he role and place of the African
Standby Force within the African
Peace and Security Architecture
INTRODUCTION
In the post-Cold War era, the peace and security scene of
Africa has changed fundamentally. his change relates
not only to the changing nature of conlicts and the focus
of the discourse on security, but also to various initiatives taken by Africa to institute an efective peace and
security regime. In this context a remarkable development has been the establishment of an African Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA) by the continental body,
the African Union (AU). One of the most important and probably the most ambitious - institutional tools that
the AU decided to establish as part of the APSA is the
African Standby Force (ASF).1 he ASF is intended to be
one of the mechanisms through which the AU seeks to
respond to future conlicts and crisis situations on the
continent ‘timely and eiciently’.2
his paper seeks to highlight the importance and
place of the ASF within the APSA and critically examines the potential of the ASF and the challenges facing
it as one of the most important mechanisms for the
AU’s strategic response to conlicts. It is argued that as
much as the activities aimed at operationalising the ASF
prepare the ASF for its role as the most important tool for
realising the historical promises of the AU to ordinary
Africans as encapsulated, among others, by Article 4(h)
of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, they also
reveal the enormous challenges that would militate
against the realisation of its full potential.
Organisation
he paper is divided into seven parts. he introduction
is followed by a brief outline of the nature of current
and future conlicts and security threats with which the
continent needs to contend, among others by the deployment of the ASF. he next section analyses the normative
and institutional framework within which the ASF is
being instituted and will operate. his is followed by an
examination of the role and place of the ASF within the
APSA. he paper then focuses on an examination of the
ASF concept and plan and the work currently under way
for its operationalisation to interrogate the potential and
limitations of the ASF. he requirements for the successful operationalisation of the ASF and the issues that pose
a serious challenge for the ASF’s role as a critical tool in
AU’s endeavour of conlict prevention and management
are considered in the following section. he paper closes
with some conclusions and observations.
Method and scope
he study is both descriptive and analytical in its approach.
Accordingly, in the main body of the paper an overview
is given of the normative and institutional framework of
the APSA. he paper also contains a critical analysis of the
role, proposed plan and concept of the ASF and examines
shortcomings and challenges that would limit the potential
of the ASF as one of AU’s critical response mechanisms for
conlict prevention, management and resolution in Africa.
he study made use of both primary and secondary
sources and draws heavily on oicial documents such
as treaties, declarations and policy instruments. his is
supplemented by information gathered through personal
observation and involvement in AU events relevant to
the subject. While the study used the available literature
on the subject in the form of books, articles and reports,
it seeks to make a limited but signiicant contribution
to the existing literature by ofering information on and
insights into the APSA.
THE TRENDS AND NATURE OF
CONFLICTS IN AFRICA
Although the number of conlicts on the continent
has declined compared to the 1990s,3 the post-colonial
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
African state continues to be prone to violent clashes,
which oten results in complex emergency situations. During the past decade, many countries - the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Central
African Republic, Uganda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
Somalia, Angola, Mali, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal,
Congo Brazzaville and the Comoros - have been subjected to long-standing conlicts and new violent conlicts
erupted in many others (including Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan
(Darfur), Chad, Nigeria, and Kenya). As Richard Jackson
noted, ‘[m]any other African states face instability, high
levels of domestic political violence, or burgeoning secessionist or rebel movements’.4
In the 21st century conl icts, particularly of the
internal kind, 5 continue to pose as serious a threat as
disease and drought to the life, security and property
of people and the survival of the post-colonial African
state.6 here are several factors that suggest that Africa
will continue to witness violent conl icts and serious
political upheavals. he i rst is the continued fragility
or weakness of many states in Africa.7 h is relates to
the illegitimate origin of the African state, its corrupt
and authoritarian systems of governance, the alienation of state structures and processes from the public,
and the failure of state institutions to provide for the
needs of citizens in any meaningful way.8 Other, related
factors are the failure of the consolidation of democratic forms of governance in many parts of Africa and
the decline of constitutionalism.9 Related to these two
is the rise of political instability in many countries,
as manifested in post-election conl icts in countries
such as Kenya,10 Zimbabwe,11 Nigeria,12 Lesotho13 and
Ethiopia.14
There are several factors that
suggest that Africa will continue
to witness violent conlicts and
serious political upheavals
he persistent high level of poverty and the rise in the
susceptibility of many parts of Africa to drought as
a result of climate change add to the vulnerability of
many African states to conl ict.15 Other factors that
shape the trend and dynamics of conl icts in Africa
include struggles over scarce resources and the exploitation of natural resources, inequalities among members
of diferent groups and regions, ethnic domination as
well as ethnic or ethno-regional rivalry and manipulation, uneven progress in economic development, and
2
involvement of external actors either from within the
region or outside.
Most of these conlicts are and will continue to be
intra-state conlicts, albeit with admittedly signiicant
regional dimensions. hese conlicts have certain features
that have to be considered when striving to develop an
efective response. One of the characteristics of these
conlicts in Africa is their persistence. Another characteristic is the multiplicity of actors involved in these conlicts.
According to Jackson, ‘African wars are characterized by
the involvement of a multiplicity and diversity of military
and non-military actors.’16 hese include government military groups (formal and informal, internal and external),
rebels, insurgents, private militias, warlords, mercenaries,
private security providers, multinational corporations,
and other business interest groups. hose involved in the
actual ighting are ‘amply supplied with arms, obsessively
secretive, inexperienced in negotiations, lacking transparent lines of authority, undisciplined, unfamiliar with the
norms of international behaviour (including humanitarian
law) and violent’.17
Many of these parties pursue or are mainly motivated by non-political objectives. As studies of several
of the conl icts in for example Liberia, Angola, Sierra
Leone, the DRC and Somalia show, for many of these
participants ‘warfare is a smokescreen for the pursuit
of accumulation in the form of direct exploitation of
valuable commodities such as diamonds, the monopolisation of trade and taxation, the establishment of
protection rackets, the diversion of emergency aids or
sanctions busting – among others’.18 hese situations
are exacerbated by the proliferation of weapons and
the resultant militarisation of the population in the
afected areas.
he conlicts are also not conducted by means of
traditional warfare but employ various unconventional
methods of combat, including terror tactics such as
deliberate mutilation, terrorism, rape and forcible
conscription, which oten target civilians, women and
children. In a number of these conlicts children have
been recruited as combatants.19 In fact, civilians oten
become the deliberate targets of warfare and hence sufer
more casualties than combatants.20 Serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law are committed21 and
there is a large-scale displacement of people as refugees
try to lee from the violence.22
In many of these conlicts, the state machinery has
collapsed or is very weak. Governance structures such
as the parliamentary process, the security apparatus,
the justice system, prison administration and public
administration, as well as local structures, are dysfunctional or non-existent. In other cases these conlicts
themselves lead to the collapse of state institutions and
law and order.
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
Although it is true that these conlicts are mainly
intra-state in nature, they oten have an external dimension due to the involvement of regional actors. he three
major conlict situations currently occurring in Africa,
namely in Darfur, Somalia and the DRC, aptly illustrate
how neighbouring states become involved in intra-state
conlicts with a resultant spill-over efect on regional stability. his is partly attributable to the security problems
arising from the artiicial borders of many post-colonial
African states. his emphasises that the regional dimensions of conlicts should receive attention as part of an
efective process for peacemaking.
The nature of African conlicts is
such that conlict management
should involve peace-building
and reconstruction activities
covering the whole range of
political, economic, humanitarian,
human rights and security
issues that led to and were
occasioned by the conlict
Africa will in the short to medium term continue to
experience violent conlicts which tend to be complicated
and give rise to complex emergency situations. he
implication is not just that there is a need for a response
mechanism, but rather that the nature and efect of these
conlicts necessitate the development of a mechanism
that is capable of deploying robust and efective responses to contain and eventually address these situations. his mechanism should also be lexible enough to
handle diferent kinds of situations. If the mechanism
is also to be efective in preventing host societies from
relapsing back to conlicts, it should not stop short of
addressing the factors that triggered the conlict. It needs
to engage the underlying political and socio-economic
factors. In other words, it should go beyond silencing the
guns and also involve peace-building and reconstruction
activities covering the whole range of political, economic,
humanitarian, human rights and security issues that
led to and were occasioned by the conlict. Conlict
management in this context should therefore go beyond
negotiating a peace agreement between the leaders of the
warring factions and also involve state or nation-building
initiatives.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
INTO THE AFRICAN UNION: TOWARDS
A NEW PEACE AND SECURITY REGIME
he transformation of the OAU into the AU was not a
change in form or in name only. It actually ushered in
substantive normative and institutional changes that
were totally unthinkable some years back under the
OAU. his is represented on the normative plane by the
move away from strict adherence to non-interference
to the right of the AU to intervene23 and by the prominence given to human rights and democracy in the AU
Constitutive Act and repeated without fail in almost all
of the major instruments it has subsequently adopted.24
At the institutional level, this transformation most
notably saw the emergence of the admittedly ambitious
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), of
which the ASF forms a part.
he decision to establish the AU was taken in 1999.
At the fourth extraordinary session of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held
in Sirte, Libya, the Assembly adopted a declaration
calling for the establishment of the African Union to
replace the Organisation of African Unity. he declaration expressly acknowledged that the ‘Continental
Organization needs to be revitalized in order to be able
to play a more active role and continue to be relevant to
the needs of our peoples and responsive to the demands
of the prevailing circumstances’.25 On the one hand,
the huge political, economic and social changes that
the world witnessed in the post-Cold War era brought
about new challenges with which Africa has to contend.
While the OAU system had reached its major objective
of the full liberation of Africa, it was operating on the
basis of outdated normative frameworks, institutional
structures and operational techniques. he OAU had
therefore served its time and was due for replacement.
Africa created for itself a new outit in the form of
the AU.
his transformation and the resultant normative
and institutional changes thus clearly represent Africa’s
strategic response to the numerous challenges facing the
continent, particularly in the form of intra- and interstate conlicts which continue to pose serious threat to
peace and security.
he AU took over from the OAU with the adoption
of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.26 he entry
into force of the Act on 26 May 2001 marked the birth
of the AU and its inauguration in Durban in 2002 its
oicial launch.
