Public Provision of Private Goods
Author(s): Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano
Source: The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 57-84
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138959 .
Accessed: 01/02/2011 13:00
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Political Economy.
http://www.jstor.org
Public Provision of Private Goods
Dennis Epple
CarnegieMellon University
RichardE. Romano
Universityof Florida
Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be
supplementedby privatepurchases.Policyis determinedby majority
rule. Under standardassumptionson preferences, a majorityvoting
equilibriumexists. A regime of positive government provision with
no restrictionon private supplements is shown to be majoritypreferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditure on the
good is higher under this dual-provisionregime than under either
of the alternatives. Under some preference configurations, the
median-income voter is pivotal; under others, a voter with income
below the median is pivotal.
I.
Introduction
Many goods supplied or subsidized by governments may be supplemented by private-market purchases. Police protection may be augmented by private security services. Public transit riders may also
use privately owned conveyances. Governmentally funded health care
may be supplemented by private purchases. Public school students
may enhance their education with tutoring and college preparatory
This research is supported by the National Science Foundation. We also thank Larry
Kenny, David Sappington, editor Robert Topel, an anonymous referee, and seminar
participants at the University of British Columbia, University of Florida, and University
of Michigan for very helpful comments. Epple thanks the Kellogg Graduate School of
Management at Northwestern University, where parts of this research were conducted.
[Journal of Political Economy, 1996, vol. 104, no. 1]
? 1996 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/96/0401-0003$01.50
57
58
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
programs. Private cartage may pick up where public refuse collection
leaves off.
Normative analyses of government intervention envision a response to market imperfections arising from distinctive characteristics
of a good, the technology for its production and consumption, or
shortcomings in market mechanisms for its allocation. Thus externalities, excludability, scale economies, costs of coordination, and imperfect information play an important role in normative analyses.
One or more such concerns may well arise in evaluating government's role in providing the goods cited above as illustrative examples. In this paper we abstract from market imperfections in order
to focus on a positive analysis of government involvement in provision
of goods. Abstracting from these other issues sharpens the focus on
political forces affecting government provision. However, we view
our work not as supplanting analysis of the effects of market imperfections, but rather as providing a framework into which such imperfections may be introduced in developing a richer positive theory.
Several questions arise in considering government provision of
goods when private provision is also feasible. Will government fund
provision of the good? If yes, what level of public provision will be
chosen? If some level of public provision is chosen, will restrictions
be placed on private-market purchases? How will aggregate consumption of the good be affected by the presence or absence of public
provision, with or without restrictions on private provision? This paper addresses these questions.
We consider an environment in which a privately produced good
may be exchanged in a market without government involvement.
Alternatively, the government may choose to fund some level of provision common to all. Also, when there is public provision, the government may choose either to permit or to prohibit private purchases.
The choice of the form of government involvement, if any, is determined by majority rule.
Some key results are the following. With private-market supplementation permitted, preferences over government expenditure are
single-peaked and majority voting equilibrium always exists. The latter dual-provision regime is majority perferred (usually strictly) to
both a regime of pure market provision and one of pure government
provision. The choice of government expenditure in the dualprovision regime need not be the preferred choice of the medianincome household but conforms to the preference of a lower-thanmedian-income household in an important set of cases. Then voting
equilibrium is characterized by a coalition of rich and poor that favor
expenditure decreases opposing middle-income households that favor expenditure increases. For homothetic preferences, combined
PUBLIC PROVISION
59
public and private expenditure in the dual-provision equilibrium exceeds expenditure in the pure market equilibrium.
Choice of policy and comparisons of expenditure levels under alternative policies are a central element of the health care debate. Our
analysis provides insights into the factors that cause individuals to
have differing preferences over policy alternatives. In addition, our
analysis provides results about the collective outcomes that emerge in
equilibrium. Since the types of issues we consider are prominent in
the health care debate, we refer to the good that is the subject of our
analysis as health care.' However, the results are applicable more
generally to dual-provision settings in which it is technically feasible
to consume both the publicly supplied good and privately purchased
supplements.
Several related lines of research are discussed next and others at
appropriate points below (see also n. 1). One related research line
concerns voting over provision of local public goods assuming that
there is not a private alternative (Barr and Davis 1966; Bergstrom
and Goodman 1973; Romer and Rosenthal 1979). A second line of
work considers public provision when there are private alternatives,
but it is not possible to consume both the public and the private good
(Barzel 1973; Stiglitz 1974; Epple and Romano 1994; Glomm and
Ravikumar, in press).2 We show that some important results are quite
different when the publicly provided good can be supplemented with
private purchase. A third related line of research is concerned with
the potential for redistribution via public provision and the efficiency
implications of doing so (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988; Besley and
Coate 1991). This work is primarily normative, whereas ours is positive.
In Section II, we present our model. Section III presents our results regarding choice of government policy. Properties of equilibrium and comparisons of expenditure levels under alternative poli-
' Gouveia (1993) studies the political economy of health care provision. While his
paper and ours were developed independently, they are similar in spirit and some key
results are analogous. Differences are that his paper provides a richer characterization
of the health care environment and develops comparative static results, whereas ours
focuses more generally on private provision of public goods and places more emphasis
on comparison across preference configurations and policy regimes. After presenting
our results, we develop the comparison between the papers more fully (n. 14).
2 This research uses education as its archetype, its point of departure the infeasibility
of full-time attendance by a student at both public and private schools. Private tutoring
and other forms of private supplement of public education noted in our Introduction
are ruled out by treating public and private alternatives as mutually exclusive. Here
we consider the other extreme in which it is feasible to combine public and private
alternatives in arbitrary amounts. Most goods probably lie somewhere between the two
extremes, a generalization that might be interesting to pursue.
6o
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
cies are presented in Section IV. Generalizations of the model are
discussed in Section V. Conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II.
The Model
There are two goods, health services and the numeraire commodity.
All households are assumed to have the same strictly increasing,
strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously differentiable utility function U(h, b) over health services, h, and the numeraire bundle, b. We
make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION 1. h and b are normal goods.
The evidence strongly supports the presumed normality of demand for health care services (see Sec. IV). The normality assumption
on b is plausible, but it is unnecessary and is made only to simplify
the presentation.
Households differ in endowed income (i.e., numeraire commodity), y. The distribution of household income is denoted f(y), and the
population is normalized to one. We assume thatf(y) is continuous
and thatf(y) > 0 for all y E (0, oo).Let aggregate income, the integral
of yf(y) over the support of y, be denoted -, which also equals the
mean income.
Health services are produced from the numeraire commodity with
constant returns to scale. One unit of publicly provided health services is produced with p units of the numeraire. All consumers of
publicly provided health services obtain the same level of health services. Public provision is financed by a proportional tax, t, on income.
