty was seen in
the younger group for fear, followed by disgust, sadness, anger,
surprise and happiness).
The previous analyses indicated that, relative to older adult
controls, individuals with AD presented with specific deficits
in the recognition of anger, fear and happiness. It should be
noted that the researcher responsible for testing AD participants
was a registered intern clinical psychologist who therefore had
the necessary clinical expertise to make judgments relating to
comprehension of tasks, and thus understand what was meant
by the different emotion labels. It therefore seems unlikely that
the observed facial affect recognition deficits were simply secondary to impaired semantic knowledge of emotions. However,
to formally assess whether variance in emotion recognition performance was shared with variance in overall cognitive status
as indexed by the ACE-R and more generalized facial recognition capacity as indexed by the Benton, a series of analyses
of covariances (ANCOVAs) were conducted. For these analyses, the between subjects variable was group status (AD versus
older), with either ACE-R or Benton facial recognition as the
covariate. The dependent variables were the FEEST emotions
that AD participants had significant difficulty with relative to
age-matched controls; anger, fear and happiness. Of interest was
how entry of each of these covariates impacted on the main effect
of group (AD versus older controls).
The group effect sizes (η2 ) for fear, anger and happiness
(0.13, 0.08 and 0.07, respectively), were entirely eliminated after
covarying for the ACE-R (all η2 ’s < 0.01). However, covarying
for the Benton had a far smaller influence on group differences
in affect recognition (η2 ’s = 0.10, 0.05 and 0.05, respectively).
These data therefore suggest that whilst AD effects on emotion
recognition do overlap with cognitive deficits, they are not simply attributable to changing visual perception of faces. Indeed,
consistent with this possibility, whilst a main effect of group was
observed on the Benton, F(2, 81) = 11.4, p < 0.001, follow-up
Tukey tests indicated that although younger adults performed
better relative to older adults, p = 0.005, and AD participants,
p < 0.001, AD participants did not significantly differ from older
adults on this measure, p = 0.376.
Subsequently it was assessed whether any of the group differences across the six target emotions reflected differences in
patterns of error responses. Informal inspection of the percentage of error types in relation to each of the six target emotions
(see Table 2) indicated that for five of the six target emotions
(happiness, surprise, disgust, fear and anger), the mode error
response was the same across the three groups (i.e., the most
commonly made errors were surprise, fear, anger, surprise, and
Table 2
Erroneous identification of facial expressions as other emotions for each of the
six emotions
Target emotion
Emotion incorrectly selected (percentage)
Anger
Sadness
Fear
Disgust
Surprise
Happiness
Anger
Younger
Older
AD
–
–
–
11.9
13.6
12.7
10.2
33.0
10.8
55.9
35.2
56.9
27.1
18.2
19.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Sadness
Younger
Older
AD
3.1
18.8
12.6
–
–
–
51.6
35.3
22.0
37.5
18.8
32.6
7.8
24.7
29.5
0.0
2.4
3.3
Fear
Younger
Older
AD
0.0
19.5
18.4
5.0
3.4
4.3
–
–
–
14.9
22.1
17.8
81.0
53.7
56.4
1.0
1.3
3.1
Disgust
Younger
Older
AD
94.7
73.7
64.4
3.9
8.8
6.8
0.0
14.0
8.5
–
–
–
0.0
3.5
16.9
1.3
0.0
3.3
Surprise
Younger
Older
AD
3.3
9.3
14.9
3.3
5.6
6.4
86.7
61.1
42.6
0.0
13.0
10.6
–
–
–
6.6
11.1
25.5
Happiness
Younger
Older
AD
0.0
0.0
2.6
0.0
0.0
2.6
0.0
14.3
5.6
0.0
0.0
5.6
0.0
85.7
83.3
–
–
–
Author's personal copy
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
disgust, respectively). However, for the emotion of sadness,
whilst younger and older adults most often mislabeled this emotion as fear, AD participants more often mislabeled this emotion
as either disgust or surprise. Further, it can be seen that, relative
to the younger and older adult controls, AD participants typically
present with a more heterogeneous pattern of error responding
across the six target emotions (i.e., they exhibit a greater confusability between the different emotions relative to the other two
groups).