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
3
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE
AND SECURITY REGIME
As noted above, the AU introduced huge normative
changes whose reach and impact were not fully appreciated at the time. hese changes are most powerfully
expressed in the areas of peace and security, human
rights and democracy and intervention. Not surprisingly,
peace and security constitute the most important items
on the agenda of the newly established continental body,
the AU. According to the preamble to the Constitutive
Act, one of the factors underlying the establishment of
the AU was the recognition of ‘the fact that the scourge
of conlicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to
the socio-economic development of the continent and of
the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and
integration agenda’.27 In line with this, the Act provides
that one of the objectives of the AU is to ‘promote peace,
security, and stability on the continent’.
Article 4(h) not only creates the
legal basis for intervention but
also imposes an obligation on
the AU to intervene to prevent
or stop the perpetration of such
heinous international crimes
anywhere on the continent
Probably the more interesting aspect of the Constitutive
Act in this area, and which marks a complete break
from the OAU, is the ground-breaking principle of the
right of the Union to intervention.28 he Act stipulates
in Article 4(h) that the AU has the right to intervene in
a member state ‘pursuant to a decision of the Assembly
in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity’. h is is a more
than mere generic commitment to the promotion of
peace and security and encapsulates the resolve of
Africa to never let another Rwanda happen again. It
not only creates the legal basis for intervention but
also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene
to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous
international crimes anywhere on the continent. As
Cilliers and Sturman rightly pointed out, this is one of
4
the provisions of the Act that form ‘the cornerstones of
credibility’ of the AU.29
his provision, together with the emphasis on ending
conlicts and promoting peace and security, reverses the
primacy that the OAU accorded to the state and its statecentric principles over people and the rights and interests
of citizens. Most notably, it revises the understanding
and scope of the application of the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference. By narrowing the scope of
application of state sovereignty and non-interference, this
provision removed the issues covered by these principles
from the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the state and
made them matters of continental concern. It settled the
controversy about the limits of these principles in cases
of grave danger to the lives of citizens of a state. his
represents a paradigmatic shit from the OAU’s exclusive
focus on state security to the security and wellbeing of
individuals and peoples, as encapsulated by the concept
of human security.30
he efect is that principles of sovereignty and
non-interference no longer shield states from external
scrutiny and even military intervention, not only where
they endanger the lives of people on a massive scale but
also where they are unable to protect their citizens from
such grave threats.31 Furthermore, it is no longer possible
to justify inaction on the part of the new organisation
in the face of such threats. In this, the AU Constitutive
Act became a pioneer in what has come to be characterised as a ‘systemic shit in international law, namely
a growing tendency to recognise that the principle of
state sovereignty inds its limits in the protection of
“human security”’.32
he most notable features of the AU Constitutive Act
is its emphasis on protecting people from grave circumstances and the promotion of human and peoples’ rights
as well as democracy and good governance. Underlying
the principle of intervention and the focus on peace
and security is the overriding concern for the inherent
dignity and inalienable worth of the individuals and
communities who are the citizens of the member states of
the AU. his is reiterated in the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC
Protocol).33
Consistent with the paradigmatic shit within the
framework of the Constitutive Act from state security
to human security, the approach that the PSC Protocol
articulates is underpinned by the concern for the
wellbeing and security of people. h is is expressed i rst
in the recognition of ‘the fact that the development of
strong democratic institutions and culture, observance
of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the
implementation of post-conl ict recovery programmes
and sustainable development policies, are essential
for the promotion of collective security, durable peace
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
and stability, as well as the prevention of conl icts’.34
Second, it envisages that one of the objectives of the
PSC is to ‘promote and encourage democratic practices,
good governance and the rule of law, protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect the sanctity
of human life and humanitarian law’. 35 Among the
principles that underpin the PSC Protocol are also
(a) early response to contain crisis situations so as
to prevent them from developing into full-blown
conl icts, 36 (b) respect for the rule of law, fundamental
human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life
and international humanitarian law, 37 and (c) the right
of the AU to intervene in a member state in respect of
grave circumstances as dei ned under Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act. 38
he normative basis for the AU’s peace and security
regime is further elaborated in the Solemn Declaration
on a Common African Defence and Security Policy.39 As
a point of departure, the policy identiies human security
as an important basis and measure of the continental
collective security system. Accordingly, it draws attention
to the need to focus on human rights, good governance,
democracy and equitable social and economic development. Moreover, the policy rightly identiies as common
security threats not only inter-state conlicts/tensions
and common external threats, but also intra-state
conlicts/tensions. Given the high incidence of intra-state
conlicts, such conlicts pose the most serious danger
to the peace and security of the continent. he threats
identiied under this category include:
■
■
■
■
■
■
■
he existence of grave circumstances, namely war
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity
Lack of respect for the sanctity of human life,
impunity, political assassination, acts of terrorism
and subversion
Coups d’état and unconstitutional changes of
government, as well as situations which prevent and
undermine the promotion of democratic institutions
and structures, including the absence of the rule of
law, equitable social order, population participation
and electoral processes
Improper conduct of electoral processes
Absence of the promotion and protection of human
and peoples’ rights, individual and collective
freedoms and equitable opportunities for all, including women, children and ethnic minorities
Poverty and inequitable distribution of natural
resources
Corruption
he Common Security and Defence Policy further
outlines a number of principles and values that reiterate and reinforce the peace and security norms of the
Constitutive Act. It reairms the right of the AU to
intervene in a member state in respect of war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. Other values
include respect for democratic principles, human rights,
the rule of law and good governance. In addition, it envisions ‘early action for conlict prevention, containment,
management, resolution and elimination, including the
deployment and sustenance of peacekeeping missions
and thus promote initiatives that will preserve and
strengthen peace and development in Africa’.40
hese normative changes should clearly be supported
by corresponding institutional developments or changes
as well. In other words, alongside these normative
developments there is a need for institutional structure/s
that will implement these norms, particularly as they
relate to peace and security and intervention. he AU
Constitutive Act itself does not give enough guidance
in this regard. It merely mentions that the AU Assembly
shall ‘give directives to the Executive Council on the
management of conlicts, war and other emergency
situations and the restoration of peace’.41
The institutional dimension
he lack of guidance was rectiied with the adoption of
the PSC Protocol at the irst ordinary session of the AU
heads of state and government in Durban, South Africa.
It came into force in January 2004 following its ratiication by a simple majority of member states of the AU and
was launched in May 2004.
h is Protocol endowed the AU with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, which has
come to be known as the African Union Peace and
Security Architecture (APSA). he Peace and Security
Council (PSC) is central to the APSA and is ‘a standing
decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conl icts’ which operates as ‘a
collective security and early warning arrangement to
facilitate timely and eicient response to conl ict and
crisis situations in Africa’.42 he mandates accorded to
the PSC as stipulated under Article 7 include that the
PSC should:
■
■
■
■
Anticipate and prevent disputes and conlicts as well
as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes
against humanity
Undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to resolve conlicts where they have
occurred
Authorise the mounting and deployment of peace
support missions
Recommend to the Assembly intervention in a
member state in respect of grave circumstances as
provided for in article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
5
■
Support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conlicts or major natural disasters
Article 2 of the PSC Protocol also identiies other components of the APSA, which support the PSC in fuli lling
its mandates. One of these is the African Standby Force
(ASF).
THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE AFRICAN
STANDBY FORCE WITHIN THE AFRICAN
PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Article 2 of the PSC Protocol deines the components of
the APSA that support the works of the PSC. hese are
the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental
Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby
Force (ASF), and a Special Fund.
he diferent components of the APSA come into
play sequentially in the process for the prevention,
management and resolution of conl icts. Initially, the
collection and analysis of information at the level of the
CEWS triggers the application of the APSA. he CEWS
uses the information it has collected mainly from public
sources to analyse developments on the continent with
a view to alerting the other relevant bodies to developments that require attention.43 he Chairperson shall
then consider the information and analysis to plan appropriate courses of action that the situation demands
through the Commission for Peace and Security.44 S/
he uses the information to irst timeously advise the
PSC on potential conl icts and threats to the peace
and security in Africa and recommend the best course
of action and second initiate eforts for preventing
potential conl icts or for making peace.45
It is at the stage where eforts for conl ict prevention
and peacemaking are deployed that the Panel of the
Wise comes into play.46 he Panel has a peacemaking
and advisory role and is also mandated ‘to support the
eforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of
the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the
area of conl ict prevention’.47 Speciically, the Panel has
the mandate to ‘advise the Peace and Security Council
and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on all
issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of
peace, security and stability in Africa’.48 In addition, ‘at
its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall undertake
such action deemed appropriate to support the eforts
of the Peace and Security Council and those of the
Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of
conl ict’.49
Within the framework of the APSA, the ASF comes
into action in cases where violent conlicts are about
to erupt or have already erupted and/or to intervene
in respect of grave circumstances.50 Under normal
6
circumstances it therefore acts at the end of the chain of
the APSA components and processes. However, depending on the conlict situation, it can be deployed alongside
other components of the APSA who are assigned
peacemaking roles. he system thus has the lexibility to
deploy the ASF at any stage of a conlict, including for
preventive deployment.
he role or mandate of the ASF is closely linked to
the PSC’s tasks in the areas of conl ict management
and resolution. According to Article 13 of the PSC
Protocol:
In order to enable the Peace and Security Council
perform its responsibilities with respect to the
deployment of peace support missions and intervention
pursuant to Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act,
an African Standby Force shall be established.
Clearly, the ASF is one of the most critical elements of the
APSA that will enable the AU to deliver on its promise
of intervention to protect people in grave circumstances
and to provide a prompt and robust response to manage
and resolve African crises. It enables the PSC irst to
prevent and manage conlicts, among others by containing their spread or escalation, second to support its
peace processes as a peace support mission, and third to
enforce its decisions in cases of grave circumstances or
to intervene.
As envisaged in the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be
prepared for rapid deployment for a range of peacekeeping operations,51 including:
■
■
■
■
■
■
Observation and monitoring missions
Other types of peace support missions
Intervention in accordance with Articles 4(h) and (j)
of the Constitutive Act
Preventive deployment in order to prevent a conlict
from escalating, or an ongoing conlict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, or the resurgence
of violence ater peace agreements are achieved
Peace-building, including post-conlict disarmament
and demobilisation
Humanitarian assistance in situations of conlict and
major natural disasters
he ASF was thus conceived from the outset as a
mechanism that will undertake a whole range of modern
peacekeeping and peace-building activities. Indeed,
it is envisaged that the ASF should be able to respond
to a range of conlict scenarios. he Policy Framework
for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staf
Committee52 identiies six possible conlict and mission
scenarios that the ASF is likely to face and will need to
respond to (see Table 1).