Hence, the public budget constraint is
ty = p *g,
1
where g is the publicly provided health services per capita. The level
of public health expenditure is determined by majority vote.
Private health services are provided by price-taking suppliers. The
cost per unit of privately provided health services is p units of the
numeraire. A household can buy as much supplemental health care, s,
as desired at this price. The implications of differences in productivity
between public and private suppliers are considered in Section V.
Policy regarding public provision of health services is determined by
majority rule.
It is natural to ask why a vote is not also taken over public provision
of good b. One rationale for limiting the focus to a particular good
such as health care is that forces outside the model (e.g., a presidential
initiative or constitutional requirement) result in placement of that
good on the policy making agenda. This is in the spirit of the extensive body of research on positive models of policy in which a priori
61
PUBLIC PROVISION
structure is adopted to surmount the difficulties inherent in analysis
of multidimensional voting problems.3 A second rationale, developed
by Meltzer and Richard (1985), is that a majority of voters may prefer
in-kind transfers to cash transfers because of labor supply incentives
(see Leonesio [1988] for empirical support). In Section V, we extend
our model to capture this motivation for limiting attention to in-kind
transfers of h.
A household's induced utility function over public tax and expenditure levels is given by
V(g,p,y(
-t))=maxU(g+s,y(
-t)-
p s),
(2)
{S?0}
where s denotes private purchases. Properties of induced indifference
curves in the (g, t) plane are central in demonstrating our results. In
lemmas 1 and 2 below, we demonstrate that an indifference curve
mapping in the (g, t) plane is as shown in figure 1. By way of preview,
it is intuitive that for households consuming supplements, public provision of g is the same as an income grant of value p - g. For households that would consume less than g if given an income grant p g, public provision is not equivalent to an income supplement. The
"boundary" between these two groups is the set of households that
would demand exactly g if given an income supplement of p * g.
Properties of this boundary locus are studied in lemma 1. Lemma 2
then shows that each indifference curve is weakly concave, linear to
the left of this locus, and strictly concave to the right of this locus.
Let hd(P, I) denote the ordinary demand function for h of a household with income I. Define H(p, y(l - t)) implicitly by H = hd(P,
y(l - t) + pH). We show the following lemma.
LEMMA 1. (a) H is increasing iny(1 - t). (b) s > (=) 0 at points (g,
t) such that g < (2) H(p, y(l - t)). (c) At points at which s > (=) 0,
- t) + pg).
g + s = (>)hd(Py(l
Proof. (a) Differentiate the definition of H yielding
_
H
a[y(l -t)]-
dhdldI
1 - p(dhd/dI)
E (0, 1Ip), implying the result. (b) Letting
By assumption 1, dahdldI
h* = g + s denote total consumption of health services, we can rewrite problem (2) as
3 Examples include the related work discussed below that restricts voting to consideration of the parameters of linear taxes, research taking congressional rules and procedures as mechanisms for overcoming voting instability (Shepsle and Weingast 1981,
1982), and research in which issues are assumed to be voted one issue at a time (Denzau
and Mackay 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1983; Meltzer and Richard 1985; Epple and
Kadane 1990).
62
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
t
Hp,y(1-t))
g
X
FIG. 1.-Indifference
curve mapping
max U(h*,y(l - t) + pg - ph*).
(h* ?g)
Figure 2 depicts solutions in which the constraint is not binding (fig.
2a) and is binding (fig. 2b). The solid lines depict the actual budget
constraint with public provision of g health services. It is clear from
the figure that the optimal s > (=) 0 as g < (?) hd(P, y(l - t) + pg).
Next we note that H is the fixed point g solving g = hd(P, y(l - t) +
pg) and again use assumption 1 to establish that g < (2) hd(P, y(l t) + pg) as g < (2) H(y(1 - t)), implying the result. (c) This is confirmed by inspection of figure 2a and b. Q.E.D.
Consider further the region below H(.), where supplemental expenditure is positive. The following first-order condition holds:
Uh(g +
s,y(l - t) - p s) - pUb(g + s, y(I - t) - p s) = O. (3)
From the envelope theorem, the slope of a household's indifference
curve V(g, p, y(l - t)) = v in the region where s > 0 is given by
dt
dg
Uh(g + sy(l - t) - ps)
- t) -ps) (s
YUb(g+sy(l
Combining (3) and (4), we establish that the slope of a household's
indifference curve in the region where s > 0 is given by
dt l
dg v.=
p
Y(5)
y,
b
y(1-t) + pg
h* > g
(s > O)
X
g
h
h*=hd
b
b
y(-t)+ pg-
ho = g
h*=g
hd
FIG. 2.-a,
hd = hd(P,y(
Constraintnot binding: hd
- t) + pg)-
=
hd(P, y(l-
h
t) + pg). b, Constraintbinding:
64
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
The intuition for this result is as follows. On the portion of an
indifference curve where supplemental expenditure is positive, consumption of health care services, h* = hd(P, y(l - t) + pg), does not
vary. Instead, each dollar increase in public provision is exactly offset
by a dollar reduction in expenditure on supplemental services. Thus,
on this portion of an indifference curve, increases in public health
expenditures are equivalent to an income grant. The equation for this
region of an indifference curve is given by the following condition
specifying that numeraire consumption remains constant:
y(l - t) -
p. (h* - g)
=
constant.
The slope of such an indifference curve in the (g, t) plane is as given
in equation (5).
Next, consider the portion of an indifference curve along which
s = 0, that is, beyond the H() locus. In this region, V(g, p, y(l t)) = U(g, y(l - t)) = vJ.Using strict quasi concavity of U(), we can
easily establish that the indifference curve in the (g, t) plane is concave
in this region. Moreover, the slope is given by
dt
dg
_
V()=i
Uh(g,y(l
yUb(gy(l-
-
t))
6
t))
()
two segments of the indifference curve meet on the H(-) locus
g = h* and, hence, s = 0. Equations (4) and (6) are the same
point, establishing that the indifference curve is differentiable
point. Thus we have established the following lemma.
LEMMA 2. A typical indifference curve in the (g, t) plane for a
household with income y is increasing, weakly concave, and differentiable and has a slope that is everywhere less than or equal to ply.
The
where
at this
at this
III.
Determining Government's Role
We now prove that a majority voting equilibrium exists in this dualprovision regime. This is followed by our results characterizing choice
over alternative regimes. There is no loss of generality in choosing
units so that the unit price of h is p = 1. Henceforth, we adopt
this normalization and suppress p as an argument in the relevant
functions.
PROPOSITION 1. When the pair (g, t) is chosen by majority rule, a
voting equilibrium exists, and the point most preferred by the voter
with the median most preferred level of g is chosen.