Following Suzuki, Hoshino, Shigemasu, and Kawamura
(2007), Pearson product-moment correlations were then computed to assess whether specific error responses were correlated
with accuracy on each of the six target emotions. Given the noted
preservation of disgust in the AD group, of particular interest was
assessment of whether misuse of the target label ‘disgust’ was
correlated with accurate disgust recognition in this group. The
correlation between misuse of disgust as a response label and
the number of correct identifications of disgust was not significantly correlated in either the AD group (r = −0.28, p = 0.183)
or the younger adult group (r = 0.25, p = 0.175). Whilst a significant association was observed in the older control group
(r = −0.40, p = 0.027), the fact that (like the AD group) this
correlation was negative, indicates that greater misuse of the
disgust label was associated with fewer correct disgust identifications overall. Thus, there is no evidence for either the AD
or the older control group that the preserved recognition of disgust is attributable to preferential use of the disgust label. These
analyses were repeated for each of the other five target emotions.
For all three groups, for none of the emotions was misuse of a
specific emotion label significantly correlated with subsequent
correct identification of that emotion (r’s ranged between 0.20
and −0.32, all p’s > 0.05). Thus, biases in the choice of labels
made per se do not seem to be driving the group effects observed
in the present study.
Finally, TASIT data (see Fig. 1) were analyzed with a 3 × 7
mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects variable of group status (AD, older, younger) and the within-subjects variable of
emotion type (surprised, sad, angry, anxious, revolted, happy,
neutral). These analyses indicated that there was a main effect
of group status, F(2, 81) = 13.85, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26, and of
emotion type, F(6, 486) = 18.2, p ≤ 0.001, η2 = 0.18, but that
there was no interaction between group and emotion, F(12,
486) = 1.35, p = 0.187, η2 = 0.03. Tukey tests on the main effect
of group indicated that older adults were impaired relative to
their younger counterparts, p = 0.005, and that AD participants
were significantly impaired relative to younger adults, p < 0.001,
but not older adults, p = 0.083.
4. Discussion
The present study is the first to simultaneously assess affect
recognition in relation to older, younger and AD participants,
and thus these data offer a unique point of comparison. In contrast to the clear AD deficits identifying the other five emotions
from static pictures of faces, the preservation of disgust recognition in the AD group, both relative to the older and even the
younger adult groups, was particularly striking. Indeed, for the
1367
contrast with younger adults, disgust was the only emotion with
intact recognition in AD. Importantly, inspection of error scores
indicated that this preservation was not attributable to misuse of
the disgust label (i.e., biases in the choice of labels made).
It is suggested that preservation of disgust might be
attributable to the relative sparing of the basal ganglia in AD. As
noted previously, both the basal ganglia and the insula have been
argued to be particularly implicated in recognition of disgust
signals (Calder et al., 2000). However, the relative contribution of these neural substrates has been subject to some debate.
The present findings, involving an AD group known to be characterized by relative preservation of the basal ganglia (Boller
& Duykaerts, 2003; Braak & Braak, 1991; Delacourte et al.,
1999; Hyman & Gomez-Isla, 1998), but significant atrophy in
the insula (Halliday, Double, Macdonald, & Kril, 2003), point
to either a more important role for the basal ganglia in disgust
recognition, or that the integrity of only one of these systems is
sufficient for intact recognition of disgust. Consistent with our
findings and with the idea that the basal ganglia on their own
are sufficient for recognition of disgust, the degree of basal ganglia (but not insula) atrophy has been shown to predict disgust
recognition deficits in Wilson’s disease (Wang, Hoosain, Yang,
Meng, & Wang, 2003).
Further, the basal ganglia are widely considered to represent the core site of pathology in relatively more ‘subcortical’
dementias, such as Huntington’s and Parkinson’s disease, and
are preferentially targeted early in the course of these diseases.
