Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
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Social Science & Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed
Habit, custom, and power: A multi-level theory of population health
Frederick J. Zimmerman*
Department of Health Policy and Management, Fielding School of Public Health, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1772, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Available online 16 January 2013
In multi-level theory, individual behavior flows from cognitive habits, either directly through social
referencing, rules of thumb, or automatic behaviors; or indirectly through the shaping of rationality itself
by framing or heuristics. Although behavior does not arise from individually rational optimization, it
generally appears to be rational, because the cognitive habits that guide behavior evolve toward optimality. However, power imbalances shaped by particular social, political, and economic structures can
distort this evolution, leading to individual behavior that fails to maximize individual or social wellbeing. Replacing the dominant rational-choice paradigm with a multi-level theoretical paradigm
involving habit, custom, and power will enable public health to engage in rigorous new areas of research.
Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Social determinants of health
Population health
Social theory
Introduction
Thoughtful introspection suggests that we are thoughtfully
introspective. Science says otherwise. An abundance of carefully
conducted research now demonstrates that we are imperfect optimizers, slapdash rationalists. The past 20 years have seen an explosion of research in neuroscience, psychology, marketing, and
behavioral economics, all of which suggests that our minds are
more efficient than rational (Rice & Unruh, 2009). Where the
rational choice model claims that behavior is the aggregation of
individual decisions, each a thoughtfully deliberative weighing of
pros and cons, newer research shows that behavior is not reducible
to individual decisions, that decisions have momentum, and that
behavior is the accretion of patterns, not the aggregation of choices.
But if we are not careful and deliberative, if instead we are
predictably irrational, profoundly influenced by default options,
framing, and heuristics, how are we able to make good decisions at
all? How is it that, despite it all, most of our decisions are rational,
or at least rational-seeming? If we are such bad decision-makers,
why aren’t we in worse shape? This question has tremendous implications for public health (Ubel, 2009).
This paper lays out an alternative paradigm for human decisionmaking, a paradigm that acknowledges its debt to rational choice,
but is not indentured to it. This alternative paradigm locates the
genesis of thought and action in cognitive habits: clusters of cognitions that are triggered as a group by a single cuedmuch as
a musician plays a scale, not a set of individual notes. These
* Tel.: þ1 310 825 1971; fax: þ1 310 825 3314.
E-mail address: fredzimmerman@ucla.edu.
0277-9536/$ e see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2012.12.029
cognitive habits evolve over time in response to selective pressure,
and can be distorted by powerful individuals or groups (cigarette
manufacturers, soda marketers, specialty physicians) who have
a vested interest in influencing behavior. This paradigm insists on
rigorous integration of research on individual choices with scientific disciplines that model the elements of choice in its neuroscientific underpinnings as well as in its social, economic, and legal
contexts. This alternative paradigm is called multi-level theory. It
stands in sharp distinction to the pervasive paradigm of rational
choice theory.
Multi-level theory is an effort to bring theoretical thinking in the
public health upstream (McKinlay, 1975; Pearce, 1996). Upstream
from obesity lie diet and physical activity, but upstream from these
issues are territories as yet uncharted by public health, contested,
and which must be hard-fought: the realm of choice theory and,
farther still, social theory. A map of this region is essential, along
with a strategic understanding of how this terrain is controlled.
Without aggressive intellectual inroads into these areas, public
health risks being swept away in the downstream effluvium of forces
it cannot apprehend (Krieger, 2011; Mooney, 2009; Pearce, 1996).
Cognitive habits
Suppose that God had given you the task of designing a decision-making machine for his new creature, Adam. You might start
by giving Adam some likes and dislikes and a calculation engine
that tells Adam to choose the option corresponding most closely to
his preferences. His behavior is the collection of these choices, with
no correlation among choices other than that implied by Adam’s
stable preferences. Fig. 1 presents the rational-choice theoretical
model.
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F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
Fig. 1. The rational-choice theoretical model.
With this rational machine, Adam can get about in the world
and make basic choices: but not always efficiently. To begin with,
a choice at one time has no influence on a choice at another time,
and unless two decisions are exactly alike, they must be considered
separately. If Adam encounters a banana and rationally chooses not
only whether but also exactly how to eat it, the second banana he
encounters requires just as much thought.
In a better machine, though, the next time Adam sees a banana,
he ought not to start over from scratch. He ought to have learned
something from his previous encounter, and if so, he will peel the
banana now with less deliberation and greater facility. Each time
Adam both refines his approach and thinks about it less until at last
the peeling and eating of the banana become automatic, with little,
if any, conscious deliberation. Adam, to his credit, is using cognitive
habit to optimize his behavior.
Multi-level theory is a new name for a theory informed by new
science, but much of the theory is old. Over a hundred years ago,
William James included in his Principles of Psychology a chapter
devoted to habit, in which he observed that the brain is “an organ in
which currents pouring in from the sense-organs make with
extreme facility paths which do not easily disappear” (James, 1890).
Thorstein Veblen wrote extensively about habits of mind (Twomey,
1998), and the related concept of habitus is an essential component
of Bourdieu’s social theory (Bourdieu, 1992).
For these authors, habit means a full sequence of thoughts or
actions that can be triggered by a single stimulus, and once triggered,
continues to the end. The essential element of habit is accordingly
not repetition, but cohesion. A habit is a group of thoughts or actions
that hang together, not a single action that is repeated.