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
Table 1 ASF mission scenarios
Scenario
Description
1
AU/regional military advisor to a political mission
2
AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with UN
mission
3
Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission
4
AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and
preventive deployment missions
5
AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional
peacekeeping mission – low-level spoilers
6
AU intervention in cases of grave circumstances
Source Adapted from the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African
Standby Force and the Military Staf Committee Chapter 1 para. 1.6
Given the nature of conlicts in Africa and the context
in which these conlicts take place, it needs to be emphasised that more attention should be paid to institutionbuilding and reconstruction work than simply to ending
the gunire and achieving a political settlement between
factional leaders. he importance of this in the African
context has been highlighted in several conlicts such as
in Liberia, the DRC and Sierra Leone. In the long run,
the ASF should therefore assume more and more such
mandates, as this is a prerequisite for preventing the
relapse of societies in transition into conlict.
ASF CONCEPT AND PLAN
According to Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol the ASF
‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their
countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’. As the italicised emphasis indicates, the
ASF is not the equivalent of a national army for, unlike a
national army, it is not a standing force. he standby arrangement is to be achieved on the basis of pledges from
member states and preparations by regional economic
communities (RECs) / regional mechanisms (RMs). To
this end member states identify and earmark military,
police and civilian personnel and forward their names
and details to the REC or RM. On the basis of these
pledges each REC/RM raises and prepares the regional
brigade and develops the standby roster. he RECs/RMs
then forward all the data on the capabilities they raised
and the standby roster they developed to the AU.
While part of the ASF standby arrangement, the
identiied personnel (contingents) remain in their countries of origin. his means that it is only when a decision
is made to deploy an ASF mission will they be called
up, assembled at a certain point and jointly deployed to
the mission area. However, while on standby they do
participate in various pre-deployment activities, including training and joint exercises, which are organised on a
regular basis by each REC/RM to keep them prepared for
deployment.
Another point lowing from Article 13(1) is that the
ASF is a multidimensional force. Since most conlicts
on the continent are complex and of long duration, they
call for a multifaceted approach and require capabilities
to address not only security and military aspects, but
also the political, humanitarian, developmental and
legal/institutional dimensions of the conlicts. here is
therefore a need for not only military but also police and
especially civilian components. Accordingly, in terms of
the Policy Framework, as well as the Roadmap for the
Operationalisation of the ASF (Roadmap I) the ASF is to
be composed of three components, namely a military, a
police and a civilian component.
he ASF is organised into ive regional brigades:
■
■
■
■
■
he Southern African Development Community
(SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG)
he East African Peace and Security Mechanism
(EAPSM) 23 brigade, which is known as the Eastern
Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)
he Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIG)
he North African Regional Capability (NARC)
brigade, which is known as the North African
Standby Brigade (NASBRIG)
he Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational
Force of Central Africa (FOMAC)
According to the original plan set out in Roadmap I, each
REC/RM should establish a small full-time planning
element, a brigade headquarters, and pledged brigade
units. he planning element is responsible for raising
and maintaining the pledged units, for developing the
police and civilian rosters and for making the necessary
arrangements for deployment. It is also envisaged that
every REC/RM will have to prepare, by 2010, a capability consisting of military, police and civilian elements
of about 5 000 personnel. his means that the overall
size of the ASF will have a capability of between 25 000
and 30 000.53
In view of the complex and longstanding nature
of African conlicts it is clear that the proposed force
strength of the ASF will only be adequate for one scenario 5 mission. he question is how will the ASF cope if
a number of conlicts occur at the same time, and are as
serious as those in Darfur, Somalia or the DRC? Could
the ASF be an adequate mechanism for responding to
conlicts in such circumstances?
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
7
According to the Policy Framework, the existing
strategy is that the ASF should hand over mandates and
responsibilities to the UN. his has been the case with
regard to the African Mission in Burundi and African
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), both of which were taken
over by a UN mission. It is assumed that the ASF will be
deployed for a period of 12–24 months during which it
prepares the conditions that will allow a UN mission to
take over.
his is obviously not consistent with the lot y
tasks that the PSC Protocol envisages for the ASF.
Furthermore, given the nature of conlicts in Africa, the
expectation that an ASF mission will stabilise conditions
within two years to a point where a comprehensive agreement would be signed that will allow a UN mission to
be deployed is unrealistic. If an ASF mission is to have a
durable impact for the establishment of peace and stability in the host country, it will have to be deployed for a
period of not less than ive years, which is the average
length of a mission.
It is assumed that the ASF will
be deployed for a period of
12–24 months during which it
prepares the conditions that will
allow a UN mission to take over
hree diferent time lines have been identiied for the
deployment of an ASF mission for the diferent scenarios.
In the case of Scenarios 1 to 4 the recommendation is
that deployment should take place within 30 days. For
Scenario 5, complete deployment should take place
within 90 days, while the military component should be
able to be deployed in 30 days. Finally, in the case of a
mission Scenario 6 relating to grave circumstances such
as genocide, it should be possible to deploy the Rapid
Deployment Capability of the AU within 14 days.
However, the question is whether and how it would be
possible to meet these deployment time lines given that
the ASF is simply a standby and not a standing body. In
this regard the observation made by Cilliers is instructive
worthy of full quotation:
he deployment timelines, already ambitious by any
standard, are made particularly demanding by the
multinational and standby character of the ASF. As
a general rule, the more multinational a force, the
more diicult it is to train and operate. Multinational
8
forces also take longer to deploy if not pre-assembled
at a staging area. Forces based on a single lead (or
framework) nation, or forces largely consisting of one
country’s armed forces, are much easier to maintain at
high readiness than multinational forces that require
substantial periods of collaboration and joint exercises
over several years, but do not enjoy the legitimacy and
trust that multinational forces engender. For example,
the Scenario 6 deployment of a military component
within 14 days can only be performed by forces that are
ready, assembled, fully equipped and exercised with
transport available on immediate call and with logistic
supplies pre-packed and ready for delivery by air. A
force at such a state of readiness cannot take leave or
be used for other duties, with the result that it cannot
be maintained at this level for very long and have to be
rotated at regular intervals.54
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
OPERATIONALISATION AND SUCCESS
OF THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE
According to the 2003 Policy Framework and the 2005
Roadmap, as supplemented by Roadmap II, the ASF is to
be developed in two phases by the end of 2010. At the end
of Phase II, in 2010, the ASF is supposed to be operationally ready for deployment, including for complex
peacekeeping operations and intervention in respect
of grave circumstances as deined in Article 4(h) of the
Constitutive Act.
From a practical perspective, this means that the AU
together with RECs/RMs should at the technical level
develop all policy documents and technical concepts
and institutional structures, prepare the pledged units
for deployment through training and joint exercises and
have a reasonable level of, if not all the required, infrastructural capability.55 At the political/strategic level, one
would also expect inalisation of detailed legal or policy
frameworks or guidelines on mandating authority and
the process of decision-making for the deployment of the
ASF at both AU and RECs/RMs level.56
Political and legal requirements:
mandating authority and processes
For the ASF to serve as the mechanism that in its
responses match the nature of conlicts in Africa both
qualitatively and in terms of timeliness, it is a prerequisite that the AU be vested with the necessary legal
authority. In other words, to ensure legitimate deployment of the ASF in any conlict or crisis situation the AU
needs to have a legally established mandating authority.
In Article 13 the PSC Protocol envisages that there
are two types of situation in which the ASF is to be
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
deployed. he irst relates to peace support missions and
the other concerns intervention under Article 4(h) of
the Constitutive Act. here are important legal distinctions between the two. Whereas peace support missions
are deployed in respect to conlicts of various levels of
gravity, as envisaged by ASF mission Scenarios 1 to 5,
intervention applies only with regard to speciically
deined circumstances (namely war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity) as covered by ASF mission
Scenario 6. Peace support missions are generally deployed with the support and consent of the authorities in
the host country, whereas intervention deployment is by
its nature forcible. While the purpose of peace support
missions as spelt out in the UN Charter is ‘the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security’
the grounds for intervention by the ASF under mission
Scenario 6 are what the Constitutive Act called grave
circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes
against humanity. he aim of such intervention is also
speciically preventing or stopping perpetration of such
gross international crimes as distinct from the general
maintenance of international peace and security as
understood within the framework of the UN Charter.’57
he AU needs mandating authority for deployment of
both peace support missions and intervention.
There are important legal
distinctions between peace
support missions and intervention
With regard to the six mission scenarios for which the
ASF is designed, the AU’s mandating authority derives
from at least two legal sources for Scenarios 1–5 (that is,
in cases of peace support operations). he irst source is
Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which
authorises ‘regional arrangements’ or ‘agencies’ to
deal with ‘such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action’. Within the framework of this provision the AU is a regional agency which may take such
measures as it deems necessary for the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the
UN Charter. his may include the deployment of peace
support missions (Scenarios 1–4). Moreover, Article 53
envisages that with authorisation from the UN Security
Council (UNSC), ‘regional arrangements’ or ‘agencies’
may also take ‘enforcement action’ in accordance with
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Scenario 5 ASF missions
fall in this category). he Framework Policy airms in its
statement that the AU and more speciically the PSC ‘is
a legitimate mandating authority under Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter’.58
he other and main sources of authority for the AU
are the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol. Article
9 (1)(g) of the Constitutive Act provides that one of the
functions of the AU Assembly ‘shall be to give directives
to the Executive Council on the management of conlicts,
war and other emergency situations and the restoration
of peace’. he PSC Protocol adopted within the framework of the Act establishes the mandating authority of
the AU PSC in more straightforward terms in Article
7(1), which stipulates that the PSC, in conjunction
with the Chairperson of the Commission, ‘shall … (c)
authorise the mounting and deployment of peace support
missions; (d) lay down general guidelines for the conduct
of such missions, including the mandate thereof, and
undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines’. Since the
PSC Protocol as a protocol to the Constitutive Act constitutes an elaboration or extension of the Act, its designation of the PSC, in conjunction with the Chairperson, as
the sole authority for mandating, revising and terminating peace support operations, indicates that the AU
PSC is the authority that takes decisions on the use and
deployment of the ASF for Scenario 1–5 missions.