The present findings involving a group characterized by relative preservation of the basal ganglia (AD) contrast sharply
with research focused on Huntington’s or Parkinson’s disorders,
where decoding expressions of disgust has been shown to be
disproportionately impaired (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1996), and
in one study selectively impaired (Suzuki, Hoshino, Shigemasu,
& Kawamura, 2006) relative to the recognition of other expressions of emotion. Importantly, Suzuki et al. (2006) study used a
refined assessment technique in which the relative difficulties of
different emotions were controlled. Further, a relatively selective impairment of disgust recognition has also been observed
in presymptomatic Huntington’s disease gene carriers (Gray,
Young, Barker, Curtis, & Gibson, 1997). The present data therefore point to the possibility of an interesting double dissociation
between AD and dementias characterised by relatively greater
subcortical (and specifically, basal ganglia) neuropathology.
In addition to identifying selective preservation of disgust,
the present study also found significant AD deficits in decoding
static facial expressions of anger, fear and happiness. Although
the neural substrates that subserve decoding expressions of happiness remain relatively poorly delineated, the orbitofrontal
cortex has been particularly linked to decoding expressions
of anger and the amygdala to decoding expressions of fear.
AD deficits for these latter two emotions (coupled with the
noted preservation of disgust) may therefore directly reflect
the neuropathological changes that are characteristic of AD.
As noted, AD involves accelerated neuropathology in limbic
regions (including the amygdala), as well as frontal neocortices, with the basal ganglia typically less affected (Boller &
Duykaerts, 2003; Braak & Braak, 1991; Delacourte et al., 1999;
Author's personal copy
1368
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
Hyman & Gomez-Isla, 1998). However, a clear limitation of
the present study was the absence of specific information relating to neuropathological change in the AD participants tested.
Thus, whilst it is suggested that the differentiated profile of affect
recognition performance that was observed in the present study
is consistent with neuropsychological models that highlight the
role of dissociable neural substrates in recognizing specific emotions, these data should be regarded as preliminary, and further
research is needed that directly maps underlying AD related neuropathology onto affect recognition performance in this group.
Finally, in contrast to the marked AD effects on the FEEST,
the present study found that individuals with AD did not differ
significantly from age-matched controls on the TASIT. These
data did not imply a complete absence of AD deficits on the
TASIT in that there were fewer items to detect differences on
the TASIT relative to the FEEST, and there was a trend showing that AD participants relative to older adults did experience
greater difficulty. Thus, there is some indication that even with
more emotion cues and using ecologically valid video clips
rather than still images, the trend is for worse performance in
the AD group relative to older adults. Nevertheless, since AD
effects on the TASIT were reduced relative to AD effects on the
FEEST, it is possible that deficits on more traditional measures
of affect recognition over-estimate the degree of affect recognition impairment individuals with AD actually experience in
day-to-day life.
Whilst such a conclusion would be extremely encouraging,
and have important implications for dementia care, the FEEST
and TASIT differ on a number of dimensions quite aside from
ecological validity. Thus, although one possibility is that ecological validity per se is the critical distinguishing feature which
explains the attenuated AD effect on the TASIT, it may instead
be the contrast between dynamic and static stimuli that is key,
particularly given recent models that highlight the role of dissociable neural systems for recognizing dynamic as opposed to
static facial expressions. Thus, it has been proposed that whilst
information about actions is processed in occipitoparietal and
dorsal frontal cortices, the bilateral and anterior temporal lobes
are among the critical regions responsible for linking perception
of static stimuli to recognition of emotions (Adolphs, Tranel, &
Damasio, 2003). Also potentially relevant is the fact that the
two tasks differed on a number of stimulus dimensions, most
notably the number of contextual cues (and thus the need to
integrate multi-modal affective stimuli), speed of stimuli presentation (stimuli were presented rapidly in the static task but
for greater duration in the TASIT), as well as the number of
response options available to choose from (the TASIT included
the ‘neutral’ option which was not available when completing
the FEEST). One way in which future research could tease apart
these competing possibilities would be to develop ecologically
valid tasks that vary along each of these stimulus dimensions,
and to use still images taken directly from the moving image
stimuli.