Proof. Substitute the budget constraint (1) into the induced utility
65
PUBLIC PROVISION
function V( ) to obtain induced preferences over g for a voter with
income y:
W(gy) = V(g,lY(l
))(7)
Weak concavity of indifference curves in the (g, t) plane established
in lemma 2 coupled with weak convexity of the budget constraint (1)
imply that the induced preferences W(-) are single-peaked. Q.E.D.
Remark.-The equilibrium is generically unique.
The single-peakedness of W(-) is illustrated in figure 3, where the
line labeled GPF is the government possibilities frontier found
from (1).
COROLLARY 1. The most preferred level of government expenditure is zero (positive) for all voters with income y > (<) y.
Proof. By lemma 2, the slope of an indifference curve in the (g, t)
plane for a voter with y > is everywhere less than or equal to lly.
By equation (1), the slope of the GPF is 1/I. Thus the slope of the
GPF is everywhere steeper than any indifference curve of a voter
with y > -. Hence, such a voter's highest utility is achieved at g = 0.
The preference for strictly positive public expenditure of households
with y <j follows from an analogous argument that uses assumption
1 to rule out corner cases. Q.E.D.
COROLLARY 2. Equilibrium government provision is positive (zero)
if the median income is less than (greater than) -y.
Proof. This follows immediately from proposition 1 and corollary 1.
Q.E.D.
Remarks
1. The preference for government provision by households with income below the mean is to effect a redistribution, as in the literature
on voting over linear income taxes (Romer 1975; Roberts 1977;
Meltzer and Richard 1981; Snyder and Kramer 1988). The tax price
of health care to households with income less than the mean is below
the market price; hence they benefit from positive taxes. While the
incentive to redistribute directly in the just-cited literature is limited
by attendant reductions in labor supply and the tax base, the incentive
here to redistribute via public supply of health care will be seen to
be limited by diminishing marginal utility.
2. Corollary 2 does not, however, imply that the median-income
voter is pivotal, as we show in the next section.
We have shown that a majority voting equilibrium exists for a regime in which government provision may be supplemented by private
GPr
I
w
I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
W2 -&-J~I
I
I
W3
t
II
I
I
I
-
g
FIG. 3
PUBLIC PROVISION
67
market purchases. For ease of reference, we denote this as regime
GM, and we let g. be the equilibrium level of government provision
under this regime. We now ask whether such a regime is preferred
by a majority to the alternatives of market-only (MO) or governmentonly (GO) provision. Let go denote equilibrium government provision
in the latter case.4 We consider simultaneous voting over both regime
and level of government provision, if any.
PROPOSITION 2. Regime GM defeats regimes MO and GO.
Proof. First consider voting over regimes GM and MO. The outcome g = 0 could be chosen by voters under regime GM. Hence,
GM with the majority-preferred public expenditure defeats MO.
Next, consider voting over regimes GM and GO. Note that every
tax-expenditure combination with GO is Pareto-dominated by the
same tax-expenditure combination with GM. Those that supplement
under GM are strictly better off by revealed preference, and those
that do not are no worse off.
Consider a vote comparing the majority-preferred tax-expenditure
combination given GM to regime GO and any tax-expenditure combination. Since the GM/tax-expenditure combination is majority preferred to all other GM/tax-expenditure combinations, the Paretodominance result implies that it is likewise majority preferred to any
GO/tax-expenditure combination. Q.E.D.
Remarks
1. The proof extends immediately to show that GM defeats a regime
of government provision that is accompanied by any restrictions on
private consumption when such restrictions are not dependent on
public expenditures or the tax rate.
2. Our results also hold with sequential voting. Consider the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the regime is chosen first and then
the level of government provision. Since (GM, g.) defeats both (GO,
go) and (GM, 0) (the latter equivalent to MO) in simultaneous voting,
it follows immediately that (GM, g.) is also the equilibrium in the
sequential voting specification.
3. If go 0 go, then regime GM strictly defeats regime GO. If go =
gm, GM strictly defeats GO if indifferent voters choose their votes
randomly. Hence, if indifferent voters randomly determine their
votes, regime GO is an equilibrium only in the uninteresting case in
I
That preferences are single-peaked in the GO case under the present conditions
is well known. Hence, existence is not problematic. See, e.g., Romer and Rosenthal
(1979, p. 566).
68
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
which no households choose private supplements, that is, when regime GM yields the same allocation as regime GO.
4. Regime MO is an equilibrium only in the case in which, under
GM, a majority prefers no public provision. This case too is of little
interest. From corollary 2 we know that positive provision under GM
occurs for income distributions skewed the usual way.
For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that the preference
function U( ) is common across individuals and that the income distribution is continuous and well behaved. These assumptions were not
used in this section, and the results presented thus far hold under
much more general conditions.
The results of this section are striking. They suggest that a regime
of government-only provision or a regime of market-only provision
will not survive. Under very weak conditions, a regime of government
provision with private supplements defeats either. Perhaps the
strongest assumption is that the government is as cost efficient as the
market in providing the good. Section V discusses the limits placed
on the results when government provision is less efficient.
IV.
Analysis of Policy Alternatives
This section has two purposes. One is to contrast government expenditure levels and aggregate expenditures under the GM regime to
those under the MO and GO regimes. The other is to illustrate GM
equilibria by invoking commonly used regularity conditions on preferences.
We first compare government expenditures under the GO and GM
regimes.
PROPOSITION 3. g >- go.
Proof. We demonstrate that go ? gm by first showing that every
voter's most preferred level of government provision is at least as
high under regime GO as under regime GM. It follows that the median ideal point is at least as high as well, and, with single-peakedness,
the median ideal point is the voting equilibrium.
Consider first voters with y < Y. Using (1), substitute for g in the
problem described in (2) (recall that p = 1). The marginal cost to a
voter with income y of a unit publicly provided is yly, and this is less
than the marginal cost of private provision when y < Y. Hence,
whether or not private supplementation is permitted, a voter with
income y < Y will prefer the level of g that maximizes U(g, y (gy/y)). Thus the most preferred allocation for a voter with income
y < Y is the same under either regime GO or GM.
Next consider voters with y > Y. Under regime GM, all these voters
prefer g = 0 by corollary 1. Under regime GO, these voters prefer
69
PUBLIC PROVISION
the level of g that maximizes U(g, y - (gy/j)). Hence, under GO,
assumption 1 implies that the most preferred level of government
provision for a voter with y > j will be higher than under regime
GM.
Combining the results above, we conclude that the most preferred
level of government spending of every voter under regime GO is at
least as great as under regime GM. Hence, the median ideal point
under GO must be at least as high as under GM, and this implies
: gm. Q.E.D.
g?
Remark.-As with the results in Section 111, the result in proposition
3 does not require a common utility function or restrictions on the
properties of the distribution of income.
Proposition 3 makes clear why some voters may prefer a GO regime. A prohibition on private purchases (weakly) increases public
provision. Below, we show that go strictly exceeds g. in a large set of
cases. Thus, in general, a subset of voters who prefer public provision
higher than that provided under GM will prefer the GO regime. We
know from proposition 2 that they are always a minority.