James, Veblen, Bourdieu and others have been joined in their
understanding of habit by modern neuroscientists, who have discovered in the basal ganglia complex webs of cognitions, triggered
by a single stimulus (Graybiel, 2008a; Graybiel, 2008b). In one
experiment, mice are placed behind a gate at the beginning of a Tmaze, and when a warning cue sounds, the gate is opened (Barnes,
Kubota, Hu, Jin, & Graybiel, 2005). As the mouse runs down the
main shaft of the T, he hears a cue indicating whether the reward is
to the right or the left. At the fork, the mouse turns and obtains the
reward. In the first trials, the mouse’s brain is highly active, but after
some time, the brain begins to learn the maze: brain activity decreases in the middle of the run, and shifts outward to the enjoyment of the reward at the end, and, eventually, to anticipation of
the reward as soon as the warning cue sounds (Fig. 2). The brain can
perform a sequence of actions without thinking about the individual piecesdonly invoking the whole. For the mice in this Tmaze, the tasks “Start”, “Cue Onset”, “Turn Onset”, and “Turn Offset” have lost their individuality as discrete thoughts: they do not
merit thinking about, and instead are part of the cohesive whole of
running the maze. For modern neuroscience, as for James, Bourdieu, and Veblen, what is important about habits is not that they are
repetitive, but that they are sequences of brain activities that have
become welded togetherdwhat the neuroscientist Ann Graybiel
calls “chunked” (Graybiel, 2008b).
For mice, cognitive habits are about fairly simple behaviors, but
for more sophisticated creatures cognitive habits can involve
complex cognitions. Say the word “confounding” to a member of
the general public and you’ll draw a blank stare. But say “confounding” to an epidemiologist, and you’ll trigger an entire set of
complex cognitions involving variables, association, causality, and
outcomes, and all of it triggered by a single cue. Psychology itself is
said to emerge from such cognitive habits (Bandura, 2006).
These habits are malleable: easy to modify, adapt, or even to
break. When the mouse’s cue indicating a right or left turn is
changed from a sound to a texture on the floor, the mouse rapidly
learns the new cognitive habit. If the reward is removed from the
end of the maze, the mouse returns to active deliberation, but if the
link between stimulus and reward is reestablished, so too is the
cognitive habit.
Cognitive habits accordingly permit learning. They are building
blocks that can be assembled in a variety of ways to create different
structures, and it is these structures that constitute our thought and
our behavior. Unlike rational choice, in which thought alone begets
behavior, in multi-level theory, thought and behavior are assembled
from cognitive habits (Bandura, 2006; Bromley, 2008; Hodgson,
2004a). The conscious brain decides to go for a run, but the unconscious brain knows how to put on shoes, walk out the door, and
choose a route: it is the unconscious brain that takes care of all the
discrete steps of the run.
In a 1965 study reported in the book Nudge (Leventhal, Singer, &
Jones, 1965; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), Yale undergraduates were
given information about tetanus, and urged to get vaccinated. Half
were asked to make explicit plans, including visualizing the path
they would take to reach the health center. Such visualization is
a kind of learning, or “chunking” of cognitive tasks, and it was
highly effective: those in the visualization arm obtained vaccinated
at 8½ times the rate of the controls. It was not about information, or
motivation, or rationality, it was the chunking together of the steps
needed for vaccination that effectively increased rates.
Rational choice misses the point that cognitive habits determine
how heavy are the costs of cognition and decision-making (Rice &
Fig. 2. Changing brain activity with learning by mice in a T-maze. Dark areas indicated highest activity. Acq ¼ acquisition stage; OT ¼ overtraining stage. Each row represents 40
trials. Source: Barnes et al., 2005.
F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
Unruh, 2009). When a set of deliberations have been encoded as
cognitive habit, they are not thought about, and therefore, not
burdensome. Habit reduces costs.
Since brain activity is valuable, the chunking together of discrete
cognitions into a cognitive habit represents efficiency in behavior
and decision-making (Desrochers, Jin, Goodman, & Graybiel, 2010).
The mouse that depends on cognitive habits runs the maze more
competently and with less thought over time. A rational mouse
would run the maze exactly the same way every time, and with
exactly the same cognitive effort. By definition, the rational mouse
would be cognitively engaged and deliberative about all the decisions in the maze. It isdperhaps ironicallydprecisely the creature of habit who learns, whose habits can become more efficient
over time.
The role of learning is one of the major differences between the
cognitive-habits model and the rational-choice model. The rationalchoice model assumes that people are “lightning calculators”
(Twomey, 1998), with a memory and decision rule. The cognitivehabits model assumes that people improve through trial and error.
A learning machine improves by making its algorithmsdits cognitive habitsdmore efficient. A calculating machine only calculates. A
learning machine learns.
Fig. 3 presents what might be called the Behavioral Economics
Theory of Behavior (with apologies to psychology, marketing, sociology, and other related fields). It shows how cognitive habits
influence not only observed behaviors, but our ways of thinking
about choices even when we make deliberative decisions. These
cognitive habits include heuristics, metaphors, rules of thumb,
cognitive frames, folk theories, and processes of social referencing,
and even incentives (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003).
In multi-level theory, observed behavior arises as much from
cognitive habits as from conscious deliberation. This process is efficient, but can go awry, as a host of recent books detail (Ariely, 2009;
Kahneman, 2011; Lehrer, 2009; Rice & Unruh, 2009; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008; Wilkinson, 2008).