Indeed, intriguingly, and also consistent with the argument
that the TASIT and FEEST differ on a number of important
dimensions other than just ecological validity, was the finding that whilst older relative to younger adults did not differ
in terms of overall accuracy on the measure of static facial
affect recognition, a significant age deficit was observed on the
TASIT. This finding does not seem easily attributed to a focus on
task differences that emphasizes ecological validity, particularly
since there is now a considerable literature showing that deficits
observed in the context of normal adult aging are often attenuated (or even reversed) in contexts where ecological validity
is increased (see Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & Crawford, 2004;
Phillips & Henry, 2005). Thus, future research is needed to identify the critical task feature(s) responsible for the pattern of age
and AD effects observed in the present study. The divergent pattern of results observed (significant AD effect on the FEEST but
not the TASIT; significant age effect on the TASIT but not the
FEEST) implies that different mechanisms may be relevant to
understanding performance in these two groups.
5. Conclusions
The present data provide further important clarification about
the nature of affect recognition deficits in AD, as well as in the
context of normal adult aging. The major finding of the present
study was that people in the early stages of AD show selective
preservation in identifying disgust from static pictures of faces.
Strikingly, this preservation was seen even in comparison to
young healthy controls, and could not be attributed to biases in
the choice of labels made. It is suggested that these data may
reflect sparing of the basal ganglia in the early stages of the
disorder.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Alzheimer’s Australia Research
and Australian Research Council grants. The authors thank all of
the participants who took part in this study and the staff at Prince
of Wales and Royal North Shore Hospitals, in particular Jane
Southwell. Ingerith Martin, Scott Nash and Beth Williams also
need to be acknowledged for helping with participant recruitment.
References
Adolphs, R., & Tranel, D. (2004). Impaired judgments of sadness but not
happiness following bilateral amygdala damage. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 453–462.
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (2003). Dissociable neural systems
for recognizing emotions. Brain and Cognition, 52, 61–69.
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. (1994). Impaired recognition of emotion in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the
human amygdala. Nature, 372, 669–672.
Allen, J. S., Bruss, J., Brown, C. K., & Damasio, H. (2005). Normal neuroanatomical variation due to age: The major lobes and parcellation of the
temporal region. Neurobiology of Aging, 26, 1245–1260.
Allender, J., & Kaszniak, A. W. (1989). Processing of emotional cues in patients
with dementia of the Alzheimer’s type. International Journal of Neuroscience, 46, 147–155.
Benton, A. L., Hamsher, K., Varney, N. R., & Spreen, O. (1983). Contributions
to neuropsychological assessment: A clinical manual. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Blair, R. J. R., & Cipolotti, L. (2000). Impaired social response reversal—A case
of “acquired sociopathy”. Brain, 123, 1122–1141.
Author's personal copy
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
Blair, R. J. R., Morris, J. S., Frith, C. D., Perrett, D. I., & Dolan, R. J. (1999).
Dissociable neural responses to facial expressions of sadness and anger.
Brain, 122, 883–893.
Boller, F., & Duykaerts, C. (2003). Alzheimer’s diseases: Clinical and anatomic
issues. In T. E. Feinberg & M. J. Farah (Eds.), Behavioral neurology and
neuropsychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Braak, H., & Braak, E. (1991). Neuropathological stageing of Alzheimer-related
changes. Acta Neuropathologica, 82, 239–259.
Breiter, H. C., Etcoff, N. L., Whalen, P. J., Kennedy, W. A., Rauch, S. L., Buckner,
R. L., et al. (1996). Response and habituation of the human amygdala during
visual processing of facial expression. Neuron, 17, 875–887.
Bucks, R. S., & Radford, S. A. (2004). Emotion processing in Alzheimer’s
disease. Aging and Mental Health, 8, 222–232.
Burnham, H., & Hogervorst, E. (2004). Recognition of facial expressions of
emotion by patients with dementia of the Alzheimer type. Dementia and
Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 18, 75–79.
Calder, A. J., Keane, J., Lawrence, A. D., & Manes, F. (2004). Impaired
recognition of anger following damage to the ventral striatum. Brain, 127,
1958–1969.