In what follows, we adopt the usual terminology of referring to the
voter with the median most preferred level of government provision
as the "pivotal" voter. In our model, it is not necessarily the case that
the pivotal voter is the voter with median income. It is instructive
to consider two alternative restrictions on preferences that permit
determination of the income of the pivotal voter.
Let the slope of an indifference curve of U(g, y(l - t)) in the
(g, t) plane be denoted M(g, y, t). Hence,
Mug y t) _ Uh(gy(l
-
t))
(8)
It will be assumed for ally that the slope of the U(g, y (1 - t)) function
in the (g, t) plane is monotone in y. In particular, we consider the
following preference configurations.
ASSUMPTION 2a. aM(g, y, t)/ay < 0 for all y (SDI).
ASSUMPTION 2b. aM(g, y, t)/dy > 0 for all y (SRI).
For ease of reference, we adopt the mnemonics SDI (slope declining in income) and SRI (slope rising in income) to refer to these
assumptions. These conditions may be interpreted graphically as follows. Refer to figure 4. (The GPF is used below and may be ignored
for now.) Consider two voters y' and y", with y" > y'. The SDI assumption implies that, in the (g, t) plane, the strictly concave portion of
the indifference curve of voter y" crosses the strictly concave portion
of the indifference curve of voter y' from above. The SRI assumption
implies the reverse direction of crossing. Keep in mind that these
slope conditions regard only the strictly concave portions of indiffer-
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
70
a
t
GPF
yI
yo
y >yI
g
b
t
GPF
BY
yI
yII
>
yI
g
FIG. 4.-a,
SDI. b, SRI
ence curves, that is, portions where s = 0. The case in which slope is
unchanging in income will be denoted SUI.
Whether SDI or SRI is the more appropriate assumption depends
on the relative magnitudes of the price and income elasticities of the
(implicit) demand for good h. The marginal willingness to pay for
public provision rises with income since h is a normal good, but this
PUBLIC PROVISION
71
is countered by the increased tax price. Kenny (1978) has shown that
SRI results if the income elasticityof demand exceeds the (absolute
value of the) price elasticity,and SDI holds in the reverse case.5The
evidence strongly supports an assumption of SRI for health services
(see Keeler et al. 1988; Phelps 1992, chaps. 5, 17). Likewise, Bergstrom and Goodman's (1973) classic study of demand for publicly
provided goods supports an assumptionof SRI for police protection,
public parks and recreation, and general (noneducation) municipal
expenditures.6 On the other hand, for public transportation,an assumption of SDI may be more appropriate.
We henceforth focus on the empirically interesting case in which
median income is less than mean income.
ASSUMPTION 3.
Mean income exceeds median income.
For voters with income less than the mean, the linear portion of
an indifference curve has a slope in the (g, t) plane of lly that is
greater than the slope 1/I of the budget constraint. Hence, the most
preferred allocation of each such voter must be a point of tangency
between the strictlyconcave portion of an indifference curve and the
budget constraint. This fact will be useful for the results that follow.
The next two propositions characterizethe two types of equilibria
that assumption 2 permits in a GM regime.
PROPOSITION
4. In a GM regime, the voter with median income is
pivotal when SDI holds.
Proof. Consider voters with income y' < y and y" < i where y" > y'.
The SDI assumptionimplies that the most preferred level of expenditure for y" is less than the most preferred level of expenditure for
y' (see fig. 4a). Since all voters with y > y prefer zero government
expenditure, it follows that the most preferred levels of expenditure
are weakly decreasing in income for all Y. Hence, the voter with median income has the median most preferred level of expenditure.
Q.E.D.
The result in proposition 4 is related to the results obtained in
models of voting over linear tax schedules (Romer 1975; Roberts
1977; Meltzerand Richard 1981; Snyder and Kramer 1988). In those
models, the incentive for redistributiondeclines as income rises, and,
as noted above, households with greater than mean income prefer
no redistribution. The outcome is the tax rate that maximizes the
5 We adapt Kenny's analysis to our specific problem in an appendix (available on request).
6 Our results below actually indicate that adjustments to the estimation procedure
of Bergstrom and Goodman are warranted. They assumed that the median-income
voter was pivotal, whereas we show that a lower-income voter is pivotal in the case of
SRI. It would be interesting to reestimate their model to see whether this is of much
consequence to the estimates.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
72
median-income voter's utility taking account of the benefits of the net
tax transfer and the costs of distorted labor supply choices induced
by the tax. In proposition 4, the benefits to the median-income household come in the form of a reduced price per unit of the good provided publicly, and the costs come in the form of an inefficient allocation between the two goods the household consumes (see fig. 2b).
When SRI holds, the results are qualitatively different, as the next
proposition demonstrates.
PROPOSITION 5. When SRI holds, voter yi is pivotal in a GM regime,
with yi defined by
f f(y)dy = .5.
(9)
Proof. Consider voters with income y' < 5 and y" < y where y" > y'.
The SRI assumption implies that the most preferred level of expenditure for y" is greater than the most preferred level of expenditure
for y' (see fig. 4b). Thus, for all voters with y <j, the most preferred
levels of expenditure are weakly increasing in income. All voters with
y > j prefer zero government expenditure. It follows that the median
most preferred level of expenditure is that of a voter with income
level yi such that voters with incomes less than yi plus voters with
incomes greater than j constitute half the population. This value of
yi is given in equation (9). Q.E.D.
Remarks
1. Propositions 4 and 5 can be interpreted as follows. The pivotal
voter's optimization problem can be written
max U(g +sY
-
y
s).
Consider the incentives of a household with income below the mean.
The price of government provision of h equals ylj, which is less than
the price in the private market. The proportional tax system subsidizes such a household's consumption.7 The household's preference
is to choose s = 0 and satisfy its demand for h via government provision at the subsidized price. In doing so, the relatively poor household
indirectly effects a favorable wealth redistribution.
Now consider the identity of the pivotal voter. All those with y >
face a price of government provision that is above the private-market
price and prefer g = 0 (corollary 1). Under assumption 3, however,
7 Similar arguments apply to many tax systems, including some regressive ones, as
discussed in Sec. V.
PUBLIC
73
PROVISION
the majority prefer g > 0 (corollary 2). For the latter set of households, the most preferred level of g declines with income in the case
of SDI. Then the most preferred level of g declines with income for
the whole population, and the median-income voter is pivotal.
In the case of SRI, although the majority subset of households
prefer positive g, their most preferred choices increase with income.
The median-preference household must then have an income at the
fiftieth percentile below the mean to have equal-sized groups that
prefer lower and higher levels of provision.