One issue that arises in this context is the question
of whether or not the AU should seek authorisation of
the United Nations Security Council when deciding
to deploy an ASF mission. From relevant documents,
and particularly the PSC Protocol, it seems as if the AU
recognises the UNSC as the authority with the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Although it is not established as
a legal requirement for the AU, at the policy level the
Framework Policy provides that ‘the AU will seek UN
Security Council authorisation for its enforcements
action’. Indeed, so far the AU has generally and as a
matter of course sought the support of the UNSC for all
its missions and not only in cases of ‘enforcement action’.
One advantage of this is that it endows AU missions with
global legitimacy.59 his practice has also been established in part to enable the AU to access the inancial
resources of the African Peace Facility provided by the
European Union.60 Arguably, it is only where it deploys
an ASF mission with authorisation from the UNSC that
the AU may have a legally anticipated recourse ‘to the
UN to provide the necessary inancial, logistical and
military support for the African Union’s activities in the
promotion of and maintenance of peace, security and
stability in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter’.61
However, notwithstanding the policy and practice
outlined above, it is possible that there may be circumstances under which the AU may need to deploy an ASF
mission without the authorisation of the UN. his is,
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
9
for example, the case where the UNSC should decline
to give authorisation when requested to do so by the
Peace and Security Council of the AU or fails to respond
within a reasonable period of time. In such cases, except
in the case of Scenario 5 missions for which the AU
may need to obtain UNSC authorisation for legitimate
enforcement action, the AU can deploy missions based
on the authority vested in it by the Constitutive Act and
the PSC Protocol. Further, the experience of ECOWAS
in Liberia and Sierra Leone shows that even in the case
of a Scenario 5 mission, the AU may not need to obtain
authorisation before deployment but can secure post
facto authorisation of the UNSC.
It is possible that there may be
circumstances under which
the AU may need to deploy
an ASF mission without the
authorisation of the UN
With respect to Scenario 6 missions, there is only one
legal source for the AU as a mandating authority for the
deployment of the ASF, namely the Constitutive Act, as set
out in the revolutionary provision of Article 4(h), which
vests the AU with a legal authority beyond and above
that granted by the UN Charter under Chapter VIII with
regard to regional organisations.62 In this provision ‘the
AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol to the PSC broke
a new legal ground under international law. hey are the
irst legal instruments to codify the right of an intergovernmental organisation to intervene for preventing or
stopping the perpetration of such serious international
crimes that go beyond those provided for under Article
33 of the UN Charter.’63 From this perspective it would be
curious if the AU needed to request any UNSC authorisation when acting under Article 4(h). It is doubtful from a
legal perspective whether the UN can give authorisation
for the AU on a matter in respect of which it (the UN) does
not itself have authority under the UN Charter.
Of relevance to the matter of mandating authority
is the AU mandating process. If the ASF is to serve as
an efective means for the management and resolution
of conlicts, the AU needs to put in place an eicient
decision-making process for the deployment of the ASF.
his must of course be reconciled with the need for the
timely deployment of an ASF mission to ensure that such
a mission is efective in responding to conlicts in Africa.
Indeed, consistent with the types of conlict experienced in
10
Africa, the PSC protocol provides for ‘a timely and prompt
response to conlicts and crisis situations’.64 If the ASF is
to meet this requirement, there is a need for not merely a
decision-making process, but one which is eicient.
A guideline which attempted to set out an AU
mandating process that would lead to the issuance
of a mission mandate was proposed in April 2009.65
According to this guideline the process would start with
the determination that a crisis is emerging or exists
in a member country by the CEWS which, by means
of the Commissioner of Peace and Security, alerts the
Chairperson and the PSC. If the crisis escalates in the
course of taking peacemaking initiatives through the
Panel of the Wise or the Chairperson’s Special Envoy as
part of a irst efort to resolve the crisis, the Chairperson
also initiates, through the Peace Support Operations
Division (PSOD), a Conlict Management Task Force
(CMTF) in preparation for possible deployment of a
Peace Support Operation (PSO). he PSC then decides
which option to take, based on a strategic analysis by
the CMTF and the Chairperson’s recommendations,
and the Chairperson issues a directive that translates
the decision of the PSC into strategic planning guidance
for the development of the operational objectives. his
leads to the issuance of a Planning Guidance by the
Commissioner of Peace and Security to the CMTF, which
develops the initial drat mission plan in which the broad
strategic objective is translated into operational objectives in the format of a planning matrix. his is followed
by the deployment of a Technical Assessment Mission
whose report on its assessment of the situation on the
ground serves as the basis for a drat mission plan.66 he
CMTF will then drat the Chairperson’s report to the
PSC which outlines among others a drat mandate. If the
PSC approves the mandate with or without adjustments,
it will issue its decision in the form of a communiqué
that provides the legal authorisation for the deployment
of the mission and the approval of the funds required for
the implementation of the decision. In cases of a Scenario
6 mission or intervention missions under Article 4(h) of
the Constitutive Act, not all these decision-making steps
will necessarily be followed.
It should be noted, however, the process does not
end with the PSC. As provided in terms of Article 7(1)
(e) of the PSC Protocol, the PSC submits its proposal for
intervention to the AU Assembly, which is the authority
that will approve intervention, once it has determined
that grave circumstances have indeed arisen or there
is an imminent threat that circumstances arising in a
member states may warrant intervention.
As the PSC is the sole mandating authority, its
decision-making procedures and practices have a direct
bearing on ASF deployment. Article 8(1) of the PSC
Protocol provides that the PSC, like the United Nations
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
Security Council, is to be so organised that it is able to
function continuously. For this purpose, each member
state of the Council must at all times be represented
at the headquarters of the AU. he PSC should meet
at three levels, namely ambassadorial, ministerial and
heads of state and government level. he Council is
required to meet as oten as requested at ambassadorial
level but at least twice a month and at least once a year at
ministerial and heads of state and government levels.67
According to the report of the African Union Audit, ‘[i]
t is doubtful whether, given the incidence, complexity,
diversity and variety of peace and security issues on the
continent, the occasional Ministerial and Heads of State/
Government meetings allow them suicient time to delve
into issues, take informed decisions and provide the
leadership required’.68
he PSC decisions are generally based on the principle of consensus. However, in case of failure to reach
a consensus, decisions on procedural matters are by a
simple majority and substantive matters by a two-thirds
majority of members eligible to vote.69 he provisional
agenda of the Peace and Security Council is determined
by the chairperson of the council on the basis of proposals submitted by the chairperson of the commission and
member states. he inclusion of any item in the provisional agenda may not be opposed by a member state.70
To the extent that the PSC, like the UNSC, is a
political body composed of member states that pursue
their respective national interests, whether and the
speed with which the PSC decides on deployment of an
ASF mission depends among others on the interests of
and political dynamics among members of the PSC and
the strength and diplomatic skills of the Chairperson
of the PSC at the time that the issue arises. he higher
the degree of agreement among members of the PSC on
deployment of an ASF mission, the better the chance that
the PSC will come to a speedy decision and the greater
the legitimacy of such a decision and hence the mission
will be. Similarly, the nature of the mandate of the ASF
is a result of political will and compromises. Although
the decision-making process meets the requirement for
a clearly established decision-making process, it has not
been tested in practice.
One fact that does emerge is that particular attention
should be paid to proper planning. he experience of
AMIS has shown that this was one of the major factors
that limited its success.71 However, this is counterbalanced by the question of whether the amount of work
and time involved in the decision-making (planning)
process will allow the timely deployment of the ASF to
take place. his is a crucial factor for early resolution or
containment of conlicts on the continent. Clearly there
needs to be a balance between proper planning and
timely deployment of an ASF mission.
Finally, there is also the issue of political will or commitment. One of the requirements for successful peace
support operations is the degree of political support
and commitment that it receives or commands from the
mandating authority, AU member states and the broader
international community. In elaborating the norms and
establishing the institutions for efectively responding
to conlicts on the continent and more particularly
in deciding to establish the ASF, African states have
expressed their shared political and legal commitment
to take the lead in responding to conlicts, among others
by deployment of the ASF. Over and above this general
commitment, however, the AU will have to mobilise and
continuously sustain the commitment of member states
to ensure that a credible ASF mission is deployed timeously whenever a situation that warrants the deployment
of peace support missions arises. his commitment has
to be obtained in terms of not only political support for
ASF deployment (legitimacy) but also of funding and
logistics support (material support). Without this, the
ASF will have to contend with serious diiculties when
it is deployed even if the ASF were equipped with the
necessary technical and infrastructural capabilities.
Judged in terms of the track record of the PSC on
its bold engagement with many situations on the continent,72 there is reason to believe that the AU is committed
to addressing conlicts on the continent. However, this
does not necessarily translate into actual commitment by
member states of the AU with regard to personnel, material and inancial support to enable the PSC to deploy an
ASF mission, as the experience of the missions that AU
has deployed so far attests. In none of its larger missions
have authorised or required troop levels been reached.73
It is yet to be seen if the ASF concept is going to address
this. Given the economic situation of many African
countries as well as their military and personnel capabilities, it would seem likely that the ASF concept will be
unable to overcome many of these problems. Although
the ASF has the potential to contribute substantially to
addressing problems of force generation (ASF forces are
pledged before the decision for deployment), it cannot
entirely overcome the issue of capability given that the
overall force strength of the ASF is itself limited.
Furthermore, the capability of the RECs/RMs is
very uneven and there is no clarity about mandating
authority. It is also not clear if RECs/RMs are developing
a clearly deined decision-making process for an ASF
deployment. Problems in this area need to be resolved.
Technical requirements
he technical requirements for success of the ASF
include the development of and clarity on various
policy instruments and technical concepts, such as PSO
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
11
doctrine, standard operating procedures, the institution
of corresponding structures and systems at AU and REC/
RM levels, training and the building of the necessary
infrastructural capacity, as well as operational capability
such as funding.
Policy elaboration and structural development
he AU has made a great deal of progress with regard
to the elaboration of various documents and concepts.