Calder, A. J., Keane, J., Manes, F., Antoun, N., & Young, A. W. (2000). Impaired
recognition and experience of disgust following brain injury. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 1077–1078.
Calder, A. J., Keane, J., Manly, T., Sprengelmeyer, R., Scott, S., Nimmo-Smith,
I., et al. (2003). Facial expression recognition across the adult life span.
Neuropsychologia, 41, 195–292.
Convit, A., Wolf, O. T., de Leon, M. J., Patalinjug, M., Kandil, E., Caraos,
C., et al. (2001). Volumetric analysis of the pre-frontal regions: Findings
in aging and schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research—Neuroimaging, 107, 61–
73.
Delacourte, A., David, J. P., Sergeant, N., Buee, L., Wattez, A., Vermersch, P., et
al. (1999). The biochemical pathway of neurofibrillary degernation in aging
and Alzheimer’s disease. Neurology, 52, 1158–1165.
Edwards, J., Jackson, H. J., & Pattison, P. E. (2002). Emotion recognition via
facial expression and affective prosody in schizophrenia: A methodological
review. Clinical Psychology Review, 22, 789–832.
Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. V. (1976). Pictures of facial affect. Palo Alto, CA:
Consulting Psychologists Press.
Fine, C., & Blair, R. J. R. (2000). Mini review: The cognitive and emotional
effects of amygdala damage. Neurocase, 6, 435–450.
Folstein, M. F., Folstein, S. E., & McHugh, P. R. (1975). Mini-mental state:
A practical method for grading cognitive state of patients for the clinician.
Journal of Psychiatry Research, 12, 189–198.
Garraux, G., Salmon, E., Degueldre, C., Lemaire, C., Laureys, S., & Franck,
G. (1999). Comparison of impaired subcortico-frontal metabolic networks
in normal aging, subcortico-frontal dementia, and cortical frontal dementia.
NeuroImage, 10, 149–162.
Gray, J. M., Young, A. W., Barker, W. A., Curtis, A., & Gibson, D. (1997).
Impaired recognition of disgust in Huntington’s disease gene carriers. Brain,
120, 2029–2038.
Grieve, S., Clark, C., Williams, L., Peduto, A., Gordon, E., & Clark, C. (2005).
Preservation of limbic and paralimbic structures in aging. Human Brain
Mapping, 25, 391–401.
Halliday, G. M., Double, K. L., Macdonald, V., & Kril, J. J. (2003). Identifying
severely atrophic cortical subregions in Alzheimer’s disease. Neurobiology
of Aging, 24, 797–806.
Hargrave, R., Maddock, R. J., & Stone, V. (2002). Impaired recognition of facial
expressions of emotion in Alzheimer’s disease. The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences, 14, 64–71.
Henry, J. D., MacLeod, M., Phillips, L., & Crawford, J. R. (2004). A metaanalytic review of prospective memory and aging. Psychology and Aging,
19, 27–39.
Hyman, B. T., & Gomez-Isla, T. (1998). Normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease.
In E. Wang & D. S. Snyder (Eds.), Handbook of the aging brain. San Diego:
Academic Press.
Iidaka, T., Omori, M., Murata, T., Kosaka, H., Yonekura, Y., Tomohisa, O., et al.
(2001). Neural interaction of the amygdala with the prefrontal and temporal
cortices in the processing of facial expressions as revealed by fMRI. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 13, 1035–1047.
1369
Killgore, W. D. S., & Yurgelun-Todd, D. A. (2004). Activation of the amygdala
and anterior cingulate during nonconscious processing of sad versus happy
faces. NeuroImage, 21, 1215–1223.
Koff, E., Zaitchik, D., Montepare, J., & Albert, M. S. (1999). Emotion processing
in the visual and auditory domains by patients with Alzheimer’s disease.
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 5, 32–40.
Lamar, M., & Resnick, S. M. (2004). Aging and prefrontal functions: Dissociating orbitofrontal and dorsolateral abilities. Neurobiology of Aging, 25,
553–558.