These cognitive shortcomings have varieties: What we can
easily think of must be fairly common; what’s less than an anchorvalue must be fairly low; if we think it, it must be right; if we have it,
it must be good; if our friends think it, we should too; what is hard
to think about must be hard to do; and many more besides.
Yet they all can be traced to a single cause: the otherwise very
sound substitution of cognitive habits for critical thinkingdin effect,
the assumption that having seen a banana we know a plantain. This
chunking, far from representing a cognitive bias, is generally helpful.
It is wrong to imagine that we have two brainsdone intuitive, one
rational; one hot, one cold; one fast, one slowdthereby making
each of us a two-headed monster. Instead, we should recognize that
we have one brain, but its functioning is idiomatic.
Many of the most important health-related behaviors emerge
from cognitive habits: eating behaviors, physical activity, prescription adherence, smoking, drinking, aggressive behavior, injury
avoidancedthese are all worked into our daily lives in such a way
49
that we carry them out without ever giving it much thought. There
is an automaticity to these behaviors, with a particular cue triggering an entire behavioral train without engaging conscious
thought (Cohen & Farley, 2008).
Cognitive habits are drivers of behavior and shapers of thought.
They directly determine health behavior and profoundly influence
the ways we think about those health behaviors we do consciously
examine. Cognitive habits are formed early. They are laid down
beginning in early childhood, and can be changed thereafter only
with considerable effort.
Because people are learners, not calculators, the focus of both
research and policy should be placed on the learning process of the
cognitive habit modeldwhich can produce better and worse
outcomesdrather than on the decision process of the rational
choice modeldwhich by assumption cannot be improved on.
As Adam moves around his world, we learn about Adam’s
learning through science, not revelation. Our understanding of
Adam is best informed and most quickly advanced not by an almost
religious belief in Adam’s innate perfection, but in our own close
observation of his behavior. This behavior is better sometimes than
others, and changes over time.
Evolution
If you are looking for a vegetable whose preparation tries your
patience, look no further than the fava. It must be shelled twice, and
the bitter inner skin is difficult to remove. Tricks abound for making
the process easier, but even with boiling in salt water and plunging
into a cold bath, shelling favas is no one’s idea of a good time. One
San Francisco food writer, lamenting the substantial work it takes
to get a quarter-cup of usable beans concludes, “you are so sick of
them you’d rather eat a peanut-butter sandwich” (Brickman, 2011).
Is eating fava rational?
Across the Mediterranean region, fava is widely consumed and
even beloved. The preparation of fava beans has in many cultures
acquired the status of a habitdit is a set of actions that can be
engaged in as a whole, without having to think of the steps along
the way. Thinking of the process as a whole enables people to
sidestep the distracting rational questions of whether each step is
really worth it every time one prepares fava beans.
The preparation and consumption of fava beans exists as a cognitive habit at the individual level, but is also shared widely within
a social group. Like all cognitive habits, it has a distinct existence at
the neurological level, at the individual psychological level, and at
the social level.
It would be possible to measure the existence of a cognitive
habit around fava-bean preparation by measuring brain wave activity as a person prepares the beans, as with Graybiel’s mice. If
brain activity is low during preparation, then the activity has
become automatic: a set of tasks that have been chunked together
and need minimal thought to keep going, a habit. One could
measure this brain activity pattern in a large number of people, and
Fig. 3. The behavioral economics theory of behavior.
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F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
create a histogram of habit in the general population. Alternatively,
one could produce a very similar histogram simply by asking people
to self-report their degree of comfort with fava preparation on
a Likert scale. Doing so would be less precise, but far cheaper. These
two measurements occur at two different levelsdthe neuroscientific level and the psychological leveldbut they both measure
the same cognitive habit.
We could also measure the existence of cognitive habits at
the social level (Anderson, Scrimshaw, Fullilove, & Fielding, 2004).
The histograms could be described by the population mean and
standard deviation of the cognitive habit. While this summary
would again be less precise, it would be better adapted to use in
population-level theories. At this level, cognitive habits are called
custom, and include norms, common assumptions, shared values,
language and law.
Each level has its own rigor, but an essential part of this rigor is
that it can speak to the rigor of the other levels. This cross-level
compatibility distinguishes multi-level theory from rational
choice theory, because rational choice has no objective correlate in
the brain, exists only at the individual level, and cannot speak to
other ontological levels. Multi-level theory, by contrast, enables us
to more fundamentally understand the social dynamics of how
cognitive habits develop and change over time.
Cognitive habits are in no way subject to the constraints of logic.
One can reflexively choose an apple over an orange, an orange over
a banana, and a banana over an apple. One can steadfastly oppose
government deficits and equally steadfastly oppose tax increases
and spending reductions. One can go broke saving money on large
purchases. Although they are not subject to logic, cognitive habits
are subject to an equally rigorous disciplinedthat of selective
pressure. The development of cognitive habits, as well as their
refinement, pruning, and alteration, occurs through evolution,
a process that involves variation in habits, selective pressure, and
replication (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Stoelhorst, 2008).
Part of the feedback process in this evolution relies on one’s own
assessment of the value of a habit, and is one important way in
which habits are trimmed, modified, expanded, and reproduced.