2. The latter type of voting equilibrium has much intuitive appeal
for services such as health. When a private alternative is available,
high-income households prefer low public expenditure because private-market purchases cost them less per unit than public provision.
Low-income households prefer low public expenditures because they
are less willing to substitute health expenditures for other goods than
higher-income households. Middle-income households are more willing than low-income households to substitute health expenditures for
other expenditures, and they find public provision to be less costly
than private provision. Hence, a coalition of middle-income households prefers higher public expenditure at the margin, whereas a
coalition of high- and low-income households prefers a reduction. In
this "ends-against-the-middle" equilibrium, these two coalitions are
equal in size and balance each other in voting. The result suggests
that all households with income below the mean prefer some positive
level of public provision, but the highest level of public provision will
be desired by households with incomes near, but below, the mean.
3. The ends-against-the-middle equilibrium is reminiscent of Director's law of redistribution. Public redistribution occurs from the rich
and poor to the middle class according to the law (see Stigler 1970).
Our model provides theoretical support and conditions for this phenomenon.
4. The two varieties of equilibria illustrate when gm equals or exceeds go (proposition 3). The median-income household is pivotal
under SDI in both the GM and GO regimes. Since it chooses zero
supplement in the GM regime, g. = go. The pivotal voter's income
is below the median under SRI in a GM regime, implying gm <
go.
5. Provision of health services is Pareto inefficient in both types of
equilibria. Zero supplement is chosen by the pivotal voter and other
households, including all those with incomes below the pivotal voter
(by lemma 1). It is apparent from figure 2b that the marginal rate of
substitution of income for health services is below the marginal rate
of transformation for these households. Reductions in the level of
provision could yield Pareto improvements. Our interpretation of
this is moderated by the point made in the Introduction that public
74
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
provision may be motivated by some market imperfection. If public
provision is purely a consequence of the redistributive motive, then
equilibrium provision is inefficient.
We now turn to a comparison of total consumption of good h, both
public and private, under the three regimes we consider in this paper.
For this comparison, we make the following assumption.
AsSUMPTION 4. Preferences are homothetic.
The next proposition is concerned with total consumption of good
h under a GM regime. To prove it, we employ the following lemma.
LEMMA 3. Along the GPF, for any t, an income 9(t) exists such that
households with y > (') 9(t) would choose a positive (zero) supplement.
Proof. The function H(y(1 - t)) = g(t) defines ^(t)at point (g(t), t)
on the GPF. The claims then follow from lemma 1. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 6. Aggregate consumption under regime GM is
strictly increasing in the level of government provision, and hence,
aggregate consumption is higher under regime GM than under regime MO.
Proof. Let HGM be aggregate consumption under regime GM. We
show that HGM is an increasing function of t along the GPF, g(t). From
lemmas 1 and 3,
HGM(t) =
f
F(^(t))g(t) +
hd(y(l-t)
+ g(t))f(y)dy.
(10)
Differentiating, we get
00
HiM
=
F(^)g'
-
h'(y
-
g')f(y)dy
(11)
9
=
F(9)g' - k 7(y - g')f(y)dy,
by
where we use hd(9(l - t) + g) = g by lemma 1 and h' = k, a positive
constant less than one, by assumptions 4 and 1. Add and subtract
k f0 h'(y - g')f(y)dy and substitute g' = j, yielding
HMM = F(^)y + k
f(y- )f(y)dy - k 7 (y - j) f(y)dy
0
=
It is clear that
0
~~~~~~~~~(12)
(1 - k)yF(ff) + kfyf(y)dy.
HM
> 0 for all t > 0, implying the result. Q.E.D.
Remarks
1. A heuristic development clarifies the trade-off from increased public expenditure and the reason why aggregate expenditure rises. A
75
PUBLIC PROVISION
marginal increase in the tax rate increases public expenditure by y.
Those households with incomes greater than 9, which supplement
public provision, will, however, reduce their supplements. The reduction equals the demand (hd) change resulting from the change in
effective income, y(l - t) + g(t), further reduced by the demand
that is satisfied by the increased public provision. Specifically, a household with income y > 9 changes its supplement by k[g'(t) -y] g'(t) = - [ky + (1 - k)j]. Hence, the aggregate change equals
-
7
[ky+ (1 - k)f]f(y)dy,
which is easily confirmed to equal (12). Because the reduction in the
supplement is a convex combination of own income and the mean
income, it would offset the increased public expenditure only if every
household were to supplement. Households that choose zero supplement exist no matter how low t is since some have incomes arbitrarily
close to zero, so HGM is strictly increasing in t.8
2. Our model's prediction that majority choice of public provision
(and regime) leads to an increased aggregate provision is not too
surprising but is potentially quite important. It would be an oversimplification and would be premature to claim that this will be the consequence of the current political debate about health services. However,
we do believe that the force we have described may play a role: The
motive for redistribution tends to lead to increased expenditures on
the good. This is a strong prediction of the model.
PROPOSITION 7. (a) Ordering of preferences across individuals implies ordering of aggregate expenditure across regimes MO and GO:
am
(g
aM(gy t)=
> 0 (SRI)
0 (SUI)
< 0 (SDI)
>
t
HMO = HGO
.
<
(b) Under any of these three preference configurations, aggregate
expenditure under GM exceeds aggregate expenditure under GO.
Proof. The price per unit publicly provided for a voter with income
y is the same as the market price under MO. Thus, under regime
8 If the poorest household has income bounded above zero, then HGM is constant
until g(t) is high enough that this household stops supplementing. Increased public
expenditure completely "crowds out" private expenditure in this range. This is similar
to the neutrality result in the literature on public/private provision of public goods
(Sugden 1982; Warr 1983; Roberts 1984; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Bernheim 1986; Steinberg 1987; Andreoni 1988; Fries, Golding, and Romano 1991). Note,
too, that increased public provision is always associated with some crowding out of
private consumption, as in the latter literature.
76
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
GO, voter y prefers a public provision level of k *y, regardless of the
ordering of preferences with income.
Consider first the case in which slope is unchanging in income
(SUI). This condition implies that if, under GO, a given voter's indifference curve is tangent to the public budget constraint at some
(g, t), then all voters' indifference curves are tangent at that point.
Thus, when preferences satisfy SUI, all voters have the same most
preferred government provision level as voter -, and aggregate expenditure is k 5 under both regimes GO and MO.
By assumption 3, median income is less than mean income. When
preferences satisfy SRI, a voter with median income prefers less public expenditure in regime GO than the voter with mean income. Since
the voter with mean income prefers k * y, it follows that aggregate
expenditure is higher under MO than under GO when preferences
satisfy SRI. When SDI prevails, the voter with median income prefers
greater expenditure than the voter with mean income, and aggregate
expenditure is higher under GO than under MO. Thus part a is
proved.