Lavenu, I., Pasquier, F., Lebert, F., Petit, H., & Van der Linden, M. (1999). Perception of emotion in frontotemporal dementia and in Alzheimer’s disease.
Alzheimer’s Disease and Associated Disorders, 13, 96–101.
Lennox, B. R., Jacob, R., Calder, A. J., Lupson, V., & Bullmore, E. T. (2004).
Behavioural and neurocognitive responses to sad facial affect are attenuated
in patients with mania. Psychological Medicine, 34, 795–802.
Lezak, M. D., Howieson, D. B., & Loring, D. W. (2004). Neuropsychological
assessment (4th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Mathuranath, P. S., Nestor, P. G., Berrios, G. E., Rakowicz, W., & Hodges, J.
R. (2000). A brief cognitive test battery to differentiate Alzheimer’s disease
and frontotemporal dementia. Neurology, 55, 1613–1620.
McDonald, S., Bornhofen, C., Shum, D., Long, E., Saunders, C., & Neulinger,
K. (2006). Reliability and validity of the awareness of social inference test
(TASIT): A clinical test of social perception. Disability and Rehabilitation,
28, 1529–1542.
McDonald, S., Flanagan, S., Rollins, J., & Kinch, J. (2002). TASIT: A new clinical tool for assessing social perception after traumatic brain injury. Journal
of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 18, 219–238.
Mu, Q. W., Xie, J. X., Wen, Z. Y., Weng, Y. Q., & Shuyun, Z. (1999). A quantitative MR study of the hippocampal formation, the amygdala, and the temporal
horn of the lateral ventricle in healthy subjects 40–90 years of age. American
Journal of Neuroradiology, 20, 207–211.
Ohnishi, T., Matsuda, H., Tabira, T., Asada, T., & Uno, M. (2001). Changes
in brain morphology in Alzheimer disease and normal aging: Is Alzheimer
disease an exaggerated aging process? American Journal of Neuroradiology,
22, 1680–1685.
Pardo, J. V., Lee, J. T., Sheikh, S. A., Surerus-Johnson, C., Shah, H., Munch, K.
R., et al. (2007). Where the brain grows old: Decline in anterior cingulate and
medial prefrontal function with normal aging. NeuroImage, 35, 1231–1237.
Petit-Taboué, M. C., Landeau, B., Desson, J. F., Desgranges, B., & Baron, J.
C. (1998). Effects of healthy aging on the regional cerebral metabolic rate
of glucose assessed with statistical parametric mapping. NeuroImage, 7,
176–184.
Phan, K. L., Wager, T., Taylor, S. F., & Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in
PET and fMRI. NeuroImage, 16, 331–348.
Phillips, L. H., & Henry, J. D. (2005). An evaluation of the frontal lobe theory of
cognitive aging. In J. Duncan, P. McLeod, & L. H. Phillips (Eds.), Measuring the mind: Speed, control and age (pp. 191–216). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Raz, N. (2000). Aging of the brain and its impact on cognitive performance:
Integration of structural and functional findings. In F. I. M. Craik & T.
A. Salthouse (Eds.), The handbook of aging and cognition. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Raz, N., Gunning, F. M., Head, D., Dupuis, J. H., McQuain, J., Briggs, S. D.,
et al. (1997). Selective aging of the human cerebral cortex observed in vivo:
Differential vulnerability of the prefrontal gray matter. Cerebral Cortex, 7,
268–282.
Resnick, S. M., Pham, D. L., Kraut, M. A., Zonderman, A. B., & Davatzikos, C.
(2003). Longitudinal magnetic resonance imaging studies of older adults: A
shrinking brain. The Journal of Neuroscience, 23, 3295–3301.
Rosen, H. J., Wilson, M. R., Schauer, G. F., Allison, S., Gorno-Tempini, M.,
Pace-Savitsky, C., et al. (2006). Neuroanatomical correlates of impaired
recognition of emotion in dementia. Neuropsychologia, 44, 365–373.
Ruffman, T., Henry, J. D., Livingstone, V., & Phillips, L. H. (in press). A
meta-analytic review of emotion recognition and aging: Implications for neuropsychological models of aging. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews.