Habits that are useful get used, and therefore are reinforced. Habits
that are not useful fall into disuse and in time are forgotten. Painful
habits are actively extinguished.
If this were the only way in which habits evolved, the cognitivehabit model would be similar to the rational-choice theory. What
makes the evolution of cognitive habits profoundly different is our
sensitivity to influence by others.
Selective pressure is exerted by friends, family, co-workers, and
strangers who either punish or reward actions and who either
reinforce or dissipate mental associations. This pressure can be
wholesome or hurtful. Parents who consistently say “no” to sugary
snacks before dinner extinguish over time children’s habit of asking
for them. On the other hand, children who bring raisins as dessert
in their school lunches may find that their peers make fun of their
dessertda punishment that exerts selective pressure against the
parents’ attempt to create a habit of mind in which dessert ¼ fruit.
Teenagers whose friends play sports after school come to see sports
as a natural and normative part of adolescenceda reinforcement of
the habit of mind that sports ¼ normalcy.
Selective pressure on habits of mind is exerted both consciously,
as by adults who wish children to behave in a certain way, or unconsciously, as by peers. Each “Ew!”, every chuckle, all of the
sidelong glances and subtle shifts of body language exert their own
mild but persistent selective pressure on the habits of minds of
others, in a Ouija board of social discipline.
Fava, it turns out, is an anti-malarial drug, rich in pro-oxidant
compounds that inhibit the growth of the falciparum parasite in
the blood (Nabhan, 2004). Its effects are enhanced by the addition
of certain spices, including cinnamon, nutmeg, clove, and peppers,
the ingredients in the seasoning known in Egypt as ras el hanout.
Using fava as an anti-malarial is tricky, but cultural evolution taught
Mediterranean peoples to avoid the green pods or to remove the
inner skin before eating, and gave many recipes for the safe consumption of fava. The culture of fava consumption, which is completely coterminous with the malaria parasite, is a fine example of
collective cognitive habits encoding unconscious, but valuable
knowledge.
Habits of mind are offered to us by our social environment as the
bequest of previous generations. They are a bank of wisdom, deposits of common sense and discoveries that were earned by the
toil and experience of those who lived long ago (Hodgson, 2004a).
Delicious eggplant, fava beans, tapioca, and mushroomsdall foolhardy risks long agodare ours only because of the legacy of habits
of preparation.
When it works properly, the evolution of cognitive habits reveals
the collective and historical wisdom of a social group, not only about
methods and procedures, but also about what has value (Stoelhorst,
2008). In this sense, rationality is collective, not individual (Bromley,
2006). Over time, the flow of selective pressure smoothens out the
rough edges of our imperfect thinking, making of individual predictable irrationality generally more optimal social custom.
But just as prices can be distorted, so can the evolution of cognitive habits. Just as true interests can be different from revealed
preferences, the true interests and wisdom of a group can be different from those discernible in their collective cognitive habits.
Because our cognitive habits are so susceptible to influence, it is
useful to understand how we can be led away from optimality by
those with the power to do so.
Power
If, as William Foege has written, “the philosophy of public health
is social justice” (Foege, 1987), then the analysis of population health
must be the study of power. Indeed, to ignore power would be to
ignore the most important determinant of population healthdit
would be possible, but it would be theoretically impoverished, ad
hoc, and boring. As many in public health have argued, rigorous
analyses of power are possible (Mooney, 2009; Solar & Irwin, 2010).
Just as neuroscience and psychology inform a rigorous study of
cognitive habit, a sophisticated theory of power has been developed in sociology, which can readily be applied to the analysis of
power in public health.
Power can be defined as the capacity to cause pain or pleasure to
others at relatively little cost to oneself.
This definition of power is precise enough to narrowly identify
a core construct, yet broad enough to encompass several manifestations of power. Two key elements are the identification of power
with a capacity, and the importance of relative costs in creating this
capacity.
A big fellow with a baseball bat and a small, unarmed fellow
meet in an isolated dark alley. The big fellow has power over the
small fellow by dint of his size and weapon. He does not need to use
the bat or even brandish it; his power derives from the potential
energy of the bat. Power is capacity, not use. Give the small fellow
a gun, however, and the power imbalance shifts. Power depends on
relative costs. Sweden dramatically changed the balance of power
for sex workers when it made the purchase, but not the sale, of sex
a crime. Sex workers now have recourse to the police when
a transaction goes awry, knowing that they, unlike the John, have
little to fear from the police.
Although power emerges from natural differences in advantages
(size, money, rhetorical gifts) and from technology, it is structured
and shaped by ethics and law, which strongly influence the relative
F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
costs of the use of these advantages and technology (Bray, 2010;
Bromley, 2006). Indeed, much of ethics is about creating such
scruples, so as to limit imbalances of power that would otherwise
make civilized life impossible. Where there is oversight, accountability, monitoring, transparency, and social opprobrium, power is
limited. Where there is secrecy, licentiousness, and broad legal
freedoms, power is greater.
This definition of power makes it measurable, either cardinally or
ordinally. In game theory, bargaining power is the value of the concessions one can extract by threatening to leave an agreementdand
thereby imposing costs on a bargaining partnerdrelative to one’s
own costs of leaving the agreement. In a quite different context,
Martin Luther King, Jr., had power not only because his soaring
rhetoric had the capacity to profoundly affect his listeners’ emotional
state, but also because the cost that he perceived of going to jail was
small relative to the opportunity to make his message heard.