Proposition 6 and part a above imply that aggregate expenditure
is higher with regime GM than with either regime MO or GO when
preferences satisfy SRI. Under SDI or SUI, the voter with median
income is pivotal in both regimes GM and GO. Hence, the level of
public provision is the same in both (see remark 4 following proposition 5). Since private purchases supplement government purchases
in regime GM, it follows that aggregate expenditure is higher under
regime GM than under regime GO. This proves part b. Q.E.D.
Let HMo, HGM,and HGO denote aggregate consumption under regimes MO, GM, and GO, respectively. Then we may summarize the
results of propositions 6 and 7 as follows:
Preference
Ordering
SRI
SUl
SDI
Expenditure Ranking
HGM > HMO > HGO
HGM > HMO =HGO
HGM > HGO> HMO
Note that while aggregate expenditures are the same under SUI in
regimes MO and GO, the distribution of utilities under these two
regimes is very different.
It is instructive to interpret the results in part a of proposition 7 in
terms of the demand for good h. Consider government provision
under a GO regime. As in the case of a GM regime, the price per
unit of g to a voter with income y is y15. Voter y's most preferred
allocation is simply that voter's demand function evaluated at income
y and price y15.
PUBLIC
PROVISION
77
Suppose that preferences are Cobb-Douglas: U(h, b) = hkbl-k. It is
easily shown that Cobb-Douglas preferences satisfy SUI. With CobbDouglas preferences, the price and income elasticities of demand for
health are - 1 and + 1, respectively. The demand function of voter
5 Thus there is unanimity in the choice of public
y is k(yly)-'y = k 5.
health expenditures: all voters want level k *y.
Now suppose that the preference function is such that the demand
function for health has price elasticity q. The demand for health by
voter y under regime GO is then k(yly)- *y. If voter y-were pivotal,
then demand would be k - 5, and aggregate consumption would again
be the same under GO as under GM. Since the pivotal voter has
income y < y, it follows that aggregate consumption under regime
if q < 1 (SRI).
GO exceeds k *j if q > 1 (SDI) and is less than k
V.
Generalizations of the Model
Key results of our model are existence of voting equilibrium in a GM
regime (proposition 1), majority preference for the GM regime over
GO and MO regimes (proposition 2), characterizations of GM equilibrium choice of public expenditure for two frequently adopted preference configurations (propositions 4 and 5), and higher aggregate expenditure in a GM equilibrium than in a market equilibrium
(proposition 6). Here we discuss several generalizations of the model
with an eye toward the latter results.9 These results are quite robust,
but we also emphasize when and how they vary. Findings reported
here that are more subtle are proved in an appendix (available on
request). A few generalizations of the model that we have not pursued
are also noted. For clarity, each generalization of the model is considered separately.
One direction of generalization examines alternative tax systems.
The results require little modification for single-parameter tax systems that are linear in the tax parameter, t. Consider tax systems of
the form T(y, t) = a(y)t, where T is household y's tax bill, t E [0,
tmax], and a'(y) E [0, 1/tmax], the latter so the marginal tax rate is
always nonnegative but below one. This tax system is more general
than it may seem. It admits progressive and regressive taxes and, of
course, subsumes the proportional-tax case.'0 The structural properties of the model are largely unaffected: Figure 1 continues to de-
9 We restrict attention to what we feel are the more important results primarily
out of concern for space. An appendix, available on request, provides additional
analyses.
10For y E [0, y. ], T = ty2, with t E [O. /2ymax],is an
example of a progressive tax
'
system; T = ty[I - (yl2y..)], with t E [0, 1], is an example of a regressive tax system.
78
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
scribe a household's preferences, the GPF remains linear, and preferences are single-peaked.
The results above all generalize with one significant difference.
Recall the significance of the mean-income household under proportional taxation. The household whose tax bill equals the average tax
bill plays an important role in any case. Those households with income above (below) this threshold income prefer zero (a positive) tax
in a GM regime. Consequently, public expenditure is positive in a
GM regime if and only if the median income is below this threshold.
In addition, in the ends-against-the-middle equilibrium of proposition 5, this threshold income provides the upper bound of the coalition that prefers tax increases. The difference in the generalized
model is that this threshold income need not equal the mean. It is
above (below) the mean under progressive (regressive) taxation for
marginal tax rates that are monotonic (see the examples in n. 10).11
Loosely, the reason is that the relative tax burden rises more rapidly
with income under progressive taxation than under proportional taxation, and the reverse for regressive taxation. The set of income distributions having a GM equilibrium with positive public expenditure
is then larger under progressive taxation and smaller under regressive taxation. Our proportional-tax model probably predicts dualprovision systems more frequently than occurs in reality, and the
prevalence of progressive taxation further exaggerates this prediction. Results discussed next may explain this anomaly.
A simpler, but potentially important, generalization allows the public marginal rate of transformation to differ from that in the private
market. Suppose that public provision comes at a higher cost than in
the market.'2 Preference mappings are unaffected by this change in
the model. The GPF simply becomes steeper! Three differences
emerge with regard to the main results. The income of the justdiscussed critical household drops below the mean (under proportional taxation). A household's tax bill must now be discretely below
the average tax bill for it to benefit from relatively costly public provision. This tightens the condition for public provision, predicting it
" A simple nonlinear tax system we have analyzed presumes zero marginal tax up
to an income y1 and then a constant marginal tax beyond, with voting over the magnitude of the positive marginal tax. Our results are easily extended if y1 is below the
median. The set of income distributions having positive g is relatively large since the
tax system is progressive. The equilibrium voting coalitions that characterize the case
of SRI are interesting. A coalition made up of upper-middle-income households and
the untaxed (incomes below Y1)that prefer tax increases balances an equal-sized coalition of lower-middle-income and wealthy households that favor lower taxes.
12 Public choice may also be relatively inefficient in selecting product characteristics
most appealing to consumers, reducing support for public provision. We thank an
anonymous referee for raising this interesting issue.
PUBLIC
PROVISION
79
less frequently. A second and obvious normative difference is the
inefficiency of public provision when positive public expenditure
characterizes equilibrium. Third, related to the latter, is a variation
of proposition 6. Although, a fortiori, aggregate expenditure on the
good rises with the tax rate, the aggregate quantityof provision need
not.
Another generalization relaxes the monotonicity assumption, SRI
or SDI. The GM equilibrium exists without such monotonicity conditions. We used these restrictions to characterize coalitions supporting
voting equilibrium in a GM regime, demonstrating the possibility of
a coalition consisting of two unconnected income ranges in the case
of SRI. The effect of relaxing monotonicity would be to allow equilibrium with coalitions consisting of more than two unconnected income
ranges in some cases. In any equilibrium, however, the top income
segment will always favor tax decreases under the normality assumption (assumption 1).