During Phase I of the operationalisation of the ASF74
ive major policy documents were drawn up. hese cover
doctrine, training and evaluation, logistics, command,
control, communications and information systems and
standard operating procedures. hese policy documents
were adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence and
Security (ACDS) and the African Ministers of Defence
and Security (AMDS) at their meeting in March 2008.
hese documents deine the policy frameworks that
provide the technical and conceptual basis and the
regulatory setup for the operation of the ASF.
he AU has also recognised the need for elaborating
and reining further operational concepts, particularly
with regard to the rapid deployment capability, maritime
capability, formed police units and sea and air lit
capabilities. In the light of the new security challenges
arising from maritime insecurity, as witnessed along
the coastline of the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of
Guinea, maritime capability should be included in the
ASF’s repertoire. Given the gravity of the problem it
is important that maritime capability be based on a
comprehensive framework to serve as a basis for REC/
RM involvement and for determining their speciic requirements and needs. Obviously, this places additional
demands on technical expertise and maritime logistics
and infrastructure requirements. his is an area in which
technical capabilities and infrastructure would only be
developed over a long period of time.
he development of policy documents is an area in
which the AU has made remarkable progress in terms of
meeting targets. However, there are gaps with regard to
air and sea lit concepts, medical and legal matters, and
reimbursement to the Troop-Contributing Countries
(TCCs). Some of the policy documents on these areas
require further reinement, while others such as the rapid
deployment capability and formed police unit concepts
still need to be inalised.
As far as structures and systems are concerned,
the Policy Framework envisaged the development
of a strategic level management capability at AU
headquarters and at each of the RECs/RMs. Based
on the plan, both the AU and RECs/RMs have put in
place a 15-person planning element, although it is not
suiciently multidimensional.75 h is provides only a
start-up (not completed) structure or capability for
12
planning, managing and supporting ASF missions. It
serves as a permanent standing headquarters strategic
level management capability. It is expected that the
headquarters planning element will have the capacity to
plan all potential missions, including the development
of an integrated mission plan.
hese are still in the initial phase of their development, however. At present the same people are used
for the operationalisation of the ASF and for planning
actual PSOs, and the AU manages and supports current
missions on an ad hoc basis. As far as the operationalisation of the ASF is concerned, the need for a permanent and expanded capability of the planning element
at AU Commission level has been identiied. h is led
to the development of a new structure for the African
Union Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD),
which will, when fully implemented, expand the staf
of the PSOD exponentially from the present number
of 28. At REC/RM level, all regions have established
core elements of their respective planning elements,
although the civilian and to a lesser degree the police
components are not fully operationalised at either AU
or REC/RM level.
here is also a need for a mechanism for developing lessons learned and ensuring that such lessons are
integrated into the planning of future missions and
management of existing ones. No provision has been made
in existing AU ASF documents for such a mechanism.
his should be rectiied during Exercise AMANI, if not
earlier.
At both AU and REC/RM levels, the proposed
rostering system for maintaining a database on available civilian and police capability from which the AU
could recruit individual civilians and police oicers for
various ASF missions needs to be instituted and start
functioning. he contribution and role of existing nongovernmental rostering systems should also be used and
their modalities properly deined.
Command and control system
In terms of the structure and systems for the ASF the
elaboration of an efective command and control system
is an essential requirement. he AU did elaborate an ASF
command and control system as part of Phase I priorities
in the operationalisation of the ASF. Clearly, however, the
institution of an efective command and control system
requires more than mere development of the document
or the concept. he AU should recruit people with
the necessary expertise and experience as part of the
continental headquarters capability in Addis Ababa. It is
not clear if the existing recruitment measures are suitable
for attracting and retaining such people.
he AU’s peacekeeping management capability is
still being developed, and in the short term its existing
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
structure will allow it to control and command only
small missions. It may need to resort to ad hoc strategic
management capability, as it has done for AMIS and
currently for the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM), for big missions. he number of staf of the
AU PSOD is very small if one considers the tasks they
are expected to undertake for the operationalisation of
the ASF and the planning, management and support of
existing and new missions. heir multiple responsibilities militate against the AU’s ability to exercise efective
command and control over missions. It is therefore suggested that the AU employs a larger number of specialists
and experts, along with more general staf, who will be
able to provide better internal coordination and allow for
a clearer division of responsibilities. his will obviously
require additional funding for the various responsibilities and programmes.76
The AU’s peacekeeping
management capability is still
being developed, and in the
short term its existing structure
will allow it to control and
command only small missions
One issue that emerged from some of the missions
conducted by the AU are problems relating to strategic
and operational command and control, as was clear
from for example the experience of AMIS.77 h is
concerns not only problems of a clear command and
control structure but also the provision of the requisite
military specialities and technical capabilities. here is
also a need for a clear dei nition of the diferent levels of
command and control at the strategic, operational and
tactical levels.78
he AU and RECs/RMs also need to put in place the
infrastructure that will enable the diferent actors to
exercise and enforce command and control on deployed
ASF missions. As Jakkie Cilliers points out, this entails
‘the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS) infrastructure, that
would link deployed units with mission headquarters,
as well as the AU planning elements (PLANLEMs)
and regions’.79
Finally, a decision should be taken on the oicial
language for missions at the regional and continental
levels as this will go a long way towards facilitating efective command and control of missions at all levels.
Training
Adequate training is an important technical requirement
and a prerequisite for the operational readiness of the
ASF capabilities. Given that ASF brigades are constituted
of multidimensional contingents based in their countries
of origin, there is a need for continuous training at
diferent levels. Personnel that states contribute towards
an ASF capability should acquire the necessary foundation training if they are to be able to contribute to ASF
peace support operations. hey should also receive joint
training by means of exercises at both REC/RM and
continental level.
h is is not an easy thing to accomplish. It requires
a number of well-equipped, well-resourced and wellstafed training centres that can provide regional
and continental support. Although there are training
centres in the diferent parts of the continent, not all
of them have the necessary capacity to meet the ASF
training needs. All of them also need to improve their
existing infrastructure and personnel capabilities. heir
training curricula must also be revised in line with ASF
requirements. he availability of such training institutions difers from region to region and regions lacking
the necessary centres should be identiied so that
such institutions can be established where required.
A region that requires particular attention is ECCAS,
i rst because such institutions do not exist in the region
and second because there are not enough francophone
training institutions.
Much work needs to be done to standardise ASF
training within and across RECs/RMs. h is will ensure
that all the brigades adhere to the same standards and
are at the same level of technical preparedness. It is
also an important means of facilitating the interoperability of troops coming from diferent brigades. Such
interoperability is in fact one of the major challenges in
raising the regional brigades, because diferent member
states have diferent standards for operational procedures, approaches, equipment, traditions and training
backgrounds. Operationalisation of the brigades
should therefore focus on training as a means of not
only preparing the regional brigades for operational
readiness by 2010 but also to achieve some degree of
interoperability.
he regions have conducted various training activities and joint exercises. he ECCAS Brigade conducted
two map exercises in 2008 and is now preparing for its
command post and ield training exercises. EASBRIG
has conducted its map and command post exercises and
has been in the process of conducting its ield training
exercise. ECOBRIG has conducted various training
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
13
activities and command post exercises and conducted its
ield training exercise during June/July 2009. he SADC
Brigade has also conducted various exercises and planning conferences and has been preparing its command
post exercise. NARC is the newest brigade and has not
yet planned or organised training exercises.
he AU is in the process of implementing a continental training plan known as Exercise AMANI
to assess the operational readiness of the various
brigades.80 Exercise AMANI, which is being implemented with the support of the EU’s EURORECAMP,
will culminate in a command post exercise in March
2010. he activities that have been implemented as
part of the Exercise AMANI cycle since its launch in
late 2008 include a contributors’ conference (February
2009), initial planning conference (12–13 March 2009),
strategic decision-makers seminar (20–21 April) and
map exercise (31 August – 4 September 2009). Further
activities will include a political-strategic seminar, a
strategic conference, a command post exercise, and an
ater-action review conference.
The deployment and
maintenance of an efective
peace support operation also
depends on availability of the
necessary infrastructure both
for its deployment and for
an efective and successful
execution of its mandate
Infrastructure capability
he deployment and maintenance of an efective peace
support operation also depends on availability of the
necessary infrastructure both for its deployment and
for an efective and successful execution of its mandate.
Needless to say, it is of paramount importance that
the ASF has at its disposal all the necessary equipment as well as air and sea lit capabilities, ground
transportation, information systems, etc.81 he lack
of such infrastructure will not only prevent a mission
from efectively implementing its mandate but will also
undermine its ability to respond to crisis situations.
h is was aptly illustrated in the experience of the
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, as detailed by
14
its former force commander, General Martin Luther
Agwai, during an interview:
he minimum, not the ideal but the minimum … is 18
utility helicopters, and about 12 to 18 combat helicopters
that can go to do reconnaissance and other things.
As of today there is no country in the world that has
volunteered to give us that capability – zero. You must
have heard about the attack we had on our camp in
Haskanita [on 30 September 2007] when we lost 10 of
our peacekeepers. Ater the attack we wanted to go to
the area to move the injured. It took us about eight hours
because the civil pilots could not take the risks if we had
military helicopters, we would have been able to arrive
very much, much earlier, and we may have been able to
save may be one or two lives. 82
hese have been common problems in all peacekeeping
operations undertaken by the AU and sub-regional
organisations such as ECOWAS. To date, the AU and
its RECs have mounted peacekeeping operations in
Burundi, the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. While these
missions have shown the value of a quick response for
containing violence and contributing to the resolution
of conlicts, ‘the ability to implement their respective
mandates has oten been constrained by a lack of
military capabilities, insuicient resources and inadequate institutional capacity to plan, manage, deploy and
liquidate operations’.83
he AU has developed a logistics concept paper in
which it proposes the erection of one continental logistics
base and ive regional logistics depots. he continental
logistics base will provide logistics support for establishing and equipping a mission headquarters, sector
headquarters and Troop Contributing Countries/Police
Contributing Countries in the case of critical shortfalls,
and for the provision of non-military equipment and
material for Military Observers (MILOBS)/police and international and local civilian staf. However, this concept
paper has not yet become a reality and no logistics depots
have yet been established. Although certain sites have
been identiied as potential locations for the continental
logistics base, AU member states could not agree on a
particular location for political rather than technical
reasons. Accordingly, the African Chiefs of Defence Staf
decided at a meeting in May 2009 that priority should be
given to development of the ive regional logistics depots
and that the decision on the continental logistics depot
should be postponed.84
he feasibility of and necessity for six logistics depots
for the ASF needs to be addressed, among others by
considering the inancial and administrative requirements of this plan. Other questions that need to be
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
addressed include that posed by Cilliers: ‘who should
take ownership of the various logistics bases – international partners, the region, the AU or the UN? Or should
it be outsourced?’85
With respect to the development of sea and air lit
capabilities, the AU has taken certain initiatives. A
Maritime Strategic Lit Concept was developed during
a technical meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, held in
March 2009. he concept will be presented to the RECs/
RMs later during the year for their inputs and concurrence
and was to have been completed by 30 November 2009.
he Algerian National Defence Force has been requested
to develop the Strategic Air Lit Capability Concept, in
conjunction with other parties in NARC. A workshop
was held in September 2009 in Algeria to discuss this
matter. he drat concept should have been inalised by
30 November 2009. he South African National Defence
Force has also been requested to develop a road/rail strategic lit concept in conjunction with other role players in
SADC. As necessary and commendable as these initiatives
are, the issue that the AU and its RECs/RMs needs to deal
with concerns acquisition of the necessary resources and
the mechanisms for operationalising these initiatives.
deployment in, say, the ECOWAS region. his is part of
the larger issue of ownership of the regional brigades.