But the most fundamental, and also the most nuanced, forms of
power are those of a parent over his child. This power can be
physical. When a toddler doesn’t want to get out of the tub at
bathtime, her mother may, after a suitable warning, gently lift her
out and begin to dry her off. The power may be rhetorical: a parent
may explain at great length why food goes in our mouths and not
over the side of the high chair. Or it may be experiential: a routine
of reading before bedtime gradually gives the child a taste for
reading, which endures so long as to become a natural part of the
child’s personality. This is power. Whatever the forms of power, it is
always directed toward the same objective: to induce in the child
an instinct for particular social behaviors. When Mom says bathtime is over, we stand up, put our feet over the side, and exit the
tub. When bedtime is announced, we put on our pajamas, snuggle
up to Dad, listen to a book and feel sleepiness arrive. Power is in no
small part the power to create cognitive habit: a series of behaviors
that are chunked together and triggered by a single cue.
Adolescents are infantilized by the power of their parents. Adults
accept it. (And grandparents, wise enough to know its limits, just
relax.) There is no state of nature, in which we are free from power.
The question is not whether we can be free from power or not, it is
whether those who influence our cognitive habits are those who
love us, or those who want our money. If nature gives us a sweet
tooth, it is our parents who give us either donuts or peaches.
Steven Lukes has identified three dimensions of power: direct
power, agenda-setting power, and power over opinions and the
framing of thoughts (Lukes, 2004).
Direct power is at play in situations of frank physical aggression.
Homicide and intentional injuries are major public health concerns,
and the leading cause of mortality and morbidity in many age
groups (Blane, Smith, & Bartley, 1990). This form of power is limited
primarily by legal means. Physicians have direct power over the
patients in their care. This form of power is limited by strict ethical
guidelines.
A second dimension of power is agenda-setting power, or the
power to allow debate over certain options and make other options
out-of-bounds for discussion. In public health, this kind of power
has been deployed to devastating effect. When a patient-outcomes
research project determined that certain commonly-used surgical
procedures are ineffective for back pain, a group of orthopedic
surgeons successfully lobbied to slash funding for the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, which had funded the research
(Deyo, Psaty, Simon, Wagner, & Omenn, 1997; Rosenstock & Lee,
2002). Since then, any attempts to use the science of effectiveness
to limit reimbursable procedures have beendfirst de facto and now
de juredoff-limits (Neumann & Weinstein, 2010).
Agenda-setting occurs at the more individual level as well. Those
who have written about structural violence point out how the set of
choices facing individuals is structured to benefit those in power
51
(Farmer, 1996, 1999; Galtung, 1969). The powerless, left to choose
within a constricted choice set, may suffer as a result (Barnes,
Hanoch, Wood, Liu, & Rice, 2012), and although their suffering is
incidental to the power dynamics involved, it is no less real. An
understanding of the importance of the choice set to individual
choices and therefore to population health has been hardwired into
public health since John Snow disabled the Broad Street pump. The
field can productively build on these insights by formally analyzing
the power that shapes both such choice sets, anddequally
importantlydpeople’s perceptions of their own choice sets.
The third dimension of power captures how power can cause
pain or pleasure to others not by making an objective change but by
making a subjective one. In this dimension power is the capacity to
change minds, making the outlandish reasonable, and the acceptable desirable.
Not so long ago it would have seemed outrageous to consume
a large soda with every meal; now it is commonplace. This shift did
not happen because a rational population suddenly came to believe
they were better off drinking soda than water or milk. It came about
because technological changes led to a massive increase in the
power of marketers to exert selective pressure on the evolution of
our cognitive habits (Zimmerman, 2011).
Rational choice theory formally denies the possibility of this
third dimension of power; behavioral economics ignores it. Multilevel theory takes an alternative approach. In recognizing both the
influence of cognitive habits on the way we think, and the influence
of power on cognitive habits, it places the full spectrum of determinants of behavior back in the realm of theoretically informed
research.
Lukes’ theory of power emphasizes three dimensions of power,
but he is clear that these are not three different types of power.
Rather, the three dimensions of power are all dimensions of the
same, unitary phenomenon. It is precisely the fact of the integration
of the three dimensions of power that makes power such an integral part of multi-level theory. Power shapes the evolution of
cognitive habits, and cognitive habits shape the ethical and legal
structures that give rise to power.
Without each of these elements, a theory of population health
looks quite different:
If there were no power imbalances, the operation of true interests on the evolution of cognitive habits would lead to
cognitive habits that are optimal, and would appear rational.
That frequently happens, but not always.
If everyone were rationaldcalculating instead of learning, and
incapable of making decisions they regretdimbalances of power would be much less important, for rational people would
find strategies to place themselves out of harm’s way.
The full multi-level theory is presented in Fig. 4. Structure is the
rules of the game, the distribution of power (or capacity to cause
pain or pleasure in others) at any given time. The powerful seek to
influence the evolution of structure: their method is to influence
our cognitive habits. Individuals have complete agency to make
their own decisions, but these decisions are structured by their
cognitive habits and by the rules of the game.