Sprengelmeyer, R., Rausch, M., Eysel, U. T., & Przuntek, H. (1998). Neural
structures associated with recognition of facial expressions of basic emo-
Author's personal copy
1370
J.D. Henry et al. / Neuropsychologia 46 (2008) 1363–1370
tions. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 265, 1927–
1931.
Sprengelmeyer, R., Young, A. W., Calder, A. J., Karnat, A., Lange, H., Homberg,
V., et al. (1996). Loss of disgust. Perception of faces and emotions in Huntington’s disease. Brain, 119, 1647–1665.
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. (2004a). Emotion recognition deficits in the elderly.
International Journal of Neuroscience, 114, 94–102.
Sullivan, S., & Ruffman, T. (2004b). Social understanding: How does it fare
with advancing years? British Journal of Psychology, 95, 1–18.
Surguladze, S., Brammer, M. J., Keedwell, P., Giampietro, V., Young, A. W.,
Travis, M. J., et al. (2005). A differential pattern of neural response toward
sad versus happy facial expressions in major depressive disorder. Biological
Psychiatry, 57, 201–209.
Surguladze, S. A., Brammer, M. J., Young, A. W., Andrew, C., Travis, M. J.,
Williams, S. C. R., et al. (2003). A preferential increase in the extrastriate
response to signals of danger. NeuroImage, 19, 1317–1328.
Suzuki, A., Hoshino, T., Shigemasu, K., & Kawamura, M. (2006). Disgustspecific impairment of facial expression recognition in Parkinson’s disease.
Brain, 129, 707–717.
Suzuki, A., Hoshino, T., Shigemasu, K., & Kawamura, M. (2007). Decline
or improvement? Age-related differences in facial expression recognition.
Biological Psychology, 74, 75–84.
Testa, J. A., Beatty, W. W., Gleason, A. C., Orbelo, D. M., & Ross, E. D.
(2001). Impaired affective prosody in AD: Relationship to aphasic deficits
and emotional behaviors. Neurology, 57, 1474–1481.
Tisserand, D. J., Pruessner, J. C., Arigita, E. J. S., van Boxtel, M. P. J., Evans,
A. C., Jolles, J., et al. (2002). Regional frontal cortical volumes decrease
differentially in aging: An MRI study to compare volumetric approaches
and voxel-based morphometry. NeuroImage, 17, 657–669.
Tisserand, D. J., Visser, P. J., van Boxtel, M. P. J., & Jolles, J. (2000). The
relation between global and limbic brain volumes on MRI and cognitive
performance in healthy individuals across the age range. Neurobiology of
Aging, 21, 569–576.
Wang, K., Hoosain, R., Yang, R. M., Meng, Y., & Wang, C. Q. (2003). Impairment of recognition of disgust in Chinese with Huntington’s or Wilson’s
disease. Neuropsychologia, 41, 527–537.
Williams, L. M., Brown, K. J., Palmer, D., Liddell, B. J., Kemp, A. H.,
Olivieri, G., et al. (2006). The mellow years? Neural basis of improving emotional stability over age. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 6422–
6430.
Wright, C. L., Wedig, M. M., Williams, D., Rauch, S. L., & Albert, M. S. (2006).
Novel fearful faces activate the amygdala in healthy young and elderly adults.
Neurobiology of Aging, 27, 361–374.
Yang, T. T., Menon, V., Eliez, S., Blasey, C., White, C. D., Reid, A. J., et al.
(2002). Amygdalar activation associated with positive and negative facial
expressions. NeuroReport, 13, 1737–1741.
Young, A., Perret, D., Calder, A., Sprengelmeyer, R., & Ekman, P. (2002). Facial
expressions of emotion—Stimuli and tests (FEEST). England: Thames Valley
Test Company.
Zimmerman, M. E., Brickman, A. M., Paul, R. H., Grieve, S. M., Tate, D.
F., Gunstad, J., et al. (2006). The relationship between frontal gray matter
volume and cognition varies across the healthy adult lifespan. American
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 14, 823–833.