Operational requirements
Funding
he nature of peacekeeping operations has undergone
substantial change over the course of the past two
decades and the inancial requirements have correspondingly skyrocketed. he UN experience in Africa has
shown that peacekeeping is a very expensive enterprise.
For example, between July 2009 and June 2010, an
estimated US$5,70 billion is to be spent on the seven UN
missions in Africa.86 his means that the organisation
will spend about US$814 million on each of the missions
and an estimated US$475 million per month on peacekeeping operations in Africa.
Clearly, if the ASF was going to be operationally ready
by 2010, it will not succeed without the necessary funds
for its operations. As the AU’s limited experience with
AMIS and AMISOM amply demonstrated, one of the
challenges for an AU mission is acquiring the necessary funds for the deployment and sustainment of the
mission. his was highlighted in the recent report of the
UN Secretary-General, as follows:
The feasibility of and necessity
for six logistics depots for the
ASF needs to be addressed,
among others by considering
the inancial and administrative
requirements of this plan
he provision of the necessary infrastructure is also critical for maintaining an efective strategic level management system at the AU headquarters as well as at RECs/
RMs level. As the role expected of PSOD expands and
its staf size increases correspondingly, there is a need to
provide suitable oice accommodation, an operations
room oice and information technological equipment for
among others communication and information gathering and analysis.
At RECs/RMs level, because the regions are at diferent
levels of development and integration, it is only natural
that some regions will be better resourced and equipped.
he issue that the AU has to deal with in this regard is
whether the resources and equipment of one brigade could
be used for deploying another brigade – thus whether or
not the AU can use for example the SADC Brigade for
[T]he absence of predictable and sustainable funding
has been linked to a number of critical operational
limitations, including:
(a) he inability to reach mandated troop levels;
(b) Limited operational efectiveness owing to a shortterm focus on the availability of funding, as opposed
to a longer term strategic focus on achieving the
mandate;
(c) In the case of the African Union Mission in the
Sudan (AMIS), a diicult transition from an
under-resourced African Union operation to a hybrid
peacekeeping operation (the African Union-United
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID));
(d) An unsustainable administrative, coordination and
inancial management burden placed on a limited
African Union capacity by multiple donors’ reporting
and oversight mechanisms.87
Administrative capability
he AU faces as many, if not more, problems with regard
to inancial administration as with availability of funds
for its operations. In the irst place, the AU does not have
the necessary absorption capacity and the capacity to
shoulder the administrative burden that comes with donor
funding. As one report of the UN Secretary-General put it,
‘even if funding existed the AU does not have the capacity
to turn dollar igures into resources’.88 he experience of
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
15
AMIS showed that the AU does not have an efective and
transparent inancial administration system.89 his has led
to speculations and rumours, among others that a large
sum of money that was meant for inancing AMIS cannot
be accounted for. Obviously such rumours undermine the
ability of the AU and ASF to attract the necessary funding.
he challenge for the AU is not just one of mobilising
the required funding for its future ASF missions but also
of developing the necessary inancial administrative
and regulatory framework to ensure the eicient and
transparent management of funds. Much work needs to
be done on the modalities of channelling and administering funding for ASF missions to ensure reliable and
timely funding for operations and to ensure that funds
are channelled and administered efectively. Finally, this
should be achieved without encumbering the AU with
demanding inancial administration responsibilities. he
best approach would be that the AU develops an efective
but simple model for channelling and administering
funds which is acceptable to its partners.
Other issues that afect efective administrative capacity include the overall organisational infrastructure of
the AU, its internal working methods, rules and procedures, and decision-making mechanisms. As very little
progress has been made to improve these aspects, which
are known to be ineicient, it is to be expected that ASF
missions will in the short to the medium term be afected
by these administrative woes of the AU Commission.
The challenge for the AU is
not just one of mobilizing
the required funding for its
future ASF missions but also
of developing the necessary
inancial administrative and
regulatory framework to ensure
the eicient and transparent
management of funds
Organisational coordination
As noted above, the ASF is organised along the lines of
ive regional brigades. his means that ASF capabilities
are raised and developed by the RECs/RMs that form
16
part of the building block of the APSA. his gives rise to
political and organisational issues.
First, notwithstanding the memorandum of understanding signed between AU and RECs on their general
relationship, there is nothing that speciically regulates
their respective roles and powers with respect to the use
and authorisation of ASF capabilities. As a result, there
is lack of clarity about whether the AU needs to negotiate
with RECs/RMs on the use of the brigades that they have
raise and maintain. If that is going to be the case, there is
no doubt that it will complicate matters.90
Second, the AU should provide guidance to RECs/
RMs to ensure that the diferent brigades adhere to the
same standards and achieve the same level of readiness. Some of the RECs have a rich experience and an
advanced level of capability but others do not, and it is
not clear whether the AU is able to provide the necessary guidance to bring all brigades up to standard.
Furthermore, no efective framework or structure has
been developed to mediate an efective AU-REC engagement on ASF issues. ‘he result,’ writes Cilliers, ‘is that
the development of the diferent ASF components has not
adhered to a single coherent concept.’91
CONCLUSION
he decision to build an African peacekeeping capability
or infrastructure could not have come at a better time.
It was taken ater more than a decade of international
disengagement and UN inaction or lack of efective
involvement to restore peace in Africa. But it also came
at a time when the global agenda was dominated by the
ight against terrorism and the operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Despite the UN’s increased involvement in
many of the conlicts, most of the contributions to UN
missions in Africa have come from developing countries
and the deployment of UN missions was oten preceded
by African peacekeeping operations, which provided the
basis for deployment by the UN.92
A further complicating factor is the new UN policy of
abstaining from the deployment of peace operations until
comprehensive peace agreements have been signed.93
Although the violence continues with a resultant loss of
human lives, mass displacement and refugee lows as in
Somalia, the blue helmets will not intervene where there
is no peace. his has created a huge peace and security
gap which could result in irreversible tragedies.
Furthermore, the political processes of deciding on
UN deployment in the Security Council as well as the
technical/bureaucratic procedures of planning and deploying UN forces could take a minimum of six months.
As the experience of Darfur also shows, even ater a
mission has been approved by the Security Council, it
takes a very long time to achieve its mandated troop and
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
logistical strengths. here is therefore a need to at least
i ll the gap between the eruption of hostilities and the
deployment of UN forces. Apart from rectifying these
limitations of the international peacekeeping regime,
the concept of the ASF also endows Africa with its own
mechanism for a timely response to conlicts and for
intervention in the case of grave circumstances.
his paper examined the normative and institutional
framework of the ASF and revealed that the ASF will
be an important mechanism for responding to future
conlicts on the continent. However, whether it will prove
to be an adequate response mechanism and will fully
realise its potential will only be known once the ASF has
been deployed in a good number of cases. In this regard
the paper highlighted the limitations in the concept and
operationalisation of the ASF that militate against it as
one of the most critical response mechanisms of the AU.
At the political level there are still issues that need to
be resolved. he deployment of the ASF is not merely a
technical matter. It is in important respects a political
afair. here is a need for clarity on the role of troop contributing countries, RECs/RMs and the AU with respect
to the use of the ASF capability. he decision on the
deployment of the ASF should not be dictated by political
considerations and to advance the national interests of a
particular country. To avoid such problems regarding the
release of national contingents and regional brigades for
deployment by the AU, there should be clear guidelines
and standards of decision-making and these should be
agreed upon between the AU and RECs/RMs.
Another important issue concerns whether the AU
will be able to mobilise the necessary political will of
its member states for a timely and eicient response to
conlicts. Although African countries have in recent
years shown the political willingness and commitment
to address conlicts on the continent, there are a number
of obstacles. Furthermore, there is a need to enhance the
will of African member states to commit their personnel
and resources to AU missions in a timely manner.
he future role and efectiveness of the ASF will also
be afected by its mandate. In terms of the PSC Protocol
the ASF should be deployed with a strong mandate
which should be clearly deined and implementable. he
experience of some of the missions, and particularly
of AMIS and AMISOM, shows that this is an area that
requires improvement. First, it is imperative that missions should be assigned a robust mandate in line with
the requirements of the conlict situation. Second, the
mandate should be clear enough to prevent confusion
and divergent interpretations that could lead to inefective execution of the mission mandate. hird, it should be
emphasised that while mandating the ASF, it is imperative that the AU, in collaboration with its member states,
RECs, partners and the UN, equips the ASF with the
necessary logistics and resources. his is something that
the AU may achieve over a period of time rather than in
one go in 2010.
At the level of the AU Commission, there should
be more commitment, professionalism and leadership
for the processes of operationalisation of the ASF and
in managing and coordinating international support.
Without such commitment, professionalism and leadership, the ASF will not have coherence and an efective
strategic level management. he AU may also need to
improve its recruitment processes and working environment to attract qualiied personnel. An area that requires
a great deal of improvement is the AU Commission’s
administrative procedures, working methods and
decision-making mechanisms which are highly ineficient at present.