The part of multi-level theory that emphasizes cognitive habit,
custom, the role of custom in setting the rules of the game, and the
evolution in custom through selective pressure owes much to the
tradition of institutional economics, in particular the Veblen and
Commons tradition (Bromley, 2006; Dawson, 1994; Hodgson,
2004a, 2004b, 2008; Ramstad, 1991). Multi-level theory contributes to this foundation a stronger theory of power, along with
a more explicit recognition of how power can influence the evolution of custom.
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F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
Fig. 4. Multi-level theory of behavior.
The theoretical paradigm presented in Fig. 4 is an epistemological commitment. It claims not only that these are the causal
pathways of behavior, but only these are causally relevant; that’s
what makes it a theory rather than a model. The theory will no
doubt be refined in time, but though it may evolve, it may not
expanddor else it will be a different theory. The relationship of this
theory to existing conceptual models is discussed in the Appendix A.
True interests
The invocation of the capacity of power to distort cognitive
habits raises the issue of discerning true interests. If a child prefers
soda to milk, how can it be determined that this is a choice arising
from a distorted set of cognitive habits rather than from his own
natural cognitive habits?
To begin, it should be emphasized that “true interests” apply
only at a certain level of abstraction. It is reasonable to assert that
true interests prioritize health over ill-health, but it would be unreasonable to invoke true interests as a preference for apples over
oranges. This distinction may seem obvious or trivial, but some
economists have suggested that even the statement that people
prefer health to ill-health is presumptuous (Cutler, Glaeser, &
Shapiro, 2003; Finkelstein & Zuckerman, 2008).
More concretely, public health and related disciplines have
made progress in identifying true interests. First, to an expanding
extent, true interests can be directly measured in quality-of-life
work and in happiness studies. This research has revealed, for
example, that the obese suffer from reductions in subjective
quality-of-life that are at least as great as their medical morbidities
(Fontaine & Barofsky, 2001), and that greater income does not lead
to sustainable increases in happiness (Easterlin, McVey, Switek,
Sawangfa, & Zweig, 2010; Frey & Stutzer, 2002).
A second strategy to discern true interests starts by directly
examining distortions. In carefully controlled experiments,
advertising has been shown to influence food choices of participants. Presumably the food choices in the control groupdnot
subject to the self-interested manipulations of advertisingdare
closer to true interests than those in the intervention group
(Harris, Bargh, & Brownell, 2009; Harris, Pomeranz, Lobstein, &
Brownell, 2009).
Finally, a third strategy relies on what might be called “a theory
of revealed social preference,” the notion that social options chosen
in societies with minimal power imbalances are closer to individual
true preferences than those chosen in societies characterized by
large power imbalances. Political scientists have used this approach
to argue that people prefer relatively tight controls on pollution,
even where power dynamics prevent these preferences from being
voiced (Lukes, 2004).
Although none of these approaches is adequate by itself to
isolate true interests from distorted interests, taken together they
provide a sufficiently reasonable estimate of true interests to enable researchers to make useful statements about which power
structures promote true interests and which distort cognitive
habits away from true interests.
The willingness to thoughtfully engage the identification of true
interests is a tradition in public health, and a significant difference
between multi-level theory and rational choice theory, which sees
the independent identification of true interests as impossible. As
one researcher sardonically remarks, “Why let things be difficult
when, with just a little more effort, we can make them seem
impossible?” (Lukes, 2004).
Multi-level theory and rational choice theory: a tale of two
paradigms
This conceptual apparatus allows our causal maps to be more
accurate. There are two frames for decision-making, equally valid,
but unequally applicable. The rational-choice model says that we
F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
are vassals of fixed preferences, in homage to which we weigh the
costs and benefits of each option in our choice set. The habitcustom-power multi-level frame recognizes that our choices and
the preferences behind them are profoundly influenced by cognitive habits, which have an ontological existence at a social level,
called custom, and this custom evolves over time both in response
to natural selectiondtoward our true interestsdand in response to
artificial selectiondtoward the interests of power.
The differences in these paradigms have profoundly different
implications.
Rational choice narrowly examines individual choices; the
multi-level theory of habit, custom, and power focuses on
patterns of behavior. This distinction carries over to specific
disciplines. Rational-choice economics is the study of individual decisions. Multi-level economics is the study of the
economy.
Rational choice invokes the brain as a mere calculating machine; Habit and custom constitute a learning machine.
In rational-choice theory decisions are individually solipsistic;
in multi-level theory individual decisions are informed by social context.
A rational change knows no improvement. For rational-choice
proponents, as for Pangloss, all is for the best in the best of all
possible worlds. A learning machine may have imperfections,
but it can learn, and therefore improve.
In rational-choice theory only the government has potential
power, and its only power is to distort the otherwise perfect
decisions of individuals. Power is a central focus of analysis in
multi-level theory.
Both trickery and regret are formally excluded in rationalchoice theory, and any unhappiness can be laid only at the
feet of the individual who, however unlucky his circumstances
is better off than he might have been. Multi-level theory looks
for ways to change social, political, and economic structures to
better promote true interests.
Rational choice has the appeal of introspection; multi-level
theory does not.
All social theorists make epistemological commitments. If public
health does not forcefully reject the rational-choice paradigm, it
will soon find that not only its prescriptions, but its very goals, are
logically invalidated by the axioms of rational choice (Mooney,
2009; Pearce, 1996; Rice & Unruh, 2009). What, after all, is public
health if individuals are perfect choosers?