As in other models of voting over tax structure, generalizations
such as tax systems nonlinear in the tax parameter or systems with
multiple tax parameters may result in non-single-peaked preferences
and accompanying potential problems of the existence of equilibrium. Generalizations such as increasing marginal cost of provision
of the good would sometimes do the same. We have not pursued
such generalizations.
A generalization that induces non-single-peaked preferences that
we have analyzed presumes that the joint consumption of the public
and private alternatives is infeasible for technical or institutional reasons. Education is a prime example. It is well known that voting
equilibrium may fail to exist here (Stiglitz 1974). In Epple and Romano (1994), we show that condition SDI implies existence with the
median-income household pivotal, and equilibrium, when it exists, is
of the ends-against-the-middle variety under condition SRI (see also
Barzel 1973; Glomm and Ravikumar, in press). We did not consider
comparisons to other possible regimes. Since the Pareto-dominance
argument in the proof of proposition 2 continues to apply, equilibrium when one exists favors permitting households to choose either
public or private consumption relative to either a GO or MO regime.13 Proposition 6 does not, however, extend to this case. As the
tax rate rises, the total expenditure on the good of those that switch
from private to public consumption declines, permitting aggregate
expenditure to decline.'4
13 We show that the median income below the mean income is sufficient for any GM
equilibrium to have positive public expenditure in Epple and Romano (1994).
14 As we noted in n. 1, Gouveia (1993) independently addresses several of the same
8o
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Above we defended our analysis of voting over public provision of
a consumption good and not over income redistribution by appeal to
agenda control. A final generalization serves to demonstrate that, in
the presence of labor supply incentives, the in-kind transfer policy
that we have considered may be majority preferred to a cash transfer
policy. Note first that in the absence of labor supply incentives, a cash
transfer policy would be majority preferred to the GM policy that we
have characterized. The proof follows the logic of proposition 2.15
Now consider the following extension of our model, which borrows
heavily from Meltzer and Richard (1985). Individuals get utility from
health services, h, and the numeraire commodity, b, and they get
disutility from labor, 1: U = U(h, b, 1). Technology requires that an
individual supply either one unit of labor (e.g., a standard workday)
or zero (drop out of the labor force).'6 Individuals differ in skill
level, x, which has continuous distribution with support [0, Xmax].An
individual who works earns income y = w * x, where w is the wage
per skill unit of labor.
Tax revenue is allocated to an in-kind grant of gh per individual
or a numeraire (income) transfer of gb per individual. Individuals
allocate a numeraire grant optimally and, as above, can supplement
consumption of any in-kind grant but cannot exchange the in-kind
grant for the numeraire commodity. Preferences are such that indi-
issues in his study of the political economy of health care, and we can now briefly
compare results of the two papers using our notation for ease of exposition. Results
on single-peakedness and the existence of voting equilibrium are analogous in the two
papers. Gouveia then shows that regime GM defeats regimes GO and MO when voting
occurs (implicitly) first over regime and then over level of provision. Our proposition
2 shows that the result also holds with simultaneous voting over regime and provision
level. In addition, in Sec. V, we show that the results apply to environments in which
the publicly and privately provided goods are not perfect substitutes. In other respects,
the papers address different but complementary issues. We develop comparisons of
expenditure levels under alternative policy regimes (propositions 3 and 6) and preference configurations (proposition 7), whereas Gouveia studies comparative static implications for the dual-provision case.
15 Those supplementing under a GM regime are indifferent between the in-kind
transfer and the cash transfer, and those not supplementing strictly prefer the cash
transfer. Hence, for a given tax rate and expenditure level, the cash transfer Paretodominates the in-kind transfer. This coupled with the observation that the majoritypreferred cash transfer policy defeats any other cash transfer policy implies that the
majority-preferred cash transfer policy defeats the in-kind policy. This implication is
very much in line with Friedman's (1962) argument for cash transfers rather than
in-kind transfers.
16 Assuming discrete labor supply alternatives greatly simplifies the analysis to follow
and permits us to easily highlight key restrictions on preferences that give rise to a
political preference for in-kind rather than cash redistribution. It would be of interest
to explore the issues in the preceding sections of the paper assuming continuous
variation in labor supply, but the attendant nonlinearity of the GPF introduces a great
deal of complexity into the analysis.
81
PUBLIC PROVISION
viduals always prefer consumption of all goods: "man cannot live by
health care alone."
ASSUMPTION 5. For any gh> 0 and for all x,
U(gh, 0,0) < max U(gh + S, wx
ASSUMPTION6. For any
for all x < x(gb),
gb >
-
s,1).
0, there is some X(gb) > 0 such that,
max U(h,gb - h, 0) > max U(h,gb + wx - h, 1).
{h}
{h}
Condition 5 states that no amount of good h will induce any individual to drop out of the labor force and entirely forgo consumption of
the numeraire. Condition 6 states that there is always a set of individuals with sufficiently low skill that a positive transfer of the numeraire
will induce them to drop out of the labor force, allocate their income
grant optimally, and consume maximum leisure.
In the absence of transfers of the numeraire, all individuals choose
to work. Hence, with this preference structure, all results in the preceding sections continue to hold. We now consider whether a cash
transfer program would be chosen in preference to the GM in-kind
program. Let (go, gb t) denote a policy triplet. Let (g*, 0, t*) be the
GM equilibrium. We now develop a sufficient condition such that, at
tax rate t*, there is no alternative grant policy (h' gb, t*) that is
majority preferred.
The sufficient condition for the GM allocation (g*, 0, t*) to defeat
(g,,,gb, t*) is that the voter of median skill in the GM allocation purchases supplemental care. This condition is likely to be met in the
"usual" case in which preferences satisfy SRI. As proposition 5 shows,
the GM allocation in this case maximizes the utility of a voter with
income yi that is often well below median income. For example, for
a lognormal income distribution with mean $36,520 and median
$28,906 (1991 Statistical Abstractof the United States, tables 722, 724)
and a constant elasticity of substitution utility function with expenditure share on h equal to .15 and price elasticity for h equal to -.19
(in market equilibrium),'7 Yi = $13,515 and t* = .078, and the median-income voter supplements the in-kind transfer for any t < =
.124.18
17 The utility function is U = [(lOh)-4 + b-4 + (k - I)-4]-4, for any k > 1, and the
market price of h is normalized to one. The income elasticity equals one, of course,
since these preferences are homothetic. The calculations of t* and t are available from
us.
18 Tax t is the one for which the i(-) locus for the median-income (or median-skill)
individual crosses the GPF.