Given the political reality of the continent and the
known capacity and resource limitations, the major
challenge for the ASF is how to ensure that the ASF will
have the necessary funding, logistics and administrative and strategic management support. his is critical
because if the ASF is deployed to undertake complex
and multifaceted mandates without the necessary
capacity, readiness, logistics and funding, it will run the
risk of failure. ‘A failed intervention,’ warn Cilliers and
Sturman, ‘can do as much damage as failing to intervene
at all.’ he problem with failure is that it can worsen
the situation. As they rightly noted ‘an inappropriate
response to a complex emergency situation can lead to
another Somalia, where intervention took the situation
from bad to worse’.94
here is a need for increased and more formalised
collaboration between the AU and its partners – including the UN – to address these problems. In this regard,
the framework for AU support that is currently being
developed by the UN is a very commendable development, which could potentially address the AU’s inancial
as well as institutional capacity woes.95 Within this
framework, the UN is expected to provide some funding
and technical support for AU-led and UN-authorised
peace operations. However, the modalities of providing
funding for the ASF missions still needs a great deal
of work to ensure reliable and timely funding and that
the funds are channelled and administered efectively
without encumbering the AU with demanding inancial
administration responsibilities. herefore an efective but
simple model of channelling and administering of funds
should be developed by the AU.
In addition, AU member states should contribute
more resources to the implementation of the peace and
security agenda than they themselves have set up within
the framework of the APSA. In this regard one notable
development is the recent decision of the AU to double
the funds to be transferred from the AU’s regular budget
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
17
to the Peace Fund. During a special session of the AU
held in Tripoli on 31 August 2009, the AU requested
the Commission to take the necessary preparatory
steps for the increase of the statutory transfer from the
African Union regular budget to the Peace Fund from 6
per cent to 12 per cent in its Tripoli Declaration on the
Elimination of Conlicts in Africa and the Promotion
of Sustainable Peace.96 he Assembly also requested its
member states to make voluntary contributions to the
Peace Fund.
his is especially important for addressing the
challenges that the AU may face in inancing for the ASF
in the case of peace support operations undertaken with
the sole authorisation of the PSC. It also expresses in
real terms the commitment of African states to the peace
and security agenda of the AU and it increases African
ownership of the AU’s eforts for achieving peace and
security on the continent.
It is fair to say that it is only in
In the inal analysis, it should be noted that the ASF
will realise its potential only ater it succeeds in achieving
an optimal level of logistical, technical, organisational
and inancial capability. his is obviously something that
will come with time. One should therefore not expect the
ASF to have achieved its projected operational capabilities by 2010. he various brigades of the ASF and their
components will at that date still be at diferent levels of
development and readiness. he operationalisation of
the ASF would therefore continue for some time beyond
2010. It is fair to say that it is only in the medium to long
term that the ASF will be in a position to implement
the full scale of its mandate as spelled out in the PSC
Protocol. In the short term, its role in and capability and
contribution towards efective conlict management and
resolution will be modest.
NOTES
1
See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and
Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol), adopted
by the irst Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African
Union in Durban South Africa, on 9 July 2002, and entered
into force on 26 December 2009, http://www.africa-union.org/
root/AU/organs/psc/Protocol_peace%20and%20security.pdf
(accessed 13 December 2009).
2
PSC Protocol, Article 2.
3
Jakkie Cilliers, Africa in the new world: how global and
domestic developments will impact by 2025, ISS Monograph
151, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, 99–101.
4
Richard Jackson, Violent internal conl icts and the
African state: towards a framework of analysis, Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 20(1), 29-52, http://cadair.aber.
ac.uk/ dspace/handle/2160/1953 (accessed 6 May 2009).
5
Most of the conlicts that erupted during the post-Cold War
period are fought within, and not between, states and involve
state and non-state actors of various kinds. See C Clapham,
he United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa, in Mark
Malan (ed), Wither peacekeeping in Africa, ISS Monograph 36,
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, April 1999, 29; Cilliers,
Africa in the new world, 99; Festus Aboagye, Introduction:
motivations and dynamic issues of post-Cold War security
issues in Africa, in Festus Aboagye (ed), Complex emergencies
in the 21st century, ISS Monograph 137, Pretoria: Institute for
Security Studies, 2007, 1, 2–3.
6
In most African states, disease, aggravated by poverty, social
instability and lack of even basic medical facilities, represents
a far greater threat to life than armed conlicts. According to
some studies, nearly three million people die each year on the
continent from AIDS alone. See Peter Hough, Understanding
global security, London: Routledge, 2004, 154–155.
7
On the fragility of the African state see B Davidson, he black
man’s burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state, New
York: Times Books, 1992; Jackson, Violent internal conl icts
and the African state; Makwa wa Mutua, Why redraw the
map of Africa: a moral and legal inquiry, Michigan Journal
of International Law 16 (1995), 1113; Makau wa Mutua,
the medium to long term that
the ASF will be in a position
to implement the full scale
of its mandate as spelled
out in the PSC Protocol
he ASF indubitably forms an important part of AU’s
strategic response mechanisms to the conlicts and crisis
situations that the continent currently faces and will
continue to face. However, it should be emphasised that
the ASF should not be seen as the AU’s main response
mechanism. It is only one of the diferent tools that the
PSC can use for conlict prevention, management and
resolution, and it is to be used only as a last resort. As
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon aptly observed, ‘it is
important to recall that peacekeeping is part of a political
solution, not an alternative. Eforts must continue to
be made in parallel to enhance and support preventive
diplomacy, early warning, and conlict resolution and
mediation. Peacekeeping operations should only be embarked upon ater careful consideration of all available
response options and must be accompanied by a viable
political strategy and a set of clear objectives.’97 However,
in cases where the ASF is indeed deployed, it is important
that its mandate involves peace building and reconstruction, for only then will it be able to play an efective role
in establishing sustainable peace.
18
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
Putting Humpty Dumpty back together: the dilemmas of the
post-colonial African state, Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 21 (1995), 505; O C Okafor, Righting, restructuring, and
rejuvenating the post-colonial African state: the case for the
establishment of an AU Special Commission on National
Minorities, African Yearbook of International Law 13 (2005),
43; A M Abdullahi, he refugee crisis in Africa as a crisis of the
institution of the state, International Journal of Refugee Law
6(4) (1994), 562.
8
9
See O C Okafor, Re-deining legitimate statehood: international
law and state fragmentation in Africa, he Hague: Martinus
Nijhof, 2000; Richard Jackson, Africa’s wars: overview, causes,
the challenges of conlict transformation, in Oliver Furley
and Roy May (eds), Ending Africa’s wars: progressing to peace,
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 15.
Since the adoption of the AU’s Lomé Declaration on
Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 2000, there have
been more than nine coups and unconstitutional changes of
government. he irst was in Madagascar in January 2002,
followed by Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé et Principe, he Central
African Republic and Mauritania in 2003 and Togo and
Mauritania in 2005. In August 2008 there was another coup in
Mauritania, followed by one in Guinea-Conakry in December.
Madagascar experienced another unconstitutional change of
government in March 2009. Many other countries experienced
coup attempts: in 2001 there were three coup attempts in two
months in the Comoros; coup attempts led to civil war in
both Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic in 2003;
and in 2004 there were two coup attempts in the DRC. See
Jackson, Africa’s wars, 19; David Zounmenou, Coup d’états in
Africa between 1958 and 2008, African Security Review 18(3)
(September 2009), 72–73; Issaka K Souaré, he AU and the
challenge of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa,
ISS Paper 197, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009,
5–6.
10 See African Renaissance 5(3&4) (2008), Electoral violence and
post-electoral arrangements in Africa,
11 See Human Rights Watch, Bullets for each of you: state
sponsored violence since Zimbabwe’s March 29 elections, 2008.
12 See O Nwolise, Electoral violence and Nigeria’s 2007 elections,
Journal of African Elections 6 (2007), 155.
13 See K Matlosa, Managing post-election conlict in Lesotho,
Global Insight, 70 (2007), 1.
14 See Terrence Lyons, Ethiopia in 2005: the beginning of a
transition? CSIS Africa Notes 25, January 2006, www.csis.org/
media/csis/pubs/anotes_0601.pdf (accessed 17 May 2008).
15 Cilliers, Africa in the new world.
16 Jackson, Africa’s wars, 19.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 20.
19 Of the 300 000 child soldiers at present ighting in more than 30
countries around the world, more than 120 000 are in Africa.
Annup Shah, Children, conlicts and the military, 2003, http://
www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Children.asp (accessed 3
December 2009). Also see Rachel Stohl, Under the gun: children
and small arms, African Security Review 11(3) (2002).
20 See he responsibility to protect: report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 2001, paragraph
1.19, 4.
21 Examples are the civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and
Somalia.
22 he long, violent conl ict in Angola led to the displacement of
more than a third of the population. In the ongoing conlict in
Somalia the number of internally displaced persons reached
a record high of 1,42 million. See http://www.reliefweb.int/
rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EGUA-7V8MKN?OpenDocument (accessed 3 December 2009). It is believed that more than 300 000
Somali refugees crossed to Kenya, http://www.hatnews.
org/2009/08/20/unhcr-chief-visits-dadaab-draws-attention-todramatic-somali-refugee-crisis/ (accessed 3 December 2009).
23 See Ben Kioko, he right of intervention under the African
Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, International Review of the Red Cross 85 (2003),
807.
24 See A Abass and M A Baderin, Towards efective collective
security and human rights protection in Africa: an assessment
of the Constitutive Act of the New African Union, Netherlands
International Law Review 49(1) (2002), 1.
25 Fourth extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya, on 8–9
September 1999.
26 Sirte Declaration, paragraph 6.
27 See Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the
36th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000, entered into force
26 May 2001, http://mirror.undp.org/african_union_en/treaties/constitution.pdf (accessed 3 December 2009).
28 For literature on this matter, see Girmachew Alemu Aneme,
A study of the African Union’s right of intervention against
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Oslo:
Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, 2008; Jakkie Cilliers
and Kathryn Sturman, he right intervention; enforcement
challenge for the African Union, African Security Review 11(3)
(2002) http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/11No3/Cilliers.
html; B Kioko, he right of intervention under the African
Union’s Constitutive Act: from non-interference to nonintervention, International Review of the Red Cross 852 (2003);
Kithure Kindiki Intervention to Protect Civilians in Darfur:
Legal Dilemmas and Policy Imperatives, ISS Monograph 131,
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007; Abdulqawi A
Yusuf, he Right of Intervention by the African Union: A New
Paradigm in Regional Enforcement Action?, 2005 African
Yearbook of International Law 3-21, 2007.