For many purposes in public health, rational choice will remain
an acceptable approximation, just as Newtonian physics remains
an acceptable approximation in modern physics. But although
classical physics can accurately predict where a cannonball will
land given its initial force and direction, it is neither correct nor
useful in guiding modern missiles to their targets. For that one
needs lasers and transistors, both of which depend on quantum
mechanics. Rational choice theory will continue to be a useful
approximation in many settings, but it must become subservient to
the more scientifically complete multi-level theory, the adoption of
which will alone permit significant advances in population health
(Mooney, 2009).
Conclusion
Conceptual models abound in public health, but conceptual
models and theory serve different purposes. While a conceptual
model taxonomizes the factors involved in a health outcome,
a theory proposes a specific causal mechanism for how these factors work. This distinction is that between nouns and verbs. We in
53
public health have better luck communicating with each and others
when we are careful and conscientious in our use of verbs. We now
have a good sense of what upstream factors influence health, but
we need a better sense of how they operate. Multi-level theory can
provide this causal insight.
Multi-level theory provides a theoretical framework that is
consistent with an emerging field of public health psychology
(Hepworth, 2004; Von Lengerke, 2006; Von Lengerke et al., 2004).
Both frameworks emphasize the role of power in shaping the
context in which health decisions are made. Multi-level theory
contributes to this earlier and more empirically developed literature by offering a specific causal mechanism for how individual
psychology evolves in response to the application of power, as well
as a fully-specified link to brain processes through its reliance on
the concept of cognitive habit. By linking these two literatures
together, each can enrich the other.
The point of multi-level theory is not to supplant previous
theoretical work, but to valorize it. What is original in multi-level
theory is not the particulars of the theory, nor any new empirical
finding, but rather the opposition of the multi-level, science-based
paradigm to the intuitive appeal of rational choice.
To assert that people are rational is to forcefully grasp the knife
at the wrong enddwith predictably bloody results. Of course
people are rationaldwe think, we deliberate, we choose carefully.
That is the beginning and end of rational choice theory. Multi-level
theory reveals how our deliberate choices are informed, constrained, and shaped both by our biology and by the social medium
in which we live. We must not seize upon an erroneous assumption
of fixed preferences and deliberative reasoning as the handle we
need to dissect the rationality of individual choices. Instead, we
must seize upon modern understandings of cognitive habit and
social forces to dissect the role of power in population health.
Appendix A offers an example.
The surprising fact is that individuals, in their imperfections, do
not decide much of their behavior. Instead, manydperhaps most,
and in some sense allddecisions about behavior are collective
decisions. And this is a good thing: it is a sign of efficiency, not
indolence; of wisdom, not folly. But because decisions are collective, we face a common threat, read in our calcifying inequality,
discernible in our ever-increasing healthcare spending, and visible
in our growing obesity. Guided by the insights of multi-level theory,
public health can map out the upstream causes of these threats to
population health, and make the downstream world a healthier,
happier, and freer one.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Tom Rice and Dan Bromley for many
fruitful discussions, and to the feedback of the Department of
Health Policy and Management Seminar at UCLA. Any infelicities
are those of the author’s alone.
Appendix A. Multi-level theory and the social patterning of
poor diet
Poor diet is one of the leading causes of poor health, which, with
lack of physical activity, leads to an estimated 300,000e400,000
deaths per year in the U.S. (Galea, Tracy, Hoggatt, DiMaggio, &
Karpati, 2011; Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004),
nearly as many as tobacco. Dietary behavior is especially obviously
dependent on habits of mind. Menu planning, shopping, food
preparation, and the act of eating, all arise as much from custom
and a reliance on social referencing, behavioral habit, and habits of
mind as from conscious deliberation and rationality. One author
refers to eating as an “automatic behavior” (Cohen & Farley, 2008).
54
F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
Behavioral economists and marketers have begun to explore the
influence of cognitive habit on eating, demonstrating, for example,
that people will eat more when in the presence of another person
who eats a lot (Cohen & Farley, 2008; Wansink, 2004); that people
will eat more when the portion size is larger (Wansink, 1996; Young
& Nestle, 2002); that people will eat differently when exposed to
the choices of others, including strangers (Ferraro, Bettman, &
Chartrand, 2009), and to the cues of advertising (Harris, Baargh,
et al., 2009). For behavioral economists, these results are curiosities of behavior that can be exploited in highly context-specific
ways to nudge people toward healthier choices, for example by
placing the healthiest foods at the beginning of the lunch line
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
For food marketers, however, people’s dependence on cognitive
habit in food choices opens the gates of power. Product placement,
aggressive marketing in schools, pouring rights contracts,
improved packaging and food product engineering, more retail
food points of sale, increased marketing at the point of saledall
these are either new or greatly expanded since 1980. It has been
argued that the tremendous increase in obesity since about 1980 is
largely due to a significant expansion in the power and scope of
food marketing (Zimmerman, 2011).
One view of this literature is to argue that eating is an automatic
behavior; people tend to be irrational, especially around automatic
behaviors; therefore of course our diets are poor. Multi-level theory
emphasizes that most if not all behavioral patterns are inflected by
power imbalances, but the question is which power matters. We
see people automatically engaging in unhealthy eating behaviors,
and erroneously conclude that the solution is to make eating less
automatic. Yet on the contrary, precisely because choosing healthy
foods is complex, the eating of healthy foods can become a norm
only if it becomes automated. If public health advocates want to
encourage healthy diets by encouraging everyone to think carefully
about what they eat at every meal, success can only ever be tragically fragile.