JOURNAL
82
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Is there any reason to believe that t* will be the equilibriumchoice
of tax rate? If the tax rate is first chosen by majority rule followed
by the balanced-budget mix (gh, gb),'9 then t* defeats tax rates in its
vicinity. Such tax rates continue to induce a choice of gb = 0 in the
second stage of voting, implying that the results of our GM model
can be applied. In fact, for all t < t (see n. 18), gb = 0 is the majority
choice in the second stage. Hence, for t* < 4, t* is always a "local"
equilibrium and is the global equilibrium over t E [0, t7. We have
shown that equilibrium always exists in the second stage for t > I as
well (details available on request). Although confirmation would require computational analysis, a continuity argument suggests that t*
will be the equilibrium choice in a broad range of cases.20 The existence problem (see n. 19) reemerges, however, if voters select simultaneously from a vector of multiple in-kind tranfers and a cash transfer,
so the argument relies on some exogenous limits on the political process.
VI.
Conclusion
Our results are striking. Using only standard regularity conditions
on preferences, we show that a majority voting equilibrium exists. A
regime of government provision that permits privately purchased
supplements is majority preferred to either a market-only or a
government-only regime. We also present results ordering the level
of government provision and the level of total consumption of the
good under these three regimes. While the GM regime will generally
not have the highest level of public provision, our results suggest
that combined public and private consumption will be higher in this
regime.
The model can be generalized in several ways, including consideration of progressive and regressive tax systems, differences in costs
between public and private providers, and goods for which it is infeasible to jointly consume the public and private alternatives. We have
outlined key implications of these generalizations.
We also show that the median voter (i.e., the voter whose most
preferred level of public provision is chosen under majority rule)
need not be the voter with median income. Indeed, by employing a
frequently used and intuitively appealing single-crossing condition
19 Simultaneous voting over t and the mix of transfers will not have an equilibrium
generically (Plott 1967).
20 While gb will rise above zero for t > i, the continuity argument demonstrates that
a strict (and substantial) majority will prefer t* over t greater than but near t, provided
that f and t* are substantially different.
PUBLIC
PROVISION
83
on preferences, we show that the voting equilibrium may be one in
which a middle-income group preferring higher government provision is counterbalanced by a coalition of low-income voters preferring
low government provision and high-income voters preferring no government provision. This intuitively appealing outcome is of interest
in its own right as a compelling illustration of the danger of assuming
the median voter to be the voter with median income.
References
Andreoni, James. "Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy:
The Limits of Altruism."J. Public Econ. 35 (February 1988): 57-73.
Barr, James L., and Davis, Otto A. "An Elementary Political and Economic
Theory of the Expenditures of State and Local Governments." Southern
Econ. J. 33 (October 1966): 149-65.
Barzel, Yoram. "Private Schools and Public School Finance."J.P.E. 81 (January/February 1973): 174-86.
Bergstrom, Theodore C.; Blume, Lawrence; and Varian, Hal. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods."J. Public Econ. 29 (February 1986): 25-49.
Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Goodman, Robert P. "Private Demands for
Public Goods." A.E.R. 63 (June 1973): 280-96.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. "On the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods." A.E.R. 76 (September 1986): 789-93.
Besley, Timothy, and Coate, Stephen. "Public Provision of Private Goods and
the Redistribution of Income." A.E.R. 81 (September 1991): 979-84.
Blackorby, Charles, and Donaldson, David. "Cash versus Kind, Self-Selection,
and Efficient Transfers." A.E.R. 78 (September 1988): 691-700.
Denzau, Arthur T., and Mackay, Robert J. "Structure-Induced Equilibria
and Perfect-Foresight Expectations." AmericanJ. Polit. Sci. 25 (November
1981): 762-79.
Enelow, James M., and Hinich, Melvin J. "Voting One Issue at a Time: The
Question of Voter Forecasts." American Polit. Sci. Rev. 77 (June 1983):
435-45.
Epple, Dennis, and Kadane, Joseph B. "Sequential Voting with Endogenous
Voter Forecasts." AmericanPolit. Sci. Rev. 84 (March 1990): 165-75.
Epple, Dennis, and Romano, Richard. "Ends against the Middle: Determining Public Service Provision When There Are Private Alternatives."J. Public Econ. (in press).
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press,
1962.
Fries, Timothy L.; Golding, Edward; and Romano, Richard E. "Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large
Finite Economies." Internat. Econ. Rev. 32 (February 1991): 147-57.
Glomm, Gerhard, and Ravikumar, B. "Opting Out of Publicly Provided Services: A Majority Voting Result." Social Choiceand Welfare (in press).
Gouveia, Miguel. "Majority Rule and the Public Provision of Health Care."
Working paper. Philadelphia: Univ. Pennsylvania, October 1993.
Keeler, E. B., et al. "The Demand for Episodes of Treatment in the Health
Insurance Experiment." Report no. R-3454-HHS. Santa Monica, Calif.:
Rand Corp., March 1988.
84
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY
Kenny, Lawrence W. "The Collective Allocation of Commodities in a Democratic Society: A Generalization." Public Choice 33, no. 2 (1978): 117-20.
Leonesio, Michael V. "Predicting the Effects of In-Kind Transfers on Labor
Supply." SouthernEcon. J. 54 (April 1988): 90 1-12.
Meltzer, Allan H., and Richard, Scott F. "A Rational Theory of the Size of
Government." J.P.E. 89 (October 1981): 914-27.
. "A Positive Theory of In-Kind Transfers and the Negative Income
Tax." Public Choice47, no. 1 (1985): 231-65.
Phelps, Charles E. Health Economics.New York: HarperCollins, 1992.
Plott, Charles R. "A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority
Rule." A.E.R. 57 (September 1967): 787-806.
Roberts, Kevin W. S. "Voting over Income Tax Schedules."J. Public Econ. 8
(December 1977): 329-40.
Roberts, Russell D. "A Positive Model of Private Charity and Public Transfers." J.P.E. 92 (February 1984): 136-48.
Romer, Thomas. "Individual Welfare, Majority Voting, and the Properties
of a Linear Income Tax." J. Public Econ. 4 (February 1975): 163-85.
Romer, Thomas, and Rosenthal, Howard. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On
the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy." QJ.E.
93 (November 1979): 563-87.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." Public Choice 37, no. 3 (1981): 503-19.
. "Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy
Implications." A.E.R. Papers and Proc. 72 (May 1982): 367-7 1.
Snyder, James M., and Kramer, Gerald H. "Fairness, Self-Interest, and the
Politics of the Progressive Income Tax." J. Public Econ. 36 (July 1988):
197-230.
Steinberg, Richard S. "Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures in a
Federalist System." A.E.R. 77 (March 1987): 24-36.
Stigler, George J. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution." J. Law
and Econ. 13 (April 1970): 1-10.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. "The Demand for Education in Public and Private School
Systems." J. Public Econ. 3 (November 1974): 349-85.
Sugden, Robert. "On the Economics of Philanthropy." Econ. J. 92 (June
1982): 341-50.
Warr, Peter G. "The Private Provision of a Public Good Is Independent of
the Distribution of Income." Econ. Letters 13, nos. 2-3 (1983): 207-11.