29 Cilliers and Sturman, Ibid.
30 According to the Solemn Declaration on a Common African
Defence and Security Policy, Paragraph 6 (adopted by the
Heads of State and Government of member states of the
African Union, at its second extraordinary session held
in Sirte, Libya, on 28 February 2004, http://www.africaunion.org/News_Events/2ND%20EX%20ASSEMBLY/
Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.Af%20Def%20Sec.
pdf (accessed 3 December 2009), human security underlies
the transformation of the OAU to the AU and serves as a
foundation for the new peace and security architecture of
the AU. Unlike the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act has a
strong human rights content. Indeed, one of its objectives is to
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
19
‘promote and protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and
other relevant human rights instruments’ (Constitutive Act of
the African Union, Article 3(h)).
31 As Cilliers and Sturman, he right intervention, supra note
28, put it: ‘he absence or disappearance of a functioning
government can lead to the same kind of human catastrophe
as the presence of a repressive state. In Africa, intervention
will be needed in as many cases where a weak state is unable to
protect its citizens, as when a repressive state is unwilling to do
so or [is] itself the cause of the abuse.’
32 Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to protect: political rhetoric or
emerging legal norm? American Journal of International Law
101 (2007), 99, 100–101.
33 Adopted by the irst ordinary session of the Assembly of the
African Union in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July 2002 and
entered into force on 23 December 2003.
34 PSC Protocol, Preamble.
35 Ibid, Article 3(f).
36 Ibid, Article 4(b).
54 Jakkie Cilliers, he African Standby Force: an update on
progress, ISS Paper 160, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies,
2008, 4, http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/
i le_manager/i le_links/PAPER160.PDF?link_id=3&slink_
id=5753&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 (accessed
14 December 2009).
55 See Peace and Security Council, Peace and Security Council
Report, No 2, September 2009, 9–10.
56 Ibid.
57 See Solomon A Dersso, he legality of intervention by the AU
in case of grave circumstances, ISS Today, 24 June 2009, http://
www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=5&slink_id=7813&link_
type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 (accessed 13 December
2009).
58 See Chapter II of the Policy.
59 Dersso, he legality of intervention by the AU in case of grave
circumstances.
60 Cilliers, he African Standby Force, 8.
61 See PSC Protocol, Article 17(2).
37 Ibid, Article 4(c).
62 Dersso, he legality of intervention by the AU in case of grave
circumstances.
38 Ibid, Article 4(j).
63 Ibid.
39 Adopted at the second extraordinary session of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government of the AU, held in Sirte,
Libya, on 27–28 February 2004.
64 PSC Protocol, article 2.
40 Common Security and Defence Policy, Paragraph 13(j).
41 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 9(g).
42 PSC Protocol, article 2.
43 Ibid, Article 12.
44 Ibid. Article 10.
45 Ibid, Articles 10 and 12(5).
65 Drat Aide Mémoire, African Union Mandating Process for
Peace Support Operations, adopted in April 2009
66 he Drat Mission Plan translates the operational objectives
into an action plan for the mission as a whole and its constituent components.
67 PSC Protocol, Article 8(2).
68 African Union Audit, 98. Available at, http://staf.issafrica.org/
resources/au/index.php, accessed on (23 Nov, 2009)
47 PSC Protocol, Article 11(3).
69 PSC Protocol, Article 8(13); Rules of Procedure of the Peace
and Security Council on the African Union, rule 28, available
at http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=3893&slink_
id=3026&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3. (accessed
on 5 Nov 2009)
48 Ibid, Article 11(3).
70 PSC Protocol, Article 8(7).
49 Ibid, Article 11(4).
71 As a former AMIS oicial put it during a 2007 evaluation
seminar: ‘AMIS was never planned; it just happened.’ See
Catherine Guicherd, he AU in Sudan: lessons for the African
Standby Force, New York: International Peace Academy,
2007, 4, http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/
au_in_sudan_eng2.pdf (accessed 13 December 2009).
46 On the Panel of the Wise see Jamila El Abdellaoui, he Panel of
the Wise, ISS Paper 193, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies,
2009.
50 Ibid, Article 13.
51 Ibid, Article 13(3).
52 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African
Standby Force and Military Staf Committee, adopted by the
African Chiefs of Defence and Staf at their third meeting
held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 14 May 2003 (EXP/ASFMSC/2(1).
53 Following the decision of the May 2009 meeting of the African
Chiefs of Defence and Staf and Heads of Security to increase
the Police Standby Arrangement from 240 individual police
oicers per REC/RM to 720 and the Formed Police Units
from two to six per REC/RM, this means a total force of
about 40 000. See Johan Potgieter, Peacekeeping forces for
peace support operations in Africa, 4 August 2009, http://
www.apsta-africa.org/news/article040809.php (accessed 13
December 2009).
20
72 See Peace and Security Council Report, No 2, 18; AU Audit
report, 98.
73 See E Svensson, he African Mission in Burundi: lessons
learned from the African Union’s irst peace operation,
Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008;
A Ekengard, he African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS):
experiences and lessons learned, Stockholm: FOI, Swedish
Defence Research Agency, 2008; and C Hull and E Svensson,
he African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): exemplifying African Union peacekeeping challenges, Stockholm: FOI,
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008.
74 See Roadmap I for the operationalisation of the ASF.
The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
75 he operationalisation of the civilian component started
much later than the military at the AU and REC/RM levels.
No signiicant progress has been made with respect to the
operationalisation of the civilian component either of these
levels although the policy framework deining the roles and
structures of the civilian component has been elaborated. As far
as actual staing is concerned, no RECs/RMs or the AU, except
for EASBRICOM and ECCAS, have yet recruit civilian trainers.
Even EASBRICOM and ECCAS only have one civilian far less
than the number mandated under the Kampala Document.
76 V Holt and M Shanahan, African capacity building for peace operation: UN collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS,
Washington, DC: Henry L Stimson Centre, 2005, 68.
84 Declaration at the sixth meeting of African Chiefs of Defence
Staf and Heads of Safety and Security, adopted in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, on 11–15 May 2009.
85 Cilliers, he African Standby Force, 7.
86 See United Nations, UN peacekeeping operations, Background
note, June 2009, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.
htm (accessed 15 September 2009).
87 See United Nations Security Council, Support to African Union
peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN.
88 United Nations Security Council, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, S/2008/178, 14 March 2008.
77 See Ekengrad, he African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 40.
89 For more details on the experience of AMIS, see Ekengrad, he
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
78 Ibid.
90 Cilliers, he African Standby Force, 17.
79 Cilliers, he African Standby Force, 2.
91 Ibid, 18.
80 Charles Debrah, Developments and challenges in the
operationalization of the ASF, Powerpoint presentation at the
APSTA Seminar held at Hilton Hotel, in Addis Ababa on 8
April 2009, slides 33–34.
92 Cilliers (he African Standby Force, 7) argues that ‘[i]n a
reversal of thinking at international level, it has now become
accepted that the AU can and should deploy in advance of the
UN’.
81 On the importance of logistics and other infrastructure, see
among others J Peter Pham, Too few good men – and even
fewer supplies: the challenge of peacekeeping in Africa, http://
worlddefensereview.com/pham12067.shtml (accessed 21
March 2009).
93 See United Nations, Report of the Panel on the United Nations
Peace Operations available at http://www.un.org/peace/
reports/peace_operations/ (accessed on 9 November. 2009).
82 Quoted in Pham, Too few good men – and even fewer supplies.
83 United Nations Security Council, Support to African Union
peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN, Report of UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon submitted to the UNSC on 18
September 2009.
94 Cilliers and Sturman, he right intervention, note 28 above.
95 See United Nations Security Council, Support to AU peacekeeping operations.
96 See AU Doc SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/DECL (I)
97 United Nations Security Council, Support to AU peacekeeping
operations.
Dr Solomon A. Dersso • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010
21
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ABOUT THIS PAPER
his paper discusses on the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) with particular emphasis and critical relection on one of its components the African Standby Force (ASF).
In considering the ASF within the context of the APSA, the paper
identiies the role and place of the ASF within the African Union’s
conlict prevention, management and resolution scheme and processes. Most importantly, taking into account its mandate, its planed
structure and mode of operation, its assigned force strength and the
politico-legal, technical, infrastructural, inancial and administrative requirements for its proper functioning as well as the nature of
African conlicts, the paper critically examines the potentials and
limitations of the ASF as a critical mechanism for responding to the
demands of African conlicts. he paper concludes that although it
is one of the most important components of the APSA to be developed by the AU, since the ASF would not achieve an optimal level
of logistical, technical, organizational and inancial capability in
the short term, one should not expect the ASF to have achieved its
projected operational capabilities by 2010. Accordingly, in the short
to the medium term, its role in and capability to contribute towards
efective conlict management and resolution, particularly in large
and complex conlict or crisis situations, will at best be modest.
As a leading African human security research
institution, the Institute for Security Studies
(ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa
characterised by sustainable development, human
rights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative
security and gender mainstreaming. The ISS realises
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr Solomon A. Dersso is a Senior Researcher at the Addis Ababa
Oice of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) working with the
African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA). He holds a
PhD degree in international human rights and constitutional law
from the University of Witwatersrand. He is ailiated as visiting
professor of human rights with the Institute for Human Rights
and the Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa University and serves as an
associate researcher with the South African Institute for Advanced
Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law
Con
(SAIFAC),
C), where he serv
served as Doctoral Research fellow before
joining ISS. Solomon undertakes research
h on subjects
bj t relating
l ti to
t
constitutional law, human rights law with focus on minority rights
and institutional and policy options for the management of ethnic
conlicts and the AU Peace and Security regime.
FUNDER
FUND
his Publication was made possible
ible through funding provided
by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Afairs. In addition,
general institute funding is provided by the Governments of
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
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The role and place of the African Standby Force • ISS Paper 209 • January 2010