Multi-level theory emphasizes not only departures from what
might be considered rational choice, but also the ways in which
these departures are economically patterned and socially systematized to benefit those with power. By understanding multi-level
theory as fundamentally about the power to influence how we
think, this paradigm shifts attention away from the peccadilloes of
not-fully-rational choice and onto broad social patterns. Both
rational choice theory and behavioral economics are inadequate to
explain the rise in obesity since 1980, and unable to offer any
system-wide or whole-population solutions. Because the increase
in obesity has been highly similar for the wealthy and the poor and
across all racial/ethnic groups (Ljungvall & Zimmerman, 2012), it is
clear that whole-population solutions are required. While the
nudges proposed by behavioral economics may produce results in
small groups, they are unlikely to effect the social change required
by this epidemic. For that, an understanding of power is required. In
particular, it will be necessary to aggressively limit or tax that power itself: obesigenic food advertising and marketing (Harper &
Mooney, 2010).
A whole-population approach, by limiting the effects of power
over our food culture, also has the potential also to reduce health
disparities related to differences in diet.
Social epidemiologists have shown that obesity is more prevalent
in low-income and minority neighborhoods, and that a major contributing factor is poor diet (Dubowitz et al., 2008; James, Nelson,
Ralph, & Leather, 1997; Martikainen, Brunner, & Marmot, 2003).
One set of explanations has relied on the role of constraints: many
low-income people live in food deserts, where fresh fruits and
vegetables are not easily available (Beaulac, Kristjansson, &
Cummins, 2009); and even when they are, their cost is prohibitive
(Drewnowski & Specter, 2004; Monsivais, Aggarwal, & Drewnowski,
2010). Although such explanations have brought important perspectives to this issue, they may do more harm than good: explanations that so foreground constraints on individual choice reify the
rationalistdand individualistdtheory of decision-making.
By contrast, multi-level theory stresses structural issues that
operate at the social level. Specifically, food marketing is more
extensive in low-income and minority neighborhoods (Yancey
et al., 2009), and this marketing exerts selective pressure on the
evolution of dietary customs in these neighborhoods. This marketing is all the more effective in that people’s cognitive resources
are depleted in these neighborhoods because of the constant strain
of a vulnerable existence. When under time pressure, consumers
simplify decision-making in various ways, such as spending less
time on each piece of information and selectively attending to the
most important items (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). The fact
that cognition is a scarce resource makes the use of cognitive habits
efficient, but it also opens them up to greater manipulation when
people regularly face cognitive overload (Baumeister, Muraven, &
Tice, 2000).
These are two very different causal theories, which produce
different policy solutions: the individualist theory emphasizing
relative prices and alleviation of specific constraints, and the multilevel theory emphasizing structural approaches, for example by
limiting the marketing of obesigenic foods (Cohen, Scribner, &
Farley, 2000).
These examples raise the issue of power, which must be carefully and explicitly foregrounded. Most models of the social determinants of health refer to power in general terms, if at all. A
notable exception is the recent WHO report presenting a conceptual model of health inequalities, which laudably defines power
both thoughtfully and unabashedly (Solar & Irwin, 2010). The
report acknowledges turbulence in the literature. Many conceptions equate power with its ill effects: power is the ability to
determine the behavior of others or to alter the course of events to
suit one’s own needs. This kind of definition of power is oriented on
the observable effects of power upon others: power as the outcome
of a particular intent, and is linked to domination and oppression.
On the other hand is Arendt’s (essentially unique) conception of
power as conferred politically through collective action. Both such
definitions are too narrow to capture the full array of power that
would be recognized in public health, and both define power as an
outcome, rather than as a causal mechanism.
Multi-level theory follows Steven Lukes (2004) in avoiding these
outcome-based definitions of power. By defining power as the capacity to create joy or sadness in another at relatively little cost to
oneself, the door is left open for power to be exercised in positive
ways, ordequally importantlydfor the use of power to produce
unintended consequences with ill effects for health.
At the same time, it is important to be realistic about the uses to
which power is most often put. As the WHO report urges us to
“skepticism towards depoliticized models of empowerment and
approaches that claim to empower disadvantaged individuals and
groups while leaving the distribution of key social and material
goods largely unchanged”. Population health improvements will
often depend on changes in allocations, changes in laws, or changes
in the objectives of the powerful.
For the specific problem of poor diet, the power imbalance to be
redressed is the power of food marketers over the cognitive habits
that undergird dietary behavioral patterns. It will not be easy to
promote laws that limit obesigenic food marketing, but a failure to
do so will impair progress in dietary change, because the rise in
obesity is rooted in power.
A lot is at stake here for public health. Economists have argued
that although Americans are becoming more obese, they are
F.J. Zimmerman / Social Science & Medicine 80 (2013) 47e56
nonetheless better off for it (Cutler et al., 2003; Finkelstein &
Zuckerman, 2008). But they would, wouldn’t they? When one
embraces a rational-choice theory in which all that is chosen is
optimal, then any observed outcome must be optimal. By contrast,
multi-level theory recognizes that in its imperfections, the world as
we know it offers opportunities for improvement. Public health
seems more naturally suited to multi-level theory than to rational
choice, and if nothing else is taken from multi-level theory, the role
of power over our ways of thinking should not be forgotten.
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